



**-----KAS-CCAS- Event-----**

**CHINA'S THIRD NEW ERA UNDER XI JINPING**

**Thursday, March 31, 2022**

**18:30-20:30 hrs.**

**New Delhi**

In the past five years, since his rise to become paramount leader, Xi Jinping has sought to strengthen the CCP's legitimacy by tightening ideological control and reviving Maoist and Marxist principles within China. Last year, for instance, Xi called on his fellow party members to apply Marxist principles and to strengthen their belief in communism and "socialism with Chinese characteristics." This ideological tightening has since been reflected in research and academic institutions, media, and civil society. Now, it will also include Xi's "Thought".

This development has prompted many observers to speculate whether the revived ideology with Xi Jinping characteristics is truly so embedded across Chinese society. On this issue, the authors offer their insights into what the 19<sup>th</sup> party congress means in terms of ideology and China's domestic and foreign policy. With the elevation of Xi's new guiding ideology, the CCP leadership signalled an end to the reform era as we knew it, proclaiming the advancement of a "strong" China that would strive to shape the global order in accordance with the national interest and its vision.

Xi's China has been gradually changing; its domestic policy is drifting from authoritarianism to a totalitarian approach. Foreign policy is steadily becoming more assertive. In many ways the 19<sup>th</sup> party congress solidified Xi's domestic and foreign policy trajectory of the past five years. The key question arising from the congress, however, appears to be whether Xi is also changing China in a more thoroughgoing way. Xi's ideological campaigns seek increased control over Chinese society. And indeed, Chinese society appears to be more and more muted. The question remains of whether that silence is the product of trust in the CCP and its leaders, or whether it is the product of fear.

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### *Programme Overview*

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Xi Jinping's acolytes claim, China had already embarked on a third thirty-year era under his leadership, like those of Mao and Deng before him. This period also saw an outpouring of criticism against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese President, not witnessed since the Tiananmen Square events in 1989. The resentment was sparked by Xi Jinping abolishing tenure limits that govern the cadres' terms in office as well as the mishandling of the initial stages of the Covid pandemic. It is also the period when Xi Jinping began using the country's security apparatus to further consolidate his position and impose progressively restrictive controls on society. He followed through on his slogan: "party, government, military, civilian and academic; east, west, south, north and centre, the Party leads everything"!

This panel discussion aims to ascertain how Xi Jinping's tightening his grip on members of the Politburo and the higher echelons of the Party has impacted the internal working of China. It will also explore China's attitude and posture towards India, which have undergone definite change since Xi Jinping adopted an aggressive foreign policy to achieve the 'rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'. This includes the ongoing incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh since May 2020 along with an emphasis on China's perception battle.

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The panel of speakers comprised:

**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade**, *President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy*

**Mr. Peter Rimmele**, *Resident Representative to India, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*

**Mr. Frédéric Grare**, *Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations*

**Amb Vijay Gokhale**, *Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India*

**Ms. Indrani Bagchi**, *CEO, Ananta Aspen Centre*

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### *Aims and Objectives*

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The objectives of the CCAS-KAS event were to discuss the period after the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress and the impact it will have not only on China's future but on the world at large. After Mao Zedong died, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues sought to prevent "the overconcentration of power" by introducing fixed terms of office, term limits, and a mandatory retirement age; delegating authority from the Communist Party to government agencies; and holding regular meetings of Party institutions. All these moves were designed to decentralize authority, regularize political life, and check dictatorial power.

The discussion addressed the following aspects:

- The reasons why the institutional rules and precedents laid down since Deng Xiaoping's time failed to prevent the emergence of another strongman leader like Mao Zedong.
- Has a "New Era" in China's modern history begun? Will historians of the future, looking back on 2018, single out a recent event as so pivotal that it divides time into a clear before and after?
- how Xi Jinping's tightening his grip on members of the Politburo and the higher echelons of the Party has impacted the internal working of China?
- How will his aggressive foreign policy change in the future, especially in the aftermath of the Ukraine war?

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### *Key Takeaways*

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- In October-November 2012, when Xi Jinping was appointed the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the President of China i.e. all three posts were given after a gap of thirty years at the same time.
- This resulted because of a political turmoil in China, when another princeling, Bo Xilai, made a bid for the top posts and wanted to oust Xi Jinping. Bo Xilai lost and Xi Jinping made it, but his case highlighted the laxity that has crept into China's domestic security apparatus and the disregard that members of the CCP nomenklatura had for party discipline and regulations concerning contact with foreigners. The Party was shaken and at the 18th Party Congress where Xi Jinping came in, he was given a lot of power to clean the Party from within.
- Xi Jinping's mantra "the party, government, military, civilian and academic, east, west, south, north and centre, the party leads everything" spelt out his ambitions very clearly. This had not happened for a very long time, at least since Mao's time, but the world was slow in reading Xi Jinping's message.
- At the 18th party Congress, Xi Jinping also exposed the idea of the China dream. China Dream, to be achieved by 2021 includes: making the Chinese people prosperous – or abolition of poverty; making the Chinese nation wealthy; and "the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation". The last promise includes the "recovery of sovereignty over Chinese territory lost through the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers"
- At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping spelt out all the components of the China Dream and gave the target dates for achieving each. The dates are important. 2021, for example, is the centenary year of the CCP and 2049 is the hundredth year of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

- The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has set out to usher in a new era for China with its third revision of history, by elevating Xi Jinping to the level of, or arguably even above, his famous predecessors.
- China's third new era coincides with what the German Chair of the Munich Security Conference, Mr. Ischinger, referred to as "a new and dangerous era" that has emerged globally. An era of open conflict over which system should prevail, our current international system based on the values of freedom of expression, democracy and the rule of law, or an authoritarian system where the law of military might prevail in the international arena.
- As China's global influence grows in tandem with its economy, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is now being pressed into the service of the Party's external operations. People in India might think that this is limited to countries with significant overseas Chinese populations. Yet there is sufficient reason to believe that the surge of outreach efforts that are orchestrated by the UFWD is influencing operations to promote the CPC's political goals even in countries that do not have significant numbers of ethnic Chinese citizens.
- As far as the Third new era is concerned, a central authoritarian figure is back at the centre of everything in China and this has led to a shifting of both domestic and foreign policies. Between 2012 and 2022, all authority has been arrogated by President Xi Jinping, who is now the chairman of all the major commissions and the head of all the Party's central leading groups. The third term of President Xi is a foregone conclusion because he is not only in complete command of the Party, but he has also amended the State Constitution to allow him to serve as president for a third and potentially even a fourth term.
- It has to however be added that China's ambitions for its third new era are confronted with a range of serious obstacles. While Western economies are recovering from the Covid-19 crisis, China's economy - which emerged faster than the US and Europe from the first Covid wave in 2020 - is now slowing down. Beijing needs to be able to increase domestic consumption to drive growth, but it is not easy to do so at current income levels, especially in the absence of a welfare system. GDP growth is slowing and the bursting of the real estate bubble, as the "Evergrande debt crisis" shows, is complicating matters. In this climate, and until domestic consumption picks up again, exports remain irreplaceable as a lever of growth. But in a context of much less favourable international relations than in the past, they too will be difficult to leverage

- In Ukraine, China initially supported Russia's aggressiveness thinking it could reap the benefits without sharing the risk. But now, China finds itself embroiled in a situation that could harm its interest. The unprecedented sanctions that have been put in place by Europe and the U.S. may seriously affect both China's economic interests through either direct or secondary sanctions. Thus, in China's Third New Era, due to Xi Jinping's ignorance, China has already wasted the political goodwill and capital it had in Europe.
- China's third new era has only just begun, but is already characterised by a foreign policy of assertiveness and aggressiveness second to none. Gone is the era where China wanted to "keep a low profile and bide its time."
- All this, however, does not, of course, mean that China's rise is over and that we are collectively going back to the status quo ante, the war in Ukraine is far from over, and where it will ultimately turn is still undetermined. Nevertheless, what is certain is that China will now have to face much more serious challenges, which may threaten also its domestic economic progress.

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### *Key Statements*

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**Mr. Peter Rimmele**, Resident Representative to India, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

“China's third new era has only just begun, but is already characterised by a foreign policy of assertiveness and aggressiveness second to none. Gone is the era where China wanted to “keep a low profile and bide its time.”

**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade**, President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy

“**Xi Jinping** made it clear that political loyalty and reliability will be the determining criteria for promotions hence forth. The same message was conveyed to the party and to the government. This led to the Party becoming omnipresent and Xi Jinping’s mantra “The party, government, military, civilian and academic, east, west, south, north and centre, the party leads everything” spelt out his ambitions very clearly. This had not happened for a very long time, at least since Mao’s time, but the world was slow in reading Xi Jinping’s message.”

**Amb. Vijay Gokhale**, *Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India*

“As China’s global influence grows in tandem with its economy, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is now being pressed into the service of the Party’s external operations. People in India might think that this is limited to countries with significant overseas Chinese populations. Yet there is sufficient reason to believe that the surge of outreach efforts that are orchestrated by the UFWD is influencing operations to promote the CPC’s political goals even in countries that do not have significant numbers of ethnic Chinese citizens.”

**Mr. Frédéric Grare**, *Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations*

“In Ukraine, China initially supported Russia’s aggressiveness thinking it could reap the benefits without sharing the risk. China finds itself embroiled in a situation that could harm its interest. The unprecedented sanctions that have been put in place by Europe and the U.S. may seriously affect both



China's economic interests through either direct or secondary sanctions. Thus, in China's Third New Era, due to Xi Jinping's ignorance, China has already wasted the political goodwill and capital it had in Europe."

**Ms. Indrani Bagchi**, *CEO, Ananta Aspen Centre*

"India should be prepared for more trouble on the boundary as it continues its infrastructure building activity and improves defence deployments. Indians should step away from talking of "differing perceptions" of the LAC. They are not "perceptions". They are two claim lines that overlap in certain areas."

**Mr. Peter Rimmele**, Resident Representative to India, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, has not revised its historical course too often, in fact until recently it had done so only twice - with far-reaching ramifications and consequences not only



for China but the world at large. The first time was in 1945, when Mao Zedong set out to overthrow the Chang Kai-Shek nationalist forces and establish the People's Republic. The second time occurred in 1981, when the country's emerging leader, Deng Xiaoping, openly denounced various policies of the Cultural Revolution and endorsed the liberalisation of China's market economy.

This time around, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has set out to usher in a new era for China with its third revision of history, by elevating Xi Jinping to the level of, or arguably even above, his famous predecessors.

China's third new era coincides with what the German Chair of the Munich Security Conference, Mr. Ischinger, referred to as "a new and dangerous era" that has emerged globally. An era of open conflict over which system should prevail, our current international system based on the values of freedom of expression, democracy and the rule of law, or an authoritarian system where the law of military might prevail in the international arena.

Hereby, it is clear from a European perspective that the EU urgently needs to ask itself how it can formulate a united China policy and strategically position itself in the "great game" of rivalry between the global hegemony, the USA, and Beijing. In reaching such a goal, Germany and the EU are relying on multilateral cooperation with like-minded democratic partners like India as arguably never before in the long history of ties between our countries. This applies particularly with regard to supply chain security issues, as the EU and India must continue to make concrete efforts to reduce dependencies in the years ahead. The hope that economic cooperation and investments could deter authoritarian regimes from warmongering has vanished into thin air after Russia's invasion of the Ukraine, just as the German approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. While the world is focused on the Ukraine crisis, China could use the opportune moment to invade Taiwan, which has been a thorn in Beijing's side for decades and is seen as an integral part of Xi Jinping's "One China" policy.

- It has to however be added that China's ambitions for its third new era are confronted with a range of serious obstacles. While Western economies are recovering from the Covid-19 crisis, China's economy - which emerged faster than the US and Europe from the first Covid wave in 2020 - is now slowing down. Beijing needs to be able to increase domestic consumption to drive growth, but it is not easy to do so at current income levels, especially in the absence of a welfare system. GDP growth is slowing and the bursting of the real estate bubble, as the “Evergrande debt crisis” shows, is complicating matters. In this climate, and until domestic consumption picks up again, exports remain irreplaceable as a lever of growth. But in a context of much less favourable international relations than in the past, they too will be difficult to leverage.

China's third new era has only just begun, but is already characterised by a foreign policy of assertiveness and aggressiveness second to none. Gone is the era where China wanted to “keep a low profile and bide its time.”

The state that China has become under Xi Jinping, thrives on rigid discipline that must be constantly enforced - so that normal social and institutional desires for more autonomy and freedoms do not rise and challenge the dictatorial regime. The history is fraught with examples of rise and fall of totalitarian regimes for human beings by nature are freedom loving and resilient but when pushed to the brink, they are likely to break the chains!

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### *Remarks*

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**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade**, President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy

In October-November 2012, when Xi Jinping was appointed the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the President of China i.e. all three posts were given after a gap of thirty years at the same time. This resulted because of a political turmoil in China, when another princeling, Bo Xilai, made a bid for the top posts and wanted to oust Xi Jinping. Bo Xilai lost and Xi Jinping made it, but his case highlighted the laxity that has crept into China's domestic security apparatus and the disregard that members of the CCP nomenklatura had for party discipline and regulations concerning contact with foreigners. The Party was shaken and at the 18th Party Congress where Xi Jinping came in, he was given a lot of power to clean the Party from within.

The day after taking over these posts, he convened an enlarged meeting of the military commission, and made it clear that political loyalty and reliability will be the determining criteria for promotions hence forth. The same message was conveyed to the party and to the government. This led to the Party becoming omnipresent and Xi Jinping's mantra

"The party, government, military, civilian and academic, east, west, south, north and centre, the party leads everything" spelt out his ambitions very clearly. This had not happened for a very long time, at least since Mao's time, but the world was slow in reading Xi Jinping's message.

India realized it in 2013 when an intrusion was carried out by the People's Liberation Army, in the Depsang plains. It was an unusual intrusion. It was long in nature, it was deeper in depth, but it happened just days before Li Keqiang was to visit India for the first time as the Chinese Premier. Soon thereafter, Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative, yet another expansive project and an expansionist project, the aim of which was to span the globe. Essentially, it meant linking production

centres inside China, to natural resource centres and markets across the world over a China built communications pathway. He also set up the western theatre command, in order to give military support to the Belt and Road Initiative, and to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which was also set up around the same time in 2015. Along with the BRI, a conference on peripheral diplomacy spelt out very clearly for the first time where China actually assured countries, who would become friendly to them, of a security umbrella. This conference also identified countries as friends and enemies and also promised long term anguish and pressure for countries who did not subscribe to China's policies.

At the 18th party Congress, Xi Jinping also exposed the idea of the China dream. China Dream, to be achieved by 2021 includes: making the Chinese people prosperous – or abolition of poverty; making the Chinese nation wealthy; and “the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation”. The last promise includes the “recovery of sovereignty over Chinese territory lost through the imposition of unequal treaties by hostile foreign powers”. This last reference is to the “hundred years of humiliation” that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) repeats consistently in its narratives. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping spelt out all the components of the China Dream and gave the target dates for achieving each. The dates are important. 2021, for example, is the centenary year of the CCP and 2049 is the hundredth year of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). For the CCP both the dates are very important to its legitimacy and its monopoly on power as China's sole ruling party. In other words, the China Dream is welded to the Party's existence and continuance as the sole ruling Party. The China Dream is not just a military ambition, but encompasses a whole range of national aspirations. Most importantly, it includes the idea of ‘Community of Common Destiny’, or China's alternative to the current system of democracies and values.

In other words, China Dream is a programme intended to build national power and China into a rival of the U.S. or capable of overtaking it. And within months, there was a reaction from the US and trade war between the United States and China was initiated. It was not just a trade war, the US was precise in its targeting to prevent China's rise and singled out ‘Made in China2025’ as well as its adjunct agenda of ‘Civil-Military Integration’, seen as the militarising of technology. The US picked on China's rapidly rising Shenzhen-based telecommunications company ZTE in April 2018. US sanctions on ZTE, including the conditions imposed following a reprieve granted on the personal intervention of Chinese President Xi Jinping, have virtually destroyed it. Next was China's fastest expanding hi-tech telecommunications company Huawei. Like ZTE, this too has clear links to China's People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The sanctions hit China hard and soon after, COVID struck and that came on top of an already weakening Chinese economy. Unemployment, the cost of goods and living rose in China and the

national budget, which was announced for two years after COVID indicated a 20 to 25% cut in every ministry, except to the People's Liberation Army and the security apparatus. These indicate that all is not well in China and with increasing decline in economy and pressure from the US, anti-China feeling across the globe is on an all-time high. The PLA daily in its editorial, which was reflective of the thinking of the armed forces, advised again, that steps be taken, lest the foreign powers inflame the existing dissatisfaction and create trouble inside China. The people were also unhappy at the mishandling of COVID but surprising were the number of articles posted at certain personal risks on social media by eminent academics and journalists.

The Ukraine war has again brought President Xi Jinping and his foreign policy at loggerheads with the US. After the February 4 summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing on the side-lines of the Beijing Winter Olympics, where Putin briefed Xi Jinping -- or certainly gave him at least a fair insight into his plans for Ukraine -- China has been unwavering in its support to Russia. This despite the US repeatedly urging China, including as recently as March 5, to join the US and West in their sanctions against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The joint statement itself was like a declaration against powers that exercise hegemony over the international world order, indicating a joint front against the US. The ideological affinity between Russia and China has prompted China to being very careful in the overt statements about the crisis in Ukraine and they have not joined the United States. In fact, they've resisted the U.S. efforts to join with them. They have extended some kind of support to the Russians, and there are reports about them having leaked information given by the U.S. to Russia. However, at the same time, while China is trying to show that it is independent, there is a lot of anxiety inside China, particularly in the Chinese Communist Party because the members of the Chinese Communist Party are worried that if the United States imposes sanctions, they would be very badly hit. As almost 70 per cent of the director level officers at counties and above in China send their children to the United States for studies, or their relatives' children and the total count done by the Chinese Communist Party members is that 300 million people will be affected if the sanctions are imposed. A lot of them have their money secreted in United States, their businesses are going to be affected. Thus, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, both nurtured within the apparatus of the respective communist parties, both have global ambitions and at this point in time, their neighbours certainly have to be very careful.



**Mr. Frédéric Grare**, *Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations*

The third new era under Xi Jinping is a period of consolidation of Xi Jinping's power, reorganization of the PLA and reassertion of the CCP's control over every aspect of Chinese life. In other words, a period of a speedy return to totalitarianism. This assertion of power made the world look at China differently. The perception of China in Europe has drastically changed over the past few years, China is no longer seen today only as a huge potential economic opportunity but also as a distant threat. It is still seen in some quarters as a huge economic opportunity but this perception is considerably mitigated by a sense that it is also a threat. Europe has started realising that blind cooperation with China will have consequences and China might exploit European interests.

It is multi-dimensional also because, over the past few years, China has weaponized every single activity that it has been involved in, including the most basic ones for geopolitical gain. China has also distorted multilateralism and the world order to make it suit its interest. In China, the conflict of interest is increasingly obvious with two recent phenomena. The first one is the COVID crisis and the second is the Ukraine war. The COVID crisis was the first time that China had figured so prominently on an issue of such critical importance to European citizens and government. As such, China did become a conspicuous part of policy debates around COVID-19 Europe. More importantly, China did put pressure on EU officials during the crisis to soften their criticism of China, attacked European countries and spread false accusations all over. This episode will have an impact on the Europe-China relationship long after the crisis subsides. They indicate nevertheless, a new mindset viz a viz Beijing, which did not exist before Xi Jinping and which has resulted as a direct outcome of the consolidation of its power. Countries are exiting the 17 plus one and looking towards the Indo Pacific strategy to find an alternative to dependency on China.

The position taken by Beijing on Ukraine is unlikely to improve its relationship with Europe. China did not want the war to happen, but ever since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it has stressed that Moscow's security concerns should be respected, insists that sanctions should be abandoned and tried to divide European and Americans over the issue. The war in Ukraine also demonstrated limits and constraints that Xi Jinping's China is now encountering, as the French Sinologist **Francois-Yves Damon** recently wrote, for a long time, China may have thought it could enjoy the benefits of

commercial and financial interdependence while challenging the liberal world order and the Asia Pacific security. Indeed, in Ukraine, China initially supported Russia's aggressiveness thinking it could reap the benefits without sharing the risk. China finds itself embroiled in a situation that could harm its interest. The unprecedented sanctions that have been put in place by Europe and the U.S. may seriously affect both China's economic interests through either direct or secondary sanctions. Thus, in China's Third New Era, due to Xi Jinping's ignorance, China has already wasted the political goodwill and capital it had in Europe.

All this, however, does not, of course, mean that China's rise is over and that we are collectively going back to the status quo ante, the war in Ukraine is far from over, and where it will ultimately turn is still undetermined. Nevertheless, what is certain is that China will now have to face much more serious challenges, which may threaten also its domestic economic progress.





**Amb Vijay Gokhale, *Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India***

India faces a fundamentally different situation today from what it faced in the past 75 years because India has a superpower on its doorstep now. As China looms larger on the world stage, it will impact all areas from politics and security to business and innovation in India. Therefore, a careful study of China's every aspect is no longer a question of choice. A set of mandatory courses at the university level across disciplines, sciences, humanities, and business studies is an absolute necessity. The

most unfortunate part is that the available material to understand is written largely from the western perspective and for India to make diplomatic, military or business decisions based on information which comes out of the West is a fundamentally untenable proposition. India's perspective is necessary for it to make apt policies concerning China.

As China's global influence grows in tandem with its economy, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) is now being pressed into the service of the Party's external operations. People in India might think that this is limited to countries with significant overseas Chinese populations. Yet there is sufficient reason to believe that the surge of outreach efforts that are orchestrated by the UFWD is influencing operations to promote the CPC's political goals even in countries that do not have significant numbers of ethnic Chinese citizens. The International Department of the Communist Party operating from inside the Chinese Embassy has been able to penetrate the political structures of India and the State Council Information Office has been publishing 5 to 10-page supplements in our major newspapers which is alarming!

The paucity of public literature on the CPC's activities through mechanisms like the UFWD needs to be redressed as soon as possible to comprehend the magnitude of the challenge that India potentially confronts in the coming decades. Indians can no longer afford to have a superficial understanding of their largest neighbour and would-be hegemon.

As far as the Third new era is concerned, a central authoritarian figure is back at the centre of everything in China and this has led to a shifting of both domestic and foreign policies. Between 2012 and 2022, all authority has been arrogated by President Xi Jinping, who is now the chairman of all the major commissions and the head of all the Party's central leading groups. The third term of President Xi is a

foregone conclusion because he is not only in complete command of the Party, but he has also amended the State Constitution to allow him to serve as president for a third and potentially even a fourth term.

The 20th Party Congress in 2022 might rubber stamp Xi Jinping for a third term, but one needs to look beyond the superficial analysis of what is happening in China, and from an Indian perspective, go much deeper into it. Irrespective of the outcome of the Part Congress, India should focus on the following aspects: One, we urgently need to write good books and pieces on China. Two, we must introduce China-related studies in all university curriculums. Three, we need to build public opinion rationally, but without demagoguery, or hyperbole by making the debate over China informed and educated. Four, we need to recognize that China has made substantial achievements as well, and learn from them, especially on the economic and technological fronts. We cannot trash China entirely merely because we have differences with them. Five, we need to reflect very carefully on what the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi said on his recent visit to India. He said that China is not seeking a unipolar Asia and respects India's traditional role in the region. In India, we need to see whether their actions, their deeds match their words. India should no longer take their words at face value. And lastly, we need to recognize that this larger than life projection of China, which we all think about in India, is a domestic Chinese requirement and we need to grapple with a much more sophisticated, much more nuanced understanding of the internal dynamics of China.



**Ms. Indrani Bagchi**, *CEO, Ananta Aspen Centre*

China's border incursion in April 2020 in Ladakh should not come as a surprise, as India was at fault in believing that China would make space for India's rise and that it was a responsible power. The downhill gradient in the India-China relationship started in 2008 when the Chinese realized they had made a mistake in letting India get the nuclear waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By 2010, China, started giving stapled visas to Indians from both Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. In 2013, while on one hand, China was talking about setting a new path for India-China relations where China would be more accommodating to India, on the other hand, the number of incursions at the border increased. China took several steps to challenge India i.e., blocking India's entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the announcement of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015 and the Doklam crisis in 2017.

The Doklam crisis was followed by two informal meetings between President Xi and Prime Minister Modi resulted in no concrete positive development in India-China relations. Trouble had started brewing even before the Galwan valley incursion by the Chinese when the Chinese Central Bank took a 1% stake in HDFC Bank in April 2020. This set off alarm bells in government and prompted the first announcement of curbs on investments from other countries sharing borders with India. Soon after, India discovered Chinese incursions on the 5th, 6th, and the 9th of May 2020 in Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal. Thus, two years, or two and a half years down the line with the pandemic still not gone, we can draw several conclusions about China as it is today under Xi Jinping.

First, India should be prepared for more trouble on the boundary as it continues its infrastructure building activity and improves defence deployments. Indians should step away from talking of "differing perceptions" of the LAC. They are not "perceptions". They are two claim lines that overlap in certain areas. When we say, "perceptions", we are essentially giving the Chinese a free pass to change the position on the ground. India made its boundary alignment clear to the Chinese in 1960, through six exhaustive meetings in Delhi, Beijing, and Rangoon (Yangon).

At the political/ diplomatic level, India should reconsider the "informal" summit with Xi where both sides take back very different perceived outcomes. India believes Xi understands Prime Minister Narendra Modi while China believes Modi kowtows to Xi. Neither is correct, of course. But it leads to avoidable crossed wires in both capitals.



## **CHINA'S THIRD NEW ERA UNDER XI JINPING**

*Organized by the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy*

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*Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, New Delhi*

*31 March 2022*

**1830-2030 hrs.**

*Speakers' Profile*


## *EMINENT KEY SPEAKERS*

**Mr. Peter Rimmele**, Resident Representative to India, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung



**Mr. Peter Rimmele** is the Former Resident Representative to India of the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. He has a First Law Degree from Freiburg University, as well as a Second Law Degree from the Ministry of Justice Baden-Württemberg, Germany, and a M.A. in Geography. After working as, a jurist, judge, and lecturer, he took public office as Ministerialrat, Head of Division at the State Ministry of the Interior in Saxony, Germany, from November 1991 on until 2000. There he first served in the Police and Security and later in the Local Government Department. On behalf of the German Foreign Ministry, he served in East Timor as Registrar General, Head of Civil Registry and Notary Services (UNTAET), and became later the principal Advisor for Governance Reform for GIZ (German International Cooperation) to the Ministry of Administrative Reform and the Anti-Corruption-Commission of the Republic of Indonesia, where he served for 7 years. He then moved to Rwanda, also as Principal Advisor Good Governance/Justice Program. Earlier he was Resident Representative Lebanon, Director of Rule of Law Program Middle East North Africa, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade, President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy**



Mr. Jayadeva Ranade, was a Member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and President of the ‘Centre for China Analysis and Strategy’. A former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, he is also a Member of the Core Group on China of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi.

He is a security and intelligence expert and a seasoned China analyst with almost 40 years’ experience in the field. He has also dealt with matters relating to Terrorism and Pakistan. He has been directly involved in formulation of policy at the highest levels in the Government of India. He was conferred the Organisation’s two highest awards, both out of turn.

He has earned a Diploma of Advanced Proficiency in Chinese after a 2-year study programme in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and completed an Intensive Introductory Course in Mandarin and a Diploma in Mandarin from the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. His foreign assignments have included Hong Kong, Beijing, and his last foreign posting, prior to retirement in late 2008, was as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington.



Mr. Vijay Gokhale is a non-resident senior fellow at Carnegie India. Mr. Gokhale retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2020 after a diplomatic career that spanned thirty-nine years. From January 2018 to January 2020, he served as the foreign secretary of India.

Prior to his term as foreign secretary, Mr. Gokhale had served as India's high commissioner to Malaysia from January 2010 to October 2013, as ambassador of India to the Federal Republic of Germany from October 2013 to January 2016, and as ambassador of India to the People's Republic of China from January 2016 to October 2017. He has served as head of the India-Taipei Association, in Taiwan, from July 2003 to January 2007. During his time in the headquarters of the Ministry of External Affairs, he has also worked in key positions in the East Asia Division, including as the joint secretary (Director General) for East Asia from March 2007 to December 2009.

He has worked extensively on matters relating to the Indo-Pacific region with a special emphasis on Chinese politics and diplomacy. Since his retirement from the Foreign Service, Mr. Gokhale has contributed opinion pieces to the New York Times, the Hindu, and the Indian Express.

**Ms. Indrani Bagchi**, CEO, Ananta Aspen Centre



Ms. Indrani Bagchi is the CEO of Ananta Centre. Prior to this, she was the diplomatic editor of The Times of India. As Diplomatic Editor, Indrani covered the Ministry of External Affairs on her news beat, as well as interpreted and analysed global trends with an Indian perspective. Earlier, Indrani worked with India Today, a premier news magazine, The Economic Times, and The Statesman.

She graduated from Loreto College, Calcutta University - with English honours. Indrani was a Reuters Fellow at Oxford University in 1997. In 2010, Indrani was awarded the Chang Lin-Tien fellowship by the Asia Foundation to study US-China relations at Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

Indrani is a Fellow of Class 3 of the Kamalnayan Bajaj Fellowship of the Ananta Aspen Centre and a member of the Aspen Global Leadership Network.





Dr. Frédéric Grare is a Senior Policy Fellow with the Asia Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He previously worked at the Centre for Analysis, Planning and Strategy (CAPS) of the French Ministry for Europe and External Affairs (MEAE), Paris, where he focused on Indo-Pacific dynamics and Indian Ocean security issues. Prior to joining the French MEAE, he served as the South Asia programme director at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC.

Grare holds a PhD from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and a Habilitation from the Paris Institute of Political Science (Science Po) in Paris. His dissertation focused on Pakistan's policy in the Afghan conflict. He was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Counsellor at the French embassy in Islamabad and Director of the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities in New Delhi. Grare has published extensively on topics related to South Asian security, India's Foreign Policy, Indo-Pacific dynamics, and maritime security. His latest book *The Indian Ocean as a New Political and Security Region* was published in 2022.

**CHINA'S THIRD NEW ERA UNDER XI JINPING**

*Organized by the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy  
&  
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, New Delhi*

Thursday, 31 March 2022, 1830 hrs. (IST) onwards

**Programme**

Registration  
18:30-19:00 hrs.

Welcome Remarks  
19:00-19:10 hrs.

**Mr. Peter Rimmele**, *Resident Representative to India, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*  
**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade**, *President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy*

Chairperson  
**Mr. Kiran Karnik**, *Former President, NASSCOM*

**Speakers**

19:10-19:20 hrs.

**Mr. Jayadeva Ranade**, *President, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy*

19:20-19:30 hrs.

**Ms. Indrani Bagchi**, *Diplomatic Editor, Times of India*

19:30-19:40 hrs.

**Mr. Frédéric Grare**, *Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations*

19:40-19:50 hrs.

**Amb. Vijay Gokhale**, *Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India*

19:50-20:10

Q & A and summing up

*Followed by Dinner/Reception*