NVDB005_-_CH_3.004._China’s_Soft_Power_in_Southeast_Asia_-_Dr._C_line-6

31 — DP Vol. 05

Regional Security Dilemma: Trends, Directions, and Illusion

that, with few exceptions, these were not donations – their governments purchased them from China at premium prices. Ambassadorial “wolf warrior” tactics have often provoked mockery or resistance in some areas – as seen with the emergence of the so-called Milk Tea Alliance, an online movement defined by anti-China or anti-authoritarianism sentiments, among “netizens” of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and other ASEAN countries.

Finally, China’s attempts at using social media as a platform for its soft power projection often fail to reach or convince younger audiences. The reasons for this are simple: Beijing’s overly controlled commu- nication is heavily charged with ideology (think of the promotion of The Governance of China by Xi Jinping). It aims to promote China’s state narratives and national priorities abroad, and focuses on technologies from the 20th century (Chinese state-run broadcasters, the acquisition of local media outlets, op-eds, book presentations and so on). For many young people in Southeast Asia, this is simply neither “fun” nor credible, and it doesn’t generate significant attention, or “likes”, online.

Local Trust

These observations are consistent with other recent research projects and opinion polls in the region. For example, the first edition of the China Index, produced by Doublethink Lab in cooperation with National Taipei University and other local academic partners, measured China’s influence in 36 countries and territories on every continent, from March to August 2021, and focused on nine domains: the media, foreign policy, academia, domestic politics, economy, technology, society, military, and law enforcement. Of the 36 countries evaluated (as of April 2022), it assessed Cambodia, Singapore and Thailand, respec- tively, as being the top three countries most exposed to China’s influence, while Malaysia ranked 8th and Vietnam 26th. 13

The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore measures opinions annually among representatives of government, academia, civil society, NGOs, the media, and the private sector in ASEAN. The latest quali- tative survey conducted in November/December 2021 found that only 37.16 percent of the respondents in the five countries of this report are either “confident” (25.8 percent) or “very confident” (11.36 percent) that China will “do the right thing” to contribute to global

13 Doublethink Lab, China Index 2021, https://china-index.io/

peace, security, prosperity and governance. 14 Inter- estingly, this percentage of confidence is higher than the ASEAN average (26.8 percent) and higher than the previous year (19.3 percent), in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the level of trust towards China was highest by far in Cambodia (74 percent), lowest in Singapore (16.3 percent) and Vietnam (24.3 percent), and more moderate in Malaysia (37 percent) and Thailand (34.2 percent).

Those who trust China in Cambodia attribute this first to the PRC’s “vast economic resources and strong political will to provide global leadership”. Those who distrust China in Singapore (69.8 percent of respon- dents) and Vietnam (64.6 percent) name two primary reasons: the fact that “China’s economic and military power could be used to threaten [their] country’s interest and sovereignty” (the first reason mentioned in Vietnam) and the fact that they “do not consider China a responsible or reliable power” (the first reason in Singapore). In Malaysia and Thailand, those who trust China primarily cite the PRC’s economic resources and political will to provide global leadership, as in Cambodia, whereas those who distrust China share Singapore’s and Vietnam’s concerns.

Similar tendencies can be observed in response to COVID-19 vaccines: Chinese brands are most trusted in Cambodia (where 67.9 percent of the respon- dents name Sinopharm or Sinovac as their preferred brand) and least trusted in Vietnam (4.2 percent) and Singapore (4.5 percent), whereas Thailand (17.1 percent) and Malaysia (23.7 percent) are closer to the average of 23.48 percent. 15

Among those who trust the PRC in the five countries, “respect [for] China” and “[admiration] for its civili- sation and culture” are rarely primary considerations for their opinion. This point is mentioned only by a small share of respondents in the latest ISEAS survey (13.9 percent in Singapore, 12 percent in Malaysia, 10 percent in Cambodia, 7.5 percent in Thailand, and 2.9 percent in Vietnam). The vast majority of respondents focus on economic, military, and political arguments. 16

Soft Power Cannot Be Bought

In terms of strategies, the pro-active, top-down method of Chinese leadership to generate a positive image of China abroad contradicts Professor Joseph Nye’s prevailing definition of soft power, as an asset

14 Sharon Seah et al., The States of Southeast Asia: 2022, ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute, op. cit., p. 42-43.

15 Ibid., p. 14.

16 Ibid., p. 43.