

Security Perspectives for Europe

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It might be worthwhile to address from a European perspective in such a publication an issue which is presumably not too prominent in debates in Latin America : Security Perspectives for Europe.

Seen they are definitely gloomier than those of the countries of Latin America since Europe although no longer being at the centre of world politics is geographically closer to the present centre of turmoil and instability, the Maghreb and the wider Middle East,. But as the world is increasingly interconnected and intertwined the situation in Europe might be of interest for Latin America as well.

To address the issue of European security one has to begin with a sober assessment of the world as it is, of the likely developments in the foreseeable future and of the risks and challenges the European nations will have to cope with. Thus one could identify the proper security arrangements for Europe. At present Europe relies on NATO as the only functioning security organisation. It is indeed at present the indispensable instrument for Europe which leaves to discuss whether this will remain so.

As so often in its more than sixty years the alliance was said in 2010 to be at a critical juncture since it is struggling with a truly difficult situation in Afghanistan and its members were to some extent divided over quite a few open issues which had to answered by the new Strategic Concept which the Heads of States and Governments agreed at their Lisbon Summit on November 20, 2010. At the centre of these debates was the question

whether an alliance such as NATO can be the proper answer to the challenges of the 21st century, to which extent it will need profound reform and whether it will remain the guarantor of European security although the emphasis of its leading nation, the U.S., is probably shifting to Asia.

The Lisbon documents reaffirmed NATO's pivotal role as the bedrock of transatlantic security and strengthened the transatlantic ties between Europe and the North American democracies although quite a few issues were left vague and will need clarification in follow on documents.

The Situation

Turning to the situation one should begin by stating that the world is in a tumultuous transition period in which for the time being but one truly global power exists, the U.S.

In Europe nations are confronted with instability in the Maghreb, with the potential crises and conflicts in the Balkans – Caucasus – Middle East triangle which today pose the nearest geographical challenges to security and stability in Europe. Spearheading the dangers is global Islamic terrorism, *Jihad terror*, spearheading instability are unrest and turmoil in some countries on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean and in Yemen.

The wider Middle East including Afghanistan and Pakistan is at the moment the main of focus of attention for Europe's indispensable ally the U.S. whereas the Maghreb instability hit both Europe and the U.S. unprepared. Both have little freedom of action since Europe is still struggling with the economic and financial crisis and the U.S. is a global power which is stretched to its limits. It is fighting the global war against terrorism, it is heavily engaged in two regional armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and it begins to understand that consumption at the expenses of future generations and being financed by foreign powers which might become at least regional rivals could eventually pose a risk to American national security. Moreover, the American society has not yet fully digested how much more change will be necessary, particularly in the American economy and industry but also, politically much more difficult to achieve, in the American way of life if the U.S. wants to maintain its leading position as the world's undisputed number one. Being under such pressures the U.S. recognises that it needs partners and allies in order to preserve the global role of the U.S. This is the key message of the recently published National Security Strategy of the U.S. The partner of choice in such a situation is for the Americans Europe. The U.S. hope that Europe which after all is the only partner which in its entirety fully shares with the US the same values and convictions will be at their side in the common task of shaping a multi-polar world order in which China, India, Japan, Brazil, Russia and Europe might be the most important players although none of these will probably be capable of playing a truly global role as a fully fledged actor during the next two or three decades. One has to underline this point since it is the key issue which will determine the future of NATO but it is at the same time a point which is not too well understood by quite a few European leaders: In a time of global challenges Europe must have an ally capable of global action as Europe although being a global economic actor does not and will not possess global projection capabilities for the foreseeable future.



Whether one likes it or not, the only power in the world which can act across the full spectrum of politics and can do it globally is now and will remain for the foreseeable future the U.S. But to get such American support will no longer be for free, therefore an alliance such as NATO which commits Europe, Canada and the U.S. to collective defence must offer advantages to the US which no one else can offer otherwise NATO will fade away. Hitherto Europe provided its geographic position to the American security equation but this alone will no longer suffice. This means that the Europeans have to matter for the U.S., they have to be on the side of the Americans there where either common interests are at stake or when the U.S. came under attack as the Europeans expect the Americans to be on their side should there be dangers for Europe. The days in which NATO stood for the import of security provided by the US are gone. Europe must become the indispensable partner of the US prepared to export security contributions to North America if necessary.

Returning to the assessment of the situation I leave for the moment aside the burning issues of our days, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the risk of an implosion of North Korea and in particular the crisis over Iran which could escalate at any moment and which holds the potential of becoming a truly global issue should the international community not succeed in peacefully preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Should this happen, and I add that I do not have the slightest doubt that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program which might enable the Iranian regime of disposing of a crude nuclear device in a few years time, a delay probably caused by the STUXNET cyber attack. Should this happen then the world will be on the slippery slope at the end of which one will probably see a world in which quite a few additional nuclear weapon states will exist and in which one could no longer rule out that one day such a weapon will be used. But Europe's security perspectives cannot be assessed against the crises at hand; one has to take into account the long-term developments although one element of today's threat assessment will most probably remain with us: Islamic jihadist terrorism.

It seems to pursue a long-term global strategy designed to achieve three aims: it seeks to establish an ideological network in the arenas of terrorism in North Africa, the Gulf region and the Indian sub-continent. It strives to islamise ethnic conflicts. It joins forces with organised crime for drug trafficking, money laundering and people smuggling.

The Long Term Perspective

As stated earlier on the world is at the brink of seeing a shift of the centre of gravity from the transatlantic/European area to the Pacific although the key area of world politics will remain for the near to mid term the enlarged Middle East. In the Pacific the U.S. and China (PRC) will be the two key players and the key question for the next two to three decades will be whether this relationship will be cooperative or confrontational. It is fair to assume that this relationship will for quite some time be more cooperative than confrontational since these two powers depend on each other in an almost symbiotic way: The Americans need the Chinese money for financing the credit-based American way of life and the Chinese need the Americans as customers who buy a large portion of Chinese products. This does not rule out, however, that there will be conflicts over access to scarce resources, over regional issues ranging from Taiwan to other disputed islands to the larger question of dominant influence in India, Pakistan and Central Asia and over financial and trade issues. Most of these issues will probably be settled through regional arrangements as China is for the time being not interested in any conflict with the U.S.. On the contrary, apparently China wishes the U.S. to remain the guarantor of Asian/Pacific security since the PRC is for the time being simply not capable of playing this role. China will for quite some time be absorbed by its huge domestic problems ranging from substantial unemployment, tremendous environmental problems to the destabilising effect of modern economies and the information age on an outdated ideology. In the meantime China is positioning itself on the world markets for energy, scarce metals and minerals and it is improving its geostrategic position. There are substantial Chinese activities in Latin America and there is a considerable Chinese presence in Africa, there are huge Chinese investments in the Afghan copper mines and there are the strategically positioned harbour construction efforts in Myanmar, in Sri Lanka and Pakistan which apparently serve a twofold strategic objective: denial of Indian control of the Indian Ocean and circumvention of the Straits of Malacca through which a large portion of Chinese imports, notably oil, is shipped. In addition, one can note the rapidly progressing modernisation of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army with main emphasis on some regional maritime power projection and on cyber operations. One could imagine that the final decision in the new forbidden city of Beijing is not yet taken on whether one should confront the U.S. or cooperate with them and that such a decision will most probably not be taken within the next twenty years or so. This is the chance for the entire world to push the two competitors into the direction of cooperation. Latin America will have to play an important role and Europe plus Russia as well. There should be no doubt on one strategic reality: Europe will remain on the side of the Americans for security reasons as well as for ethical reasons. We Europeans share after all common values and convictions with our American allies and friends such as democracy, the rule of law and the respect for Human Rights as do most Latin American countries. Should the U.S. succeed in keeping Europe firmly on their side, should they succeed in forging a true partnership with Russia and should they also succeed in fostering friendly relationships with the majority of the Latin American countries then the chances will grow that the US will remain the world's leading power and that the Chinese /American relationship will be cooperative. This means for Europe, however, that the Europeans have to do more than today to become a player who can use all instruments of international politics. Based on this macro-weather forecast I turn to the reasons of crises and conflicts in the decades to come.

Obviously, nobody can predict with certainty, which risks and dangers will surface during the next twenty to thirty years. But there is one certainty, the world will remain a very unruly place and the likelihood of crises and conflicts is increasing and not decreasing. Nevertheless, people in all nations will most probably increasingly look inward, they will not appreciate if governments will see the necessity of taking preventive action in order to keep dangers at a distance and they will not too often support the need of staying engaged in conflicts far from home. Convincing electorates of such strategic necessities will remain a permanent uphill battle.

I see three long-term developments, which could become the reasons for crises and conflicts: demographic changes, resource scarcity and climate change. Traditional reasons such as unresolved territorial disputes, ethnic rivalries or religious strife will probably not be the reasons for armed conflicts but they will be used to trigger or inflame conflicts. Such future conflicts will probably be characterised by three features: Non-State actors, proliferation of WMD and cyber operations. The traditional inter-state conflict might presumably become more and more the exception whereas some of the future conflicts could begin as inner-state conflicts. And there are two other noteworthy features: Non-state actors will have access to all weaponry and thus the states' monopoly of using force will fade away.

From a European perspective demography could pose the biggest risks since Europe's population will shrink and will get older and older but the populations in Europe's neighbourhood will grow and will get younger and younger. By the year 2050 the average age of the Europeans will be approximately 50 years whereas the US population will grow and stay at an average age of 37 years. In Russia the demographic data are even more alarming: The population may decrease to less than 100 millions but today's share of Muslims will increase to more than one third of the Russian population. The six million ethnic Russians living today in the thinly populated Siberia, which is so rich in natural resources of all kind, will helplessly watch today's four million illegal Chinese immigrants growing in numbers.

In China, which will soon be outnumbered by India, the average age will increase as well and the society will have to struggle with the long-term impacts of the one child policy in an increasingly urbanised society. Today's tensions in the Chinese society are enormous: there are some 150 millions of unemployed plus some 200 millions of migrant workers and there are incredible environmental problems which alone would require an annual real growth of the Chinese economy of some eight percent to be kept manageable. In addition, there is the questionable attempt of the Communist Party to control the country by an authoritarian form of capitalism masked as Communism. I tend to believe that today's tensions will probably increase. This is one of the reasons why I doubt that China will be capable of global power projection for quite some time to come.

A real growth of population will take place in Latin America, in Africa and in the Muslim world. If one looks at the many young people in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia where often close to 50 percent of the population are younger than 25 years and if one remembers that in Germany soon one third of the population will be older than 60 years than one can



foresee what might happen: Social unrest first later to be followed by migration which will primarily hit an aging and unprepared Europe.

The second reason for conflict is scarcity of resources. I do not have oil and gas in mind when I mention resources although nobody should harbour the illusion that assured supplies will be guaranteed: The fact that the so called West possesses three percent of the world's known reserves but stands for 40 % of the world's consumption does not suggest that this will happen. But possibly more alarming will be the likely competition for water and scarce minerals, metals etc, in particular if one takes the fancy ideas serious which are floated here and there, e.g. one million electro-cars in one country which would eat up a large portion of the world's known and exploitable Lithium reserves.

Europe, China and to some extent India as well need imports of energy and raw materials. Regardless whether nations will stick to nuclear energy, wise nations should for a few more decades, or not there is no hope that the growing demand for energy could be covered by renewable energy sources and the formula of the long term, fusion power plants will not be available for other than experimental use before the second half of this century. Energy supply and with it energy security will become one of the issues of the future. The same is true for potable water, the most demanded natural resource in the future. Today some 40 percent of the world's population need foreign water sources to get the drinking water they need; one billion people have at this moment no access to potable water at all. Should the World Bank's estimate be correct then the demand for food will increase by 30 percent in the year 2030 which means that the struggle for water could become the reason number one for conflicts.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcities, prompting large-scale migration of people, instability and conflict. The impact of climate change will vary and it is not as precisely predictable as one would need it for a proper assessment but many regions will suffer harmful effects, particularly water scarcity, storm intensity and loss of agricultural production. Estimates suggest that by 2020 up to 250 million Africans could face starvation and malnutrition due to the lack of fresh water supplies, lower crop yields and drought.

Another development could be the Arctic Ocean being ice-free in summertime. Such a development could have profound strategic consequences. It might open up vast energy and mineral resources and it could pose considerable environmental, legal and geo-strategic challenges. Some estimates suggest that up to 25 percent of the world's remaining oil and gas resources lie north of the Arctic Circle. Moreover, one might see disputes over SLOCs as world shipping might be transformed: The Northern Sea Route between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific is about 5000 nautical miles shorter, that is a week's sailing time, than the trip via the Suez Canal.

Should the results of these developments be crises and conflicts the resulting future conflicts will as mentioned earlier on probably be characterised by three features: Non-State actors, proliferation of WMD and cyber operations.

Europe will probably see less obvious forms of attacks ranging from terrorist attack to cyber attacks launched by truly invisible attackers and there might be truly asymmetric reactions to all steps alliances such as NATO may take in crisis management. There will be armed conflicts outside Europe triggered by other than the traditional reasons for war and Europe's nations will be forced to react to proliferation and to cope with failing states. Terrorism, organised crime and radical ideologies will continue to exacerbate regional tensions and trans-national threats and they will fuel competition and instability. Moreover, the technology and the knowledge to make and to deliver agents of mass destruction are proliferating among some of the most ruthless actors. The ability of non-state –actors to employ destructive power will grow as governments struggle to meet the challenges of stateless networks that roam freely across borders.

I mentioned the risk of spreading nuclear proliferation when I discussed Iran but the world's most devastating agent of mass destruction – infectious disease – is moving from the hands of nature to the hands of man. The age of engineered biological weapons is here, today. The world is on the cusp of exponential change in the power of bio-agents and their accessibility to state and non-state-actors. The absence of available medical countermeasures and the inadequacies of health systems will limit most nations' capacities to deal with large-scale man made epidemics.

In addition to nuclear and missile proliferation the proliferation of bio-agents thus poses truly existential dangers for the highly vulnerable industrialised societies as well as those of less developed countries.

Moreover, a new dimension seems to loom over the horizon, a dimension I would call the dimension of mass disruption caused by cyber attacks. Cyber operations could produce a shift of strategic paradigms for state actors as cyber operations may permit to paralyse an opponent before he began using its instruments of power and coercion. Thus the strategic paradigm of enforcing surrender through destruction might be replaced by enforcing preventive surrender through paralysation.

None-state-actors will have access to cyber operations as well and they will use it since it will be increasingly difficult to locate the source from which the attack was launched. Remember the incredible growth of capabilities: In 2000 the capability was determined by 4 Gbps, today it is 16 Gbps or more. Determined and skilled actors are or will soon be able to disrupt modern societies unless the industrialised nations take resolute action to protect them better and to coordinate their efforts. It is thus no longer Bond-movie science fiction that non-state-actors might take on states. We are about to enter a world in which cyber hackers, criminal cartels and terrorists have one thing in common: They are networks that prey on our networks, our interconnected arteries and nodes of vulnerability which are so typical for free societies.

This means in a nutshell that the potential for conflicts is growing faster than the international community's ability to arrange for proper conflict resolution mechanisms since the states being locked in the "Westphalian order" thinking are too often looking for the traditional tools which were not made for a world without any rules and full of asymmetric conflicts. It is a world in which no conflict can be settled by using military means alone and in which no nation state including the U.S. and none of the existing international organisations will be able to arrive at a settlement by acting alone since the global has become local and the local has become global.



The Consequences for Europe

Thus the security perspectives for Europe are not as bright as our citizens wish them to be but two consequences can be drawn at this stage already:

- There will be no security for Europe without the U.S. and Europe has to do more and has to become a full-fledged actor in all domains of politics.
- As there is no time to develop something new and from scratch, Europe needs functioning security arrangements and the EU has to be capable of acting in global dimensions but unfortunately Europe is not capable of doing so and it will not be it for some time to come.

Therefore NATO is and remains Europe's security guarantor but NATO appears at a first glance to be yesterday's organization. First, it disposes of military tools only and secondly, it can no longer afford to sit and wait until the dangers arrive at the NATO Treaty Area. The reactive defence of the past is no answer to the challenges of the future but at the same time NATO must never become the interventionist global policeman. The NATO nations can neither afford it nor would they be prepared for supporting long lasting military engagements if they do not see that they serve their nations' security. Moreover, an interventionist NATO would never be able of producing political stability. This should not mean, however, that NATO should focus exclusively on the territorial defence of Europe against a more assertive Russia. Russia will for quite some time remain an authoritarian state but Russia is for the foreseeable future not capable of threatening NATO as such. Therefore NATO should seek an arrangement with Russia which allays the Russian fears of NATO's superiority and which leads without making any concessions on NATO core issues to a more cooperative NATO-Russia relationship.

Thus the first answer for Europe in responding to tomorrow's challenges is that NATO must be strengthened and reformed as well. The Lisbon documents point exactly into this direction.

But this alone will not suffice. Needless to say that this means as well that nuclear deterrence remains indispensable although it could increasingly become a sole purpose instrument of exclusively deterring the use of nuclear weapons. The Lisbon documents are a little vague on the nuclear deterrence issue but follow on work is mandated.

The open question is how to make deterrence and defence credible in times in which the nature of conflicts and the threats are truly different. Obviously, today's defences must no longer be the one directional, largely territory oriented defences of the past. Today's defences have to be multi-directional and multi-dimensional since the threats are multi-faceted and they can come from anywhere. Today defence could begin at an early stage of a conflict and could include preventive military action although the use of force, provided it is both legal and legitimate, must remain the ultimate resort of politics, which does not necessarily mean the last. But first and foremost defence must include the protection of the homelands. The main military contributions to a truly integrated NATO homeland defence are, first, a much improved intelligence cooperation, second, an integrated multi-layered missile defence which covers the entire NTA, i.e. North America and Europe, as well as deployed NATO forces, and, third, CBRN defences. In addition NATO forces will

have to contribute to our nations' provisions of protecting their energy supplies as well as their cyber defence efforts. Cyber defence requires NATO as well to dispose of a limited cyber attack capability enabling the Alliance of regaining the initiative should a cyber war being waged against NATO. Therefore the second answer is that Europe has to strengthen its capabilities. For this reason the Lisbon NATO Summit decided to review until spring 2012 the deterrence and defence posture of NATO.

Such a review will have to stress one strategic imperative: Europe must become capable of strategic action. This is not a call for a programme to drive America out of Europe; quite the opposite in fact: the higher Europe's capacity to act is, the earlier and the more America's burden in Europe can be relieved or it can expect Europe to be able to act on its own. Only a bundling of European components can provide Europe with a limited capacity to respond to the global challenges even if US resources are tied up or the USA does not wish to act. They would also enable Europe to act in tandem with the USA where the USA is unable to engage for political or military reasons even though common interests are at risk. This approach would turn Europe into an indispensable partner for the USA, would tighten the transatlantic bracket and, with reasonably manageable time and effort, would maximise its political influence over the USA. However, the sole aim is not just to relieve the USA of its burden but also to act side by side where either common interests are endangered or there is a need to demonstrate alliance solidarity towards the USA.

In terms of practical implementation, a European division of tasks embedded in a transatlantic alliance would involve establishing European components which are fully interoperable with those of the USA and which, by being flanged to identical or at least fully interoperable American components, could become NATO Component Forces.

Europe's Way Ahead

To this end Europe's way towards a common a EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) should be guided by the following six principles:

- **Firstly:** Europe's security will, in future, continue to require a fully functional structure of nuclear armed forces whose task is to prevent other holders of nuclear weapons from using these.
- **Secondly:** Not least of all, a corresponding land and/or sea-based missile defence system that, at all costs, should be built up by NATO together with Russia, would help to counter the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles which may be armed with CRBN warheads.
- **Thirdly:** In the old days the Mediterranean Sea was the element separating and uniting Europe and North Africa. Today, the Indian Ocean has a similar key impact on the geographical situation between Africa, Europe and Asia as some 25–28,000 large ships navigate through the Indian Ocean every year on their way to Europe or the Pacific.
- **Fourthly:** In view of the geographical concentration of the potential for crisis and conflict and terrorist forces in the southern arc of crisis, above all in the Balkans, Caucasus, Near/Middle East triangle, but also in Northern Africa, Europe must shift its strategic focus to the South and South-East. It is *the paramount interest of Europe* that *Turkey* be tied in to Europe.

- Fifthly: The shift in the strategic constellation is leading to the Mediterranean members of the EU practically becoming “front-line states”.
- Sixthly: The new threat necessitates that Europe equip itself with strategic and operative means of intelligence and be able to dispatch and lead light combat units across long distances and keep them in theatres over extended periods. The significance of naval forces capable of operating on the outskirts of Europe is on the increase.

Concluding Remarks

Despite many remaining deficiencies Europe made substantial progress in the field of foreign and security policy during the past ten years. But there is no reason to lean back since too much still needs to be done.

Now as the constitutional treaty entered into force, the EU is better equipped to bring together the many policies and instruments that it has to focus on security .

Within a few years the foreign minister will be able to call on the member-states to deploy not only 5,000 policemen, but also a further force of 5,000 gendarmes, armed police who can operate in a rougher environment. These men and women will normally serve in national police or gendarme units, but be available for EU missions at short notice. The EU will also develop a ‘civilian rapid reaction force’, consisting of skilled professionals such as judges, prosecutors, doctors, nurses, customs experts, aid workers, water engineers and electrical engineers, all ‘ear-marked’ as ready to fly to a trouble zone at a few weeks’ notice.

There will be more pooling of military equipment and support functions.

Governments are most likely to apply pooling to the less-sensitive sorts of military task. National defence bureaucracies will resist such pooling, for it would force them to change the way they work and to accept job losses. But finance ministries, understanding that pooling permits a higher level of output for a given financial input, will drive it forward.

Although there will be no formal directorate of large countries to lead EU military operations the foreign policy interests of the EU states are more likely to converge than diverge. The EU will therefore continue to develop a more coherent CFSP – and as a consequence it will seem natural to step up co-operation on military operations. One distant day there will thus be a European Army provided the EU will eventually adopt a meaningful and coherent CSFP, will agree on common Rules of Engagement , lift national constraints and will, first and foremost, develop the common will to act collectively if and where necessary based on the understanding that the nucleus of national sovereignty in the 21st century is the „responsibility to protect“.

Such a Europe would be more than happy to cooperate as closely as possible with all democracies in Latin America which share such or similar views.