NVDB005_-_CH_3.011._Concerted_efforts_advance_the_COC_negotiations_-_Dr._Pham-2

57 — DP Vol. 05

Regional Security Dilemma: Trends, Directions, and Illusion

Negotiations of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) are entering a crucial stage. ASEAN and China have reached a provisional agreement on the preamble of the Code. Both sides are currently preparing to work on important contents of the COC that are mutually agreed to be substantive, effective and in line with international law and 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

There is a big hope that Cambodia will contribute to the COC process. China explicitly expressed a desire to conclude the COC in 2022 under Cambodia’s chair- manship of ASEAN to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which ushered in a “golden period” in history of ASEAN-China relations. Implicitly, Cambodia is expected to advance the COC negotiations and mark another milestone to promote the ASEAN-China relations.

Indeed, the ASEAN Chair’s support is necessary, since it can set the COC negotiations as one of the main prior- ities on the agenda of related meetings throughout 2022. But this alone is insufficient, as the COC process does not merely depend upon the Chair alone. Instead, it needs concerted efforts from all countries concerned, both inside and outside the region.

All countries must firmly thwart disturbances to the negotiation process. Major powers must ensure they engage only in responsible forms of competition. Power politics, muscle flexing, coercion, intimidation, militarization and fortification should be abandoned. All countries concerned must earnestly maintain peace, security and cooperation, exercise self-re- straint, and refrain from any provocative actions that complicate the situation or violate either the littoral states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and conti- nental shelves or the international law.

The ASEAN Chair must clearly demonstrate its readiness to proactively perform its mandated role. It has to actively promote and enhance the interests, consensus and unanimity of ASEAN on the COC issue. It must maintain the momentum of the COC negotiations and keep the issue at the center of regional attention and focus, while simultaneously coordinating on other pressing issues, such as the post Covid-19 recovery, the Myanmar Crisis and external developments like the situation in Ukraine.

There should be an appropriate solution for the coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations to fulfill its role. Currently, Myanmar undertakes this task. Myanmar and China co-chair COC-negotiating meetings, namely the ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC (SOM-DOC) and the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC (JWG-DOC). Unfortunately, it is difficult for Myanmar to do its job sufficiently, since it is currently bogged down in a crisis and ASEAN only allows non-political representatives from the country to participate in important ASEAN meetings.

ASEAN and China must find a way to reconvene face-to-face meetings. Both sides have flexibly held prior meetings through virtual platforms, resulting in the previously mentioned provisional agreement on the preamble section. They held the 26th in-person meeting of the JWG-DOC in May 2022 in Phnom Penh. It is an encouraging progress, paving the way for future physical meetings as they remain the primary modality of COC negotiations, since its contents are crucial and confidential. However, it is very difficult to hold in-person meetings while the Covid-19 pandemic remains rampant and the countries concerned are still adopting strict measures to prevent the virus contagion from getting out of control, such as zero-covid policy, travel bans and so on.

Dr. Pham Duy Thuc is a senior researcher at the East Sea (South China Sea) Institute, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) (2012-present).

His research interests focus on international order, trust and confidence building measures, international relations in the Indo/Asia-Pacific, especially US-China strategic competition, Southeast Asia, ASEAN, Vietnam’s foreign policy and the South China Sea disputes. He has written extensively for the International Studies magazine, East Asia Forum, The Diplomat and the likes.

Prior to joining the East Sea Institute, Dr. Thuc served as a researcher at the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies (IFPSS), the DAV (2008 - 2009). He had a posting as Third Secretary at the Embassy of the S.R. of Vietnam in the United Republic of Tanzania (2009 – 2012).