NVDB005_-_CH_3.004._China’s_Soft_Power_in_Southeast_Asia_-_Dr._C_line-3

Diplomatic Briefing — KAS Cambodia and CICP

28 — DP Vol. 05

The Smiling Dragon

of the state and the ruling party. Some experts call this Chinese variation “sharp power”. 5

Since early 2020, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic that originated in the city of Wuhan and negative international reporting on human rights and security issues, Beijing has relied on soft power to mitigate reputational damage and protect China’s appeal. It developed new soft power tools known as “mask diplomacy” and later “vaccine diplomacy”, as well as “wolf warrior” diplomats responding aggres- sively to criticism . In the Global Soft Power Index produced by the British consulting firm Brand Finance, China has achieved its best performance ever in 2022, ranking 4th worldwide and overtaking Japan as the highest-ranked nation in Asia. 6

China’s growing influence on a global scale is a subject of the highest importance for decision-makers and interested observers across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and beyond. In 2021 and 2022, Konrad-Ad- enauer-Stiftung (KAS) conducted a research project based on qualitative data to better understand the extent, impact, and potential implications of Chinese soft power efforts in the northern part of Southeast Asia. The researchers involved focused on Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are all linked by land to their much larger northern neighbour, characterized by centuries of exchanges with China, and within the scope of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This part of the world is particularly interesting because Southeast Asia has been a nexus of power contestation between China and the US, from the Cold War to the present day. Interactions with these global powers continue to shape the modern history of the region and the decisions of such smaller states. 7 The study highlighted many specificities of the PRC’s soft power strategy in four areas: gover- nance and diplomacy, education and culture, media, and economy. The following details several important findings.

China’s Appeal and Growing Influence

The study demonstrated that the PRC under President Xi Jinping has successfully developed and implemented a multifaceted outreach strategy. This has allowed China to increase its overall footprint, strengthen its

5 See for example: Joan Pablo Cardenal et al, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, National Endowment for Democracy, 2017, https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp- Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf

6 Global Soft Power Index 2022, Brand Finance, https:// brandirectory.com/softpower/report

7 See for example: David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, 2020.

influence, and in some cases enhance its appeal with its five Southeast Asian neighbours. Beijing’s “host diplomacy” as well as scholarship programmes, media investments, and economic engagement in the region appear to be especially effective tools in obtaining its objectives.

It is difficult to evaluate whether the PRC’s “host diplomacy”, with numerous invitations to political leaders, party officials, students, academics, and journalists, directly translates into producing soft power gains: visitors who return from their trips in China with an improved image of the country and a willingness to actively contribute to its international prestige. But this approach certainly appears to have built important relationships in key sectors and improved the PRC’s influence in the region, as well as its image as an influential country. It is well-docu- mented that in the context of political (or business) negotiations with foreign representatives, this strategy aims to produce so-called “old friends” – interpersonal relationships with mutual obligations helping the Chinese side to achieve its objectives. 8 China experts also underline the fact that China’s elite-to-elite diplomacy can resonate quite well in countries in East Asia and the Pacific, where relations with the West can sometimes be strained due to the West’s values-ori- ented diplomacy. Beijing’s policy of non-interference in its neighbours’ domestic affairs, its top-down control of development, and its policy of limiting calls for political reform in favor of economic progress fits particularly well with the range of blended authoritarian and democratic systems in the region. 9

Both growth in trade, coupled with large investment projects like BRI initiatives, and a high number of Chinese tourists eager to travel the world also contribute to the PRC’s appeal as a partner, thus improving its status among the selected Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, China’s strategy to showcase its socio-economic achievements, especially by extensively communicating its ability to lift millions of people out of poverty, has certainly proven effective. It generates respect and demonstrates the appeal of its model, especially in circles where strong leadership or economic interventionism are well regarded. Popular Chinese brands and companies in Southeast Asia, like Oppo, Vivo, Xiaomi, and Huawei for the smartphone

8 See for example, David Lampton et al., Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 122.

9 See for example Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia”, Current History, University of California Press, September 2006, Volume 105, Issue 692, p. 270–276, here p. 272, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2006.105.692.270