NVDB005_-_CH_3.008._Dual_Challenges_of_Indonesia_-_Andrew_W._Mantong-2

45 — DP Vol. 05

Regional Security Dilemma: Trends, Directions, and Illusion

Andrew Wiguna Mantong joined CSIS in January 2016. Prior to joining CSIS he served as the Secretary of Under- graduate Program at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. His expertise includes topics such as non-traditional security, state-society relations, Indonesian foreign policy and ASEAN. He also teaches some international relations related courses on foreign policy, global civil society, theory and methodology at the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia. He obtained bachelor degree in International Relations from Universitas Indonesia in 2008 and master degree in International Relations from S. Rajaratnam School of Interna- tional Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, in 2012. Since 2016 he has been working with national and regional officials and academics to provide trainings and workshops related to foreign and security affairs, to conduct numerous studies and to formulate policy recommendation for various foreign policy stake- holders. Some of his research includes multiple studies on Indonesian defense diplomacy formula for maritime affairs, Indonesia’ perspective on ASEAN maritime security frameworks, and Indonesian foreign policy under President Joko Widodo’s administration. He is also currently observing state-society relations in Indonesia in issues like terrorism and radicalism, cybersecurity, and broader non-traditional security issues.

Indonesia will soon assume the role of ASEAN Chairman in 2023. Jakarta will likely find an intricate space between national and regional challenges to navigate ASEAN in dealing with its most pressing issues.

This year, Indonesia is the President of the Group 20 (G20). Aside from political challenges, it has put Jakarta at a tremendous logistical challenge to hold a series of back-to-back high profile meetings from the end of 2021 last year. While the G20 presidency mostly involves governmental agencies in economic affairs, many foreign affairs resources have been drawn into the events given the strategic importance of the issues involved.

Indonesia’s G20 presidency this year may have provided some reflections for Indonesia’s ASEAN policy next year. First, President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy focus on economic diplomacy has found its gauge in the events of the G20. Controversy over Russia’s atten- dance in the upcoming Summit has provided some tremendous diplomatic challenges for Indonesia who seeks to ensure that its agenda and priorities are not put aside by a security agenda. Jakarta prefers the international community to separate economic priorities from security concerns. Such normative standards, which are built around the long-seated doctrine of Free and Active Foreign Policy, will likely continue next year when Indonesia will go on to host not only ASEAN meetings involving ASEAN countries, but also ASEAN meetings with its dialogue partners, including the United States (U.S.), China, and Russia. The doctrine sets up a parameter to which Indonesia should remain neutral and be guided only by national interests and ideals in the middle of great power competition while being active in contribution to any efforts of maintaining international peace and stability.

Second, consequently, we may expect some continu- ities of the agenda set this year by Indonesia in the following year. Along with economic diplomacy prior- ities, dealing with the post-Covid 19 economic recovery will heavily influence Jakarta’s priorities and policies for ASEAN. Jakarta will likely discern regional challenges, including geopolitical issues, through the lens of economic priorities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is important for Jakarta due to the shocks it has caused in terms of finance, commodity prices and supply chains, all of which may endanger regional attempts to jump-start the economy through recovery policies.

In various strategic talks within the country during President Widodo’s tenure, the potential for a demographic dividend and opportunities to create economic growth have become some of the most important strategic concerns. Jakarta believes that a certain level of growth should be secured to make the most of Indonesia’s current demography before turning its attention towards other liabilities in the future. Investment inflows and the creation of overseas markets are thus pivotal. We can therefore expect some continuities between Indonesia’s proposal on the creation of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific, its agenda for the G20 Presidency, and its ASEAN Chair- manship next year.

The post-pandemic recovery, as well as the economic growth that goes along with digitalization and sustainable development, will only be achieved, in Jakarta’s eyes, by ensuring a “free and active” region. However, to realize such a vision, Indonesia will have to deal with both structural and internal pressures.

First, intensifying competition between the U.S. and China in the region has continuously blurred the