NVDB005_-_CH_3.004._China’s_Soft_Power_in_Southeast_Asia_-_Dr._C_line-7

Diplomatic Briefing — KAS Cambodia and CICP

32 — DP Vol. 05

The Smiling Dragon

of the state that influences others by virtue of its own inherent appeal. In that sense, for the American sinol- ogist David Shambaugh, the PRC’s approach is more accurately defined as public diplomacy than real soft power. 17

In July 2015, both Joseph Nye and David Shambaugh analyzed the limits of Chinese soft power. Nye wrote that “China has emphasized its cultural and economic strengths, but it has paid less attention to the political aspects that can undermine its efforts”. In his view, two factors limit the PRC’s soft power – its nationalistic approach, with assertive narratives that often antag- onize target audiences, and the government’s intention to be the predominant source of soft power, focusing on traditional culture and often using propaganda tools abroad. 18 Shambaugh simply called China’s soft power agenda “external propaganda”. 19 At the time, Nye and Shambaugh both came to the conclusion that China’s global appeal will only improve if the PRC’s leadership agrees to unleash the full talent of the Chinese civil society and allows people and companies to freely innovate and be visible abroad. As Shambaugh puts it: “the Chinese government approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs high-speed

17 China Power Team (CSIS), “Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?”, Discussion with Joseph S. Nye Jr., Liz Economy, David Shambaugh, CSIS, 27 February 2016, https://chinapower.csis.org/ is-chinas-soft-power-strategy-working/

18 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Limits of Chinese Soft Power”, Project Syndicate, 10th July 2015, https://www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/china-civil-society-nationalism-soft-power-by- joseph-s--nye-2015-07

19 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push. The Search for Respect”, Foreign Affairs, art. cit., here p.100.

rail or builds infrastructure – by investing money and expecting to see development. (…) Soft power cannot be bought. It must be earned.” 20

The recent study conducted by KAS shows that more than half a decade later, the Chinese leadership continues to implement the same playbook with its five neighbours in Southeast Asia. It uses top-down methods to try to control information and opinions about China in the region, without enabling individuals, the private sector, or Chinese civil society to participate freely in the process. This strategy produces mixed outcomes in terms of international appeal. It remains to be seen if Beijing will dare in the future to “get out of its own way” and unlock the full potential of its soft power. China’s international media policy, the broad deployment of “wolf warrior” tactics by its diplomats, and pressures on foreign celebrities to affirm the “One China” principle suggest that for the time being, a strategic shift in this area is not on the agenda of the CCP.

For interested readers, the full KAS study about China’s soft power in selected ASEAN countries can be found here: www.kas.de/Thailand

20 Ibid., p. 107.