



# IX Conference of Forte de Copacabana International Security A European-South American Dialogue

**Security and Responsibility  
in a Multipolar World**

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## Introduction

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This year's International Security Conference "Forte de Copacabana" takes place under the banner of "Responsibility and Security in a Multipolar World". A title that unites three key themes in international security debates. As the process of redistribution of power in the international system continues, established as well as emerging powers must share the responsibility in providing security to a restive world. This in turn will enable prosperity for all. As in all times, security remains paramount as a facilitator for all human progress.

In last year's edition of this publication, the introductory essay referred to an arc of instability that spans from the horn of Africa to the Hindu Kush. Unfortunately, this trend continues to accelerate. Agents of disorder have thrived in the climate of uncertainty and turmoil, and have further expanded this arc of instability, now encompassing regions as far as Mali in Western Africa, all the way to South East Asia.

One of the most fascinating but also unpredictable catalysts for change in recent history has of course been the "Arab Spring". At first this event of historical dimensions was greeted with enthusiasm, many a spectator saw in it the triumph of the legitimate desire for freedom over the tyranny of oppression. The deterministic premise of the Enlightenment that liberty must be the natural endpoint of the historical process seemed back in vogue. The young dynamic leaders that emerged at the revolutions' outset all over the Muslim world, who used Facebook and Twitter to organize and coordinate the demonstrations which eventually lead to general uprisings and downfalls of authoritarian governments appeared frequently in global media out-

lets suggesting that the upheavals would soon ebb away, leaving in its wake States molded on universal ideals of freedom, tolerance and inclusion. However, this once heroic narrative was quickly stained by stories of terror and despair.

In Libya the downfall of Colonel Gaddafi resulted not only in surprisingly peaceful elections – the first in over 40 years – but also in the proliferation of arms and battle hardened soldiers throughout the region. This in turn led to the disintegration of already weakened Mali and the proclamation of a jihadist state in the heart of Western Africa. Thousands have since perished, many more have fled. Further to the East, on the Arabian Peninsula, a power struggle between several contenders is being fought out. Its flashpoint is set for now on Syria, where an initially peaceful uprising has evolved into a proxy war, with powerful players backing different sides. The patterns of this conflict resembles, with each passing day more, the terrible past of Lebanon: a sectarian war, where one does not fight for one's convictions but is judged and bound by sectarian and ethnic identities. Fear of a potential spill over of the conflict into neighboring countries is rising in the region.

While it is not clear where the “Arab Spring” might lead us yet, it must be clear that spreading instability challenges the very workings of the international system. In trying to understand the correlation between security and prosperity, a glance back in history might be of use. In the opening parts of the 18<sup>th</sup> century epic work “The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”, Edward Gibbon attempted to answer the question, where and when might have been the happiest place and time in the history of mankind, concluding that it was Rome in the second century AD. In this judgment he was influenced by what he read in the writings of the Roman historian Tacitus, who lived through these times. Tacitus had complained that there had been no great military deeds for the last few generations for him to write about, so solidly entrenched were peace and security within his world; its border regions secured through complex networks of alliances and defensive pacts.

In Tacitus' time, security brought peace and prosperity. Extensive road systems and shipping lanes would allow for sophisticated trade and commerce networks. Metals mined in Britain were exchanged for olive oil and wine from southern Europe. Surplus food production from Egypt would feed more specialized professionals in the growing cities of the continent. From Lisbon through Rome and Constantinople, and from Alexandria to London, craftsmen, artisans and philosophers could focus on their particular trades, create the wonders of their times, some of which we marvel at even today.

In the fifth century this world of affluence was put to the sword and was not to rise again until more than a thousand years thereafter. Goth, Vandals, Franks and other ferocious barbarian tribes took control of the West and roamed the lands in search of blood and plunder. Trade and commerce crumbled and so did prosperity. Soon the once proud cities were depleted of people. Millions perished. The dark ages had arrived; a Hobbesian World had taken hold, where man was wolf to man:

In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; [...] the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Thomas Hobbes, the Leviathan, Book I, Chapter XIII

This conditionality that there must be security for industry and trade to flourish and in turn to render prosperity and progress holds true for our own times. Our times are defined by sovereign nations that agree on global institutions through which cooperation and dialogue are facilitated and disagreements are resolved peacefully, all based on an ever expanding framework of international law. It is this fertile soil on which globalization and modernity sprouts, making life for seven and more billion people possible.

Never has the world been more interlinked. Raw materials are mined in Australia or Brazil, from where they are shipped by Indian or Greek shipping companies to industrial sites in China or Germany. Once arrived at their destinations, the raw materials are processed and turned into our everyday goods - designed at again other locations, for example in the USA or Sweden - that make our modern civilization work. However, such a constellation also means that once one link in this global production chain is obstructed, the whole of the world may feel the consequences. What happens on one side of the globe can have a direct impact on the point most distant to it, there is no *far-away* anymore. The escalating struggle in the South China Sea may leave a price hike for advanced information technology in its wake; increased pirate activities around the Horn of Africa might lead to hungry bellies in Sub Saharan Africa; a closure of the Straits of Hormuz would skyrocket oil prices and thus be felt by each and every woman and man on our planet.

Fortunately, the society of states does not stand idle. Motivated by the understanding that security and stability must be guaranteed, paired with a strengthened will to stand up on behalf of whole populations in the face of slaughter, action has been taken whenever possible. The UN mandated intervention in the Ivory Coast was able to secure repose for that country by avoiding a bloodbath; naval deployments around Somalia have thwarted the further expansion of piracy in that area, and all around the world the international community is present in post conflict areas, providing assistance in the quest to build up new stable political and societal entities. However, whether these and other measures are enough must be put under scrutiny. Disagreements in the councils of power and action in favor of perceived national interests by some members of the global community have too often obstructed necessary development. And while some members of the international community have been more active in providing resources, other powers that equally depend on a stable world order have so far not committed themselves.

As mankind progresses through world history, ever into the unknown, it must be in the interest of all to define it's course, to weather storms and to evade perils. South America and Europe find themselves in relative fortunate situations, with no hot conflicts on their territories. But their security also depends on the security of others. The resolution of the above described challenges also depends on their continued commitment. It is under this premise that the International Security Conference Forte de Copacabana opens its doors each year, to provide a forum for specialists as well as the interested public from both sides of the Atlantic, to identify challenges and to discuss possible solutions. This book is anchored in the debates that come about within the conference and is designed to further promote dialogue and mutual understanding. This year we have slightly modified our concept, by providing a platform for participants of last year's conference as well as for those debating on this years gathering. Thus combining the intellectual products of the VIII and the IX conference in one volume.





## **The impact of the resurging Malvinas (Falklands) issue on South American and European Union relations**

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The “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” is in itself an important issue which pervades the historical relations between Europe and Latin America.<sup>1</sup> During the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the islands had already given rise to official positions in the region in support to Argentina’s claim, albeit with no impacts in diplomatic circles. However, the issue lay dormant as a potential mechanism to produce controversies and friction: a belief by the majority of Argentinean foreign policy makers that the islands, occupied by inhabitants of a British background, were within the bounds of Argentinean sovereignty. Nonetheless, until the 1960s the issue alternated between periods of greater importance in the country’s foreign policy agenda and its actions in the United Nations, and moments during which the topic remained dormant; yet in general without causing any adverse outcome in Argentina – United Kingdom relations.

In 1964 the Argentinean representative in the United Nations put forth the historical and legal foundations of Argentina’s claim, which stressed the jurisdictional position assumed by that country and encouraged a debate within the Organization’s sphere. In the following year a resolution was passed inviting both countries to discuss the islands’ sovereignty issues, bearing in mind the inhabitants’ interests. Interpretation of the resolution by both countries’ diplomats was not identical: the Argentinean government understood in this case that the principle of self-determination by the people was not applicable.<sup>2</sup>

The United Nations' resolution encouraged the start of a series of negotiations between both countries, formal ones as well as those involving specific projects. By 1982 several cooperation actions on specific subjects and with regard to contacts between the Malvinas (Falklands) and the continent had advanced. But the Argentinean interpretation of self-determination made it difficult to discuss sovereignty issues.

In 1982, owing to reasons basically of a domestic nature that had been very much considered and based on misconceptions by the Argentinean government, the latter put an end to the negotiations and invasion of the islands took place on April 2. Occupation of Stanley by Argentina cut short the tenuous progress of cooperation between the islands and the continent, and besides the surprise gave rise to the need by other Latin American countries to take a position of support or rejection of the Argentinean claim. Albeit unexpectedly for the makers of Argentinean foreign policy – or the supporters of war – the United Kingdom reacted, also owing to a number of factors which included its domestic policy, and certainly with a great deal more military resources.<sup>3</sup> Following an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the United States, which had good relations with the military government, selected to support the United Kingdom, its key international ally, at a time when the political affinities between President Reagan and Margareth Thatcher were at their best, and after all, Argentina had caused this confrontation.

However, the circumstances in the region at that time favored Argentina. In 1982 the region's countries were undergoing the first consequences of rising interest rates in the US financial market, and their respective economies were unable to create a response to the crisis (and here began the so-called "lost decade"). In political terms, the transition to the 1980s combined efforts to diversify partners by the region's countries, with the progressive weakening of the Organization of American States (OAS) and with stress on East-West relations by US foreign policy. This fact placed the Cold War back in the center of international attention and enfeebled actions by third-world countries. Under this scenario, efforts for joint actions by the region's countries were being devised and resulted in the creation of ALADI in 1980.<sup>4</sup>

Support to Argentina, calling on the parties to negotiate and on Great Britain to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty on the islands was at that time expressed by a number of countries. The region's countries opted for a conduct opposed to that by the US, and the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (TIAR), of no practical application, was not employed and became definitely ineffective. In turn, the then European Community (EC) countries put in practice with Argentina an economic embargo by the Commission as part of its foreign policy. The Argentinean embargo was put in practice and the meetings by GRULA (the Brussels Latin American Group, composed of ambassadors from the region's countries) with the CE's Committee of Permanent Representatives were curtailed.<sup>5</sup> The subsequent talks were fruitless, as the issue of sovereignty was removed from all the talks' agendas, and the United Kingdom invested in the political integration and economic strengthening of the local population.

The current scenario is totally different from 30 years ago, yet a number of items persist to this day. The “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” continues alive; the distance between the region’s countries and the United States has reappeared. But the international order is no longer bipolar; the idea of South America has been overriding the concept of Latin America; there are clear integration and cooperation efforts in the South American subcontinent headed in first place by Brazilian diplomacy; during these years Argentina has consolidated an important partnership with Brazil under the MERCOSUR banner. And negotiations aiming at an association by MERCOSUR with the European Union have faced a dilemma on whether to be curtailed once again or to conclude with a minimal agreement, full of exceptions.

The objective here is to look into the importance of the resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue, 30 years after occupation of the islands by Argentinean troops, for the political and security dimensions of South American and European Union relations. The decision that assigns South America as an area of importance is due to the fact that its integration actions – such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR<sup>6</sup> – are currently the chief venue for involvement by the region’s countries in devising joint actions as well as for developing relations with countries outside the region.

## Developments following 1982

After the war’s end and the armistice, the islands’ political and strategic status changed. Concern over the repetition of belligerence was instrumental for the United Kingdom to create a local military base, with a large number of soldiers and new weapons.<sup>7</sup> But on the other hand, military cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has increased and in 1986 the South Atlantic was decreed to be a Peace and Cooperation Zone (the ZOPACAS) by 24 South American and African governments. Without mentioning, however, the status of the islands.<sup>8</sup> Within a geopolitical viewpoint, the presence of English weapons on the islands could be seen as an imbalance in the region’s security. However, in terms of South America, the issue was not included in the agenda. Neighboring countries continued to support Argentina’s entitlement to the islands’ sovereignty, yet this topic had no space in regional talks. The government of Carlos Menem sought to restore several cooperation bonds with the islands’ inhabitants by means of a “seduction policy” by chancellor Guido di Tella, but to no avail.<sup>9</sup> In practice, efforts to encourage closer relations were curtailed at the end of his government and the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” again assumed a more challenging status in the Argentinean government agenda.

With regard to relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, in 1986 the government of the former suspended the embargo on Argentinean goods and in 1990 diplomatic relations were restored between both nations. However, the British government made investments in the local economy of the Malvinas (Falklands), and in 1983 the inhabitants were granted British citizenship. Since then, the outlook for resuming warfare by Argentina, from the local viewpoint, appears as a Sword of Damocles as well as a justification for receiving benefits from London.<sup>10</sup> In 1985 the United Nations’ General Assembly approved a resolution encouraging both countries to negotiate, and other resolutions fol-

lowed from the Committee on Decolonization. Yet these were not put into practice: the differences of opinion regarding the right to self-determination by the islands' inhabitants blocked progress of all sorts of negotiations between both countries.

The creation of MERCOSUR in 1991 encouraged closer relations by Argentina and neighboring countries. In the course of bilateral relations with Brazil and despite the difficulties in agreeing on common foreign policy actions and joint positions within the OAS, and the different views by both countries on the international scenario, there were important advances in other dimensions as in terms of defending democracy. Business growth was brisk in the field of intra-block trade, with interdependence among the member states. In 1997 both presidents declared a strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina. On this occasion direct dealings on the Malvinas (Falklands) were not included in the bilateral agenda. The latter was basically restricted to military considerations, in particular by means of war studies. There were advances and actions during the decade involving military cooperation, which resulted in joint bilateral maneuvers but did not include discussions on the subject. From the Brazilian angle, there was greater interest on the specifics of the war experience.

In connection with European Union relations, in the framework of inter-regionalism, the creation of MERCOSUR attracted attention from Europe; expectations that arose in the Committee with regard to its political as well as economic development were expressive. In turn, MERCOSUR countries demonstrated a clear interest in negotiating a cooperation agreement with the EC. In 1992 an inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement was undersigned by both parties and in 1995 the Inter-regional Cooperation Agreement was executed. The agreement included liberalizing trade, economic cooperation, and political dialogue. Although the talks to liberalize trade were difficult, in politics the spaces made available by the Agreement were opportune and the talks moved ahead despite the absence of an initial institutionalization. The explicit driver of the political relations between both blocks during the period were the values shared, defended in international regimes. During this time, which coincided with president Carlos Menem holding office, the Malvinas (Falklands) issue did not serve as an obstacle to the development of inter-regional relations, and it did not find a place in the agenda of talks between both blocks.

During the 1990s the European Union also maintained the EU-Group of Rio political talks, and in 1999 the EU-Latin America and Caribbean (EU-LAC) talks started. In neither of these cases did the Malvinas (Falklands) enter the agenda. The issue was limited to the bilateral relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Also in the Latin American regional framework – represented above all in the Group of Rio – the issue acquired a low profile.

As of the year 2000 there were a number of changes in the region's dynamics, within Argentina and in the European Union's relations with MERCOSUR, which gave way to opportunities for the Malvinas (Falklands) issue to reappear and to be included in the regional agenda. In political terms, several economically anti-liberal governments were elected consecutively in South America, which sought to put in place new bases for their



respective countries' political systems. In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner's election was equal to a renewal of the political framework: Human rights policy, foreign policy, and social policies among others were reformulated in conformity with the region's progressive governments. In connection with the domestic economy, Kirchner adopted a heterodox neo-developmental strategy which sought to put in place a more active industrial policy in order to recover the country's industrial park. The Cristina Kirchner government was a continuation of the preceding government. Under this framework, relations with the United Kingdom were remote.<sup>11</sup>

In regional terms, in 2000 the first meeting of South American countries took place in Brasília in order to form the South American Community of Nations (CASA), during which the chief ideas under discussion were economic integration and the region's infrastructure, and the encouragement of democratic systems.<sup>12</sup> CASA inaugurated a new stage in the region's dynamics, stressing a clear South American dimension in the Latin American structure and at the same time encouraging a number of regional integration actions such as IIRSA<sup>13</sup> and in 2008 the conversion of CASA into UNASUR. In 2002 the election of Lula da Silva in Brazil caused impacts on the regional dynamics. Foreign policy during the Lula government considered it a political priority to rearrange South America under Brazilian leadership, and this would be possible based on a cooperative, developmental, and politically progressive viewpoint.

UNASUR gradually assumed an important role as a consensus mechanism, aligning the views of the region's countries. It played an important role when facing continental crisis situations; whether of domestic policy (as in Bolivia) or border relations (as between Venezuela and Colombia). The creation of the South American Defense Council within its scope, under Brazilian government initiative, has contributed to closer relations among

the region's countries in the military sphere, and has also placed Brazil in the center of the regional security agenda.<sup>14</sup> The Malvinas (Falklands) issue in itself was not highly stressed but was included in the organization's agenda since its creation. The military issue of British presence was recognized by the member countries and the positions held were in defense of Argentina's right to negotiate in its favor the islands' sovereignty, in addition to the importance of these talks being peaceful. Overall, the British presence in the South Atlantic and issues with regard to Antarctic exploration and to sea resources – of greater weight following oil discoveries – were sources for the organization's concern.

Regarding relations between MERCOSUR and the European Union, the 1990s standards were maintained until the middle of the decade. But in 2004, with Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner already holding office as presidents of the two major partners, commercial negotiations were suspended.<sup>15</sup> Political cooperation and dialogue actions proceeded, but the partial admission of Venezuela into the block in 2006 and the strategic partnership entered into with Brazil in 2007 created obstacles to dialogue. The partnership implied playing down inter-regional relations in political dialogue and cooperation, and the Argentinean government made its dissatisfaction clear with the EU. With regard to the relations between the EU and Latin America, the twice-yearly summits were maintained, but growing Brazilian presence in the region and UNASUR's development as the sub-region's chief interaction mechanism played down the meetings. The absence of a North American policy for the continent led to greater independence by the regional players, which sought out their own alternatives for regional organization and international insertion.<sup>16</sup>

## **Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue**

In early 2012 the Argentinean government decided to revive the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue.” A number of circumstances could have encouraged this decision. Firstly, in recent years oil was discovered in the sea close to the islands; and in 2010 future exploration started to be planned.<sup>17</sup> This would give rise to new prospects for gains to the Argentinean government. Soon after, the United Kingdom renewed its airplane and warship fleet, which created distrust in the Argentinean government as to the purpose of these weapons. Thirdly, this year it has been 30 years since the conflict and the date of the Argentinean invasion is being remembered with a commemoration.<sup>18</sup> Domestically in Argentina, the “Malvinas (Falklands) issue” symbolizes the legacy of territorial nationalism and acts as a mechanism that rallies society's different sectors around the government.<sup>19</sup> The current consolidated situation is also important, with its South American integration / cooperation mechanisms and the accepted practice of a consensus. This allows UNASUR to act as a strong support mechanism, should its member countries consider it important, for Argentina's claims.<sup>20</sup> Finally, the distant relations between Argentina and the European Union, marked by Argentinean disappointment over the strategic partnership entered into between the EU and Brazil, the end of inter-regional political talks, and difficulties in trade discussions in view of Argentinean protectionism.

Argentina's domestic actions and debates on the Malvinas (Falklands) issue cannot be construed simply as a foreign policy matter, as two dimensions are involved. On the one

hand, they refer to something outside the country's borders and assume an objective and action strategy to face overseas players (whether key players such as the United Kingdom or partners from which support is sought). Yet on the other hand, they refer to the country's domestic policy. Citizens and electors are mobilized, different spheres of the government's structure are involved, and enormous emphasis is created by the press. The constitutional reform in Argentina approved in 1994 included in its text restoration of Argentinean sovereignty over the islands by peaceful means, as a permanent goal by the country. These two sides of the same coin make it difficult to understand them within what would be strictly a diplomatic procedure, and explain the difficulties that action by Argentina is likely to produce for the European Union and regional partners.<sup>21</sup>

The start of Argentina's domestic campaign was followed by a number of attitudes intended for the islands and the United Kingdom as well as for South America in general. Regarding the Malvinas (Falklands) themselves, the Argentinean government took action at two levels. It first clearly criticized through diplomatic circles and accused the United Kingdom of encouraging an arms race in the South Atlantic, including stationing a nuclear submarine in the islands, contrary to ZOPACAS principles. And then it harshly criticized the presence of Prince William on the islands from January to June 2012.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, it launched a vigorous campaign to isolate the islands' inhabitants from the South American continent, following a strangling maneuver.

Domestically, preparations began for the April 2 commemoration. President Cristina Kirchner made a speech regarding the islands, stressing Argentinean sovereignty and seeking support from all the political authorities. Demonstrations were held to ratify the lawful sovereignty by Argentina over the islands, in addition to protests against cruise ships that had passed by the Malvinas (Falklands). The president had proposed putting in place direct flights from Buenos Aires to the Malvinas (Falklands), rejected by the local inhabitants. The government also persuaded major Argentinean corporations not to import British goods. English reaction was soon felt: a complaint was lodged with the European Union, which stated that it had begun the appropriate diplomatic procedures to solve this trade dispute. Soon afterwards the president requested support from UNASUR for its disputes with the United Kingdom.

The controversy progressed throughout March. In view of the statements by the EU, the Argentinean government issued veiled criticisms against the latter in connection with its "silence" after the British refusal to negotiate the islands' sovereignty with Argentina, and for bringing modern weaponry to its military base. Soon after, president Cristina Kirchner threatened to file lawsuits against companies that did business with oil exploration companies in Malvinas (Falklands) waters, as well as against the oil companies themselves, including investment banks, service providers, and others.<sup>23</sup> The islands' residents reacted and accused the Argentinean government of aiming to disrupt the local economy.

The Argentinean government sought outside support for its actions. Its chief strategy, which proved successful, was to highlight the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in the regional agenda.<sup>24</sup> During the MERCOSUR presidents' summit in December 2011, it requested and

obtained approval for a declaration that restricts access by ships bearing the Malvinas (Falklands) flag to any of the block's ports. UNASUR made statements defending the right by Argentina to sovereignty over the islands, and expressed concern with the traffic of British ships in the South Atlantic. In mid-March in a UNASUR meeting held in Asuncion, approval was given to restrict entry of ships with Malvinas (Falklands) flags – “unlawful” – into ports of South American countries.<sup>25</sup> Following this restriction, Cristina Kirchner visited Chile in order to reaffirm support, and the Peruvian government cancelled the visit of an English frigate to its seaports in late March. This same Declaration stressed concern with the exploration of “Argentina’s” natural resources by the United Kingdom and pointed to the need for the British government to conclude negotiations with Argentina as soon as possible.

### **The topic’s regional dimension and the impacts on relations with the European Union**

Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue led to impacts on inter-regional relations as well as those between South America and the European Union. Having no doubts regarding support from its regional partners to sovereignty over the islands, the aggressive diplomacy adopted by Argentina – jointly with trade barriers recently put in place by Cristina Kirchner’s government – produced a certain discomfort among its neighbors.

In first place, in the commercial area Argentina’s relations with its neighbors have deteriorated owing to the numerous trade barriers that the government has raised in order to defend and encourage development of its domestic industrial park. This topic has been treated together with the Argentinean claim for sovereignty over the islands. Blockading the islands’ economy has started to raise criticisms and thoughts by minor MERCOSUR members, of a more economic nature such as by Uruguay, and of a territorial nature as in the case of the block’s Paraguayan delegation.<sup>26</sup> In second place, Brazil’s relations with European countries and the United Kingdom have their own dynamics and Brazilian diplomacy has no interest in endangering them.<sup>27</sup>





To make things worse, Argentinean behavior does not point to any solutions in the short run. UNASUR's South American Defense Council was created with the purpose of managing articulations and common interests in a framework of peace, and an outlook of regional conflict involving an outside player may lead to friction. On the other hand, reaction by the islands' inhabitants is not indifferent. To the contrary, in the light of war memories and incisive diplomacy by the Argentinean foreign office, local willingness to cooperate is reduced.<sup>28</sup> Currently life on the islands is organized under strictly British standards and fear of contacts with Argentina is great.<sup>29</sup>

With regard to the impact on relations with the European Union by Argentina, United Kingdom relations tend to deteriorate even more with the Malvinas (Falklands) issue as priority in the bilateral agenda. The British government in turn has adopted a vigorous defensive behavior in a campaign disclosing the lifestyle and preferences of the islands' inhabitants, placing emphasis on their right to self-determination. To make things worse, economic relations have also become complex. If on the one hand the Argentinean government has mentioned a boycott on British goods, in practice its protectionism has affected foreign trade as a whole, giving way to estimates of difficult times in this area.

The outlook is also somber regarding Argentina's relations with the European Union. In addition to traditional problems with claims from Brazil, negotiations between MERCOSUR and EU are facing obstacles created by the Argentinean government. And the domestic industrial park's reconstruction project is a long-term plan. On the other hand, the Euro countries are undergoing a critical economic spell, which limits their ability to assume a leading position in the economic area and to provide Argentina with what is most required by South American partners: investments.<sup>30</sup> The strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil continues – albeit less vigorously – and political dialogue with MERCOSUR which included Argentina is now restricted to business rounds aimed at molding a free trade agreement. These dealings are under way, though with scarcely expressive progress. Argentina's main partner in Europe, Spain, is undergoing a severe economic crisis and therefore its priorities are now domestic. The EU has little to offer Argentina, which has little to lose with the weakened relations between both of them.<sup>31</sup>

In inter-regional terms, UNASUR has adopted numerous moves to regionalize the matter. UNASUR's decision to veto traffic by ships bearing the Malvinas (Falklands) flag in member countries' territorial waters was severe, and the United Kingdom showed its discomfort by referring to this as "hardly friendly and disappointing".<sup>32</sup> From a British viewpoint, the plan of sending a warship to the British base on the islands is in effect and should give rise to a position by the organization. Nonetheless, in political terms there is no direct channel for dialogue between UNASUR and the European Union; interaction by both takes place during the EU and Latin America and Caribbean summits. The next meeting is planned to be held in Chile this coming June, and most likely Argentina will attempt to include the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in the agenda. But this topic tends to be more diluted when brought up in EU-LAC summits.

## Final considerations

In general, EU - South America relations are not at their best. The financial crisis in Europe; elections for a number of heads of government in the region, with neo-developmental ideas; difficulties in trade owing to preservation of protectionist rules by both sides; an emphatic South American dimension not organized to maintain communications channels with the EU, are items that create new challenges for bi-regionalism.

Resurgence of the Malvinas (Falklands) issue should give rise to a new area of friction between both regions, yet this will be the lesser of several impacts among the above-mentioned challenges. The absence of a willingness to communicate by Argentina as well as by the United Kingdom will bring problems to other European and South American partners in their respective regional environment and bi-regional framework, and will also create barriers to solve the problem.<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, the bilateral and inter-regional relations, molded over a longer term, will remain within the standards of recent years.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The Malvinas (Falklands) issue is the claim by Argentina of sovereignty over the archipelago in the South Atlantic, allegedly converted into a longing by every Argentinean, defended with intensity and placed among key foreign policy objectives. For this topic, refer to PALERMO, Vicente, *Sal en las heridas. Las Malvinas en la cultura argentina contemporánea*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2007.
- <sup>2</sup> The Argentinean government did not accept application of the principle of self-determination by the Malvinas' (Falklands') inhabitants and counter-argued with the "territorial integrity principle."
- <sup>3</sup> It is interesting to note that while the Argentinean military government was already living its final moments and with the war it sought to obtain the people's support and the resulting survival, the British government was in the midst of an election campaign with scarce approval rates, and the people's support due to nationalism could equally be a successful tool.
- <sup>4</sup> Latin American Integration Association.
- <sup>5</sup> But restored only in 1989, when consular relations were reestablished between Argentina and the United Kingdom.
- <sup>6</sup> Common Market of the South and Union of South American Nations.
- <sup>7</sup> The end of hostilities by Argentina was decreed only during the Menem government.
- <sup>8</sup> The Resolution (UNO 41/11 dated October 24, 1986) refers to the importance of military-significant countries respecting the peace zone. More directly, the only ones mentioned were Apartheid in South Africa and the need for Namibia's independence. Available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/495/19/IMG/NR049519.pdf?OpenElement>.
- <sup>9</sup> These actions occurred based on an agreement that placed reservations on the sovereignty issue.
- <sup>10</sup> The memories of war are always a painful legacy for the inhabitants of the war theater. This dimension is rarely recalled in debates on the Malvinas (Falklands) issue in South America.
- <sup>11</sup> During the Cristina Kirchner government Argentina had no ambassador in London, having in place only a business attaché.
- <sup>12</sup> CASA was formalized in 2004.
- <sup>13</sup> Initiative for Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure.
- <sup>14</sup> On this topic, see MERKE, Federico, *A América do Sul e a agenda de segurança hemisférica: o desafio das assimetrias*. In: *Segurança Internacional: um diálogo Europa-América do Sul*. Rio de Janeiro, Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2008, p.34-45.
- <sup>15</sup> During the negotiating procedures the EU was not overly concerned in complying with MERCOSUR's key area of interest, for opening their agricultural markets to the block's exports. The Brazilian government in turn did not make concessions to European claims for opening the domestic market to high-technology goods and for authorizing participation by overseas companies in public bids. As of the election of Néstor Kirchner and his option to reconstruct the

country's industrial park on a protective basis, the outlook for arriving at an agreement was made more difficult, with greater resistance also in the Argentinean government.

- <sup>16</sup> Although there were converging expectations on many of the region's topics between the EU and Brazil, the Brazilian government deemed that joint action would neither be necessary nor desirable. Brazil has behaved independently with its neighbors, and a tacit alliance with the EU could give rise to suspicions and jeopardize its rising leadership in the region.
- <sup>17</sup> Janaína Figueiredo – Argentina mira no petróleo das Malvinas, *O Globo*, March 16, 2012, p.34 – mentions an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil, allowing Argentina to cease importing oil.
- <sup>18</sup> April 2, the commemoration date in honor of the war's casualties, was the day on which the Argentinean military disembarked on the islands. July 14 marks the end of hostilities.
- <sup>19</sup> See ROMERO, Luis Alberto, ¿Son realmente nuestras las Malvinas? *La Nación*, February 14, 2012.
- <sup>20</sup> And as UNASUR's member countries support Argentinean sovereignty over the islands, a higher profile support would be the most likely.
- <sup>21</sup> From the viewpoint of games at two levels – PUTNAM, Robert. D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two level games. *International Organization* vol. 42 n. 3, summer 1988, p.427-460 – domestic commitment to the subject encouraged by the government itself would leave scarce space for maneuvering in international discussions. Hence, this scenario may cause embarrassment to overseas partners.
- <sup>22</sup> Though not admitted as such, the Prince's presence in the Malvinas (Falklands) immediately prior to the war's 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary may not be coincidental.
- <sup>23</sup> A team of specialists was formed for this purpose.
- <sup>24</sup> The government also sought support from outside the continent, as in the trip by chancellor Timerman to Africa.
- <sup>25</sup> On what is deemed "unlawful," see ver Declaración del Consejo de Ministras e Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de UNASUR sobre la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas. Available at: [http://unasursg.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=568:declaracion-de-malvinas-asuncion-marzo-2012&catid=96:declaraciones](http://unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=568:declaracion-de-malvinas-asuncion-marzo-2012&catid=96:declaraciones).
- <sup>26</sup> See for example, "Uruguay no apoya um bloqueo comercial a las islas Malvinas", *La Nación*, March 29, 2010 (available at <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1460478-uruguay-no-apoya-un-bloqueo-comercial-a-las-islas-malvinas>) and the statement by González Núñez, head of the Paraguayan delegation in the MERCOSUR parliament (available at: [http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/v/6133/1/secretaria/pronunciamiento\\_del\\_parlamentario\\_gonzalez\\_nunez\\_sobre\\_las\\_islas\\_malvinas.html](http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/v/6133/1/secretaria/pronunciamiento_del_parlamentario_gonzalez_nunez_sobre_las_islas_malvinas.html)).
- <sup>27</sup> In Notes to the Press, in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' site [www.itamaraty.gov.br](http://www.itamaraty.gov.br) between February and March, when the Malvinas (Falklands) issue gained importance in regional mechanisms, the term Malvinas (Falklands) appears not even once.
- <sup>28</sup> See the interview with Vicente Palermo, "Tática de Cristina leva país a beco sem saída." *O Estado de São Paulo*, April 1, 2012, p. A19.
- <sup>29</sup> A number of articles were published in Brazilian newspapers during February and March on this topic.
- <sup>30</sup> In relative terms, European investments have already declined following the economic crisis in late 2001.
- <sup>31</sup> Albeit in trade terms the EU has had a deficit in recent years. Available at [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc\\_113344.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113344.pdf)
- <sup>32</sup> See "Diplomacia cada vez mais agressiva", *O Globo*, April 1, 2012, p. 43.
- <sup>33</sup> The United Kingdom conditions any agreements to compliance to the will by Malvinas (Falklands) inhabitants for remaining British, and Argentina, despite the alleged invitation for talks, conditions any initial dialogue to the prior acceptance of Argentinean sovereignty over the islands.



## Maritime situational awareness

The chilean approach named  
“vigilancia, control, alerta y respuesta”

Ivan Valenzuela

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### I. Introduction

*New topics in the international security agenda*

There is no doubt that the concept of international security is no longer a matter of concern only for the National States authorities, Governmental Institutions, or for those organizations responsible for the security of the national citizens, such as Police Organizations, Bureau of Investigations and other law enforcement agencies.

Today, the concept of security and international security is a matter of major concern for the common people. The statistics regarding security matters show that the feelings of common people about insecurity in their houses, in the public transport services, in the metro, and in general, in all transport services, is one of the most relevant issues nowadays.

The reason is very clear, the feelings about insecurity are very powerful because they affect the core organization of the society which is the family, and this creates a need to have confidence in the institutions responsible for these matters. Thus, the same organizations and the top level authorities of the national states must have, as one of their most important duties, is to provide by all means possible, not only the proper organizations and institutions to ensure the security and protection of the people, but also, and more important, to make those people feel confident in these

institutions and feel that they can live peacefully and quietly as members of the national society.

Unfortunately, the modern world, the fast transfer of information, the possibility to be a witness of what is going on almost at the same time things are happening will represent, at the end, the first sign of threats to the security of the normal people, who will see in the images of reality, the various threats to their own security.

Earthquakes, storms, hurricanes, and all the list of natural catastrophes, are only part of the safety and security concerns of people. As we will see in this paper, the list of new topics in the international security agenda is very long, and there is no doubt that it will increase in the near future.

This paper intends to show a maritime view of this problem, how some of these threats together with the lack of governance have already converted democratic and prosperous countries into what we know now as “Failed States<sup>1</sup>”, and being the Chilean Navy responsible for running the Chilean Maritime Administration through the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine, it is the Chilean Navy and particularly this Directorate General, the institution responsible for the maritime safety and security issues in Chile.

#### *Brief description of the chilean maritime organization*

The Chilean Navy is under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, whom at the same time, depends on the President of the Republic.

The organizational structure of the Chilean Navy is built around five distinct bodies: The Directorate General of Logistics, the Directorate General of Personnel, the Directorate General of Finance, the Naval Operations Command, and the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine.

The latter, commonly known in the maritime community as DIRECTEMAR, is the naval body that acts, by virtue of the Law, as the National Maritime Authority in all national and international maritime activities carried out within its jurisdiction. Additionally, our staff has the power to oversee activities performed within our maritime territory, acting as Maritime Police.

DIRECTEMAR, in coordination with other State agencies, is responsible for promoting and controlling activities carried out by the maritime community.

According to the Chilean Navigation Act<sup>2</sup>, the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine is the National Maritime Authority and it is empowered to represent the Chilean State, at a national and international level, regarding maritime issues.



### *Mission*

DIRECTEMAR is the organization within the Chilean Navy through which the Government of Chile oversees the compliance of laws and international agreements presently in force in order to protect:

- Life at sea
- The marine environment
- Natural marine resources

and control the activities carried out within the maritime field under its jurisdiction, thus contributing to the maritime development of the nation.

### *Our vision*

Along with our Mission we have created the following Vision: “To be a maritime public service of excellence.” All our efforts, across the entire organization, are directed towards achieving this goal in such a way that the actions of all our naval personnel and civilian employees are guided by it.

## **II. MSA global challenges**

### *Threats to maritime trade operations*

In the beginning, threats to maritime trade operations were related to situations such as search and rescue, water pollution, maritime law enforcement and monitoring of daily maritime/fishing/coastal related activities.

Currently, the concept of “asymmetric threats” must be added; being sea banditry or robbery, terrorism, and piracy, the most common situations.

The maximum expression of terrorism in modern times occurred on September 11, 2001, with the attacks to the United States of America. Almost immediately after those tragic and criminal actions, the international community got organized to face the increasing terrorist threat, which was able to demonstrate its evil capability.

The response of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was fast, hard and determined, with the purpose of not allowing the international maritime transport to be an easy target for the international terrorism.

Criminal organizations, sea bandits, pirates and terrorists, use Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC s) for:

- Conducting illegal activities,
- Providing their own logistics, and
- Generating economic income.

Therefore, all States shall have a Global Maritime Situational Awareness, to prevent the use of sea lines of communication for illegal activities and terrorism.

Global challenges to maritime trade operations also include industrial fishing and pleasure boating. In other words, these are challenges to global stability.

From piracy to humanitarian operations, some involve illicit / criminal operators and some involve legal and governmental organizations.





The stability and governance of every country is affected by these threats against their Maritime Safety and Security.

- Piracy
- Drug dealing
- Illegal migration and slavery
- E.E.Z. (resources exploitation)
- Trade disruption
- Search and rescue
- Substandard vessels<sup>3</sup>
- Substandard crews<sup>4</sup>
- Criminal organizations
- Damage to the environment
- Political and religious extremism
- Terrorism
- Humanitarian operations

Lastly, the so-called “Social Networks,” such as Facebook, Twitter and other Internet social sites, have also been included in the list of threats to International Security, just because they can be used for illegal purposes against people, the governance and permanent institutions of the State. According to the gathered information from the Internet, there are more than 350 websites considered as social networks.

### III. Areas of confluence and choke points

#### *An international need of maritime situational awareness*

In this regard, it must be said that almost all states engaged in the international maritime trade are very concerned about these areas of confluence, because in most cases, the international trade represents the way through which countries like Chile base their own development.

There is no doubt about the importance of the international maritime trade for Chile, considering that the main destinations of our exports and imports transported by sea are within the Asia Pacific basin.

Another relevant consideration is that 91.1% of the Chilean cargo is transported by sea, representing 48% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

In addition to that, and considering that the Pacific Ocean concentrates more than 40% of the global population, generates 43% of world trade and produces 53% of global GDP, maritime shipping in this area is of utmost importance for the Chilean economy.

Our country is the third largest user of the Panama Channel, one of the most important areas of confluence and choke points in the world.

Based on the importance of these areas of confluence, there is an international need of maritime situational awareness, in order to have an effective control of the areas of navigation, to protect the valuable cargoes transported by sea, which represent a great interest for criminal organizations, not only for their value, but also for the possibility of hijacking the vessel and her crew members, requesting the payment of very high amounts of money for the liberation of people and the release of ships.

A Somalian Piracy Threat Map registering 2010 activities, shows that the piracy disrupting the maritime trade reaches far most of the territorial waters of the Horn of Africa, so a multilateral effort needs to continue while failed states maintain their status, otherwise the global economy may be affected.

#### *S.A.R. area of responsibility*

Based on the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, the coastal states usually consider as their Area of Jurisdiction, the 200 miles of Exclusive Economic Zone, in which the states have the right to protect their marine resources, such as fishing and seabed minerals.

In addition to that, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR 79), gives to some coastal states, the responsibility to establish Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers, in order to fulfill rescue operations in a defined Area, taking into account the organization, assets and facilities to run such operations.

The Chilean Maritime Search and Rescue area of responsibility, comprises 26,476,000 square kilometers and is legally based on the International Law of the Sea Convention, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS 74) and on the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR 79).

If we trace an imaginary line from Valparaíso to the West border of the search and rescue area of responsibility, the distance to be covered extends to 3,100 nautical miles.

If we compare the territorial continental area with the maritime area of responsibility, we can see that the latter is 35 times bigger than the land area, which shows the dimension of the efforts we have to make, especially when we think about SAR assignments.

It should be emphasized that in the areas and duties mentioned previously, the Chilean State, through the Navy, uses all means according to its operational capability in order to fulfill the tasks assigned.

SAR Area of Responsibility is not only for navigational seaworthiness purposes.

ISPS Code implementation makes for Chile this Area of Responsibility the place to monitor asymmetrical threats.

*Surveillance, control, alert and response - SCAR*  
*(vigilancia, control, alerta y respuesta) - VCAR*

We fulfill our duties incorporating a strategic perspective, which involves surveillance, control, alert and response of the Maritime Area of responsibility.

The Surveillance, Control, Alert and Response (SCAR) concept has been defined as: “the effective and timely awareness of all the activities carried out in the maritime, river and lake areas of responsibility and which may impact the national security and our maritime interests, in order to alert, prevent, protect and provide a prompt response in accordance with the requirements of our national interests.”

Therefore, DIRECTEMAR has nowadays different ways to obtain information on what is happening in its area of responsibility, such as through satellite communications, maritime patrolling, air maritime surveillance, automatic information systems, coastal radars and vessel traffic systems which provide the necessary information to obtain a clear surface picture of the situation within its jurisdiction

This is our Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) vision,  
...this is our Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) approach.

The SCAR / VACR Model is not different from other countries model for MSA and is based on the need of having a recognized maritime picture of the area of responsibility, and many times out of it, since the challenges and threats to maritime trade operations (MTO) are global as well.

So the more knowledge on the surface picture we have, the better response we can provide.

#### *Maritime Situational Awareness. C4 ROOM*

In order to fulfill the required control and to monitor both the area of jurisdiction and the area of responsibility, in the facilities of the Directorate for the Maritime Safety, Security and Operations of DIRECTEMAR, there is a special room equipped with state-of-the-art technology to allow the organization to monitor and analyze sea and inland waterways areas of responsibility, in order to provide Maritime Situational Awareness that could impact the maritime national interests.

The Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) operations room, keeps watch 24/7 over the entire area of responsibility and beyond, in order to foresee and generate a knowledge database for decision making upon any situation related to vessels of interest.

Among the capabilities, the room has different equipment for VHF and HF communications, real time video conference, real time video cameras connected to the different Chilean ports and areas of geographical interest, access to Internet, access to the Automatic Information System, access to Satellite Vessel Monitory System, access to the Global Mar-

itime Distress Safety System, to various databases and information data bases, satellite telephony and other state-of-the-art systems.

#### **IV. GRAFIMAR**

One of the most important assets in service in this moment is the Computer Platform called GRAFIMAR, which main characteristic is the integration of all the data provided by maritime authorities, particularly by the Captain of the Port's Offices, regarding the registry of merchant and fishing vessels, artisan fishing boats, maritime personnel, crew members of all vessels and boats under Chilean flag registry. It includes complete information regarding the vessel and the people onboard, which allow the organization to have real time information of all vessels operating in our jurisdiction and even of those vessels operating overseas under Chilean flag.

Grafimar is the result of more than 15 years of implementation, with the participation of very highly qualified technical personnel, specialized in information technologies. This software was developed within the organization with the participation of members of the maritime authority staff along the country, who have been for a very long time populating the databases with relevant information.

It is also capable of linking web-based maritime industry related portals to correlate data and produce valuable information for the decision making process.

Grafimar has many data sources, most of them are developed and managed by our organization, and some of them are purchased data from vendors.

- PRE ARRIVAL NOTIFICATION
- DEPARTURE & ARRIVAL SYSTEM
- S.I.A.N.
- L.R.I.T.
- MSSIS SeaVision (COASTAL AIS)
- INMARSAT POLLING
- AIR & SURFACE SURVEILLANCE
- MINI VTS SATATIONS (Lantano / Teseo)
- COSPAS-SARSAT EPIRB L.U.T.
- INTERNET WEB PORTALS
- INTERAMERICAN COOPERATION AGREEMENTS (Convenios Colco)
- AIS (SATELLITE) VIA WEB SERVICES
- V.M.S.
- REGIONAL PLEASURE AND FISHERMEN BOATING MOVEMENT SYSTEM
- CHILREP (QTH)
- AMVER
- CRT-AMAS
- DIRINMAR DATABASES
- REMIX / OASIS (IFC Singapore)

The use of different technologies has enabled our country, represented by DIRECTEMAR, to enhance its capabilities regarding the projection of its port and maritime presence, in which the use of GRAFIMAR should be highlighted. This system interacts with a group of source applications and allows to graphically display a dynamic vision of the surface picture in real time.

GRAFIMAR integrates and shares information to facilitate the analysis and decision making processes in keeping a secure and protected maritime trade, as well as all other activities related to life at sea.

In this way, it is possible to access external websites that are useful for intelligence purposes. In the same way, this application offers us the possibility to visualize the SAR area of responsibility corresponding to MRCC Chile, where we fulfill our duties related to control.

#### *Collection of AIS data using MSSIS*

Grafimar is a surface picture visualization tool that enables the Chilean Maritime Authority to make data mining on the numerous databases maintained by the Directorate General of Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine, Maritime Governors, Captain of the Ports and the two Technical Directorates established for: Maritime Safety, Security and Operations, and Maritime Interests and Aquatic Environment Protection.

This also allowed the organization to develop a GRAFIPUERTO version, which provides us information regarding the capabilities of every single port of our country, with logistics information including, among others, vessels that are operating in port, information about their crew and the ISPS Code requirements, and information regarding the stevedores operating in real time onboard those vessels.

It also shows real time closed circuit TV images, allowing the maritime authority to see what is happening in all port areas of our country.

GRAFIMAR and GRAFIPUERTO are very important tools in the decision making process when facing an emergency situation, and as I mentioned before, they are based on the integration of many different data bases.

#### *MSSIS participant partners*

MSSIS encourages participation by all countries through data sharing in order to achieve the universal goal of a safer, more secure, global marine environment.

Albania	Ecuador	Kenya	Portugal
Argentina	Estonia	Liberia	Romania
Australia	Finland	Lithuania	Sao Tome & Principe
Bahrain	France	Malta	Senegal
Belgium	Gabon	Mauritania	Serbia
Benin	Gambia	Mauritius	Seychelles
Brazil	Georgia	Mexico	Singapore
Bulgaria	Germany	Montenegro	Slovenia
Cameroon	Ghana	Morocco	Spain
Canada	Greece	Mozambique	Sweden
Cape Verde	Guinea	Netherlands	Togo
Chile	Iceland	New Zealand	Tunisia
Colombia	Iraq	Nigeria	Turkey
Croatia	Israel	Norway	Ukraine
Denmark	Italy	Pakistan	United Kingdom
Djibouti	Jamaica	Peru	United States
Dominican Rep.	Jordan	Poland	Uruguay

#### *VRMTC-A à MSSIS Sea Vision*

*(Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre for the Americas)*

VRMTC-A was the beginning of an information sharing tool at a global scale using MSSIS data.

Now, the system is moving to a new web-based portal called “MSSIS Sea Vision” at <https://mda.volpe.dot.gov/SeaVision>

MSSIS Sea Vision displays the same coastal AIS MSSIS voluntary network, but it is capable of managing satellite AIS from vendors of this technology

As established on its webpage, the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is a freely-shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network.

Its member countries share data from Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), coastal radar, and other maritime-related systems.

MSSIS is intended to promote multilateral collaboration and data-sharing among international participants, with a primary goal of increasing maritime security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an entire national vessel tracking network. MSSIS is perfectly suitable as a one-stop source for streaming global maritime data. Since the data distributed by MSSIS maintains its original, internationally recognized format, and is delivered to users in near real time, member organizations are able to utilize the feed to meet their specific mission requirements.

Chile entered MSSIS in 2008, and was presented during the 7th International Maritime and Naval Exhibition & Conference for Latin America (Exponaval-2008). Since then, more and more Chilean coastal AIS stations have been added to the network.

Furthermore, MSSIS started to feed the VRMTC-A portal and now feeds MSSIS Sea Vision portal, managed by the Volpe Centre from the Department of Transport of the U.S.A.

#### *Information Fusion Centre – Singapore*

Since Chile is part of various working groups engaged in maritime trade operations and naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, the IFC Singapore became a relevant actor for maritime security, thus, IFC is envisaged to be the node to enhance collective understanding of the maritime domain in order to strengthen maritime security in the region and beyond.

To achieve the above-mentioned, general aims are:

- To collate & fuse white shipping information that is shared among maritime security partners.
- To sense-make collated & fused information to build a coherent maritime situation picture and maritime domain knowledge base.
- To deliver actionable information to partners timely to cue operational responses.

Chile participates actively in this initiative since 2009, when we were invited to the Maritime Information Sharing Exercise (MARISX). This year we are participating in Singapore and from Chile activating our Operational Centre co-located in DIRSOMAR.

#### *LRIT system*

Due to the existence of asymmetric threats worldwide, the IMO implemented a long-range identification and tracking system which provides information upon the request of coastal States, for Flag State, Coastal State and Port State Control purposes. Although these requests have a cost, they allow the obtainment of a surface picture for Search and Rescue operations, which is free of charge for the requesting countries.

This information is included in the GRAFIMAR platform enhancing its surface picture with current information.

The LRIT Data Center managed by Chile through DIRECTEMAR is located at the Information Technology facility and is operative 24/7.

Chile is the Data Center provider for Mexico and Colombia.

## **V. Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS)**

NATO's review of its policy for operations involving merchant shipping has led to the development of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), with its associated tactics, techniques and procedures, to replace Naval Control of Shipping (NCS).

To provide NCAGS support to military commanders and merchant shipping in peacetime, tension, crisis and conflict through cooperation, guidance, advice, assistance and, where necessary, supervision.

Additionally, to provide military guidance, advice or assistance in respect of participating nations' global, maritime commercial interests to enhance the safety of merchant ships and to support military operations.

Although Chile is not a NATO member country, our participation in the Pacific and Indian Oceans Shipping Working Group (PACIOSWG), allowed us to experience through Bell Buoy NCAGS series of exercises, the opportunity to adapt NCAGS doctrine and policies as a valuable tool to organize and to get operational the Maritime Situational Awareness.

One of the various responses that NCAGS can determine is Maritime Interdiction Operations with use of tactical boarding teams.

## **VI. Fast Action Anti Terrorist Group (FAATG)**

Since Chile is member State of international treaties and conventions on security, illegal drugs trafficking, smuggling, piracy and illegal immigration, the Chilean Navy has a special trained fast action antiterrorist group for maritime interdiction operations. The team is in permanent training and ready to go any place where they could be necessary.

Their essential mission is to protect maritime security in national and international waters and port facilities.

The first team has participated in international exercises in the South Pacific Ocean and in the Panama Canal area on Panamax Exercises since 2003.

Panama Exercises are carried out in order to train different forces and navies to protect the Panama Canal from the attack of an asymmetric threat, usually represented by a terrorist group with the mission of destroying or, at least, producing a major damage in the Canal, affecting the international maritime commercial trade.



## Final remarks

Since the birth of the Republic of Chile, the Maritime Authority (DIRECTEMAR) has been an integral part of the Navy. It offers a maritime public service that fully satisfies the needs of the Chilean society.

The world's social and technological evolution has impelled DIRECTEMAR to adapt and optimize its capabilities and resources in order to face the new challenges. This is an iterative process which requires planning and programming to maintain the quality of the service provided.

Pursuing Safety and National development the Chilean maritime administration has been established to protect the State's maritime interests within the national maritime jurisdiction and project them to the international sphere.

In addition to that, DIRECTEMAR services provided to the maritime sector has allowed the organization to develop human, material and financial resources that help to provide safety, monitor the legislation in force and meet the requirements of the maritime users.

To provide a maritime public service of excellence, the Chilean Navy through the General Directorate of the Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine, has the legal framework, the personnel and the assets, to fulfill all its duties according to the Navigation Act and the national and international regulations.

The Maritime Situational Awareness implemented in the Chilean area of responsibility and maritime jurisdiction, in terms of Surveillance, Control, Alert and Response, allows the Chilean Maritime Administration to perform a very effective and timely awareness of all the activities carried out in the maritime field and which may impact the national security and our maritime interests, in order to alert, prevent, protect and provide a prompt response in accordance with the requirements of our national interests.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The term **failed state** is often used by political commentators and journalists to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. Common characteristics of a *failing state* include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations; and sharp economic decline. *Noam Chomsky's 2006 Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*
- <sup>2</sup> Supreme Decree N° 2.222 dated on 21st May 1978, "Ley de Navegación".
- <sup>3</sup> In reference to those ships which do not comply with the minimum standards established in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Conventions regarding the safety of vessels and the protection of the marine environment.
- <sup>4</sup> Reference to those crew members of a ship which do not comply with the minimum standards established in the International Maritime organization (IMO) International Convention regarding the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping of seafarers.



## **New items in the security agenda for South America**

### **Climate change and environmental security**

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#### **Introduction**

There are different perspectives on the concept of security, some that favor the individual and others States. However, the overall focus is on the perception that they are not subject to threats that could jeopardize its existence. With regard to the debate that has been generated in recent years, there are two fundamental points to ponder.

First, the perspective especially in the Southern Cone and Central America, which seeks to clearly delineate between the notions of defense and security. This distinction between security and defense is based on confronting situations in which the boundaries between them have been blurred, leading to a militarization of security and a lack of separation between the fields of military and civilian authorities. The lack of clear distinction between these fields has led to the perception that national security is an eminently military issue, in response to which it has been raised that defense should apply only to the external security of a country.

The second point to be discussed is the increasing dangers of “securitization” of various problems, assuming that they should not be dealt with military responses. Warns have been voiced on the growing trend in addressing issues or events as if they were part of the security agenda and, therefore, faced through mechanisms that go beyond the procedures of regular public policies and pre-established rules of the game. This second situation often

occurs in several areas such as social and economic development, public safety or environmental risks and access to natural resources

In the last two decades two basic perspectives have been outlined (Jácome, 2006). From 1994 to September 11, 2002 (9/11), the dominating phase posed a concept of security not restricted to interstate conflicts prompting the emergence of proposals in terms of human democratic and regional security. With a predominant redefinition of concepts, agendas and strategies focused not only on conventional threats but incorporating non-conventional ones such as drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental problems, among others, including non-state actors as participants in the discussions on security. In general terms, the aim was to contribute towards a democratic perspective of security.

It has been reported (Romero, 2010) that the Copenhagen School thesis prevailed in the analysis mainly focused on promoting peace, human security and human rights and the need for supranational institutions. In this context, within the American continent, the Organization of American States (OAS) was strengthened, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) began a process of renewal that sought to insert and strengthen itself in the new regional initiative setting the stage for a Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Similarly, these innovations put forward a vision of international relations in which States were not the only actors, but recognized that internationally there are a number of non-state actors that contribute to more complex and enriching global interaction.

These initiatives were a turning point with the events of 9/11 when, under the leadership of the U.S. government, there was a trend towards returning to the narrow perspective that leads to a reformulation process incorporating non-conventional threats and favors national security as a return to a predominantly statist and militarist vision, what has been considered as an authoritarian view when it comes to security, reintroducing the realistic perspective of international affairs (Romero, 2010) and, even more, in security issues. From the abovementioned perspective based on the idea of designing and strengthening cooperation mechanisms considered an idealist position, within the traditional schools of analysis of international relations, there was a shift to a paradigm based on a vision of troubled relationships and struggle for power.

On that basis, there was a return to the perspective of national security as a fundamental aspect which leads to deepening a bilateral vision of security and defense relations, despite recent initiatives to resume regional agendas such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the conformation of the South American Defense Council (CDS). Additionally, the issue revolves around conflicts whether external or internal-, with the emphasis on the military and defense aspects as well as the predominant role of the Executive Branch and the armed forces.

. In this scenario, notions focused on conflict prevention, the role of non-state actors, the promotion of a culture of peace and support for the construction of regional cooperation mechanisms are displaced, in which mutual trust mechanisms play a fundamental role. A particular concern has been a renewed focus in concepts regarding the traditional National

Security Doctrine that supported military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and Central America, having the presence of not only external threats but also “internal enemies” as key areas. We should be mindful of the fact that in time, such doctrine led to repression and violation of human rights.

In this framework, the first decade of the XXI century has led to changes in the South American security agendas. Based on this, three points are to be considered. Firstly, the main aspects that have been changed in the Latin American and Caribbean security agendas. Secondly, the main trends and changes in priorities in the areas of cooperation in the major blocks such as ALBA and UNASUR and, finally, some preliminary considerations on the very recent introduction of subjects such as climate change and environmental security.

### **Changes in the security agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean**

The political dynamics in the Americas have reinforced this view. The first decade of the century has been marked by a growing process of disintegration produced largely by different political-ideological and even antagonistic projects that have led to important divisions within the continent (Benitez / Celi / Jácome, 2010). In general terms, the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century faces a reality that clearly differentiates the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the one hand, the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico clearly looked to the north. On the other hand, South America as a region that wants to reaffirm itself yet with important differences between the countries pertaining to the Andean region and the Southern Cone.



In terms of security, the Andean countries are involved in issues related to the production and trafficking of drugs and the presence of armed non-state actors play an important role, especially in the case of the Colombian illegal groups. We should also ponder that the Southern Cone countries are focused on ways to strengthen cooperation in security and defense, especially in regard to peacekeeping missions, currently underway is the case of Haiti. A further aspect to be added to this scenario is the internal political dynamics of some Andean countries (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador) that have led to the establishment of a set of “alternative” projects geared to the apparent construction of the “socialism of the XXI century” vis a vis other projects of a reformist left that favors social issues but considers economic growth as essential. We can not fail to mention other government led projects, such as the ones in Peru and Colombia, which follow the path of liberal policies

To this project, we need to add relations with extra regional actors such as China, Russia and Iran with their sharp differences. It was noted that in the first decade of this century the so called “Pacific Rim” emerged as a group of countries facing the Pacific and considered as an area for expanding their relations, especially in the cases of Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico. On that basis, in 2010 the so called Latin American Pacific Rim Forum was re-launched, operating as an informal meeting point since 2007, until in January 2011 a Pro Tempore Secretariat was set up. On the other hand, especially the Caribbean and the Southern Cone countries seek to deepen their relations with the European Community. Undoubtedly the case of Brazil is particular since it has become the quintessential global player in the region. Is an actor who has become an active participant in the global scenario, for example as member of the BRIC group of emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Similarly, the scenario turns increasingly more complex with the presence of other extra-regional actors such as China, Russia and Iran, which also exert their influence on the relationship between Latin American and the Caribbean countries and the perspectives on defense and security.

On that basis, the most recent debates on security have focused (Tulchin, 2009) on the concept that insists in the need of developing security communities through cooperation to deal with multiple threats under the perspective that they are “intermestic”, which include both domestic, international and transnational aspects stemming from state and non-state actors. In this sense, Raúl Benítez has proposed (Apud Tulchin, 2009) that the analysis and cooperation mechanisms for each threat should be dealt with in different levels, internal, sub- regional , regional, hemispheric and global.

## Cooperation mechanisms in security and defense

### Hemispheric:

- *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* (TIAR) and the Inter American defense Board (IADB)
- Summits of the Americas y and Annual OAS Assembly Meetings
- Meetings of Ministers of Defense
- Inter American Drug Abuse Control Commission
- OAS Peace Keeping Programs
- Convention against illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other related materials (OAS-2001)
- Inter American Convention against Terrorism (OAS-2002)
- Special OAS Conference on Security (OAS-2003)

### Subregional:

- Framework Agreement for Democratic Security in Central America (1995)
- Regional Security System (RSS) for the Caribbean (1984)
- CARICOM Regional task Force on Crime and Security (2002)
- Decision 505 by CAN: the Andean Cooperation Plan for the Fight against Illegal Drugs and Related Crimes (2001)
- The Lima Commitment - Andean Charter for Peace and Security-Restrictions and Control of Targeted Expense for External Defense (CAN-2002)
- Decision 587 by CAN: General Lines of the Andean Common External Security Policy that established the Andean Security Network (2004)
- Declaration of San Francisco de Quito on the Establishment and Development of the Andean Zone of Peace (CAN-2004)
- General Lines of the Common External Security Policy (CAN-2004)
- Decision 552 by CAN: Andean Plan on Prevention, Fight and Eradication of Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CAN-2003)
- Commitment for Strengthening Coordination in the Fight against Terrorism and the International Problem of Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Related Crimes (CAN-2003)
- South American Defense Council of Unasur (2008)
- Permanent Committee on Sovereignty and Defense of ALBA (2009)

However, other analysts (2010 Romero) argue that recent developments in Latin America and the Caribbean have shown the need for a new paradigm of analysis better suited for the present reality. As a result of the crisis in Honduras in 2009, four key issues are to be addressed.

First, revisiting the theme of civil-military relations since the latter is still an important actor in society and its subordination to the civil power has not actually occurred. Secondly, democracy should be on the table, since there are clear differences in conceptions manifested basically through visions of traditional representative democracy vs. participatory democracy. Another aspect that has to be tackled is development, since clearly there are conflicting views especially between the capitalist and socialist perspectives. Finally,

the issue of international relations, mainly in terms of links with the United States, integration and trade relations that generate cracks due to ideological differences.

### **Current trends and changes in the agenda: UNASUR and ALBA**

The first decade of the 21st century has seen prevailing changes in multilateralism with the shift from what has been considered (Sanahuja, 2011) as an open regionalism, focused on economic integration, to a “post-liberal” perspective oriented mainly to the political sphere. It has innovative features different from traditional integration processes previously developed. An important feature to underscore (Sanahuja, 2011) is the return to agendas that prioritize political affairs, development and social aspects as well as the fact that *vis a vis* the market priority it is rather set on actions by the State. In addition, they seek cooperation and consultation in non-commercial areas moving towards issues related to infrastructure and communications as well as energy security in the region.

Firstly, when considering the role of sub-national actors, it is important to highlight that the new initiatives of Unasur and especially of the Bolivarian Alliance for the peoples of our America (ALBA) are agreements between Governments which in the Venezuelan case and its partners in ALBA, favor only the participation of State-owned enterprises. In this sense, Legler and Santa Cruz. (2011: 12) argue that current multilateralism has three distinctive characteristics: “(1) a marked presidentialism (2) (an emphasis on the construction of spaces for political dialogue and cooperation, and 3) the construction of weak institutions.”

In his official speeches, the Brazilian and Venezuelan administrations have emphasized the complementarity and the establishment of partnerships in the regional arena. “However, some actions by President Chávez could lead to a certain gap, at least with regard to regional relations in South America, especially since 2007, when radicalization of his Bolivarian revolution and the construction of the “socialism of the 21st century”, are implemented.

In this sense, certain differences can be observed in the sphere of consultation and regional cooperation between both Governments and their regional leadership goals. These are clearly manifested in face of the increasing fragmentation and weakening of traditional bodies, such as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR and in recent years two proposals come to play. Unasur, spearheaded by Brazil and ALBA energized by Venezuela. In spite of the fact that a formal agreement could resemble a relationship of complementarity in some areas, security and defense have been marked by different perspectives on certain issues. The differences are rooted in distinctive perspectives regarding the perception of the main vulnerabilities faced by the countries in the region and based on this, on responses that can be built from multilateral levels of cooperation.

Within this context, the argument could be made that such divergences in national views on Security and defense might lead to the possibility of an overlap of institutions between Unasur and ALBA. The first one established the South American Defense Council and the



Centre for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED). In terms of ALBA, as of 2009 the Standing Committee on sovereignty and defense was approved (with the exception of the Caribbean's of English-speaking countries) with the purpose of defining a common defense strategy and as of 2011 the defense school of ALBA was set up in Bolivia. Similarly, in its 11th Summit in Caracas on February 2012, President Morales of Bolivia proposed the establishment of a Defense Council of ALBA which is being examined ([www.alianzabolivariana.org](http://www.alianzabolivariana.org)).

Since its inception, Unasur emphasized that it was neither a military alliance nor a military operational body. This is in contrast to the Venezuelan proposal within the framework of ALBA, which raised such alliances to address possible foreign interventions limited today to the United States. This difference is reflected in the framework of the South America Defense Council – CDS, which has privileged the subject of measures of mutual trust, especially under the Pro Tempore Secretariat of Ecuador and more recently of Paraguay.

Accordingly, in the framework of the 1<sup>st</sup> extraordinary meeting held in November 10/11 2011 in Lima, the “final report for the design of a common methodology to measure the cost of defense” prepared by a working group with the participation of the Ministry of defense of Venezuela ([www.unasurcds.org](http://www.unasurcds.org)) was adopted. The first commitment from Governments was to submit to the CEED the 2006-2010 South American Report on Expenditures in Defense. Currently this body is performing an analysis of this information, which is not yet publicly available nor so far are the reports submitted by the Governments of each country.



This same extraordinary meeting of 2011 agreed to give greater importance to the area of strengthening industry and technology for regional defense, an item considered crucial for Brazil. In the same vein, decision was reached to incorporate two task forces to the CDS 2012 Working Plan([www.unasurcds.org](http://www.unasurcds.org)). The first one to design, develop and produce a South American basic training aircraft and the other to assess the feasibility of developing unmanned aircrafts. Consensus was reached on analyzing the feasibility of establishing a South American Space Agency, but the feasibility of these projects is in question.

However, in what appears to be an effort to find consensus among the member countries, a short term agenda has been outlined that gives priority to the issues related to natural resources and the environment. In June 2011, in an interview to the general Secretariat of Unasur by the newspaper El País from Spain and in the inaugural address from the new director of the CEED in May 2011 ([www.unasurcds.org](http://www.unasurcds.org)), it was stated that the fundamental issues pointed out would be:

- Development of a new concept of sovereignty in which the protection of natural resources occupies an increasingly important role.
- Protection of food reserve.
- Defense of democracy. (Can be a point of controversy given the different definitions of democracy, and that this is often a topic that leads to the nationalist approaches and of non-intervention in internal affairs).
- Joint effort in case of natural disasters, area in which the creation of a regional military unit to assist in emergency situations has been proposed.



In the case of ALBA (Jácome, 2011), the agenda includes sovereignty and food security, natural disasters as new issues as well as considerations on climate change, the environment and the use of natural resources. Despite the fact that there is an area of work on environment and climate change, currently there are no projects or specific programs being developed with this purpose.

Under the leadership of Venezuela this asymmetric cooperation scheme (with its supreme expression to be found in Petro Caribe), is based on energy resources, but not from the same perspective that has been raised in Unasur, which is based on the perspective that these resources should be used as a geostrategic instrument, an element of confrontation with the United States, transnational companies and other powers of the North. Thus, favoring a political and ideological discourse that is rooted in the idea that countries should collaborate, especially in the political and defense areas, with a view to jointly face common external threats

The fundamental difference lies in the fact that while Unasur raises the need of developing mechanisms to ensure the sovereignty over energy and natural resources and their use for economic and social development, in ALBA the focus is on the (military) defense against possible interventions by the United States. In this case, Libya and the string of processes developed in the Middle East and the North of Africa are cited as emblematic examples.

Therefore it seems to be a tendency towards giving priority to the issue of the protection of natural resources and energy sovereignty and it has been expressed that the main threat in this area comes from outside including climate change in the agenda. Based on these plans one cannot lose sight of the greater importance to be given to the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO).

Yet, one can argue that the debate could be deepened in the area of defense and security, especially in contrast to the development of strategies aiming at strengthening measures of mutual trust, supported by Brazil, since several member countries, for example Venezuela, focus their strategies on traditional perspectives revolving around nationalism and defense of their sovereignty.

### **A few preliminary considerations on climate change and environmental security**

Today the importance of social and environmental risks is growing in the context of national, regional and global security agendas, namely those related to climate change. Latin America and the Caribbean should put an emphasis on those causing particular regional impact such as episodes of floods and droughts as a consequence of the phenomena of el Niño y la Niña, hurricanes, which have expanded their coverage as well as desertification. In addition to these serious climate related problems, the main natural threats posed on the region (De Lisio, 2011) are earthquakes and epidemiological contagion (yellow fever, dengue and malaria).

Several of these phenomena are of a trans-boundary nature, indicating the need of developing strategies and mechanisms for consultation to deal with increasing impacts. Based on this, some joint responses have been raised to counter these threats, which have basically revolved around two axis (De Lisio, 2011): mitigation of impacts and the development of actions in the framework of proposals on alternative models of development.

#### *Impact mitigation*

- CAN: Andean Regional programme for the prevention and reduction of risks caused by disasters (Preandino)
- Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO): epidemiological care for emerging and re-emerging diseases
- Regional disaster information center (CRID), created by PAHO; the Secretariat of the UN international strategy for disaster reduction; National Commission for risk prevention and emergency care from Costa Rica; International Federation of national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent; Focal point for the prevention of natural disasters in Central America; and Regional emergency office from Doctors Without Borders.
- Risk Emergency and Disaster Task Force for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Despite these initiatives of coordination among different multilateral organizations as well as civil society organizations, important challenges still prevail, being that the notorious climate change is of such magnitude “that the until recently exalted mitigation plans are completely insufficient.” (De Lisio, 2011 p. 11). Consequently, one reaches the conclusion that everything points towards the implementation of alternative development initiatives which are in their embryonic phase at present.

#### *Initiatives of alternative development models*

- ACTO Program 2004-2012.
- The Regional Bio-diversity strategy for the Andean tropic countries of CAN.
- Mercosur Framework Agreement on the Environment.

However, despite these emerging initiatives, neither regional programs nor bi-national projects take into account the environmental impacts and the effects on already existing threats as a result of climate change. For example, such is the case of some projects that are developed based on greater integration, as the initiative for the integration of regional infrastructure in South American (IIRSA), that has become part of Unasur, as well as several bilateral initiatives especially in the exploitation of the mining-energy sector. These appear to be rather smoky to the approaches of ACTO. Therefore, there is evidence of a lack of coordination among regional bodies that turns out to be counter-productive for the approaches on how to deal with the effects of climate change and other natural hazards.

On this basis, Antonio De Lisio (2011) proposes an examination on the way they can be transformed into catalysts of structural changes. Accordingly, an important contribution is prospects on the need for a cross-border eco-political articulation in the region and the approach on the need for political will to implement practical models of sustainable development that are often found in the discourses of the political elites but seldom do they materialize in real terms.

On the contrary, many government led strategies rather increase the deterioration of the environment and lead to greater vulnerability. The insistence on traditional notions, centered on sovereignty and nationalism threaten the development of effective tools that can deal with these transnational threats which have increasing social and economic impacts on the population of the region. In addition to everything that has been laid out, there is a growing displacement of people, problems with water supply and electricity, mobility issues, as well as growing precarious conditions vis a vis food security.

## Conclusion

There is consensus that the new political coordination initiatives being set up such as Unasur and the newly created community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac) are positive, potentially leading to overcoming the security agenda of the “North” focused on terrorism, drug trafficking and migration, besides having created a space for the prevention and resolution of conflicts without the interference of extra regional actors. However, although nascent, there is concern in terms of the little attention that is being given to climate change, other natural threats and the need to strengthen regional cooperation for environmental security.



In Latin America and the Caribbean significant evidence can be found on climate vulnerability, endangering the environmental safety conditions of the inhabitants in different countries. It is expected that these vulnerabilities may increase in the future, in response to forecasts for the region. So far, the capacity to respond to climate change has been unsustainable, insecure and fostered greater climate vulnerability. Based on this, with the purpose of including sustainable regional cooperation, seven basic proposals have been introduced to assist in changing the sense of uncertainty brought about by climate change:

- 1 *Greening the national economies in the framework of the environmental renewal of regional cooperation.*
- 2 *Economic re-engineering for greening economies under a perspective of cooperation and regional complementarities.*
- 3 *Synergies against deforestation and the expansion of unsustainable agriculture:*
  - National social and environmental capacity building and training programs.
  - Design and implementation of training and capacity building programs for green work and working green, responsible consumption and eco political leadership needed to sustain changes in consumption and production protocols and in life styles in general.
- 4 *Network of centers of excellence and pertinence to climate change.* This is one of the most dynamic areas of scientific and technological development in the world. Latin America should be prepared through different bodies and spaces not only to participate in the search, generation and experimentation of new options, but to disseminate them in an updated format to the population as a whole.
- 5 *Observatory social and climate conflict prevention.* As we saw in the diagnosis of the current situation, the number of people affected by rains and migration driven by drought has been on the rise in Latin America and the Caribbean. There have been major migratory displacement movements especially because of desertification, however, in face of forecasts showing countries that tend to benefit and others that are on the losing end because of climate change, migrations should be viewed as an issue that goes beyond borders. On the same vein, in countries that share more than one sub regional area, climate displacement situations can arise, leading to a scenario of increased social conflicts within and beyond national borders.
- 6 *Regional network of cities and climate change.* Different cities in the region have been moving forward in these initiatives of adaptation and reduction of vulnerabilities to climate change
- 7 *Establishment of the Commission for climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean (3CALC).* The ensemble of proposals outlined requires institutions with coordinating power to strengthen their realization, in this regard the setting up of the Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on Climate Change (3CAL) is proposed as a regional body entrusted with advisory and follow up capabilities at national and sub-national levels.

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# **Strategies and Tools for Achieving Responsible Security**

## Some Reflections from a European Perspective

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“Security” is hardly a topic of concern for European policymakers these days. At least not in the sense of protecting the homeland and the people from war and other forms of external violence. They rather worry about “securities” with regard to the EU debt and currency crises and about the effects a fracturing Union and a crumbling euro might have on “social security” programs in European nation-states. Under the stress of political and economic turmoil, more typical questions of international security policy have been relegated to the back pages of European newspapers and to the very bottom of the EU Council’s agenda. How to withdraw from Afghanistan while still stabilizing the country? How to deal with the challenge of the Iranian nuclear program? How to manage increasing instability in Asia Pacific? These are just three examples of the pressing issues that receive short shrift by European strategists and politicians.

Given the severity of the debt crisis and its political consequences, it is understandable that security policy is not a priority. But it would also be a dangerous mistake to ignore security issues altogether—the World keeps turning regardless of current European preoccupations, and security challenges, even existential ones, have a habit of occurring with sudden inevitability. Once a security crisis is there, the time for sufficient preparation and effective action will often have evaporated. Hence it is important for Europeans, while struggling to solve the internal problems of the European Union, not to lose sight of the bigger picture of global security affairs.

Of course, both realms—the internal affairs of the European Union and the global security agenda—are more deeply interconnected than is usually acknowledged. The idea of European integration (in combination with more than just a little help from our American friends) created an unparalleled era of peace on the old continent. For centuries, war and conflict between European nation-states, kingdoms, and tribes was usual, peace being the exception. Today, armed conflict between members of the European Union is almost unthinkable. This is not just a boon for Europeans themselves, but also for the world at large, as European wars—due to the geostrategic and economic importance of the region—have a tendency to involve other powers. (Think World Wars I and II which both started as European “civil wars”.) Solving the euro crisis and strengthening the European Union for the future is thus a significant contribution to international stability and security.

The security relationship between Europe and the wider world also works the other way around. It is obvious already how the debt crisis affects the defense budgets of EU member States.<sup>1</sup> With the notable exception of Poland, all major and mid-size players in the European Union’s foreign and security policy are significantly reducing military spending, shrinking their armed forces, and reducing investment in research and development. So even if Europeans manage to preserve and strengthen their Union and the peace and stability it ensures, they will certainly be less visible and in all likelihood also less effective players on the international stage when it comes to providing security and enforcing Western interests and values.

Against this backdrop, one must ask: What exactly will Europe’s role in international security look like in the future? What are the strategies and tools Europeans might employ to live up to their responsibilities in international security affairs? And what, after all, is a “responsible” security policy, anyway? In the scope of this essay, such sweeping questions can of course only be addressed, not fully answered. But it is possible to provide a few thoughts that might serve as guidelines for further inquiry.

A good starting point is the much abused term “strategy”. Nowadays, governments are awash in “strategies”: Administrations have got a strategy for everything, from a “Strategy on Biological Diversity” to a “Broadband Strategy” (to name just two examples from the rich portfolio of the German government). In other words, the phrase “strategy” gives a sheen of thoughtful authority to even the most mundane policies. The true test of strategy, however, is the prioritized alignment of resources, means, and goals under conditions of uncertainty. Since survival is the most basic purpose of statecraft, security policy is the ultimate field of political strategy.

Hence, the conception of strategy in foreign and security affairs cannot start with the formulation of goals. A State’s goals in international security policy are either self-evident or trivial. Many a White Book has spelled out the litany of survival, freedom, prosperity, and peace as the aim of all political efforts. This is all commendable, but such motherhood and apple pie aspirations are of little help when it comes to actual strategy-making. They are generalizations as extreme as they are uncontroversial. They will not provide orientation when it comes to setting priorities or assigning resources and developing tactics.

What will focus the mind of the strategist, however, are concrete threats to a State's survival or its other self-evident goals. It is thus the analysis of threats which serious strategy-making in security policy needs to start with. Of course, threat perception differs substantially among the member States of the European Union. Differences in geography, history, political culture, and power account for diverging interpretations of the international security landscape between, say, Riga and Berlin. Still, it is possible to define three broad types of threat facing the European Union as a whole as well as the individual member States.

The first threat is the danger of interstate war. Many Europeans, especially among the younger generations, might view this as an anachronism. After all, the whole "European project" is built on the idea of overcoming war between nation-States. Indeed, the scenario of war between major European powers has become exceedingly unlikely. And yet, its impact would be so catastrophic that it warrants inclusion in the list of threats. Moreover, whenever Europeans believed that they had escaped the bloody tracks of history, they were in for an unpleasant surprise: consider the Balkan Wars in the 1990s or the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Based on such experience, NATO was right in its current 2010 Strategic Concept to list interstate war as the number one threat to Alliance security. (And this is not even touching on the truly gloomy scenario of what might happen to European security if the Euro and the European Union should disintegrate—a scenario that does not seem as far-fetched these days as it did over the last twenty or more years.)

The second type of threat to European security is the so-called "new threats". This category basically encompasses every security risk or danger except traditional warfare, no matter how long they have been in existence. Examples range from international terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to State failure and instability in crucial regions (often precipitated by other "new" threats such as climate change and migration). The list could be easily expanded, as both the European Security Strategy (2003) and the NATO Strategic Concept demonstrate.



In fact, hardly any of these phenomena are really new in the sense that they are without historical precedent. What is new, however, especially from a European perspective, is that they affect international and Western security. Terrorism, for instance, used to be a distinctly domestic problem; Munich, Lockerbie, and other heinous acts of international proportions were the exception rather than the rule.

As a consequence of globalization, that changed. A “smaller” world of more porous borders, truly global and instantaneous information and communication, and multifaceted interdependencies creates more opportunities for the spread of prosperity and freedom. But it also creates more vulnerabilities as well as more opportunities for what Thomas Friedman calls “super-empowered angry men” to disrupt and destroy. One of the tragic lessons of 9/11 is that, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, even the most powerful Western nations have to care about what is going on in remote and destitute places such as Afghanistan—or suffer the consequences of their neglect.

The third broad type of threat facing Europe today is the shift of power in the international system. Compared to the first two types of threat, this third is rather more abstract. It is a threat on the systemic level of analysis, not a threat within the international system. Because of that, and because it does not imply an immediate damage to public safety, prosperity, or the European way of life, it is easily overlooked in casual discussion. Yet it is no less dangerous than the first two types of threat, and it might even exacerbate the likelihood and/or the effects of those threats actually affecting Europe.

The two fundamental trends characterizing the international system in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century are changes in the distribution of power and the increasing diffusion of power. The latter means that power is more difficult to locate than it ever was since the dawn of the Westphalian system. Nation-states are no longer the only—or even the major—actors in power politics. Non-governmental organizations as diverse as Apple, Moody’s, Greenpeace, and al-Qaeda enjoy growing influence over international affairs in a globalized world. This poses fundamental theoretical and practical problems for international security policy. But for the purposes of this essay, we should set all that aside for a moment—especially since this author is of the contrarian opinion that, counter-intuitively, the rise of the NGOs in turn strengthens the influence, credibility, and legitimacy of the State.

What is more interesting in the context of threat assessment is the change in power distribution among States. For more than a decade, the consistent economic success of threshold countries such as China, India, and Brazil has been a challenge to old conceptions of world order. It is only a question of time until this new economic power will be translated into military and, most importantly, political power. In many ways, this is already happening as the creation of the G-20 indicates.

From a European perspective, this could be seen as good news. More stakeholders in the international system, more evenly distributed wealth, and more stable trading partners are, after all, very much in the interest of Europe. However, there is no guarantee that international politics will not, yet again, turn into a zero-sum game. Then, other players’

gain will be Europe's loss. Already one can make the case that Europe's influence on global affairs, its ability to shape general rules of the game and political outcomes, is waning. The international negotiations on how to battle climate change are a case in point. It is easy to see how such a development, in the long term, will not only affect Europe's prosperity and way of life but that it will also have a security dimension to it. As before, this is not even touching on the worst-case scenario, which would be a military confrontation between a rising power and a status quo power. If History is any guide, it is not at all unlikely that China and the United States might engage in a hegemonic war over dominance in the international system. One hesitates to think where that might leave Europe.

So these are the three types of threat to European security that require a strategic response: "traditional" interstate conflict and war; "new" transnational threats; and systemic change. It is very difficult to prioritize them because no one can say today with any degree of reliability which of these threats will materialize sooner than others and which will have the most dire repercussions. It might also be unwise to prioritize too much because that would reduce much-needed flexibility in case the assumptions turn out to be wrong. Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that at least some of these threats will manifest themselves simultaneously, thus reinforcing each other. A prudent strategy retains the necessary adaptability to overcome such a confluence of challenges.

The scarcity of resources demands nevertheless to focus on challenges of greatest urgency and greatest possible impact. In doing so, the NATO Strategic Concept with its — at least implicit — ranking of threats is a useful guideline. The bigger challenge than discussing abstract priorities is to discern the actual tools and instruments of European security policy. As we will see, there remains a lot of work to do for Europe to develop an effective and coherent toolkit in dealing with the threats at hand.

Before examining the state of the EU security policy toolbox, however, an obligatory preliminary remark needs to be made: Not all, not even most, of the threats described in this essay require the use of military force. In fact, military force will be of little use or might even be counterproductive in dealing with type two and type three threats. It is a bitter lesson of the last decade and the operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq in particular that military force cannot achieve political solutions. Political problems, however, are the root cause of almost all "new" security challenges. For this reason—and because of their relative military weakness—European states are always quick to point out that European security policy does and should focus on political and civilian measures. For historical reasons, this reflex is prevalent especially in Germany.

Such considerations notwithstanding, military power remains an essential asset not only in international security affairs, but in international politics more generally. For one thing, it is indispensable in unstable situations. After all, this is a lesson of Afghanistan and Iraq as well: Military superiority is often a precondition for the implementation of civilian approaches. Without security, especially in post-conflict situations, there can be no development. Even more importantly, military power is the ultimate guarantee of a State's survival. The most basic of all national interests is to keep existing, to hedge against

foreign invasion or violent secession. Only military strength can reliably deliver that security. And for this very reason, military power is the most credible expression of a nation's assertiveness.

This ancient relationship between a state's military power and its ambition of self-preservation (and of enforcing other political interests) is understood all over the world. A nation's prestige and its influence in international affairs are usually reflected in its military posture. This is why rising states such as China and Brazil continue to expand their military capabilities. It is only in Europe where such a connection between military and political power is sometimes disputed — an aftereffect of the decades spent under the comfortable U.S. security umbrella. Since this umbrella is becoming somewhat threadbare, Europeans are well-advised to overcome this misperception and to get serious about maintaining the military aspect of their strength in international affairs as well.

The distinction between the respective qualities and uses of “hard” military and “soft” civilian power in mind, it makes sense to look at the international security threats facing the European Union not individually or by region, but rather to discuss the means and instruments Europeans have at their disposal to counter them. Those tools can be roughly divided into two categories: means of conflict prevention and means of conflict management (including defense and preemptive measures).

Conflict prevention is usually less costly in blood and treasure than conflict management, but it requires a greater and more sustained political effort at implementation. In a sense, all foreign policy can be interpreted as contributing to conflict prevention. International economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, “classical” diplomacy, and so on—they all serve the greater cause of peaceful development, mutual understanding, and the relaxation of possible tensions. Following a more narrow understanding of security policy, however, there are four particularly prominent examples of the tools of conflict prevention employed by the Europeans; two in the context of NATO, and two in the context of the European Union.



At the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO allies agreed to create an — albeit modest — civilian crisis management capability. This is intended to help the alliance come to grips with the often frustrating problems of a military actor like NATO coordinating various civilian actors in post-conflict scenarios. In the future, NATO will be able to do some of that work by itself (instead of getting blamed for the shortfalls of others). At the same time, this small capability contains the nucleus of a civilian conflict prevention capability, overseen by NATO. This is a quality in line with the Alliance's more policy - rather than defense - related Article IV obligations. European members have been pushing for that for quite some time now. It would also fall in line with what the British call "upstream engagement": security sector reform, military training, and similar efforts by NATO at keeping possible crises from developing into full-fledged conflicts.

Cooperative security is, next to civilian crisis management, the second key idea for conflict prevention that received a boost at the Lisbon summit. It was also stressed again this year at the — otherwise quite unspectacular — summit in Chicago. Cooperative security pertains to the ever-growing network of partnerships that has developed around the transatlantic alliance, in particular with regard to the missions out of area. The hope of many European allies is that these relationships can be maintained and deepened even after the end of operations such as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). If that were the case, NATO could develop into a hub for several regional security arrangements — and thus play a truly stabilizing role in global security affairs. Again, this is not primarily an issue of military-to-military cooperation or of burden-sharing in expeditionary missions. Instead, it is seen as a political network that should contribute to preventing crises from turning into conflict.

The European Union has also developed a number of instruments to strengthen conflict prevention. The two most notable are the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Neighborhood Policy. The Service was launched as recently as December 2010 under the leadership of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton. Accordingly, it is yet too early to fully assess its impact and potential. However, it is already discernible that European foreign policy gains a somewhat more unified presence in international affairs due to the EEAS. Moreover, the Service puts particular emphasis on conflict prevention and, according to its mission statement, "addresses the root-causes of violent conflict, like poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality."

The European Neighborhood Policy, in turn, is a program that currently addresses sixteen countries, focusing on the Northern Africa and Middle East region as well as on Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. As part of that program, the European Union offers financial assistance to those States which adhere to government reform, economic reform, and other issues surrounding positive transformation. For some participating countries, eventual membership or at least ever closer association with the European Union are additional "carrots". In doing so, the EU seeks to create not just better living conditions in the neighboring countries but also to strengthen the stability of its geopolitical rim, thus fostering European security.

As the rebellions in Northern Africa, and especially in Libya, have demonstrated, sometimes reform and long-term stability require the use of force. Moreover, several of the pressing security challenges discussed in this essay — prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting terrorism, and checking aggressively expansive States — call for at least a credible military threat to deter troublemakers. And credibility is achieved, in the final analysis, by the convincing and effective use of military force when necessary.

Over the last decades, that has been a weakness of European security policy. The difficulty of mustering political will and strategic coherence among the States of Europe has often been an impediment to responsible security. That was perhaps most tragically evident in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. It also betrayed the ossifying consequences of an outsized reliance on U.S. leadership in international and also in European security affairs. Today, the European capacity to act is further reduced by the crunch exerted on nearly all Western defense budgets by the financial and economic crisis.

The answer to that problem is increased cooperation. European States — within the European Union, but also within NATO — need to find new ways of arranging the military aspects of their common security. They must do more *together* instead of in parallel. They must achieve more integrated procurement of capabilities and develop shared usage of armed forces. This process is called “Smart Defense” in NATO jargon and “Pooling and Sharing” in EU parlance.

Declarations of intent such as the German-Swedish Ghent Initiative of 2010 serve as a roadmap of how to proceed, stressing in particular the need for identified priorities: In the end, not every European country should and will maintain a full-spectrum force. Individual states will focus on specific strengths, specific capabilities. Those capabilities, in turn, will be used with and by other states as well.

So far, NATO and EU countries have a sizeable list of projects pointing in the right direction. In the NATO context, the joint air policing in the Baltics, the development of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) are all examples of a successful smarter defense. In the context of the EU, prime examples would include the helicopter training program, development of joint air-to-air refueling capabilities, and the many initiatives currently pushed by the European Defense Agency, the institutional embodiment of the idea of pooling and sharing.

Still, these are all rather limited efforts. A real breakthrough in jointly procured and operated capabilities is yet to be achieved. Why not organize, for instance, the air forces of several central and eastern European states as a joint force, perhaps under German leadership? Cooperation on that scale is not yet happening, although it might be the only way towards a truly effective and lasting European role in international security affairs.

There are three main reasons why Europeans have such a hard time taking this crucial next step. The first reason is that defense cooperation, especially “Pooling and Sharing”,



has been born out of financial constraints. The rationale behind all such efforts was therefore simple economics: defense cooperation as a means of saving money. This, however, is both insufficient and misleading. It is insufficient because effective defense reforms need to be driven by strategic concerns; the rationale needs to be security-driven, not budget-driven. Otherwise, the resulting armed forces will not be serving their purpose, they will not be applicable to the threats and missions at hand. It is misleading because “Pooling and Sharing” will not save money, at least not in the short run. In fact, it might initially cost even more to restructure the various European defense organizations and capabilities into a coherent whole. But it is nonetheless an investment worth making, because it will strengthen European security and save money in the long run.

The second reason is the perennial problem of national sovereignty. Once Europeans create a truly coherent joint force structure, there will be very little room for national caveats. That sword cuts both ways: It will be almost impossible for a single nation to drop out of a military mission that was agreed upon by the NATO Council or the relevant EU body. At the same time, there will be occasions when a state would prefer to use military force but must refrain from it because the majority of European partners is opposed. Because certain capabilities are no longer under national but under collective control, options of unilateral action will narrow. Thus, the political implications of deeper defense cooperation are enormous; they ultimately affect the core business of the sovereign state, its ability to protect itself and on its own.

This leads to the third reason why Europeans are reluctant to undertake further steps towards defense integration: the problem of credibility. Exactly because so much is at stake—the very heart of national sovereignty and the State’s survival—it is mandatory that shared capabilities can be used with great reliability. No State will agree with shared solutions if there is no certainty that those capabilities will be ready when needed. The experience with shared capabilities so far is, unfortunately, not encouraging. When Germany, for example, refused to let AWACS (a shared capability under German leadership) participate in the controversial Libya mission, many allies saw that as evidence that “Pooling and Sharing” does not work—or at least, that it puts the participants’ security at risk because shared forces were obviously no reliable assets in crisis situations.

None of these problems lends itself to easy solutions, but the challenges are not insurmountable either. It is the task of political leadership to find ways, on a step-by-step basis, to overcome the remaining hurdles. Europeans need ideas and creativity, and, above all else, the courage and political will to move forward before a security crisis more severe than we can currently deal with befalls us. It is the hope of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation that conferences such as the Forte de Copacabana help to contribute to that understanding and help to generate fresh ideas on common approaches to common security challenges.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Patrick Keller, Challenges for European Defense Budgets after the Economic Crisis, AEI National Security Outlook, No. 1, July 2011. (<http://www.aei.org/files/2011/07/11/NSO-2011-07-No-1-g.pdf>)



## Armed Forces and Internal Missions: the European Context

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In the transatlantic spirit of the *Forte de Copacabana* Conference, this article seeks to balance the presentations in the panel “Armed Forces and Urban Peacemaking” of its 8<sup>th</sup> Annual iteration in 2011 – which are all understandably focussed on recent advances in this area in the South American context – with a perspective from Europe and, more broadly, the Northern Hemisphere. However, on the topic of urban pacification and the internal use of the armed forces, the marked divergence of experience between these regional contexts warrants setting the conceptual stage before embarking on the task of comparison. The primary difference consists of the historical context and legal underpinnings for the employment of the armed forces within a state’s borders. Accordingly this condensed analysis will preface its look at the illustrative example of the Federal Republic of Germany with a brief exposition of key elements of the differences in the theory and practice of civil-military relations between the global North and, primarily, .

Put succinctly, in Western Europe today the internal use force by the regular armed forces to quell disturbances and combat organized crime as is done in Brazil and other countries of South America is politically unthinkable. Western European states lack the socioeconomic conditions that create the situations to which such forms of intervention are a response, such as widespread poverty and armed drug trafficking rooted in gaping economic disparities; the underinstitutionalization and underfunding in the civilian arena that motivates recourse to the use of the military; and, whether this be cause or effect, the legal underpinnings for such operations to take place. These

differences are best encapsulated in a short review of the dominant model of civil-military relations – or civilian/democratic control of the armed forces – in the Northern Hemisphere today, which bears significant divergences from South American historical practice.

## Paradigms of civilian control over the armed forces

The study of civil-military relations grapples with the basic question of the use of force in a democratic society; in order to maintain itself and to provide basic public goods such as security to its citizens, a civilian government must maintain a standing armed force which by its very nature poses a threat to that government's own ultimate political control. This fundamental tension is eloquently summed up by Peter Feaver:

The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity. ...

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. ...

On the other hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. ... Yet another concern is that a rogue military could involve the polity in wars and conflicts contrary to society's interests or expressed will. And, finally, there is a concern over the simple matter of obedience: Even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters, or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests? ...

The tension between the two desiderata is inherent in any civilization, but it is especially acute in democracies, where the protectees' prerogatives are thought to trump the protectors' at every turn, where the metaphorical delegation of political authority to agents is enacted at regular intervals through the ballot box. ...

It follows that, in a democracy, the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians over the military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of de facto power favors the military. Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed to remain the political masters. ... In the civil-military context, this means that the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society<sup>1</sup>.

The sophistication with which civil-military relations specialists have approached this dilemma has increased significantly over several generations of scholarship. The advent of massive standing armies in and North American in the wake of the Second World War led to the beginnings of academic preoccupation with the relationship between democratic government and its monopoly over the use of force. The seminal early work of this generation was Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*<sup>2</sup>; in it most notably develops the concepts of objective and subjective civilian control. These notions, and their basis in the assumed separation of the military and civilian political ambits into distinct and separate societal arenas, continue to be extremely influential in Northern thinking on civil-military relations half a century after their first formulation.

### *The Northern paradigm*

Put briefly, what is in the North considered the more desirable objective form of civilian control is based on the idea of military professionalism – that soldiers, in this case career officers, are experts in the wielding of force, and that civilian authorities are the holders of political legitimacy. So long as both spheres are kept separate, with the armed forces not intervening in politics and politicians not interfering in technical and corporate military issues – a satisfactory level of civilian supremacy over the use of force can be achieved. Subjective civilian control, by contrast, involves the use of the armed forces for internal, parochial political gain and risks their ultimate politicization and ultimately, the threat of military attempts to take over political power.

In this sense, internal military missions have from a very early date been considered to harbour the risk of politicising the military and weakening democratic control of the use of force and ultimately of government. As the study of civil-military relations has progressed – through landmarks such as Morris Janowitz' sociologically-grounded work on the relationship (considered by Janowitz to be in a process of convergence) between militaries and their societies<sup>3</sup> and a later focus on institutional arrangements that accompanied a shift in focus to the specific dilemmas of postcolonial states – internal missions have remained a constant concern. Throughout various novel iterations of civil-military relations theory, such as Charles Moskos' focus on institutions and occupations<sup>4</sup>; Peter Feaver's principal agent theory, informed by microeconomics<sup>5</sup>, and Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory which lifts the necessity of a distinction between the political and military spheres<sup>6</sup>, the politically-oriented deployment of the armed forces within a states' borders is considered a violation of sound practice for democratic control.



Indeed the existence of these missions is taken by an influential model to be itself an indicator of deficiencies of civilian supremacy:

...different combinations of external and internal threat environments shape the military's "mission" and hence the pattern of civil-military relations. Missions can be distinguished according to whether a given military's key tasks are internal or external and whether they are limited to war-fighting or include such non-military functions as nation-building, internal security, humanitarian relief, and social-welfare provision. External military missions are the most conducive to healthy patterns of civil-military relations, whereas non-military, internal missions often engender various pathologies. ...

[t]he threat environment that a nation confronts determines in large part the military's mission and hence military subordination to civil authority. A state faced traditional, external military challenge is likely to have stable civil-military relations. ...

In contrast, if a country faces significant internal threats, the institutions of civilian authority will most likely be weak and deeply divided, making it difficult for civilians to control the military. Civilian politicians often cannot resist the temptation to bring the military into the domestic political arena...<sup>7</sup>

This is perhaps particularly true of those who studied the Latin American context, where military establishments have – often as function of the lack of civilian capacity – since their inception

...demonstrated a propensity to expand their missions beyond external war-fighting. Armed forces throughout the region have been involved in public works (laying roads, building dams, and constructing buildings), civic action (delivering education, health and other services to disadvantaged groups), internal policing (including antidrug and antiterrorist activities), and even economic activity (running both military-related and consumer-oriented enterprises). Democratization has pushed the issue of the military's proper role to the fore and led some governments to scale back at least the military's involvement in the arms industry.<sup>8</sup>

### *Southern experiences*

All of these theories are in some way or another firmly grounded in the experience of the Northern Hemisphere, particularly the North Atlantic ambit, and share an evident common normative judgment establishing Northern paradigms of military activity as desirable while condemning patterns dominant elsewhere as deviant. Scholars of civil-military relations recognised early on the necessity to take into account the effects of divergent processes of institutionalization and socioeconomic and political development in global South<sup>9</sup> and later in the heir states to the Soviet Empire<sup>10</sup>. In this sense the burgeoning civil-military relations literature has increasingly taken into account the divergent traditions outside the area of origin of its dominant theories. Indeed Brazil is a prominent example of these divergences, in which are rooted the differences between it and Western European states in propensity to deploy the armed forces for internal policing.

In keeping with the postcolonial experience of many states in the region, Brazil's Army played a fundamental role in the territorial consolidation of the modern Brazilian state, particularly in the remote and sparsely-populated Amazonian region. Indeed it often represented the only presence in remote areas of the country. This presence has significant psychological importance, particularly as large swathes of territory accrued to Brazil based on the legal principle of *uti possidetis*, further entrenched through by the provision – by the Army – of infrastructure such as roads, telegraph lines and hospitals.

The Army was further instrumental in bringing economic development to remote areas, particularly the Amazon<sup>11</sup>. In this sense the Brazilian armed forces have always possessed a strong internal component to their mission, to which the civilian population is accustomed, which are anchored in the Constitution, and of which internal policing roles such as those exercised in the current context of urban pacification are simply another iteration. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution explicit places public safety within the purview of the country's various police forces (through the absence of mention of armed forces among agencies tasked with it), yet assigns to the Armed Forces the task of maintaining public order if called upon to do so by one of the branches of the state:

Article 142. The Armed Forces, comprised of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order.

...

Article 144. Public security, the duty of the State and the right and responsibility of all, is exercised to preserve public order and the safety of persons and property, by means of the following agencies:

1. federal police;
2. federal highway police;
3. federal railway police,
4. civil polices.
5. military polices and military fire brigades.<sup>12</sup>

As will be shown below, in most Western European countries a clearer distinction is made between the internal and external ambits of armed forces' action, with civilian police forces retaining exclusivity in the maintenance of law and order internally and the armed forces possessing an external mandate with exception subject to very tight control.

## Internal missions and urban pacification in Western Europe

As stated above, Western Europe generally lacks the type of political and socioeconomic conditions that create situations where it is necessary to call on the armed forces to assist overpowered police forces in the maintenance of law and order in the face of organised crime and civil unrest. Typically, it has been possible to deal with such situations through a strengthening of civilian, internal police forces; one way of characterizing this distinction is to distinguish between forces controlled by the Interior or Ministries on the one hand, and troops under the control of the Ministry of Defence on the other.

Western Europe in particular, however, has seen significant changes in its internal security landscape following the recent rise of terrorism and its blurring of the lines between domestic and international sources of threat. This has led to an increased identification of national security – usually associated with the armed forces and external armed threats – with traditional police tasks such as internal order and control of civilian movement across borders.

As a result, rather than to militarize police tasks, the response has been to define national security in such a way as to increase the role of the police and the justice system in maintaining it – such as increased migratory controls, and limitations of civil rights such as preventive detention as an antiterrorist measure. What is perceived as the ensuing merging of police and military logics – and the emergence of increased applicability of military tools to threats of civilian origin, leading to a diminution of civil rights – has been sharply criticized, including by scholars, particularly in France<sup>13</sup>.

Alongside the armed forces' burgeoning role in combatting terrorism, most Western European constitutions, while restricting militaries' internal tasks, permit MoD-controlled forces to act in a secondary role to strengthen civilian agencies' capacities in emergency situations. These internal missions, however, are not based in a tradition of internal deployment and never involve the use of armed force directly by the military in a domestic setting.

Empirically, alongside the growing convergence of police and military anti-terrorism tasks, European armed forces' internal missions are limited to assistance in the case of natural disasters, maritime search-and-rescue, and increasingly in security and logistics efforts surrounding large sporting events and political summits. These missions are carried out – similarly to Brazil, although their secondary and exceptional nature is more clearly stated – only at the explicit behest of civilian authorities. The following section will provide examples from four national contexts: Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy.

It should be noted that there is a difference between manners of dividing the internal and external forms of the state monopoly on force in the Germanic and Mediterranean ambits. The less rigid conceptual separation in practice between police and military roles in South America reflects a colonization process rooted in Iberian patterns; constabulary forces – a *via media* straddling what has, in the United States, come to be summed up in the distinction established by the Posse Comitatus Act<sup>14</sup> – are common in Southern Europe and largely absent in the continent's North. These include Italy's *Carabinieri*, the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, the *Guardia Nacional Republicana* in Portugal, and in France the *Gendarmerie*. Though all of these forces have internal law and order as their primary mission, all are military character and subjected to varying degrees of control by their nations' respective Ministries of Defence.





### Germany

Due to the legacies left by the Second World War and the Holocaust, the use of force by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany is regulated very strictly<sup>15</sup>, and oversight is placed firmly in the hands of the legislative branch.<sup>16</sup> The deployment of the *Bundeswehr* (Federal Armed Forces) is regulated by two paragraphs of the Constitution, which place strict limits on the circumstances of internal use, calling for extreme circumstances and the exhaustion of all civilian resources beforehand:

#### Article 35

[Legal and administrative assistance and assistance during disasters]

(1) All federal and Land authorities shall render legal and administrative assistance to one another.

(2) In order to maintain or restore public security or order, a Land in particularly serious cases may call upon personnel and facilities of the Federal Border Police to assist its police when without such assistance the police could not fulfil their responsibilities, or could do so only with great difficulty. In order to respond to a grave accident or a natural disaster, a Land may call for the assistance of police forces of other Länder or of personnel and facilities of other administrative authorities, of the Armed Forces, or of the Federal Border Police.

(3) If the natural disaster or accident endangers the territory of more than one Land, the Federal Government, insofar as is necessary to combat the danger, may instruct the Land governments to place police forces at the disposal of other Länder, and may deploy units of the Federal Border Police or the Armed Forces to support the police. Measures taken by the Federal Government pursuant to the first sentence of this paragraph shall be rescinded at any time at the demand of the Bundesrat, and in any event as soon as the danger is removed.<sup>17</sup>

...

## Article 87a

## [Armed Forces]

(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their numerical strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the budget.

(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.

(3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.<sup>18</sup>

As a result of this strict regulation, and of the absence of the need for extensive urban pacification in Germany's context of high development and federalist decentralization, instances of the internal deployment of the *Bundeswehr* have been rare. Indeed the German experience is somewhat indicative of Western European experience overall in a number of ways: first, urban pacification in the sense the termed is used in South America, implying the use of force against its own citizens, is absent; second, when used internally, the armed forces have been used – under the rubric of mutual aid (*technische Amtshilfe*) – to bolster the capacities of civilian agencies in times of exception such as natural catastrophes and the provision of security for large events; and finally, beginning with the advent of left-wing terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s and receiving a substantial boost after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the armed forces have collaborated with civilian authorities in efforts to counter terrorism. It is important to note that where responses to such phenomena have taken place, this response has typically come in the form of strengthening civilian police capacity, rather than increasing military participation. As can be expected, the evolution of this pattern has been highly dependent on reaction to specific events.

The German armed forces have an extensive tradition of placing their capacities at the disposal of civilian agencies in times of natural catastrophe. Perhaps the first example of this was the North Sea flood of 1962, which inundated large parts of Hamburg, Germany's second-largest city. The city's interior minister, Helmut Schmidt – who would later become Federal Chancellor – assigned the *Bundeswehr* a role in controlling the floods based on personal contacts rather than official legitimation. Controversial at the time, this later became standard practice based on Article 35 of the Basic Law and was repeated, for example, in the 1997 flood of the Oder River and a number of other natural disasters.<sup>19</sup>

The kidnapping and killing of 12 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich laid combined the hosting of a large international event with a concrete terrorist threat on German soil, and laid bare severe shortcomings in the country's ability to handle these situations. Partially in an attempt to cast off associations of the past, German authorities were reluctant to use force, and not overly adept at doing so. Additionally, the efficacy of the response was hampered by a federal system which placed oversight of the response measures with local and state (*Land*) officials. Here, it is important to note divergences in response to South American experience: the bungling of the response to the Munich attack led to the creation, within two months, of the Federal Border Police's GSG-9 unit, today considered among the world's best. Rather than delegating response to the military hierarchy, there was a significant increase in civilian firepower and professionalism, as well as an adjustment of federalism to allow for national co-ordination. Co-ordination on terrorism would increase further in response to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings, including the fusion of civilian and military operational and intelligence resources, under civilian command, in the Joint Terror Defence Center (*Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum* – GTAZ), founded in December 2004 to coordinate the activities of over 40 security agencies with mandates ranging from police to military intelligence to border control.

In more recent years the Armed Forces have been called upon to participate in security measures for large events, most prominently the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, where tens of thousands of protesters had gathered, and the 2006 FIFA World Cup. Post-9/11 calls by mostly conservative politicians to legally formalize internal military deployments of this nature met with strong resistance and were abandoned in favor of strengthening civilian capacities.<sup>20</sup>



### *Great Britain*

Germany's experience is quite similar to that of other Western European states. Alongside major similarities one significant difference to date has been in the area of immigration, which has received more attention as a security issue in Great Britain and France due to more concentrated immigrant backgrounds. The British armed forces are very rarely used internally, mostly for disaster relief<sup>21</sup>. One exception has been the extensive involvement of the UK military in security preparation for the 2012 London Olympics, where uniformed personnel have taken on a crucial role and a high degree of public visibility in what has been dubbed *Exercise Olympic Guardian*.<sup>22</sup> The Armed Forces also played a part in responses – both immediate and in terms of protective policy – to the London bombings of 7 July 2005; however, once again these roles have not involved the use of force against British citizens or residents as a matter of policy. In this sense British policy has been particularly marked by the events termed *Bloody Sunday*. On 30 January 1972, 26 protesters at a march in Northern Ireland, were shot by members of the British Army's Parachute Regiment, deployed in assistance to the Royal Ulster Constabulary; 13 were killed. This event led to a number of inquiries and to a re-thinking of both the UK government's Northern Ireland policy and patterns of military deployment to that province.

### *France*

France has since the end of World War II constituted a specific situation in Europe in terms of defence policy. During this Cold War, the armed forces' defensive focus was not territorial and on the USSR, but rather on the internal Communist threat. In the 1950s and 1960s it was drawn further away from the practice of other states by the situation in Algeria. A reorientation of military missions followed the failure to prevent Algerian independence; they would subsequently coincide more closely with NATO orientations, with the nuclear *force de frappe* also contributing to establishing a predominantly external focus.

The French experience is particularly interesting for Brazilian analysts in that theories first brought to Brazil in French texts and by French specialists (based largely on experience in Algeria and Indochina) provided the basis for the *Escola Superior de Guerra* to develop its internally-oriented *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* during the same period. This doctrine laid the groundwork for moving away from what had previously been a more objective model of military professionalism with more external missions, albeit always with a strong component of internal developmentalism. But the internal missions made ponderable by the military doctrine, which also took on a strong American counterinsurgency mould later on, would increasingly give shape to the internal activities of the Brazilian armed forces. Indicatively, the National Security Doctrines used in Latin America and based on US and French concepts are considered by many Northern theorists to be prime examples of internal missions leading to increasing political involvement, clashes with the government and the population, and later to coups, particularly in the Southern Cone. In more recent years the French armed forces have increasingly been called upon to perform internal counterterrorism functions, including through measures such as the *Plan Vigipirate*,

instituted in 1978 and intensified significantly throughout the last decade.<sup>23</sup> In this sense, France is somewhat of an exception, albeit one heavily criticized by civil society and the political opposition.

In terms of the rest of Europe, it should be noted that increasingly the acceptance of the predominant Northern paradigm is considered a key indicator of progress in civil-military relations and value diffusion in states in Eastern Europe who have joined NATO as they internalize norms of liberal democratic control.

## Concluding thoughts

In observing militaries' internal roles in Europe, it is important to consider the larger context. Many European militaries lost their main mission after the end of the Cold War, and subsequently began to search for a new objective. Rather than turning inwards, most European militaries have been transformed into expeditionary forces with an eye to participating in peace operations, with an internal role never really constituting a viable moral or political option. Ironically, then, where European soldiers do train for urban combat, crowd control and crimefighting, they do so with a view to deploying *outside* their own countries. Counterterrorism has emerged as a lesser component of the new mission after 9/11, but as mentioned this largely has been carried out with the framework of the policy primacy of civilian law enforcement.

In general, however, one sees the Armed Forces not being used extensively in the UK after the 2005 bombings, not being used to quell rioting and looting in 2011; in France the riots in the suburbs in 2005 and 2008 were handled by the CRS and the Gendarmerie; in Spain ETA is largely confronted by the constabulary Guardia Civil. Italy constitutes somewhat of an exception, which proves the rule that the need for internal missions correlates to the urgency of the challenge to state authority. Here when the Mafia is combatted by the Carabinieri, the Guardia di Finanza and other police agencies, there is typically extensive help, but only in a subsidiary way, from the Army and even the Naval Infantry.

A look at specific examples shows that the traditionally externally oriented armed forces are not being used for internal missions. We see a very different situation all around from Latin America and Brazil; while the level of organized crime being confronted is much higher in the global South, conversely the level of perceived terrorist threat being faced in Europe is much more alarming. In short we see that differences predominate with respect to the armed forces' internal roles in South America and Europe, especially as they relate to the use of force inherent in urban pacification.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Peter D. Feaver. "Civil-Military Relations". *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 2 (1999); pp. 211-241. Here, pp. 214-215.
- <sup>2</sup> Cambridge: Belknap (Harvard University Press), 1957.
- <sup>3</sup> Morris Janowitz. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960.
- <sup>4</sup> See *inter alia* Charles Moskos and Frank R. Wood eds., *The Military: more than just a job?*. Washington : Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988; Charles C. Moskos. "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization." *Armed Forces & Society*. Vol. 4, No. 1 (1977); pp. 41–50.
- <sup>5</sup> Most consistently laid out in *Armed Servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- <sup>6</sup> *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- <sup>7</sup> Michael C. Desch. "Threat Environments and Military Missions". In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Civil-military relations and democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; pp. 12-29. Here, pp. 12-14.
- <sup>8</sup> Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. "Introduction". In Diamond and Plattner, pp. ix-xvii. Here, p. xv.
- <sup>9</sup> On the inapplicability of the Northern paradigm to states, see, among others, Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations". *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol 26, No. 1 (1999); pp. 7-26. Studies on the specificities of armed forces' roles in Latin American societies and polities include Alfred Stepan. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988; Alfred Stepan, ed. *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973; Pion-Berlin, David, ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001; Farcau, Bruce. *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military*. Westport: Praeger, 1996.; Hunter, Wendy. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997; Frederick Nunn, *The time of the generals: Latin American professional militarism in world perspective*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.
- <sup>10</sup> See the studies in Hans Born, ed. *Civil-military relations in Europe: learning from crisis and institutional change*. New York: Routledge, 2006; and the sophisticated analysis by Alexandra Gheciu of NATO norm transmission in *NATO in the "new Europe" : the politics of international socialization after the Cold War*; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- <sup>11</sup> See, for example Hunter.
- <sup>12</sup> Brazil. *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*. Available from [http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file\\_id=218270](http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=218270). Accessed 1 May 2012.
- <sup>13</sup> Mathieu Rigouste , "L'ennemi intérieur, de la guerre coloniale au contrôle sécuritaire". *Cultures & Conflits*. No. 67 (2007); pp. 157-174.

- <sup>14</sup> United States of America. *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878*. 20 Stat. L., 145. Available from [http://www.dojgov.net/posse\\_comitatus\\_act.htm](http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm); accessed 1 May 2012. The Posse Comitatus Act was intended to prevent the use of the federal armed forces by local governments in the wake of the Civil War.
- <sup>15</sup> See, for example, Thomas U. Berger. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; and Maja Zehfuss, *Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- <sup>16</sup> See Dieter Wiefelspütz. *Das Parlamentssheer: Der Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte im Ausland, der konstitutive Parlamentsvorbehalt und das Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005; and *Der Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr und das Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft Dr. Clemens Lorei, 2008.
- <sup>17</sup> Federal Republic of Germany. *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*. Available from <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>; accessed 4 May 2012.
- <sup>18</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>19</sup> It is important to note as well that the Bundeswehr has been deployed over 150 times abroad on humanitarian assistance missions—an occurrence therefore much more common than its deployment within Germany's borders. On both internal and external deployments, see Bernhard Chiari and Magnus Pahl, eds. *Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr*. München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010.
- <sup>20</sup> Wolfram Wette. "Der Feind im Innern". *Die Zeit*. 7 October 2008. Available from [http://www.zeit.de/2003/24/A\\_Milit\\_Bareins\\_8atze](http://www.zeit.de/2003/24/A_Milit_Bareins_8atze); *Der Spiegel*. "Bundeswehr im Inneren: Schäuble will Grundgesetzänderung nach der Wahl". 27 August 2009. Available from <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,645345,00.html>; *Rheinische Post*. "Terrorabwehr: Friedrich für Bundeswehr-Einsatz im Innern". 25 May 2011. Available from <http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/friedrich-fuer-bundeswehr-einsatz-im-innern-1.1275883>; *Frankfurter Rundschau*. "Bundeswehr: Einsatz im Innern droht Aus im Bundesrat". 7 October 2008. Available from <http://www.fr-online.de/politik/bundeswehr-einsatz-im-innern-droht-aus-im-bundesrat,1472596,3446736.html>. All accessed 1 May 2012.
- <sup>21</sup> See Rupert Wieloch. "The humanitarian use of the military". *Forced Migration Review*. Vol. 18 (2003); pp. 32-33. Available from <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR18/fmr1813.pdf>. Accessed 1 May 2012.
- <sup>22</sup> See the following related reports from the British Broadcasting Corporation website: "London 2012: Security measures" (30 April 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17896225>; "RAF Typhoon jets arrive in London to test Olympic security" (2 May 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17922490>; "Military begins Olympics security exercises in London" (3 May 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17934042>.
- <sup>23</sup> See Rigouste; and Philippe Bonditti et al. *Le rôle des militaires dans la lutte contre le terrorisme*. Paris: Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense, 2008. Available from [http://dev.ulb.ac.be/sciencespo/dossiers\\_membres/olsson-christian/fichiers/olsson-christian-publication18.pdf](http://dev.ulb.ac.be/sciencespo/dossiers_membres/olsson-christian/fichiers/olsson-christian-publication18.pdf). Accessed 4 May 2012.





## Climate Change as a Security Issue

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This paper reflects some of the discussions taken place at the *Climate Change and Energy as Security Issues* panel in the VIII Forte de Copacabana Conference hosted by Konrad Adenauer Foundation in partnership with the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI). The Forte de Copacabana Conference is one of the most important forums on Security Affairs in South America, drawing experts from around the world, especially those from South America and Europe. In this latest edition the main theme of the Conference was “New Issues on the International Security Agenda”. Following this theme the Panel on Climate Change and Energy discussed how these two elements have appeared in the international security agenda and what has changed. In discussing this issue, we had top level discussants that provided both highlights and interesting opinions. The discussants were: Francine Jácome (Institute for Social and Political Studies); Jeffrey Mazo (International Institute for Strategic Studies); and Odilon Marcuzzo (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials).

Traditionally, Security Studies are composed of the negative relations between States and old fashioned military threats. This may be easily explained and exemplified with context, the birth of International Relations (with capital letters – meaning the field of International Relations – similar to Pierre Bourdieu's Field concept<sup>2</sup>). International Relations was born soon after World War I. The first centers/universities in UK were at that time in the US, and were mainly concerned with studying and understanding the phenomenon

of war. Avoiding scourge of the war was therefore the ultimate objective of the, so called, Field of International Relations (IR).

As time passed, International Relations has grown in two different ways, which both caused significant discussion in the Field. On one hand, the first expansion refers to the “progress” that transnational relations have undergone (here the use of transnational rather than international is significant to recognize that aside from States, other actors started to have a pivotal role in the “international” arena). The interdependence between states and a wide range of actors has benefited from the scientific revolution, with improved communication, transportation, logistics, informatics, etc. This new level of interconnectedness met its apogee with the historic phenomenon of Globalization, identified after the Cold War. At this time a variety of analysts were producing new concepts to address this new phenomenon, such as “global village”, “international citizen”, and others. Bottom line, this new context of international relations generated a wide range of issues that before did not exist or at least were relegated to a second plan.

On the other hand, a second form of expansion also contributed to this new generation of issues that had started to gain ground in the international agenda. This was an expansion in the Field of International Relations, not only in the subjects studied but in the actors that studied it. By that I mean, during the XX Century, international relations as an academic field grew in importance all over the world. Soon after the establishment of the first centers in the UK and US, many other countries started to develop their own centers, subsequently adding their perspective to the Field. Another characteristic of this moment is the incredible speed that most countries formed their IR Field. One notable example is the expansion of IR undergraduate courses in Brazil. The first course was established in the early 1970’s at University of Brasilia, by the 2000’s Brazil had already close to 150 courses.

Together these two developments have fueled an intense debate within the ever-expanding Field of the International Relations. If during most of the XX Century the discussions were divided into High Politics (security/military issues) and Low Politics (economic, social, environmental, etc.), now there are many analysts looking for ways to include a different range of subjects with an agenda that focuses on discussion. Most of those “new actors” (that vary both in gender and geography) advocate many other subjects as priorities in the international agenda.

With that said, it is interesting to stop and look at one of the main methods used by many analysts to support their perspectives, the changing definition of security. By changing the concept of security, it was possible to include other issues under the High Politics umbrella. Another similar way was establishing relations between any given issues to military or to a threat – from there the correlation with security would be much easier.

Many schools of thought have tried to develop theories and mechanisms to create a framework where issues formerly considered, ‘Low Politics’ issues, would instead be considered a security issue. One approach that I would find particular interesting is the “securitization theory” from the Copenhagen School – in which “security” is a discursive process that is

used to define priorities. By that they mean, at first a securitizing actor will outline a given issue that would pose a grave threat to community survival, if he succeeds to legitimize his discourse, he will then manage to move this issue from the realm of normal politics to the emergency level, where it will be possible to channel extra resources to approach the issue. In other words, according to this framework, security is a “self-referential practice”<sup>3</sup> and not necessarily a static phenomenon. Matters of security may vary in time and space, since the priorities of any community is its own.

Environmental issues are not that different. With the great debate on what subjects should be considered under the security realm, the environment found its way backed by a variety of actors (green political parties, foundations, NGOs, scholars, among others). Today it is hardly debated if the environment agenda (mainly that of the climate change “threat”), is a security matter. The biggest issue of focus is that it is hard to determine when and how gravely environmental consequences will impact on our society. Another challenge is how to explain, as Richard Ullman<sup>4</sup> would say, to society that environment issues indeed should be regarded as a security threat and therefore it should become a priority in the international agenda.

Climate change has been a problem to human security (causing famine and even death due to the climate reaching extremes) since the beginning of time, the so called Little Ice Age between 1300 and 1850 caused major problems to the population throughout the world (climate related detriments during this period were best documented in Europe). Even though there is a long history of our natural environment intervening in human survival, the association between environment and security is not that old. Some of the first connections can be traced back to the 1960 s. These traces can be found in the Vietnam War, when the US engaged in environmental warfare. Herbicides, chemical agents, salinization of arable lands and water poisoning were part of the overall military strategy to break the spirit of the Vietnamese army and population. The “misconducts” of the American army during the Cold War have generated criticism that led to the US department of Energy and Department of Defense adopting a different stance. The “military environmental security complex”<sup>5</sup> was developed. It not only has an interesting significance in the role that the US military has played in coping with environment problems, but also in the understanding that this institution has unique capabilities of influence and could act where no other could.

In the early 1980 s, several authors who were trying to expand the Field of Security Studies, began to include the Environment agenda in global debate. This happened in a variety of ways. One of the most interesting approaches of this movement was made by Richard Ullman<sup>6</sup>. Ullman was critical of the “traditional” way of addressing security and he argued that this approach was, in part, a result of lack of consensus on security definitions – which, in turn, resulted in many politicians pushing forward only “traditional” solutions regarding security and their avoidance in addressing new definitions. To Ullman, energy and natural disasters were given less importance than they deserved. To exemplify the lack of due attention, he provided an interesting study on public attention regarding security issues. He compared the threat of a nuclear war, which in his opinion was becoming less probable

each day, with the expected earthquake on the San Andreas Fault (US West Coast), which undoubtedly would cause far more destruction and deaths than the nuclear event. In his opinion it is impressive that the US Government directs huge resources to an improbable (which may never occur) nuclear event, and far fewer resources to a natural phenomenon that would definitely happen (yet not at a distinguishable time).

Ullman also stated that most of the conflicts that have been fought until today were related to territories and resources. Even today, since the vast majority of the world has defined borders, future wars would probably be fought over scarcity of natural resources, which will and have been deeply affected by climate change. As a result of these “new” conflicts a wide range of problems will gain importance such as migration/refugees. Ullman concludes by emphasizing the need for a “changing of consensus” when referring to security. He calls for a movement of redefining security that could readdress foreseeable threats (or at least those that will really happen, even if we do not know when).

These ideas have generated a whole new set of discussions that have become the most visible part of the relation between environment and security – that is, the idea that environmental issues can lead to conflict. This point has received a lot of attention, and still is the eventual basis for much of the literature on the subject. The idea that scarcity of natural resources is enough to fuel both inter and intrastate violent conflict has already been proven. The Toronto Group which was formed in the 1980’s and led by Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon, has since become a prominent hub for discussion on the matter.

The Toronto Group developed a series of case studies on how environment issues, most notably scarcity of natural resources, could have a direct causal relationship with society, with disturbance that could lead to violent conflict. They conducted research throughout the world (Americas, Asia, Africa and Middle East). Understanding the impacts that the depletion of a given resource would cause in given communities, they could trace the roots of the conflict. To that matter, they developed a key concept, of “resource capture”<sup>7</sup> which stated that certain groups could capture vital resources, resulting in its scarcity, causing social instability- by prompting famine, forced migration, etc.



The Toronto Group's Scarcity Theory had received a lot of attention by the time of the studies. But as any other thesis, critics started to challenge their basic assumptions. An interesting approach was the "honey pot" hypothesis, which stated exactly the opposite idea of the scarcity one. The "honey pot" suggests that it is not the scarcity that is the cause of social instability (and conflict), but the abundance is also a great source of strife, since local abundance of resources often generates struggles for its ownership.

Until the 1990s, in parallel, it is worth noting that most of the approaches to relate environment with security used the perspective of the state. That means, when raising awareness to environmental issues, it was common to address them as national security matters. That tendency walks hand in hand with the development of the Security Studies as a field of study. Since international security was traditionally only conceived at state level, it would be understandable that for the idea of environmental security issues would have to be related to national security. This causal relation started to fade or diminish at the same time that some theorists started to move the *locus* of security from the state to the individual. The concept of human security flourishes in the mid 90s, mainly, with the UN Report on Human Development. From this moment, a variety of authors started to develop theories that would relate international security to the human (in)security.

The main aspect of relating environment issues with international security is the understanding that environmental issues know no boundaries and therefore, it impacts not the state itself, but the communities within the region are affected. More importantly, the consequences of environmental threats (such as global warming, pollution and deprivation of water, desertification, etc.) directly affect people and increase human vulnerability. For the proposers of this idea, the approach towards dealing with environmental issues (most notably climate change) should not be at the state level, but at the international level. To them, only international coordinated action will be able to tackle and diminish its impacts.

Since the early 1990s the "beginning" of the globalization process, has spurred unprecedented economic and technological development. The global chains of production have increasingly integrated the world just as the revolution of communication technology has metaphorically shortened distances across the world. But that did not come without a cost. The internationalization process, aided by multinational companies, was not only led by cheap labor. The companies not only chose countries with circumventive labor and environmental regulations, but they did so at a time when the central (different word than central) countries were redrafting their environmental laws in face of the rapid degradation, a degradation accelerated by the industrial process.

During this period the biggest villain was the greenhouse effect. The general idea was that the careless emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> gas in the atmosphere was considered to cause great harm to the ozone layer and its depletion would leave human kind exposed to gamma rays from the sun, which would be one of the main sources of skin cancer. The protection of the ozone layer gained a lot of public attention, reaching homes worldwide. There was also a lot of criticism of countries that outsourced its production processes abroad, looking for

looser regulations in order to continue its emissions. Some critics claimed that the damage to the ozone layer would be done anyway, inevitably, and since the ozone layer knows no national borders, the harm would be the same. In contrast, public pressure got so strong that, in 1997, after several international events on the subject the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in Japan, aiming at reducing global emissions and diminishing the greenhouse effect. This was the first international action to tackle global warming, and it was starting to become the new international target.

Currently, the most visible face of environmental threat is the climate change. In fact it is interesting to note that during the transition to the XXI century, the idea of global warming was incorporated in the climate change framework. On these first two decades of the XXI century, the impacts of the global warming (eg. climate change) have split the attention (along with the sustainable development, which will be mentioned later) at international forums of environmental issues. The negotiation and the “failure” of the COP15 in Copenhagen gained a large coverage of the media and therefore a lot of public attention.

The impact of climate change is being propagated, by many actors, as the main threat to human security in our time. Unlike the case of the Ozone Layer deterioration, mostly causing skin cancer (although worst case scenarios illustrate the Earth unfit to survive due to the strength of the direct incision of the sun), climate change offers a wide range of impacts that are already causing disturbances in our lives. The first and most famous signs were the El Niño and La Niña meteorological phenomenon that altered the rain season in a significant part of the Americas. But, along with these events, many other impacts have been alerted by the environmental epistemological community, such as:

- rising of sea levels, which pose a considerable danger to some coastal and low altitude countries like the Netherlands. Some islands like, Tuvalu, is at risk of disappearing under water (which brings a whole new set of discussions regarding whether a nation exists without territory/boundaries?). The issue of rising sea levels has a direct relation with the global warming issue, since the increase of global temperatures is starting to melt the ice cap of the extreme north and south.
- changing of the rain season has changed the agricultures of many countries. These changes have not only impacted the economies of various countries, but also World’s food security, since the change in weather can make some regions unfit for growing traditional crops. Anyhow, the period of adaptation, will be a difficult one, as a result of the challenges imposed by the necessity of adapting the traditions to a new reality.
- desertification has a lot to do with the exploitation of the soil – mainly caused by its misuse, the process seems to have been intensified by the climate changes.
- extreme weather conditions are becoming more frequent each year and it is the main responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. By extreme weather conditions we understand record temperatures in summer (heat) and in winter (cold/snow) and abnormal precipitation of rain in the wet season.



To summarize, it is possible to say that all these phenomena, which are related to the climate change, impact severely on societies and lead to forced migration; cause famine, poverty and social instability, just to name a few. Such a reality not only threatens human security, but also could unleash violent conflicts throughout the world.

To exemplify some of the aforementioned impacts from climate change and their relation with security we may refer to the recent Arab Spring. Soon after the domino effect of civil unrest in several North-African and Middle-Eastern countries, many experts began to look for the roots of those events. Certainly, chance is not to be blamed since most of the traditional causes of civil discontent were present in that scenario for quite some time. The strongest arguments pointed not to one or two causes but a myriad of issues that, together, enabled the protests to gain enough strength to topple their leaders (in the case of Tunisia and Egypt and, in a certain extent, Libya) or at least organize massive and protracted strife in their countries (such as Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and others).

Some commentators, such as Jeffrey Mazo and Sarah Johnstone<sup>8</sup>, suggest that one of the issues that contributed to the explosion of protests was the spike in food prices. In their opinion the extreme weather conditions in 2010 (heavy rains, drought, bushfire and even sand storms) has caused significant worldwide losses, mainly in grain production. What is interesting is that those events were completely unexpected, since, for example, the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) anticipated that 2010 would count higher production levels and lower prices, in the case of wheat<sup>9</sup>.

This situation worsens when we take into account the “energy security” concern. In the last decade we have seen a huge movement in developing renewable sources of energy.

Biofuel is one of the most emblematic, above all for the developing countries. The movement towards the biofuel was twofold. In one hand, it had an economical side – which is concerned with the exhaustion of the traditional sources of energy and with political/social instability of some oil-rich regions and has been pushing on renewable alternatives (eg biofuel). On the other hand, the environmental side also fostered the development of renewable sources, since the non-renewable sources have a high degree of emissions. The net result is that a consensus on the development on alternative sources of energy and the biofuel have an important role in this framework. But what we should bear in mind is that the main raw materials for the biofuel has grains and other cultures such as wheat, corn, soybean, sugarcane and beets<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, in a scenario in which extreme weather conditions have been punishing the crops, the increase on consumption for the biofuel industry pushes the prices even higher.

Despite the fact that the links between environmental issues and international security have made their way to the top of the international agenda, there are those who have a more apocalyptical discourse (urging the environmental problems to be threatening as our very survival) and those who believe that there is certain degree of exaggeration. Those skeptics, such as Julian Simon, argue that most of the discussions rest on false premises. In his opinion, humanity has already faced both exhaustion of important resources and periods of harsh weather. However, none of those events managed to overcome the human ingenuity. He pointed that whenever an essential resource presented risk of exhaustion the economy forced humanity to find an alternative and, whenever confronted with life-threatening weather conditions, we have always managed to survive the adversities. Therefore, there will not be the time when we will face unsolvable environmental threats. Most probably, for Simon, we will find alternatives, viably economically, for energy and technologies that will diminish the impact of the environmental changes.

As a conclusion, the first challenge is the conclusion itself. The subject of treating environmental issues as a security problem is complex, since there are only few consensus points. Probably all of us understand that some environmental issues, especially climate change, are becoming a pressing matter (at an impressive speed), but we do not agree on a number of things, such as: what are really the environmental issues that should be treated as priority; how to cope with those (identified) issues; who are the proper actors and what is the forum to deal with it.

Perhaps, the problem is that we do realize that all should be considered one of the priorities of the international agenda, but the actions towards it does not reflect the same importance of the rhetoric. The consciousness of the importance of environmental issues is being built, however slowly. The question is if we will have the time to deal with the future challenges. Perhaps, we should work fast in “securitizing” this subject, (as Buzan *et al* would say) by turning it a priority and therefore allocating more resources (of every kind) to hold this process, since it is not enough to acknowledge its importance but it is imperative to prioritize the subject. Perhaps, there will be a time when the economical process (as the skeptics would say) will not manage to answer in time the challenges that we face.



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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> It is imperative to thank Larissa Martha and William Brooke, interns at CEBRI who helped in the development of this paper.
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## Climate Change and Energy Security as Military Issues

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In his first major speech after taking office in 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said there was an urgent need to reframe the debate on climate change from an environmental to a development and security issue, and that it would be one of his top priorities as secretary-general.<sup>1</sup> Six weeks later the UN Security Council held its first debate on climate change and security. The evening before, then UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, who was to chair the debate, gave the Annual Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture in New York. She called the security implications of climate change ‘a gathering storm’ – the title of Churchill’s history of the build-up to world war in the 1930s.<sup>2</sup>

This high-level debate was a reflection of an emerging consensus among analysts and policymakers that climate change posed a real security threat – if not, strictly speaking, a direct military threat, but rather a threat to human, economic and systemic security, to which militaries, like the rest of society, would have to respond, and which militaries might or might not be able to mitigate. The year 2007 also saw the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).<sup>3</sup> Former US Vice President Al Gore, author of the 2006 best-seller *An Inconvenient Truth*, and the IPCC authors were jointly awarded the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. There were also reports from at least four major security- or international-affairs think tanks on the question of climate change and security.<sup>4</sup> Ban Ki-moon and Margaret Beckett were joined by a growing

list of national and international leaders, among them French President Nicolas Sarkozy, UK Defence Secretary John Reid, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, EU foreign-policy chief Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Lord Nicholas Stern, author of a review of the economics of climate change commissioned by the UK Treasury.<sup>5</sup>

The principle concept behind this emerging consensus is that climate change will act – and indeed is already acting – as a ‘threat multiplier’, a concept introduced into the debate in the report from the CNA Corporation, published, with the oversight of a panel of 11 retired generals and admirals and under the direction of a former undersecretary of defense for environmental security. They concluded that projected climate change over the next 30–40 years posed a serious threat to US national security. It would, said the report, act as a ‘threat multiplier’ for instability in volatile regions and add to tensions in more stable regions.<sup>6</sup> The EU/EC report on ‘Climate Change and International Security’ from Solana and Ferrero-Waldner concluded that climate change was ‘a threat multiplier which ... threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone’.<sup>7</sup> The 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that ‘climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration. While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In addition, extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defence support to civil authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster response’.<sup>8</sup> And in his keynote speech at the VIII International Security Conference of Forte de Copabana in Rio in 2011, Brazilian General Francisco Carlos Modesto, Director of the Department for Strategic Intelligence at the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, listed climate change as one of the constellation of new and emerging challenges to global security.

## Nature of the threat

There is a tendency to focus on how much hotter the world is getting as a result of increased greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere as a result of human activity. But global warming is a driver of climate change, rather than a symptom. Natural variability in the weather from year to year is still much greater than the long-term warming trend, and it will be several decades before the unambiguous impact of global warming begins to be noticeable against the backdrop of extreme events such as seasonal or multi-year droughts; heat waves and cold snaps; and storms and floods. But an increase in the frequency and severity of such extreme events is expected to be an early manifestation of man-made climate change, and there is evidence that it is happening already.<sup>9</sup> And if global warming were to occur in a steady, linear fashion, it would be much easier to anticipate and adapt to its effects. It is the increased uncertainty and volatility in the climate, as much as the absolute amount of warming, that is the biggest problem in the short to medium term.

Other potential security threats that have been identified include boundary disputes and conflicts over resources. Rising sea levels are changing coastlines and swamping low-lying islands, which may eventually impact maritime territorial claims. The thinning and shrinking summer ice in the Arctic is making potentially huge resources, especially oil and gas, accessible for the first time, and will soon open new shipping routes, which will mean big changes to the geo-strategic and geo-economic balance. Climate change in the Antarctic, on the other hand, will be a longer-term problem, and in any case there is a long-standing treaty regime in place.

Through its impacts on the availability of clean water and food, the geographical pattern of disease vectors, and the stability of communities and shelter, climate change has the potential to exacerbate human insecurity and contribute directly or indirectly to political or violent conflict in weak and failing states. This means that the types of threats to international stability emanating from such states, such as transnational organised crime, terrorism, migration and so on, will be enhanced.<sup>10</sup> The same dynamic applies in the case of the human security of the people who will be directly affected by global warming, but in this case climate change may be better described as a risk multiplier rather than a threat multiplier.

For example, climate change is one of four broad and interrelated trends threatening global food security (the others being water scarcity, competition for land and high oil prices).<sup>11</sup> The dynamics of food security are complex, but climate (or weather), as both a chronic problem and through sudden shocks, is commonly mentioned as one factor among many influencing food security in household surveys in the developing world.<sup>12</sup> Falling crop yields and crop failures due to reduced rainfall or availability of irrigation water are only part of the story. Some effects of climate change, such as longer growing seasons, may be positive in the short term in some regions, and there might even be a net positive effect with modest global temperature increases. The impacts will vary from region to region, however, and for the most part the regions worst affected will also be those already experiencing high levels of food insecurity and least able to compensate or adapt. Fisheries and aquaculture will be affected by ocean warming and acidification and destruction of coral reefs, while sea-level rise can result in salinisation of coastal soils and aquifers. Crop pathogens, such as wheat stem rust, particularly the virulent Ug99 strain (first identified in Uganda in 1999) that has been damaging normally resistant wheat crops in Africa, Asia and most recently the Middle East, are spreading more widely and more quickly as winters become wetter and warmer.<sup>13</sup>

Energy security, like food security, is bound up with climate in complex ways. The final report of the IISS Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change and Security concluded that the effects of climate change will add to the volatility and unpredictability of energy markets, especially given the complex interdependencies of global energy infrastructure. But, “unlike water or food security, there is not a direct link between changing climatic conditions and reduced energy security”.<sup>14</sup> The principle threat comes from the impact of rising sea levels and increasingly frequent and severe storm surges on low-lying coastal or off-shore infrastructure. Water availability affects all aspects of energy production, from hy-

drocarbon extraction and refining to nuclear power plant cooling to hydroelectric generation to biofuel production. As climate change begins to make potentially large new sources of hydrocarbons in the Arctic accessible, there will be wide-ranging geopolitical and geoeconomic implications. But the dynamics of the global energy market are also beginning to change in response to the threat of global warming, as countries increasingly turn to low-carbon energy sources in order to mitigate long-term climate change. As energy transformation proceeds in the next few decades, in both the mature industrial economies and the emerging economies, energy production will become increasingly local or regional, but the geoeconomic balance may change as countries seize the opportunity to develop manufacturing bases for low-carbon energy technologies and to control the resources that those technologies require.<sup>15</sup>

## Climate Wars?

To be sure, not all observers, academics and analysts agree that climate change poses a security threat.<sup>16</sup> The principal objections are four-fold. Firstly, the strength of the link between conflict and environmental factors such as climate change is contested, with some empirical studies showing no link at all. Secondly, many of the studies that do show a link between climate change and conflict suggest that in the past it has been cooling rather than warming that has been the problem. Thirdly, even if the link is established, it is unclear how relevant it is to military and strategic planning, given the uncertainties of projection. And finally, many have argued that focusing on environmental conditions or changes as a driver of conflict is counterproductive, since it might be seen as absolving individuals or governments of the blame for atrocities committed during such conflicts.

The debate over the link between environmental factors and conflict is decades old, and unlikely to be resolved soon. But it is interesting to compare it with the debate over the reality of climate change itself. Climate science, and hence the current consensus on anthropogenic global warming, is firmly grounded in a consilience of method, evidence and theory.<sup>17</sup> More specifically, the model-based projections of global warming and climate change are robust. Models differ in their specific, detailed projections, as indeed to individual runs of the same model based on slightly different starting conditions. Yet they all agree, within the limits of experimental error, on the overall warming trend; projections of climate change broadly considered are relatively insensitive to the choice of model or variables. Environmental conflict studies, on the other hand, are highly sensitive to such choices, such as how one defines war or conflict (e.g., number of deaths in a given period). Case-based studies obviate this problem, but involve subjectivities of their own. Yet there are good a priori reasons to think that the link is real, and the evidence that it is not is unpersuasive.<sup>18</sup>

Although historical precedents of climate-induced conflict, unrest and even societal collapse tend to involve global or regional cooling rather than warming, the post-industrial warming the world has already experienced is historically unprecedented. Projected global warming, even over the next few decades, leads further into uncharted territory. The rel-



evance of the historical data may also be limited because of qualitative differences between pre-industrial and industrial civilisation, and between a pre-globalised and a globalised world. Theoretical considerations also suggest that the socio-political effects induced by projected warming over the medium term will be similar to those experienced by past societies facing climate change.<sup>19</sup>

What is clear is that environmental factors are only one, and rarely the decisive, contribution to a complex interaction of other political, social and economic factors underlying conflict. Conflicts involving environmental factors occur predominantly within states, and where they do transcend state borders they tend to be sub-national rather than classic interstate conflicts. Interstate environmental issues have always tended to be resolvable through diplomacy, mediation and international law. The most pessimistic global warming projections would have to prove accurate before climate change threatened to overwhelm such mechanisms.

## Practical examples

How does the concept of climate change as a security risk multiplier work in practice? Consider the case of the Darfur region of Sudan. The violence in Darfur in the past decade was the largest and latest in a series of sporadic conflicts going back to the 1980s, originating in tribal competition over access to grazing land and water. Historically, agriculturalists and pastoralists coexisted without clashing, and in fact functioned symbiotically. But population growth, together with declining productivity of agricultural land due to low rainfall and increasing losses to pests, necessitated the expansion of land under cultivation. A simultaneous deterioration of pastureland meant pastoralists needed more area

to support a growing animal population, and shifts in ecological zones due to changes in aridity affected the competition between pastoralism and agriculture in a given area. By 2007 over two million people in Darfur had been displaced, many fleeing across the border to Chad, and the number of killed and wounded has been estimated at somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000. Other countries in the Sahel experienced similar climate change, drought and environmental impacts, but different political and social conditions and actors meant that these did not lead to anywhere near the same level of violence. Climate change was insufficient on its own, but was a necessary condition, for the particular constellation of circumstances that led to the conflict. Other chains of events and conditions might have also sufficed. Climate change simply multiplied the threat.<sup>20</sup>

Darfur, too, illustrates the problem of attribution of blame for conflicts or atrocities. There is no real disagreement, at root, that climate was a factor in the Darfur violence. The argument is over semantics. Those who object to calling Darfur a ‘climate-change conflict’, or reject a causal link between environmental change and violence in this case, do so because they see the influence of environmental factors as too indirect to be relevant, especially compared to the contingent actions of individuals. Yet objective evaluation of the contribution of climate change to violence is like observing a link between poverty and crime, or between global inequality and terrorism. That the link exists does not absolve the actors of responsibility for their crimes.<sup>21</sup>

In some cases, rather than acting as a ‘threat multiplier’, climate change may be better characterised as shifting ‘the tipping point at which conflict occurs’. The recent series of popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa is a good example. Global warming did not cause the Arab Spring, but it may have made it come earlier. A spike in the price of food, in part due to extreme global weather, was an important factor behind the initial protests and uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that set off a chain reaction throughout the region. Although World Bank President Robert Zoellick described food prices as an ‘aggravating factor’ in the turmoil, rather than as the principal cause, it was a vivid illustration of the way climate change acts as a risk multiplier for insecurity both directly, through its impacts on food security, and indirectly, through the knock-on effect on political stability and the different responses of governments to the unrest. The range of outcomes, from relatively peaceful democratic transitions to autocratic repression to civil war and foreign interventions, illustrates the unpredictable nature of the risks.<sup>22</sup>

Some of the world’s most fragile states are in sub-Saharan Africa. This is also a region where some of the worst effects of climate change will be (and are already being) felt. But since they face so many other problems, it is difficult for climate change to really make things worse. At the other end of the continuum are the wealthier powers such as the United States or Europe, which will be able to adapt to climate change except in the worst cases. Ironically, these are the countries which bear the greatest historical responsibility for global warming. In between are countries such as Brazil, or many others in Latin America and elsewhere, whose adaptive capacity will be increasingly put under strain by the changing climate, and which may find their growth and their stability significantly curtailed.



## Military and Strategic Considerations

The nature, or at least the relative mix, of missions for many nations' armed forces will change as a result of the changing climate within the time horizon of force planning and acquisition programmes. An increase in humanitarian crises from extreme weather events is already putting strain on militaries, which, as General Modesto pointed out at the VIII Forte de Copacabana conference, are often the only organisations prepared to respond quickly. The US military has regularly deployed troops both externally and internally in the aftermath of hurricanes in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in the last 20 years, and the international responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, and the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 all involved military resources and personnel from many developed and developing countries. While most of these disasters were not climate related, this sort of disaster response is likely to be increasingly needed as the climate changes. Increased weather volatility and sea-level rise threatens military infrastructure and affects operations. As a second-order impact, carbon-pricing mechanisms or binding emissions ceilings that might be established to mitigate global warming will have a disproportionate impact on militaries, which are huge energy consumers. The flip side is that new low-carbon technologies will benefit military forces, freeing them from or reducing dependency on long, resource-intensive and difficult to defend supply lines. There are other second-order impacts not directly related to the military. For example, reduced demand for oil or natural gas could damage the economies of producing states, and an increased reliance on nuclear power for electricity generation could increase the risk of proliferation, terrorism or accidents such as Fukushima.

The inherent uncertainty of climate projections is of a part with a more general problem of uncertainty in strategic planning, and defence planning in particular. On the one hand, the future is impossible to predict; on the other, without some guidance as to what is likely to happen planning becomes impossible too. Rather than focus on particular cases, planners need to expect the unexpected, and focus on an increasing range of variability rather than simply the direction of the underlying trend.<sup>23</sup>

With the three main sources of uncertainty in climate projections – models, scenarios and annual variability – are important over different timescales. Over the short term, and particularly for regional or smaller-scale projections, choice of scenario matters little and variability predominates, while over the longer term scenario and model become critical.<sup>24</sup> Although the long-term warming trend is already distinguishable against annual variability globally and in most regions of the world, precipitation trends, which depend critically on models, are not. In many areas, particularly Latin America and Africa, even the direction of the trend by the end of the century cannot be projected with confidence.<sup>25</sup>

When it comes to state instability and the aggregate threat it poses to international order, climate change is indeed a threat multiplier. But it is not necessarily any more so than any of the other causes or contributors to instability – no single factor is either necessary or sufficient. What makes current climate change unique is that it is a new variable; other

causal factors – including natural climate variation – have always been with us, but human-induced warming is directional, accelerating and (on the timescales that matter) irreversible. There will undoubtedly be climate-related conflicts over the next several decades, as there have been in the past. Given the time frame there may be fewer than the analytical consensus would have it, but it is necessary to be prepared to respond directly through military or humanitarian interventions and to cope with social and political consequences.

How important climate change is, relative to all the other global security problems, is difficult to say. As a rough metric, the IISS journal *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* has devoted about 5% of its space to climate change in the past five years. How bad the consequences of global warming will be, how soon they will materialise and how quickly they will increase is highly uncertain. There are too many unknowns. At one extreme, on the most optimistic of assumptions and models, we could face climate change no more severe than that already experienced in the last century. Although this has had real strategic consequences, it has gone for the most part unnoticed, and would not be a game changer for the twenty-first century. At the other extreme lie the catastrophic scenarios, where global temperatures quickly, significantly and irreversibly exceed the level where global systems are able to cope. There are good reasons to think that the catastrophic scenarios are more likely than the complacent ones. This is true with regard to the rate of climate change as well, a factor of critical importance to policymakers who must assess the urgency and extent of necessary responses. Disagreements among analysts as to the overall security and geopolitical impact of climate change stem less from differences in method than from the assumptions they make with regard to the uncertainties and the relative weight they place on different projections. Policymakers, of course, have in turn to weigh these assessments against the costs of taking preventive action.

## Notes

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## Climate change and energy as security topics: the role of nuclear energy

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The news release was brief: “Philippine Baby Danica Camacho born yesterday (October 31, 2011) in Manila, the capital city, was considered by the United Nations Organization planet Earth’s inhabitant number seven billion. The child will receive a scholarship and her parents will be given a sum in money to open a small store.”

We were one billion at the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; we leapt to six billion in 1999. In the last twenty years the earth’s population rose by 1.4 billion people.

“Decipher me or I will devour you.” Twenty-five centuries later the Enigma of the Sphinx returns, on this occasion requiring a much more complex solution and with a severe outcome for humanity as a whole. How to feed and shelter in a civilized manner a population that in accordance with estimates from the United Nations should increase by 2.5 billion by 2050, and at the same time not destroy the planet that serves as our habitat?

Feeding this population adequately, in quality as well as with an appropriate level of calories, tends to become a task of reasonable proportions, which if unmet will certainly place world peace at risk. In 2010, Director General Jacques Diouf of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, warned world authorities with the following assertion: “*The hunger crisis poses a serious risk to peace and security. We urgently need to arrive at a consensus for the swift and complete eradication of famine.*”

The FAO estimates that the world population currently surviving with food levels below 1800 calories per day will exceed the mark of one billion people.

The *Water Management Institute* (WMI) informs that only in the Asian continent there will be an increase of 1.5 billion people by 2050. This situation is made worse by the fact that in that region there is no land available to expand agricultural activity, and the existing water resources will be unable to support such a rise in demand.

In early November 2012, a report was published by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in preparation for the “Rio + 20” conference to be held in June 2012. One of the report’s more alarming points was that we are consuming natural resources at a rate greater than the planet’s recovery capacity. Regarding water resources, estimates are to the effect that by 2030 there will be 2.8 billion people suffering from an insufficient water supply.

Humanity’s capacity for survival and progress has always been related to the knowledge and ability of using energy sources convenient and sufficient to meet the needs of each development stage. Food safety, sufficient water resources, food production, and an infrastructure capable of supporting the advance of civilization, these are all factors that depend essentially on energy. Humanity may continue to obtain this energy from traditional sources, dilapidating natural riches and polluting the planet with emissions and residues harmful to life, or to seek new sources of an energy density sufficient to meet rising demand without adversely affecting the environment.

By mastering the art of fire several thousands of years ago, humanity found an energy source capable of meeting its needs for a stretch of time. The energy concentrated in 1 kg of firewood, roughly 6 to 10 megajoules (MJ), was sufficient for the activities required at that stage of civilization. Evolution and development impelled humanity to seek out other energy sources, with greater density and more adequate for new requirements and new uses.

The discovery of steam engines in the 18<sup>th</sup> century made it possible to haul large masses over long distances. Steamships and railways created wealth and built empires, consolidating the era known as the First Industrial Revolution. Yet in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century the energy density found in firewood was no longer sufficient to meet requirements compatible with the level of civilization achieved at that time by humanity. From then on, fossil fuels started to play a fundamental role as energy sources. At first coal with its energy density of 32 MJ per kg, followed by petroleum with 45 MJ per kg, became almost the sole sources to meet rising demand for energy in a growing and ever more sophisticated civilization of individuals, who for this very reason were avid for energy.

Scientific development allowed man to understand the different forms of energy and provided him with the ability of selecting these different forms in accordance with his interests and needs. When in 1831 Michael Faraday understood how to produce an electric current, he opened a highway for the development of humanity, to the point whereby access to

electricity is currently deemed an essential development factor. The relation between a country's use of electricity per inhabitant and the Human Development Index (HDI) is well known. While North America reflects the use of over 12 megawatt-hours per inhabitant, in Africa this rate is below 1 megawatt-hour.

Oil and its derivatives gave rise to technological innovations which, as reflected in production and transportation machinery, led to a renewed boost in development in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Together with innovations arising from electronics and employed in information and communications technologies (ICT), they gave way to the Second Industrial Revolution.

The intensive use of fossil sources resulted in damage to the environment in such a scale that it is currently acknowledged as one of the key menaces to ongoing life on planet Earth. During the 1980s scientists began research on possible climate change scenarios based on known data, employing new and powerful computers that made possible more and more precise simulations. The greenhouse effect caused by emissions of certain kinds of gases (known as Greenhouse Gases – GHG) is currently recognized as a threat to life on Earth. Carbon dioxide emissions that arise from burning fossil fuels are one the main villains in this story. The early 20<sup>th</sup> century's Second Industrial Revolution, based on coal and oil as energy sources is certainly coming to an end in this initial period of the third millennium.

Awareness of the problems caused by burning fossil fuels in the earth's atmosphere, in addition to the effect of oil scarcity owing to price, will cause humanity to turn to other sources of energy. The question posed by specialists has not been if there is a limited supply of oil available for exploration, but rather **when** a peak in production of barrels per day will be reached. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) this peak in production already took place in 2006 with 70 million barrels per day.



Still more important is the perception that per capita world production has reached its peak several years ago. Results of surveys on the subject have coincided in asserting that this peak was reached in 1979. The fact should be borne in mind that new oil field discoveries around the world have not kept pace with the growth of the world's population. Accelerated economic growth in India and China in recent years has included almost two million people in the oil economy. According to IEA data, in 2035 oil will continue a key source of world energy and China will be using 70% more energy than the United States. This scenario will cause the pressure by demand to raise oil prices, which will induce all production inputs to be subjected to this boost also. In this respect, it should be recalled that world agricultural production depends strongly on fertilizers and pesticides based on petrochemicals. This same petrochemical strain is built into practically all modern productive chains such as pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, paints, and plastics. Research and development in cleaner and more efficient energy sources will make humanity use fossil hydrocarbons not as inefficiently as we do currently, burning them to use part of the energy only and releasing noxious residues into the environment, but rather by using these long molecules produced by nature over millions of years, to produce more sophisticated goods derived from petrochemicals.

In a scenario in which concerns with climate change are placed among other topics deemed to be material in the world agenda, such as the eradication of poverty, food security, water supply, and refusal of treatment, it becomes ever clearer that the solution to these challenges will involve three interdependent areas: public policies / energy / sustainability. Public policies at a level convenient to ensure citizenship to all of Earth's inhabitants, and aiming at a world governance that seeks sustainable development. The quest for energy production sources in the quantity and quality required by humanity's level of civilization, at the same time economically feasible, technically feasible, and with the least possible outcome in the use of natural resources as well as in the production of undesirable byproducts, will be strategic in enabling humanity to proceed with its development. Planning and implementing an energy policy that complies with the above-mentioned requisites have become important items in the National Security agenda.

It can most certainly be said that there is no ideal universal energy matrix. A region's or country's energy matrix will always be a reflex of a choice based on a series of factors, encompassing strategic, political, technical and economic issues. It is evidently greatly important that such decisions should be made with the use of qualified information, and whenever possible avoiding decisions based on punctual emotions. There are but a few countries, such as Brazil, which are fortunate to count with renewable energy sources (water, wind, and biomass) in sufficient amounts to comprise an important share of the energy matrix. Brazil has 45% of its energy originated from renewable sources. The world rate is 13%. In electricity, 85% of our production is based on renewable sources, of which 75% comes from hydroelectric plants. The Amazon region contributes with 10% of the country's electricity generation. The target is to raise this to 20% by 2020.

However, expansion of the hydroelectric system will not take place without problems: the largest existing potential is located in the Amazon region, far away from consumer centers



and in locations where environmental as well as social and economic interests are involved. In the Amazon region there are currently 12 plants under construction and 12 being legalized. All of them involving problems arising from conflicting interests: whether by local governments, NGOs, or native Indian populations. To this may be added the divergence in the pattern of rainfall, in particular in the Amazon region. The fluctuation in rainfall from the rainy season to the dry season can be as much as 9.9 to 1 in that region.

It is certainly true that technologies optimizing the use of energy and encouraging rational use are always welcome and are able to perform a key role in a country's energy policy. Since its creation in 1985 and until 2010 in Brazil, the National Electricity Preservation Program (PROCEL) has contributed in preventing 230 million tons of carbon emissions into the atmosphere.

As sources practically free from GHG emissions, renewable energy sources such as the wind and sun have acquired a more and more prevailing role in the energy matrix of a number of countries, despite their high cost and some technical restrictions. The use of these two sources of electricity generation is made difficult owing to both being of a low energy density and intermittent by nature. Measurements taken in several regions in Brazil have shown that the wind's average speed may range from two to six meters per second at 50 meters above the ground. Brazil's geographic position, with a large portion of its territory close to the Equator, favors an intense incidence of sunlight. Nonetheless, solar energy's average annual power is of roughly 220 watts per square meter, which requires large areas to install solar energy units. As a comparison, Central Elétrica Solar Moura in Portugal covers an area of 1.14 million square meters with an installed capacity of 62 megawatts.

The main feature of a good electricity generation and distribution system is the ability at any time of matching supply with demand. Traditional sources of electricity generation obtain this by storing energy close to their generation facilities, in the form of stocks of coal, oil, or gas, or water reservoirs, which are used according to demand. An electrical system comprising predominantly wind or solar sources will hence encounter difficulties in matching supply with demand to stabilize the system. Under the circumstances, energy storage technologies may provide a potential solution to this problem, though they will end up increasing the final cost of the energy produced. A large volume of funds are being channeled in Europe into research on these technologies. These range from water pumping systems for temporary raised reservoirs, compressed air storage systems (Compressed Air Energy Storage – CAES), or even pumping large volumes of hydrogen into former salt mines, for its subsequent use in hydrogen cells.

The fact that large consumers of electricity are concentrated in urban areas and in industrial conglomerates, raises the need to have high-density energy sources close at hand or requires building extensive transmission lines, an extremely costly affair. In Brazil, apart from the fossil sources that create GHG, there are hydro and nuclear plants as dense energy sources. It is well known that the still available hydroelectric potential is separated by large distances from large consumer regions. The key advantage of a nuclear plant is its high-



density energy: in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) this is equal to 3.5 million MJ per kg, 100 thousand times the energy density of coal.

A century has not passed yet since the discovery of nuclear fission and of the perception that the associated energy could be controlled, opening up horizons never dreamt of by humanity. Unfortunately, the first use of such a great energy potential was not intended to build but to destroy. This “original sin” has kept pace with nuclear technology for decades. Nobody visits “ground zero” in Hiroshima without experiencing a feeling of profound horror and disbelief in humanity.

On the other hand, nuclear technology in its numerous applications has led to huge benefits to humanity, with important contributions in manufacturing, agriculture, the environment, and chiefly in health. Every year throughout the world, roughly 25 million procedures are held in radio diagnosis with the use of Technetium-99 radioisotopes. Approximately three million radio diagnosis and radiotherapy procedures are performed in Brazil every year.

Furthermore, please note that the high standards of technological excellence required by the nuclear industry tend to create an environment in favor of raising quality throughout the industrial park active in the nuclear productive chain.

The use of nuclear power to generate electricity, dating back to the 1950s, was faced by strong opposition in every country during the 1970s and 1980s, due chiefly to the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. The scientific advances of recent years and the subsequent technological breakthroughs have given rise to substantial increase in the safety levels and reliability of present-day nuclear reactors. This fact jointly with the growing concern regarding global warming caused by the exponential use of fossil fuels in the energy matrix, has restored nuclear power’s place in the international agenda. Under the circumstances, nuclear fission reactors have been regarded as low-carbon emission energy sources compatible with concerns on climate change.

This status of a gain in public confidence undergone by the nuclear industry was once again shaken by the events following the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami that befell Japan. The Fukushima accident gave rise to reactions by the people as well as by countries, including a broad spectrum ranging from the absolute rejection of nuclear power to reaffirming the latter as a reliable source of clean energy.

Reactions by countries to the Fukushima affair have been most varied. Germany in a somewhat surprising move and, according to specialists, in response to specific circumstances of domestic policy rather than technical issues, decided to impose an immediate check on the growth of its nuclear-electric power plants. This included the planned extension of the useful lives of a number of reactors in operation. How the energy requirements by this industrious country will be met in the near future, is yet to be seen. China and India, the two key locations of the reactors currently under construction and projected for the next twenty years, have not changed anything in their expectations. According to a statement by the IAEA Director General in the General Conference held in September, the world's nuclear reactor facilities should increase in numbers by at least 90 reactors by 2030.

Fourteen months after the Fukushima earthquake Japan disconnected the last of its 52 nuclear reactors in activity prior to the event, and which produced roughly 30% of the energy generated. It is difficult to visualize what type of solution will be found to meet demand, which rises considerably during the torrid summer months in Tokyo. Replacing nuclear plants by thermo plants run on fossil fuels will greatly increase greenhouse gas emissions, in addition to burdening Japan's balance of payments.

Inclusion of a nuclear power source in a country's energy matrix is the result of a number of factors such as: type of demand, abundance of other energy resources, political factors, strategic issues, etc.

Evidently, in a democratic society the least that can be expected is that decisions of major national issues should be of a democratic nature, involving debates of the topics. Such discussions will be more fruitful if society is more informed. Central Nuclear Almirante Álvaro Alberto in Angra dos Reis is in charge of generating 3.17% of the energy for the Brazilian Sistema Integrado Nacional (SIN). Nuclear generation is solid and ongoing, does not release GHG, and is not subject to seasonal variations of renewable sources such as hydro, solar, biomass, and wind. This last nature is of major importance in ensuring stability to the SIN. In Brazil from 2000 to 2006, nuclear power generation avoided emissions of 63 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) into the atmosphere.

The Brazilian nuclear program should not be affected by the Fukushima event. Conclusion of the Angra dos Reis Nuclear Plant number 3 is expected, in addition to four other reactors in yet to be defined locations, most likely in the Northeast region. These new plants should be of the PWR kind, with natural convection advanced cooling technology. This means that accidents similar to that in Fukushima will be avoided, as cooling during the first downtime hours will take place without the need for electric pumps, which will only be activated subsequently to dissipate residual heat.

The Program also provides for building the Brazilian Multipurpose Reactor (RMB). The RMB will play an important role, as it will provide the country with independence to produce the essential Technetium-99 radionuclide. The RMB will serve as an anchor for the scientific and technological compound, functioning as a national laboratory for testing new materials, and will also play a key role in training human resources in the nuclear field.

Evidently, the authorities in charge of the Brazilian nuclear program, as occurs in the rest of the world, should make use of the lessons from Fukushima to perfect the entire nuclear facilities' safety rules and procedures. Yet this event should not discourage or reduce the country's efforts that seek full development of this important field of technology. The reason is that Brazil is one of the few countries in the world which, in addition to mastering technology in connection with the complete nuclear fuel cycle, also harbors one of the world's largest uranium reserves. This is no doubt an expanding market. Brazil is preparing to be a player in the international nuclear market for goods and services. Evidence of this is the submission by the Executive Authority of a project to the National Congress, on the creation of a state-owned company in charge of projects related to the Brazilian Nuclear Program and of encouraging innovation in the nuclear area's productive chain.

In 2050 Danica Camacho, planet Earth's citizen number 7 billion, born on October 31, 2011 will be 39 years old, and under current trends may bear one or not more than two children. She will live in a society that uses electric or hydrogen-powered vehicles and will probably enjoy a life expectancy in excess of 100 years. She will share the planet with 10 billion other people, all of whom entitled under the United Nations' Charter to health, housing, food, safety, and education. In practice these rights will only be ensured if humanity employs rationally the natural resources available and the technologies created. Scientific development will certainly continue to expand exponentially and will give rise to innovation in all fields of human interest. Communication and information technologies will surely receive strong impacts. Genetic engineering will play a key role in improving health in general and in food security as well, creating new vegetable species more resistant to pests and contributing with ample improvements to livestock, improving protein production.

Nuclear power may play a major role not only as an economically feasible source of energy, technically plausible, and with the least possible effects in the use of natural resources as well as in the creation of hazardous residues. Its insertion in health activities such as radiotherapy and radio diagnosis will increase in importance. Employing appropriate nuclear technologies has proved to be a strong ally in food production. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) makes enormous efforts in this direction in a partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other regional bodies. This effort has accrued decades of favorable results, improving harvests in quantities as well as in quality. Research on new wheat strains more resistant to what is known as "wheat rust", which has decimated harvests in Africa and the Middle East, may provide important answers to improve these crops in the affected regions. Hydrological studies using radioisotopes have improved irrigation techniques and optimized the use of existing water resources, essential in African and in particular in Asian regions, owing to their acute scarcity, which is made worse by the accelerated population growth.

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November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2011

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