
Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation

November 28, 2025

An in-depth survey of the Arab community in Israel following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire

76.6% report a weak sense of personal security and their mood is pessimistic, mainly because of violence in Arab cities • The most important issue for the Arab public is the problem of violence and crime (74%), and they believe that the entity best able to deal with the issue is the government (39.7%), the police (22.3%), or parents and family (25%) • A large majority (74.6%) believe that the war over the past two years has negatively affected Arab-Jewish relations in the country; nonetheless, 64.6% believe that Arab-Jewish political partnership is possible • 77.4% of the respondents support the inclusion of an Arab party in the coalition that will be formed after the next Knesset elections.

Dr. Arik Rudnitzky

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Main findings

- A majority of the Arab public (64.6% of respondents) believe in Arab–Jewish political cooperation, but only 44.7% think that the Jewish public actually supports such cooperation.
- With regard to what determines the personal identity of Arab citizens, two responses stand out: Arab identity (35.9%) and Israeli citizenship (31.7%). Two additional factors are religious affiliation (17.3%) and Palestinian identity (14.7%).
- About half of the Arab public (47.3%) believe that the most realistic solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is two states based on the 1967 boundaries. Only 14% believe the most realistic solution is one state from the river to the sea for both Israelis and Palestinians, and 8.5% advocate a regional solution with international mediation. In contrast, 21% of respondents believe that no political solution is on the horizon.
- A large majority (77.4%) support the participation of an Arab party in the government formed after the next elections: 45.6% support joining any government that is formed, while 31.8% support joining a center-left government. These figures are similar to the findings of earlier surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the war.
- An overwhelming majority of the respondents (74%) stated that the most important issue for the Arab public is to address the problem of violence and crime. Other notable issues are resolving the Palestinian issue (7.6%) and the regulation of planning and construction in Arab towns (7%).
- An overwhelming majority of the Arab public (76.6%) report feeling a weak sense of personal security. The main factor they cite is the high number of violent incidents in Arab towns (51.9%), alongside concerns about the outbreak of a new war in the region (14.2%), the situation of the Palestinians in Gaza (11.3%), and economic distress (10%). In contrast, a large majority (73.4%) of survey participants report that their economic situation is relatively good—the highest rate reported in surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program during the war.
- A large proportion of the respondents (39.7%) believe that the institution most capable of addressing the problem of violence and crime in Arab society is the government, while 22.3% believe it to be the police. 25% of the respondents believe that parents and immediate family are the ones best able to address the problem.
- A large majority of the respondents (74.6%) stated that relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel have deteriorated over the past two years due to the war; 45.8% even noted that relations have deteriorated significantly. 37.5% of respondents said that their sense of belonging to the state has weakened over the past two years because of the war. At the same time, 50.8% said that the war did not affect their feelings toward the state one way or the other.

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- If elections for the Knesset were held today, the expected voter turnout in the Arab sector would be 52.4%, similar to that in the elections for the 25th Knesset (53.2%) held in November 2022. In this scenario, Hadash–Ta'al (5.3 seats) and Ra'am (3.9 seats) are expected to pass the electoral threshold, while Balad is not (2.6 seats). However, if the Joint List were re-established as a consolidation of the four Arab parties—as it existed in the past (Hadash, Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad)—the expected voter turnout in the Arab sector would jump to 61.8%, and the Joint List could win 15.5 seats.

Public sentiment in the Arab society with the conclusion of the war


A large majority of survey participants (76.6%) report a weak sense of personal security, and more than half of them (55.6%) say it is very weak. It is worth noting that in a survey conducted in June 2025, at the height of the war in Gaza and during the military confrontation between Israel and Iran, a similar level of insecurity was recorded (75.5%). It turns out that the war was not the main factor that negatively affected the sense of personal security, but rather the rise in the prevalence of violence in Arab towns. This conclusion follows from the finding that half of the respondents (51.9%) indicated that the main factor adversely affecting their mood is the level of violence in Arab towns. Over the past two years, and against the backdrop of the war, this problem has continued to take a heavy toll on Arab society: 244 people were murdered in 2023, 237 in 2024, and 228 up to November 2025.¹ Other factors negatively affecting the mood of Arab citizens are the fear of a new war erupting in the region (14.2%), the situation of the Palestinians in Gaza (11.3%), and economic distress.(10%)

In the economic domain, it appears that with the end of the war, life is returning to normal. A large majority of the respondents (73.4%) reported that their economic situation is fairly good. It should be noted that this is the highest rate measured during the past year, when the war was at its peak. According to the findings of the previous three surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program (June 2024, December 2024, and June 2025), the average proportion of respondents who assessed their economic situation as good was 65.7%. It can therefore be concluded that the prolonged war negatively affected people's self-assessment of their economic situation.


¹ Hassan Shaalan, "[Murder in the Midst of a Crowd](#)", *Ynet*, 15 November 2025 [Hebrew]

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
How would you describe your sense of personal security?
(percent)



What is the main factor adversely affecting your mood?
(percent)



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
The Arab public's agenda: Violence and crime at the top of the list

Now that the war has ended, the Arab public's agenda is once again focused on everyday issues, especially the need to address violence and crime in Arab society. Accordingly, an overwhelming majority (74%) of survey participants ranked this as the most important issue. Other day-to-day issues — such as regulation of planning and construction in Arab towns or challenges related to education, employment, and poverty — also concern Arab citizens (11% combined).

An interesting picture emerges regarding national issues when comparing the findings of the current survey with those of the June 2025 survey. The need to resolve the Palestinian issue has not disappeared from the agenda (7.6%) and has even grown in importance relative to the previous survey (4.4%). However, as long as the war in Gaza continued, the question of how it would end held a relatively high spot on the Arab public's agenda — 23.2% then ranked it as the most important issue while in the current survey only 2.1% said that aiding the Palestinians in Gaza is the most important issue for them today.

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What is the most important issue for the Arab public in Israel? (percent)




The respondents were asked which institutions are capable of dealing with the problem of violence and crime most effectively. A large proportion (39.7%) believe that the government is capable of doing so, while 22.3% said it is the police. Conversely, a significant proportion places the responsibility on parents and the immediate family (25%). The Arab public does not place much hope in political leadership nor in traditional leadership when it comes to addressing violence and crime in Arab society: only 1.5% believe that the Arab parties represented in the Knesset could handle the issue effectively, while 2.5% point to traditional institutions in Arab society. In addition, 7.5% of respondents believe that there is currently no entity capable of addressing the problem of violence and crime in Arab society.

This question was first presented in a survey conducted in May 2023 and appeared again in the current survey. Comparing the findings from the two surveys reveals a shift in the Arab public's stance on this issue. Two and a half years ago, the Arab public was divided on whether responsibility for solving the violence problem lay with the state's executive institutions (the government and the police — 39.5% in May 2023), or with family-based and traditional mechanisms within Arab society itself (traditional authorities and the immediate family — 29.7% in May 2023). Today, a considerable proportion still places responsibility on Arab society's internal mechanisms (27.5%), especially the immediate family, but most of the Arab public is convinced that the state's executive institutions (the government and the police — 62%) are most capable of addressing the problem of violence and crime. Notably, the proportion of respondents with no opinion on the matter has almost completely disappeared. After more than two years in which Arab society has paid a heavy price in blood as the

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level of crime has risen, there is now greater understanding that only a systemic and comprehensive solution initiated by the state's executive mechanisms can resolve the issue.




When will an effective solution be found to the problem of violence and crime in Arab society? 22.3% believe that the problem will be solved within one to two years, while 14.5% believe that it will take three to five years. It is possible that these respondents — 36.8% in total — place their hopes on the emergence of a new government after the next elections (expected to take place in the fall of 2026). This finding is consistent with the previous one, according to which a large share of the Arab public places responsibility for the issue on the government. In contrast, 34.4% believe that it will take years to solve the problem of violence and crime. This view is based on the assumption that the issue constitutes a complex strategic challenge that cannot be resolved in the near future. Meanwhile, 28.8% do not know when the problem will be solved.

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Arab-Jewish relations, political partnership, and the sense of belonging to the state

A large majority of the respondents (74.6%) believe that relations between Arab and Jewish citizens have deteriorated over the past two years as a result of the war; 45.8% believe that relations have worsened significantly. The responses to this question become increasingly negative as the level of education rises: those with an academic education (a bachelor’s degree or higher) are more likely than those with a lower level of education (up to 12 years of schooling, with or without a matriculation certificate) to believe that the war has adversely affected Arab–Jewish relations.





Nonetheless, most participants (64.6%) indicated that in principle they believe in Arab–Jewish political partnership. Thirty-four percent said they do not; of those, 26.1% said they do not believe in it at all. The responses revealed significant variation by age and by political orientation. Belief in the possibility of Arab–Jewish political partnership increases with age. In the young adult group (ages 18 to 34), opinions are divided: half of them (51.6%) believe in it, but a third (33.6%) said they do not believe in it at all — the highest rate among all the age groups. In the older age groups, a clear majority supports Arab–Jewish political cooperation.

An examination of the responses by voting intentions in the next Knesset elections (2026) shows that supporters of the Jewish parties (76.8%), supporters of Ra’am (70.6%), and supporters of Hadash–Ta’al (67.9%) expressed very high levels of belief in the possibility of Arab–Jewish political partnership. In contrast, only 40.9% of Balad supporters expressed such a belief, while a majority of Balad supporters (59.1%) do not believe in it. It is worth noting that a relatively high level of belief in

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
the possibility of Arab–Jewish political partnership (60.8%) was found among respondents who said they do not intend to participate in the upcoming elections.




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Survey participants were asked whether the Jewish public supports Arab–Jewish political partnership. Opinions on this question are divided: 44.6% believe that there is support among the Jewish public; however, the vast majority of them (41%) believe that this support is limited. In contrast, 50.7% believe that the Jewish public does not support the idea; 29.7% of them are convinced that there is no support at all.

The responses to this question revealed variation by age and by voting intentions in the next Knesset elections. A large majority in the youngest age group (18–34) believe that there is no support among the Jewish public for Arab–Jewish political partnership. By contrast, about half of those in the older age groups believe that there is. Among Hadash–Ta’al and Ra’am supporters, there appears to be a slight majority who believe that the Jewish public supports Arab–Jewish political partnership, at least in principle, whereas a majority of Balad supporters and of those who do not intend to vote in the upcoming elections do not.



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


37.5 percent of the respondents said that their sense of belonging to the state had weakened over the past two years as a result of the war, while only 10.4% said that their sense of belonging had strengthened. The most striking finding is that the largest share of the respondents (50.8%) stated that the war had neither strengthened nor weakened their sense of belonging to the state. The answers to this question showed no significant variation by age group or level of education, but did vary by religion: the proportion of Druze who said that their sense of belonging to the state had strengthened over the past two years (42.3%) was much higher than that of Christians (11.6%) or of Muslims (7%). At the same time, half of the respondents in each of the three religious groups said that their sense of belonging to the state had not been affected one way or the other by the war over the past two years. It should be noted that similar results — with respect to both the overall distribution of responses and the significant differences by religion — were found in the survey conducted last June, at the height of the war in Gaza and against the backdrop of the direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran.


In the context of voting intentions in the next Knesset elections (2026), it was found that the dominant share of Hadash–Ta'al and Ra'am supporters said that their sense of belonging to the state had not changed over the past two years (49% and 49.5%, respectively), although the proportion of Hadash–Ta'al supporters who said that their sense of belonging had weakened was higher than for Ra'am supporters (44.5% vs 39.8%). The dominant view among Balad supporters reflects a weakening sense of belonging to the state (59.2%). In contrast, a large proportion of supporters of the Jewish parties (44.9%) said that their sense of belonging to the state had strengthened.

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Has your sense of belonging to the state strengthened or weakened as a result of the war during the past two years?
(by religious affiliation, percent)



Has your sense of belonging to the state strengthened or weakened as a result of the war during the past two years?
(by voting intentions in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)



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The question of personal identity

According to the survey findings, the personal identity of Arab citizens is shaped primarily by two main components: Arab identity (35.9%) and Israeli citizenship (31.7%). Components of secondary importance include religious affiliation (17.3%) and Palestinian identity (14.7%).

A comparative analysis of surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program over the past two years — before, during and after the war— leads to several interesting conclusions. Arab identity, Palestinian identity, and religious affiliation have returned to their pre-war levels of importance. In contrast, the component of Israeli citizenship has strengthened significantly, at the expense of respondents who—prior to the war—did not know which component of their personal identity was most important. The prolonged war pushed many Arab Israelis to clarify their sense of personal identity, and it appears that a considerable number reached the conclusion that Israeli citizenship plays a key role in defining who they are.

Secondly, Arab identity has once again become the dominant component of identity in Arab society (a trend already evident in the June 2025 survey). This finding is not surprising given that Arab identity carries deep meanings — national identity, connection to the land, culture, tradition, and values.² At the same time, in the current survey (conducted as the war ended), the Palestinian identity component strengthened compared with the average during the wartime surveys, returning to its pre-war level. This finding indicates that in times of national conflict, members of a minority group tend to downplay elements of their identity that might directly clash with the identity of the dominant majority.


It should be noted that the survey presented the Israeli component using the term “citizenship” (an instrumental component) rather than “identity” (an emotional component). Nonetheless, the trend emerging from the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program over the past two years (November 2023–November 2025) shows that Israeli citizenship has become one of the more important components of identity among Arab citizens.

An analysis of identity components according to voting intentions in the upcoming Knesset elections (2026) shows that Arab identity is the dominant component for supporters of all Arab parties. Among Hadash–Ta’al and Ra’am supporters, Israeli citizenship ranks second, while among Balad supporters, Palestinian identity ranks second. Among supporters of the Jewish parties, Israeli citizenship is dominant, followed by Arab identity.


² Amal Jamal, *Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of Indigeneity* (Routledge, 2011), pp. 102-103.

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What is the most important component of your personal identity?
(percent)



What is the most important component of your personal identity?
(by voting intentions in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)




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The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict


About half of the survey participants (47.3%) believe that the most realistic solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Another 21% believe that there is no political solution on the horizon, 14% think that the most realistic solution is a single state from the river to the sea shared by Palestinians and Jews, while a smaller proportion (8.5%) believe that a regional solution with international mediation is the most realistic path forward (an option first introduced in the current survey).

A large proportion of supporters of the Arab parties believe that the two-state solution is the most realistic solution to the conflict: 55.8% of Hadash–Ta’al supporters, 52.1% of Balad supporters, and 51.5% of Ra’am supporters. In contrast, among supporters of the Jewish parties (37.2%) and among those who do not intend to vote (37.4%), there is a lower level of belief in the two-state solution.

This question has been asked several times in surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years among the Arab public in Israel. Until the outbreak of the war, only a minority of the Arab public believed that the most realistic solution was a two-state solution, while most believed that there is no political solution on the horizon. Following the war, the two-state solution has come to be seen by the Arab public as a more realistic option relative to the other alternatives.



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Survey participants were asked when they think the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians will end and reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved. A majority (61.4%) do not believe that reconciliation is on the horizon. In contrast, a significant proportion (20.8%) believe that the conflict will end, and reconciliation will be achieved within a decade, of whom 14.1% believe it will end within no more than five years. Compared with the findings of the survey conducted a year ago (December 2024), at the height of the war, it appears that there have been no real shifts or changes in the Arab public's views on this question, even now that the war has ended.

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Arab participation in Knesset elections and the question of joining the government

The survey examined two scenarios as to how the Arab parties might organize ahead of the upcoming elections. According to one scenario, the Arab parties would run separately, in three electoral lists, as they did in the previous elections — Hadash-Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad. In this scenario, the expected voter turnout among Arab citizens is 52.4%, similar to the turnout recorded in the 2022 elections (53.2%). Hadash-Ta'al is expected to win 5.3 seats, and Ra'am 3.9 seats (passing the electoral threshold), while Balad is not expected to pass the threshold (only 2.6 seats).

According to a different scenario, the Joint List would be re-established as a consolidation of the four Arab parties (Hadash, Ta'al, Ra'am, and Balad), as it existed in several election cycles over the past decade (2015, September 2019, and 2020). In that case, Arab voter turnout is expected to surge to 61.8%, and the Joint List could win 15.5 seats in the Knesset, similar to the record achieved in the 23rd Knesset elections (2020).

The difference between the two scenarios is substantial: in the first scenario, the Arab parties would jointly win around 12 seats, but only 9 of them would translate into actual representation in the Knesset, since Balad is not expected to pass the electoral threshold. In the second scenario, the Arab parties would win 15 seats — six more than they are expected to receive under the first scenario — and all of the parties would be represented in the Knesset.

The limitations of these findings should be taken into account. First, Ra'am's true electoral strength is greater than what the current survey predicts. Due to sampling limitations, the survey did not capture the views of certain segments of the Arab population, such as Bedouin tribes in the Negev. Many of them typically vote for Ra'am, and therefore Ra'am's actual strength is underestimated by the survey.

Second, the voter turnout measured in the first scenario (52.4%) is lower than what was recorded in the previous survey (57%, June 2025). The reason lies in the broader political atmosphere among the Arab public. The survey data were collected during a period of intense political debate over the elections for the chairmanship of the Supreme Monitoring Committee — an Arab, non-parliamentary representative body that brings together nearly all political parties and movements active in the Arab public sphere. A dispute erupted among the Arab parties regarding the process for selecting the committee's chair and its members, leading Ra'am to boycott the committee's elections. Among the Arab public, this was widely perceived as a lack of cooperation among the Arab parties and the absence of agreed-upon political leadership in Arab society.³ It is therefore very likely that these developments contributed to the relatively low turnout rate measured in the current survey.


³ Jalal Banna, "[Who is monitoring the Monitoring Committee](#)", *Yisrael Hayom*, November 22, 2025 [Hebrew]

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How will Arab citizens vote in the 2026 Knesset elections?

Scenario 1: Voter turnout 52.4%


(by party, number of seats)



How will Arab citizens vote in the 2026 elections?

Scenario 2: Voter turnout 61.8%

(by party, number of seats)



Survey participants were also asked whether an Arab party should join the coalition formed after the next Knesset elections. The question was presented in general terms, without reference to either of the scenarios described above. A large majority of participants (77.4%) support such a move; most of them (45.6%) even support the participation of an Arab party in any coalition that is formed, not just a center-left government. Conversely, only 18.9% oppose the idea — including 8.4% who oppose both the entry of Arab parties into a coalition and support for a coalition from the outside (by means of a blocking voting “bloc” in the Knesset).

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The highest level of support for an Arab party joining the coalition was recorded among Ra'am supporters (94.8%) and supporters of the Jewish parties (88.2%), followed by supporters of Hadash-Ta'al (74.5%) and Balad supporters (73.2%). A somewhat lower, though still relatively high, level of support was recorded among those who do not intend to participate in the upcoming elections (64.3%). The trend emerging from the surveys conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Program in recent years is clear: Arab public support for an Arab party joining the coalition is stable and consistent.

Should an Arab party join the coalition following the next elections? (percent)

Yes, 77.4

Yes, any government that is formed after the elections, **45.6**

Yes, but only a center-left coalition, **31.8**


No, 18.9

No, but an Arab party could support the coalition from the outside in exchange for real benefits, **10.5**

An Arab party should not join the coalition or support it from the outside under any circumstances, **8.4**


Should an Arab party join the coalition following the next elections? (by voting intentions in the 2026 Knesset elections, percent)

■ Yes ■ No




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Should an Arab party join the coalition following the next elections?
(by survey, percent)



When will the Arab-Israeli conflict end and reconciliation be achieved between the two peoples?
(by survey, percent)



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The survey was initiated by the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, in cooperation with the Israel Office of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

The survey was carried out by the Stat-Net Research Institute under the direction of Yousef Makladeh.

The data were collected during the period November 13–18, 2025, in a telephone survey carried out in Arabic among a representative sample of the adult Arab population in Israel (aged 18+).

Size of the sample: 500. Sample error: ± 4.4 percent.