NVDB005_-_CH_3.001._Cambodia’s_triangular_relations_with_China_and_Vietnam_-_Amb._Julio-4

15 — DP Vol. 05

Regional Security Dilemma: Trends, Directions, and Illusion

This presents a serious problem to the government and, while the ruling party has been benign in their treatment of the illegal migrants, it has in recent years carried out enforced relocations of entire Vietnamese communities, particularly in the area of the Great Lake, and officially requested Vietnam to repatriate those found without documentation accrediting their identity. 9

However, as some of these migrants have lived in Cambodia for many years, the Vietnamese author- ities no longer recognize them as Vietnamese citizens, which causes tensions in the bilateral relationship.

In spite of the tensions mentioned above, trade between Cambodia and Vietnam has not been affected and in 2021, Cambodia’s trade with Vietnam reached

9 Kimhong Hen, Cambodia-Vietnam Relations: Key Issues and the Way Forward, Singapore, Perspectives, No36, 2022, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

a peak of US 9,3 billion, or a 75% increase over the previous year.

Le Hong Hiep, Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Program at ISEAS Singapore, told the Asia Times Online that “China and Vietnam strategic and economic competition in Cambodia has been ongoing for a long time, and will only intensify when both China and Vietnam want to maintain and strengthen their influence over Phnom Penh”. 10

No doubt this intricate rivalry will continue into the future, but forty years after Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia to topple Democratic Kampuchea, it is clear that China has emerged the ultimate winner.

10 Hutt David, Cambodia on middle path between China and Vietnam, Asia Times Online, 29 April 2022

Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen poses for a photo with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc at the Government Office in Hanoi, Vietnam October 4, 2019. REUTERS/Kham