NVDB005_-_CH_3.013._Middle_Powers,_Strategic_Approaches_-_David_Gregosz-5

Diplomatic Briefing — KAS Cambodia and CICP

68 — DP Vol. 05

Middle Powers, Strategic Approaches and Rethinking in Times of External Threat

relations with Western partners, as had been consol- idated in a cross-party consensus under previous governments since the 1990s, were no longer a priority under PiS. General principles of the rule of law collapsed under national judicial reform, for which Poland is currently in a deep dispute with the highest European bodies such as the EU Commission and the European Court of Justice, as well as the majority of other EU member states. But instead of resolving opposition, Warsaw shifted into a destructive mode. The government obstructed the traditional line of deepening the country‘s integration with the West with an exaggerated narrative claiming that a hegemonic Europe dominated by Germany wanted to deprive Poland of its sovereignty and cultural identity. Believers of such a narrative argued that Europe does not see Poland as an equal partner. Therefore, the government sought its own profile in regional cooper- ation initiatives such as the Visegrad Group or the Three Seas Initiative, thus far without capitalising on them or establishing improved relations with neigh- bours such as the Czech Republic or Hungary beyond singular agreements. There is one principle that can be seen as the force behind the country’s actions abroad in recent years: PiS sees domestic policy as the driving factor of foreign policy. Until recently, the government‘s sole aim was to politicise foreign policy problems, such as the migration crisis on the Belarusian border at the end of 2021 or conflicts with the EU, in order to gain support among its own voters in Poland‘s currently highly polarised society. Actual problem-solving was not relevant and foreign policy became secondary. This has resulted in phenomena such as the ineffec- tiveness of Polish diplomacy for party-political goals and the loss of important mutual trust at the supra- national political leadership level. 16 What limits this damage at the moment is solely the fact that despite all the abuses described above, one of the few lines of continuity in Poland - due to the dramatic historical experiences of the nation‘s repeated obliteration by foreign powers - is the irreversible pursuit of and focus on national security and defence as an essential factor of its foreign policy. A policy entirely detached from the West - be it a rejection of the EU as a major regional economic power or the USA as a world power and dominant provider of security within the framework of the transatlantic alliance - is therefore unthinkable, even for the current government in Warsaw. 17

16 Klaus Bachmann, Politik in Polen, Stuttgart 2020, S. 67 ff.

17 „Ohne normativen Kompass“, KAS-Länderbericht von David Gregosz (10.11.2021): https://www.kas.de/ documents/252038/10987758/Au%C3%9Fenpolitische+Bilan z+der+polnischen+Regierung+unter+F%C3%BChrung+der+P iS.pdf/00a4fd0a-7986-c4b4-4127-9fee3873bb50?version=1.0&t=1636560296143.

Lessons for Middle Powers in Other Regions of the World

The sheer scale of the refugee exodus from Ukraine to the West (very likely the largest since World War II) and the decisive response of the United Nations shows that the war in Ukraine cannot be classified as merely a regional conflict. The unclear role of China and questions about the impact on global financial and energy trade, as well as the possible involvement of NATO as the conflict escalates, emphasise the transre- gional scale of the crisis.

The reaction to the recent aggression of the Russian nuclear power, in violation of international law, leads to the conclusion that in the face of such broad conflict, middle powers in particular must strengthen their foreign policy strategy capabilities in order to build effective resilience. This is all the more urgent as, in the 21st century, a major conflict between the world powers of the USA, still the provider of stability freedom and democracy, and China, the advocate of a multi- polar and ideologically pluralistic world order 18, seems imminent. Medium-sized powers in other regions, such for example the Indo-Pacific, will therefore also find it more difficult to continue to adopt a neutral or balancing position in the future.

Cambodia, a state that is oscillating between the USA and the EU as its largest foreign trade partners and China as a regional power seeking to expand its economic, military and cultural dominance in strategi- cally important regions (locally evident in the context of issues such as China‘s Belt and Road Initiative, the use of military bases and the role of Chinese migrants 19), will not be exempt from this. In this respect, middle powers everywhere are faced with the need to make crucial decisions. At this point, it is not expedient - as the example of Poland shows and as some reports also attest to Cambodia 20 - to orient foreign policy solely in the light of domestic policy being the driving force. The times of such negligent misjudgements and irrespon- sibility should be over.

18 https://www.dw.com/de/chinas-weltordnung-f%C3%BCr-das-21- jahrhundert/a-54351316.

19 Kambodscha zwischen China und dem Westen - Rosa- Luxemburg-Stiftung (rosalux.de).

20 Ibidem.