NVDB005_-_CH_3.004._China’s_Soft_Power_in_Southeast_Asia_-_Dr._C_line-5

Diplomatic Briefing — KAS Cambodia and CICP

30 — DP Vol. 05

The Smiling Dragon

market 10, also do their share to cultivate a positive image of China abroad.

In terms of influence, the PRC’s military power helps define China as a major player who must be taken seriously by its neighbours. China has developed an extensive media ecosystem that relays its messages throughout many Southeast Asian countries. Pro-Beijing news reporting in Chinese state-run broad- casters (such as CCTV and CRI) and in local media outlets with ties to China also help persuade the public to accept the truthfulness and validity of PRC messaging. The long-term benefits are potentially substantial, particularly in terms of China’s ability to use local media to inform and influence discourse on foreign policy issues that touch upon its own interests.

The most tangible success of China’s soft power projection is certainly in the cultural field, from Chinese “classics” to popular entertainment. The first category includes Chinese classical literature and music, Confu- cianism, traditional medicine and festivals, cuisine, calligraphy, architecture, and martial arts, among others – all traditional elements of Chinese culture and society that are immediately identifiable as typically Chinese by a broad audience. The second category includes giant pandas, popular (and occasionally chauvinistic) movies and TV shows, romantic novels, or internet celebrities like YouTube star Li Ziqi, who shares her idealised traditional rural lifestyle with millions of followers worldwide. These non-political aspects of Chinese culture remain China’s most successful tools for exercising soft power because of their broad popularity among large segments of Southeast Asian societies.

The Limits of China’s Strategy

However, the study conducted by KAS also showed that China’s effective cultural diplomacy (classic liter- ature, festivals, TV shows, and so on) does not partic- ularly translate into deference toward the PRC as a global actor, stronger support for its political and economic model, or acceptance of its regional and international policies. In other words, the immediate return on investment for China’s soft power projection in this field is arguably limited, at least at the moment, in terms of direct foreign policy gains.

The PRC also struggles to increase its appeal in the fields where other states, especially Western countries

10 “Chinese smartphone brands take 62% of Southeast Asia’s 30.7 million shipments”, Canalys, Shanghai (China), Bengaluru (India), Singapore, Reading (UK) and Portland (US), 15th August 2019, https://www.canalys.com/newsroom/southeast-asia- smartphone-marketshare-Q22019

or Japan and Korea, are already well established. This is the case for academic exchange programmes where opinion polls show that Chinese universities are less popular than the competition in the United States, the UK, the EU, or Australia. The only noticeable exception in this area seems to be Cambodia, where China is by far the top preference for tertiary education abroad. 11 The same is true for tourism: in 2021, the most popular holiday destinations in the five countries of our study were Japan, the EU, and ASEAN member states. China was mentioned in the top 3 only in Cambodia where it took first place. 12 Other examples include sustained interest in the study of European and other foreign languages, pop culture, lifestyle and sport, or new technologies and brands, including for example in the automotive sector where the “made in Germany” or “designed in California” labels are still excellent selling points.

China can sometimes undermine its regional soft power efforts with its own business practices, security policy in the South China Sea, and political asser- tiveness towards its foreign partners. For example, economic investments in the five countries of this study do not necessarily improve China’s local image, as the implementation of many mega projects results in popular resentment due to concerns over sover- eignty issues, the dangers of “debt trap diplomacy”, negative environmental and social impacts, the lack of employment opportunities for local workers, techno- logical issues, and resulting legal disputes. Soft power is of little help when China’s actions begin to threaten the fundamental economic, security, or political interests of its Southeast Asian partners and their citizens.

Chinese tourists are welcome in the countries of this study because they stimulate economic growth, but their absence during the COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the economic dependence of several states in this regard and the negative impact of mass tourism on the environment.

China has attempted to use vaccine diplomacy to promote its soft power, while responding to critics with “wolf warrior” combativeness. Such tactics have not always yielded favourable results. Despite being delivered early in the countries of this study, Chinese inactivated vaccines soon proved to be less popular than other alternatives. Citizens in these countries were acutely aware that Chinese vaccines were less effective than those provided by the West, and were also aware

11 Sharon Seah et al., The States of Southeast Asia: 2022, ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2022, p. 53, https://www.iseas. edu.sg/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/ the-state-of-southeast-asia-2022-survey-report/

12 Ibid., p. 54.