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Special Issue

ON THE FUTURE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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2|2019

Dear Readers,

In 2018, at least the cinema allowed us to experience what Sub-Saharan Africa could possibly look like: paradisiacal conditions and a highly developed civilisation that uses its immense resource wealth to provide its own population with a life in freedom and prosperity and to defend this achievement from the outside world. Unfortunately, reality does not reflect the utopian conditions enjoyed by the Kingdom of Wakanda in the film "Black Panther". For many, Africa continues to be the embodiment of political crises, technical backwardness, enormous population growth, famines, and wars over raw materials.

Here, resource wealth in particular is both a blessing and a curse. For instance, China has long since discovered the region as a source of new raw materials and attempts to systematically expand its influence. For many authoritarian governments, Chinese pragmatism is an attractive alternative to Western conditionality, as Christoph Plate explains in his article.

Inadequate economic prospects, insufficient political participation, and last but not least a lack of security due to terrorism and local conflicts motivate young Africans in particular to head for Europe. It is only through development cooperation, closely meshed with foreign and security policy, that migration to the European Union can be better regulated in the future, Peter Molt believes. Security can thus be considered an important pillar of Berlin's Africa policy. In his article, Tinko Weibezahl also highlights the idea of networked security and emphasises that Germany's military involvement in Mali must address not only security policy concerns, but rule of law issues and societal problems as well.

The economic and social pressure bearing down on many African communities does not necessary result in a rejection of democracy, Simon Primus and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi argue. They paint a refreshingly positive picture with regard to the liberal democratic attitudes of African citizens based on the Afrobarometer's surveys. According to the latter, many of the continent's citizens are more open to democratic values than is frequently assumed.

Using Kenya as an example, Jan Cernicky and Antonie Hutter show how political liberty can benefit from technical progress. Young people, who dominate in numbers, have a good chance to use the internet to participate in the design of a freer, fairer society, even if free internet does not necessarily lead to more political codetermination in Africa.

Apart from the digital space, urban space and its development also poses a challenge to the continent. Tilmann Feltes takes a close look at Africa's rapidly growing urban centres. There is a danger that poverty and lack of future prospects will come to the cities, giving rise to new slums and informal settlements. Nevertheless, being centres of political involvement and power, African cities in particular have enormous potential for sustainable solutions in the development of democracy.

Finally, Mathias Kamp sheds light on another challenge for the economic future of the African continent: energy supply. He argues that the necessary African energy shift towards a low-carbon supply can succeed only if renewable energies are used intensively. Even so, the road to that success will be an extremely long one.

We should therefore not expect that the utopian, high-tech Kingdom of Wakanda will become a reality in Africa's near future. Nevertheless, innovative steps in the direction of technical development and democratisation do give us reason to hope.

I wish you a stimulating read.

Yours,



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On the Future of Sub-Saharan Africa

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Dedicated Democrats against the Global Trend?

Attitudes towards Democracy in Africa

Simon Primus / Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi

Africa contains more transitional democracies than any other world region. Could the crisis of the liberal world order draw the continent towards authoritarianism? This article suggests that Africa's democratisation may continue despite the current global trend towards illiberalism. Survey responses from 36 societies on the continent reveal a widespread commitment to the practices and principles of liberal democracy.

Africa's Democratisation and Citizen Attitudes

The global crisis of the liberal world order could become especially dangerous for Africa's historically unstable post-colonial states. Since the 1990s, most of the continent's 54 states experienced a democratic transition with the introduction of new constitutions and regular multi-party elections. The institutional change was rapid and the sustainability of Africa's democratisation is yet to be proven. Could the globally fading appeal of liberal democracy draw Africa towards a new era of authoritarianism and instability?

Indeed, recent developments on the continent hint at a democratic regression. Several democratically elected governments, including those of Zambia, Uganda, and Tanzania have started to curtail civil liberties and to systematically crack down on media houses, activists, and oppositional groups. Meanwhile, fast-growing autocratic states such as Rwanda have become more confident, openly justifying political repression by presenting a positive record in poverty alleviation and development. The negative trend observed, alongside the economic success of some authoritarian systems, has revived debates among policy makers and experts about whether liberal democracy is a viable and desirable mode of governance for African societies.[1]

A crucial factor to consider, when attempting to determine whether Africa will see a new rise of authoritarianism, is the attitudes of ordinary citizens. Citizens who support democracy and embrace democratic ideas will not only consider democratic procedures legitimate, but will also stand up against authoritarian regime change. Citizens with undemocratic attitudes may by contrast be indifferent, and even endorse the abolition of democratic liberties in situations of political or economic crises.[2]

Most experts are highly sceptical about whether Africa's citizens are dedicated democrats. Common theoretical arguments, narratives, and anecdotes suggest that African value systems rather favour strong authoritarian rule and, in some ways, contradict the principles and practices of liberal democracy. The global discussion on a crisis of liberal democracy may further fuel such tendencies and depress commitment to democracy, allowing political elites to curtail civil liberties and democratic competition without facing much resistance from citizens.

However, the traditionally negative image of democratic attitudes in Africa is not backed by new results from public opinion polls. This article summarises insights from recent Afrobarometer surveys in 36 African countries. Against theoretical expectations, we find widespread and firm commitment to the procedures and principles of liberal democracy. The figures nourish the hope that African citizens will continue to support the continent's democratisation process in spite of negative global trends.

Concerns about Anti-Democratic Attitudes in Africa

Concerns about popular attitudes in Africa are common among analysts and experts. Ethnic divisions, relatively low levels of human development, and strong communitarian values are thought to constrain the ability and willingness of people to practice democracy and to hold the powerful to account. Before turning to the actual attitudes of African citizens, we shall give a brief overview of the most common arguments.

The most widespread concern regards the role of ethnic identities.[3] The legacy of colonialism has left African states with arbitrary boundaries in which various language and identity groups are merged into single nations. The exploitative nature of the colonial state hindered the formation of national identities; colonial administrations often created or exacerbated interethnic tensions by relying on ethnic labels as a tool of political control, and favouring certain groups over others.[4] The consequences are most compellingly explained by Peter Ekeh's seminal essay on two publics,[5] which recounts that after independence, African citizens' moral values only applied to pre-colonial identity groups. In this manner, it was felt to be legitimate to rob the nation state and its offices to the advantage of one's own group. Such a primacy of ethnic over national identity constitutes a significant obstacle

Spoilt for choice: The majority of the young African population grew up in a state of law holding regular multi-party elections. Source: © Luc Gnago, Reuters.

for democratic consolidation. People who identify in ethnic instead of national terms and expect resource distribution to be driven by ethnic favouritism will find it hard to accept any but their own group in power, which implies a high risk of electoral violence and political instability.

Another common reservation regarding citizen attitudes is the low level of development of most African states. Advocates of modernisation theory argue that democratic attitudes are to a large extent a consequence of systematic socio-cultural changes brought about by human development.[6] Accordingly, better education and economic security induce people to think for themselves and to give priority to free choice, whereas low-income societies (which include most African countries) generally emphasise obedience and subordinate individual freedom to social conformity. Consequently, citizens in non-industrialised societies are expected to comply uncritically with authoritarian rule and sometimes even prefer authoritarian government and the abolition of their own civil liberties.

The modernisation view aligns well with narratives of strong communitarian values which suggest that Africans put the well-being of the community before that of the individual and that they hold extraordinarily strong social bonds with kinship groups defined by family and origin.[7] Such an emphasis on the community urges individuals to accept hierarchies and to align themselves with established structures of authority, which is why communitarian attitudes have been linked to an uncritical citizenry and a culture of silence towards dictatorship.[8] Communitarian values may, moreover, fuel personalised politics in which personal networks replace bureaucratic rules in determining who gets what.[9] Such informal distribution is not only at odds with liberal democracy's emphasis on individual rights, it also makes people dependent on the goodwill of officials, thereby further discouraging them to challenge political authority. These elements, if taken overall, suggest that populations on the continent would provide only weak support for government scrutiny or mechanisms of accountability.

Issues of ethnic identity and prejudice towards outgroups seem to clash with a positive attitude towards democracy.

A final frequently discussed issue regarding Africa's political culture is a lack of tolerance towards outgroups, such as foreigners, people of different religions, and homosexuals. The image of low tolerance is partly a consequence of state-orchestrated campaigns and popular hostility against LGBT communities in Africa, which earned the continent the reputation of being one of the world's most homophobic regions.[10] Popular homophobia is often interpreted as an indicator of a larger syndrome of low tolerance towards outgroups, including foreigners and people of different religions and ethnicities.[11] A lack of tolerance would constitute another liability to democratisation. Tolerance is inextricably linked to citizen equality and the protection of minorities.[12] State-orchestrated discrimination against outgroups is, moreover, a well-established tool of authoritarian regimes to deflect pressures for more political freedom.[13]

Taken together, the points above draw a relatively grim picture regarding the willingness and ability of African citizens to practice and promote democracy. Strong ethnic identities might be a constant liability to peaceful elections. In addition, Africans may generally prefer authoritarian rule and subordinating themselves uncritically to political authority, as modernisation theory and narratives of communitarian values suggest. Finally, low tolerance towards outgroups could further weaken the basis for democratic cooperation, and provides a threat to minorities.

However, fortunately, there are reasons to question this worrisome assessment. Narratives such as ethnic divisions and communitarian values cite historical conditions, but African statehood has transformed in recent years. The majority of Africa's young population has been born

and raised in constitutional states with regular multi-party elections. Some scholars promote a learning hypothesis according to which the practice of democracy – even if it is flawed – gradually leads to pro-democratic attitudes.[14] If this is true, it is reasonable to expect a democratisation of Africa's political culture after 30 years of democratisation. An accurate assessment thus needs to adopt an empirical perspective.

The Views of African Citizens

For a long time, little has been known about the actual views of African citizens. Theoretical arguments hardly got tested empirically because there was simply no data to draw upon. This has changed in recent years, most of all due to the introduction of the Afrobarometer (AB). The AB is a pan-African, non-partisan research network conducting surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and other related issues. Since 1999, the AB has conducted 145 surveys in 36 countries and has changed how researchers conceive of African politics.

Democratic attitudes are a good example of how the emergence of African survey data challenges conventional wisdom. In fact, most concerns about undemocratic attitudes are not backed by the responses of ordinary people. This is illustrated below by recent results from the sixth Round of the AB, which interviewed 53,935 citizens from 36 countries between 2014 and 2015. The samples are nationally representative[15] and altogether summarise the views of more than three-fourths of the continent's population.[16]

The article presents summary statistics based on the weighted samples of all 36 countries. Such a general overview of 36 African societies is contentious. The continent's 54 states may have much in common regarding their historical trajectory of state formation but there is considerable diversity in many other respects, e.g. wealth, religion, ethnic composition. In the case of political attitudes, it is nonetheless reasonable to infer some aggregate statements because most of the results are relatively unambiguous and coherent across countries. To keep the paper straightforward, we do not show country-level results but discuss deviant cases in the text.

Ethnic vs. National Identities

To start with, do public opinion data back the claim that Africans identify primarily as members of ethnic groups, and hardly at all with their respective nation states? The AB asks respondents to choose whether they identify more with their nation, or with their ethnic group. The results given by Figure 1 reveal remarkably strong ties with the national community. A clear majority (81 per cent) of respondents say they identify at least equally with the nation state, including 38 per cent who identify as nationals only. Just ten per cent rank ethnicity before nationality: four per cent of which identify only in ethnic terms and six per cent of which identify more with their ethnic group than with their nation. The figures indicate that African citizens have embraced the idea of a national community. Ethnic identities continue to play a role, at minimum for those 53 per cent who do not feel national only, yet the national identity is overwhelmingly acknowledged. Hence, there is little reason to doubt that Africans can overcome primordial group rivalries and cooperate in a democratic nation state. This holds true for all 32 countries where the question has been asked. The highest share of respondents who rank ethnicity before nationality was found in Uganda, and is still as small as 18 per cent.

Commitment to Democratic Institutions

Another assumption is that Africans may actually prefer strong, authoritarian leadership over democratic institutions. To verify this claim, Figure 2 presents AB's central indicators on demand for democracy.[17] The figures show strong support for democratic institutions: Two-thirds of the sample (67 per cent) say "democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government". Respondents, moreover, show little tolerance for alternative forms of government. 73 per cent reject military rule; 78 per cent, one party rule; and 78 per cent, presidential dictatorship without elections and parliament.

Dedicated democrats should simultaneously prefer democracy and disapprove of all three alternatives. If only those citizens are considered who express pro-democratic attitudes on all four items, the figure falls to 43 per cent. This seems relatively low, but there are significant cross-country differences. Especially the Arab countries in our sample (Egypt, Sudan, Algeria) but also some Sub-Saharan societies (Mozambique, eSwatini, and Madagascar) fall sharply below the average with less than 25 per cent dedicated democrats. This being said, many countries markedly surpass the continental average with clear majorities who prefer democracy and reject all forms of non-democratic governance.[18] In most countries, the number of people with a firm commitment to democracy is thus sufficiently high to expect that a considerable share of the citizenry will demand democracy and oppose any attempt at authoritarian regime change. Moreover, further research has illustrated that this popular demand for democracy does in fact indicate a desire for democratic procedures, and is not merely a reflection of economic expectations associated with the word "democracy".[19]

Fig. 1: Ethnic vs. National Identity in 32 African Countries 2014/2015 (in Per Cent)



Source: Own illustration based on Afrobarometer Round 6, in: http://afrobarometer.org [10 Dec 2018].

Demand for Accountability

Africans might prefer democratic institutions, but will they also call for accountability? Even within a democratic institutional framework, there is a worrisome trend of African rulers evading accountability through the restriction of civil liberties. The modernisation view suggests that African citizens may accept such processes apathetically because social values discourage challenging political authority. So, what are the views of Africans towards mechanisms of political accountability?

To gauge popular demand for accountability, the AB includes a number of questions asking respondents to choose one out of two statements. Both sound favourable, yet one puts the emphasis on accountability, whereas the other points to the efficiency of unaccountable governance. For instance, respondents choose between (1) "Too much reporting on negative events, like government mistakes and corruption, only harms the country" and (2) "The news media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption". Figure 3 presents the proportion of respondents who opt for the pro-accountability statement on four such items. In the first three cases, clear majorities favour strong accountability: 69 per cent declare the media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption, 67 per cent state that the President must always obey the laws and the courts, and 53 per cent say citizens should hold the government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions come about more slowly. However, only 28 per cent say the opposition should monitor and criticise the government, whereas a majority wants it to cooperate. The control function of the opposition is thus not well-acknowledged. Nonetheless, the overall image indicates a great deal of support for democratic accountability and does

Fig. 2: Demand for Democracy in 36 African Countries 2014 / 2015 (in Per Cent)



Source: Own illustration based on Afrobarometer 2016, in: https://bit.ly/2hmYhG7 [10 Dec 2018].

not back the view of a culture of political apathy. The results are relatively coherent across countries with few outliers who show a notably lower demand for accountability. Among them are the Arab countries Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria, but also some Sub-Saharan societies, such as Mozambique and Guinea.

The lack of tolerance towards sexual minorities in Africa is still worrying.

Social Tolerance

A final common concern about African value systems is a lack of tolerance towards outgroups, which would be in opposition to democratic citizen equality, and might be utilised by dictators so as to distract from autocratic and arbitrary governance. To investigate tolerance, the Afrobarometer asks respondents whether they would like, dislike, or be indifferent to have people belonging to certain potential outgroups as their neighbours. The reactions are displayed in Figure 4. Interestingly, we find fairly high levels of tolerance towards four out of five groups. Overwhelming majorities of more than 80 per cent would not mind living next door to people from a different ethnic group, people of a different religion, and immigrants. When it comes to people living with HIV/Aids, the number is slightly smaller – yet, on a positive note, those countries which have been worst affected by HIV crises show extremely high tolerance levels with vast majorities who would accept neighbours living with HIV. Examples include Botswana (96 per cent), Namibia (94 per cent), and Zimbabwe (94 per cent).[20] A deviating and worrisome result is, however, found regarding tolerance towards homosexuals. Across 33 countries (in Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan the question was deemed too sensitive by national survey partners), only 21 per cent would accept homosexual people as neighbours. The only positive outliers are some South African States and the islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, where about 50 per cent would not mind homosexual neighbours. In many societies, the number falls below ten per cent. Among them is Uganda, for which it is very well documented how President Museveni sought to evade accountability pressures through a state-orchestrated campaign against sexual minorities.[21]

Fig. 3: Demand for Accountability in 36 African Countries 2014 / 2015 (in Per Cent)



Source: Own illustration based on Afrobarometer Round 6, in: http://afrobarometer.org [10 Dec 2018].

Concern about homophobia is thus certainly justified, especially if it is misused as a tool to deflect pressures for a more open political space by authoritarian leaders. This last point notwithstanding, the prior claim of generalised low social tolerance levels in Africa is clearly unfounded. Most outgroups are, on the contrary, well accepted.

To summarise, we find little support for common narratives of undemocratic political attitudes in Africa in our survey data. Ethnic identities may continue to play a role in African politics, but they are by no means the primary category of identification nowadays. Similarly, the modernisation view that low-income societies generally fail to develop democratic mass attitudes is not backed by the data. Although people in more developed settings (educated, urban) exhibit somewhat more democratic attitudes,[22] macro-level low-development does not seem to prevent the emergence of critical, autonomous, and tolerant citizens. The cross-country distribution of democratic attitudes rather lends support to a learning process, evident in the fact that societies with a more democratic recent history also tend to show stronger democratic attitudes.[23]

All in all, the views of ordinary citizens reveal a remarkably democratic African political culture. Identification with the nation state is widespread, national majorities prefer democracy, endorse strong accountability, and show high tolerance towards outgroups. Theories of political culture generally regard it as sufficient when a critical proportion of the citizenry are dedicated democrats.[24] The share of pro-democratic citizens in most African states is certainly above the threshold to ensure that societies accept democratic procedures and exert effective accountability.

The findings from the Afrobarometer give hope that new African democracies will resist the crisis of the liberal world order and continue on their way towards democratisation. Although political elites may feel encouraged by the global trend to curtail liberal democracy, the strong democratic commitment of citizens constitutes a hurdle for authoritarian-minded elites, which are likely to face protests and popular disapproval if they try to roll back democratic freedoms.

Africa's Political Culture: Pro-Democratic Attitudes and Civic Action

The crisis of the liberal world order is particularly dangerous for Africa's nascent democracies. An emerging democracy needs dedicated democrats in order to survive. Citizens need to accept the rules of the game, hold the government to account, and – if necessary – defend civil liberties.

Common narratives suggest that the value systems of African societies fail to promote such virtues, and, consequently, that the crisis of the liberal world order might further depress popular commitment to democracy on the continent.

Yet, the public opinion data presented in this paper draw a different picture. Responses by ordinary Africans to Afrobarometer surveys from 36 countries reveal widespread commitment to democratic core principles. This includes identification with the nation state and a preference for democracy over other systems of governance. Most encouragingly, the surveys indicate that people endorse mechanisms of accountability: Majorities support government scrutiny by journalists, courts, and citizens, even if it means less efficient governance. Finally, tolerance towards most outgroups is high.

Only a few details tarnish the overall pro-democratic pattern. The control function of opposition parties is not well-acknowledged; most citizens rather want the opposition to cooperate than to challenge the government. A second concern is widespread hostility towards homosexuals, which may be further emotionalised by authoritarian leaders. It should also not remain unmentioned that, although the results are generally fairly coherent across the 36 states, some countries systematically deviate. Countries repeatedly found amongst those with least democratic attitudes are, in particular, Arab countries (Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria), and some Sub-Saharan states (Madagascar, Mozambique, eSwatini).

However, most societies show a pro-democratic political culture. Moreover, recent events illustrate that these attitudes also lead to political action. In Uganda, journalists, bloggers, and citizens withstand increasing repression by long-term leader Museveni and continue to voice their opinions.[25] In Tanzania, civil society organisations stand up against the detainment

Fig. 4: Tolerance in 33 African Countries 2014 / 2015
Number of Respondents Accepting Neighbours Unconditionally (in Per Cent)



Source: Own illustration based on Afrobarometer 2016, in: https://bit.ly/2d5fRZW [10 Dec 2018].

Election ink: A substantial part of African populations calls for democratic forms of government and rejects an authoritarian shift in politics. Source: © Finbarr O'Reilly, Reuters.

of, and threats made towards, opposition groups, journalists, and social media activists under President Magufuli.[26] In Burkina Faso, where a popular uprising in 2014 toppled the 27-year dictatorship of Blaise Compaoré, citizens have cultivated a culture of protest and regularly take to the streets to demonstrate for various issues.[27] Meanwhile, in Africa's more established democracies, peaceful turnovers via the ballot are becoming more common. Gambians unexpectedly voted out long-term ruler Yahya Jammeh in 2016, despite a tightly restricted public sphere. Weeks later, Ghanaian voters dismissed President John Mahama due to an exceptionally poor developmental record. Most recently, in April 2018, Sierra Leoneans, for the first time in their history, recalled the ruling party. The tightly contested election remained peaceful despite relatively strong ethnic linkages of the two major parties and a history of ethnic conflict.

Overall, the results nourish hope that Africa's democratisation will continue even if liberal democracy's universal appeal diminishes. Africa's political culture seems quite favourable for future democratic gains and it can be expected that opposition leaders, social activists, and ordinary citizens continue to press for democratic reform. The prevalence of a democratic political culture does not, however, guarantee democratic consolidation. In some countries, for instance Cameroon, Rwanda, and Togo, political elites are still highly reluctant to relinquish authoritarian control.[28] Generally, the short supply of democratic politics fails to satisfy the expectations of citizens in many African

states.[29] Hence, most societies still have a long way to go before they become full democracies. A crucial factor on this road could be the solidarity of international donors and policy makers, who should be reminded by the figures presented here that the acceptance of authoritarian rule is against the preferences of most African citizens.

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Dr. Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi is the Executive Director of Afrobarometer and retired Professor of Political Science at the University of Ghana.

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15 Countries and survey dates: http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/survey-schedule [10 Dec 2018]. The Afrobarometer data is gathered through face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice. The samples are nationally representative: All respondents are randomly selected; every adult citizen has an equal chance of being selected. The methodology yields country-level results with a margin of sampling error of +/- 2% (for a sample of 2,400) or +/- 3% (for a sample of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.

16 The demographic statistics of the 36-country sample reflect Africa's transformation processes, as well as the continent's developmental challenges. More than 50 % of respondents are younger than 35. Males and females are equally represented. 40 % live in urban settings. About 20 % have no formal education, whereas another 20 % received post-secondary education (university, vocational training). 30 % report frequent food shortages, whereas 70 % say they never or rarely went without enough food. 38 % say they have a regular cash income. 20 % use the internet regularly, about 70 % listen to radio news on a daily basis.

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23 Bratton, Michael / Mattes, Robert 2001, n.19

24 Almond and Verba (1962), for instance, acknowledged that a democracy can flourish with a mix of passive and active citizens. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) focus on societal mean values which imply that considerable minorities may deviate in an overall pro-democratic political culture. See: Almond / Verba 1963, n.2; Inglehart / Welzel 2005, n.2.

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Source: © Johnny Miller

International Reports (Ai) 3|2018, pp. 38 – 50

Mastering Africa's Urban Future

Safety and Security in South African Cities

Tilmann Feltes

Africa's future is urban and young: by 2050, the urban population in Africa will have tripled, the number of African megacities will have quintupled, and the majority of urban residents will be young people. For some, these are the most important challenges surrounding development in Africa. Challenges such as safety and security will become an important focal point. How can crime prevention and policing keep apace with such challenges? Will Africa's urbanisation translate into a better and economically prosperous life for all, or is it set to increase violence, inequality and mal-administration?

Introduction

Over the last few years, the focus of debates around population growth and urbanisation and their implications for the governance sector has been shifting from Asia to Africa. The reason for this is that the predicted population growth rates for Africa will outnumber the Asian rates by far (see fig. 1 and 2). The overall political management of the challenge facing African urbanisation is also crucial for Europe given the geostrategic positioning of the African continent, and the interdependencies in the fields of economy, stability, food security and migration.

Urbanisation is a defining phenomenon of the 21st century. In 2050, two thirds of people will live in cities and the urban population on the African continent will have tripled. The majority of this growth will take place in low- and middle-income cities especially in Africa and Asia, while the share of growth in Europe, North America, and Oceania is projected to decline steadily until 2050. The London Urban Age Project calculated that in Lagos, for example, the population grows by over 58 people per hour. In comparison, London's population grows by only six in the same time. With an annual population growth rate of almost four per cent, Africa has the fastest urban population growth rate worldwide, and cities such as Ouagadougou, Bamako, Addis Ababa and Nairobi are currently growing at an even faster rate than that.[1]

However, the process of urbanisation is not only accompanied by new chances and opportunities, but also by enormous challenges. Thus, the level of crime is especially high in metropolises: in a period of five years, 70 per cent of city dwellers in Africa fall victim to a crime.[2] To secure ongoing important technological, economic, urban, environmental, and socioeconomic changes, safety and security need to be improved in African cities, because safety and security play a key role in economic upsurge and democratic development in these societies.

Currently, the question of sustainable urban development is also on top of global development agendas such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the UN-Habitat's African Urban Agenda. The newly established goal no. 11 of the SDGs ("making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable") in particular, shows that urban development is now perceived as an individual topic in its own right, as opposed to one that is cross-sectional. This promises new impetus for much-needed future urban investments and policies, which are vital, especially in Africa.

This article addresses the political relevance of urbanisation, the role of youth and related political fields such as urban governance and safety and security in African cities. The main focus will lie on urban violence and crime prevention as the most innovative and creative policy approaches are currently being developed in this field.

Fig. 1: Africa's Urban Population Growth 2016 to 2050



Source: Own illustration based on UN DESA 2014, n.1.

Urbanisation and Economic Growth

Research from the World Bank indicates that poverty is increasingly urbanising, some experts are warning about the "planet of slums".[3] The reality is that the majority of urban residents in Africa today live in slums or informal settlements, lack access to basic services, and have an informal low-wage and low-productivity job at best. Even though future improvements in urban poverty reduction are likely, the sheer number of poor (as well as young) people who lack access to the job market as well as to other social, medical or educational services is expected to increase dramatically. The African Economic Outlook 2016 predicts that Africa's slum population will grow in line with the cities' population growth. Hence, the aim of minimising urban slum populations will not be realised if the current development of the majority of countries will be followed.[4] Even though such structural hurdles are highly problematic for the economic development of cities, urbanisation also goes hand in hand with great transformative potential. Cities have been and still are engines of economic growth, innovation and productivity. Yet in Africa, urbanisation takes place against the background of urban poverty and inequality.

Furthermore, structural change that takes too long severely hampers the adjustment of the cities and their administrations to the demographic development: there are still too few educational and job opportunities, social and healthcare provisions as well as the supply of electricity and water are inadequate in many places and young people's future prospects are bleak.

Yet, more and more people, and especially the youth, migrate to the cities. Dissatisfaction with the public administration, as well as the implications of climate change and armed conflicts are the main reasons for rural exodus in Africa.[5] In contrast to Latin America, Africans do not necessarily expect better employment opportunities from migrating to urban areas. New studies show that there is no real correlation between economic development and urbanisation in African cities as we witnessed in Europe decades ago.[6]

According to the African Economic Outlook, this "urbanisation without growth" has exacerbated the consequences of slow structural transformation in Sub-Saharan cities. Economic development continues to positively effect urbanisation dynamics, but urbanisation in Africa can and does happen in contexts of low growth. At the moment, we can see this for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the GDP per capita is one of the lowest worldwide yet the country's level of urbanisation is in line

Fig. 2: Shares of World Urban Population between 1960 and 2050 (in Per Cent)



Source: Own illustration based on UN DESA 2014, n.1.

with the African average. In addition, countries such as Angola and Nigeria are urbanising rapidly despite the lack of industrialisation. These factors need to be analysed and monitored more carefully since we know that there is a link between urbanisation and development; higher levels of urbanisation generally correspond to higher levels of human development and vice versa (measured according to the HDI; see fig. 3). This is not yet the case for Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, given the high official und even higher unofficial unemployment rates, the informal labour market in particular should be the focus of attention and subject to more in-depth analysis in regards to urban planning and development measures.

The Aspects of Safety and Security[7] – Reasons, Challenges and New Crime Prevention Strategies

Violence and Crime in Cities

Incidents of violence, whether politically or criminally motivated, are common in Africa's cities, and, just like poverty, violence is urbanising. Crime rates are always much higher in large cities than in small cities or rural areas.[8] In most cases, urbanisation is inextricably linked to high rates of crime and violence due to factors such as extreme inequality, unemployment, inadequate services and health provisions, weakening family structures, less social ties, social exclusion and overcrowding.

While the rising number of armed conflicts in the area compels many to move to the city, unplanned, overcrowded settlements can also become a breeding ground for violence.

Furthermore, armed conflicts, riots and protests are on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, too. The often oppressive state responses to protests are also a problem. In South Africa's Gauteng province (home to Johannesburg and Pretoria), for example, people took to the streets on average more than 100 times each year between 1997 and 2016 – more often than in any other African megacity[9] region. Unplanned, overcrowded settlements populated mostly by marginalised

youth can be hotbeds for violence. Armed conflict has triggered rural-urban migration, and hence accelerated urbanisation. This is currently the case in the DRC and in Nigeria.[10]

Violence and conflicts weaken the democratic and economic development of cities and contribute to decreased levels of economic growth even of entire national economies. Conversely, there is a strengthening of local democracies and economic development if a decrease in violence, conflict and crime is achieved.

It goes without saying that private and public investors avoid high-risk districts and this negatively affects the socioeconomic stability in the country as well as the population's quality of life. Even just a perceived lack of security poses a risk to a city's sustainable development.

Safety and Security and the Youth Bulge

We refer to a "youth bulge" if at least 20 per cent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 24. This age group makes up the majority of both victims and perpetrators of crime everywhere in the world.

The role of the youth needs to be a critical focus area in light of urban demographics in Africa (see fig. 4). Africa has by far the youngest population worldwide, and younger people are generally more prone to migrate to urban areas than older ones.[11] This boosts the proportion of the working-age population in cities and potentially contributes towards economic dynamism. On the other hand, the exclusion and marginalisation of urban youth may also increase the risk of urban violence.

The role and impact of young people on democratic and participatory governance as well as on economic development and social cohesion are important for every society and any future democratic development.[12] According to some, the youth represents huge potential for the development of democracy in the future, while others are more pessimistic and correlate, for example, the numbers of young people (mainly of young men) with the likelihood of violent

Fig. 3: Levels of Urbanisation and Human Development Worldwide Represented by Human Development Index (HDI) Rating



Source: Own illustration based on UN DESA 2014, n.1.

Incendiary mixture: Armed conflicts, riots, and protests are continually on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: © Siphiwe Sibeko, Reuters.

conflicts[13] – however, the majority see a stronger link between jobs, poverty and violence. Young people without proper school education or vocational training are more likely to commit crimes due to their experienced or perceived lack of individual development perspectives. If the youth cohort is reasonably well educated but there are no jobs, this will often trigger youth protests and cities are the main locus of these protests for the most part. The well-known "Arab Spring" uprisings in 2011 exemplify these types of urban protests; we now increasingly see them in Sub-Saharan Africa, too. In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, urban youth-led protests in 2014 led to the resignation of long-term President Compaoré after 27 years in power. In South Africa, so called "service delivery protests" were shaking communities and the hegemony of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Another very prominent example are the *#FeesMustFall* student protests witnessed in South Africa over the last few years, which finally shed light on other political fields such as social cohesion etc.

This is why the youth needs to be the focus of political education measures; otherwise, social apathy, violence and crime will increase dramatically in urban areas. Young people must participate in societal debates and have a voice in the political arena. If the youth have no real voice in society, the resulting frustration could lead to a feeling of abandonment by society and easily turn into acts of violence and crime.

Fig. 4: Median Population Ages across the World



Source: Own illustration based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2011: The World Factbook 2011, in: https://bit.ly/2NgdJzz [20 Aug 2018].

Youth violence and juvenile delinquency must not be overlooked when it comes to international cooperation. It results in high economic and social expenses, alienates internal and external investors and is generally considered one of the greatest barriers to development.[14]

Crime and Violence Prevention Strategies in South Africa

Similar to other African countries, urbanisation in South Africa is striking. Whilst 52 per cent of the population lived in urban areas in 1990, 71 per cent will live in urban areas by 2030 and the figure will rise to 80 per cent by 2050 (see fig. 5). In addition to the facts already mentioned, the legacy of socially and spatially segregated urban development during apartheid plays a crucial role in South Africa.[15] Violence and crime is particularly concentrated in urban centres. The South African government has developed a comprehensive national violence prevention policy (White Paper on Safety and Security[16]); however, implementation at the local level is generally weak. The country has a very high rate of murders, assaults, rapes, and other crimes compared to most other countries. Crime rates have declined since the end of apartheid, but they remain 4.5 times higher than the global average. Unfortunately, the most recent statistics do not reflect this decline. In the last four years, the murder rate has again increased by 20 per cent and the number of armed robberies has risen by 30 per cent.[17] This happened during a period when the South African Police Service (SAPS) annual budget increased by 50 per cent. Much of this undesirable development is associated with poor political appointments, arguably due to corruption linked to former President Jacob Zuma.

Crime Prevention in Townships: Hotspot Policing and Urban Upgrading

The described decline in the murder rate over the first two decades of democracy in South Africa was primarily due to the introduction of a new series of SAPS deployment strategies, shifting the focus towards "hotspot policing" or "high density policing" operations. The

interventions exclusively focused on the townships (South African term for slums) and their micro hotspots such as hostels, shebeens (formerly illegal bars) and taxi ranks. Reasons for violent crime in these hotspots are mainly alcohol and firearms misuse combined with youth unemployment, weak social cohesion and social norms that are generally pro-violence.[18] During such operations, SAPS members are usually heavily armed and deployed in battle-ready formations with the support of armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. Soldiers from the South African National Defence Forces accompanied the police on many occasions. Today, SAPS have taken a more passive and complementary approach of policing urban hotspots and is moving towards community-oriented policing models, as is the case in many other countries[19]. In the meantime, community policing has become the organisational paradigm of public policing in South Africa.

"Through community policing governments can develop the self-disciplining and crime-preventive capacity of poor, high-crime neighborhoods. Community policing incorporates the logic of security by forging partnership between police and public. Since safety is fundamental to the quality of life, co-production between police and public legitimates government, lessening the corrosive alienation that disorganizes communities and triggers collective violence. Community policing is the only way to achieve discriminating law enforcement supported by community consensus in high-crime neighborhoods."[20]

In one of the largest and most violent townships in Cape Town, Khayelitsha, local gang wars led to the temporary shutdown of all services delivered by the city. During a six-month gang war between the "Taliban" and the "America" gangs, schools were closed, transport was disrupted and health services in the community were restricted. As this example shows, crime is concentrated at specific places.[21] Against this background, in June 2018, South Africa's Police Minister announced a new "high density stabilisation intervention" to tackle crime. It includes the deployment of desk-based police officials to the streets, particularly in "identified hotspots" such as Khayelitsha in accordance with the new community-policing philosophy.

"Hotspot policing" is now more often accompanied by social and infrastructural crime prevention initiatives. In Khayelitsha, for example, a municipal project called "violence prevention through urban upgrading" aims at reducing crime, increasing safety and security and improving the social conditions of communities through urban improvements and social interventions. The project is unique in South Africa insofar as it integrates all forms of development concepts and not only the infrastructural upgrading of urban spaces. The project combines planning efforts by state institutions with community-based protection measures.[22] This includes the connection of policy frameworks, private security and neighbourhood watches and the easier access to justice for residents. The project uses different lenses, one being the "Situational Crime Prevention" approach. The term "Situational Crime Prevention" seeks to reduce crime opportunities by increasing the associated risks and difficulties, and reducing the rewards. It is assumed that positive changes

Fig. 5: Percentage of Urban and Rural Population in South Africa, 1950 to 2050



Source: Own illustration based on South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), press release, 22 Jan 2013, in https://bit.ly/2Ogmclg [20 Aug 2018].

in the physical environment ultimately lead to safer communities. Changes such as the "Active Boxes" are to be used for this approach: small three-story buildings with offices, a caretaker flat and a room for community patrollers, which are built close to the so-called "micro hotspots" mentioned above. Another aspect of the project is the "Social Crime Prevention" approach that promotes a culture of lawfulness, respect and tolerance. The project focused on three areas: patrolling street committees combined with law clinics (in collaboration with the University of the Western Cape) and social interventions such as school based interventions and early childhood development programmes. The implementation is carried out using local resources to the greatest extent possible. A visible decrease in crime rates in Khayelitsha has been recorded since implementing the project.[23]

Crime Prevention in South African Suburbs: "Cities Without Walls"

The counterpart to the townships are the wealthy South African urban suburbs. South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, which these suburbs are a clear reflection of. At the end of apartheid, South African suburbs began to change dramatically due to rising levels of crime. This is a typical development for countries in transition, particularly for those characterised by high levels of inequality. With the demise of the inner city economy, businesses, together with their employees, started to move to the South African suburbs. The inner cities were abandoned and crime became widespread. With the associated increase in the fear of crime, suburb dwellers built higher walls and erected electrified fences as a means of defence. This initially attracted strong support and was bolstered by the private security industry, which had vested interests in the rush to monitor space and strengthen security.[24] To date, high walls have become a part of the accepted landscape in the suburbs. New research has now proven that crime rates are higher in places surrounded by walls. Solid, high walls are viewed as an obstacle to policing. Furthermore, natural surveillance by neighbours and patrolling by police or private security services are limited. Against this background, another interesting approach to tackling crime is the "city without walls" project in Durban where academics, the Metropolitan Police Service, private security firms and local communities are working together. The objective is to challenge the perception of crime, to eliminate the perception of alienating neighbours and to strengthen a cohesive community. Selected communities and institutions such as the *Alliance Française* and the *Goethe-Institut* participated in the project, tore down their own walls and replaced them with transparent and see-through fences or walls. Research proved this pilot project to be successful: lower crime rates and more social cohesion in the pilot communities.[25]

State police violence destroys trust in the police and democracy, as well as leading to a vicious circle of violence, aggression, prejudice, and mutual rejection.

Conclusion: The Increasing Power of Cities and the Role of Good Governance

Cities in Africa have enormous potential to provide sustainable solutions to democratic development. They offer opportunities for social and economic change and participation but also for political protest and unrest. Unfortunately, there is a lack of urgency within local city governments to respond to these challenges and opportunities in a sustainable way. The reasons for this is that they are overloaded with other (social) problems, they are not equipped with the necessary knowledge and infrastructure, and they are not willing to see this problem for what it is: a real danger to future democracy in Africa.

Source of unrest: African cities have enormous potential for change. However, this potential often erupts into violence as well. Source: © James Akena, Reuters.

To ensure that the upcoming urbanisation translates into sustainable development, African cities need far better urban planning and innovative approaches that are tailored to their diverse urban realities. It is therefore important to foster political education and participation among the youth. Civil society together with political parties or political movements can be strong drivers to initiate dialogue and create platforms for engagement; however, local governments and authorities must always be involved in such processes.

The community-based and people-oriented policing approaches in South Africa after the end of apartheid are an example of how modern African administrative structures could be organised. On the other hand, exaggerated state police violence as we saw recently in the DRC, Ethiopia, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (against the political opposition) destroys trust in the police and in democracy, as well as leading to more aggression and a vicious circle of violence, aggression, prejudice and mutual rejection. As a result, young people develop deep hatred against the police and hence against the state itself. In this context, policing needs to be seen as a diverse and pluralistic set of social acts. Policing in African cities will also need to stay abreast of the current technology (including social media) for an enhanced system of communication with the local communities and to therefore improve safety in urban spaces.

The newly established "Institute for Global City Policing" at University College London stated

that due to the emerging political power held by city governments, they should be seen as "change agents of the future" or "change drivers". In some cases, megacities now already have more political power than nation states. In light of this, local governments become more important in the national and the global context and need to be included as new players in global political processes such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), the UN Conference of the Parties (COP) or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). There are now a number of African cities in which progressive or liberal non-socialist opposition parties govern big cities or capitals (e.g. Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Harare, Bulawayo, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa) and they often follow different approaches in regard to tackling crime and violence than those of the national government. Such a "non-coherence" of urban policies and strategies could hamper urban development, but in other scenarios, this could also lead to more independent and stronger cities. As regards security aspects, it could also lead to a stronger politicisation of the urban space including more political protests, demonstrations and violence.

The legitimacy of the people charged with ensuring public safety and order must be a key emphasis in every security environment. Increases in the numbers of police or the army should not necessarily be the best antidotes to insecurity. Military and policy exchange, as currently witnessed between the Colombian and Nigerian or the Malian and European police forces concerning the fight against local terrorism for example, together with an extended community or partnership approach would be an ideal framework for tackling future challenges. The root causes of crime and the foundations of law and order can be found in the nature and dynamics of each society. Therefore, a democratic, equal and just society based on the rule of law is the best prevention of crime and violence. Recently, the African continent presented an abundance of positive examples. Decade-long leaders or dictators together with their patronage networks were urged to step down to make room for political improvements and reforms (e.g. in Angola, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, South Africa, The Gambia) – these positive developments will trickle down to the local level and guide the process for more people-centred local government politics.

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1 Cf. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) 2014: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, New York. Attention should be paid to the general limitations of data and projections on Africa's population. It should be noted, for example, that some of the former UN-Habitat projections were generally highly overestimated in this regard.

2 Cf. UN-Habitat 2014: The State of African Cities. Re-Imagining Sustainable Urban Transitions, Nairobi, p. 276. Cf. UN-Habitat 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security. Global Report on Human Settlements, Nairobi, p. 55.

3 Davis, Mike 2011: Planet of Slums, London.

4 Cf. African Development Bank (AfDB), OECD and UNDP 2016: African Economic Outlook: Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation, p. 154, in: https://bit.ly/2mIh6mI [20 Aug 2018].

5 Cf. The World Bank 2016: From Oil to Cities: Nigeria's Next Transformation, p. 63.

6 Cf. Jedwab, Remi / Vollrath, Dietrich 2015: Urbanization without Growth in Historical Perspective, in: Explorations in Economic History 58, Oct 2015, pp. 1–21.

7 In cities, the terms "safety" and "security" are often used interchangeably. In fact, in the German language, there is only one word (*Sicherheit*), and there is no differentiation. However, from a political and academic point of view, it makes sense to differentiate: Security is seen as the degree of resistance to, or protection from, harm. It applies to any vulnerable and/or valuable asset, such as a person, dwelling, community, item, nation, or organisation. Security is the more technical term, covering the process of establishing safety and relying on those, who are responsible for ensuring safety (such as the police). Safety is the condition of being protected from harm or other non-desirable outcomes, health and well-being included. Safety has both emotional and physical attributes, and both must be ensured for safety to be achieved. Safety is more than not being victimised and it implies the feeling of being safe. The existence of both safety and security is important because they are interrelated and the absence of one necessarily affects the other.

8 Cf. Glaeser, Edward / Sacerdote, Bruce 1999: Why Is There More Crime in Cities?, in: Journal of Political Economy 107: 6, Dec 1999, pp. 225–258.

9 Megacities have a population of ten million inhabitants or more. At the moment, these are Lagos, Cairo and Kinshasa. In 2030, Johannesburg, Luanda and Dar es Salaam are predicted to become megacities. In 2040, Abidjan and Nairobi and in 2050, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Dakar, Ibadan and Kano might join.

10 In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern part of the country has displaced an estimated 1.5 million people since 2009, and the city population of Maiduguri may have more than doubled to two million due to the influx of internally displaced people.

11 Cf. Fox, Sean 2011: Understanding the Origins and Pace of Africa's Urban Transition, Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper 89, Sep 2011, p. 5.

12 Cf. Feltes, Tilmann 2013: Youth and Democracy: The Promotion of Youth Participation by the International Community in Kosovo, Security and Human Rights, Vol. 24, pp. 195–209, in: https://bit.ly/2xWchMR [20 Aug 2018].

13 Cf. Abbink, Jon / van Kessel, Ineke 2005: Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa, Leiden; Wagschal, Uwe / Metz, Thomas / Schwank, Nicolas 2008: Ein "demografischer Frieden"? Der Einfluss von Bevölkerungsfaktoren auf inner- und zwischenstaatliche Konflikte, in: Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 18: 3, pp. 353–383.

14 Cf. Imbusch, Peter 2010: Jugendgewalt in Entwicklungsländern. Hintergründe und Erklärungsmuster, in: Imbusch, Peter (ed.): Jugendliche als Täter und Opfer von Gewalt, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp. 11–90.

15 Since violence and crime in South Africa are often a reflection of structural economic and socio-political exclusion, we also have to keep the historical context of policing during the apartheid time in mind. During the 1980s, one of the South African Police's responses to the growing political resistance in the country was to hastily train groups of men who were deployed as the "municipal police" to combat the so called "anti-apartheid terrorism" in the slums or townships. However, there was only little accountable control and thus, they gained a reputation for high levels of excessive and inappropriate use of violence against almost exclusively black South Africans. Many of the now 25 to 35 year-old black South Africans experienced police violence when they grew up. On top of that, witnessing violence as a child renders a person 3.8 times more likely to be a victim of domestic violence later in life, while living in a high crime neighbourhood makes someone 5.6 times more likely of the same.

16 Civilian Secretariat for Police Service 2016: White Paper on Safety and Security, in: https://bit.ly/2Okz4MB [20 Aug 2018].

17 Cf. South African Police Service (SAPS) 2016: Crime Situation in South Africa, p. 10, in: https://bit.ly/2tgDoC8 [20 Aug 2018].

18 Cf. Seedat, Mohamed et. al. 2009: Violence and Injuries in South Africa: Prioritising an Agenda for Prevention, in: The Lancet 374: 9694, 25 Aug 2009, pp. 1011–1022.

19 Cf. Department of Safety and Security 1997: A Manual for the South African Police Service, Apr 1997. Cf. Rosenbaum, Dennis 1994: The Challenge of Community Policing. Testing the Promises, SAGE Publications, London / New Delhi.

20 Bayley, David / Shearing, Clifford 1996: The Future of Policing, in: Law & Society Review 30: 3, pp. 585–606, here: p. 604.

21 In the most recent crime statistics, two per cent of police stations recorded 20 per cent of all murders in the country, and 13 per cent recorded 50 per cent of murders.

22 Cf. Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) 2015: A Manual for Safety as a Public Good, in: https://bit.ly/2N7YOXS [28 Sep 2018].

23 Cf. Graham, Alastairs / Giles, Chris / Krause, Michael / Lange, Udo 2011: Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, South Africa: Achievements and Trends of a Bilateral Financial Cooperation Programme, in: Coeser, Marc / Marks, Erik (eds.): International Perspectives of Crime Prevention. Contributions from the 3rd Annual International Forum 2009, Godesberg, pp. 67–90.

24 In South Africa, the number of private security companies doubled in the last twelve years and now outnumbers the public police force by three to one.

25 Cf. Marks, Monique / Overall, Chris 2015: Breaking Down Walls: New Solutions for More Effective Urban Crime Prevention in South African Cities, in: Stability. International Journal of Security and Development 4: 1, p. 3, in: https://bit.ly/2NLON8b [28 Sep 2018].

Source: © Kumerra Gemechu, Reuters.

International Reports (Ai) 4|2018, pp. 87 – 101

A Huge Leap to Green Energy?

The Future of Africa's Energy Supply

Mathias Kamp

The lack of a comprehensive, reliable electricity supply is a central obstacle to economic development on the African continent. In times of climate change, the question arises as to how the rising energy demand can be met in a climate-friendly manner. Western partners, and Germany in particular, emphasise the opportunities presented by renewable energy, but some African countries are already making plans for nuclear alternatives – and fossil fuels are by no means out of the running, either.

More than 600 million people in Africa live without electricity. If one excludes the better-off North African states, only just over 40 per cent of the population has access to electricity. Even within Sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant differences: For example, while more than 80 per cent of South Africa's population has access to electricity, in crisis-ridden Southern Sudan the figure drops to nine per cent. Despite the heterogeneity, it can be generally stated that Africa (south of the Sahara) lags far behind the rest of the world in terms of electricity supply. This is also reflected in energy consumption, of course: nowhere is per capita electricity consumption lower than in Africa – it is only about one third of the global average.[1]

Among the causes, in addition to chronic shortages due to insufficient capacity, is a high degree of supply system inefficiency and enormous inequality of distribution. Almost everywhere, rural areas are particularly affected by energy poverty. But even where electricity is available, supply is often unreliable, and outages are shockingly frequent. Many African cities experience outages regularly. The hum of diesel generators, employed for self-sufficiency, is a sound that is familiar to all..

Energy Poverty Despite Wealth of Resources

The shortages cannot be explained by a lack of resources: The continent is blessed with raw materials – and new sources of these materials are being discovered on a regular basis. Africa is a supplier of energy raw materials to industrialised countries, and its potential for renewable energy is unrivalled by any other region of the world. But in the past, the vast potential has hardly been exploited. The reasons for this are numerous: financial obstacles, wrong development and economic policy priorities, and a focus on export-oriented investment; but also inefficient management, corruption, and poor governance have all played their role. As a result, there is a lack not only of large-scale power plants that could produce the required amount of electricity, but also of corresponding power grids that would be required for comprehensive supply. The actual amount of energy that arrives at the African end user is usually far below both the theoretical and actual production volume. One reason for this is that obsolete, poorly maintained plants, and fuel shortages, result in lower production than is actually technically possible. Another reason is that there are considerable losses in power transmission, due to poor grid infrastructure, damaged power lines, and energy theft. Last but not least is the problem of power plant inefficiency and the dominance of fossil fuels, which make the electricity produced in Africa extremely expensive.

An analysis of the overall energy mix in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that electricity accounts for only a small percentage. By far the most frequently used energy source is conventional biomass, primarily in the form of firewood and charcoal for household cooking and for use in small businesses. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 80 per cent of the population relies on the traditional use of solid biomass. In power generation, fossil

Fig. 1: Access to Electricity in selected African Countries (in Per Cent of Population)



Source: The World Bank 2016: Access to electricity (% of population), in: http://bit.ly/2SOetPd [14 Dec 2018].

fuels dominate, primarily coal, followed by oil and gas. With the exception of hydroelectric power, renewable energies account for only a small share. However, there has been rapid growth in the last few years, and renewables also represent the greatest potential for the future.[2]

Demand is Exploding

Without new strategies and large-scale investment, the already dire situation would significantly worsen. The demand for electricity is positively exploding on the continent. The challenge is not only to overcome the current shortages, but to prepare the energy sector for both a burgeoning population and a growing economy. Nowhere else in the world is the population growing as swiftly as it is in Africa: According to UNICEF,[3] it will double by 2050 to about 2.5 billion people. At the same time, many African countries are enjoying relatively high economic growth – and there is plenty of room to grow much more. The demand for energy will grow accordingly. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)[4] predicts a tripling of electricity consumption in Africa between 2010 and 2030. A McKinsey study[5] discusses a fourfold increase by 2040, also using 2010 as a baseline and assuming a forecast supply rate of 70 to 80 per cent of the population. Supplying the entire population is likely to remain illusory for decades. A report by the Africa Progress Panel considers it will only be possible, given current development rates, to supply the entire African population with electricity by 2080.[6]

Energy for Development

Energy poverty and a lack of electricity supply have a decisive impact on economic development and quality of life. They hinder productivity and mobility, and impair education, healthcare provision, and other important social services. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not just households, but also many schools and hospitals, that must manage without electricity. Important medicines cannot be refrigerated, and life-saving medical equipment cannot be operated. Lack of lighting in a house makes it hard to study after the sun goes down. Household dependence on conventional fuels for cooking results in severe health consequences due to the inhalation of smoke. According to the World Health Organisation, these consequences cause more deaths per annum than malaria and HIV/AIDS combined.[7]

Businesses currently suffer production losses and high costs for electricity, especially when operating their own diesel generators, which is often necessary. The energy deficit has a negative impact on production costs and competitiveness, thereby hampering economic growth, innovation, and job creation.

Fig. 2: Electricity Production Capacities in Sub-Saharan Africa by Fuel (2016)



Source: Own illustration based on IEA 2017, n. 8, p. 79.

Securing access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all is one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda. Beyond this direct goal, the World Bank considers access to energy to be a key factor in achieving all other SDGs. As a report by the World Bank notes, without energy supply, it is difficult if not impossible to promote economic growth and employment, overcome poverty, and advance human development. Almost three quarters of 2030 Agenda's target indicators (125 of 169) are directly or indirectly related to the issue of energy.[8]

Poverty and energy scarcity usually go hand-in-hand. A glance at the statistics reveals that the poorest countries are usually also those with the worst energy supply. While the precise causal relationships are complex and cannot always be clearly proven, numerous studies show a close correlation between energy supply or energy consumption on the one hand, and economic growth, income level, and employment rate on the other.[9] Energy is a key factor for economic transformation. Energy poverty thus represents a decisive obstacle to development in Africa.

Climate Change as a Key Factor

Africa as a whole contributes relatively little to climate change, yet African countries are especially hard hit and threatened by its consequences. This is partly due to geographical conditions, and partly because of already precarious living conditions, difficult political situations, and the correspondingly weak adaptability such conditions engender. Climate change, and its causes and consequences, must be taken into consideration in all efforts to promote economic development in Africa. The effects of climate change can have a considerable impact on development progress. Economic growth and infrastructure expansion must therefore

Goal 7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Ensure Access to Affordable, Reliable, Sustainable and Modern Energy for All

7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix

7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency

7.A By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology

7.B By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing states, and land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support

be aligned with ecological sustainability.[10] The "old" development paths of industrialised countries, with their dependence on fossil fuels, cannot serve as models.

When it comes to the transformation of the African energy sector, climate change must be taken into consideration in two respects. Firstly, the energy mix of the future should be as climate-friendly as possible. Secondly, the expected consequences of climate change must already be taken into account during the planning stage. For instance, droughts and erratic rainfall can have a severe impact on hydroelectric power generation. Investment in innovative solutions is therefore particularly important, especially in the area of renewable energies.

Opportunities for Green Energy

"The enormous demand for energy presents Africa with major challenges. But we should also perceive it as an opportunity to invest in green energy. Africa could be the first continent to be supplied entirely from renewable sources," said Federal Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development Gerd Müller.[11] This focus on renewable energies has emerged as a broad consensus among experts, and above all among Western development partners. African governments are also increasingly realising the extent of the immense potential in this area, and are ratifying ambitious plans to promote the use of these opportunities. At least 40 countries on the continent already have renewable energy targets.[12]

And indeed the conditions for using renewable energy sources are better in Africa than anywhere else. Sun, wind, and water offer an incomparably rich green energy portfolio. Experts put the capacity for solar energy at 9,000 to 11,000 gigawatts; for hydropower, at more than 350 gigawatts; and for wind energy, at more than 100 gigawatts. In East Africa, there are additional opportunities in the field of geothermal energy, estimated at 15 gigawatts. By way of comparison: The total power generation capacity of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2016 was 122 gigawatts.[13] The potential of renewable energy

sources is thus more than sufficient to cover the continent's future energy needs.[14] According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), they could provide half of Africa's electricity consumption by 2030.

In Africa, the conditions for using renewable energies are much more advantageous than for old energy sources.

However, the effective use of the renewable energy potential can only be realised if both the infrastructure and administrative framework conditions are met. This requires coherent political strategies from African governments to support infrastructure expansion, provide targeted incentives, attract investment, and create a transparent, reliable regulatory framework.

From an economic perspective, renewable energies are becoming increasingly attractive and competitive as compared to conventional energy sources. Technology costs are falling steadily, especially in the solar sector.[15] In addition, rapid innovation leads to ever greater efficiency and reliability. This applies not only to energy generation technology, but also, for example, to energy storage systems.

Beyond falling costs, there is a whole range of other factors that favour renewable energies. For instance, their applications are far more flexible. In addition to grid feed-in, they offer decentralised supply solutions – from photovoltaics to small home systems. This makes them especially well-suited to the swift, cost-effective electrification of rural areas. They also contribute to the improvement of energy security, especially for countries that currently rely on fossil fuel imports. Studies that examine domestic African economy discover increased potential for local innovation and value creation. Renewables provide more local entrepreneurial prospects and a greater employment effect than fossil fuel energies do. Another significant advantage is that, as compared to coal and nuclear power plants, projects in the area of renewable energies have relatively short lead times and can be implemented comparatively quickly[16] – with the exception of large-scale hydropower projects.

Large Hydropower Projects

While the share of wind and solar energy is still very low, hydropower already accounts for about one fifth of electricity generation in Africa. This represents only about ten per cent of the estimated technical potential. At full capacity, hydropower could deliver more than three times the current energy consumption of Sub-Saharan Africa.[17]

Half of the overall hydropower potential is found in the Congo. Investment in hydropower began as far back as the early 1970s with the construction of the Inga I and Inga II dams on the Congo River. A further dam, Inga III, has been in the works for a long time, but construction is delayed. Amid controversy, the World Bank withdrew from the contentious project in 2016. But other partners, including a consortium of partners from China and Spain, remain interested in the project's implementation.[18] Meanwhile, critics warn of negative impacts on people and the environment. Congo, a country tormented by conflicts and corruption, has not even been able to consistently maintain its old dams. But the grand vision goes still further: The "Grand Inga" project plan includes the construction of the "mother of all dams". Its capacity could be as much as 40 gigawatts – almost twice the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam in China, which is currently the largest in the world.[19] The implementation of this mammoth project would fundamentally change the African energy sector. But at the moment, that implementation seems very unlikely – and given the risks and anticipated side-effects, scarcely desirable.

Elsewhere in Africa, however, things are progressing more rapidly. Ethiopia is already the continent's leader in the use of hydropower and is in the process of expanding its capacity via

several large projects. Much attention is given to the *Grand Renaissance* Dam on the Blue Nile, which is soon to be completed, and is to produce six gigawatts of electricity.[20] But here, too, there is controversy. This is above all due to the fact that the project is a source of tension between the large Nile-riparian states: Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. The Nile supplies almost all of Egypt's drinking water, and a reduction in flow could have dramatic consequences.[21] Although the three countries announced a solution to the conflict at a summit in early 2018, the potential for further tension remains.[22] This example shows that hydropower requires an especially high degree of regional diplomacy and cooperation.

Meanwhile, further upstream, Uganda is also investing in the construction of more dams. In other regions of the continent, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola, amongst others, are also expanding their hydropower capacities.

But these large projects do not represent the ideal solution to the issue of energy shortages. In addition to concerns about the ecological and

The downside of the oil industry: Sun, wind, and water provide an incomparably rich portfolio for green energy and are a feasible alternative for Africa. Source: © Akintunde Akinleye, Reuters.

social consequences of dam construction, there are also increasing apprehensions regarding the stability of hydropower supplies. The effects of climate change could pose major challenges for hydropower generation. For African countries with a high dependency on hydropower, experts warn of the risk of electricity shortages due to insufficient rainfall and periods of drought. Hydropower can therefore only be a partial element of the future energy mix. Wind and, above all, solar energy will play a key role in the climate-friendly transformation of the African energy sector.

Many consider it a foregone conclusion that Africa will "leapfrog" to a phase beyond the power-grid age.

Leapfrogging: Is the Great Leap Coming?

If the African energy revolution is to result in low-carbon energy supply, a considerable effort will be required. Despite the enormous potential for renewable energy sources, a number of obstacles must be overcome first. After all, the concern is not only electricity generation, but also universal distribution. Many experts view the poor condition of existing grids and the entirely inadequate pace of power grid expansion as both obstacle and opportunity. The creation of a comprehensive, centralised grid infrastructure would be a mammoth, near unachievable task, since it would be expensive, protracted and risk-prone. The alternative to a single "big" solution (large power plants with comprehensive grids) is therefore a combined approach based on the diversification of energy sources (with priority given to renewable energies) and many small, decentralised, grid-independent solutions.

The buzzword "leapfrogging" is often heard in this context. It refers to dispensing with or skipping development stages in the course of rapid technological and economic modernisation, and is therefore referred to in German as "Sprunginnovation". Africa's current situation means that many consider it a foregone conclusion that the continent will make a "great leap" to a phase beyond the power grid age. "African nations do not have to lock into developing high-carbon old technologies," wrote the late Kofi Annan in the 2015 Africa Progress Panel report. "We can expand our power generation and achieve universal access to energy by leapfrogging into new technologies that are transforming energy systems across the world[23]."

Multifaceted, Decentralised Solutions

Renewable energies play a decisive role in diversification and decentralisation. Many innovative photovoltaic solutions already contribute to improving quality of life, especially in rural Africa. These solutions go beyond solar modules on roofs; they include numerous mini-applications such as solar lamps, solar cookers, and solar backpacks for schoolchildren. A dynamic local and foreign start-up scene contributes to the rapid spread of increasingly reliable and, above-all, affordable solutions. This also includes German players, such as the start-up *Mobisol*, which delivers complete packages for electrification via photovoltaics in selected African countries. Micro-credit offers make these packages affordable to low-income households.

In view of the very specific and immediate needs of the undersupplied rural population, such offers often represent enormous progress. Nevertheless, they make only a limited contribution to the great transformation required. There is no doubt that large-scale projects – i.e. investment in power plants, solar and wind farms, and the expansion of centralised grids – will continue to play a decisive role for the economy as a whole. They form the backbone of energy supply and are indispensable for supplying cities, industrial centres, and boom regions. But between large-scale power plants and centralised power grids, on the one hand, and individual modules and mini-applications, on the other, there is still a large range of innovative intermediate solutions

that might significantly change the African energy sector. This includes miniature power plants for small communities, businesses, and manageable clusters of consumer households, as well as small, decentralised power grids (mini- and micro-grids). These small grids, most of which are based on solar and wind energy (and to a lesser degree on biogas plants or small hydroelectric power plants), offer promising solutions, especially for remote rural areas.[24] They can improve grid stability and, in many places, replace the traditional, climate-damaging diesel generators, which still constitute a widespread alternative to the centralised power grid.

Given that comprehensive expansion of central power grids to all rural areas will take decades, decentralised approaches offer a more realistic – and above all swifter – response to the challenges of energy poverty.

Fig. 3: Decentralised Power Grid (Micro-Grid)



Source: Own illustration.

Fossil Energy Sources Remain Relevant

Despite all the euphoria and pioneering spirit surrounding the opportunities provided by renewable energies, it must not be forgotten that fossil fuels have not been ruled out by any means. Africa has vast oil and gas reserves, many of them entirely undeveloped. From a climate policy perspective, it would be advisable to leave these resources as untouched as possible. But given the energy supply challenges described above, the complete phase-out of fossil fuel use in Africa, as indeed in the rest of the world, is not something that will happen overnight. On the contrary, in the short to mid-term, the use of fossil fuels will likely be expanded in parallel with the development of renewable alternatives, and will thus remain a central component of the energy mix. The International Energy Agency forecasts that in 2030, just over half of the electricity produced in Sub-Saharan Africa will still be generated from fossil energy sources (with production capacity doubling from 2016 levels): 21 per cent from coal, 18 per cent from gas, and twelve per cent from oil[25]. Modern gas-fired power plants will probably dominate the future: while the proportion of energy from coal and oil will gradually fall, the share of natural gas in electricity generation will rise, compared to current levels. Technical innovations can increase efficiency and significantly reduce CO_2 emissions.

Nuclear Alternatives?

Another option that is usually consciously neglected in many reports and plans is nuclear power. This is not because nuclear power has no

A light in the dark: To satisfy the growing demand for energy, the use of fossil fuels in Africa will also have to be further expanded. Source: © Siphiwe Sibeko, Reuters.

role to play. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that a large number of African states are interested in investing in nuclear power. There are more or less concrete plans in twelve African countries. Some African politicians seem to find the option attractive. They see nuclear power as a fast, efficient, climate-friendly way to escape energy poverty and to stimulate the economy. China and Russia present themselves as two potential partners who, according to some observers, are already in the midst of a fierce race to export nuclear technology.

Various African countries are considering using nuclear power, with China and Russia as potential partners.

In some countries, planning is already at an advanced stage. South Africa is the furthest along. Since 1984, the only nuclear power plant on the continent has been located in Cape Town. In addition, in 2015, plans were introduced to construct further reactors with an overall capacity of 9.6 gigawatts – initially with a view to a possible partnership with Russia. Since then, however, much criticism and doubt has been voiced as to the sense and feasibility of the plans, and their future appears uncertain.[26] But other countries are also at the starting point: In 2016, Sudan signed a framework agreement with China which provides for the construction of an initial nuclear power plant by 2027. Kenya also intends to build four reactors by 2030 with Chinese assistance. Nigeria has chosen Russia as its partner, and also plans to build four nuclear power plants. In West Africa, Ghana has dreamt of having its own nuclear power plant since its independence; now there are concrete plans for constructing two reactors. There has, as yet, been no decision on a potential partnership with China or Russia.[27]

It remains to be seen when these plans will come to fruition, if indeed at all. The majority of experts are sceptical. Obstacles cited include: high initial investment; possible environmental consequences and security risks (especially where there is political instability); high technical and personnel requirements; and the pessimistic forecasts regarding profitability. Given the falling costs and rapid innovation in other energy sources, the plans do not seem particularly prudent from a market economy perspective.[28] Some critics therefore analyse them as two things: a dying industry's struggle for relevance, and largely symbolic geopolitical manoeuvres.

Partnerships for Funding

If the African energy revolution is to become a reality, African governments need not only to set the requisite political and administrative course, but above all to involve their international partners and the private sector in order to overcome the immense financing challenges. Within a very short time, massive investments are needed, and African countries are not in a position to make them unaided. The International Energy Agency estimates a required investment volume of at least 450 billion US dollars[29] in order to halve power outages and ensure universal access to power in cities – and this is still a long way off from the goal of nationwide supply.

One of the key instruments for providing the required support is the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), launched at the Paris Climate Change Conference in 2015. Under this African-led initiative, up to ten gigawatts of additional renewable energy generation capacity is to be created by 2020; the 2030 target even rises to 300 gigawatts. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives have provided ten billion US dollars in financing for the first phase (ending in 2020). Germany is the largest contributor with three billion euros.[30] As early as 2013, the US, under Barack Obama, initiated the Power Africa programme, which channels over 50 billion US dollars for investments in the African energy sector via a public-private partnership model. Despite such large-scale programmes, both commitments and actual investment in the African energy revolution have remained below both expectations and targets.

The shortfall is especially large in the private-sector investments, which are urgently needed if the gap between the growing demand and the enormous potential is to be closed. Many investors hesitate to commit themselves in most African countries. It is up to African governments to improve the investment climate, create incentives, and minimise risks. Above all, a proper political and administrative framework is required, namely: fair competitive conditions,

reliable regulations, security of the rule of law, transparent decision-making procedures, efficient bureaucratic structures, and the containment of corruption. But Western partners must also do their part to mobilise more private capital by means of incentives, improved safeguards, and multifaceted partnerships.

Summary: Ten Points for a Sensible African Energy Agenda

In view of the developments described above, the author has identified ten key elements that should be considered in the development of a sensible energy agenda for Africa. They apply to the African countries' national and regional development and electrification plans, as well as international funding programmes, and, last but not least, the dialogue with private-sector players.

1. The agenda's top priority must be to **close the massive supply gap** and **overcome inequalities** in access to energy as soon as possible. Energy poverty is a decisive obstacle to development, which means that the transformation of the African energy sector is a fundamental prerequisite for economic growth and the improvement of living conditions. There is a clear consensus surrounding the idea that the ambitious goals for poverty reduction and economic transformation cannot be achieved without improved electricity supply. This consensus is also reflected in the prominent position of the energy supply question in national and international development plans. This, in turn, provides the foundation for appropriate political action.

2. The agenda must follow a **comprehensive strategy** based on a **holistic understanding** of the situation. This involves an expanded view of the energy issue that goes beyond electricity generation. The various challenges and needs of households and businesses of rural and urban areas, require an integrated strategy with diverse components – a standardised blueprint will not work.

   The foundation for this is a further optimisation of the use of comprehensive data, so as to correctly align the strategy to suit regional and local characteristics. The data revolution, and especially the emergent possibilities offered by Open Data, will greatly facilitate such alignment in future. An example for this is the energydata.info data platform[31], in which German Development Agency, GIZ, is also involved. Comprehensive studies, such as the mapping of wind and solar energy capacities in Africa, undertaken by the University of California, Berkeley[32] facilitate the focus on solutions in electricity generation and supply that are adapted to specific geographical conditions.

   The wide variety of players means that, with a view to creating a comprehensive strategy, a multi-level approach is best, with special attention given to the promotion of regional and local solutions. While national governments do play a central coordinating role, local players and innovative start-ups can – at least in the short to mid-term, and especially in rural areas – realistically do more for electrification than centrally planned, comprehensive projects, the implementation of which often remain as pipe dreams for a very long time.

3. Due to the challenges posed by climate change and the opportunities presented by technical innovation, **renewable energies should clearly remain at the centre** of the agenda.

   The signs are favourable: One, is that political pressure to fund environmentally friendly technology is mounting in view of the already noticeable effects of climate change. Another, is that technical innovations continue to present new opportunities, and the cost of producing energy from renewable sources is falling steadily. In the African context, various studies reveal not only the enormous potential of green electricity, but also indicate its economic attractiveness – both in terms of cost projections and expected

employment effects. The corresponding declarations of political intent seem promising, but the extent to which actual implementation keeps pace with them remains to be seen.

4. The goal of an intelligent, sustainable, climate-friendly energy mix can be achieved only **in phases**. In the short and medium-term, conventional energy generation will continue to play a role, even though carbon-neutral energy supply remains a fixed long-term goal.

   The focus on renewable energies outlined above should not obscure the fact that many African countries are just beginning to develop their large oil and gas reserves. It would be foolhardy to believe that these countries' governments could be convinced to leave these reserves unexplored in the ground. Compromise is necessary – and will only be achieved if the alternatives prove to be economically attractive through innovation and investment. The answer to nuclear alternatives is easier: neither are they desirable, nor do they make economic sense.

5. Investments in **micro- and macro-solutions** can complement each other in useful ways. Decentralised solutions must be promoted in parallel with the capacity expansion of central power grids. The African energy sector of the future will be a combination of micro-grids, regional and supra-regional power grids.

   The realisation that there need not be one single great success, but that instead there are many opportunities for smaller needs-based solutions, facilitates cooperation among many players. This is also reflected in the design of various funding programmes, which focus specifically upon the innovative power of local initiatives and start-ups. One example is the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development's (BMZ) "Grüne Bürgerenergie für Afrika" (Green Citizen Energy for Africa) project, which is aimed at supporting decentralised, people-oriented energy supply in rural areas, modelled upon the 850 energy cooperatives in Germany.[33]

6. In addition to the issue of energy generation, investments must also be made in **technical progress** for **energy efficiency** and improved **storage capacities**. Since firewood and charcoal will remain relevant for rural households for a long time to come, even the promotion of more efficient stoves and cooking methods can make a considerable contribution to improving quality of life. Energy consumption can also be reduced via improved **user behaviour** by means of education and awareness-raising measures. The work of GIZ in Africa is particularly noteworthy in this area.

7. **Regional cooperation** and integration will be key if ambitious solutions are to be reached. Interconnected networks can contribute greatly to capacity expansion, increased efficiency and energy security. So-called power pools facilitate cooperation among national electricity providers. The leader among them is the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) in southern Africa. But West and East Africa have also produced similar networks. Additionally, conflicts can be avoided through regional cooperation, especially in the area of hydropower. One successful example of this are the recent agreements concluded between the Nile-riparian countries.

8. The transformation of Africa's energy sector requires **massive financial resources**. Both international partners and the private sector are needed. Reliable partnership must form the basis for mobilising the necessary investments. National players must actively promote private sector involvement. The large-scale initiatives mentioned above, such as AREI and Power Africa, show that there is a willingness to be involved, even if these initiatives have so far fallen short of expectations. Further initiatives are therefore called for. From a German perspective, investment

partnerships that are part of the Compact with Africa, further detailed below, show the greatest potential for opening up new avenues of involvement.

9. The energy agenda must be based on **realistic expectations of the economic effects**. The positive economic effects and growth stimulus provided by electrification will not come to fruition overnight. The benefits will emerge in the very long term. The concern is therefore to correct exaggerated expectations and to work with realistic forecasts. Rapid effects will initially be observed in conurbations where a number of positive factors have an impact (general infrastructure, education, local entrepreneurship, access to markets, etc.).

10. Without **promoting the optimal political and administrative framework conditions**, the ambitions for the African energy revolution are doomed to failure. Part of the agenda must therefore include an active dialogue concerning standards for market economy, democracy, and the rule of law.

Conclusion: African Energy Revolution is in Germany's Interest

Various German initiatives, such as the Compact with Africa as part of the G20 or the BMZ's proposed Marshall Plan with Africa particularly emphasise the interest in funding renewable energies in Africa. The transformation of the African energy sector rightly receives special attention in German development cooperation. It is a key factor in improving the quality of life, achieving sustainable, dynamic economic growth, creating economic and professional prospects for Africa's young population, combatting climate change, and securing peace and stability on the continent. Germany's commitment in this area is thus, not least, a contribution to combatting the causes of refugee flight.

The African energy revolution is important for the German economy, too. Current developments offer great potential for projects that could be very interesting for German companies. The African energy sector offers the German economy promising markets for its products and services. German technology and expertise are in demand. But although Germany is a recognised leader in the area of renewable energies, China has surpassed Germany in this field by now. So far, existing incentives and investment security appear to be insufficient to provide the necessary push for a German private sector that is hesitant about involvement in Africa. But greater involvement by German companies would clearly benefit both sides. Strong efforts by German companies could contribute to putting the African energy revolution on the right course, making it innovative, inclusive, sustainable, and climate-friendly.

–translated from German–

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International Reports (Ai) 2|2018, pp. 82 – 92

From Trinkets to Values

China's Engagement in Africa Also Has an Ideological Dimension

Christoph Plate

China's engagement in Africa attracts both enthusiastic proponents and vehement critics. Does Beijing have a master plan for subjugating the entire African continent? What is certain is that Africa is part of China's global strategy, in which disinformation and propaganda appear to be as important when it comes to protecting Chinese interests as trade relations and naval bases.

At the edge of the motorway to O.R. Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, there is a large billboard. Nobody who drives by can miss it: It depicts a lorry of the Chinese FAW make in dusty surroundings. Rough terrain and the red African sun suggest that this vehicle must stand up to the toughest of conditions. Appropriately, the billboard bears the words "Africa tough". Meaning: China, via its products, is already aware of how to deal with difficulties on the continent. Independent of whether a FAW is a good lorry or not (and experts say that its greatest asset is its low price), this advert demonstrates what distinguishes China's engagement in Africa: its readiness to take on the most adverse conditions, whether they be topographical, cultural, political, or economic. Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, once said that China delivers what Africa needs. The long-time ruler was certainly not only referring to lorries that meet the challenges of African off-road conditions with simple, affordable technology.

The Chinese ability to adapt, the pragmatism of their negotiators, car salesmen, road construction workers, mining experts, and kitchen operators who have gone to Africa over the last twenty years is much appreciated there. This also helps Africans to overlook certain shortcomings, such as the poor quality of many Chinese products, the predatory competition against local suppliers, and the tendency to buy the necessary influence with financial favours towards immigration officials, land registry heads, and ministers.

A few figures indicate that the continent may have been waiting for China's engagement: Up to one million Chinese are actively involved, not just as merchants, but primarily in mining, building construction, and civil engineering. In 2000, Chinese trade with Africa was just ten billion US dollars; just 14 years later, it has risen to 220 billion. The African countries with the greatest Chinese direct investment – Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and South Africa – are regarded as economic centres in Africa due to their good infrastructure or large reserves of raw materials. The recipients of most Chinese loans – Ethiopia and Kenya (besides Angola) – are countries whose historical and economic developments could scarcely be more different from one another. Here, the former empire, which became a socialist country and a dictatorship that is only slowly opening itself to the world; there, the economic centre of East Africa, which has stayed away from all ideological experiments and whose development has suffered only from corruption and massive political intervention. Here as there, the Chinese seem to ask no questions about the past as long as the country and its characteristics are strategically and economically promising. Incidentally, Chinese direct investment in Africa overtook that of the US for the first time in 2016.

In Europe, China has used huge amounts of investment, in Greece and Hungary, for example, to drive wedges into the European Union. Europe's failure to present a united front towards China is a grave error. Is China too important to be criticised? Beijing cares as little about what Europeans think about its engagement in Africa as it does about European reservations regarding its domestic policies. China

knows that the weight and scope of its investments, credit, and infrastructure projects can brush aside any European attempt at gaining economic influence.

A majority of Africans perceive Chinese influence on the continent as a positive one.

German diplomats and representatives of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Kinshasa, Windhoek, or Harare have many stories to tell of how Chinese emissaries are wooed while they themselves, as representatives of the West, struggle to call attention to such concerns as preservation of competition, respect for human rights, and separation of powers.

In Germany and in the Congo

Chinese consumer and household products can today be found in any German household. From the flashlight to the designer lamp to the laptop chip, China is omnipresent. In many Congolese households, it is the pens, bikes, and malaria medication that come from China. And last but not least, the low-cost smartphone. In addition to Chinese construction of football stadiums, roads, and telecommunication infrastructure, that is, to profit-oriented activity, there is also an ideological component of Chinese engagement in Africa that propagates much that the West cannot countenance: single-party states, reduced freedom of speech, and ruthless treatment of minorities.

The pragmatism of the Chinese is viewed with favour by many African governments. This is unsettling to Africa's Western partners. While Europe considers how best to combat the causes of refugee waves (and it is right to do so, even if it does not always apply the correct concepts), the Chinese are building and investing at a pace that causes some African observers to wonder why Beijing can so quickly accomplish things that take years of negotiations with ministries in Berlin or Paris. Every day, the Chinese, by creating tangible improvements in quality of life, including that of the lower classes, also create reasons to remain on the

Enquiries unwelcome: China now attempts to spread the restrictions of freedom of speech and freedom of the press practiced at home to Africa. Source: © Carlos Barria, Reuters.

continent. The West can do little to counter this sheer volume of investment. Nor can the West match the prices at which the Chinese build roads, railways, and airports. It is of little help to point out that a German road in deepest Africa lasts longer than a Chinese one. Despite the manifest Chinese head start, they have not, however, won the people's hearts yet. Promise

and vision continue to come from Europe and the US, not from China.

According to a survey by the opinion research institute Afrobarometer, conducted in 36 African countries in 2015, more than 60 per cent of respondents perceived Chinese influence positively.[1] The Chinese are not familiar with the openness with which they are received in Africa. They neither experience it in Asia, nor in Europe, where people are concerned for their national industries, and for the protection of European values.

One may well wonder whether the Western view of China and of Chinese engagement in Africa represents a case of wishful thinking. The assumption is that China will grow into its role in world politics and fulfil its obligation to provide humanitarian aid; whether or not the assumption is born of the wish, however, is unknown. The Economist Magazine analysed Western misconceptions of China in a March 2018 issue, concluding that the assumption that Western values, such as separation of powers and independent justice will establish themselves in China is fallacious. One way or another it is clear that democratisation from within, resulting from a rising middle class that demands civil liberties, has in any case failed to materialise.[2]

The increase in repressive tendencies in Africa could further increase the migratory pressure.

Just the opposite appears to have occurred – the dictatorial tendencies in the country, where the president could remain in office for life, might entail precisely the antipode of what we have always hoped. The Chinese reluctance to accept outside suggestions for their country's politics is met with great sympathy by many potentates. In Kinshasa as in Kigali, rulers are tired of hearing from Berlin or the EU or the State Department that they do not respect human rights, are doing too little to combat corruption, or simply have an outdated view of democracy. Then the Chinese come, look, build, make no political demands, and refrain from questioning the rulers. This pleases the likes of President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda's Paul Kagame very much. The latter may purchase his weapons from Israel or the US. But his model of supposed freedom on the internet is an African variant of the Chinese surveillance state: He allows almost all websites and social media, creating the impression of relative freedom, while in fact using these tools for comprehensive nationwide surveillance.

Accounting for African Diversity

It is important for politicians, foundation representatives, and investors to represent Western values. But this representation must be carried out with much more chutzpah and self-confidence if it is going to effectively counter the overly casual Chinese manner in Africa and the brutal selfishness of the representatives of Beijing. There must be more assertiveness and open pride in the achievements of Western democracies. The ever-growing Chinese loans and the new Chinese roads are not the core of the problem. "There are indications that China wants to limit the territorial scope of the liberal system of order for the long term," a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) concludes.[3] If Africa becomes more Chinese, it will become less free, and repressive tendencies on the continent will be strengthened. This development is worrying in view of the expected population growth and the associated migratory pressure.

Just as the comprehension of Africa is most likely to arise when national differences are taken into account, a nuanced look at China's activities on the continent and at the wide variety of motives for the Chinese to move to Africa is also beneficial. First, there are the merchants, who, with their cheap but useful trinkets have been changing retail trade on the African markets for years. Much like the Chinese

construction workers who, with large sun hats protecting them, asphalt the roads between Entebbe and Kampala, many of these men may often not know exactly where they are. Like many Chinese immigrants, they are looking for business and success.

The biggest group of Chinese on the continent live in South Africa.

Then there are those who got degrees at universities, which do not belong to the first socioeconomic tier; they are looking for opportunities and know that if they display a certain willingness to take risks, they can make something of themselves here as brokers, doctors, or merchants. And finally there is Chinese diplomacy which, with a phenomenal scope of cultural, economic, and military cooperation makes it clear that China is looking for long-term prospects in Africa and does not intend to leave any time soon. Chinese embassies, in Windhoek or Nairobi, for instance, are often enough larger and more modern than those of the US or Russia. There are a total of 52 Chinese diplomatic missions in Africa, almost one in every country on the continent, against 49 for the United States.

The biggest group of the approximately one million Chinese on the continent live in South Africa. More than 300,000 settled there from the People's Republic after the end of Apartheid. Angola is next with about 250,000 Chinese, followed by Madagascar with 100,000. Georgetown University China expert Yoon Jung Park reports that Chinese diplomats are seriously worried about their country's reputation, since many immigrants to Africa are considered uneducated. Park tells of an unnamed Chinese diplomat who said, "These people give me the worst headaches."[4] Some Chinese are worried about their image as new colonisers who crowd out African merchants and cheat customers, so they support charity work for schools and the needy. The Chinese ban on the ivory trade is also said to have been imposed out of concern for the public image of the People's Republic on the continent and beyond.

Rapid Development in 30 Years

All of this has only come about since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But it has happened with breathtaking speed. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War between the states of the Warsaw Pact and the West, new ideological struggles are being carried out in Africa. By 1989, African heads of state such as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (in power from 1965 to 1997), Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya (1964 to 1978) and Siad Barre in Somalia (1969 to 1991) were masters at using the ideological struggles of the Cold War to further their own ends. Questions regarding the respect of human rights and tolerance towards the opposition were rarely posed, even by the West, because it seemed more important to prevent losing each respective partner to one's ideological opponent.

At that time, the engagement of the People's Republic of China in Africa consisted mostly of solidarity actions for liberation movements or for states such as Tanzania and Zambia. The TAZARA Railway project is legendary: Chinese engineers worked to make Zambian copper exports independent of ports in South Africa, where the white minority government had imprisoned Nelson Mandela and was touting the superiority of the white race.

In a true feat of strength, and by means of a masterful performance of the Chinese engineers, the TAZARA was built. At the beginning of the 1980s, there were standardised railway buildings at each tiny station along the line on the long ride from Mbeya in southern Tanzania to the port city of Dar es Salaam where Chinese mechanics in blue Mao suits could be seen. These mechanics with their friendly smiles went along for the journey, tapping axles and nuts during stops at the stations, thereby avoiding intensive contact with travellers and the Zambian and Tanzanian populations as much as possible.

The strategists in London, Bonn, and Washington thought themselves relatively safe in the face of such predominantly solidary involvement on the part of the Chinese. In view of their limited resources, there did not appear to be such a great threat from Beijing. And, strictly speaking, Soviet engagement was merely a military threat, intensified by Cuban intervention in Angola, not an economic or ideological one. In repressive states such as Zaire, Rwanda, and Uganda, Western values such as freedom of speech, separation of powers, and liberality had an allure against which the Soviet Communist Party's propaganda apparatus could do little. On top of that, the Soviets had little to offer economically. Western cars, clothes, and music were always more attractive to the elite than the limited Soviet consumer offerings.

Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta recognised the limited pull of the Soviet model on his elite early on. It is said that he intentionally sent as many Kenyan students to study in the USSR as possible. He sensed that after spending ascetic years in the Soviet Union, they would return home as steadfast capitalists.

Then the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR collapsed. Cuba had already scaled back its engagement in Africa and was in any case on its own given the loss of Soviet support. Suddenly Bonn, London, and Washington found themselves unchallenged as potential partners for African governments. The USSR was no more. And the People's Republic of China was not yet far enough along. Very quickly, the West put together conditions and criteria for cooperation that presented African partners with great challenges: For instance, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi was similarly irked by calls for multi-party democracy as Mobutu Sese Seko in what was then Zaire.

From time to time, these rulers probably longed for the good old days of East-West conflict. Their successors today are making good use of the opportunity to do business with the new alternative to the West: the People's Republic of China.

A Struggle About a Way of Life

The Economist Magazine quotes China's President Xi, who, in a speech at the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017, announced "a new option for other countries" regarding "Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind".[5] This amounts to a declaration of war on traditional Western interests in many corners of the world, including in

Gold rush: The state budget of Zimbabwe can also benefit from Chinese investments. Source: © Philimon Bulawayo, Reuters.

Africa. While people in the capitals fume about the "shithole" comments of the American president, China offers extensive cooperation on an equal footing.

In many cases, this economic cooperation is defined not by quality, but by price and quantity. Chinese industry's seemingly insatiable demand for oil, ore, agricultural products, and high-grade timber has led to a restrained gold-rush atmosphere in countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's ailing tobacco economy is being rebuilt with Chinese help, and the demand of the Chinese market seems endless.[6]

In 2017, the People's Republic of China opened its own naval base in Djibouti. The current ostensible mission is the protection of international merchant shipping around the Horn of

Africa. But it seems clear that Beijing considers military presence in Africa indispensable for the protection of its investments and citizens on the continent. Since 1978, up to ten million Chinese citizens are said to have moved abroad for extended periods of time. Those who went to New York or Oxford to study are an important minority, but most set off in search of success, business, and prosperity. That brought many to Africa – one million Chinese have emigrated to the continent in the last 20 years.

Since 2017, China has also had a military presence in Africa.

The Chinese are exporters of a globalisation from which they themselves have profited in the last 30 years. Their presence on the continent is, for many, the promise of a bright future, since China has made the leap that many in Africa dream of. This promise is also the great challenge for the West, for the media, and for the work in political communication aimed at defending Western values on the continent.

Wits University in Johannesburg holds regular conferences of Chinese and African academics to take stock of China's progress.[7] The tough question of who is benefiting from all this engagement is rarely discussed, however. The presence of Chinese academics and representatives of Chinese state media means that much remains between the lines or is not expressed at all. Such topics as "Road to a New Future: The Chinese Built Bingu Highway in Malawi" and "The donkey skins pipeline to China" about the growing trade of African donkey skins for China's pharmaceutical production are preferred. The most important insight is that Chinese engagement on the continent is not uniform, but highly adapted to national and regional conditions. And it is completely apolitical. China is also popular because it does not harm anyone. Their very reporting on African issues is so innocuous and friendly that Western media audiences would at best react with a yawn. Such reporting is very popular with African heads of state and government. This Chinese pragmatism often makes reference to positive Chinese-influenced journalism and to Western colonial history in Africa.

Competing for Hearts and Minds

This aggressive competition for African minds, the touting of the Chinese model of success, which consists of dictatorship and economic development, only started with the Chinese economic miracle of the 1990s. At that time, Xinhua, China's state news agency, opened offices in Nairobi and Johannesburg, and private as well as semi-governmental media companies also began to focus on Africa, to propagate China's view of the world in English, French, and Portuguese, but also in Arabic and Swahili.

Just as the West long dismissed China's economic commitment as a trade in cheap goods and only very late realised how pragmatically the Chinese had been able to deal with African imponderables, many institutions of educational cooperation and many media outlets did not realise until late how much China had set about shaping the perception of African opinion leaders. This influence is exerted primarily through scholarships, invitations to travel to China, and offers of media cooperation through which texts from Xinhua are offered for reprint free of charge while the offers from Western news agencies are, as a rule, on the expensive side.

Chinese policy is about more than just roads and a naval base. It is about winning the hearts and minds of the people, and exerting significant influence over opinion leaders and decision-makers. Beijing wants "more than to influence the content of news and debates in the long term with their foreign investments in media companies, their offers of think-tank cooperation, and their research projects. Beijing also wants to establish the rules and procedures for political discussion in the long run and as it sees fit", says a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.[8]

One aim of Chinese policy is massive influence on African decision-makers.

When analysing Chinese engagement in Africa, it is important to distinguish between the attempt to win over politicians and those who work in the media. Moreover, as Dr. Bob Wekesa of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg emphasises, it is important to differentiate between the effect of Chinese engagement from country to country.[9] "Wherever democracy is part of the political culture, in places like Kenya and Nigeria, the Chinese will have less success than where democracy is less well established, in places like Uganda or Rwanda," Dr. Wekesa said.

Dr. Wekesa is one of those academics from Africa who is familiar with Chinese influence from his own experience. He studied for four years at the Institute for Communication Studies in Beijing, where he earned his doctorate. It was during his stay there that China began trying to gain influence, especially in Africa, developing the tool of "positive journalism". Positive journalism is a kind of intermediate journalism "in which Chinese thinking is communicated, but clouded over with Western philosophy and concepts", says Dr. Wekesa.

The media expert considers self-censorship to be the greatest danger for those who go to China. This is because, unlike Western scholarships and invitations, such programmes in China entail great pressure to adopt their perspectives; the Chinese expectation for visitors to show political or journalistic gratitude is usually tacitly present.[10]

Africa is very much a part of the overall strategy to influence public opinion, Dr. Wekesa explains. He thinks that the attempt to keep people from asking critical questions constitutes a threat. When this policy is criticised, the Chinese often cite the alleged Western efforts to achieve hegemony on the African continent, Dr. Wekesa recalls. The Economist Magazine recently warned of the growing "sharp power" of the Chinese in the world, i.e. conscious influence over thinking and opinions. "Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion" the magazine stated.[11]

When officials of the African National Congress in South Africa or the ruling Jubilee Alliance in Kenya travel to China for party management training, it is less an expression of ideological affinity than a conscious departure from Western conditionality, which often ties cooperation to compliance with human rights and basic democratic principles.

The failure of the West to consistently insist on such values with all its African partners is now taking its toll. Experience has shown that countries that could help achieve economic and military goals have heard less of such insistence than partners who had little to offer.

What is the optimal response to this? Perhaps the insight that a courageous manner – if both feasible and advisable towards Turkey or the US – may also work with China. But Germany will be able to do this effectively only within the European network. Greater self-confidence, which has definitely grown in recent years in dealings with the US and Russia, is now needed towards China. Pride in things such as democratic achievements, freedom of speech, and the separation of powers may seem audacious in the face of Chinese projects that seem overwhelming considering the sheer number of them. But these Western constructions represent an offer to which there is no alternative for African societies, who are concerned not only with basic needs, but also with freedom and participation.

–translated from German–

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

KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG

Automation and the Future of Work in Sub-Saharan Africa

by Alexander Gaus and Wade Hoxtell

Automation is leading to a profound transformation of the economies of industrial, emerging, and developing countries alike. What factors are driving or inhibiting the automation revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa? Is automation a threat to the countries' workforces? The study "Automation and the Future of Work in Sub-Saharan Africa" analyses the potential impact of automation on Sub-Saharan African economies and helps to frame future debates on the topic. For access, contact Martina Kaiser ✉martina.kaiser@kas.de

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The Digital Natives Are Coming!

How Social Media Are Changing Political Discourse in Kenya

Jan Cernicky / Antonie Hutter

In many regions of the world, the ideal of the internet as an instrument of political freedom has not been fulfilled. Instead, the internet is increasingly used as a means of maintaining power for the elites. In many African states, and especially in Kenya, this conflict has not yet been resolved. Here, the youth, who make up the majority of the population, have a good chance of creating a freer, fairer society via the internet. But without well thought-out support, they are unlikely to succeed.

Introduction

According to the World Bank's definition, Kenya is no longer a developing country.[1] It has become a middle-income country and possesses the fourth-fastest-growing internet market in the world. The M-Pesa mobile payment service that has been developed here, is regarded as a model for modern payment systems worldwide. A large number of start-ups have been founded around this service, and are now expanding rapidly. In the social and political spheres, too, the internet – and especially social media – has become an influential instrument of political decision-making. This trend will become even more pronounced because the extremely high birth rate will result in the usually internet-savvy young generation in Kenya, playing an increasingly significant role in the coming years. This generation of digital natives is currently faced with a social and political elite for whom the internet is new territory at best. Especially in rural areas, where the authorities are often not even able to write, this rift is even deeper. In countries such as Kenya, the young generation therefore has the rare opportunity to use their position of relative strength to depose the old elites, and define for themselves how the internet will influence social decision-making processes in the future.

Internet and Social Media in Kenya

Kenya is considered to be one of the most advanced countries on the continent in terms of digitalisation. Today, 85 per cent of the population in Kenya are registered with mobile phone providers. There are almost 30 million internet users, and 70 per cent of the population have access to mobile internet. Social media are widespread. According to a June 2016 report by the Blogger Association of Kenya (BAKE)[2] social media platforms such as blogs, Twitter, and Facebook have become an effective tool for Kenyans to exchange information on political topics of interest to them and to demand their freedom of speech. In this respect, social media provide a platform for political dialogue and influence opinion-forming. Twitter is especially important here. In 2016, Kenya had over 700,000 confirmed, active monthly users on the platform, the majority of whom access Twitter on a daily basis. This is more than in Germany, which has a much larger population.

A central element of the Kenyan internet wonder is M-Pesa, a mobile payment service provider. Even though the idea is not from Kenya, and other mobile operators now offer mobile payment services as well, M-Pesa operated by Safaricom, a mobile operator in the Vodafone Group, remains synonymous with mobile payments far beyond Kenya. The original idea of sending the most frequently used prepaid phone credit in Kenya to another mobile phone subscriber, quickly became a fully-fledged payment system.

M-Pesa developed so rapidly because there were previously hardly any low-cost options for

School 1.0: In terms of digitalisation Kenya is one of the most advanced countries on the African continent, but it is still a long way to the digital classroom. Source: © Thomas Mukoya, Reuters.

transferring money from the larger cities to rural areas. However, doing so is of great importance in Kenya because of the high number of internal economic migrants who commute between rural and urban areas. In many cases a family member, usually the husband, works in a city while the families remain in the countryside. Today, more than 80 per cent of Kenya's adult population use mobile payment services – this even applies to illiterate nomads.

The rapid acceptance of M-Pesa among the population and the integration of digital payment services into the economy, placed Kenya on the global digital map. M-Pesa's dynamism has spawned numerous digital innovations that have established themselves in Africa and led to multinational companies such as Craft Silicon and Cellulant.

This also resulted in ever more international capital finding its way to Kenya. One example is the company Accelerators 88mph. In August 2013, the company invested 500,000 US dollars in its third group of start-ups in Kenya and increased its total financial commitment to two million US dollars with 32 start-ups, in which it holds stakes of between ten and 25 per cent. These start-ups include, for example, the social travel network, Tourist Links, the Yum

food delivery website, the Iprocure mobile agricultural payment start-up, and the Booknow mobile ticket platform. The sums invested may seem small from a global perspective, but the fact that there is international investment in start-ups here is a revolution for Kenya.

Another important element of the information and communication technology landscape (ICT) in Kenya is iHub, which was founded in 2010 by Eric Hersman, one of the co-founders of *Ushahidi*; a website that collected eyewitness reports of violence via text messages and Google Maps. iHub is a technology incubator that promotes innovation and collaboration between its tech start-up members. It is also a regional precedent, whose concept has been reproduced in other countries. There are now more than 70 similar tech centres on the African continent, for instance.

The developments mentioned above, may be some of the reasons why Kenya was named in a study by Tufts University in 2017 as the fourth-most-important growing digital economy among 60 industrialised and emerging countries. The Digital Planet 2017[3] report finds that Kenya's digital economy is highly dynamic and has great potential for growth in the coming years.

Political decisions also contributed to this positive development. One of Kenya's first major steps in ICT was the connection of underwater fibre optic cables from the Indian Ocean to Nairobi in the autumn of 2007, with the aim of providing millions of people with fast internet access. 2008 witnessed the publication of the first national ICT Master Plan, covering a period of five years (2008 to 2012,). It is now part of the Vision 2030 development agenda launched by Kenya's former President Mwai Kibaki that same year.

At the time, Kenya was one of the first African countries to join the Open Government Data Initiative, launched in 2011. To date, 75 countries have committed themselves to the initiative, and other countries are preparing to join. Supporters of the initiative agree to develop action plans for greater transparency, civic participation, and administrative modernisation in their countries and to carry out regular review processes. In this context, the government has been actively recruiting data scientists since 2014 with the aim of developing an e-governance that can be accessed by everyone.

Kenya is considered the fourth-most-important growing digital economy.

However, success seems to be moderate; the authors' experiences with Kenyan e-government tend to be negative, for example. In fact, even though the application routes have been digitalised and most official procedures are initiated on the appropriate internet portal,[4] it is still necessary to visit the authorities in person, and it is often unclear why the digital route was necessary to begin with. These may be teething troubles, but difficulties may also be due to the on-going insufficiency of digital infrastructure in Kenya and, above all, the poor quality of staff training.

The government's lack of understanding of digital dynamics is also evidenced by the Kenyan ICT plan mentioned above. Since it does not deal with the basic components needed to develop an ICT industry, such as high-quality higher education in conjunction with developing a network of IT companies, which contributed to the success of Silicon Valley. Instead, a housing development costing ten billion US dollars, Konza Tech City, is being planned and is primarily described as a real estate project. Real estate is the classic source of income for those in power, and once again it is evidently impossible to break this paradigm.

So it is not surprising that, despite the growth described above, Kenya remains at a very low level of digital framework condition development compared to more developed countries.

In 2016, Kenya was ranked 52nd out of 60 countries surveyed in the field of digital economy development and was second among the six African countries in the survey. When compiling the indices, researchers evaluated the selected countries in four main areas – the robustness of infrastructure, the ability and willingness of consumers to use digital technology, the legal and policy framework, and the level of innovation and change. Training in the IT sector also remains weak compared to the international standard. It therefore comes as no surprise that many of the founders of start-ups and visible blogs studied at prestigious universities abroad.

The growth of the Kenyan digital industry is not due to, but in spite of, state regulations.

Hence, the highly acclaimed growth of the Kenyan digital industry is not due to, but in spite of, the state infrastructure and regulations. However, this is certainly not a disadvantage for internet-savvy young people, since it allows them to create free spaces whose principles the ruling elite can scarcely understand.

Development of the Internet as a Political Forum

At almost the same time as Kenya's connection to the international fibre optic network, another event was shaping Kenya's politically active internet community: the civil war-like clashes following the disputed presidential elections at the end of 2007. These clashes were the first historical event in Kenya to be influenced by the use of social media. Only via the internet was it possible for Kenyans of the diaspora in particular to obtain information about actual events in the affected regions. The traditional media held back to the point of self-censorship, fearing that reporting might escalate the situation. In order to document the atrocities committed in a manner that was independent of the political interest groups, the *Ushahidi* ("witness" or "testimony") platform was founded after an appeal by Ory Okolloh, a well-known blogger. The platform was used to document reports of violence via SMS, which were also associated with a physical location. This internationally visible reporting on the violence committed and the pressure of the Kenyan diaspora which was thus informed, provided an important impetus for achieving ultimately successful, high-level international mediation in the conflict. This is regarded as the birth of Kenyan internet activism, which was initially supported primarily by political blogs written by such people as Okolloh, Daudi Were, and Charles Ng'ang'a Wairia (in Swahili).

The "Arab Spring" in 2011 gave new momentum to internet activism. During this time, for example, the hashtag #Kenya28Feb developed into a movement which mainly focuses on cohesion among Kenyans and is still active today. Yet, the confrontation with the "Arab Spring" also led the government to devote more attention to monitoring unwelcome opinions on the internet.

This trend was intensified by the terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping centre in September 2013, whose traumatic effect is still felt in Kenyan society to this day. The attackers used social media to publish (effectively live) graphic images from the shopping centre, in order to use them as propaganda. This placed the focus on the use of the internet by criminals and terrorist groups.

The government and parliament reacted with tough anti-terrorism laws that were passed at the end of 2014, generally referred to as "security laws". In some areas, these laws weakened the essence of the rule of law. The laws had a particularly large impact on the media and the liability regulations for content distributed on social media; because the terrorist attacks were so recent, however, protests against them only occurred sporadically.

What is particularly important here is the introduction of a criminal charge for offensive or inciting statements, commonly referred to as

hate speech.[5] However, the Kenyan Supreme Court weakened the relevant provisions, since freedom of speech must not be subject to restrictions across-the-board. According to the court's decision, the burden of proof that something can be interpreted as hate speech lies with the prosecuting authorities. This means that all expressions continue to fall under free expression unless it can be proven that they are hate speech, which is very difficult in practice. There is therefore only one documented case of an internet activist who was convicted of hate speech; who in turn had to serve a three-month prison sentence. There have, however, been at least six cases since 2016 in which citizens have been arrested and detained because they were accused of hate speech.[6] But all of them were released quite quickly, since it was not possible to press charges. At the moment, the passage under discussion tends to be used to intimidate disagreeable bloggers.

Nevertheless, global comparison shows Kenya doing quite well with regard to the freedom of the internet: In the internet freedom survey conducted by Freedom House, Kenya scored a remarkable 29 points on a scale of 0 (best) to 100 (worst).[7]

How Are Young People Using Their Freedoms?

The use of the internet as a political instrument has changed considerably since 2007. While the

A picture of the past: Bloggers with their notebooks shaped the early stages of web activism. Today, the scene mainly communicates via Twitter and Instagram. Source: © Thomas Mukoya, Reuters.

scene was dominated by active bloggers at that time, they have been replaced by users of Twitter and, to a lesser extent, Instagram.

The commercialisation of the internet has gained momentum in Kenya, too.

The remaining blogs are very strongly commercialised and deal with areas where targeted advertising is obvious, such as fashion, food, and technology. A few individuals who used to be considered political bloggers, such as Aurther Mandela (Xtian Dela), now use their profiles primarily as advertising platforms. Scarcely any political messages can be discerned from them. Nevertheless, political blogs continue to make an appearance, such as Kenya Today,[8] which is close to ODM, the opposition party. However, these are hard to distinguish from internet editions by traditional newspapers and do not fill a substantial gap in the relatively free Kenyan media landscape.[9] Newspapers that are visible at a national level also report on corruption scandals and – depending on their political orientation and owners – are quite critical of politics. Blogs therefore tend to fill gaps in questions of youth culture or specialised technology, for which there are no adequate media products in Kenya. Albeit, at least since the controversial 2017 elections, the Kenyan government has taken a much more restrictive stance towards the press. Whether this will have consequences for the use of blogs remains to be seen.

Twitter has become a very relevant tool for political and social mobilisation. It is not a tool for discussing complex interrelationships, but rather for placing specific issues on the daily agenda by means of fast-paced, short messages, usually including some photos. Boniface Mwangi,[10] with nearly one million followers on Twitter, is very successful at this. For example, in May 2015, the announcement that President Kenyatta intended to fly to the inauguration of the new Nigerian president with a delegation of 60 people, caused such an outcry that the trip had to be cancelled and was reduced to a small delegation under the vice-president. Since Mwangi tweeted about the president's official speeches being flown in printed form by plane to the various provinces, there has also been a switch to more modern and cost-effective communication channels for this, too. The introduction of public toilets in courthouses is also a result of Mwangi's tweets. The Kenyans on Twitter group[11] recently managed to publicly and critically discuss the president's list of persons to be honoured for special services to the country. This in turn led to completely different individuals being honoured informally on the internet and political statements being associated with them.

So far, however, only this type of small, isolated topic has been set in motion using short campaigns on the internet. The really big challenges – corruption, the ailing education system, and the various obstacles to young people who want access to formal employment and political influence – obviously cannot be adequately addressed on Twitter. Even Mwangi admits that this is the case: "Twitter is good at making a lot of noise. Successful political mobilisation still requires activity in the non-virtual world."[12]

This is not simply theoretical knowledge. Mwangi, Ory Okolloh, and other internet-savvy young people from Nairobi's well-educated middle class, founded the UKWELI party in 2015 and stood for election in 2017. The UKWELI Party is not an internet-based party like the European Pirate Parties, for example. On the contrary, it stood for election with a programme to combat corruption, provide better opportunities for young people and women, and improve the quality of state services with very concrete ideas for enhancing the lives of the young middle class. During the election campaign, it benefited from experience in the use of social media, but ran its election campaign primarily in direct contact with people on the street.[13] Although it addressed the pressing problems of most Kenyans, conducted a very professional election campaign, and above all addressed

people under 40 years of age (who make up the clear majority of voters), not one candidate won a mandate in the national or any of the regional (county) parliaments.

One reason for this is Kenya's majority voting system, in which ethnic affiliation and bribes play a major role in many cases. In some constituencies, it is therefore considered a great success to reach second or third place during the first attempt. At the same time, it is disappointing because a clear majority of Kenyans are against ethnic politics and vote-buying.[14] Thus, if responses to surveys are honest, it should actually be possible to achieve a majority in elections using such a programme.

A representative of UKWELI Party explains why it is not that simple: "Small, short campaigns are very effective. It is easy to mobilise quite a lot of people for them. But when the campaign has reached its goal, people feel that they have made their contribution to politics, are satisfied, and return to everyday life. It is very difficult to win them over to politics in the long term."[15]

Structural problems such as bribery of voters cannot be solved with internet campaigns alone.

Thus it is not to be expected that young people who can be mobilised on the internet for a campaign against the president's trip to Nigeria with an excessively large delegation, will also reject bribes during elections. This connection does not follow. Structural problems such as bribery of voters cannot be solved with internet campaigns[16] alone – the reasons for such problems are far too complex.

The UKWELI Party reacted to this knowledge early on, launching a door-to-door campaign in the real world. It was probably too late for this election. The challenge now is to prepare for the 2022 elections at an early stage, skillfully connecting the virtual and non-virtuall worlds. The chances should be good; after all, about a quarter of the electorate will be eligible to vote for the first time in the upcoming elections – and in Kenya, these new voters will almost all be digital natives as well.

Generational Conflicts

Thus Kenya – like many other African states – is faced with a fascinating generational conflict based on many fault lines: On one side, there are young relatively well-educated people (by African standards), for whom the internet is a normal part of life, and who are systematically distanced from power and resources by the older generation; on the other, there is the 50+ generation which, especially in rural areas, is often scarcely able to read and perceives the internet as more of a threat, but has a large part of the resources at its disposal. The younger generation constitutes a clear and constantly growing majority.

Having said this, the internet most clearly depicts the difference between the two worlds. Although the most important Kenyan politicians maintain Twitter profiles with many followers, they only use them as an additional channel to spread messages that are also delivered via other media.[17] They do not seem to understand Twitter's function as a quick campaign tool for specific issues. This is underscored by relatively amateurish online smear campaigns primarily against the opposition. These campaigns, apparently carried out by an American media company, hardly had any impact because they merely repeated assertions that had already been made in traditional media. Nor does the fact that President Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga have hired highly visible social media activists as communications advisers, and that President Kenyatta pays groups of bloggers, such as the "36 bloggers", to disseminate their opinions, do much to change this change this impression. According to internet expert Mark Kaigwa,[18] these internet specialists are very far removed from the powerful men in the internal hierarchies, and have no influence

on the development of communication strategies. They are there to distribute prescribed messages as effectively as possible via their followers. Nor are they included in the political line of the politicians distributing money.

This describes a change which, according to Kaigwa, is currently underway: A few years ago, internet activists mainly formed a kind of "virtual NGO" in which political and social opinions were formed quite spontaneously, but the commercialisation of the internet has gained momentum in Kenya, too. In this context, it is not only the political elite who pacify internet activists by giving them money, but as discussed above, the advertising industry to a greater extent; the latter is diluting the political effectiveness of internet activists through product placement, without having an explicitly political agenda.

Conclusions

As described above, many factors seem to be coming together in Kenya that can pave the way towards a free, dynamic internet as a space for social and democratic freedoms. On the other hand, the newly re-elected government already exhibited authoritarian tendencies in the last legislative period and indicated – immediately after the (subsequently annulled) elections in August with its crackdown on several NGOs[19] and on several television stations in January 2018 – that these tendencies can be expected to intensify further. China, too, which no longer defines its interests in Kenya solely in terms of trade policy, but is also seeking political allies on the African continent, will support these tendencies with its technical expertise. The necessary Chinese IT equipment suppliers, such as Huawei, already have a strong presence in Kenya. In addition, the commercialisation of the internet provides for a gradual dilution of political content.

It therefore remains unclear who will prevail in the medium term. Will the old generation hang on to the resources while the young people occasionally engage in short pinprick campaigns? Or will the internet activists and young politicians succeed in changing the social and political awareness of the younger generation, achieving better political participation opportunities in the long term and thus a chance to gain fairer access to state resources and high-quality government services?

There is definitely a chance that they will follow the latter course. As described above, with respect to technology, Kenya is far removed from countries such as China that can largely control the internet. In addition, the courts have proven that they are fully committed to protecting freedom of expression, including on the internet, and do not shy away from conflict with the government. Despite the restrictions imposed by the aforementioned security laws and a judiciary that is not always fully functional, Kenya remains a constitutional state. This is precisely where the legal basis for the use of the internet is defined in the conflict between legislators and the highest courts.

The young generation therefore has the opportunity to further develop the internet as a space for open discourse. This is not without risk, however, because opponents who do not really understand what is happening on the internet tend to react harshly and disproportionately. Given this constellation, it would be naïve to believe, based solely on their greater knowledge of the internet and numerical superiority, that the Kenyan digital natives will automatically assert themselves and maintain the internet as a space for free expression. Targeted support, not only from individual internet activists and their groupings, but also from specialised lawyers, critical media, and NGOs, as well as cooperation with courts and governmental regulatory agencies, seems necessary if this goal is to be achieved.

–translated from German–

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1 Kenya has been among the lower-middle-income countries since 2015.
2 Cf. The Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE) 2016: State of the Internet in Kenya 2016 Report, Nov 2016, in: https://bit.ly/2uqU2ke [22 Feb 2018].
3 Cf. Chakravorti, Bhaskar / Chaturvedi, Ravi Shankar 2017: Digital Planet 2017 – How competitiveness and trust in digital economies vary across the world, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Jul 2017, p. 22, Table 2, in: https://bit.ly/2tLqJ9M [22 Feb 2018].
4 The portal can be found at: https://www.ecitizen.go.ke [22 Feb 2018].
5 Paragraph 12 of the Security Laws: "A person who publishes, broadcasts or causes to be published or distributed, through print, digital or electronic means, insulting, threatening, or inciting material or images of dead or injured persons [...] commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, to a fine not exceeding five million shillings or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both." Kenya Gazette Supplement 2014: Acts, 2014, Kenya Gazette Supplement 167, 22 Dec 2014, in: https://bit.ly/1HeTwFa [22 Feb 2018].
6 Cf. Freedom House 2017: Freedom on the Net 2017, in: https://bit.ly/2IT609k [22 Feb 2018].
7 Cf. ibid. For comparison: Germany scores 20 points, China 87.
8 Kenya Today, in: http://kenya-today.com [22 Feb 2018].
9 Reporters sans frontières showed Kenya achieving 95th place among 180 surveyed states; in the Freedom House ranking, Kenya is "partially free", achieving a score of 58 on a scale of 0-100. For comparison: Germany: 20, Bulgaria: 42, Russia: 83. Cf. Reporters sans frontières 2017: Classement Mondial de la Liberté de la Presse 2017, in: https://rsf.org/fr/classement [22 Feb 2018].
10 Boniface Mwangi, Twitter, in: @Bonifacemwangi.
11 You can follow them at #KOT on Twitter.
12 From a conversation between Dr. Jan Cernicky and Boniface Mwangi, Dec 2017.
13 During the election campaign, the KAS in Kenya followed a UKWELI party candidate, Samantha Maina, with a camera. The video is available at https://bit.ly/2GaAWEC [22 Feb 2018].
14 Cf. i. a. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung / Centre for Multi-Party Democracy – Kenya (CMD) 2016: Voter Bribery as an Election Malpractice in Kenya – A Survey Report, Dec 2016, in: http://kas.de/kenia/de/publications/48023 [22 Feb 2018].
15 From a conversation with Dr. Jan Cernicky.
16 An example of this is the quite visible campaign #notwithmyvote, which ran during the elections in 2017.
17 Cf. the profiles of President Kenyatta (@UKenyatta, 2.8 million followers) and Vice President William Ruto (@WilliamsRuto, 1.6 million followers).
18 Cf. Ndemo, Bitange / Weiss, Tim (ed.) 2017: Digital Kenya – An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke.
19 This concerned, for example, the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).

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Combatting the Causes of Refugee Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa

Why a Reorientation of German and European Development Policy Is Urgently Needed

Peter Molt

Behind the current debates concerning refugees and migrants is the concern that the problems with which they are associated are not temporary, but that Europe could remain under great migratory pressure, especially from the Middle East and North Africa, but also from Sub-Saharan Africa. One especially important driver of the migration from Sub-Saharan Africa is the severe shortage of jobs for a rapidly growing number of young people. In order to curb mass migration to Europe, a fundamental reorientation of German and European development policy is needed.

In many states in Sub-Saharan Africa, the economy has grown steadily over the past few decades, but the majority of the population benefits little or not at all from this growth. This has increased inequality and made social conflicts more intractable, especially because there are not enough new productive jobs for the influx of young people, resulting from the unchanged high population growth. This discrepancy will very likely become even greater in the next few decades. Europe can close itself off from the immigration of illegal migrants, but it must be prepared for such an approach to increase political instability, resulting in severe unrest and the deterioration of public order. All this will seriously threaten Europe's security and economy and endanger global environmental and climate protection agreements. The current influx of economic migrants could become a torrent of refugees.

The European Commission, and especially the German and French governments are in the process of meeting these challenges with a networked security and development policy approach.[1] Germany's Federal Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, Gerhard Müller, told the Bundestag on 21 March 2018, "We assume responsibility in the world, and we do so with a networked approach: foreign policy, security, and development. [...] In today's world, development policy has received an entirely new significance."[2]

Development policy as part of national security and foreign policy? In fact, this combination is not new. German development cooperation began because of the escalation of the Cold War in the early 1960s. Support granted as development aid then served again following the collapse of the Soviet Union for the economic and political reorganisation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Today, migratory pressure and terrorist threats are once again making such networking necessary. It is questionable whether development cooperation can make a significant contribution to the pacification and reconstruction in North Africa and the Middle East. In Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, it can attempt to influence the causes of illegal migration to Europe.

An initial step was taken in late June of 2017, when the European heads of government approved in principle the project of a new European security and defence alliance for missions that NATO cannot or will not take on. The proposal, supported by France and Germany, focussed above all on the Islamist threat in the Sahel, which today, as a leading French expert on Africa fears, has become a powder keg that could explode at any time.[3]

The flood of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea has definitely changed the German view of Africa. The distant continent is suddenly near. Germany has reinforced its military mission to Western Africa, which began in 2013, and

pledged more resources to the region. For the Sahel, the networking between foreign, defence, and development policy has thus been initiated.

Demography as a Driver of Migration

The idea that Sub-Saharan Africa will present a special challenge to German policy in the next few decades is based on the fact that there are far too few jobs for the current generation of young adults, but also for the next one, which has already been born.

As late as 1970, Sub-Saharan Africa was considered to be sparsely populated, and its strong population growth was considered an enhancement to its economy. However, economic migration from Africa to Europe began as early as the last stage of colonial rule, and increased after independence due to recruitment of migrant workers. On the one hand, this satisfied Europe's demand for workers, and on the other, it was seen to be a positive contribution to Africa's development, since migrants acquired qualifications that they could use profitably upon their return or, if they chose to remain in Europe, they could send remittances to their relatives, thereby generating additional purchasing power in their countries of origin.

However, increasing problems were associated with integrating migrants, as the recurring unrest in the outskirts of Paris demonstrates. During the renegotiation of the cooperation between the European Union and the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries at the end of the last century, which led to the Cotonou Agreement, the latter were obliged to take back illegal immigrants. In practice, however, little came of it because the countries of origin had no interest in repatriation, and therefore dragged their feet in the prosecution of such cases. Another reason was that, until the collapse of Libya and the opening of the central Mediterranean route, the number of migrants was manageable.

European institutions and governments were late to recognise the explosiveness of lack of work for millions of young Africans. African demography also has many unfamiliar characteristics. Population growth rates vary greatly from country to country, a phenomenon that can be explained by the variety of traditions, religions, and ethnic and social tensions. It is a matter of speculation whether remittances to relatives prompted families to send as many children as possible to Europe in order to secure these sources of income. However, it is incontrovertible that the improved health care associated with development cooperation contributed greatly to population growth.

The rapid growth of Africa's population is today one of the great global challenges. New calculations from the United Nations are alarming. According to current trends, Africa's population, which is now one billion, will grow to between 1.8 and 2.3 billion by 2050. While the current population density in Africa – 42.4 people per square kilometre – is already relatively high, considering the large uninhabitable deserts, by 2100, it could reach 150.7, exceeding the current density in Asia – 145.1 people per square kilometre. Current world population growth is restricted almost exclusively to Africa.

The Republic of the Niger is an example of what this means. There, the average woman has more than seven children. In 1960, Niger had just three and a half million inhabitants, but today it has more than 20 million. By 2050, that number could rise to 68 million – in a country where only eight per cent of land is suitable for agriculture.

The issue of population growth is still taboo in development cooperation negotiations. Family-planning projects encounter resistance from traditional and religious groups. The experience of other continents that a growing middle class and the improved education of girls lowers the birth rate is only valid in Africa at a much slower pace, if at all. That is why it was a first when, in the face of the current refugee crisis, population growth became an important issue for discussion for the talks on the fringes of the African Union-European Union (AU-EU) Summit in Abidjan in November of 2017. The President

of the Ivory Coast, Alessane Ouattara, supposedly promised that African governments would work to achieve visible results in this area by 2030. However, when French President Macron brought up the issue a few days later in a speech, he was accused not only in social media, but also by the then head of the AU, and President of Guinea, Alpha Conde, of evil colonialist racism. The prospects of achieving a fundamental change of attitude in this area as part of development cooperation are slim. The issue is not a profitable one in African politics – it only brings trouble.

Loss of Political Trust as a Driver of Migration

A second factor that motivates people to migrate is lack of trust in political leadership. The great enthusiasm of 50 years ago for the new states after their independence has given way to a general indifference, if not downright distrust of political leadership among the rural population and urban underclass. Belief in a better future has faded. The lives of large parts of the population are increasingly characterised by a struggle for survival. Hunger in the countryside and wretched slums in the megacities make the promises of governments appear hollow. While the percentage of people in absolute poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen from 60 per cent in 1993, to 50 per cent in 2018, the absolute number of absolute poor has risen from 330 to 399 million. Because economic growth has primarily benefitted the middle and upper classes, the gap between rich and poor has widened.

Scepticism that this situation will change in the foreseeable future prompts people to seek their fortunes elsewhere. All in, a total of at least one million people have left Sub-Saharan Africa for Europe, and 400,000 for the US since 2010. Family situations, a lack of work and opportunity, ethnic and religious discrimination, corruption, and the arbitrary nature of political systems contribute to this migration. News of relatives and acquaintances who have succeeded in settling outside Africa is also an important pull factor. In a survey, 78 per cent of Senegalese respondents, and 53 per cent of Ghanaian respondents, indicated that they had regular contact with relatives and friends in Europe and the US.[4] Many migrants are relatively well educated, but do not have the requisite "relationships" to get local jobs in the formal sectors of management or business.

Economic growth and greater natural resources in a country therefore do not necessarily reduce the number of migrants. For instance, potentially prosperous countries, such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Ghana, and Cameroon are among the countries with relatively large numbers of emigrants. A Pew study shows that in Ghana and Nigeria, but also Kenya and South Africa, more than half of respondents could imagine emigrating to another country that offered more and better jobs. In Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal, 40 per cent of adults indicated that they would like to emigrate in the next five years. The fact that, in 2015, 1.7 million (!) Ghanaians with a secondary school certificate registered for the US diversity visa programme shows that this intention is a serious one.

New Priorities and More Resources for Development Cooperation?

In view of the millions of young people who see no future for themselves in their own countries, and therefore consider emigrating, regulated immigration by way of immigration laws that provide for limited quotas only cannot provide a solution for Sub-Saharan Africa's mass unemployment. Such a system certainly cannot solve illegal immigration. The answer can therefore only be to create as many jobs locally as possible. This implies a corresponding reorientation of development cooperation. This will certainly involve more resources. But above all, new strategies and instruments are needed. Unfortunately, however, the substantive discussion of such a re-orientation has so far not been very concrete or creative.

Important African voices are also arguing for reorientation. For instance, former Nigerian

President and head of the AU, Olusegun Obasanjo, has called for radical reform. Meanwhile, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who has recently become head of the AU, sees the need for greater autonomy from the army of non-African advisors.

The European Commission has recently come to view its primary task regarding its efforts in Africa as the advancement of more challenging employment opportunities for young people. The overarching goal must be industrialisation with more and better jobs, and growing productivity. It is not yet clear what this means in detail. The German federal government has also promised an increase in funds. However, money is only one side of the reorientation; what is more important is the discussion surrounding priorities and methods. Because the current German federal government's coalition agreement of 24 February 2018 references European development policy with respect to content, there is a lack of detail. The "Marshall Plan with Africa", published by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, leaves many questions unanswered, including how and to what extent funds will be concentrated in the future, what priorities will be set, and what new instruments will be introduced.

Intensifying Agriculture

Governments, administration, and upper and middle classes assumed until a few years ago that the growing population in Africa would continue to subsist from agriculture. The focus of development cooperation after independence was, therefore, on modernising agriculture, although this was initially largely pursued with a focus on cash crops introduced during the colonial period, such as coffee, tea, and tobacco. Their proceeds were important for the balance of trade, but also for financing the state apparatus. Attempts were made later on to increase the productivity of traditional agriculture, and animal husbandry, by means of developing new land and consulting. Although cash crops suffered from increasing competition from new suppliers on world markets, they have remained an important component of exports to this day. Improvement of traditional agriculture, on the other hand, has remained modest; the predominant smallholder economy was unable to take advantage of the so-called Green Revolution, which consisted primarily of the introduction of improved seeds. The majority of these measures were financed through development projects. The low effectiveness led the donors to reduce direct subsidies and, as part of a strategy of structural adjustment, they relied on the power of the market here as well. When, at the turn of the millennium, the United Nations declared combatting poverty to be a priority goal, this meant another course change. At that time, all AU member states agreed to set a target of at least six per cent growth in the agricultural sector, and to allocate at least ten per cent of their national budgets to this end.

Because of the rapid population growth, agricultural production is already insufficient, as the food crisis of 2007/2008 showed. Currently, Sub-Saharan Africa must import about a quarter of its food needs. Demand will continue to rise in the future: several hundred million people already suffer from malnutrition, today. It is not certain whether Sub-Saharan Africa will succeed in securing food supplies for its population in the coming decades.

One measure that could theoretically be implemented is further expanding agricultural areas, which would also create new jobs. However, the potential for the reclamation of new land varies from region to region. If the measure were implemented, it would require several large resettlements. The colonial period saw such resettlements, the long-term effects of which were sometimes problematic. Today, they would likely meet with determined resistance on the part of local populations, and would exacerbate land conflicts that already exist in many places. There is also some controversy about the extent to which the expansion of agricultural areas is compatible with environmental and climate protection. And, finally, many young people no longer see any prospects in agriculture, and prefer modern life in cities.

The plan now is to attempt a new transfer of technology to smallholder farmers. It is questionable whether this approach will be more successful than previous ones. It remains a mystery why, after decades of new agricultural technology programmes and funding for cooperatives, Sub-Saharan Africa's small-scale agriculture has scarcely modernised at all. It is clearly not because of lack of agricultural know-how or money; more likely, it is because of local political and social structures and government interest in keeping urban food prices low. This is made possible by global markets, and donor food security programmes.

Existing impediments can be overcome only incrementally, if at all. That is why agricultural production systems will develop only slowly, and only if the process is supported by government priorities and support measures. Experts hope that integrated farming, which involves increased use of fertilisers, improved seed, and mechanisation, will provide a breakthrough. Irrigation projects may also play a significant role, as so far only four per cent of the suitable land in Sub-Saharan Africa has been irrigated, compared to 35 per cent in Asia and 15 per cent in Latin America. However, the reform is being driven by the purchase and management of large agricultural areas by predominantly foreign investors. This has been going on for several years, and so far has primarily happened in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Madagascar. This controversial process, which some call "land grabbing", has already made a noticeable contribution to local food supplies. The political and legal conditions for such practices, however, vary widely. In Rwanda, for instance, the government is attempting to modernise with a combination of smallholder farming and leasing of government-owned land to modern companies. The result of all these programmes remains unclear. The World Agricultural Report forecasts no substantial improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 as compared with today. The report notes that insufficient land, declining soil fertility, frequent droughts, low yields, pest infestation, animal and plant diseases, post-harvest losses, and inadequate farming practices will continue to shape agriculture. The new programmes might increase production somewhat, but will contribute little to creating more jobs. The number of those employed might even fall. At best, this decline might be compensated for, to some extent, by the processing and trade of agricultural products associated with modernisation.

More Jobs Outside of Agriculture

New infrastructure projects create jobs, some in the form of government employment programmes (cash for work), but they, too, are subject to the limits imposed by costs and the use of machinery. Given the size of the potential workforce, all these measures will solve only part of the problem. Many millions of young Africans earn their living in retail trade, simple services, and small handicrafts, but their work is no more productive than subsistence agriculture. On other continents, cities increase economic potential, but in Sub-Saharan Africa, they are a burden on economic output, due to the lack of manufacture, the formation of slums, and the cost of urban infrastructure.

In countries that produce raw materials, the lack of jobs in industry used to be compensated for by employment in mining. In the last few years, the number of miners has fallen drastically due to economic and political difficulties. Even if sales and prices were to rise again, the number of jobs cannot be expected to grow because modern technology and mechanisation also reduce the demand for labour in the mining industry.

The majority of economists no longer believe that Africa can make economic progress without a manufacturing industry. Even the United Nations, despite reservations, has included job creation via industrialisation in its new global sustainability agenda (Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs).

It has been foreseeable for decades that there would not be sufficient productive, permanent jobs available for the rapid population growth

in many regions. One might wonder, of course, why African governments, regional and international organisations, and OECD donor countries have done nothing about it. The differing interests of the various players led to disastrous omissions. What scenarios remain today for a late correction of this issue?

Foreign Investment

First, hopes are pinned on the investment policy of the People's Republic of China, which has accelerated its involvement in recent decades, making it the African continent's most important trading and economic partner. Above all, China purchases large quantities of raw materials. Besides the purchase price, it invests in the necessary facilities and provides loans for infrastructure projects. Many of these projects are undertaken by Chinese companies employing around 250,000 workers. More and more Chinese are also active in the service sector. Their total number in Sub-Saharan Africa is of about one million. This "immigration" challenges African governments' expectations that China's involvement will create jobs for their own citizens. It was not until recently that Chinese industrial companies began to employ African workers because wages in China itself had become too high for the production of cheap mass goods. However, Chinese involvement will provide limited relief for the African labour market, especially because mass goods imported from China hinder the development of African industrial companies. The Chinese are investing in South Africa and Ethiopia, and sporadically in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya because they desire to establish themselves in these countries in their search for new markets, and expect to gain a strategic advantage over their competition from Western industrialised countries. So far, there is nothing to justify the expectations that Chinese investors will construct a continent-wide "industrial core".

A further expectation regarding job creation is directed at private foreign direct investment (FDI). African governments remember the unpleasant experiences they had with state-owned companies during the initial industrialisation stage, which was ended in 1980 with "structural adjustment". They fear that even private local companies will manage to hold their own in global markets. Proponents of FDI assume that, despite all difficulties, Africa's development potential presents great opportunities, and that there is so much long-term capital available globally that a fraction of it would be sufficient to finance the necessary investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. For German business, which has so far had little to do with Africa outside of South Africa, the German federal government has set up its own funding programme as part of the "Compact with Africa". Other industrialised and emerging countries are more heavily involved, but overall FDI has only created a total of 600,000 jobs. This is a respectable contribution, but far too small in view of the millions who are seeking work. Foreign investment can provide a role model of successful industrialisation that will create a significant number of permanent jobs, and it can provide important inspiration and ideas, but it cannot take the place of industry sustained by Africans themselves.

Obstacles to Work-Intensive Industrialisation

The founding of private companies owned by Africans is impeded in most countries by uncertainty regarding the legal system, creditworthiness, and the status of property. African societies are torn by open and covert power struggles, which constantly endanger law and property. Contrary to popular opinion, countries ruled by dictators are also not politically future-proof. Africa continues to provide fresh examples of this. For many decades, Cameroon was considered a stable country, but now it is in the grip of severe political clashes. States such as Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, and Nigeria – to name only those with the greatest potential to become industrialised nations – have turbulent political histories involving coups and civil wars, and it is not at all certain whether they have overcome their internal social conflicts, or whether these problems have merely temporarily dropped from sight. No progress can be reported in the disintegrating states of South

Sudan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Somalia, and Burundi, and the political developments in populous Nigeria and resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo remain uncertain. Regardless of the balance of power at any given moment, most African states are characterised by political and social instability. Only Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Malawi present somewhat acceptable risks for foreign investment.[5]

However, when it comes to the establishment of a local African-owned manufacturing industry, the political risks are far greater: "African companies must overcome a number of obstacles. Besides the well-known challenges of corruption, faulty financing, small domestic markets, and unreliable infrastructure, the fragmented spaces in typical African cities pose a problem that is less obvious. They saddle companies with high costs because they limit agglomeration effects and make it necessary to pay high wages. That is why African companies have essentially one option: produce non-tradable goods (generally services). This impedes the development of a processing industry and perpetuates the slow growth of African cities. Moreover, the weak performance of industrial and service sectors means that the employment situation of most people in cities is precarious."[6]

Another obstacle is the revival of central planning, which, during the period of decolonisation, was intended as an instrument with which to steer development, but which largely failed. During the next phase, the World Bank and IMF imposed neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes. Now, the pendulum is swinging again in the other direction. For example, the development plan for the Republic of the Niger for 2017 to 2021, which was essentially prepared by IMF consultants, requires that the procedures and mentality of economic and financial policy be fundamentally changed. Otherwise, it will be impossible to achieve the goals of the plan, which includes a comprehensive list of infrastructure projects and government activities for the next four years. International organisations, Western donors, Arab development funds, etc. pledged no less than 22 billion US dollars for the plan, which has returned to the old models of central economic planning, but with the notable difference that the infrastructure provided is expected to attract private capital for industry and trade. It is very questionable, however, whether or not this calculation will work. It rather tends to serve the interests of national and international development bureaucracies, who are willing to underestimate the obstacles such as: the unpredictability of political forces, the inadequate functioning of corrupt public services, and the sluggishness of coordination among donors and financing institutions.

No breakthrough in the development of labour-intensive industry can be expected in the medium term under the current circumstances. Most countries will at best receive small amounts of direct investment from abroad. The modern private sector with stable employment relationships is so small that even GDP growth rates of five or ten per cent for several years would not be sufficient to integrate the large number of the precariously employed and unemployed. Under current conditions, however, industrialisation will proceed only slowly, even in countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and even South Africa. In most other countries, especially small and land-locked ones, the inadequate prospects of turning a profit, the small markets, and the high political risk are likely to stand in the way of foreign direct investment.

Prospects for a Changed Development Policy

The belief that development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa might contribute to self-supporting economic and social development has faded in almost all political, administrative, economic, and scientific spheres. In view of the goals and implementation of development cooperation in recent decades, this is understandable. Cooperation has led to many local changes, but the political and economic system has not fundamentally shifted. Negative developments have not been arrested. Those who think development aid is nothing but a waste

of taxpayer's money, however, should consider that it is an exercise of soft power that improves Germany's international reputation and status.

However, the discussion so far about the effectiveness of development cooperation is outdated by now. Migratory pressures, infiltration by Islamist terrorism, and further political destabilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa have all immediately affected Germany's security interests. Development policy as part of networked security and foreign policy has the urgent tasks of relieving migratory pressure, combatting terrorism and international crime, preventing further political destabilisation of states, and creating the conditions that will allow for sustainable climate and environmental policy.

This requires and justifies a substantial increase in, and concentration of, funds for development cooperation. Much experience has been gained in six decades of development cooperation, and it can be brought to bear on new objectives. But there have also been fundamental shortcomings. The involvement of donors often was not appropriate to the actual conditions and requirements on the ground. Despite all the lip service, it did not truly serve to improve the quality of life of the broad mass of people, and all too often there was a lack of any effective, detailed knowledge of their needs. Donors tended to see what they wanted to see. In doing so, they forced their African partners to adopt strategies that led to a zigzag course for their economic development, and to a corresponding waste of money. In its World Development Report 2008, the World Bank emphasised the absolute priority of agricultural development, and then, in the World Development Report of 2013, it declared that the employment crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa could not be solved without industrialisation and urbanisation. A long list of similar contradictions would be easy to compile.

Even worse, however, were the negative developments among African partners. They are well-known for the stereotypically repeated scolding of the elites, who are called to account for corruption, authoritarianism, and tribalism. The motives, views, and behaviour of other social classes, however, are rarely discussed. Only recently have some documents[7] clearly expressed that without radical changes in the behaviour and views of ordinary people, scarcely any economic or social progress can be made. There is a lack of commitment to the state, responsibility for public goods, and responsible family planning. Work ethic and values awareness, especially in public service, are weak. Overall, the passive mentality of charity recipients prevails in large parts of the population.

To this description could be added that in emergencies, the population no longer looks to its own government, but expects international assistance as a matter of course. The political leadership follows this example with the variant that it demands compensation from donors for their past misconduct and guilt for slavery, colonisation, unjust trade structures, climate change, and so on.

Under such conditions, how can governments mobilise their populations to support plans such as "Rebirth of the Niger Republic" or "Vision Burundi 2025"? How can they achieve the ambitious goals of creating productive jobs and improved quality of life for future generations? And what can donors contribute, thereby reducing the migratory pressure on Europe?

One solution to the dilemma of the urgency of a change in strategy and the difficulty of implementing such a change is to concentrate upon the construction of industrial cores. The African Union 2063 strategy provides for such an approach: creating industrial centres to connect local economies with global value chains.[8] The Charter City Model, developed by New York economist and former Chief Economist of the World Bank Paul Romer, is more detailed with regard to labour-intensive industrialisation. A charter city is a city in which equal rights and opportunities apply to all; new ground can be broken without lenghty consultations and approval by public authorities, and above all without corruption; the viewpoints of those affected are heard; better external support

and better services and offers can be tried; and energy supply and transport systems are planned so as to conserve resources. Such cities would create the conditions for a dynamic, entrepreneurial economy. Self-government would be restricted to securing the foundations for economic enterprises, and should therefore be acceptable even to governments who are very dependent upon their sovereignty. Good governance is the prerequisite for any effective aid, but it is possible to limit its essential conditions to the economic sector, as the successful example of the city of Shenzhen in the People's Republic of China demonstrates.

Romer's ideas were long considered unrealistic.[9] Today, his critics' arguments have been weakened by the flood of refugees and migrants. Leading scientists have taken up the idea of model cities because such cities could steer migrant flow and give crisis-ridden regions prospects for the future. They could give migrants the opportunity to shape their own future in a protected space. As part of the dialogue among global research institutes in advance of the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017 – the Think 20 Engagement Group – Dennis Snower, the President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), proposed supporting special economic zones as an approach to solving the refugee and migrant problem: "[I]f the EU and other rich regions were to subsidise such special economic zones – with financial transfers, customs facilitation, education and training, and infrastructure creation – it would be a win-win situation. One such model would provide an alternative to migration and cost only a fraction of that of integrating refugees into societies far from their homes."[10] However, the G20 summit did not take up this proposal, but repeated the conventional, very general suggestions of the G20 partnership in Africa, proposals that do not take sufficient account of the employment situation.

This is regrettable, in view of the problems and dangers involved; continuing on the current path would be a failure in the face of the challenge posed to Europe by the demography of Sub-Saharan Africa. Under the pressure of this crisis, it should still be possible to take the necessary steps towards the goal. At the G5 Sahel Conference on 23 February 2018, the German and French governments presented an alliance for the Sahel combining military engagement with more support for youth employment, rural development, decentralisation, climate, and energy. As was resolved at the Franco-German Council of Ministers in Paris in July 2017, France and Germany intend to cooperate more closely on Africa policy, especially in the particularly dangerous West African Sahel region, which is both a source and transit region for migrant workers heading for Europe. As unrealistic as it may appear at first glance, consideration should therefore be given to proposing to the Sahel states an expansion of cooperation to create a charter city on the Atlantic coast with a labour-intensive processing industry for regional consumption. Reservations and conflicting interests can be more easily overcome here than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa because these states so far have only minimal industry, especially severe unemployment, and can scarcely hope for increased Chinese involvement or significant FDI. If such an initial model of an African charter city were to succeed, it would show African governments the indispensable conditions for – and the potential of – this form of organisation.

However, if the step of founding a charter city is not dared, or does not succeed, the attempt should be made to support the industrial centres demanded by the AU with the given starting points. However, such a compromise is likely to offer slimmer prospects of success, because the location will be selected according to political, not economic, considerations, and the fundamental conditions Romer names are unlikely to be fully complied with.

Conclusions for German and European Development Cooperation

What is certain, is that German development policy must be fundamentally reoriented. Germany's influence on politics and economy in

Sub-Saharan Africa has been only slight in the past, both with respect to the political situation, and economic and social progress. If its proposals are to have any real impact, Germany will have to greatly increase its involvement.

This refers primarily to the financial expense. Although Germany increased its share of global official development assistance (ODA) from ten per cent in 2007, to 19.3 per cent in 2016, its contributions to Sub-Saharan Africa remain low. In 2016, these amounted to 9.9 per cent of the contributions of all ODA member countries for Sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa, compared to 8.7 per cent in 2007. German involvement remains very fragmented, which leads to relatively modest sums for individual countries. Only eight of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa receive annual payments of more than 80 million US dollars, another twelve countries receive between 40 and 80 million US dollars, and eight receive between 18 and 40 million US dollars. At the top, however, is G20 member South Africa with 350 million US dollars, i.e. 15 per cent of the total ODA aid for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The scope, objectives, and distribution of German and European development cooperation have so far been insufficient to provide the necessary impetus for labour-intensive industrialisation. The continuation of the current project portfolio is ill-suited to this goal. It is time to stop business as usual. It was not incorrect, for instance, to promote local self-government, or to advise courts of auditors and the judiciary. But these measures did not create productive jobs for the masses of young people flooding into the cities. The currently envisaged return premiums for illegal immigrants, and cash-for-work programmes in regions with high unemployment rates, are expensive and of limited effectiveness. Training projects without the assurance of subsequent employment even spur migration to Europe.

To recapitulate the consequences of the refugee and migration crisis: Germany has not only an ethical responsibility, but also a vested interest in using all available resources to create new jobs and prospects for the future of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The necessary far-reaching changes will not be successful unless obstacles and dead-ends are recognised, and the necessary conditions for overcoming or avoiding them are created. There is a danger that wrong approaches will be chosen, and that previous activities will merely be re-labelled and pursued further. The new focus must also not falter due to the development cooperation awarding criteria that have so often been ideologically reinforced. Solidarity should be sought with France because of its special relationships to West Africa, in conjunction with the European Commission if possible. All of this means abandoning the old approaches to development cooperation, and realising new ideas and initiatives. One principle must drive it all: The state must promote business, but not attempt to create jobs directly. It should focus on designing suitable, supportive framework conditions. In any case, the phenomenal sums invested in development aid for African states must not trickle away into Africa's bloated, inefficient, and often corrupt state apparatuses. Potential for employment prospects that meet the challenge will arise only if funds, in as direct a manner as possible, reach dedicated young people who are prepared to work. Concentrating German bilateral development policy on these tasks would be particularly appropriate to Germany's role as a leading industrial and trading power. It corresponds to both its interests and its values.

It is not yet too late to reverse the decline of Sub-Saharan Africa into a continent of mass poverty, migration, and violence. Young people emigrate because they no longer see any opportunities to create an economic existence for themselves and their families under the existing political and economic conditions. They must be shown a new path to a better future and given plausible examples of how they can create this future themselves. Europe must not meet them only with border protection, deportation, and denial of assistance, but must instead help them in an effective manner that earns their trust.

Their economic empowerment will one day also result in their political empowerment.

–translated from German–

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Much Ado About Nothing

Trump's Africa Policy and Its Consequences for Europe

Christoph Plate

Donald Trump's Africa policy is dominated by the "War on Terror". This was also the case under Barack Obama. The essential difference lies in the rhetoric of the current incumbent, which is marked by ignorance and derogatory attitudes vis-à-vis the African continent.

Donald Trump is unpopular in Africa. US presidents are traditionally held in high esteem across the African continent. In the case of Trump, however, rejection prevails, as he is perceived as hostile and racist. In Senegal, trust in the office of the US president has decreased by 51 percentage points, in South Africa it has dropped by 34 percentage points since January 2017. Crucially, when interpreting the results of a Pew opinion poll[1] a distinction must be made between Trump the individual, and the US as a country.

On the African continent, the United States remains emblematic of the dream that everyone stands a chance. The US continue to be the destination of choice for many of those looking to emigrate. A scholarship in the US is valued more highly than one at a university in Beijing. In the same way, American rap music and apparel communicate a certain attitude towards life for which Chinese karaoke is no match. Measured against these, not unimportant, outward appearances, Trump is inexistent: When Obama acceded to the presidency, his portrait was printed on t-shirts across the continent, and irrational "Obamania" was commonplace. Obama disappointed many of the high hopes invested in him. Yet, he gave the continent a voice; he imparted the feeling that he understood. This generated much affinity towards him and the US, despite the fact that it was not translated into increased levels of support or improved trading conditions. In fact, Obama merely continued initiatives introduced by his predecessors, and launched hardly any programmes of his own. He did, however, cushion this status quo with silver-toned speeches. Trump does not share these sensibilities, yet further pursues, in many instances, a number of Obama's approaches. Trump's withdrawal from UN organisations and reduction in US contributions have, however, had an impact on Africa, since the United Nations fulfil regulatory functions in many parts of the continent.

Remarks – hitherto unconfirmed – made by the 45th US president referring to some African states as "shithole countries" in January 2018 led to protests and diplomatic enquiries. However, many commentators in Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe have drawn a line between this US president – who seems to be somewhat bewildered by the geography of the continent, speaking of "Nambia" rather than Namibia – and American administrative bodies, which endeavour to honour agreements, such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an economic agreement initiated by Bill Clinton. Clinton launched the AGOA in 2000. Its goal is to provide preferential access to the US market for some products from African states. This is the very opposite of what "America First" stands for. The AGOA was extended to 2025 under Obama.

Trump's rhetoric is what determines his relationship with Africa, and the way he is perceived. In the same way that his inclination to provoke and his aversion to diplomatic etiquette and political courtesy have perplexed the German Chancellery and the Élysée, he has also alienated politicians in Africa. In the aftermath of the US immigration ban on citizens from a range of African countries, the then-chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa, declared that the very country that once took Africans as slaves was now shutting the door in the faces of people from these very countries.

Trump is perceived as a man not even attempting to counter allegations of racism, and who, in the eyes of many observers, chiefly represents the rule of the white man. Ultimately, American Africa policy lacks "an overarching strategic vision for the region," as authors from the German Institute of Global and Area Studies deplore.[2] They posit that restrictions on immigration within Trump's "America First" policy will drive Africa further towards China and Europe.

In mid-December 2018, John Bolton, Trump's Security Advisor, presented the Africa strategy of the Trump administration. The strategy can be broken down into three aspects: First, economic success for all involved, also to defy the Chinese. The Chinese and Russia are framed as "predators" attempting to create African dependency. Second, Trump further intends to fight Islamist terrorism and to have every single US dollar spent to serve American interests.[3] Bolton made abundantly clear that this was essentially a race against Beijing, declaring, "China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing's wishes and demands."[4]

At the same time, Bolton announced the "Prosper Africa" initiative, which primarily aims to promote economic involvement of US companies on the African continent. The rather reserved commentaries on the new strategy by the New York Times or the Brookings Institution emphasised the salience of having a strategy in the first place, but critiqued it as overly vague and, as compared to German or European initiatives, rather limited in scope.

The inertia the US administration has displayed towards the 54 African states, bestows upon Chinese endeavours the advantage that Beijing would not even have to act in the first place for now. "It is fair to say that the United States does not currently have much of a grand strategy in Africa. Instead, it has a mishmash of African policies, some of which work well, some of which work poorly, and few of which work in concert with each other," as an analysis in the US political journal The American Interest claims, referring, however, to the Obama era as well.[5]

In point of fact, Obama also had dealings with politicians who did not live up to his lofty standards. Jon Temin, Africa director at Freedom House, called for a clear overhaul of US Africa policy: Less proximity of the State Department to the actors involved, and a rethink of prior partnerships if – as has been the case in South Sudan – there is an increasing amount of evidence pointing to gross violations of human rights. Temin points out that Obama, conversely, invited South Sudan's president Salva Kiir to a meeting of African heads of state in 2014, despite not granting other potentates in Africa the same honour.[6]

Will the new administration do any better? In November 2018, Trump reportedly considered striking Sudan off the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Khartoum had harboured both Osama bin Laden prior to his relocating to Afghanistan, as well as "Carlos the Jackal", the Venezuelan terrorist. The International Criminal Court has even issued an arrest warrant against Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Sudan's long-term ruler. Trump's rationale for such deliberations remains obscure.

Soon after Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2017, the New York Times published a paper outlining questions the Trump Administration had put to the Pentagon and the State Department in order to understand contemporary Africa policies. The paper implies a simultaneous drive to challenge everything, on the one hand, and gross ignorance on the other. Is the US losing to China in Africa? Why should the US be spending nine billion US Dollars on development aid for Africa annually, and are those funds not mostly misappropriated?[7] Detractors had, however, lamented the "low level of coherence in security, economic and development policies" even prior to Trump's taking office.[8]

Reuben Brigety, Obama's US ambassador to the African Union and the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, has strongly

criticised Trump's Africa policy. To him, the fact that it took one and a half years to appoint a Secretary of State for Africa speaks of ignorance vis-à-vis Africa. He has also criticised "diplomatic blunders", such as when the Rwandan president Paul Kagame was not given an appointment with the US administration during his visit to Washington in March 2017; apparently, in the general confusion, nobody felt responsible for Africa.[9]

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, on the other hand, identified advantages for Africa in Trump's National Security Strategy in early 2017: reforms were to be encouraged and cooperation with "promising nations" was to be fostered.[10] German academia was astonished as authors wrote in a study by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) declare that Africa not being a matter Washington concerns itself with yet is a blessing, since policy shifts would impact upon the lives of over a billion of Africans.[11] However, the challenges pertaining to matters of migration, population growth and counter-terrorism in Africa are so grave that they cannot possibly be tackled by the Europeans and Chinese alone; the US do play a key role.

US government inactivity has even been criticised by those schools of thought which can be regarded as well-disposed towards Republican government. The director of the CSIS's Africa programme has criticised the US for being disheartened vis-à-vis Africa. He outlines that since 2010, more than 150 new embassies have been opened in Sub-Saharan Africa by Arab and Asian states hoping to do business with Africa.[12] Africa experts, such as those from the Brookings Institution, are alarmed at "summit diplomacy" with Africa pursued in particular by the EU, and here especially by Angela Merkel's government in Germany, as well as by the Chinese.[13]

Shifting Rhetoric

Hardly any country in the Western hemisphere has historically had such strained relations with Africa as the United States. Even the former colonial powers – the UK, France, and Belgium – do not appear to be as affected by the legacy of the slave trade. This might be grounded in the fact that all recognised freedoms and opportunities in the US notwithstanding, the aftermath of racism remains evident in the US, in contrast to the European colonial powers. Since the 1990s, virtually all US presidents have been highly sensitive to this issue. In Ghana and Senegal today, one would not be unlikely to encounter groups of African American tourists tracing the tracks of their ancestors in West Africa. In the past decades, every US president has had their photo taken on the slave island of Gorée, just off the coast of Senegal's capital Dakar, at the stone gate through which hundreds of thousands of African slaves were hustled onto America-bound ships. In the 1990s, American ambassadors in Africa, such as Smith Hempstone, the legendary conservative diplomat and journalist in Nairobi, claimed that the US, following the end of the Cold War, would want to see the blessings of democracy and the separation of powers implemented across Africa.

This has changed. Trump's statements on black athletes protesting against racial discrimination during the playing of the anthem, defaming them as "sons of bitches", are met with incomprehension in Nairobi's sports bars.

Trump's ambivalent stance on democracy might also be read as tolerating local undemocratic governments.

The South African comedian Trevor Noah has labelled Donald Trump the "perfect African president", simply happening to be in office on the wrong continent. Noah identified commonalities between Trump and African dictators, portraying Trump as badly prepared and attempting to bend the law. Policies less concerned with democratic values than interests

might please many an African potentate, but even they cannot disregard Trump's rhetoric aiming to sideline Africa. Paul Kagame, the Rwandan president, did not shy away from conflict with the Trump administration by banning the import of American second-hand clothing

Place of longing: On the African continent, the United States remains emblematic of the dream that everyone stands a chance. Source: © Carlo Allegri, Reuters.

to his country – with the understandable argument that this would hamper the development of Rwanda's nascent textile industry. In return, tariff-free access of Rwandan products to the US market was suspended.

And what are the implications of Trump's disdain for the press and the separation of powers for those who campaign for democratisation and strong civil societies in Africa? The Trump presidency "might dishearten Africa's democrats and boost the continent's autocrats", as John Stremlau of Wits University Johannesburg writes. He points to the danger arising from Trump's use of fake news and the manner in which he twists the truth, quoting the Ugandan journalist, Charles Onyango-Obbo, who writes critically and ironically, "Trump's genius lies in him grasping what guerrilla leaders internalised years ago: do exactly what your opponent deems impossible or inconceivable so that he will have no plan to defend himself."[14]

The disappointed champions of democracy and the separation of powers in Africa at the best of times joke about a man whose indifference to the continent appears to manifest itself in the fact that it took one and a half years and two US Secretaries of State to even decide to appoint a director for the Africa Desk with the State Department in the first place. It was only in July 2018 that diplomat Tibor Nagy was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Nagy is the erstwhile ambassador to Guinea and Ethiopia and is now tasked with shaping American policy towards the African continent.

Trump himself has denied the reported "shithole" statement in January 2018. Crucially, though, all observers consider such statements possible. The tremendous number of rhetorical tweets and demands for clarification included those put forward by South Africa's head of government, Cyril Ramaphosa, the Senegalese head of state, Macky Sall, and the Foreign Office of Botswana.

Trump sends his own people to Africa, such as the then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, whom he fired while Tillerson was on a trip to Africa in March 2018. Later that year, he then sent his wife Melania who expressed her doubts as

to her husband ever having referred to African countries as "shitholes". As her husband's envoy, Melania Trump visited Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, and Egypt in October 2018. The media particularly remarked on her sartorial choices reminiscent of the tropical clothing of the colonial era. Melania Trump emphasised that the people in Africa had warmly welcomed her on this trip. "We both love Africa. Africa is so beautiful."[15]

Germany's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper quoted John Stremlau of Johannesburg's Wits University as saying that conflicts of interests, such as those Trump is experiencing from his own business interest and the national interest are well-known in Africa. Contempt for institutions, the subordinate role of women, as well as disdain for freedom of expression, also find their counterparts in African potentates.[16]

Military Interests

The US would have preferred to stay out of Africa militarily after the Cold War. However, a vacuum was created after the end of the East-West conflict, which had been fought with great vigour on the continent. The first failing state was Somalia; all the attacks and terrorist threats that were to follow were entirely unforeseeable in the early 1990s.

In 1992 in Somalia, then-president George H. W. Bush wanted to defeat hunger and bring peace, even though the strategic importance of the country on the Horn of Africa had considerably decreased owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the East-West conflict. Bill Clinton inherited the Somalia engagement. When, in 1993, 13 US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, the doctrine emerged that never again should an American soldier die on African soil. Bringing this trauma into office with him, Clinton refused to use military means to counter the Rwandan genocide, which started on 6 April 1994. Clinton would later apologise to the Rwandan people for this; in hindsight, his decision to stand idly by and watch the murder of one million people within 100 days appears lowly and motivated by domestic politics.

After Black Hawk Down, the shooting down of an American helicopter in Mogadishu, claiming 13 lives, the Americans would once again be traumatised when, on 7 August 1998, terrorists affiliated with the al-Qaeda network attacked US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, killing a large number of Americans and locals. In retrospect, these attacks are seen as precursors and exercises for the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001.

In Africa, the US army is operating mostly autonomously and is mostly tasked with countering terrorism.

The growing threat of terrorism from Islamist groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Mali, and Niger led to the creation of AFRICOM under US president Barack Obama in February 2007. Mission control for military interventions in Africa is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. Numerous drone attacks are, apparently, also controlled from there. In September 2008, Air Forces Africa and the Seventeenth Air Force, serving as AFRICOM's air force, were set up in Ramstein.[17]

The core of American Africa policy is the drone, political scientist Richard Joseph (Northwestern University, Evanston) sarcastically noted.[18] The drones programme, in operation since 2014, reportedly uses bases in Ethiopia, Niger, Kenya, and Djibouti.[19] Indeed, attacking al-Shabaab targets in Somalia appears to be one of the central aims of US military policy in Africa. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the devastating September 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, as well as for the attack on the dusitD2 hotel in Kenya's capital in January 2019. In 2018 alone, over 30 US airstrikes on al-Shabaab targets were executed in Somalia.[20]



Pith helmet: It is not only Donald Trump himself who has offended many people in Africa over the last two years.
Source: © Carlo Allegri, Reuters.

Military cooperation with German and other European armies appears to be virtually non-existent. At a hearing at the US House of Representatives in March 2018, the AFRICOM commander, Thomas Waldhauser, declared that he finds that there is only very marginal cooperation in Africa, if at all.[21]

In the ten years since AFRICOM was established, US commandos have been active in Africa, including in Kenya, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Mauritania, and Niger. However, the general public in the US only became aware of this in October 2017, when four American soldiers were ambushed and killed in the village of Tongo-Tongo in Niger. In the US, the debate was soon dominated by a discussion surrounding the president's poorly-worded expressions of sympathy for one of the young widows. Trump reportedly told her that her fallen husband must have known what he signed up for when he had enlisted with special forces. Officially, the soldiers had only been deployed to the Sahel country for training purposes. Germany, too, maintains close ties with this country. Notwithstanding, they were obviously killed in combat, which they – to make matters worse – were allegedly insufficiently equipped for.

Covertly, several hundred Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and Marine Raiders appear to have

stayed in Niger. The country serves as a transit destination for Europe-bound refugees, but is also increasingly exposed to Islamist terrorism, with terrorists benefitting from the fact that borders with Mali and Libya are hard to monitor. As the magazine Politico has established, the boundaries of operations in these countries are fluid between training and counter-terrorism.[22] In mid-November 2018, the Pentagon declared that about ten per cent of the 7,200 soldiers of the Africa Command would be withdrawn over "the next several years".[23] According to unconfirmed reports, this is scheduled for the next three years. Observers suggest that this withdrawal is also a reaction to the death of the four US soldiers in Niger in 2017.

Racing the Chinese

Military contacts between American and Chinese soldiers can only occur in Djibouti, where the People's Republic of China has opened its first naval base beyond its own borders. Reportedly, US pilots were blinded by the Chinese using lasers in May 2018. The head of AFRICOM, General Waldhauser, has however assessed China's involvement in Africa in a positive light. About 2,600 Chinese blue helmets serve on UN missions, for instance in Mali, South Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire. The US, on the other hand, has officially only dispatched 68 blue helmets to the continent.[24]

Economic competition is less about sales markets which might be lost to the Chinese, but rather about access to African raw materials. US dependency on imports, such as platinum, manganese and chromium (the largest reserves of which can be found in South Africa) or coltan (80 per cent of reserves located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is dramatic. The US imports more crude oil from Africa than from the Middle East.[25] The Americans will find it difficult to win the economic race against the Chinese if the considerable US direct investment and military cooperation are not complemented by relevant political measures – agreements, conferences, declarations, and visits. In 2017, US trade volume with Africa totalled 39 billion US dollars; yet, at 170 billion US dollars, China's was more than four times as big.[26] The US is only Africa's third most important trading partner, after China and Europe.

The entirely underdeveloped intra-African market is overly dependent upon exports, including to the US. Less than 20 per cent of African trade is between African states.[27] For this very reason, and unlike Europe, Africa has difficulty in speaking with one united voice at negotiations.

Moving Forward

Africa is three and a half times the size of the United States. In a speech in January 2017, Chris Coons, a Democratic US Senator, pointed Trump to the challenges and opportunities Africa provides: the continent offers great economic potential; its population is set to double within the next 30 years; Africa's role within the global economy will increase; and the continent must take action to counter terrorism and jihadi threats.[28] Trump's half-knowledge on Africa can be dangerous, for instance when he speaks of "mass killings" of white farmers in South Africa (as he did in August 2018) – this patchy understanding is grounded not in intelligence service reports, but on the reporting of Fox News.

Current US policies vis-à-vis Africa imply that Europe and Germany will have to take on more responsibility promoting democracy in Africa.

The fact that Trump attacks the press and attempts to influence the judiciary through his tweets has, if not an imitation effect, then a suggestive one – that some cherished principles do not have to be honoured. Said values, however, are frequently precisely those which institutions such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation hope to promote in African civil societies.

So, what do these US policies towards Africa imply for Europe and for Germany? Obama was similarly indifferent to Europe's struggles with African migration. What will have a greater impact is that the promotion of democracy in Africa – a task hitherto shouldered by the US and Europe together – might increasingly become a European matter. Europe, and Germany in particular, has been much more proactive than the US, through a range of measures to strengthen small and medium-sized businesses, the Marshall Plan with Africa, the Compacts with Africa, and reform partnerships with selected states. Simultaneously, the rhetoric employed has been stripped of much ideology, increasingly referring to German and European economic interests.

Europe must act in greater unison given both American indifference and Chinese expansionist aspirations – this point cannot be emphasised enough.

Africa and Europe will both probably come to terms with this US president and his Africa policy. Ideally, Europe will succeed in furthering its Africa policy with recourse to smaller means than the Americans or Chinese. Besides, Trump's Africa policies cannot last longer than eight years. That is a manageable time-scale, especially in Africa.

–translated from German–

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An African Afghanistan?

On the German Troop Deployment in Mali

Tinko Weibezahl

A lack of state structures, more frequent attacks by Islamic extremists, persistent poverty, and a steady expansion of military involvement on the part of Europe – in German public debate, the mission in Mali is often compared to the situation in Afghanistan. Despite all efforts, strong words and support from Western nations, so far nothing has helped to significantly weaken the Islamists. Vast swathes of the country are beyond the control of the central government, allowing the Malian desert to become a haven for terrorist groups. Why is Germany involved, what is the situation today, and what does the future look like?

On 26 April 2018, the German Bundestag decided to continue the *Bundeswehr*'s mission in Mali as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In a roll-call vote, 496 members of parliament voted in favour of the German government's motion, with 156 against.[1] This decision means the troop ceiling for the new mandate has been increased to 1,100. In early December 2017, Germany also assumed responsibility for managing Camp Castor in Gao, Mali. This will require more personnel, as will the additional protection measures and the planned expansion of the air base in Niamey, the capital of Niger. The EU-led training and advisory mission EUTM Mali will also continue its involvement. Germany plans to take over command of the EUTM Mali mission once again from November 2018 (as was the case in 2015/16). The German Parliament extended the mandate until 31 May 2019 and raised the troop ceiling from 300 to 350.[2] In theory, this would allow up to 1,450 German soldiers to serve in the two missions in West Africa; alongside Afghanistan, the Mali mission would thus be the *Bundeswehr*'s largest foreign military engagement.

Beforehand, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Germany would "spend 1.7 billion euros on the Sahel region and its development between 2017 and 2020 alone" as part of a reorganisation of its development cooperation.[3] Merkel also called for more international support, stressing the importance of a coordinated approach to security and development policy. She remarked that combating illegal migration would require not only security but also development in the regions.

Germany's military engagement is intended to supplement development assistance and foreign policy initiatives for Mali. As recently as late February 2018, comprehensive military and development assistance was discussed with France and the EU during the G5 Sahel Conference.[4] As a core country of the Sahel zone, according to the German government, Mali plays a key role in the stability and development of the entire Sahel region, not least because of the cross-border nature of challenges such as terrorism, organised crime, irregular migration and smuggling. The German government estimates that additional expenditure for the period from 1 May 2018 to 31 May 2019 will amount to some 268.6 million euros. It identifies the stabilisation of Mali as a priority for Germany's engagement in the Sahel region and a key goal of the government's Africa policy. 2018 will be a decisive year for Mali as it faces presidential and parliamentary elections. It would therefore be vital to stabilise the country with the help of MINUSMA and EUTM. It is also envisaged that the missions in Mali will cooperate with the new regional force set up by the G5 Sahel states. In the future, German soldiers may also be deployed in Niger, Mauritania and Chad in

Military presence: French soldiers already engaged in battle in Mali prior to the official start of EUTM and MINUSMA.
Source: © Joe Penney, Reuters.

order to offer advice and training, particularly to the new G5 Sahel Joint Force. The plan is to provide logistical assistance in developing infrastructure, support with the transportation of consumer goods, as well as help with transporting casualties within the country. Mali in West Africa is about three and a half times the size of Germany and has approximately 10,000 regular soldiers.[5]

The Genesis of Military Engagement in Mali

By 2012, Mali was already in a state of severe crisis. The ongoing conflict between the Tuareg rebels in the north and the Malian government had been smouldering for decades. It reached a new peak in the spring of 2012, a direct result of the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, as Philippe Hugon, Africa expert at the IRIS political institute in Paris, observed at the time: "When the Libyan government fell apart, rocket launchers and anti-tank mines went with them. All kinds of groups had access to these weapons. They included the Tuareg, who fought for Gaddafi. Suddenly these people were left empty-handed because of course it was impossible to join the Malian or Libyan army. That's why they joined the rebellion", says Hugon.[6] The struggle of the so-called National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (*Mouvement pour la Libération de l'Azawad*, MNLA), a Tuareg movement for an independent Berber state called

Azawad, received new impetus when heavily armed Tuareg returned to Mali from Libya.

Just a few months later, in April 2012, the Tuareg overran the weak Malian government troops in the north in the space of a few weeks and declared territorial independence. The advance of the rebels was favoured by a military coup in the capital. In Bamako on 22 March, a group of officers seized power and forced President Amadou Toumani Touré to flee. The soldiers claimed to be unhappy with the government's feeble attempts to tackle the crisis in the north. As a result, Mali effectively split in two: the rebel state in the north, which was not internationally recognised, and the territory in the south of the country that was still under the control of the central government.

The UN Security Council addressed the situation in Mali in December 2012. It passed Resolution 2085, authorising the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali. However, by the beginning of January 2013 the Malian army visibly deteriorated after many months of fighting. The rebels were advancing on the strategically important city of Mopti, which provides access to the capital, Bamako. This led the president of Mali's transitional government, Dioncounda Traoré, to formally request military support from France to prevent the jihadist offensive.

On the evening of 11 January 2013, French President François Hollande announced that French troops had, that afternoon, actively engaged in the conflict in Mali. He said the objective was to support Mali's government troops in their fight against "terrorist elements". He noted that the operation would last as long as necessary. A few days later, at a press conference in Dubai, Hollande stated that French troops would not leave Mali and terminate the operation until Mali was secure and had a legitimate government and electoral process. He added that the terrorists would no longer be allowed to threaten Mali's territorial integrity. He outlined three main objectives of the operation:

- Stop terrorists trying to control the country;
- Ensure that Bamako is secure, along with the several thousand French nationals who live there;
- Enable Mali to restore its territorial integrity, with the help of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), supported by France.[7]

On 20 January, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian declared that the aim of what the French had now named *Opération Serval* was the complete end of any Islamist control over parts of the country. So France was now using military force against the Islamists. The decisive factor here was the realisation that not only were the Islamists committing large-scale murder, they also had the potential to destabilise the entire region over the long-term. Commenting on the French intervention, President Hollande said that the very existence of this "friendly state, the security of its people and that of our compatriots" was at stake. He said Mali was facing a "terrorist aggression from the north" of the country, which was notorious for its "brutality and fanaticism".[8]

However, Hollande initially only wanted to help train Malian soldiers, saying the direct deployment of troops to Mali should be left to African countries. France would only intervene in the wake of an international resolution – this was the message from Paris just a few days before troops were deployed. Nevertheless, the advance of the Islamists led Hollande to change his mind. This unilateral decision initially attracted international criticism.

According to Merkel, terrorism in Mali is also a threat to Europe.

In January 2013, in the course of the EU's internal discussions on how to support AFISMA, German Chancellor Merkel met with Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara, who at the time

was Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). She pledged initial support for the mission that was planned to involve some 3,000 troops, by supplying two German Transall transport aircraft. Following talks with François Hollande, the Chancellor also stressed "we are under a lot of time pressure", saying: "Terrorism in Mali is a threat not just for Africa, but also for Europe." She added that every country "must determine its capacity to contribute without endangering the safety of its soldiers involved in other missions"[9].

EUTM and MINUSMA

An extraordinary summit of EU foreign ministers was held on 17 January 2013, also attended by Mali's foreign minister Hubert Coulibaly. This officially approved the launch of EUTM Mali, the EU's military training mission in Mali. The German government agreed to provide personnel to support EUTM Mali. The objectives of EUTM Mali were defined as follows:

- To provide training and advice at key Malian military locations with a particular focus on command personnel;
- To advise Mali's Defence Ministry and the Malian armed forces' command staff and training institutions;
- To support and encourage cooperation between the armed forces of the G5 Sahel states to increase their cross-border capabilities;
- To advise personnel deployed by the G5 Sahel states at their headquarters;
- To train formations deployed by the G5 Sahel states in Mali.[10]

On 28 February 2013, the Bundestag for the first time approved the deployment of German troops to support AFISMA based on UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012). Germany directly supported AFISMA by providing air transport capabilities for conveying supplies from neighbouring countries to and within Mali and carried out air transport and air refuelling for French forces. After the UN Security Council's decision on 25 April 2013 under Resolution 2100 (2013) to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), German support for AFISMA was transferred to MINUSMA following approval by the German Bundestag on 27 June 2013.[11]

More than 50 nations are currently participating in the stabilisation mission in Mali with around 11,000 blue helmets, 1,500 police officers and civilian personnel.[12] Germany is also providing personnel for the Forces Headquarters (FHQ) in Bamako and is operating an air transport base in Niamey, the capital of neighbouring Niger, to supplement material and personnel transport and medical care for casualties. The German contingent is supporting MINUSMA's mission, which at present includes the following aspects:

- Maintaining the ceasefire;
- Supporting the implementation of the peace agreement;
- Protecting the civil population;
- Stabilising key population centres;
- Helping to restore state authority;
- Supporting the political process and protecting human rights;
- Helping to secure humanitarian aid;
- Protecting cultural heritage and sites in cooperation with UNESCO.

In January 2016 the German Bundestag approved the extension and expansion of the mission, which involved raising the troop ceiling from 150 to 650. This expansion of Germany's contribution was partly used to relieve the Dutch forces on the ground and was primarily focused on reconnaissance capabilities.

The disagreement between Germany and France in the wake of France's unilateral action in Mali was resolved with a joint statement by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande at the EU-Africa Summit in Brussels. They both stated their intention of working together in Africa. Hollande said that, through their friendship, the two countries make a stronger joint contribution to security policy in Europe than is the case between other states. "In addition, we

Counting votes: The persistent weakness of state structures inevitably leads to legitimation crises.
Source: © Joe Penney, Reuters.

want to ensure that this friendship also extends to, and develops on, the African continent."[13] The Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) played a major role at the summit. With this, "we want to enable Africans to build up their own security structures and then equip them with the necessary materials," explained Merkel.

Military Alliances

In addition to Mali's national armed forces, the international community is striving towards a military alliance with the G5 states' new regional intervention force. This 5,000-strong multinational force has been created largely because of the sluggish implementation of the African Standby Forces. The aim is to bring together units from the G5 states of Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Chad under one single command. This new joint force will enable a fast military response to regional crises. The countries' five leaders established the *G5 du Sahel* (group of five) in February 2014. At the G5 summit in February 2017, it was decided to establish the G5 Sahel Joint Force under a joint high command, to be operational by

spring 2018. In April 2017, the African Union's Peace and Security Council approved the strategic deployment concept, and the UN Security Council also finally welcomed the deployment of the joint force with Resolution 2359 (2017). The soldiers and police officers from the G5 nations are spread across seven battalions. They are commanded from a joint headquarters in Mali and three regional commands (West, Central and East) focusing on the three interstate borders on the north-south lines between Mauritania and Mali, between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and between Niger and Chad.

The G5 Sahel states will provide ten million US dollars each to develop the force, while the EU will contribute 50 million US dollars for infrastructure, equipment and training. France will contribute eight million US dollars, 70 vehicles and communications equipment to relieve *Opération Barkhane*. The total estimated cost of the G5 Sahel Joint Force is 432 million US dollars. Germany is supporting the establishment of the regional command in Niamey in Niger as part of the infrastructure measures. The German government is providing equipment for the G5 Defence Academy in Mauritania and is financing the establishment of a regional training network in the area of biosafety with funds from the upgrading initiative.[14]

The Political and Economic Situation in Mali

Ever since Mali was founded, the central government has never had full control of the north of the country. The lack of state structures and hence the guarantee that the central government is able to assert itself, is not a problem caused by the 2012 rebellion, but has instead existed for decades. As a result, in large swathes of the country the government is incapable of safeguarding security or meeting the basic needs of its people in terms of legal certainty, education, health and infrastructure. This encourages the formation of armed groups of all kinds, whether that be religiously motivated terrorism or for criminal reasons.

The immense military efforts and expenditure on the part of the international community have so far failed to bring any sustained improvement to the security situation in Mali.

The lack of state structures is also particularly noticeable with regard to the future prospects of Mali's fast-growing population. High unemployment, rising food prices, an inadequate

education system – this is clearly an ideal breeding ground for economic, political and religiously motivated conflicts, with corresponding implications for the security situation. The massive military efforts and expenditure on the part of the international community have so far failed to bring any sustained improvement to the security situation in Mali. Although the country elected a new president, Ibrahim B. Keita, following the international military intervention in 2013, the north of the country remained unstable. Islamists continued to attack, while the Tuareg minority was subjected to retaliatory action. At the end of 2013, the Tuareg ended the ceasefire with Mali's central government. After the rebels had recaptured many cities on the borders with Algeria and Niger at the end of May 2014, a new peace agreement was negotiated in March 2015; not all parties involved signed it, however. Extremist groups in the north are still committing violent acts today. The situation remains tense and has deteriorated in some areas over recent years, which is a key reason why the international community has extended and expanded its military engagement.

Mali's internal economic and political problems should not be underestimated as contributing factors to the security crisis. Mali is one of the world's poorest countries. Agriculture is effectively its only economic sector, despite the fact that only a small part of the land can be cultivated. According to a government study published at the end of 2017, 4.1 million Malians will be affected by food insecurity by mid-2018. Around 800,000 people, mainly in northern and central Mali, are in need of humanitarian aid.[15] Focusing the international debate on the security sector, that is to say the threat posed by terrorism and rebel groups from the north, has pushed the domestic, home-grown dimensions of the situation in Mali into the background, as Africa expert Denis Tull of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) notes in his analysis.[16] He sees the "logic of the evacuation of endogenous political factors" as an attempt by the Malian government to ignore social and political factors in the Mali crisis and in this way negate its own responsibilities.

Few states in the Sahel region are able to retain a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory.

Indeed, the generally widespread weakness of state structures is not a new phenomenon in Mali, but it is one that persists today. Like its neighbours in the Sahel region, few state structures are able to assert a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory. This means their sphere of influence becomes limited to a few provinces, and often only to the regions in the immediate vicinity of the capital and seat of government. This inevitably creates a problem of legitimacy among the population. When state institutions are unable to guarantee a minimum level of security and social services, it leaves a gap for other actors to fill. In March 2015, Annette Weber and Guido Steinberg of the SWP produced a study of jihadism in Africa, which shed light on this vicious circle of eroding structures and the rise of terrorist groups.[17] According to this, the people of Mali lack confidence in state bodies, and indeed often perceive them as a threat. Moreover, Mali's peripheral populations are often closer to their neighbours on the other side of the border than to their own governments – an explosive long-term consequence of arbitrarily drawn state borders during the colonial era.

Conclusion

Europe's security is increasingly threatened by the consequences of developments in Africa. Particularly since the beginning of the refugee crisis in mid-2015, this long neglected fact has finally reached those who make decisions on security policy in Germany, too. The effects of civil wars and other conflicts, corruption, mismanagement and overpopulation are primarily mass refugee movements towards Europe (with Germany a favoured destination), but also the growth of Islamist terrorism, which finds fertile ground for recruiting new members in the dissatisfaction of the masses. Ungoverned regions provide havens

for terrorism and organised crime. In turn, terrorism and crime are having a detrimental effect on the majority of the population's living standards, such that people are increasingly seeking a brighter future outside their own country. This downward spiral of war and economic decline has been evident in Mali since 2012. Even then it was clear that it is in Germany's interests to make an active contribution to the ceasefire and to restoring stability in Mali. Not only are German interests affected when it comes to avoiding mass illegal migration, which would overwhelm Germany's overall capacity and willingness to accept foreigners; it is also a matter of drying up breeding grounds for international terrorism, securing trade routes and helping to make West Africa a region where people have a chance of living in dignity. The protection of Mali's natural resources and people's livelihoods is therefore also in the vital self-interests of Germany and Europe.

The weakness of state institutions in Mali is primarily due to the ruling elite's lack of political will as regards taking effective steps to introduce reforms over the past decades, which would have legitimised political power and encouraged stronger economic development. This also – and particularly – applies to the security sector. Policymakers may call for a sustainable security architecture, but at the same time, they are extremely cautious when it comes to actually satisfying this demand by providing the adequate resources and skills.

By focusing on security, other urgent topics such as employment and education will fall by the wayside.

Faced with the bleak situation in 2012 – to quote Denis Tull once again – the international community has, since then, rightly responded with a range of political, military and development-related assistance.[18] However, in view of the government's lack of initiative, it is time to set new standards for external aid. We must ensure that the status of being an international security risk is not used to outsource urgently needed reform projects to foreign actors – in this case the French and German military – so as to avoid having to do something themselves. There is also a danger that, by focusing the discussion on security, other equally urgent topics such as health care, education and employment will fall by the wayside.

The causes of the ongoing crisis in Mali lie not primarily in the security sector, but rather in the lack of rule-of-law structures, inadequate infrastructure and high unemployment. Even the most ambitious military support mission can do little to tackle these persistent problems in the long term – a lesson that should have been learned from the disappointing results of the Afghanistan mission. Therefore, civilian and military instruments available for peacekeeping and development cooperation should be used in a systematic, coordinated way, including by Germany. This requires a well thought-out strategy that is adequately based on one's own political and economic interests. In light of the above-mentioned threat that African wars and conflicts pose for Europe, it is obvious that Germany's own interests are largely congruent with those of African nations. Political and financial engagement in Mali of course requires the willingness to enter into long-term commitments too, and if necessary in the face of public opposition at home. The situation in Mali and neighbouring countries will not change drastically in just a few years – neither in the security sector nor any other sector.

Another aspect to consider is the evaluation of the existing military engagement. To date, there have been a lack of opportunities to determine exactly who the Malian armed forces nominate in order to benefit from German military training assistance (such as EUTM). Moreover, at the end of their training, the participants are not followed up, and no checks are made to see whether the training was successful. The question of whether the quality of Mali's army has actually improved owing to the international training remains largely unanswered. And last

but not least, the question must be asked at the political level in Germany as to whether the *Bundeswehr* will be able to cope in the long term with the material and personnel demands of Mali in terms of equipment and training levels. The security policy challenges facing Germany have increased significantly over recent years. It does not take much political foresight to predict that this trend is likely to continue. The development of a coherent strategy and intensive coordination and communication with potential partners – inside and outside the European Union – should be a top priority when making foreign and security policy. This particularly applies to the difficult political and economic climate in the Sahel states in the medium term – and above all to Mali.

–translated from German–

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