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The orthographic standard of this publication is that of British English, except for the following article.

The Capa Method for Conflict Assessment and Policy Analysis for the Security and Defense Sectors

Salvador Raza

Problematization: Originating Necessity

The concept and possibility of violent conflicts between politically organised groups within the international environment has remained constant since time immemorial, be it for ethnic, economic, energy-related, or religious reasons. Implicitly viewed as a necessary cost of development, violence is invisibly nurtured within the fabric of society itself. In recent years we have witnessed atrocities tearing the social fabric apart on an extraordinary scale, placing the issue of violence against individuals at the very top of the international security agenda. Particular attention has been given to the multiple manifestations of terrorism, as well as violence against civilians during armed conflicts and gang wars.

These conflicts, generically gathered beneath the umbrella of infrawars or hybrid wars, have a common internal structure that defines them and classifies them in the Complex Adaptive Conflicts (CAC) category. The specific nature of each particular conflict depends on the structure of perceptions that shapes the context in which it manifests itself. Its nature equally depends on the political calculations which will be made by the institutions required to put together and sustain possible responses to this conflict. This mutual causation (of conflict and conflict-response) highlights the central nature of politics in conflict resolution, forcing those in charge of security and defense to take this causal relationship into account when determining which doctrines and technological solutions are best adapted to each case.

Isolated phenomena, such as CAC, therefore exist in a relationship of mutual conditionality between environment perception structures and institutional capability to enforce acceptable countermeasures. This is why these conflicts are classified as "adaptive" since they react and shift with each attempt to confront them.

This article presents the Conflict Assessment and Policy Analysis Method (CAPA) as a useful tool for "deciphering the code" of CAC, enabling the development of integrated force designs and associated policies. These processes are found in the Critical Redesign Methodology in the field of Security and Defense Institution Building (SDIB).

The CAPA method's innovative conception owes an academic debt to two methodological and conceptual works: 'Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure', by Floyd H. Allport, and 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning', by Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber. These two references support the theoretical and methodological modelling here outlined. Other references omitted are specific to ancillary components of the CAPA Method and the Critical Redesign Methodology to which it belongs.

Ontology of Complex Adaptive Conflicts (CAC)

A phenomenological object can only be conceptualised when it can be operationally defined in a distinct manner from the environment in which it takes shape. Once conceptualised, this object is incorporated into a system of meanings generally accepted as valid, thus becoming a vehicle for inferences. For example, the manner in which a given country conceptualises the potential conflicts in which it is immersed determines its strategic options. This analysis subsequently allows for a decision regarding, for instance, the transfer of military bases to the conflict-affected region. As such, the operational definition of a given event or object takes "command" of the meanings it creates. It manages and circumscribes which strategies are valid – and which are not – when it comes to dealing with the problem defined. Each operational definition of a CAC creates the references whereby institutions will determine possible responses. These responses will then form the context within – and due to – which the conflict will takes on new meaning and evolve.

Identifying and enumerating CACs, in their multiple forms, is a means of recognising that these are currently the main security concern of the international community. They represent the greatest threat to peace and security, today. Simultaneously, this conceptual activity recognises that the assumptions and premises which drive the CACs condition the options available for an appropriate response.

The CAC concept illustrates the fact that any proposed universal definition of 'conflict' – as of which one constructs mechanisms and policies for security and defense – is a semantic exercise devoid of analytical significance. The ontology of conflicts relates to the methodological treatment of 'conflict' – as regards: existence, nature, manifestation, and categories. Such a derived typology inevitably leads to definitions which are at variance with those related to security and defense. This causal connection is seen as regards security and defense's meaning, extent and functionality. It is

especially clear when the mutual relationship of conditionality between conflict and conflict response is considered, as well as the political significance of their respective practical manifestations.

Political significance is key when constructing criteria for the definition (and policies related to) conflicts, security and defense, and their mutual relations of conditionality. This construction implies that the typology of conflict is drawn up by specifying its perceived qualities, and by interpreting the manifestations of recurrent, significant phenomenological variables.

Thus, we arrive at the following classification: limited wars, cyber warfare, insurgency, war on terror, asymmetric war, conventional war and gang wars. The list is endless. Each event holds a different meaning for each country at each historical moment. Each nation tries, at a given point in time, to understand the degree of maturity of its institutions as well as the conditions for the manifestation of conflicts, which are neither constant nor linear.

The undeniable conclusion is that there is neither a "solution" for conflicts that create insecurity and require the use of defense mechanisms, nor an "optimal" design of force. Each alternative of force, used in each of the types of conflict listed above, depends on the structure of perceptions that dictates policy options, instructional procedures, standards and benchmarks by which these alternatives are judged and implemented in the face of weighted costs and risks.

Conflict assessment depends on the context in which the perceived phenomenon takes on meaning. The structure of perceptions regarding the differentiation between conflict and non-conflict (within the same decision environment) is fundamental. As such, conflict assessment is conditioned by the institutions of security and defense that offer alternatives for preventing, neutralising or confronting causes of conflict. These options are drawn up by weighing costs and risks, which evolve differently in each type of conflict, driven by distinct and competing dynamics.

The multiple definitions of terrorism, for example, although it is impossible to identify which definition predominates, does not imply that some are right and the others are wrong. The specific nature of each one mirrors the variety of conditions and contexts – a variety which in turn conditions the selection of tactics, techniques, and technologies. El Salvador has just recognised the Maras as terrorist organisations. Once they were seen as gangs, now, as terrorists. Clearly the phenomenon has not changed overnight, rather the semantic rules for interpreting it have been modified. In other words, what changed was the context of the political significance of the phenomenon, not the phenomenon itself.

In the same vein, it is silly to think that the convergence of terrorism with organised crime, referred to as CTOC, is something unique unto itself. The phenomenon passes through a filter of perceptions, indicating the union of complex causes; a transmutation of ideas driven by micro-cultures and technologies. However, the idea that "something new has been discovered" is an analytically incorrect simplification which only

serves to placate academic vanities disconnected from reality, lacking historical perspective, and that serve no practical purpose.

The ebb and flow of new contexts is constantly driven by: dynamic events; political agendas; diplomacy; economic and financial vectors; and the networks of social relationships which lead to a culture of specific organisational and decision flows. These factors transcend the conventional understanding of differences between both internal and external security and defense – and between regular and irregular military action. Equally, and, more importantly, taking these factors into account overthrows the idea of linear spectrums of discrete types of conflict and non-conflict segments.

As previously noted, different contexts lend different meanings to the same perceived conflict phenomenon. Therefore, any change in context alters this meaning, shifting and adapting the relationship between conflict-creating and conflict-solving institutions. Thus, the context provides the political meaning of the problematized phenomenon. Simultaneously, the institutions guide the construction of policies by which this meaning is defined, as well creating expectations of the results that those same policies will achieve.

The dynamic of context-creation leads to the configuration of conflict networks with variable architectures. These architectures are correlated with networks of capability systems that also have variable architectures. Both architectures (of conflict networks and capability systems) are modelled on different incentives. The actors of each architecture achieve their purposes, justified in contexts that are also different. On the one hand, we currently have a growing network of players that advertise their intentions in complex micro-cultures founded on ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, and tribal identities. On the other, we have players that shape and advertise their intentions in complex mission areas determined by the security and defense forces.

Although different in form, these systems of players share two key similarities. The first being that it is increasingly difficult to identify different practices in how their players interact: terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare; paramilitaries, urban gangs and insurgents; police and military. In other words, the typology of conflict in which players interact is increasingly overlapping and unclear. The second similarity lies in the growing dependence on civilian information network structures, applied technologies and commercial logistical supply systems.

These two similarities form trends of the modern-day security and defense scenario. They imply that both security and defense forces, and opposition forces, are becoming increasingly adaptable. This is due to the fact that contexts and configurations are rapidly modified, meaning that conflicts (defined contextually) are also extremely dynamic. The modelling flux operates on multiple axes: from 'conflicts' in and of themselves to the 'forces' engaged therein – and back; including relationships among the 'forces'. This challenges the current logic for effectiveness of Capability-Based Planning. Capabilities emerge in the structures of the relationships between: the means of force available; organisations; command and control systems; doctrines;

and the concept of employment. However, technological convergence means it is now possible to take down an entire capability system simply by taking down a few links among these elements.

The literature dedicated to analysis techniques and methodologies will classify CACs in the category of unstructured, evolving problems (wicked), or problems with strange loops. The conclusions are absolutely convergent on two points: *The problem of complex adaptive conflicts (CACs) does not have a single solution or linear progression – the response is always stochastic, meaning that the classification of the problem depends on how its recurrent standards are recognised in the context where they appear, and on the alternative competing responses built to enable them to be interpreted.*

That is why, when analysing CACs, the focus is on identifying how the perceived standards of the conflicts are defined within the context in which they are set. In Central America, the most violent players are the Maras; in Colombia, the FARC; in Paraguay, the EPP; and in the Middle East and Africa, the multiple factions and affiliations of radical fundamentalist Islamic groups. Each of these has its particular microculture and is defined and particularised with regard to each specific context in which they gain significance, *pari passu*, with the confrontation options derived from specific and varied strategies.

Situational awareness will thus increasingly dominate the context of decisions and judgements relating to security and defense. The concept of deterrence will also become increasingly complex and less effective, challenging the established force structures and doctrines, while conflicts will advance into every structure of national power.

The US' new Military Strategy classifies CACs as "Hybrid Conflicts". The term has good marketing appeal, but it must be taken with a pinch of salt so as not to reach simplistic (and erroneous) conclusions. CACs are hybrid in the sense of being complex and adaptive, with each manifestation being unique to – and dependent on – its context. They are not hybrid in the sense of being the outcome of a combination of others, a "mutant" conflict. This would be the case of a conflict "by proxy", i.e. a conflict which will reappear elsewhere as a replica of itself with the same characteristics. Coincidentally perhaps, this is precisely what US military doctrine would need to justify itself. The problem occurs when doctrine overrides analysis. In such cases, distorted interpretations, which serve corporate interests, will unfortunately prevail, meaning that the design of security and defense forces will distance itself from what countries actually need.

SDIB: Constructing Institutions

Security and Defense Institution Building defines and sustains the architecture of policies, strategies, capabilities, processes, procedures, rules and decision-protocols. These are carried out simultaneously within and between functionally-linked organisations. One could say that these institutions manufacture articulate decision nexus by means of which their responsibilities and authority are functionally defined, and by which

organizations produce the results for which they were intended. The ultimate purpose of such institutions is to produce results which are in accordance to the purpose that gave rise to them. To make a parallel: marriage and baptism are institutions in which the sacraments of the Church are transformed into institutional practices of the religion that creates and regulates them.

Unlike other domains of executive decisions, those involving the building of institutions for the resolution of CACs cannot be undertaken by successive hits and misses. The adaptive nature of the CAC provides no stable reference for measuring the returns on the cumulative investments in security and defense. And if, hypothetically, there were a formally established general reference or doctrine: the uncertainties relating to its interpretation – and the inability to judge the correlation between the minimum degree of security prior to the conflict and the maximum degree of security effective after it – would render any conclusion regarding the necessary use of force to prevent further conflict uncertain, at best.

This implies that the nature of security and defense decisions refuses to admit a direct problematization of the relations between perceived causalities. It also refuses to accept that the possible responses should be built cumulatively and gradually. Equally, it implies that those decisions can only be measured a priori as to their expected and potential internal and external effects. A posteriori effects cannot fit into the analysis. This, in turn, implies that in order to enhance, accelerate and improve security and defense decisions, one must get to know the scope and structure of the decisions that build these institutions. This, consequently, requires correlating the logic of Force Design with the political purposes and expectations which structure the alternatives and possibilities on offer for tactical success.

Following these considerations, Security and Defense Institutions (SDI) are functionally defined as articulated decision systems encapsulated in the manner described above. Their policies, instructional procedures, standards and benchmarks exist for the purpose of guiding and providing internal consistency to the processes which design, validate and sustain security and defense alternatives.

Security and Defense Institution Building (SDIB) involves formulating those instruments which, taken in their collective and mutually offsetting relationship, define the extent and validity of actions as well as the expected legitimate political results. There are three strands of strategic actions flowing from Security and Defense Institution Building designed to deter and combat or impede the flaring-up of conflict:

› The prevention of potential conflicts that imply higher-than-acceptable risks can be enforced when building capabilities that shape the perception of the players involved. If the political costs envisaged are not worth the gains projected in any given dispute, then said dispute will be prevented.

› Building the intention to combat conflict and its manifestations of violence implies an acceptance that necessary resources employed in the use of force will lead to the expected benefits, or at least contains the conditions necessary for success.

› The plausibility of modelling strategic and cognitive environments can be adapted to identify and remove the structural causes of the flaring-up of conflict before it begins.

The historiography of conflicts, as a field that studies, analyses and records the phenomena of conflict, shows that the classification of these phenomena over time is always benchmarked against these three strands of strategic actions. These actions are, of course, subject to a given structure of perceptions that explains the context and significance of each conflict. In this manner, actors engaged in a violent dispute, fighting for their interests, parties to the same conflict, can have different interpretations of their significance.

This is illustrated, for instance, by the case of the US and the former USSR, who found themselves in a situation of asymmetrical deterrence. The 'saddle point' of the conflict between them can be identified following the Nash equilibrium – a situation in which players, seeking to maximise their interests, calculate that withdrawing from said situation may lead to greater risks than remaining in it. As such, while one power viewed the act of building up its arsenal as a means of preventing war, the other viewed its own parallel and reciprocal act as necessary preparation for war.

The same asymmetry may manifest itself among allies. Different structures of perceptions create different estimates of conflict-related risks and rewards. High transaction costs in shared decisions may thus lead to strategic paralyses and internal tensions in an alliance, since both (or more) parties try to influence their degree of decision-making power and cost sharing.

Institution Building is today the key axis of the US' Department of Defense and Department of State. It is working where most other strategies have failed as regards dealing with complex adaptive problems, combatting violence manifest in the form of terror, violence associated with illegal trafficking, gangs, corruption, and all other aspects that reflect failed governance.

The rationality that sustains SDIB is clear and simple: only those institutions able to identify and dynamically handle complex adaptive phenomena have shown themselves to capable of coming up with valid solutions. Or in more explicit terms: Security and Defense Institution Building is a successful formula for dealing with CACs, far more so effective (with sustainable results) than, for instance, the use of unilateral destructive force with unacceptable collateral damage. Or in more explicit terms: SDIB works!

To create and establish effective institutions, the SDIB process uses an analytical framework capable of drawing up responses to the continuous mutations and complex adaptation of CACs. This framework is known as the CAPA – Conflict Assessment and Policy Analysis method, and is an essential part of the process for building effective institutions. Its function is to identify the 'Institutional Gap' that guides the modelling (analysis and formulation) of the strategic and political actions regarding each particular conflict. This method thereby overcomes the limitations of doctrine-based responses which are only able to apply the lessons of the past to conflicts that are being built in the future.

The CAPA Method provides guidance on structuring the perception filters that define the CAC within its environment and sphere of significance. Within this method, each conflict, once taken in isolation, operationally defines effective reality. The variables that define its status are stabilised, so as to enable the necessary analytical treatment, while at the same time building sufficient response alternatives. That is to say, the method problematizes the perceived forms of the manifest conflict phenomenon. It simultaneously identifies the institutional gaps. Once these gaps are filled, capabilities and competencies required to combat conflict can be built, while weighing up the costs and risks.

The CAPA Method assesses conflicts using processes of critical context analysis, while at the same time analysing the institutions that create their political significance and effects. Context Assessment is a tool for assessing the significance and the risks arising from the conflicts in the light of the policies instituted within the SDIB methodology.

The CAPA method forms the basis of the Critical Redesign Methodology as a founding element of the Security and Defense Institution Building initiatives as an area of specific knowledge equipped with conceptual systems and specific practices. The method was successfully employed in the reform of the Security and defense Sectors of Guatemala, and is currently being implemented in El Salvador under the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) together with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). It was also used to formulate the Security and Defense Policy of Peru, and partially used in the building of institutions in 12 other countries, including Brazil and Colombia.

Institutional Gaps identified by applying the CAPA Method

The Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) is one of the world's most violent regions, with indices of death, robbery, extortion and other indicators reaching epidemic standards. This situation is compounded by devastating corruption run by drug traffickers operating in an environment of extreme poverty, with porous and imprecise borders, environmental degradation, and energy shortages. An unimaginable litany of sorrows is distributed mainly in areas of ethnic minorities and micro-cultures, where the scourge of the gangs (Maras) goes hand-in-hand with that of the drug lords. This leads, amongst other things, to the displacement of entire populations – in desperate migrations – to urban centers, or to the US.

This is not to say that there are not many honest politicians, businessmen, honest military – filling the clichéd notion of "good people" in these countries. However, they have been gradually removed from decision-making structures, paying a high price for being ethical in an environment of distorted morals. And although they form the great majority, it a silent one, removed from power and isolated from policy-making and implementation.

Gang wars are not the privilege of Central America, and one must recognise that the Irish gangs in New York in the 1820s-1830s, and their successors, were as violent as the Maras today; they had, moreover, very similar organisational standards, although were

totally different in scale and technology. They even had a price list for the services they sold: $100 for a kill; $30 for a broken leg. For more than a century, nothing worked to stem the conflicts; even after the 1920 Sullivan Act on gun control and countless reforms of the police, demographic changes and more forceful police action. The gangs of New York metamorphosed, merged, and fragmented; they became politicised and organised themselves into powerful mafias, always exploiting political and police corruption; they moved into the drugs business and finally exported their model elsewhere.

The Maras are the "offspring" of the American gangs, only poorer and with no prospects. They are the outcome of the convergence between organised crime and illegal migration. The so-called pachucos of the 1920s, the second generation of illegal Mexican immigrants, who engaged in urban warfare with the military; and the *Zoot Suit Riots* in Los Angeles in the 1940s are more historical examples. The pachucos, however, went to jail, although the Military (mainly members of the Navy) had assaulted anyone ethnically resembling Mexicans over a period of two days. The same violence erupted in other American cities, even after the presidential order for the Military to control its soldiers.

In Central America's Northern Triangle, the suffering population, of approximately 20 million, cannot measure or recognise their condition as that of conflict. They only see it as *"desdichas"*, sorrows – sorrows for losses that slowly diffuse into grudges. In the meantime, the governments of these fragile democracies, recently emerged from decades of violent civil wars, see all this as a matter of national security. They acknowledge that their states are on the verge of political collapse and economic bankruptcy. Adding to this rather bleak backdrop, corrupt and cynical populists, which openly associate with drug traffickers, take advantage of the loopholes extant due to fragmented institutions, and transform the people's grudges and sorrows into political currency in order to further undermine the structures of governance.

With the complicity of equally corrupt associations and businessmen, the hyper-concentrated wealth of these nations operates under completely inefficient fiscal and monetary mechanisms. El Salvador, for instance, has no monetary policy – the US dollar is legal tender. These systemic flaws are taken advantage of so as to hide resources from the tax authorities, using a deficient banking system that facilitates unethical and/or unlawful transactions. The laws on tenders are strictly complied with using sophisticated control mechanisms, but they only catch the "rateros" (petty fraudsters), whilst the "tiburones" (fat cats) defraud without conviction, since they are in league with the government, private sector agents, as well as members of the judiciary. The evidence of corruption is abundant. Several investigations recently resulted in the conviction and jailing of the former Vice President of Guatemala on August 21, 2015; the President resigned in the aftermath and is under pre-trial detention.

All of this occurs within the context of an archaic, slow, defective and corrupt legal system, operating with an unimaginable array of unhelpful and obsolete procedural laws. Such conditions are hardly ideal to put the brakes on extremely "court-centered distortions": almost everything becomes a law in order to function. This situation has

become increasingly severe; by now, legislation is freezing changes. Meanwhile, those actors who profit from this distortion are engaged in bolstering these defective mechanisms, all the while pretending to defend the rule of law.

With the figure of 100 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants as the primary indicator of this complex situation, the Ministry of Government of Guatemala (Ministerios de Gobernación – which are roughly equivalent to, but more powerful than, the Ministry of the Interior) throws good money after bad on corrupt police, prison, immigration and customs organisations. The Ministry develops no public safety policies, concentrating instead on the action of the police, and complicating the state's ability to raise taxes. It has been many times demonstrated that providing security is not, a priori, a question of money, but rather of competence in establishing robust institutions, effective policies, functional governance, fiscal structures and proper systems of accountability.

With the collusion of agencies, state-owned companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the situation is going from bad to worse; public coffers run dry as corrupt actors continue to remove funds the state doesn't have. When investigated, moreover, they hide beneath the mantle of protecting human rights, pressuring the press and threatening to re-open cases that were given amnesty, which would destabilise countries that not so long ago were at civil war. They develop, thus, the idea that it is better to accept the "indirect costs" of democratic peace, which is to say, an "acceptable" level of structural corruption, than to face up to a new military dictatorship. This idea is a fourfold fallacy: firstly, there are no "acceptable" or "tolerable" levels of corruption; secondly, dictatorships are not exempt from corruption; thirdly, military dictatorships and the preservation of the privileges of interest groups do not have a causal relationship; and, fourthly, the civilian-military scenario does not share the same level of tension and fragmentation of interests.

The Military – suffering from insufficient budgets, obsolete capabilities, archaic management systems, and subject to a set of laws that recently accommodated the conditions of guerrillas so as to end the internal war – are ordered to modify their priority of action from their constitutional missions to secondary missions of supporting the police. In this manner, operating at will and without resources, with poorly paid individuals lacking social security support, they distort political institutions of strategic logistics, control and oversight in the search for additional funding – on an individual and institutional basis. Corruption is becoming "chemistry"; while theft and larceny are becoming "loans". These soft terms are used to justify crimes under a permissive corporate culture, which also finds justification in the slogan: "survival as power built from within, or slow death imposed from without".

The institutional gap can be summarised in the following terms: the violence born of the interconnections between the Maras and Organised Crime, in the form of a self-sustaining private micro-culture, gains significance as a CAC within a context of endemic corruption pervading all sectors of the State. The lack of transparency regarding the management of public funds also stretches to the Security and defense sectors.

These, in the absence of consistent security and defense policies, find themselves directionless, lacking effective governance. Without a credible agenda and budgetary mechanisms to support effective responses, the conflict spreads both on the borders and in the major urban centers. The few responses offered are no more than spontaneous unthinking reactions, without reference to a national strategy for concerted action and devoid of any metrics or assessment mechanisms. This has led to a reduction in the prestige and residual capabilities of the Security and Defense Sectors. In the absence of effective containment measures, violence increases, heightening the perception of insecurity, fostering the marginalisation of the Police and the Armed Forces, thereby providing political arguments for their budgets not to be adjusted.

Building the Institutional Response

Guatemala in particular is a success story of Security and Institution Building (SDIB). In the period from 2012 to 2015, under an interagency effort of led by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the following occurred and was achieved:

› National, functional and sectorial policies and guidelines were drawn up to provide guidance on Force Design and the sustained and efficient use of security means.

› Managerial efficiency was fomented by creating organisational resilience, preventing and countering corruption by inserting mechanisms that enable transparency and accountability to prosper.

› Performance indicators and metrics were established so as to enable dynamic oversight and timely control of the performances of the institutions.

› An integrated decisions platform (Integrated Governance System – IGS or SIGAN using the Spanish acronym) was created, providing for effective governance based on a consistent scheduled architecture for required capacity building.

The SDIB process followed the Critical Methodology designed precisely in response to those purposes. There were five necessary subsystems for the achievement of security and defense aims by means of policies, policies with scheduled budgeted results, budgets with metrics, and analyses from metrics back to the original objectives:

› The first subsystem defined the axiological framework of security and defense by setting out the following: the breadth of the operational definitions, the composition, attributions and responsibilities of the security and defense sectors and systems; and, primarily, the functionality of those sectors and systems when integrated into the national decision-making system. These elements were consolidated in the coordinated review of the National Defense White Paper and in the formulation of the first National Security White Paper, ensuring high level of consistency across the Security and defense Sectors.

› The second and third subsystems dealt with the integration and validation of the seven vectors for propagating security within internally consistent policies: (1) energy security; (2) environmental security; (3) technological security; (4) social and human security; (5) political and economic security; (6) geostrategic security; and (7) Knowledge and data security. These elements were consolidated when formulating the above-mentioned White Papers, both of which are fully mutually coherent and consistent. There elements were equally considered when determining the actions required to build the essential political support that the entire process would need, primarily when executing the fourth subsystem where the mechanisms of accountability, transparency, compliance and governance were to be installed.

› The fourth subsystem involved the formulation of an effective Integrated Governance System (IGS), responsible for the formulation and management of the sectorial policies aligned with the Force Design process. This integrated view of capabilities and competencies required: revising the Defense Strategy, translating all these policies into a single budget based on solid public accounting rules and practices, starting from a single programatic architecture; integrating all the budgetary requirements under the aegis of a Technology Policy for Defense; the whole being formulated in consonance with mechanisms of control and oversight.

› The fifth subsystem dealt with the drafting of operational action and strategic logistics plans. A robust Metric Plan was developed, and a Personnel Policy was developed and integrated into a reform of the Professional Defense Education System, so as to ensure sustained results over time.

The Critical Redesign Methodology took four years of intense work, benchmarking against the assessment of the institutional demands resulting from the CAPA Method, so as to provide a response to the CAC perceived at that time. The success indicators are registered in the official project documentation showing: the elimination of plans that did not meet requirements; the lack of interruption caused by the transition of government; the rupture of corrupt interest networks; the creation and effective implementation of a new governance structure for preparing and aligning budgets with functional and sectorial policies; savings of 7% in the defense budget (double the amount available at the time for investment); the creation of an Integrated Logistical Support System; and the reduction in criminality in key areas where the Defense Department was consistently present.

From the Specific to the General

The first and principal purpose of the CAPA Method is to identify institutional gaps with a view to finding means of containing – primarily, but not only – CACs. This involves acknowledgement and analytical treatment of the CAC as the phenomenon most present on the security agenda of the entire world. The goal of the global security agenda's being, thus, to prevent, in a permanent and sustained manner, the rupture of the social fabric on a global scale, to prevent situations from evolving into a similar structure as that lived in the Northern Triangle of Central America. In other words, to prevent the merging of organised crime with illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons,

people and commodities; a situation in which para-guerrilla-type groups ensconced in ethnically and socially isolated micro-cultures are the main players; and in which scenarios, politically limited objectives are achieved by using tactics of infra-terror with moderate technological sophistication. Equally important is to prevent the radicalisms manifested by terror from re-settling in the region by mingling in longer chains of complex conflicts and structures.

The second purpose is to prove that each perceived manifestation of the CACs is sui generis, and depends on each country's structure of perceptions.

The third purpose is to show that each of these models is allocated a terminology according to how it is classified within a typology created by the structure of security and defense institutions.

The fourth purpose is to determine that the construction of these security and defense institutions responds to a particular structure of perceptions that defines and establishes the specific nature of each conflict manifestation, as well as defining the category to which the phenomenon pertains.

The fifth and last link in this chain of purposes connects to the first – being to discourage institutional reforms to confront conflicts based on "labelled" frames or generalisations. These acritical views of "new" categories of conflicts ought to be reconsidered since they are warped by individual preferences, or lodged in the interest of the survival of corporate cultures, or constructed as justification for the existence (and budgets) of ministries, agencies and non-governmental organisations, even when strictly speaking, financed by the government.

To be able to deal with these purposes, the Critical Redesign Methodology was created in which the CAPA Method engages to build effective institutions aiming at the reform of the security and defense sectors, establishing multiple relationships of dependence with each one from the results of their constituent processes:

› The PS module – Parameters Setting, which establishes Design Parameters and Management of the Process for Institutional Reform of the Security and defense Sectors. This incorporates: (1) the CAPA Method in the differentiated diagnosis of the institutional gaps; (2) the determining of results in advance (what means success, or the desired end state: political utility metrics); and (3) the requisites for managing the Security and Defense Sector Reform process.

› The MSD module – Managing Security and Defense Module, which includes the processes for: (1) Formulation of the Portfolio of Policies and Architecture of Normative Documents; (2) Capability-centric Force Design and Base Realignment (BRAC); (3) Strategic Formulation (Strategizing); (4) Performance-based Program Portfolio Value Management; (5) Results-based budgeting; (6) Metrics-based Policy Alignment; (7) Design of Decision Platforms and Organisational Alignment (IGS formulation); (8) Compliance-driven Budget Implementation; and (9) Adaptive Change Management.

› The SL module – Strategic Logistics module, which includes: (1) analysis and integration of Capability Life Cycles in capability-based resource allocation; (2) Management of Contracts and Strategic Acquisitions; (3) Standards and Strategic Stockpiles; and (4) Modelling and Management of resource flows in Logistics Networks.

› The MRM module – Metrics and Risk Management module, which encompasses the processes for: (1) Risk Analysis; (2) Risk Assessment; (3) Performance Modelling and Operational Analysis; (4) Tests and Evaluations; (5) Execution and Management of the Metrics Plan; (6) Strategic Audit and Compliance; and (7) Analysis, Integration and Data Communication, Standards and Performances.

› The CB module – Competence-Based module, which consists of: (1) Professional Defense Education Curriculum Development; (2) enhanced Instructional Methodologies; (3) Development of Doctrines and Operation Performance Requirements; (4) Competence Modelling; and (5) Knowledge Sustainment.

Security and Defense Sector Reforms, as a result of integrated Security and Defense Institution Building requires integrated results generated throughout all these processes. Each one producing a particular solution for each specific country. They are necessary steps of the Critical Redesign Methodology required to ensure internal and external consistency, sustainability, affordability and effective results by way of institution building.

The particularity of the Critical Redesign Methodology is the construction of solutions within each country's institutional culture, respecting their priorities and preferences, so as to identify process chains, no matter how they are referred to, correlating them with the functionality of the Processes Modules. These chains are then connected by other processes to ensure that once integrated, they are capable of carrying out: capability-centric capacity building; performance-based programming; results-oriented budgeting; and metrics-based assessments. The longest chain of engaged processes becomes operational on a single decision platform (IGS) resulting in a single budget that reflects sectorial, functional and instrumental policies required for achieving the political objectives of security and defense while weighing up costs and risks.

In Guatemala, this platform was referred to as SIPLAGDE (Integrated Defense Planning and Management System) to which the Guatemalans hold intellectual property rights, taking pride in making it operational, since it was designed by Guatemalans for Guatemala. The same model is being implemented in El Salvador (under the SIPDEN acronym – Integrated Defense Planning System); its bases are equally enshrined in the Security and Defense Policy of Peru. This system is also making inroads in other countries, and at different stages, all benchmarked against the conflict classification designed by the *CAPA Method for Assessment of Complex Adaptive Conflicts and Policy Analysis for the Security and Defense Sectors. The CAPA method is the entry point for SDIB: the proven effective, low-cost tool to combat CACs from a holistic point of view.*

From Theory back to Practice

The ultimate purpose of the Critical Redesign Methodology, through its adaptive, modernising and transformational stages of Security and Defense Sector reforms is to combat conflict and thereby save human life. The CAPA method, the capacity building effort, and the IGS decision and management platforms are all means to that end. They form enforceable mechanisms towards transparency, accountability, and compliance without which all effort becomes a bureaucratic, self-serving litany of resource-allocation optimisation methods.

Concepts matter in SDIB. A limited operational definition of institutions and institution-building, coupled with a narrow understanding of the complexity behind generating effective Security and Defense sector reforms may serve partisan (parochial) agency interests, but they will not produce concrete results. Moreover, when concrete reality is plagued by CACs – unless one does not recognise the adaptive systems of conflicts as a reality, or change the focus to Institution Building – then the best case scenario becomes that which existing agencies can, or are funded, to do. This is a terrible mistake, generating no tangible reforms other than reshuffling data, which tends to perpetuate the need for the "services" these agencies provide.

While CACs have shown themselves to be dominant in today's world, showing up as a priority in the CAPA agenda, this predominance does not render other dimensions of conflict irrelevant. These include: conflicts involving mass destruction via nuclear, biological, chemical and genetic manifestations of war (NBCG); technological conflicts via electronic, cyber and robotic manifestations of warfare; and conflicts to control spaces, areas, routes and flows via manifestations of kinetic wars in the aerospace, terrestrial, maritime and inland water way domains.

Although the CAPA Method is optimised for dealing with CACs, it is also able to identify institutional gaps relevant to other conflict dimensions. This is because the CAPA is, as regards other conflict assessment methodologies, the *"primus inter pares"*. The MSD Module is used during Force Design, in defining the preparatory requisites in the Metrics Module, as well as within the Educational Module. The method allows for a case-by-case analysis of each particular country and decision-making context, in which all alternatives are defined within those three logical stands of strategic actions. These strategic actions, moreover, are all tied to the central role of institutions in building responses to contemporary conflict phenomena.

Bearing this in mind, we can put forward two recommendations as a conclusion. The first is the imperative need to incorporate SDIB as an analytical tool for security and defense planning and management worldwide. Without this conceptual structure, it is impossible to deal with the scourge of CACs. The second, as a corollary of the first, is to fix Critical Redesign as the benchmark for in-depth Security and Defense institutional reform. Without this reorientation of management structures, the response to CACs will be "more of the same", leading countries into a destructive spiral of insecurity and violence.