NVDB005_-_CH_3.013._Middle_Powers,_Strategic_Approaches_-_David_Gregosz-4

67 — DP Vol. 05

Regional Security Dilemma: Trends, Directions, and Illusion

approach is the fact that many institutions with inter- national significance are located in Vienna: the Secre- tariat of the OSCE and the headquarters of the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Drug Control Programme, and the Organi- zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In addition to this balancing strategy for international influence, however, there is also a second essential parameter in Austria: the strong ties to the West through its membership in the European Union since 1995. Unlike in Switzerland, taking a political stance is therefore not a contradiction to neutrality. The reaction to Putin‘s military incursion (despite deep economic relations with Russia 10) was correspondingly clear 11: Chancellor Karl Nehammer spoke of a unilateral unleashing of the war in Ukraine by Russia, of war crimes as well as crimes against humanity. Moscow sharply criticised this as a violation of the duty to maintain neutrality. But despite this, Austria supports Brussels‘ tough sanctions and in fact even contributes to the financing of weapons deliveries to Ukraine by supporting an EU fund. 12 While this position is legally questionable, it underlines only too clearly that Austria is indeed undoubtedly in the camp of Western democracy.

By contrast, another European state, Poland, made this decision clearly long ago - and deeply insti- tutionalised it over two decades. After the end of communism, the continuous integration of the country into „the West“ was considered an irrevocable maxim. This led to Poland‘s accession into NATO in 1999 and the development of a close relationship to the USA as world power in terms of security policy, which is reflected in particular in the country‘s participation in military combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Poland joined the European Union in 2004, where it is the fifth-largest member state with a population of almost 38 million. It is also the sixth- largest economy in the EU-27 with a nominal GDP (2021) of 655,332 billion US dollars 13 - a strong economic base that even reported positive growth during the global financial crisis. Poland is thus evidently a European middle power. Aware of its status, the country exerts international influence through its membership in organisations such as the OSCE, whose presidency it currently holds at the time of writing in 2022, or in the United Nations. And as the largest EU member

10 https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/russland-oesterreich- sanktionen-wirtschaftsbeziehungen-ukrainekrieg- auslandsinvestionen-1.5545891.

11 Russland bezweifelt Österreichs Neutralität im Ukraine- Krieg (faz.net).

12 Seite 2 - Warum Österreich Neutralität auch im Ukraine- Krieg heilig ist (faz.net).

13 GDP of European countries 2021 - StatisticsTimes.com.

state in Central Eastern Europe, it has for a few years been trying to establish a regional leadership position through new initiatives such as Visegard, the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest 9. Since Poland, as an eastern EU and NATO member, has long been advocating support for democratic neighbours in the east, and since it is now, as a country bordering Ukraine, directly affected by the war and the immense influx of refugees, its current response is explicit 14: Europe and the Western world - united in awareness of their shared values - must stand together, put all politically and economically conceivable sanctions in place against Russia and provide humanitarian and military backing for the neighbour across the border as much as possible. The seriousness of this stance was underlined by the Polish proposal to offer Ukraine even its own MIG fighter planes to engage Russia. 15 But as a middle power alone, Poland will not be able to provide all of this support, but instead relies on the joint strength, capability, and resilience of international alliances such as the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, the country feels confident in its assessment of Russia as a major regional power that uses its energy resources as a political weapon to fulfil imperial dreams and to once again subject the countries in its immediate vicinity to its influence.

The conclusion to be drawn from the three cases outlined here is that a comparatively relative, limited international influence as a middle power does not necessarily lead to uniform or analogous foreign policy strategies. On the contrary, medium-sized states take very different positions. However, what they all have in common is that they are making strategic decisions during the current crisis in the service of common values that, in the face of the gravest external threat, promote a supranational alliance that will secure their own continued existence and freedom in the future.

Poland‘s Foreign Policy in Recent Years

On the basis of the analysis so far, with regard to the Law and Justice (“PiS“) government, it can only be stated soberly that foreign policy pursued since 2015 does not correspond to the strategic approach that Poland is currently rightly pursuing in light of the war and the immense security challenge it poses. Good

14 https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/komunikat-msz-w-sprawie- rosyjskiej-agresji-zbrojnej-na-ukraine; https://www.gov.pl/web/ premier/przemowienie-premiera-mateusza-morawieckiego- w-berlinie; Was ist die Strategie des herrschenden Lagers gegenüber dem Krieg in der Ukraine - Polityka Insight.

15 https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus237421027/ Ukraine-Krieg-Wie-es-zum-Konflikt-ueber-28-Kampfjets-kam. html?icid=search.product.onsitesearch.