



CHAPTER 05

Japan's New ASEAN Policy under the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Its Continuities and Discontinuities from the Fukuda Doctrine and the Role of Cambodia

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INTRODUCTION

The 2022 Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship has started amid the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine diplomacy, increasing tensions of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the unresolved Myanmar's 2021 coup. It also faces an intensifying great power rivalry between the United States and China in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Japan announced its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision in 2016 and uses this in its ASEAN policy today. It was a reaction against China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) over its geopolitical and geo-economic presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, Japan and China are two important economic partners. Thus, their competition might have negative impacts on ASEAN's centrality and economic integration. Can ASEAN work with Japan's FOIP while maintaining a good relationship with China? This is an important question that ASEAN must deal with in the coming years. ASEAN has to manage its Japan and China policy while maintaining its centrality and autonomy.

This chapter examines Japan's emerging ASEAN policy under the FOIP by focusing on its continuities and discontinuities from the 1977 Fukuda doctrine, the guiding principles for Japan's ASEAN policy from then. It provides policy proposals for Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship. Most of Japan's new ASEAN policy under the FOIP continues its conventional policy under the Fukuda doctrine. Still, two points are different from the past: value diplomacy and a quality-of-infrastructure proposal. This chapter examines the contents of the two and the Japanese intentions behind them. First, the chapter outlines the 1977 Fukuda doctrine and focuses on its neutrality to ideologies and respect for ASEAN autonomy in Japan's ASEAN policy. Second, it examines the idea and policy fields of the FOIP and focuses on value diplomacy and the quality-of-infrastructure proposal as the new points in Japan's new ASEAN policy. Third, it shows how Japan-China and the US-Japan relationships will influence Japan's competition with China. Finally, the chapter provides policy proposals for ASEAN chairmanship by focusing on Japan's domestic rationales for its economic assistance to ASEAN and Cambodia during the FOIP era.

JAPAN'S ASEAN POLICY UNDER THE FUKUDA DOCTRINE

The 1977 Fukuda doctrine has been the key guiding principle for Japan's ASEAN policy. After the doctrine was announced, it became a turning point in post-WWII Japan's ASEAN policy from an economic-oriented one to a broad engagement in Southeast Asian regional order and development. Under this doctrine, Japan has pledged to be a non-military power, used economic assistance as its main policy measure, and upheld equal partnership based on mutual confidence, trust, and "heart-to-heart" understanding, cooperating with Southeast Asian countries' efforts to strengthen its solidarity.

It has “supported the growth of ASEAN member states, particularly in infrastructure and human resource development” (MOFA Fact Sheet on Japan-ASEAN Relations).

The influence of the Fukuda doctrine on Japan’s ASEAN policy thereafter can be found in the following two points. First, though it was not sufficient, Japan attempted to be neutral to ideological differences among ASEAN members during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, Japan’s ODA to Southeast Asia did not necessarily follow the US Cold-War policy. For example, after the Vietnam War, Japan sought to provide its ODA to Hanoi in 1970, distancing itself from the US Cold War policy and providing disaster relief until its ODA was resumed in 1992. Japan also supported an ASEAN-initiated peace process for Cambodia from 1989 using its person-to-person relationships with Cambodia (Yano 2015, 212–220). While the United States imposed sanctions on military-ruled Myanmar in the 1990s, Japan has continued to provide its ODA from a non-ideological stance on Myanmar’s development. Second, Japan’s ASEAN policy under the Fukuda doctrine respected ASEAN’s autonomy. Japan avoided using its economic support to control recipient countries. It did not take a forceful diplomatic style to impose Western values and ideas on ASEAN members. However, it is a member of G7, which are composed of Western liberal democracies.

The ideological neutrality and the respect for ASEAN autonomy were maintained in ASEAN-Japan joint statements in the post-Cold War period. For example, in a press conference after the 2001 ASEAN Plus Three, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi asserted that Japan could find significance in its cooperation because of ASEAN’s diversity in culture, religion, race, and economic capability. He added that Japan would walk with ASEAN and maintain a frank partnership (MOFA Japan-ASEAN Relations). About a decade later, the 2013 Vision Statement of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation continued to emphasise “partnership” and used it as the headings for its policy list: partnership for peace and stability, partnership for prosperity, partnership for quality of life, and heart-to-heart partnership (Ibid.). Thus, the Japanese political stance to ASEAN, which was determined by the Fukuda doctrine, has been maintained even in the post-Cold War context.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOIP

In 2016, Japan announced the FOIP, a geopolitical vision for its policy to Southeast Asia, India, and Africa. It was a reaction against China’s BRI though its early use of the term “strategy” was replaced with “vision”, and its competitive nuance with China was moderated later. The earliest official statement of Japan’s Indo-Pacific can be traced back to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2007 speech at the Indian Parliament titled, “Confluence of the Two Seas”. In the speech, he emphasised an enlarged Asia stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans and the importance of shared fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the respect for basic human rights and strategic interests.

In his policy speech at the 196th Session of the Diet in 2018, Abe stated, “Japan will work together with countries with which we share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law...to ensure the peace and prosperity of this region stretching from Asia and the Pacific Rim to the Indian Ocean.” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet)

Japan’s FOIP has three policy fields: diplomacy, economic cooperation, and support for capacity building. Firstly, Japan will actively be engaged in diplomacy to maintain and promote a present liberal order by espousing freedom of navigation and free and open trade. Secondly, economic cooperation is the continuation of the conventional policy, but Japan proposes an idea, i.e., the quality of infrastructure. Japan’s quality-of-infrastructure proposal is the idea that hard infrastructures such as roads, bridges, and power plants should be constructed and maintained with long-term durability and cost-effectiveness. Last but not least, the support for capacity building in Indo-Pacific countries intends to strengthen maritime security and safety, counterterrorism, and disaster risk reduction by supporting maritime law enforcement, human development, and equipment for them.

While it is based on the continuation of Japan’s conventional economic assistance, the FOIP espouses liberal and democratic values and supports capacity building of ASEAN countries. Southeast Asia is the key region for the FOIP because of its historical and economic linkages to Japan. However, post-war Japan did not espouse a clear geopolitical vision to Southeast Asia because its overseas use of force was constrained by Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, and it understood that its strategic presence in the region would remind Southeast Asian people of Japan’s wartime occupation and brutality during the Pacific War. Thus, economic cooperation was regarded as the main tool in Japan’s ASEAN policy. As a result, a geopolitical strategy was only observed in a short period during Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s (1957–60) anti-communist Southeast Asia policy.

The FOIP may change the above-mentioned reserved posture to some extent. It encourages Japan to ensure geopolitical interest in Southeast Asia, but it should be noted that the origin of the FOIP had a utopian background as a diplomatic vision. It was written by a small group of bureaucratic elites close to Abe and originally reflected his anti-China attitudes and policy before 2017. The key writer, an ex-officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masakatsu Kanehara, was strongly influenced by Halford Mackinder’s geopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century (Suzuki 2017, 73–4, 81–4). However, the application of Mackinder’s idea to Japan’s present Southeast Asia and China policy lacks practical considerations of Japan’s power in relations to the Indo-Pacific region and China. Because of this, how Japan’s FOIP can be implemented to meet the vast geographical area from Southeast Asia to Africa is not well planned. Most of the FOIP’s key elements, except for its espousal of liberal and democratic values and maritime capability building, continue the conventional economic cooperation under a new banner of “FOIP”.

The core of the FOIP lies in the power of norms (Cannon 2018; Takahashi 2021). Japan intends to use this power for locking China in the conventional maritime and free trade order (Takahashi 2021). The FOIP espouses norms such as the rule of law, the freedom of navigation, openness, free trade, diplomacy, and economic cooperation to distinguish its influence and presence from China's BRI. Japan hopes to encourage China to respect the present maritime order and the free and open trade. Under the FOIP, Japan does not intend to create a power balance against China in the region. Instead, it seeks to promote multilateral dialogues and economic cooperation by espousing norms. Japan's 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook notes that maintaining and strengthening rules, not power, is necessary for stability and prosperity in international relations and the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, rulemaking should be an international public good and will be able to contribute to international society (Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan 2020).

VALUE DIPLOMACY AND THE QUALITY -OF-INFRASTRUCTURE PROPOSAL UNDER THE FOIP

VALUE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN ASEAN AND JAPAN

There are two points of change in Japan's ASEAN policy under the FOIP, both of which cannot be found in the Fukuda doctrine. One is the emergence of Japan's "value diplomacy". Japan's ASEAN policy under the FOIP espouses liberal and democratic values at the diplomatic front, called value diplomacy (Takahashi 2021). The espousal of liberal and democratic norms is new in Japan's ASEAN policy and is what the Fukuda doctrine avoided. References to liberal and democratic values in Japan's ASEAN policy have increased in political and diplomatic statements. In January 2013, Abe chose Southeast Asia as the first destination of his diplomatic visit during his second premiership (2012–20) and announced the Five Principles of Japan's ASEAN Diplomacy. Two of the five principles were related to liberal and democratic values: 1) protect and promote universal values, such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights; and 2) ensure the free and open seas are governed by laws and rules and not by force (MOFA Japan-ASEAN Relations).

Value diplomacy appeared in Japan-Mekong cooperation as well. The Tokyo Strategy 2018 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation "underscored the importance of continued efforts of each country to reinforce a free and open order based on the rule of law" (MOFA Japan-Mekong Cooperation). It added that countries of the Mekong region "welcomed Japan's policy to realise a free and open Indo-Pacific" and "expressed their determination to steadily implement the Mekong-Japan Cooperation projects which contribute to and complement the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific" (Ibid.). Japan's active references to liberal and democratic norms in its ASEAN diplomacy are increasing.

On the other hand, ASEAN is not opposed to Japan's espousal of liberal and democratic values, but its approach is different. It announced the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in 2019 to "enhance ASEAN's community-building process and to strengthen existing ASEAN-led mechanisms" (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific). The AOIP lists values and norms ranging from "openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for international law" (Ibid.). As to ASEAN's external relations with great powers, the focus of the AOIP in the value list is "inclusiveness" (Acharya 2021, 118-120). Inclusiveness intends to show ASEAN's will not to exclude China from multilateral dialogues and economic cooperation. China is indispensable to ASEAN's economic growth and development, and the inclusion of China in multilateral dialogues and economic cooperation is, as a matter of fact, in its actual policy. However, ASEAN is cautious about value confrontation, which may jeopardise its centrality and inclusive growth, which is a different posture from Japan's FOIP.

Despite this difference between the FOIP and the AOIP, their coordination has been observed so far in diplomacy. Japan did not consider ASEAN's inclusiveness an obstacle to the FOIP and allowed a value consensus, respecting ASEAN's autonomy as the Fukuda doctrine did. In a 2020 speech at Bahasa, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimitsu Motegi stated that he respected ASEAN's diversity in history, culture, ethnicity, and religion. He said, "Japan has never pushed ASEAN to accept any specific idea...and has consistently deliberated, together with you, what is truly necessary for ASEAN's growth and development" (MOFA Japan-ASEAN Relations). A similar value consensus between the FOIP and the AOIP was also observed following Japan's diplomatic statements. In 2020, Motegi stated that Japan would fully support AOIP's goals but emphasised clear rules with transparency, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolutions of all disputes in the seas. A section on Mekong-Japan Cooperation and Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which was added to the 12th Joint Statement of the Mekong-Japan Cooperation, noted "the importance of continued efforts to maintain a free, open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based regional architecture, and confirmed that both the AOIP and Japan's FOIP shared relevant fundamental principles in promoting peace and cooperation" (MOFA Japan-Mekong Cooperation).

Japan has no strong intention to impose liberal and democratic values on ASEAN. Its acceptance of the value consensus between the FOIP and the AOIP comes from the following reasons. The first reason is Japan's espousal of liberal and democratic values in the FOIP was originally a political tool to distinguish itself from China. It is for idealistic identification of the FOIP in relation to the BRI to press or encourage China to follow the present order that the United States has created and maintained. Because of this, the FOIP attempts to promote liberal and democratic values but whether ASEAN countries will accept them for their actions is not necessarily prioritised in diplomacy.

Second, under Japan-China competition, Japan is in a difficult political position to impose liberal and democratic values on ASEAN unless the latter is willing to accept. Japan and China are competing for an influence on ASEAN, but this competition works for ASEAN's advantage. Japan needs ASEAN support and wants to attract their interest in the present liberal order and Japan's economic cooperation, hopefully reducing China's increasing influence in South-east Asia. Therefore, if Japan excessively forces ASEAN to accept its values, it might stimulate the latter's inclination to China. To obtain ASEAN's support for its presence, Japan has to make a concession on value diplomacy.

Third, Japan's approaches to liberalism and democracy are often relativistic. They are not the same as the Western ones. According to the 2021 Press Freedom Index by Reporters without Borders, Japan was only in 67th place among 180 countries, even though it is the oldest democratic country in East Asia. Furthermore, Japan as an Asian country can understand an Asian way of interpreting Western values. It can understand ASEAN's nuanced support for liberal and democratic values and its discomfort with coercive means to achieve them. As a result, Japan can share this relativism from its traditional culture, and its attitudes to values are less principled. Thus, the difference between Japan and ASEAN on liberal and democratic values may not be necessarily an obstacle for ASEAN-Japan value consensus at the diplomatic level. This is different from Japan's ideological neutrality in the Fukuda doctrine, but Japan's diplomatic attitude may be similar in enabling compromise on value differences.

JAPAN'S QUALITY-OF-INFRASTRUCTURE PROPOSAL

The other point, which is not found in the Fukuda doctrine, is Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal. An emphasis on infrastructure is the continuation of Japan's ODA policy to ASEAN under the Fukuda doctrine, but the quality of infrastructure is a new attempt to add special meanings to Japan's ODA projects and distinguish them from China's. The idea of the quality of infrastructure is not of Japanese origin, but Japan now emphasises this in its economic projects, especially the construction of bridges, roads and electronic facilities, and seeks to enhance ASEAN connectivity through this idea.

Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal entails a normative meaning of the development of hard infrastructures. In other words, it addresses how infrastructure should be beyond initial cost considerations. The long-term maintenance costs and sustainability of infrastructures are considered in the idea of the quality of infrastructure. There is a broadly shared view that high-quality infrastructures are required for economic growth, and a better investment environment should be prepared. Huge projects are appealing, but the problem is a deficit. Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal also conveys a political message for competition with China.

It asserts that Japanese-made roads, bridges, and power plants have advantages in quality. For Japan's quality-of-infrastructure, in the 2018 East Asia Summit, the Japanese government raised its continuing projects for the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) that connect the Mekong region.

Japan has developed principles of the quality of infrastructure through multilateral dialogues. For example, the 2016 G7 Ise-shima Summit announced the G7 Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment, which include ensuring effective governance, reliable operation and economic efficiency; ensuring job creation and capacity building; and transferring of expertise and know-how to local communities. It also addressed social and environmental impacts and an alignment with economic and development strategies, including climate change and environment, and enhanced effective resource mobilisation (MOFA G7 Japan 2016 Ise-shima).

Furthermore, the 2019 G20 Osaka Summit adopted the G20 six principles for quality infrastructure Investment: 1) Maximising the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainability; 2) Raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost; 3) Integrating environmental considerations in infrastructure investments; 4) Building resilience against natural disasters and other risks; 5) Integrating social considerations in infrastructure investment; and 6) Strengthening infrastructure governance (The Government of Japan, G20 Japan 2019). In addition, Japan formed a Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment with the United States and Australia to coordinate financing of major projects and their quality for sustainable infrastructure development with high standards (Rajah 2021, 101).

Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal will definitely benefit ASEAN and contribute to its connectivity and economic integration even under Japan-China competition. It is the enhancement of Japan's past economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, but the quality of infrastructure includes an idea of how hard infrastructures and economic cooperation should be for the recipient countries. It may stimulate China's effort to raise the quality of its infrastructure projects. It can raise standards for economic cooperation and the possibility of cost-effective development through a "good" competition between Japan and China. Through multilateral or minilateral cooperation, including both Japan and China, may have a positive influence on China's infrastructure projects and can be a norm for economic cooperation in ASEAN. Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal is new and not included in the Fukuda doctrine, but it may encourage high-standard economic cooperation for ASEAN. It is a discontinuity from the Fukuda doctrine, but ASEAN's economic cooperation would be strengthened as the recipient.

GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION AND JAPAN'S FOIP

ASEAN now faces great power confrontation between China and the United States, and its centrality in multilateral dialogues is challenged. Japan has maintained an independent ASEAN policy under the Fukuda doctrine, but there is a possibility that the great power confrontation might influence Japan's ASEAN policy under the FOIP. China attempts to increase its presence and influence in Southeast Asia through economic assistance and investment, and, as to the COVID-19, it has actively implemented vaccine diplomacy. On the other hand, the United States has changed its gear to a commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration replaced the term Asia-Pacific with Indo-Pacific in the US 2017 National Security Strategy and announced the US Indo-Pacific vision in 2019. The Biden administration has endorsed this vision and changed Trump's forceful diplomatic stance, intensifying the US engagement in Southeast Asia.

Under the increasing confrontation between China and the United States, ASEAN may face a binary choice between the two great powers, which is the worst scenario for ASEAN (Stromseth 2021, 2-3, 8-9). Is Japan's ASEAN policy under the FOIP likely to change in the face of the US-China great power confrontation? As we have seen, Japan's ASEAN policy under the Fukuda doctrine took a non-forceful stance towards ASEAN over ideologies and respected ASEAN autonomy, but the FOIP has a competitive element with China. If the competitive element of the FOIP dominates Japan's ASEAN policy, ASEAN might face another choice between Japan and China.

On the one hand, Japan-China bilateral relationship is now in a "long period of mutual distrust", and its moderation is hard to expect soon. Though it has become moderated since 2017, the bilateral relationship always moves backwards and forward, and it is difficult to see stable progress. Sources of tension will not disappear. On the surface, Tokyo and Beijing have confirmed a strategic partnership in bilateral talks, but underlying distrust and emotional antagonism, which are found on both sides, continue to influence their relationship. On the Japanese side, its recent moderate and cooperative stance to China from 2017 is only supported by a small group of pro-China Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) political elites such as Chairman of LDP Toshihiro Nikai and Foreign Minister of the Suga government Motegi. A territorial dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea has escalated, and the Japanese public show strong antagonism against China's coast guard operations around the islands. China's increasing naval expansion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and its tightening authoritarian control of Hong Kong and Xinjian have caused Japanese public opinion anti-China reactions. On the China side, Japan's increasing references to Taiwan in diplomatic statements and domestic politics have caused distrust. Some LDP conservative politicians and security experts assert Japan's military involvement in defence of Taiwan. This may be a denial of a Japan-China consensus leading to the 1972 diplomatic normalisation and will weaken the Japan-China relationship.

Japanese neo-conservatives have continued negative campaigns against China and attempted to deny history, which are underlying Chinese distrust with Japan. Under the long period of mutual distrust, positive effects of the Japan-China relationship on ASEAN are difficult to expect.

On the other hand, Japan and the United States now share the idea of the FOIP and are making a competitive front against China. The Biden administration shows a strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific region to counter China's increasing influence. In April 2021, Japan and the United States announced a joint statement, called the Global Partnership for a New Era, in which both countries confirmed their FOIPs as a shared vision. While Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga denied the containment of China, a political front to counter China in the Indo-Pacific is being led by recent actions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which is composed of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. The Biden administration is strengthening the Quad to be the key political coalition against China. It has been developed into a coalition of not only military exercises but also a diplomatic front. It was originally proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Abe in 2007 and resumed by Japan in 2017. In 2021, the Quad announced a joint statement, called the Spirit of the Quad beyond security cooperation. While this statement emphasised a united effort to maintain norms in the Indo-Pacific such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, it expanded policy fields to COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy and climate change (The White House 2021). In addition, Japan's active diplomacy for US-Japan cooperation to counter China's influence is observed beyond the Indo-Pacific. In July 2021, Foreign Minister Motegi visited four Central American countries for economic cooperation, such as COVID-19 vaccines, the quality of infrastructure, and human resources development to support the United States (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 July 2021). This change suggests that Japan's ASEAN policy might be more influenced by US ASEAN policy in terms of the competition with China. Japan's bilateral relations with China and the United States in the above-mentioned contexts provides a hint that the FOIP might become more competitive with China in Southeast Asia though their diplomatic attitudes to ASEAN differ.

CAMBODIA AS THE BRIDGE BETWEEN JAPAN'S FOIP AND CHINA'S BRI

In the face of Japan's new ASEAN policy under the FOIP, how should the 2022 Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship be? The Cambodia's Chairmanship should greatly focus on the development of Japan-ASEAN economic relations. Overall, Japan's new ASEAN policy under the FOIP may not negatively influence ASEAN and Cambodia's Chair, except for an external "indirect" effect of intensifying US-China great power confrontation. As examined above, Japan's value diplomacy is still relativistic and adjustable to the realities of ASEAN, and its quality-of-infrastructure proposal will be beneficial for all.

Cambodia should seek positive outcomes of Japan-ASEAN relations under the FOIP in economic cooperation, as was under the Fukuda doctrine. For the Cambodia Chair, development issues such as the economic gap within ASEAN would be important in relation to Japan. This is the core issue of CLMV countries leading to connectivity and inclusive growth in ASEAN's preferred terms. Cambodia can understand the importance of this issue well, and, as a country of the CLMV, it is in a good position in promoting this issue in its 2022 ASEAN chair. On the other hand, Japan understands, from the accumulation of its cooperation with CLMV countries, that development is still important for ASEAN's connectivity and inclusive growth.

Japan's will to contribute to ASEAN's connectivity and inclusive growth through economic cooperation does not change. Its ODA to Southeast Asia continues to be supported by the public. In a democracy, foreign policy must be accountable to the legislature and the public. Especially, ODA is often a matter of public debate because its policy outcome is difficult for taxpayers to evaluate. As a result, the accountability and transparency of ODA policy are required for public support. Japanese public support for ODA, especially in Southeast Asia, is continually high. Due to its insufficient accountability and transparency to the Japanese public, Japan experienced declining public support for ODA from the 1990s to the middle of the 2000s, but, during the second half of the 2010s, about 80 per cent of those surveyed positively considered ODA and more than 30 per cent supported more assistance (Ando 2019, 4). A MOFA survey of Japanese public opinion on foreign policy in 2018 showed that, among regions, those who were surveyed continually thought that Southeast Asia should be the top destination of Japan's development assistance (MOFA 2018). That survey also made clear that the public considered Japan's ASEAN policy should be strengthened in all policy fields, from economic relations to people-to-people exchanges, defence and security cooperation, and infrastructure and human resource development (Ibid.). Oppositions to Japan's ODA in Japanese public opinion were often observed in the 1990s, but they were not directed to the significance of ODA itself for development, but to Japanese ODA practices: how Japan's ODA is effective or what it brings about in ODA recipients was questioned (Tsukamoro 2004, 92-3). It is a question of accountability and transparency. Considering the above public opinion, Japan's ODA to ASEAN continues to be strongly supported by the Japanese public as far as the accountability and transparency are sufficient.

On the other hand, Japan's increasing commitment to Cambodia's economic development is also clear. Japan is a key ODA donor for Cambodia and has increased its support. In 2020, Japan doubled its ODA assistance (580,613,101 USD) and became the largest ODA donor for Cambodia, replacing China (491,867,084 USD). Both Cambodia and Japan seek to deepen their economic relationship beyond ODA. The 2007 Joint Statement on the New Partnership Between Cambodia and Japan showed that they agreed to enhance economic relations and mutual understanding and address regional and global challenges. The two countries reaffirmed "the importance of fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law, and welcome Cambodia's steadfast progress toward realising these values" (MOFA Cambodia).

In 2020, Cambodia completed legal procedures for the First Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan and ASEAN, which enables the promotion of service trade and investment between Cambodia and Japan. Cambodia needs to diversify external economic partners and add Japan to its list (Chheang 2021). Its 2022 chairmanship would be a chance for strengthening relations with Japan in its development as well.

In economic cooperation with Japan, Cambodia should keep an eye on its domestic rationales of economic cooperation. One group of Japanese conservative political and diplomatic elites find a rationale of Japan's Cambodia support in a geopolitical competition with China under the banner of the FOIP. This competition rationale is now a strong trend among Japanese decision-makers. It has promoted Japan's ODA to Cambodia, but this is too utopian and lacks an understanding of Cambodia's realities. This is no more than a desk plan in Tokyo without seeing the realities in Cambodia. The other group finds a rationale in Japan's development cooperation itself which has been observed in most of Japan's ODA projects. This group is composed of liberal political and diplomatic elites and opinion leaders. Though its influence has been weakened under the FOIP, most Japanese public share the same rationale. According to a 2018 public opinion survey by the Cabinet Office of Japan, the largest number of those surveyed considered the primary role of Japan's foreign policy was to maintain international peace through human resource contribution, regional stability, and peaceful resolutions of conflict (Cabinet Office 2018, 28). Among the Japanese public, the linkage between Japan's ODA and geopolitical interest is still weak, the same as the Fukuda doctrine. Cambodia should consider the importance of the latter rationale in development issues and obtain the best from Japan's economic cooperation by appealing to Japan's liberal rationale even under the FOIP.

Economic development today requires respect for the autonomy of recipient countries. For development in ASEAN and Cambodia, balancing Japan's and China's economic cooperation is necessary. China has an advantage in geo-economics and has invested more in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Japan is weaker to compete with China over business investment due to its geographical distance. Thus, ASEAN and Cambodia will need to balance a strong China and a weak Japan in economic cooperation and business investment. One idea for Cambodia is its planned allocation for Japanese and Chinese investment in different business sectors or local areas. A similar allocation may have been practised, but this will continue to be important for balancing Japan and China. In addition, the moderation of Japan-China competition can be sought by creating minilateral institutions, including both as members. For example, the Mekong region may be a pilot case for seeking this inclusion. There are some institutions for developing the Mekong region, but Japan and China separately join different institutions. Minilateral institutions in which both Japan and China join would be a place to find mutual benefits in their cooperation for development in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

Japan's new ASEAN policy is emerging with the FOIP as a geopolitical vision. The FOIP espouses liberal and democratic values at the diplomatic front and hopefully attempts to lock China in the present liberal maritime order and free trade. Value diplomacy and the quality-of-infrastructure proposal has two points in Japan's new ASEAN policy, which are not found in the 1977 Fukuda doctrine. They are new but will not necessarily change Japan's neutrality to ideological differences and respect for ASEAN's autonomy as the Fukuda doctrine endorsed. Under Japan-China competition, Japan's value diplomacy is relativistic and adjustable, and Japan's quality-of-infrastructure proposal has merits for ASEAN. Nevertheless, there remains a possibility that Japan's ASEAN policy under the FOIP may be more competitive with China because the Japan-China relationship is in a long-term mutual distrust, and the US-Japan relationship is moving towards competition with China through the Quad.

However, Cambodia's Chair is an opportunity to balance Japan's economic cooperation and China's one to moderate ASEAN's economic gap and realise its connectivity and inclusive growth. FOIP's competitive element should be tamed between Cambodia, ASEAN, and Japan. Cambodia should draw on Japan's liberal rationale for economic assistance in its relations with Japan and create economic projects upon this rationale. Cambodia and ASEAN have an advantage in balancing China's and Japan's economic support because the latter two are competing to increase their presence and influence. Cambodia may create minilateral or multilateral institutions, including both Japan and China, to provide a place for them to find their mutual benefits in cooperation. For Japan, value diplomacy in the FOIP excessively simplifies complicated and delicate relationships among ASEAN countries and China. Imposing values is not a good strategy in Japan's ASEAN policy. The FOIP may change Japan's ASEAN policy to some extent, but Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship can find an opportunity to avoid a hard choice over different values and who is the donor as far as it seeks economic cooperation for actual development in CLMV countries.

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