

The impact of the resurging Malvinas (Falklands) issue on South American and European Union relations

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The “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” is in itself an important issue which pervades the historical relations between Europe and Latin America.¹ During the first half of the 19th century, the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the islands had already given rise to official positions in the region in support to Argentina’s claim, albeit with no impacts in diplomatic circles. However, the issue lay dormant as a potential mechanism to produce controversies and friction: a belief by the majority of Argentinean foreign policy makers that the islands, occupied by inhabitants of a British background, were within the bounds of Argentinean sovereignty. Nonetheless, until the 1960s the issue alternated between periods of greater importance in the country’s foreign policy agenda and its actions in the United Nations, and moments during which the topic remained dormant; yet in general without causing any adverse outcome in Argentina – United Kingdom relations.

In 1964 the Argentinean representative in the United Nations put forth the historical and legal foundations of Argentina’s claim, which stressed the jurisdictional position assumed by that country and encouraged a debate within the Organization’s sphere. In the following year a resolution was passed inviting both countries to discuss the islands’ sovereignty issues, bearing in mind the inhabitants’ interests. Interpretation of the resolution by both countries’ diplomats was not identical: the Argentinean government understood in this case that the principle of self-determination by the people was not applicable.²

The United Nations' resolution encouraged the start of a series of negotiations between both countries, formal ones as well as those involving specific projects. By 1982 several cooperation actions on specific subjects and with regard to contacts between the Malvinas (Falklands) and the continent had advanced. But the Argentinean interpretation of self-determination made it difficult to discuss sovereignty issues.

In 1982, owing to reasons basically of a domestic nature that had been very much considered and based on misconceptions by the Argentinean government, the latter put an end to the negotiations and invasion of the islands took place on April 2. Occupation of Stanley by Argentina cut short the tenuous progress of cooperation between the islands and the continent, and besides the surprise gave rise to the need by other Latin American countries to take a position of support or rejection of the Argentinean claim. Albeit unexpectedly for the makers of Argentinean foreign policy – or the supporters of war – the United Kingdom reacted, also owing to a number of factors which included its domestic policy, and certainly with a great deal more military resources.³ Following an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the United States, which had good relations with the military government, selected to support the United Kingdom, its key international ally, at a time when the political affinities between President Reagan and Margareth Thatcher were at their best, and after all, Argentina had caused this confrontation.

However, the circumstances in the region at that time favored Argentina. In 1982 the region's countries were undergoing the first consequences of rising interest rates in the US financial market, and their respective economies were unable to create a response to the crisis (and here began the so-called "lost decade"). In political terms, the transition to the 1980s combined efforts to diversify partners by the region's countries, with the progressive weakening of the Organization of American States (OAS) and with stress on East-West relations by US foreign policy. This fact placed the Cold War back in the center of international attention and enfeebled actions by third-world countries. Under this scenario, efforts for joint actions by the region's countries were being devised and resulted in the creation of ALADI in 1980.⁴

Support to Argentina, calling on the parties to negotiate and on Great Britain to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty on the islands was at that time expressed by a number of countries. The region's countries opted for a conduct opposed to that by the US, and the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (TIAR), of no practical application, was not employed and became definitely ineffective. In turn, the then European Community (EC) countries put in practice with Argentina an economic embargo by the Commission as part of its foreign policy. The Argentinean embargo was put in practice and the meetings by GRULA (the Brussels Latin American Group, composed of ambassadors from the region's countries) with the CE's Committee of Permanent Representatives were curtailed.⁵ The subsequent talks were fruitless, as the issue of sovereignty was removed from all the talks' agendas, and the United Kingdom invested in the political integration and economic strengthening of the local population.

The current scenario is totally different from 30 years ago, yet a number of items persist to this day. The “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” continues alive; the distance between the region’s countries and the United States has reappeared. But the international order is no longer bipolar; the idea of South America has been overriding the concept of Latin America; there are clear integration and cooperation efforts in the South American subcontinent headed in first place by Brazilian diplomacy; during these years Argentina has consolidated an important partnership with Brazil under the MERCOSUR banner. And negotiations aiming at an association by MERCOSUR with the European Union have faced a dilemma on whether to be curtailed once again or to conclude with a minimal agreement, full of exceptions.

The objective here is to look into the importance of the resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue, 30 years after occupation of the islands by Argentinean troops, for the political and security dimensions of South American and European Union relations. The decision that assigns South America as an area of importance is due to the fact that its integration actions – such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR⁶ – are currently the chief venue for involvement by the region’s countries in devising joint actions as well as for developing relations with countries outside the region.

Developments following 1982

After the war’s end and the armistice, the islands’ political and strategic status changed. Concern over the repetition of belligerence was instrumental for the United Kingdom to create a local military base, with a large number of soldiers and new weapons.⁷ But on the other hand, military cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has increased and in 1986 the South Atlantic was decreed to be a Peace and Cooperation Zone (the ZOPACAS) by 24 South American and African governments. Without mentioning, however, the status of the islands.⁸ Within a geopolitical viewpoint, the presence of English weapons on the islands could be seen as an imbalance in the region’s security. However, in terms of South America, the issue was not included in the agenda. Neighboring countries continued to support Argentina’s entitlement to the islands’ sovereignty, yet this topic had no space in regional talks. The government of Carlos Menem sought to restore several cooperation bonds with the islands’ inhabitants by means of a “seduction policy” by chancellor Guido di Tella, but to no avail.⁹ In practice, efforts to encourage closer relations were curtailed at the end of his government and the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” again assumed a more challenging status in the Argentinean government agenda.

With regard to relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, in 1986 the government of the former suspended the embargo on Argentinean goods and in 1990 diplomatic relations were restored between both nations. However, the British government made investments in the local economy of the Malvinas (Falklands), and in 1983 the inhabitants were granted British citizenship. Since then, the outlook for resuming warfare by Argentina, from the local viewpoint, appears as a Sword of Damocles as well as a justification for receiving benefits from London.¹⁰ In 1985 the United Nations’ General Assembly approved a resolution encouraging both countries to negotiate, and other resolutions fol-

lowed from the Committee on Decolonization. Yet these were not put into practice: the differences of opinion regarding the right to self-determination by the islands' inhabitants blocked progress of all sorts of negotiations between both countries.

The creation of MERCOSUR in 1991 encouraged closer relations by Argentina and neighboring countries. In the course of bilateral relations with Brazil and despite the difficulties in agreeing on common foreign policy actions and joint positions within the OAS, and the different views by both countries on the international scenario, there were important advances in other dimensions as in terms of defending democracy. Business growth was brisk in the field of intra-block trade, with interdependence among the member states. In 1997 both presidents declared a strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina. On this occasion direct dealings on the Malvinas (Falklands) were not included in the bilateral agenda. The latter was basically restricted to military considerations, in particular by means of war studies. There were advances and actions during the decade involving military cooperation, which resulted in joint bilateral maneuvers but did not include discussions on the subject. From the Brazilian angle, there was greater interest on the specifics of the war experience.

In connection with European Union relations, in the framework of inter-regionalism, the creation of MERCOSUR attracted attention from Europe; expectations that arose in the Committee with regard to its political as well as economic development were expressive. In turn, MERCOSUR countries demonstrated a clear interest in negotiating a cooperation agreement with the EC. In 1992 an inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement was undersigned by both parties and in 1995 the Inter-regional Cooperation Agreement was executed. The agreement included liberalizing trade, economic cooperation, and political dialogue. Although the talks to liberalize trade were difficult, in politics the spaces made available by the Agreement were opportune and the talks moved ahead despite the absence of an initial institutionalization. The explicit driver of the political relations between both blocks during the period were the values shared, defended in international regimes. During this time, which coincided with president Carlos Menem holding office, the Malvinas (Falklands) issue did not serve as an obstacle to the development of inter-regional relations, and it did not find a place in the agenda of talks between both blocks.

During the 1990s the European Union also maintained the EU-Group of Rio political talks, and in 1999 the EU-Latin America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) talks started. In neither of these cases did the Malvinas (Falklands) enter the agenda. The issue was limited to the bilateral relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Also in the Latin American regional framework – represented above all in the Group of Rio – the issue acquired a low profile.

As of the year 2000 there were a number of changes in the region's dynamics, within Argentina and in the European Union's relations with MERCOSUR, which gave way to opportunities for the Malvinas (Falklands) issue to reappear and to be included in the regional agenda. In political terms, several economically anti-liberal governments were elected consecutively in South America, which sought to put in place new bases for their



respective countries' political systems. In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner's election was equal to a renewal of the political framework: Human rights policy, foreign policy, and social policies among others were reformulated in conformity with the region's progressive governments. In connection with the domestic economy, Kirchner adopted a heterodox neo-developmental strategy which sought to put in place a more active industrial policy in order to recover the country's industrial park. The Cristina Kirchner government was a continuation of the preceding government. Under this framework, relations with the United Kingdom were remote.¹¹

In regional terms, in 2000 the first meeting of South American countries took place in Brasília in order to form the South American Community of Nations (CASA), during which the chief ideas under discussion were economic integration and the region's infrastructure, and the encouragement of democratic systems.¹² CASA inaugurated a new stage in the region's dynamics, stressing a clear South American dimension in the Latin American structure and at the same time encouraging a number of regional integration actions such as IIRSA¹³ and in 2008 the conversion of CASA into UNASUR. In 2002 the election of Lula da Silva in Brazil caused impacts on the regional dynamics. Foreign policy during the Lula government considered it a political priority to rearrange South America under Brazilian leadership, and this would be possible based on a cooperative, developmental, and politically progressive viewpoint.

UNASUR gradually assumed an important role as a consensus mechanism, aligning the views of the region's countries. It played an important role when facing continental crisis situations; whether of domestic policy (as in Bolivia) or border relations (as between Venezuela and Colombia). The creation of the South American Defense Council within its scope, under Brazilian government initiative, has contributed to closer relations among

the region's countries in the military sphere, and has also placed Brazil in the center of the regional security agenda.¹⁴ The Malvinas (Falklands) issue in itself was not highly stressed but was included in the organization's agenda since its creation. The military issue of British presence was recognized by the member countries and the positions held were in defense of Argentina's right to negotiate in its favor the islands' sovereignty, in addition to the importance of these talks being peaceful. Overall, the British presence in the South Atlantic and issues with regard to Antarctic exploration and to sea resources – of greater weight following oil discoveries – were sources for the organization's concern.

Regarding relations between MERCOSUR and the European Union, the 1990s standards were maintained until the middle of the decade. But in 2004, with Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner already holding office as presidents of the two major partners, commercial negotiations were suspended.¹⁵ Political cooperation and dialogue actions proceeded, but the partial admission of Venezuela into the block in 2006 and the strategic partnership entered into with Brazil in 2007 created obstacles to dialogue. The partnership implied playing down inter-regional relations in political dialogue and cooperation, and the Argentinean government made its dissatisfaction clear with the EU. With regard to the relations between the EU and Latin America, the twice-yearly summits were maintained, but growing Brazilian presence in the region and UNASUR's development as the sub-region's chief interaction mechanism played down the meetings. The absence of a North American policy for the continent led to greater independence by the regional players, which sought out their own alternatives for regional organization and international insertion.¹⁶

Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue

In early 2012 the Argentinean government decided to revive the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue.” A number of circumstances could have encouraged this decision. Firstly, in recent years oil was discovered in the sea close to the islands; and in 2010 future exploration started to be planned.¹⁷ This would give rise to new prospects for gains to the Argentinean government. Soon after, the United Kingdom renewed its airplane and warship fleet, which created distrust in the Argentinean government as to the purpose of these weapons. Thirdly, this year it has been 30 years since the conflict and the date of the Argentinean invasion is being remembered with a commemoration.¹⁸ Domestically in Argentina, the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” symbolizes the legacy of territorial nationalism and acts as a mechanism that rallies society's different sectors around the government.¹⁹ The current consolidated situation is also important, with its South American integration / cooperation mechanisms and the accepted practice of a consensus. This allows UNASUR to act as a strong support mechanism, should its member countries consider it important, for Argentina's claims.²⁰ Finally, the distant relations between Argentina and the European Union, marked by Argentinean disappointment over the strategic partnership entered into between the EU and Brazil, the end of inter-regional political talks, and difficulties in trade discussions in view of Argentinean protectionism.

Argentina's domestic actions and debates on the Malvinas (Falklands) issue cannot be construed simply as a foreign policy matter, as two dimensions are involved. On the one

hand, they refer to something outside the country's borders and assume an objective and action strategy to face overseas players (whether key players such as the United Kingdom or partners from which support is sought). Yet on the other hand, they refer to the country's domestic policy. Citizens and electors are mobilized, different spheres of the government's structure are involved, and enormous emphasis is created by the press. The constitutional reform in Argentina approved in 1994 included in its text restoration of Argentinean sovereignty over the islands by peaceful means, as a permanent goal by the country. These two sides of the same coin make it difficult to understand them within what would be strictly a diplomatic procedure, and explain the difficulties that action by Argentina is likely to produce for the European Union and regional partners.²¹

The start of Argentina's domestic campaign was followed by a number of attitudes intended for the islands and the United Kingdom as well as for South America in general. Regarding the Malvinas (Falklands) themselves, the Argentinean government took action at two levels. It first clearly criticized through diplomatic circles and accused the United Kingdom of encouraging an arms race in the South Atlantic, including stationing a nuclear submarine in the islands, contrary to ZOPACAS principles. And then it harshly criticized the presence of Prince William on the islands from January to June 2012.²² On the other hand, it launched a vigorous campaign to isolate the islands' inhabitants from the South American continent, following a strangling maneuver.

Domestically, preparations began for the April 2 commemoration. President Cristina Kirchner made a speech regarding the islands, stressing Argentinean sovereignty and seeking support from all the political authorities. Demonstrations were held to ratify the lawful sovereignty by Argentina over the islands, in addition to protests against cruise ships that had passed by the Malvinas (Falklands). The president had proposed putting in place direct flights from Buenos Aires to the Malvinas (Falklands), rejected by the local inhabitants. The government also persuaded major Argentinean corporations not to import British goods. English reaction was soon felt: a complaint was lodged with the European Union, which stated that it had begun the appropriate diplomatic procedures to solve this trade dispute. Soon afterwards the president requested support from UNASUR for its disputes with the United Kingdom.

The controversy progressed throughout March. In view of the statements by the EU, the Argentinean government issued veiled criticisms against the latter in connection with its "silence" after the British refusal to negotiate the islands' sovereignty with Argentina, and for bringing modern weaponry to its military base. Soon after, president Cristina Kirchner threatened to file lawsuits against companies that did business with oil exploration companies in Malvinas (Falklands) waters, as well as against the oil companies themselves, including investment banks, service providers, and others.²³ The islands' residents reacted and accused the Argentinean government of aiming to disrupt the local economy.

The Argentinean government sought outside support for its actions. Its chief strategy, which proved successful, was to highlight the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in the regional agenda.²⁴ During the MERCOSUR presidents' summit in December 2011, it requested and

obtained approval for a declaration that restricts access by ships bearing the Malvinas (Falklands) flag to any of the block's ports. UNASUR made statements defending the right by Argentina to sovereignty over the islands, and expressed concern with the traffic of British ships in the South Atlantic. In mid-March in a UNASUR meeting held in Asuncion, approval was given to restrict entry of ships with Malvinas (Falklands) flags – “unlawful” – into ports of South American countries.²⁵ Following this restriction, Cristina Kirchner visited Chile in order to reaffirm support, and the Peruvian government cancelled the visit of an English frigate to its seaports in late March. This same Declaration stressed concern with the exploration of “Argentina’s” natural resources by the United Kingdom and pointed to the need for the British government to conclude negotiations with Argentina as soon as possible.

The topic’s regional dimension and the impacts on relations with the European Union

Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue led to impacts on inter-regional relations as well as those between South America and the European Union. Having no doubts regarding support from its regional partners to sovereignty over the islands, the aggressive diplomacy adopted by Argentina – jointly with trade barriers recently put in place by Cristina Kirchner’s government – produced a certain discomfort among its neighbors.

In first place, in the commercial area Argentina’s relations with its neighbors have deteriorated owing to the numerous trade barriers that the government has raised in order to defend and encourage development of its domestic industrial park. This topic has been treated together with the Argentinean claim for sovereignty over the islands. Blockading the islands’ economy has started to raise criticisms and thoughts by minor MERCOSUR members, of a more economic nature such as by Uruguay, and of a territorial nature as in the case of the block’s Paraguayan delegation.²⁶ In second place, Brazil’s relations with European countries and the United Kingdom have their own dynamics and Brazilian diplomacy has no interest in endangering them.²⁷



To make things worse, Argentinean behavior does not point to any solutions in the short run. UNASUR's South American Defense Council was created with the purpose of managing articulations and common interests in a framework of peace, and an outlook of regional conflict involving an outside player may lead to friction. On the other hand, reaction by the islands' inhabitants is not indifferent. To the contrary, in the light of war memories and incisive diplomacy by the Argentinean foreign office, local willingness to cooperate is reduced.²⁸ Currently life on the islands is organized under strictly British standards and fear of contacts with Argentina is great.²⁹

With regard to the impact on relations with the European Union by Argentina, United Kingdom relations tend to deteriorate even more with the Malvinas (Falklands) issue as priority in the bilateral agenda. The British government in turn has adopted a vigorous defensive behavior in a campaign disclosing the lifestyle and preferences of the islands' inhabitants, placing emphasis on their right to self-determination. To make things worse, economic relations have also become complex. If on the one hand the Argentinean government has mentioned a boycott on British goods, in practice its protectionism has affected foreign trade as a whole, giving way to estimates of difficult times in this area.

The outlook is also somber regarding Argentina's relations with the European Union. In addition to traditional problems with claims from Brazil, negotiations between MERCOSUR and EU are facing obstacles created by the Argentinean government. And the domestic industrial park's reconstruction project is a long-term plan. On the other hand, the Euro countries are undergoing a critical economic spell, which limits their ability to assume a leading position in the economic area and to provide Argentina with what is most required by South American partners: investments.³⁰ The strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil continues – albeit less vigorously – and political dialogue with MERCOSUR which included Argentina is now restricted to business rounds aimed at molding a free trade agreement. These dealings are under way, though with scarcely expressive progress. Argentina's main partner in Europe, Spain, is undergoing a severe economic crisis and therefore its priorities are now domestic. The EU has little to offer Argentina, which has little to lose with the weakened relations between both of them.³¹

In inter-regional terms, UNASUR has adopted numerous moves to regionalize the matter. UNASUR's decision to veto traffic by ships bearing the Malvinas (Falklands) flag in member countries' territorial waters was severe, and the United Kingdom showed its discomfort by referring to this as "hardly friendly and disappointing".³² From a British viewpoint, the plan of sending a warship to the British base on the islands is in effect and should give rise to a position by the organization. Nonetheless, in political terms there is no direct channel for dialogue between UNASUR and the European Union; interaction by both takes place during the EU and Latin America and Caribbean summits. The next meeting is planned to be held in Chile this coming June, and most likely Argentina will attempt to include the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in the agenda. But this topic tends to be more diluted when brought up in EU-LAC summits.

Final considerations

In general, EU - South America relations are not at their best. The financial crisis in Europe; elections for a number of heads of government in the region, with neo-developmental ideas; difficulties in trade owing to preservation of protectionist rules by both sides; an emphatic South American dimension not organized to maintain communications channels with the EU, are items that create new challenges for bi-regionalism.

Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue should give rise to a new area of friction between both regions, yet this will be the lesser of several impacts among the above-mentioned challenges. The absence of a willingness to communicate by Argentina as well as by the United Kingdom will bring problems to other European and South American partners in their respective regional environment and bi-regional framework, and will also create barriers to solve the problem.³³ Nonetheless, the bilateral and inter-regional relations, molded over a longer term, will remain within the standards of recent years.

Notes

- ¹ The Malvinas (Falklands) issue is the claim by Argentina of sovereignty over the archipelago in the South Atlantic, allegedly converted into a longing by every Argentinean, defended with intensity and placed among key foreign policy objectives. For this topic, refer to PALERMO, Vicente, *Sal en las heridas. Las Malvinas en la cultura argentina contemporánea*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2007.
- ² The Argentinean government did not accept application of the principle of self-determination by the Malvinas' (Falklands') inhabitants and counter-argued with the "territorial integrity principle."
- ³ It is interesting to note that while the Argentinean military government was already living its final moments and with the war it sought to obtain the people's support and the resulting survival, the British government was in the midst of an election campaign with scarce approval rates, and the people's support due to nationalism could equally be a successful tool.
- ⁴ Latin American Integration Association.
- ⁵ But restored only in 1989, when consular relations were reestablished between Argentina and the United Kingdom.
- ⁶ Common Market of the South and Union of South American Nations.
- ⁷ The end of hostilities by Argentina was decreed only during the Menem government.
- ⁸ The Resolution (UNO 41/11 dated October 24, 1986) refers to the importance of military-significant countries respecting the peace zone. More directly, the only ones mentioned were Apartheid in South Africa and the need for Namibia's independence. Available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/495/19/IMG/NR049519.pdf?OpenElement>.
- ⁹ These actions occurred based on an agreement that placed reservations on the sovereignty issue.
- ¹⁰ The memories of war are always a painful legacy for the inhabitants of the war theater. This dimension is rarely recalled in debates on the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in South America.
- ¹¹ During the Cristina Kirchner government Argentina had no ambassador in London, having in place only a business attaché.
- ¹² CASA was formalized in 2004.
- ¹³ Initiative for Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure.
- ¹⁴ On this topic, see MERKE, Federico, *A América do Sul e a agenda de segurança hemisférica: o desafio das assimetrias*. In: *Segurança Internacional: um diálogo Europa-América do Sul*. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2008, p.34-45.
- ¹⁵ During the negotiating procedures the EU was not overly concerned in complying with MERCOSUR's key area of interest, for opening their agricultural markets to the block's exports. The Brazilian government in turn did not make concessions to European claims for opening the domestic market to high-technology goods and for authorizing participation by overseas companies in public bids. As of the election of Néstor Kirchner and his option to reconstruct the

country's industrial park on a protective basis, the outlook for arriving at an agreement was made more difficult, with greater resistance also in the Argentinean government.

- ¹⁶ Although there were converging expectations on many of the region's topics between the EU and Brazil, the Brazilian government deemed that joint action would neither be necessary nor desirable. Brazil has behaved independently with its neighbors, and a tacit alliance with the EU could give rise to suspicions and jeopardize its rising leadership in the region.
- ¹⁷ Janaína Figueiredo – Argentina mira no petróleo das Malvinas, *O Globo*, March 16, 2012, p.34 – mentions an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil, allowing Argentina to cease importing oil.
- ¹⁸ April 2, the commemoration date in honor of the war's casualties, was the day on which the Argentinean military disembarked on the islands. July 14 marks the end of hostilities.
- ¹⁹ See ROMERO, Luis Alberto, ¿Son realmente nuestras las Malvinas? *La Nación*, February 14, 2012.
- ²⁰ And as UNASUR's member countries support Argentinean sovereignty over the islands, a higher profile support would be the most likely.
- ²¹ From the viewpoint of games at two levels – PUTNAM, Robert. D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two level games. *International Organization* vol. 42 n. 3, summer 1988, p.427-460 – domestic commitment to the subject encouraged by the government itself would leave scarce space for maneuvering in international discussions. Hence, this scenario may cause embarrassment to overseas partners.
- ²² Though not admitted as such, the Prince's presence in the Malvinas (Falklands) immediately prior to the war's 30th anniversary may not be coincidental.
- ²³ A team of specialists was formed for this purpose.
- ²⁴ The government also sought support from outside the continent, as in the trip by chancellor Timerman to Africa.
- ²⁵ On what is deemed "unlawful," see ver Declaración del Consejo de Ministras e Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de UNASUR sobre la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas. Available at: http://unasurg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=568:declaracion-de-malvinas-asuncion-marzo-2012&catid=96:declaraciones.
- ²⁶ See for example, "Uruguay no apoya um bloqueo comercial a las islas Malvinas", *La Nación*, March 29, 2010 (available at <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1460478-uruguay-no-apoya-un-bloqueo-comercial-a-las-islas-malvinas>) and the statement by González Núñez, head of the Paraguayan delegation in the MERCOSUR parliament (available at: http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/v/6133/1/secretaria/pronunciamiento_del_parlamentario_gonzalez_nunez_sobre_las_islas_malvinas.html).
- ²⁷ In Notes to the Press, in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' site www.itamaraty.gov.br between February and March, when the Malvinas (Falklands) issue gained importance in regional mechanisms, the term Malvinas (Falklands) appears not even once.
- ²⁸ See the interview with Vicente Palermo, "Tática de Cristina leva país a beco sem saída." *O Estado de São Paulo*, April 1, 2012, p. A19.
- ²⁹ A number of articles were published in Brazilian newspapers during February and March on this topic.
- ³⁰ In relative terms, European investments have already declined following the economic crisis in late 2001.
- ³¹ Albeit in trade terms the EU has had a deficit in recent years. Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113344.pdf
- ³² See "Diplomacia cada vez mais agressiva", *O Globo*, April 1, 2012, p. 43.
- ³³ The United Kingdom conditions any agreements to compliance to the will by Malvinas (Falklands) inhabitants for remaining British, and Argentina, despite the alleged invitation for talks, conditions any initial dialogue to the prior acceptance of Argentinean sovereignty over the islands.