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## Peace Process in Colombia: Implications for internal and regional Security

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*“Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation [of war] from where we are now is like trying to see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire. There is no telescope that can reach so far. We can see the barbarians on the march. In America and in Europe, we already find them inside the limes and within the legions. But what follows the chaos they bring in their wake, only the gods on Mount Olympus can see. It may be worth remembering that the last time this happened, the gods themselves died.”*

William Lind

Undoubtedly, and running the risk of falling into the clichés that permeate all the analyses on the international system and on the trends of the early twenty-first century, it is important to note that September 11 particularly marked the way we see the world of the new century. This being said, it was not an extraordinary event in world history: indeed, most countries have faced such challenges. Of course, countries try to respond to such threats, and try to adapt to the new environment they create; and, when this happens, the entire life of a country or political organisation is engulfed by national security. From domestic to foreign policy, everything is viewed through the prism of defence and security. The country's policy ceases to be dedicated to national development and/or to the welfare of its citizens, becoming instead a neurotic policy of defence – and eventually even a policy of attack.

Concepts of stability and reliability are left behind (Torrijos 2009, 169) and the international system then faces an ongoing crisis, which determines the actions of international players seeking to ensure the survival of global institutions. Latin America stands, in this modern world, as one of the international system's major pivot points regarding political stability – based on two axes: economic development and regional security. The latter, in particular, impacts every corner of the globe in times of trans-nationalisation of threats.

Colombia and its conflict are emblematic of this. The Colombian government has embarked on a bid to achieve a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This agreement would lead to Colombia's political stability against armed threats, however it involves a significant redesign of the country's security system, because in the background of the negotiation lies the drug problem. A problem that became evident during the paramilitary United Self-defence Forces of Columbia (AUC) peace process. The so-called paramilitary groups became criminal gangs with regional networks from Mexico to Argentina, working for drug traffickers. Some of these groups try to maintain a facade of right-winged resistance against the "communist threat"; however their criminal actions have always undermined their supposed ideological discourse.

This paper aims to approach the challenge of regional security based on the analysis of the peace process in Colombia, a process which forms part of the shifts generated in a time of global uncertainty and the transformation of irregular threats in a changed global context. Everything has been affected in the past 20 years by these evolutions and trends: states themselves, the global economy, politics, governance, – and, of course, security.

## The peace process in Colombia

The peace process in Colombia involves the broader transformation of the structures of defence and security within the Colombian Government, as well as the deployment of public security forces against new enemies. This is not a new idea; having in fact always been a government guideline for once the agreement is reached.

Initially, the tactical plan included de-escalation measures such as suspending the use of the Air Force against the FARC. Such measures illustrate that the government is both committed to peace, and aware that de-escalation is a long-term process. But before that, the bilateral ceasefire was initiated with some measures to reduce the operational readiness of the Armed Forces, in this case the Air Force. This measure demonstrates the effectiveness of airpower in the required work and highlights the inability of the FARC to counteract it. This act of suspension has already been performed twice along this process, in March and July 2015. The risk of this measure is that some other criminal structures, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Criminal Bands (Bacrim), may try to blend in among FARC members in order to avoid being bombed, implying a reduction in operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces (FFMM).

The political challenge for the government lies in convincing public opinion that the guerrillas have indeed complied with the unilateral ceasefire, which is rendered complex since the media have reported attacks during the announced ceasefire period.

Likewise, the Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (Cerac), recorded at least 10 actions that violated the ceasefire, which contradicts government Intel, Intel which was presented as coming from the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. President Juan Manuel Santos has faced resistance to the peace process and related activities, both from the public, and from certain institutional sectors which have been quite vocal against the peace process. The President recently specifically referred to members of the Armed Forces which position themselves against the peace talks between the government and the FARC; Santos warned that those members of the Military who too “openly” criticise that which occurs at the table at Havana should remove themselves from office. “If they openly express criticism, they will be considered as incurring serious disciplinary fault, and will have to leave: this is the government’s policy,” he said. Santos also questioned criticism of the talks in Havana, that is, he asserted, based on “lies”. “It is not fair to criticise the peace process with lies, it is not good for democracy (...) we want to call people to come forward if they have questions and we will explain. These questions and criticisms are welcome, but lies are not” (El Herald. 2015).

This clearly political message is aimed at empowering the government before the Armed Forces. The problem is that, quite to the contrary of the intended effect, it has further stressed a sector of the state that has been highly critical in its stance against the peace process.

This approach corresponds to what the President views as a political offensive to try to end the opposition to his actions, above all directed to the political sectors that are behind all possible stances that some members of the Military have taken towards the process. That is, this message is not directed at the Military *per se*; this message is meant for politicians who aim to politicise military forces that have sworn not to be neither deliberative nor political. Unfortunately this is another mistake made by the President against his security forces, creating more resistance than consensus.

The peace process with the FARC includes both instances of clarity and of shadow.

Amongst the successes, or bright spots, is the fact that the peace process manages to keep the FARC sitting at the negotiating table, even while security operations continue to be deployed against them. This shows that the FARC have a latent military weakness, but from the political point of view, it shows that the organisation’s Secretariat has set a political goal which does not necessarily include military victory. This is essentially due to two things: first of all to the fact that some of the group’s main military leaders were written off during the course of the war and, secondly, that this group has lost significant international support and is today acknowledged as a narcoterrorist organisation. In fact, countries that have fought against such guerrilla structures, such as the US and Russia, understand that a total military victory is, in such cases, impossible; they have, thus, given repeated and public support for the peace process in Colombia. Likewise, old guerrillas such as Jose Mujica, former President of Uruguay, now question the legitimacy of armed struggle. In actual fact, supporting the peace process allows for the negotiation of penalties to account for laundered money as well as for the unveiling of criminal structures; both concrete benefits for the United States.

Among the darker aspects of this process are some serious issues:

- › Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration: this issue is central to the process because it indicates the “re-civilisation” of FARC fighters. If done poorly, it may increase social problems in the sense that the fighters, who fail to return to a productive civilian life, will articulate new criminal gangs that may exponentially increase insecurity in both cities and the countryside. Such gangs might act similarly to the present Bacrim and dispute territories and the rest of the production chain with them. Likewise, disarmament must involve the delivery of weapons to ensure that this threat is not reactivated. Disarmament without weapons delivery involves the latent risk of violence, regardless of motivation.
- › Transitional justice and punishment: the FARC will seek at all costs to engage the Military in criminal proceedings. The objective is to align their penalties and eventually reduce them by means of the argument that the war was so cruel that all sectors involved committed crimes and that, in that sense, one cannot fully judge either side. The role of the prosecutor is here essential to define the crimes for which these terrorists will be judged and to seek their acceptance of the justice system. It is equally important to ensure that the International Criminal Court (ICC) considers that the crimes were judged properly, so as to prevent the ICC’s involvement in the process. Putting governmental forces on trial, however, is a somewhat controversial issue because it was the very same government which established the doctrine by which to pursue the enemy and prevent the collapse of the country. In this sense, the ICC must be sure that all war crimes have been considered, especially because there is no record, considering recent wars, of an army that has not been judged for war crimes. Obviously in those cases the individual was judged, not the institution. The problem in Colombia is that to judge all who were engaged in combat in the past 50 years of war is impossible. So the solution will be to look for the person “chiefly responsible” so as to judge those who had the ultimate responsibility for military and political orders, both as regards the state and the guerrillas.
- › Doctrine and the system of defence and security: This point is unavoidable; clearly the central role of the military will not change, in the sense that they will continue to defend the country’s territory and protect Colombian citizens. What will be defined is the threat and structure of forces. In this sense the government isn’t lying; the problem is the expectation created within the ranks of the Military against such an enemy as the guerrillas, which, in being inducted to the official political arena, will cease to be military targets. The government will thus have to define new paths for state defence and security. The adaptation and reform of the Armed Forces will be attempted without legal or political trauma. Basically the point is to eliminate the problem of the internal enemy and to reform the Military – with or without their consent.

One can say that the peace process is now advanced and has reached the turning point whereby to abandon it would represent a very high political cost for the parties involved. In short, the guerrillas are betting on the signing of a deal, and it is clear that all that would be left of them after such a deal would be dissidents transformed into *stricto sensu* criminal groups.

However, as already noted, the war has continued. Ecopetrol, the country's main state-owned company, has, since May 2015, suffered 16 attacks on its oil infrastructure. The guerrillas have forced truck drivers to spill 200,000 gallons of oil in the department of Putumayo, causing damages that the government estimates will take it 15 years to overcome, and which may spread to Ecuador and Peru. The Vetra oil company in Putumayo had to bear the loss of many gallons when the guerrillas stopped a convoy of tankers and forced them to open their valves and spill the crude oil they carried over the jungle. This is somewhat of a paradox, considering that the company had only been using this transport system in the first place because guerrilla attacks had made the Trans-Andean pipeline able to operate for less than half a year last year (Nieto. 2015).

In addition, three policemen were killed in the department of Cauca in an assault with explosives and rifle shots, and an electrical tower in the department of Caqueta was knocked down leaving nearly 470,000 people without power. Authorities also reported a FARC attack in June of 2015 against a pipeline in the department of Nariño, which polluted rivers in the region and reached the Pacific Ocean.

In accordance with these events, the bilateral ceasefire is pressured by a show of a force that politically affects the image of the whole process. Consequently, if the fight is of a political nature, it is difficult to understand what is to be gained by such an onslaught, which tarnishes, in terms of public image, the little that could have been gained in political and social sectors by supporting the peace process. In political terms, neither the government nor the guerrillas win with these attacks. If there hasn't been more fuss about these issues, it is because regional elections are approaching and no politician wants to commit themselves by making statements about it.

If the process breaks down, the situation would return to that of a war of attrition, with a high level of terrorist attacks in which the adaptation-capacity of operational plans would be key to neutralising the threat; the formulas already in use will not work against this potential mutation of the FARC. The difference between this scenario and the previous Samper, Pastrana and Uribe eras is that the guerrilla strategy was, then, based on the idea that they could act as an army taking towns, performing open attacks against the Armed Forces and undertaking kidnappings that would give them economic and political power to pressure the government. In these 20 years, the government's military superiority was made evident – and what was learnt during both the peace process and the experience of open confrontations – is that the guerrillas will not again act in the same way. The success of guerrilla activities is now determined by the efforts undertaken by their terrorist support networks as well as by the certainty of their concrete terrorist acts.

On the other hand, if an agreement is signed, it will be so weak that confrontation will be the order of the day and it will be carried out in two scenarios:

- › Political Scenario: in which the government will have to ensure – by means of referendum or by act of law endorsed by a Congress divided between proponents and

opponents of the peace process – that the signed agreement is accepted. This will force the government to negotiate the little political capital it can afford to leave Havana. To win this fight, it will have to resort to populist measures that guarantee popular support. Its communications strategy will focus on showing that peace will prevent that the poor, the peasants and the soldiers die in a war that has been fought only by the underprivileged members of Colombian society.

- › Military Scenario: This post-agreement scenario would be similar to how the FARC are currently acting, with an additional component similar to that of the Bacrim at the time of the AUC negotiation. There would then be internal purges and struggles for control of illegal businesses kept by the organisation; new groups would proliferate, with some wanting to keep the name FARC alive.

Certainly the peace process has faced difficult times due to two specific political issues: the government's sign of weakness to bet on a process that the FARC does not seem to take seriously, and the ability of the FARC to appear strong before the government because of their terrorist activities, which create unrest in the country. There are also three main strategic lines which can be drawn out:

- › To show the government's warmongering and violent attitude
- › To reveal the government's illegal actions
- › To create military pressure in order to show the government's inability to protect the population, and in turn create pressure on public opinion.

The first two have generated international pressure and pressure from certain national social sectors, especially of the centre and left, which interpret the conflict as an illustration of the government's non-democratic attitude, along with some countries that only seek to maintain their investments and businesses in the country and see the FARC as the party that prevents them from doing so. The third point has generated an unfavourable view of the process. The guerrillas have launched an offensive that has taken away their legitimacy before public opinion, and which shows a certain level of "desperation" since their political strategy has neither worked at the negotiating table, nor has it been very effective at the political forces' level in the country, since nobody wants to talk during an election year.

It also shows that the terrorist group's "interest" in the country is purely rhetorical; it is essential for them to position themselves before the Government, to defeat it in Havana and make sure of being advantaged at the stage of transitional justice. It is clear that they are aware that breaking the dialogue involves shutting down this possibility for the next 50 years. Besides which resorting to military means is not internationally well regarded in this type of conflict anymore, which would deprive them of important international support and classify them with governments considered "pariahs" in the international system. That is to say: the argument that was once an advantage is now a problem.

The strategy is so fragile and awkward that its result is that society is pressuring the government to break the dialogue. Unlike his predecessors, the advantage is that President Santos has managed to negotiate support, even with political opponents,

who have indirectly given support to this government's programme and now participate as positive and proactive elements within the peace process.

The FARC also have political difficulties. Contrary to their plans, their current strategy has instead worked negatively with 93% of people viewing them with a negative image (Caracol. 2015). Boasting electoral support only in areas of low electoral influence, their political struggle is blurred and their ability to achieve power – be it through the polls or by force – is statistically impossible. A mass struggle and a prolonged popular war makes no sense when the masses do not support the insurgency. That's the point that the FARC have yet to understand, and it is why their statements gain them no ground, while their violent actions do cause a stir, although it is always in the direction of increasing their opposition. It would seem that the government is losing, but these terrorists – in their desire to sink the state – are sinking themselves.

## International relations and regional security

Understanding national security is complex when it comes to countries that have focussed their concerns in their domestic setting, i.e. when they have not been consolidated, or when they simply do not have an expansionist vocation. This determines the configuration of their foreign policy, which becomes no more than a subsidiary element of their domestic policy. In other words: when international relations become accessory to the primary means of achieving support for local problems.

In this sense, national security becomes the condition for internal consolidation and anything that threatens the weak structures of power, become major threats to consider. In this view, the international system is not important; the relationship with neighbouring countries is tangential; and border control is totally improvised.

These internal struggles are globalised and give a sense of a world threatened by African guerrillas, Asian terrorists or Latin American drug traffickers, as well as by social resistance movements in Europe and the United States that suddenly appear in both spaces caused by economic and political crises in their countries, but that serve as amplifiers to a sense of generalised global crisis.

However, in the late twentieth century it was thought that the world had overcome its major stability and security problems. But the post-Cold War Era began its time of uncertainty with a mix of different elements:

- › The idea that the liberal worldview had triumphed over all others (Fukuyama 1992). Certainly the liberal values of freedom, civil rights and above all, the possibility of economic advancement, made the post-World War II world seem peaceful in global terms, be it with a need for “small” adjustments of situations and actors that did not fit quite with these ideas. These adjustments led to the wars in Korea and Vietnam, besides some minor invasions and the development of an intelligence network that would bring back the Panopticon ideal to the world. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was thought that the world was already set.



- › The feeling that the new threats that existed in the world would be easily remedied by a global power that had emerged triumphant after a century of war; and that what threats remained were minor and did not widely endanger the international system. All that remained were split threats resulting from the dismantling of the communist world that eventually would stabilise again.

In other words, the post-Cold War era's tenets were based on false assumptions. But above and beyond the most dangerous aspect was that – now free of the supposed risk posed by the bipolar world – it was assumed that by ending this rigid structure of the international system, a world pacified by economic relations would emerge. However, this analysis failed to take into account the numerous racial, religious, nationalist, criminal, and even environmental conflicts that remained, since these were considered localised police problems and not globalised threats with the potential to destabilise the international system. This misperception obscured the international system's new weaknesses. At which point – because of the lack of understanding of what was happening – all those threats and risks were thrown together, and labelled 'terrorism'.

In addition, the international system's axes shifted and new countries and regions emerged and stood out in this post-Cold War order.

"The President reiterated that it is time for the world to see Latin America as a strategic partner. He noted that among the advantages of the region are the high rates of sustained growth of nations, the implementation of sound fiscal policies that enabled the tackling of the financial crisis, created good conditions for foreign investment, and the ability to produce what the world needs: food, water and energy, among other things" (President's Office 2011).

Thus spoke the Colombian president in London regarding the recent prominence of the Latin American region in the international system. This new role brings economic benefits to these countries and the opportunity for the region to make new and important alliances. It also shows the rise of new friendly countries from other centres of power, willing to open new dialogues with Latin America on issues ranging from economic investment to military cooperation.

### National security and global terrorism

The international system of the XXI century has tried to make sense of its current evolution, but more in consequence of the blows and buffets it has suffered, rather than impelled by an intentional effort of adaptation.

Far from the liberal ideal of a pacifying global economy, the world seems fractured in local situations that leave the great politics of powerful countries' without option (Beck: 242) Consequently, local events and global events intermingle and create a new scenario for global security. Modern global security involves all the international system's actors, from countries, as actors par excellence, to intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, corporations, banks, national political

movements and parties. This creates an amalgam of processes and interactions that, on the one hand, form the foundation of globalisation within the international system, but which, on the other hand, create fertile ground for new conflicts to arise.

Global terrorism by extremist groups is a variant of these new global threats, coupled with drug trafficking or other forms of organised crime. Today, there is no single part of the world that does not host some kind of conflict that can become a military confrontation of some magnitude.

But, in the eagerness to understand the uncertainty of our times, everything is seen as terrorism, caused by terrorism or a result of terrorism. This mirrors the simplistic bipolar view of the 1990s. However, supposing the prior analysis is indeed correct, then the world is facing the worst terrorist threat in its history. The international system would need, thus, to take a stand on global security, making an attempt to redesign and implement security policies taking account of this context so as to restore a sense of peace and reduce risks in international politics.

Today, “global security is understood as the amalgam between two dimensions: one, which allows us to interact, engage with and influence the international system feeling more or less integrated upon acknowledgement of certain historical trends; and the other, which allows us to draw a contrast between new traditions, interests and expectations, and the risks, threats and dangers that we perceive as parts of the same system” (Torrijos 2009: 78). The second dimension is what is seen in the fracture of international processes when the system resets – readjustments which occur every so often in history.

These fractures, seen in great historical changes, now have a powerful catalyst with both the ideological and practical capabilities to create the perception of a different world: modern globalisation. New actors emerge thanks to the world’s new communication channels and to their speed. Therefore, and considering the second dimension mentioned by Torrijos, we are part of the same system. It is fundamental that the analysis of the world is able to shift away from Hans Morgenthau’s (1986) basic schemata. This is to say: by changing the communication channels of power, it is necessary to reinterpret the forms that power then takes within international networks – networks which become transnational and create a process of hierarchy-removal, leading the international system to be faced with a dynamic of empowerment of actors of vastly different natures. (Cancelado 2007: 14)

The second security dimension, known as selective security is defined as one that “allows us to clearly determine what we are, what we really want and how we can achieve it (...) In this sense, we exercise some control over the system’s variables and can reach an approximate conclusion about how clever, useful or able we are to make our value system survive, and to which degree our beliefs or abilities persuade or dissuade others” (Torrijos: 79). This selective security allows players to distinguish between threats in an attempt to understand them, and address those which are most urgent.

In today's world one cannot address every threat; this is what countries like Russia and China seem to understand, and what America refuses to. The US' power was built from a base of global confrontation; in order to keep its position it requires, therefore, a global enemy, such as terrorism – a concept which it has constructed by power of rhetoric. Other countries follow its discourse, but their efforts and strategies are directed at other regions, at influencing issues on a local-level and at integrating their efforts within the international system, as opposed to imposing their will upon it.

### Regional security and peace process

FARC, along with the narcotraffickers present in Latin America are a factor of regional instability, easily linked to global terrorism. In the case of drug trafficking, this practice generates such a large amount of economic resources that it encourages the rise of black markets which cater to narcotraffickers' need for violence in order to keep and control their market share. With regard to FARC, its "anti-imperialist" discourse is easily assimilated to the anti-Western discourse of various terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda or, more recently, Islamic State.

The guerrilla can undergo transformations similar to those of the paramilitary AUC. It may stay in the drug business or link up with other networks of international terrorism to survive under a new structure, as an armed actor in Colombia. The fact that part of their funding is tied to the drug trade makes this group an important player in the international narcotrafficking arena. In this manner, they abandoned kidnapping as a form of financing and turned to the support of drug networks and illegal mining. Another option is its conversion into an organisation that articulates global terrorism networks, supporting both regional and international groups. This hypothesis derives from the analysis that shows a trend towards the stability of the drug trade which, when coupled with the political and economic instability seen in Latin America, leaves a governance gap that can be exploited by these criminal structures. This governance gap is ideal for terrorist groups seeking to open cells in other regions, and thereby continue to maintain their combat level and financial inputs for the development of their activities.

In this sense, FARC, acting from Colombia – thanks both to the country's strategic position and to its internal conflict and lack of territorial consolidation – have made the Colombian scenario to become a coordinator of the activities of terrorist groups and narcotraffickers within the region. Colombia's borders, on their various fronts, present opportunities which transform the capacities of criminal groups. On the one hand, the FARC seek international support for their terrorist activities, while, on the other, providing support themselves to various terrorist groups. Recently the idea that the Colombian organisation had lent support to the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP), especially with training and in some operations, such as in the kidnapping of Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of former President Raul Cubas, in 2004 gained strength.

The Paraguayan anti-kidnapping prosecutor, Sandra Quiñónez, has raised the possibility that the EPP was strengthened with the inclusion of FARC members who are potential dissidents against the current peace process. In other words, the issue of

the approximation of the FARC with the EPP and the possibility of a real presence of Hezbollah in the triple border of the Southern Cone (Brazil-Argentina-Paraguay) creates a network of instability setting off the alert regarding a possible terrorist presence able to coordinate and act jointly (Infobae. 2015).

In addition to the FARC's direct support for these groups, they find – via the Colombian guerrilla – means of doing business and obtaining funds. With Hezbollah, the trade of weapons for money gives the Islamic extremist group a way to continue funding its actions in the Middle East while helping to maintain the weapons stockpile of Colombian terrorism. Additionally Hezbollah may provide training in return for an operating base in the region, as has already occurred between this group and the Mexican cartels (Infobae. 2015).

The FARC-Mexican Cartels alliance became known with the arrest of the official doctor of FARC's Secretariat, Carlos Ariel Charry Guzman, on December 6, 2011 in Bogota. (El Tiempo. 2011) According to Colombia's Attorney General, he owned the drug routes from the FARC to the Tijuana cartel, access to which was paid for with weapons. Caqueta, Putumayo, Vichada, Amazonas, Norte de Santander and Meta, are the areas most affected by the guerrilla's drug trade. All except Caqueta are border areas. The lack of government presence is offset by the strengthening and deployment of military units such as the Omega Task Force, in Caqueta, which puts pressure on South and Southwest blocks.

In Amazonas and Vichada, there are corridors which help the creation of drug routes through which inputs and finished product travel. In Vichada, the Meta River along with others that run through to Venezuela, facilitate the exchange of drugs for weapons (UNODC. 2006).

Using the Guainia and Casiquiare rivers, that run from the Colombian plains to Venezuela, bands of smugglers have connected Latin American cartels and the FARC with the Fernandinho Clan in Brazil (McDermott, 2014) and the Desi Bouterse Clan in Suriname (Stone, 2011). In a post-conflict scenario, with criminal gangs brim-full with FARC members who refuse to deliver their weapons, mafias will come for these resources and black markets worldwide will make use of them. This will lead in turn to more, and richer, and more powerful criminal gangs, as well as neighbouring countries with nuclear capability. The time it could take for such a process to occur is estimated to be a mere 5 years from the signing of an agreement with the FARC. Five years of mutation, fighting between gangs or cooperation, strengthening of international routes and links with global terrorism.

## Conclusions

Challenges of national security are structured and defined within the context of the regional relationship, as detailed above. But the first necessity is to adjust the characteristics of national security forces to their traditional roles, roles which were transformed by the demands of internal conflicts.

The implementation of the peace process is important for the consolidation of the Colombian State, in the sense that the process is directly linked to the options of reintegration and demobilisation of all combatants involved in the conflict. It is not a case of FARC alone, because a poorly handled demobilisation or reintegration might lead to the increase in internal violence due to the transformation of the factions that refuse to play by rules of the negotiation process. It should be made clear, from the moment an agreement is signed, that any subsequent violence would no longer be linked to an ideology and that any attempt on the part of criminal group to take over the power of the state would be, without exception, a matter of sheer economic survival. In this sense, it is incorrect to speak, concretely, of a post-conflict period; there will be instead, a process of transformation and a criminalisation of the war in Colombia. The post-agreement period cannot fit into the current political discourse of confrontation in the country: it will be a mere matter of mafias attempting to fight the state and also battling between themselves.

In concrete terms, the security issues will encompass the protection of cities, the fight against drugs and all that that implies. The increase in illegal crops in the country illustrates this reality. The problem of crime that derives from narcotics is intensified if the country is no longer immersed in the political struggle for control of its territory. In addition, the absence of organised groups who cannot control parts of the country, such as the paramilitary and guerrillas did in the 90s, leads to small local leaders trying to articulate large drug trafficking networks with cartels that allow them to stay in business at regional and global levels. Colombia no longer deals with distribution routes and is only responsible for the production of narcotics and illegal crops. Over time, criminal networks in Latin America will be fostered; not necessarily the FARC in and of itself, but a transformed version of the group – be it after the success or failure of the peace process, facilitating the emergence of further arenas for terrorism and conflict.

Moreover, terrorism is a variable of the contemporary world that illustrates how insecure the international system really is, calling into question the actions of states, creating uncertainty in the XXI century, and needing new ways of both thinking about and confronting threats. It may be necessary to refer to broader concepts of security in order to properly comprehend the concrete transformation of ‘threats’ – creating new ways of dealing with them which challenge the structures of defence and security established during the 50 years of the Cold War. A new phase of evolution is upon us, with new actors, new powers and new structures within the international system. New forms of conflict arise, and with them, new generations of war.

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