

## Evolving Deterrence along the India-China LAC: The Way Ahead

# Report

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# **Ensuring Deterrence along the India-China LAC: The Way Ahead**

## **Speakers**

**Lt. Gen. DS Hooda  
(Retd.)**

Former GOC-in-C  
Northern Command;  
Co-Founder, Council for Strategic  
and Defense Research;  
Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group

**Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi  
(Retd.)**

Former GOC-in-C Eastern  
Command

**Air Marshal Anil Khosla  
(Retd.)**

Former Vice-Chief of  
the Air Staff;  
Former AOC-in-C Eastern Air  
Command

## **Chair**

**Lt. Gen. (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia (Retd.)**

Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies;  
Former GOC-in-C Central Command

## Background

The events of 2020 mark a watershed moment for Sino-Indian relations, with India reevaluating its strategic posture vis-à-vis China. Reorienting the country's military posture remains a crucial aspect of deterring future Chinese aggression along the border. Though the past few decades have seen various CBMs and border agreements holding the peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), events like the Galwan clash and Op Snow Leopard reflect the inadequacy of past agreements, and the urgent need to bolster India's conventional deterrence against China's military.

What are the immediate doctrinal changes and modernization India's military should undertake to counter the continental threat from China? What aspects of China's military should worry India's security establishment the most? Will the LAC now be an 'active' border, as the Line of Control is with Pakistan? How can India rebuild CBMs and ensure credible deterrence against China? How should the Army and Air Force work together to ensure a military edge along the LAC? These themes, and other issues were discussed in this ICS-KAS seminar.

## Programme Overview

To explore what should be India's course of action to counter the threat presented by China's increasing military power and ensure deterrence, the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS) in partnership with the India Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) organized the ICS-KAS Conversation on '*Ensuring Deterrence along the India-China LAC: The Way Ahead*' on Wednesday, 7 April 2021 at 3:00 P.M IST on Zoom along with ICS media partner, The Print.

The Conversation witnessed the presence of distinguished panellists from the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force, who provided excellent insights on how India should move forward to provide a military edge along the LAC. The panel comprised of the following panellists:

- Lt. Gen. DS Hooda (Retd.), former GOC-in-C, Northern Command; Co-Founder, Council for Strategic and Defense Research; Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group
- Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi (Retd.), former GOC-in-C Eastern Command
- Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd.), former Vice-Chief of the Air Staff; Former AOC-in-C Eastern Air Command

The conversation was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia (Retd.), Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies; former GOC-in-C Central Command.

## Glimpses



## Key Takeaways

- In the past, there was a mutual understanding of the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and where it lay between the two militaries. There was an acknowledgement of some disputed areas and where they lay, but both sides were also clear about areas where there was no dispute, with each patrolling up to their perception of the LAC.
- Depsang Plains is an example of one of the disputed areas, with both sides attempting to patrol till their perception of the LAC. Similarly, the North Bank of Pangong Tso was also a disputed area. However, Chinese aggression at sites like Galwan and Gogra-Hot Spring indicates that the earlier mutual understanding has completely broken down, because there was no dispute over these areas earlier.
- The stand-off over the course of 2020-21 shows a complete disregard of confidence-building measures (CBMs) that used to keep the peace by the Chinese. Going forward, such incidents are likely to arise along the entire LAC.
- It is unlikely that the LAC with China will become as violent as the Line of Control with Pakistan, but it will continue to remain tense and uncertain. We are likely to see greater suspicion, greater mistrust, increasing deployment of troops, and more aggressive reactions to the other sides' actions in the future.
- China miscalculated in Doklam and Eastern Ladakh by identifying India's redlines incorrectly – India's resolve in responding was not factored into their calculations. They may have taken a strategic pause at the moment but will continue trying to achieve their political objectives.
- The military capability gap between India and China is significant and is likely to grow much more in the future. While in the past the Indian Army used to have a slight disadvantage due to the infrastructure build-up on both sides, the Navy and Air Force had some advantages. These are also rapidly shrinking and could disappear over the next decade.
- Long-term planning naturally has to involve economic and technological developments, but one must recognize that India is currently outstripped by China in most parameters. Therefore, in the short-term, India has no choice but to look at coalitions and alliances,

whether formalized or unformalized, while understanding that no coalition is going to get boots on the ground along the border with China.

- China is increasing the military capability gap because of its significant investments in cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities – all enabled by the Military-Civil Fusion strategy where dual-use high-end technologies are being inducted.
- Though there were doubts about the ability of both militaries to continue the recent standoff through the winters, they clearly mitigated the various difficulties involved. The PLA has been conducting military exercises in Tibet during the winter months for several years now. While their terrain allows easier movement, the Indian Army in Ladakh is cut off 4-5 months a year. Similarly, in states like Arunachal, India still doesn't have roads going up till the LAC. All these points highlight the urgent need for India to invest further in infrastructure development.
- Recent events may prompt attempts to put more boots on the ground. While some restructuring is required, capability development must be emphasized over boots on the ground - issues of budgeting and revenue are exacerbated by manpower-intensive approaches.
- India should consciously be moving away from kinetic and contact-centric doctrines to a more nuanced strategic response to the kind of grey-zone tactics China is favoring. Deterrence by denial, and deterrence by punishment, both these options should be considered.
- Dealing with the grey-zone warfare India finds itself besieged by, requires not only a military or diplomatic response, but a whole-of-nation response. This kind of warfare creates a sense of perpetual conflict, and also increases the potential of real conflict while undermining deterrence.
- Grey-zone tactics also thrive in toxic sociopolitical environments. The more schisms, the greater the vulnerability of a nation. Measures should also be taken to keep India's social cohesion intact.
- India's decision makers should reflect on why we face narrowing options every time India faces a strategic challenge. Why is the security establishment scurrying around looking for options when response options should be readily available?
- The three very important aspects of deterrence to consider are – capabilities, resolve, and communication. While India has demonstrated significant resolve in various incidents with China, urgent doctrinal relooks are required to ensure efficient capability

development. Similarly, the security establishment has to decide what India's redlines are and convey them effectively to China.



## Chair's Remarks



**Lt. Gen. Ahluwalia** first observed that deterrence is a function of three things: capability, resolve and communication. While talking about capability - if a nation doesn't have the wherewithal during conflicts, it suffers tangibly, as does its credibility at the international and regional level. He augmented this by mentioning India's resolve in conflicts with China, when augmented by communicating India's redlines to its opponent, presented an appropriate deterrent posture during the Sumdorong Chu and Doklam incidents.

Lt. Gen. Ahluwalia pointed out that India surprised China by four major undertakings after the events of 5th May 2020

1. Robust deployment and mobilization of the armed forces, particularly the army and the air force.
2. Occupying strategic heights in the Kailash Range at the most opportune moment, giving India significant leverage
3. Continued infrastructural development despite Chinese objections
4. The positive role played by all elements of national power be it political, economic, trade, investment, information technology, which was not expected by China.

The Chair also mentioned India should not be looking only at the continental theatre, but more broadly at all of South Asia as a subcontinent. Furthermore, he emphasized on the need to focus on improving India's ISR capabilities (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), currently a major weakness.

Gen. Ahluwalia raised some pertinent questions for the panellists to answer: What qualifies credible deterrence in the conventional context? Can infrastructure development and strategic

assets also be drivers of deterrence? He observed that India must include more warfighting concepts, and that there is a need to move from a defensive to offensive doctrine. Quoting Lawrence Freedman, he remarked “the threat must be made, the threat must be noticed, and the threat must be believed” – stressing the need to have all three: capability, resolve and communication.

## Panellist



**Lt. Gen. DS Hooda** started his remarks by observing the situation along the LAC in the future is likely to be ‘tense’ and ‘uncertain’. Unlike the popular belief that the LAC was something not understood by either side, earlier there was a clear understanding of the alignment of the LAC between the two militaries, while acknowledging the disputed areas and where they lay. Being clear about the undisputed areas, both militaries patrolled up to their perception of the LAC. This understanding appears to have completely broken down, with “the complete LAC now fair game” – which the intrusions in Galwan, Gogra, Hot Springs show, there being no dispute over these areas earlier. Thus, we are likely to see greater suspicion, mistrust, deployment of troops and much more aggressive reactions along the LAC. The measures that kept the peace earlier have completely broken down, with now, a complete disregard for confidence building measures. The LAC will not become like the Line of Control but will certainly be marked by mutual mistrust and suspicion.

The military capability gap between India and China, Lt. Gen. Hooda pointed out, is growing, and is likely to grow much more in the future. The Chinese infrastructure along the LAC is much more developed, and this mismatch poses a big disadvantage for the Indian Army. India does have some advantages where the Air Force and Navy are concerned, but these are also shrinking, and might just disappear over the next decade. The PLA Navy is the largest in the world, in terms of numbers, and China has made significant investments in cyber, space, and electronic warfare. All this is aided by the Military-Civil Fusion strategy, under the aegis of which dual use high-end technologies are being inducted.

Concluding his remarks, Lt. Gen. Hooda gave the following recommendations to mitigate the growing military gap India faces from China-

1. Invest heavily in infrastructure development. The Indian Army in Ladakh is cut off 4-5 months a year, and India still doesn't have roads going till the LAC in certain parts of Arunachal Pradesh. India is accustomed to operating in terrain like Eastern Ladakh, but the PLA has also been undertaking wintertime military exercises in Tibet these past few years.
2. Though some extra boots on the ground may be required in some areas, a manpower-intensive approach should be avoided, as it would only exacerbate the revenue issues faced by the military – the focus should instead be on appropriate capability building.
3. A crucial doctrinal and capabilities debate should be undertaken. India has to establish how it can deter China from what it is doing, and what capabilities are required for future warfighting, as well as for effective deterrence.
4. New Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have to be developed, as the old ones have completely failed. It is not in the interest of both sides to have a 'tense' LAC, therefore new CBMs have to be developed at the diplomatic and military level.

## Panellist



**Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi** first posed some questions to be considered - Why have India's response options to the strategic challenges it faces been narrowing over the years? Why are options frantically being sought in times of crisis when the options should have been readily available? He further asserted that India is in the midst of a grey-zone conflict, and this is something that should have been recognized a decade or two ago. China and Pakistan should be placed on the same canvas, with an institutional need to rework doctrines to meet this challenge.

Coming to the threat from China, Gen. Bakshi opined China miscalculated in Doklam and Eastern Ladakh by flagging India's redlines incorrectly. Decision makers across the border perhaps did not factor in the strong resolve India would show. Though they may take a strategic pause for now, Indian decision makers should be in no doubt that they will continue trying to achieve their political objectives. To prepare for this, India should consciously be moving away from kinetic and contact-centric doctrines to a more nuanced strategic response, better suited for grey-zone operations. Deterrence-by-Denial, and Deterrence-by-Punishment should both be considered.

The speaker further held that grey-zone isn't just about force-on-force interactions and deterrence, but a whole-nation response. Quoting Michael Nazar, he made the following points about grey-zone conflicts –

- Going forward, grey-zone conflict is likely to be the default mode of conflict
- In such scenarios, preparations (doctrinal, and strategic) should be made much in advance, with an adversary losing before force-on-force interactions even happen.

- Grey-zone operations create a sense of perpetual conflicts, while also increasing the potential of real conflict – war-waging capabilities need to be kept intact to guard against this likelihood.
- Grey-zone conflict undermines deterrence significantly.

India appears significantly underprepared for such kind of warfare, but can improve its posture by incorporating some of the following recommendations -

1. The apex security architecture has to be streamlined; there are currently too many different authorities, with no one person calling the shots.
2. India's redlines need to be outlined clearly and conveyed properly to India's adversaries.
3. Grey-zone tactics thrive in more toxic socio-political environments. Measures have to be taken to ensure social cohesion.

In his concluding remarks, Lt. Gen. Bakshi characterized Pangong Tso as a red herring, as was Naku La. In the short-term, as India is outstripped by China in all parameters, there are no options but to look at coalitions and alliances, whether formalized or unformalized – with a caveat that no coalition is going to get boots on ground along our land borders. The long-term perspective should have a focus on becoming economically and technologically strong.

## Panellist



**Air Marshal Anil Khosla** characterized the Chinese strategy as that of the “ends” mattering, not the means. Treaties are used only to buy time, and deception is an acceptable tactic in order to win. Going forward under Xi Jinping, opportunism is likely to be the defining word, and no treaty or CBMs will hold water. Air Marshal Khosla further coined a “3 E” policy that China has for India - encirclement, entanglement, and ensnarement. He stated China is unlikely to delineate or demarcate the LAC in the future, and since entanglement suits the PLA, they will continue actions like Doklam and Eastern Ladakh at different times and places of their choosing. Enough CBMs already exist with China but are not followed - what is the point of these CBMs if the opponent is not willing to adhere to them? He concurred that boots on ground is not the most affordable option for India and stressed that utmost focus must be on significantly enhancing ISR capabilities, with space-based ISR the most suitable option. To improve India’s posture against China in the future, Air Marshal Khosla gave the following recommendations –

- A border development plan looking not only at infrastructure, but also at demographics in the border areas, with periodic reviews.
- Troops and equipment maintained in rear bases, with plans for acclimatization and speedy mobilization.
- Citing China’s attempts at water warfare in the past, the speaker stated India needed to develop a water strategy soon – especially considering China’s proposed construction of the largest dam in the world.
- A comprehensive cyber and space strategy.
- An effective bulwark against their drone swarm technologies, as China is gradually filling its gaps between artillery and long-range vectors.

- An urgent need for multi-tiered Ballistic Missile Defence systems such as the S-400; many more such regiments have to be integrated with the military

The speaker also cautioned against the likely six aircraft carrier battle groups China would be able to field in the next 15-20 years and advised India to develop the Andaman and Nicobar command far beyond its current dispensation. To conclude, Air Marshal Khosla identified three weaknesses for India to exploit – Taiwan, Tibet, and Trade and also counselled an open mind about military cooperation.



## Special Remarks



**Mr. Peter Rimmele** extended the vote of thanks to ICS for the successful conduct of the event, the distinguished panellists for their insights and the audience for their participation; and added to the conversation by sharing some European experiences. Expressing his opinion that the way ahead always has a positive connotation, so we should also look at what can be done positively in the future. He re-emphasized the points made by the panellists about India needing to invest in infrastructural development on one hand and rebuild the framework on CBMs on the other. India's need to consolidate its economy to finance this infrastructure setup, and closing this gap was deemed crucial. The speaker also agreed with Air Marshal Khosla on how India need to focus on issues of water, as most river systems of note in the region originate in Tibet.

Looking into the past, Mr. Rimmele remarked how it was the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who first used the term Line of Actual Control. Taking the example of France and Germany, he pointed out the many wars that had been fought along their borders, in the past and how it exists only as a virtual line today. A border where people had been fighting for generations; it demonstrates a good example of what is possible if one were to address border conflicts properly. He concluded by hoping the same will occur along this border, perhaps over the next 50-60 years.

## Interventions

**Q. Should India not develop more bilateral agreements and increase its maritime deployments to tackle China and put pressure on its facilities in the South China sea?**

**A.** According to the pressure-cooker theory, China creates hotspots and then tries to control the situation through whatever means possible, wherever possible. In a similar vein, China is applying pressure on India in the Himalayan region, so increasing pressure in turn through the maritime domain is one of the options available to India. While India is entering into agreements with various countries for support, including the maritime domain, resource constraints put limitations on how far from home-bases can India operate, and for how long. That said, India boasts an excellent geostrategic advantage in the Indian Ocean and should utilize this to the best of its ability. Strengthening the Andaman-Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands is a crucial starting point.

**Q. Is the current negotiating model, that of senior military officials and diplomats together better than when Lt. Gen. Bakshi handled the Doklam issue without a combined negotiation team?**

**A.** Undoubtedly, there is a huge number of diplomatic inputs that go into decision-making and negotiation even when one is negotiating on ground. PLA senior officers always consider foreign policy and diplomatic inputs in their decision making. A combined military and foreign service team, makes it easier to make decisions as there is no need for back-and-forth for further inputs.

In Doklam, Gen. Bakshi stated he did not have access to diplomatic insights on the issues, and appropriately engaged in a force-on-force operation to retain the initiative with India. One should analyze why China so readily agreed to a staggered mode of negotiation with different teams, and whether this was a stalling technique to buy time. To conclude, military diplomacy gets reinforced and decision-making at the national level gets reinforced when the uniform fraternity joins hands with diplomats.

**Q. If it's true that current talks are stagnant, and India has no more leverage to push for withdrawals, what is to prevent the Chinese from taking India by surprise again?**

**A.** One must not blow the Chinese threat out of proportion – though they have higher defence spending and advanced military capabilities, there has been a certain reticence in their stance at times as well, especially in the North-East. Putting up defences along India's extremities is good optics but has no tactical significance. One must keep the terrain in mind, and develop the technology required appropriately – especially space-based ISR. The future should see this capability-based approach, developed suitably for each theatre.

**Q. How sure is India that China's actions in Galwan or even Doklam were an extension of China's growing aggressiveness?**

**A.** There is little doubt about why China is doing what it is doing – at least in Asia, India is aware that it is embroiled in a long-term strategic rivalry, and that actions along the LAC are to pressurize India – which is why no efforts to delineate the LAC are taken. If there were any doubts, they were about India being able to handle China diplomatically, economically, politically and keep peace along the LAC. India has laid some of those to rest but should press on with increased modernization and restructuring on priority.

ThePrint was the media partner for this event, with the video available on their YouTube channel – [Link](#)

## Profiles



**Lt. Gen. DS Hooda (Retd.)** PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM\*\* was commissioned into the 4th Battalion of the 4th Gorkha Rifles on 15 Dec 1976. During his career spanning forty years, he has gained vast experience of counterinsurgency, both in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East Region. He commanded an Infantry Brigade in Jammu & Kashmir, a Division in Manipur and the 16 Corps at Nagrota. Lt Gen DS Hooda took over the command of the Northern Army on 01 Jun 2014 and retired from there in December 2016. He was responsible for handling the disputed and troubled borders with Pakistan and China as well as counterinsurgency operations in J&K. He is co-founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, New Delhi and a Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group.



**Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi (Retd.)** PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC retired from the Indian Army after forty years of service on 31 July 2017 as GOC-in-C of Eastern Army. He was responsible for the border defense with four countries, including the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, the internal security of the insurgency areas in the North-Eastern States, and strategic military engagement with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Commanding approximately 3,00,000 troops, he was responsible for the military response to the Doklam

incident with China A graduate of Staff College, Army War College, Mhow and the National Defence College, he commanded an Armoured Brigade and a RAPID in the desert sector and a Corps in the plains of Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. The General officer is accredited as a Distinguished Fellow with USI, New Delhi, and is also a member of Marshall Goldsmith MG 25 (India) list for Corporate Strategic Coaching and an advisor with a leadership skill company.



**Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd.)** PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC is the former Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force who also served as AOC-in-C Eastern Air Command. His other appointments include Director General Air Operations, Senior Air Staff Officer Central Air Command, Air Officer Commanding J&K, and AOC Maritime Air Operations (along with Navy). He has overseen operations relating to the Doklam crisis, as well as the Balakot strike. Having served in all sectors of the IAF's operational commands, he has been closely involved with the formulation of Air Force War Plans, Force Structure Planning, and Capability Building. He holds two MPhil degrees in Defence and Strategic Studies, and is pursuing a Ph.D. on "Decoding China's Brain". A Distinguished Fellow at USI, New Delhi, he is also associated with the Centre for Air Power Studies and Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.



**Lt. Gen. (Dr.) VK Ahluwalia (Retd.)** PVSM, AVSM\*\*, YSM, VSM retired as GOC-in-C Central Command in 2012, after a career spanning four decades. Thereafter, he served as a Member, Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), Jaipur – Jodhpur Benches, for four years, presently he is the Director CLAWS. He commanded an Infantry Brigade in Uri Sector (2001-02), Mountain Division in Kargil (2005-06) and Corps in Leh-Ladakh Sector (2008-09). He was the first Indian Brigadier to attend the National Defence Course (NDC), at Dhaka (Bangladesh), in 2003. As a young helicopter pilot, he was based in Srinagar and Leh, where he flew extensively in the Kashmir valley and the Ladakh region. A Doctorate in 'Internal Security and Conflict Resolution', he has also authored a book, "Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond".



**Peter Rimmele** is currently the Resident Representative of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Office, India. He has a First Law Degree from Freiburg University, as well as a Second Law Degree from the Ministry of Justice Baden-Württemberg, Germany and a M.A. in Geography. After working as a jurist, judge and lecturer, he took public office as Ministerialrat, Head of Division at the State Ministry of the Interior in Saxony, Germany, from November 1991 on until 2000. There he first served in the Police and Security and later in the Local Government Department. On behalf of the German Foreign Ministry, he served in East Timor as Registrar General, Head of Civil Registry and Notary Services (UNTAET) and became later the principal Advisor for Governance Reform for GIZ (German International Cooperation) to the Ministry of Administrative Reform and the Anti-Corruption-Commission of the Republic of Indonesia, where he served for 7 years. He then moved to Rwanda, also as Principal Advisor Good Governance/Justice Program. Earlier he was Resident Representative Lebanon, Director of Rule of Law Program Middle East North Africa, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

## Institutional Profiles



The **Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi (ICS)** is one of the oldest research institutions on China and East Asia in India. With support from the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, it is the mandate of the ICS to develop a strategic vision for India's dealings with China and to help adapt India's priorities quickly and appropriately to address the research and educational demands arising from China's emergence. The ICS seeks to promote interdisciplinary study and research on China and the rest of South -East Asia with a focus on expertise in China's domestic politics, international relations, economy, history, health, education, border studies, language and culture, and on India-China comparative studies. It also looks to foster active links with business, media, government, and non-governmental organizations in India through applied research, executive training programs, and seminars and conferences, and to serve as a repository of knowledge and data grounded in first-hand research on Chinese politics, economy, international relations, society, and culture. Its supporters include Tata Trusts, Indian Council of Social Science Research Gargi Vidya Prakash Dutt Memorial, the Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation, and the Pirojshah Godrej Foundation. It also boasts of various universities worldwide as academic partners. The mandate of the ICS is to develop a strategic vision for India's dealings with China and to help adapt India's priorities quickly and appropriately to address the research and educational demands arising from China's emergence. The Institute has played a notable role in shaping the public opinion on China through a variety of outlets such as its regular publications like China Report, ICS Analysis, ICS Occasional Papers, and Working Papers, which marks its activity on the academic forefront. It also has a robust social media presence as it is very active on Twitter and Instagram, uploads regularly on Soundcloud, videos on YouTube, and publishes regular blog pieces on its website.

The **Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)** is a political foundation. Established in 1955 as “Society for Christian-Democratic Civic Education”, in 1964 the Foundation proudly took on the name of Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. With 16 regional offices in Germany and over 120 offices abroad, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation is committed to achieving and maintaining peace, freedom and justice through political education. We promote and preserve free democracy, social market economy, and the development and consolidation of the value consensus. We focus on consolidating democracy, the unification of Europe and the strengthening of transatlantic relations, as well as on development cooperation.

The leitmotif of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation "Germany. The next chapter" is supported by a thematic focus. With the three main topics Innovation, Security and Representation and Participation, it is quite clear which topics the Konrad Adenauer Foundation will focus on in the coming years.

We cooperate with governmental institutions, political parties and civil society organizations, building strong partnerships along the way. In particular, we seek to intensify political cooperation in the area of development cooperation on the foundations of our objectives and values. Together with our partners, we make a significant contribution to the creation of a global order that empowers every country to determine its own developmental priorities and destiny in an internationally responsible manner.

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung has organized its program priorities in India into five working areas:

1. Foreign and Security Policy
2. Economic, Climate and Energy Policy
3. Rule of Law



4. Political Dialogue focussed on Social and Political Change

5. Media and Youth

The India Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation takes great pride in its cooperation with Indian partner institutions who implement jointly curated projects and programmes.