

# Mexico's strategic ambiguity

Reflections on a possible  
global partnership with NATO

*Policy Brief*

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# Abstract

This document discusses the relevance of the Mexican State exploring the possibility of joining international security and defense cooperation frameworks, based on the premise that these mechanisms offer a strategic space for the maintenance and projection of national power. Initially, it addresses the main geopolitical changes that explain the new global order—through the lens of a systemic hegemonic understanding—and explores how these changes directly impact our country.

In the second part, the historical and current reasons that explain the Mexican cultural indifference towards the international arena are pointed out, not only among the general population but also within the political class, which ultimately leads to an ambivalent exercise of its foreign policy.

The third element of this text provides examples where this ambivalence has occurred. Benefiting sometimes the proper positioning of national interests, while in other cases acting as a straitjacket.

Finally, the text delves into the advisability of bringing the Mexican State closer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), not as an active member but as a global partner, while explaining the benefits that this status has brought to sister nations like Colombia and soon, Argentina.





# The evolving world:

The return of geopolitics and national implications



## The evolving world: The return of geopolitics and national implications

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when the international order based on norms—specifically, the liberal institutions that emerged after Bretton Woods—began to fracture. For some, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union—what Vladimir Putin called the greatest geopolitical tragedy in history—might represent that moment. For others, the turning point was September 11, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets in the United States. However, assuming there is a single moment or specific date that marks the beginning of this new era is ultimately futile.

Conversely, taking a somewhat more systemic view of the global scenario, it is clear that global processes are highly complex, as they respond to temporal patterns defined by underlying variables in the social, cultural, economic, and political fields. Under the concept of *longue durée*, Braudel (1949) offered a framework for approaching history through long-term structural changes (decades and perhaps centuries) that allow us to go beyond the immediate context. Building on this conceptual framework, other theoretical perspectives have identified key elements that, when combined, enable the transition from one geopolitical era to another. It can be argued, not without reason, that the changes in the current global scenario correspond to an evolutionary, perhaps cyclical, process that is giving rise to a new institutional framework in the international order.

It seems that the contradiction between the West and the pan-Asian region, led primarily by China, can be explained by the hegemonic cycle itself (Gordon, 1980; Wallerstein, 1984). According to this systemic and long-term view, the hegemonic state gains primacy when it surpasses its peer states in economic and productive efficiency. This gives it a commercial advantage that, in turn, allows it to expand its markets beyond its natural borders. Finally, the hegemonic state designs, creates, and operates financial institutions that support these markets. However, when another nation (or group of similar nations) achieves greater productive efficiency in strategic sectors of the global market, the decline of the leading state becomes inevitable.

This text does not aim to address the specific aspects in which China—though not exclusively—is achieving greater economic efficiency than the United States or Europe in certain sectors, but it is undeniable that Beijing's revisionism has a historical and undoubtedly geostrategic explanation. From a classical geopolitical perspective (Kelly, 2016), the "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (López, Marrades, Márquez, 2023) faces, on the one hand, the joint response of nations such as the United States, Australia, Japan, and India in the Indo-Pacific theater; and, on the other hand, a Europe that is increasingly distrustful and assertive towards the West.

In the coming decades, this confrontation will largely define the future not only of Eurasia but of the entire world, and Mexico—where China is one of its main trading partners—is no exception.

Another phenomenon of great relevance in the current international scenario relates to the process of (re)defining the European Union as an economic-political integration and, beyond that, the architecture of European security beyond the Union. The so-called Strategic Autonomy (Bartels, Kellner, Optenhögel, 2017) has been put to the test following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, especially since February 2022. In this regard, it has become evident that European nations simply cannot fulfill the collective defense of their borders if they do so outside the NATO framework and, especially, outside Washington's defense umbrella. The articulation of a pan-European security framework—beyond the European Union—is a pending task that will be difficult to achieve soon. Russia, although internally weakened by an inefficient economy increasingly dependent on China, will remain the main existential threat to European liberal democracies in the years to come. Mexico, which has yet to ratify its trade agreement with the EU, cannot remain detached from the geopolitical swings in the old continent.<sup>1</sup>

All these changes in the global scenario, whose speed is largely explained by advances in global information and communication systems, pose a formidable challenge for nations like Mexico. Where its political class hardly possesses the strategic vocabulary (Herrera, 2023) to understand the available options not only to cope with these changes but to project its national interests. For the purposes of this text, it is evident that, during this great historical process, the Mexican State is navigating an uncertain course.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Bank of Mexico (2024), Germany - the main European economy - represents our third trading partner in terms of imports and sixth in terms of exports.



# Brief review

of Mexican strategic ambiguity



## Brief review of Mexican strategic ambiguity

From Mexico, the world seems distant. The war in Ukraine, political processes in Europe, the conflict between Israel and its neighbors, the growing tension in the South China Sea, or even the elections in the United States are phenomena that, not only for the average Mexican but also for much of its political establishment, go completely unnoticed. This might be expected of a small, isolated nation. But Mexico is far from that: as the world's twelfth-largest economy, with a population of 130 million people, borders with the world's leading power, and a geopolitical position that serves as a bridge between North and Central America, the Mexican nation must assume a much more responsible role on the international stage.

Understanding this *strategic ambiguity* is fundamental to imagining possible scenarios, especially now that Mexico is entering a new presidential era that coincides with a series of geopolitical changes whose effects will largely define the rest of this century. As Herrera (2024) notes, the way Mexico—and particularly its political establishment—addresses these challenges will have a decisive impact on how Mexicans understand their role in the world in the coming decades. The reasons for this apparent indifference are related to both historical-political variables and more recent factors.

From its creation as an independent country in the early 19th century, Mexico faced the challenge of consolidating its own identity that would guarantee

a minimum of internal cohesion, not only to create a common foundational myth but for something more practical: to mitigate the possibility of subnational divisions that would undermine its territorial integrity. In short, the struggle to build a minimally operational nation-state, with relatively functional institutions under an integrative narrative, largely determined the *inward orientation* of the Mexican nation and its political-economic leadership. This does not mean that the foreign invasions of that century did not have a significant impact on the Mexican psyche, but rather the opposite: they happened largely because of the internal weakness of the state, reinforcing our *inward-looking strategic culture*.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the contradictions inherent in a government that combined economic liberalism with political authoritarianism created the conditions for a social uprising that would drag the nation into an outright civil war. The Mexican Revolution—from 1910 to 1917—would give birth to the political system of modern Mexico, which would remain virtually intact until the end of the century, and whose foundations maintained the central idea of national cohesion in the face of the cultural imaginary of the *external enemy*.

Thus, during the rest of the 20th century, the Mexican state continued to build (itself) an idea of national self-sufficiency where, with some important

exceptions that will be discussed later<sup>2</sup>, it missed the international stage as a strategic arena for the expression of national power, under the pretext of a foreign policy doctrine based on principles such as respect for the self-determination of peoples and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. While the Estrada Doctrine initially served as a way for Mexico to navigate a complex bipolar international order, the truth is that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advent of the Peace Dividend and globalization of the 1990s, it ultimately became a straitjacket.

It was then that Mexico faced a paradox: on the one hand, its tradition of foreign policy distanced it from an active role on the international stage; on the other hand, the adoption of a neoliberal economic model—which would be consolidated with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement—opened the doors to the world. This contradiction posed a huge challenge to the Mexican State, which coincided with two major processes within the country towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century; The arrival of an opposition political party to the presidency for the first time in more than 70 years and the beginning of the epidemic of violence<sup>3</sup> related to organized crime, largely caused by the loss of political territorial control after the end of authoritarian *priismo*.

It is precisely this second point, the exponential increase in homicides related to organized crime, that constitutes the recent variable mentioned earlier

in relation to the national inward-looking culture. The rampant violence across the country has turned the attention of Mexicans and their political establishment once again inward, leaving little room for reflection on the country's role abroad or for analysis of how international phenomena impact Mexico's present and future. Simply put, there is no strategic space for it.

As we enter the third decade of this century, the situation does not seem to have changed much. However, there was a relatively bold—though not very substantive—attempt during the 2012-2018 administration. Under President Enrique Peña's government, for the first time in the country's recent history, a National Security Program (2019) was drafted with a strong geopolitical component, at least in its doctrinal part. In that document, the political establishment established Mexico's dual position as a North American nation by spatial location and economic future, while also belonging, by history and culture, to the Latin American group. This "dual nature" would face its first test with the arrival of conservative neo-nationalism to the White House in 2016, under President Trump, which exposed Mexico's strategic vulnerabilities in relation to its powerful northern neighbor, with which it was almost impossible to establish a balanced position. The truth is that, with the advent of *obradorismo* in 2018, the political establishment abandoned the "More Mexico in the world and more world in Mexico" approach and opted to return to the traditional ambiguous and, it must be said, absent foreign policy focus.

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<sup>2</sup> The 1969 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibited nuclear weapons in Latin America, as well as intermediation to achieve peace in some Central American nations between 1980 and 1994, are proof that the Mexican state has had some successes in terms of the management of its foreign policy, as a tool to enhance its weight in the region.

<sup>3</sup> The concept of "epidemic of violence" is widely used by scholars of the criminal phenomenon in Mexico, since it is an abrupt, perhaps unusual, process of exponential growth in homicides not experienced in another country, in such a short time. Recommended: Guerrero, Eduardo. Aguilar, Hector. Madrazo, Alejandro. Lajous, Andrés. Hernandez, Jorge. Chavez, Joel. Haro, Dante. (2012). The Jalisco Report: beyond the war on drugs. Lime and Sand.



Considering these two converging historical events—the arrival of Trump to the White House and López Obrador to the National Palace—and after a vague attempt to reach out to Central and South American nations, the truth is that Mexicans once again turned their backs on the world.

But the international scenario continued to evolve, and what some have called the new global disorder (Neumann, 2023), brought with it substantial challenges in terms of economic development, trade, security, and the environment. All these phenomena, although they may seem distant to most of the Mexican population and its political establishment, have a direct impact on the nation and will largely define the world in which Mexico will navigate in the coming decades. Understanding, even in a general way, these major geopolitical phenomena is essential to discerning the possible and desirable areas of action for Mexico, such as the case of strategic alliances that will be discussed later.





# México:

A responsible actor of international security?





## Mexico: A responsible actor of international security?

As mentioned before, the 20th century—particularly the second half—was a clear example of Mexico's strategic ambiguity, where foreign policy had some notable moments but gradually lost momentum due to national inwardness. Mexican ambiguity is not, in fact, a deliberate exercise with clear goals, procedures, and means, but rather the result of this contradiction.

Within this Mexican ambiguity, and as previously mentioned, there are some historical examples where Mexico assumed a certain regional leadership by participating in various international, regional, and multilateral organizations; promoting nuclear disarmament; participating in international military exercises—especially naval ones—and the limited deployment of personnel in peacekeeping operations. These actions allowed the country to advance its national interests and establish alliances with some strategic partners who share similar positions and interests.

In the diplomatic arena, Mexico is one of the founding countries of the United Nations, being among the 50 countries that participated in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which led to the creation of the United Nations. In addition, it is important to highlight that the country also actively participates in the various agencies and organizations of the UN.

In the area of regional security, two initiatives stand out where Mexico played a fundamental role in their creation and consensus-building: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) is a defensive pact that originated at the Chapultepec Conference held from February 21 to March 8, 1945, in Mexico City. Among the topics discussed at this meeting was the suggestion to create a treaty that would protect the states of the Americas against external aggression, a proposal that materialized on September 2, 1947, in Rio de Janeiro with the signing of the Treaty. However, although Mexico was one of its main promoters, it decided to withdraw in 2002, citing the obsolescence of the pact. This is, once again, a clear example of the ambiguity in Mexican foreign policy, as it was never clear what the strategic rationale—if any—was behind the decision of the then-government of Vicente Fox (2000-2006).

On the other hand, the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean—has its origins in a joint declaration made by the governments of Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador in April 1963. This declaration laid the groundwork for the creation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was signed in 1967 by 33 countries in the region.

Among the most important points of the treaty is its contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the area covered by the treaty and the commitment to abstain from conducting or promoting nuclear weapons testing, possession, or manufacturing.

Another aspect of Mexican foreign policy, although rarely discussed, is the role played by the armed forces, which, in addition to performing traditional tasks related to deterrence and external defense, also engage in military diplomacy and contribute to peacekeeping operations, albeit in a limited manner.

In the field of military diplomacy, the armed forces have played an increasingly active role in recent years. During the 2017-2018 period, Mexico assumed for the first time the chairmanship of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), an entity under the Organization of American States (OAS) that provides technical, advisory, and educational support on military and defense matters in the hemisphere.

Participation in international military exercises is another important component of military diplomacy. These exercises allow the Mexican armed forces to strengthen cooperation ties, facilitate interoperability in joint operations, and improve response effectiveness against common threats.

## Some recent examples of these participations include:

- **The Multinational Exercise Tradewinds**, held annually since 1984 by the United States Southern Command. In 2024, this exercise took place from May 4 to 16 in Barbados and involved the participation of 21 countries. In Mexico's case, the Navy Secretariat, through the Mexican Navy, participated with 128 naval personnel. The multinational exercise aimed to conduct joint, combined, and inter-institutional training to increase regional cooperation in combating transnational organized crime and conduct humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
- **The Multinational Exercise RIMPAC** (Rim of the Pacific), considered the world's largest multinational maritime exercise, has been held since 1971 by the United States Navy. The 2024 edition took place from June 26 to August 2 in Hawaii, United States, and involved the participation of 29 countries. In Mexico's case, the Navy Secretariat, through the Mexican Navy, participated with 580 personnel and two ships, the ARM "Usumacinta" (A-412) and ARM "Juárez" (POLA 101). The exercise aimed to improve interoperability and ensure the security of maritime routes in the Pacific Ocean.



- **The UNITAS Naval Exercise**, organized by the United States Navy, has been held since 1959 under the framework of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). The 2024 edition will take place from September 2 to 13 in Valparaíso, Chile. Mexico's Navy has participated in these exercises since 2010, and 135 personnel are expected to participate in the 2024 edition. The exercise aims to increase the interoperability of Latin American navies to address common threats.
- **The Binational Exercise "Fuerzas Amigas 2024,"** conducted by the U.S. Northern Command and the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) through the Army and Air Force. The exercise took place from June 24 to 28 in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico. The objective of the event was to strengthen training and coordination between different government agencies and military authorities in the event of a natural or anthropogenic disaster (such as a chemical spill or a freight train derailment) along the Mexico-U.S. border.

Although progress has been made in the interoperability of the armed forces in recent years, Mexico is still working to meet the standards of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). There is a roadmap to ensure that by 2030, the Mexican armed forces have the operational and technological capabilities to conduct joint operations with the United States and Canada, to strengthen North American cooperation and security.

Another important element of military diplomacy is Mexico's role in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In this regard, although there have been significant advances—as will be discussed below—the country is still far from having a truly substantial participation in these operations, particularly regarding the deployment of a company-level unit—a commitment that was even publicly made during the administration of President Peña Nieto.

Since the creation of these operations in 1948 until 1993, Mexico participated in three different missions, serving as an observer in the Balkans (1947-1950) and Kashmir (1949) and as an advisor for the creation of a new civilian police force in El Salvador (1992-1993). Subsequently, in 2015, Mexico resumed participation with a broader vision, in line with the evolution of its foreign policy interests in consolidating its image as a responsible global actor.

Under this new vision and mandate, Mexico has participated in operations in Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, Mali, Colombia, and on the India-Pakistan border. Notable is the inclusion and participation of women as part of the country's commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and the creation of the Joint Training Center for Peacekeeping Operations (CECOPAM), inaugurated in January 2020<sup>4</sup> during President López Obrador's administration.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.gob.mx/sedena/prensa/inauguracion-de-las-instalaciones-del-centro-de-entrenamiento-conjunto-de-operaciones-de-mantenimiento-de-la-paz-en-mexico>

However, as an example of Mexican strategic ambiguity, the progress mentioned here pales in comparison to the enormous national potential in this area. For a country like Mexico, with professional armed forces with well-established and tested capabilities, maintaining such a minimal participation in PKOs is now a straitjacket and, it must be said, a weak point in our regional and international positioning, especially compared to nations like Brazil, whose commitment in this area is undeniable. In this regard, the incoming government could elevate Mexico's role in these operations, both quantitatively (in terms of the number of personnel) and qualitatively (by assuming a leadership role), which will necessarily require a well-coordinated strategy between the two military secretariats (SEDENA and SEMAR) and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

These are just some examples of the strategic ambiguity in Mexican foreign policy, where every time there is an opportunity to advance the national interest, the national inward-looking culture prevails. This is relevant because, if Mexico eventually seeks to join an international security and defense cooperation framework, it will once again face the challenge of promoting a narrative of openness and responsibility against the inertia of tradition and ambivalence. In this sense, studying—even in a general way—the experiences of other countries in the region in such cooperation frameworks can help to elucidate the benefits that this could mean for Mexico's national interest.





# Latin America and NATO



## Latin America and NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has evolved in accordance with the international strategic context and new global threats. The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and more recently, Russia's war against Ukraine, are milestones that have prompted substantial changes in the organization and posed challenges such as the addition of new European members, the acceleration of European strategic autonomy, and the formation of new alliances around the world. Paraphrasing Tertaris (2023), the end of the 1990s<sup>5</sup> and the beginning of the 2000s also motivated NATO to redefine its strategic concept, expanding its international cooperation frameworks even beyond its natural operational space.

In the case of Latin America, although it is not part of NATO, there are two modalities in which some countries participate: Major Non-NATO Allies and Global Partners. Major Non-NATO Allies is a designation made by the U.S. government to foreign partners that grants commercial benefits and favors cooperation in security and defense matters. Among the benefits of this designation are the creation of bilateral or multilateral training agreements, the provision of loans for materials or equipment for research or development purposes, and financing for explosive detection devices.

Currently, there are three Latin American countries that have this designation: Argentina since 1998, Brazil since 2019, and Colombia since 2020. It is important to note that this designation does not imply any security commitments for the country, nor does it grant guarantees under the collective defense pact.

Regarding the Global Partners modality, NATO's engagement occurs on an individualized basis with countries outside the Alliance with which it shares common values and challenges. In Latin America, the first country to develop an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program with NATO was Colombia in 2017<sup>6</sup>.

The Colombian Partnership includes topics such as training and exercises to develop interoperability within the Colombian armed forces under NATO standards and norms, collaboration in maritime security, combating piracy, and strengthening cybersecurity and counter-terrorism capabilities. While this partnership has allowed the armed forces to strengthen capacities and improve their functionality, it has also enabled them to share knowledge and experience in counter-narcotics, explosive device detection, and demining with other NATO member countries, which has helped consolidate Colombia as a regional power and an international strategic partner.

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<sup>5</sup> Tertaris considers that, contrary to Putin's speech, it was the Eastern European countries that sought to freely join NATO, and not the other way around. The loss of the post-Soviet space is then a natural result of Moscow's failure and not a geopolitical whim of the West.

<sup>6</sup> Reith, Stefan. (2024).



In the case of Argentina, although it has held the designation of Major Non-NATO Ally from the United States since 1998, following the rise of Javier Milei as President in late 2023, the country has shown greater interest in participating more actively in global security. As a result, in April 2024, Argentine Defense Minister Luis Petri met in Brussels with NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana to express Argentina's intention to become a Global Partner. The topics that would be part of the partnership are related to strengthening maritime security, improving cyber capabilities, and developing peace operations.<sup>7</sup>

Although this partnership has not yet materialized, if it does, NATO would have two regional powers as global partners who could contribute to international security and the containment of shared threats.


“Regarding Mexico, although it has not expressed any interest in participating as a Global Partner of NATO, its geographical location as part of North America, its status as a regional power, and the arrival of a new President who enjoys broad popular support and legitimacy, open the possibility of proposing a new international agenda where Mexico plays a more active role in international security.

Among the topics that the partnership could include are maritime security and combating piracy, strengthening cybersecurity capabilities, protecting critical infrastructure, and detecting explosive devices. While Mexico could share its experience in responding to natural disasters with NATO member countries.

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<sup>7</sup> Ministry of Defense of Argentina. (2024).

# Conclusions



## Conclusions

In recent decades, Mexico has played an ambivalent role on the international stage. While the guiding principles of Mexican foreign policy—non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples—have largely limited its positioning and actions internationally, there have also been various instances where Mexico has led regional initiatives on security and assumed responsibilities commensurate with its stature as a regional power.

With the arrival of a new president—who enjoys significant legitimacy and popular support—and the appointment of Juan Ramón de la Fuente as the next Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mexico faces the dilemma of either continuing with the current inertia, where domestic politics and public security challenges dominate government efforts, or resuming regional leadership with the capacity to influence the international agenda and build consensus.

Should Mexico choose to rekindle its multilateral vocation and regional leadership, the new government will have the responsibility to redefine the new priorities guiding its foreign policy and implement internal changes to meet the expected role on the international stage. Among the changes Mexico might adopt to lay the groundwork for this transformation in foreign policy are:

- **National Security Policy with a global vision:** National security, understood as the essential condition for maintaining the nation-state over time, includes foreign policy as one of its main action axes (strategic tools). The new administration could build
- **National Security Policy:** a National Security Policy that addresses Mexico's position on regional and international security challenges, as well as mechanisms to promote national interests in its geopolitical spheres of influence (particularly Central America and the Caribbean, as well as northern South America). As mentioned earlier, a similar conceptual exercise was conducted in 2019 but was unfortunately not followed up.
- **Multilateral Foreign Policy Strategy:** Mexico's multilateral foreign policy enables it to better navigate the fluctuations of the international stage and the current global challenges and threats. In this context, the incoming Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Juan Ramón de la Fuente, has hinted that, in addition to maintaining relations with the United States—Mexico's traditional partner and ally—he will also seek greater engagement with Europe and Asia. For Europe, Mexico can strengthen its economic and trade ties by leveraging the "strategic autonomy" momentum, which aims to diversify supply sources through the revitalization of existing relationships with partners who share interests like Mexico's. Ratifying the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the European Union is urgent. Additionally, Mexico could explore new specific cooperation agreements with countries with which it shares cultural and historical ties, such as Spain.
- **NATO Global Partner:** Considering the similarities between Mexico and Colombia regarding internal security challenges, their regional power status, and the bonds of friendship between them, Mexico could learn from the experience and benefits Colombia has



gained from its NATO global partner designation. Furthermore, the new Mexican foreign minister's commitment to diversifying the international agenda and relations with Europe opens the path for Mexico to explore advancing in this area, allowing the country and its armed forces to strengthen capabilities, improve interoperability, and share knowledge with other NATO member countries. It should be clear that this role does not imply any responsibility for Mexico in the defense of Europe but rather serves as a mechanism to access technologies, operational concepts, and capabilities currently non-existent in Mexico's defense sector.

- **Civil Oversight of the Armed Forces:** In recent decades, the armed forces in Mexico have taken on new responsibilities and functions within the framework of the fight against organized crime and corruption. However, these tasks have not been accompanied by effective civilian oversight to prevent cases of corruption or abuse of power. Therefore, it will be important for the new administration to implement new measures to promote accountability and transparency in the armed forces in line with international standards and to drive a new Initiative that serves as a guiding document to foster integrity in the security and defense sectors, referencing the NATO Integrity Manual published in 2020.<sup>8</sup>

Reclaiming the regional leadership and multilateral vocation that characterized Mexico will take several years and even different administrations. However, Mexico's economic and political weight in the region grants it the de facto status of a regional power that it can hardly renounce. This reality brings, above all, a tremendous responsibility to the international community, but especially to the nations within our so-called geopolitical sphere of influence. The 2024-2030 administration will face a strategic dilemma: continue with the traditionalist and insular inertia in our foreign policy, or fully assume the role expected of Mexico in the concert of nations and, especially, in the region.

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<sup>8</sup> [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/4/pdf/210104-bi-handbook-spa.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/4/pdf/210104-bi-handbook-spa.pdf)

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
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