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Between Peru and its neighbors**


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EXTRA-REGIONAL THREATS TO SECURITY

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1 Introduction

In 2020, six years after its creation, the Policy Network on Security has produced a new publication titled “Extra-regional threats to security.”¹ It is an interesting and important topic in which the Policy Network on Security again seeks to offer its contribution.

This policy paper thus concentrates on identifying and analyzing the extra-regional threats, risks and vulnerabilities facing Peru and its neighboring countries. These include the presence in the region of countries such as China, Russia and Iran, their intervention in the Venezuelan crisis and the tensions they generate with the United States; the challenges the Venezuelan crisis represents particularly on migratory, health, economic-social, labor and educational issues; organized crime; cybernetic crimes; the global threat of pandemics such as COVID-19; drug trafficking; illegal mining and logging; contraband; human trafficking; citizen insecurity; corruption and assets laundering; the presence of groups associated with Islamic extremism; lethal autonomous weapons; maritime pirating; and Antarctic claims, among others.



1 Digital version of the book in:

<http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/172059>

<https://www.kas.de/es/web/peru/einzeltitel/-/content/amenzas>

2 Perspectives from Brasil

Antonio Ramalho

Juliano Cortinhas

This policy paper examines the extra-regional threats affecting Brazil and South America. Two questions guide the argument to follow: 1) What are the extra-regional threats to South America and Brazil at this time? And 2) What is their degree of preparedness to minimize them? Our thesis states that the region is dealing not so much with external threats as with risks resulting from its own vulnerabilities.

The extra-regional threats relevant to South America are the result of global systemic dynamics, with manifestations in the regional sphere, so that the processes are more relevant than the deeds. To develop this thesis, we conceptualize threats, risks and vulnerabilities. Let us then examine the extra-regional threats to the countries of the region and their conditions for resisting them, taking into account the concept of multidimensional security shared by the region's countries. Similarly, we discuss the extra-regional threats to the region from Brazil's point of view, and the importance of cooperating with its neighbors to counteract them. The Brazilian case illustrates an erroneous way of dealing with possible extra-regional threats and underscores the need for concerted actions to reduce each country's vulnerabilities.

1. Conceptual aspects: Threats, risks and vulnerabilities

The distinction between the concepts of risk, vulnerability and threat is instrumental for the following analysis. Risks imply the possibility of events occurring that could extinguish the life of citizens or the integrity of States; they directly affect the essence of the States, the way of life of societies and the existence of citizens. States, societies and citizens are obviously vulnerable to multiple occurrences and the sensation of security is achieved when sufficient measures are taken to prevent the occurrence of such events.

The deterioration of the international institutions and the multipolarity resulting from the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy have expanded the risks in the international sphere. In this context, governments are turning more intensely to diverse instruments to satisfy their interests, generating gray zones in which "hybrid wars" can develop.

The notion of vulnerability for a State combines the degree of exposure to outside events, the intrinsic resilience of the political and socioeconomic systems and their capacity to act to protect the life of its citizens and the country's integrity and interests. Vulnerabilities can thus involve diverse factors in dynamic interaction.

In contrast, the idea of threats presupposes the interaction of actors endowed with intentionality. A threat presupposes the possible intention (and ability) to cause harm, and in extreme cases annihilate the other. Threats therefore imply the interaction of at least two actors (not necessarily regional) endowed with their own determination. This interaction can be framed in an arena of strategic negotiation in which a zero-sum logic prevails.





For their part, vulnerabilities can be perceived based on natural, social, political, or economic dynamics in which there is more space for cooperation. This difference is not always considered by analysts and political operators. That is why one speaks of a “war against Covid-19” just as one spoke of a “war on terror” and, since the seventies, a “war on drugs.”

Drug traffickers, terrorists, natural disasters and pandemics inflict pain and suffering on societies and can put thousands of people at risk, but they are not confronted in the same way as a war. The fact that it is sometimes necessary to turn to the logistical capacity of the armed forces to respond with immediacy to social demands adds confusion to the issue, but it is useful to clearly distinguish between the principal missions and subsidiary activities of these actors.

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2. South America in the global geopolitical environment: The risks of employing the concept of multidimensional security

This discussion is relevant in South America, due initially to the singularity that marks the region with respect to the questions of war and peace. The option of the notion of multidimensional security on the continent, which derives from the conceptual confusion mentioned above, makes international cooperation and the definition of effective public policies to reduce vulnerabilities and counteract threats difficult.

South America is an area of peace and cooperation, free of weapons of mass destruction and committed to resolve controversies between the sovereign States peacefully. South American countries fought against each other only in three major conflicts in the past two centuries: the War of the Pacific, the War of the Triple Alliance and the Chaco War. The territorial limits established at the time of national independence, except with respect to Bolivia and Peru, have virtually remained unaltered. This relative state of peace among States contrasts with what has happened in other continents, such as Africa, Asia and Europe, where the borders continue to be transformed by means of more or less bloody wars.

In recent years, however, the governments of Colombia and Brazil have, with respect to Venezuela, resorted to explicit threats between States in the region. Nonetheless, an armed conflict in the region would be surprising, among other reasons because an equilibrium was established, guaranteed by the presence of large powers that are developing their own interest games here.



Despite the existence of certain stability among the countries, the region per se is one of the most violent on the planet when considering the concept of human security. If homicide rates are used as a parameter, for example, 22 of the 50 most violent cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants in the world in 2018 are in South America, 15 in Mexico and 6 in Central America and the Caribbean (IMCO, 2019).

In this context, the concept of multidimensional security gradually transferred the reference of the security of States to that of individuals. This process has created a new vulnerability for the South American countries, expanding the scope of the Armed Forces' action in promoting domestic security and other tasks. But once the Armed Forces get involved in political and administrative activities instead of war preparedness, the countries' limited military resources lose combat capability.

This process is developing in a world in which multilateral institutions are losing efficacy and legitimacy, while new poles of power have arisen and become disputing zones of influence in the global arena. China's presence in South America has expanded strongly. The closeness to NATO of countries such as Colombia, Argentina and Brazil is generating additional concerns.

South America is no longer on the margins of global geopolitical dynamics. Given the inability to offer a negotiated solution to the Venezuelan crisis, the great powers are currently disputing spaces of influence in the region. China and Russia are using Venezuela as bargaining chip to expand their scope of action in the respective strategic settings. Turkey and Iran are intervening through their trade interests while Syria is agreeing to dialogue with the Maduro government to expand its diplomatic alliances.

In addition, the concept of multidimensional security obscures the vision the South American countries have about the role of the Armed Forces and jeopardizes regional cooperation on defense issues.

3. Local Vulnerabilities and extra-regional threats: Brazilian perspectives

Brazil shares with the other countries of the region the majority of their vulnerabilities with respect to organized crime and the precarious situation of their population. The absence of direct threats from extra-regional powers is also shared.

Furthermore, Brazil is one of the countries with the world's 10 largest populations, 10 largest territories and 10 largest economies. These conditions obviously exert a great dissuasive capacity. Invading the country would involve a very costly and improbable effort. Nonetheless, it would be prudent for the Brazilian government to invest in training its Armed Forces sufficiently.

That, however, is not happening. Brazil's defense budget is relatively low and is concentrated excessively in personnel expenses. Training defense for the protection of a territory like Brazil's would involve investing heavily in new C4ISR technologies²

² The abbreviation stands for "command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance" capacities.



to conduct anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)³ and having a sizable logistical capacity. Only technology can identify possible threats or attempts to take advantage of vulnerabilities in a short time and reach the location at the proper time to contain them. That being said, the Brazilian Armed Forces are poorly equipped, numeric oversized and constantly used for subsidiary domestic .

Brazil is thus increasingly more vulnerable to extra-regional threats. Such threats are of three types: 1) the challenges that emerge as a consequence of the characteristics of the international structure in constant change; 2) threats related to the participation of extra-regional powers in conflicts resulting from the deterioration of the political-economic conditions of some countries of the region; and 3) economic or political pressures in the future through the use of technological resources. For example, it would not be too difficult for a technologically capable State to block the country's communication system. With the propagation of cybernetics and nanotechnologies, the vulnerability of the countries that do not have high-tech defense systems has seriously increased.

Finally, non-state actors can also take advantage of our vulnerabilities. Any actor wishing to destabilize Brazil's capacity to regulate its political and economic environment autonomously can use the same tools mentioned above.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, it is worth mentioning some of the topics mentioned above: a) South America is a zone of peace, where extra-regional threats are diffuse; b) the presence of foreign powers in the region has increased in recent years, with risks of conflict in the region; c) Brazil is the only country that could lead a new process of rapprochement between the region's States, but is giving no sign of wanting to do so.

Despite the pacifism that marks the relations among the continent's countries, nothing guarantees this will continue indefinitely. It would be prudent for countries to reassume the construction of their own initiatives on security and defense issues, beginning by clarifying conceptual differences and distributing responsibilities among the security institutions operating in each country.

Finally, two remarks about Brazil. The country could become an important middle power in the international system, heading up a process of regional cooperation in security and defense matters. Unfortunately, its current government has negatively affected Brazil's reputation as a country capable of promoting peaceful solutions and generating confidence. What can be inferred from this policy is a progressive decrease in Brazil's ability to influence international processes, as can already be seen in relation to issues such as the environment and human rights.

A more solid prospect in order to reduce our vulnerabilities may perhaps lie in sub-national political institutions and technical cooperation (from the Armed Forces and Police). The culture of cooperation in the region could be strengthened through

³ For a country such as Brazil, which has well-defined borders, the main strategic capacity to dissuade possible extra-regional threats is expressed in the concept A2/AD, i.e., development of the capacity to impede access and deny areas to enemies that attempt to approach Brazilian territory.

ad hoc initiatives. For its part, academia also has a mission to fulfill in this process, developing concepts and making recommendations to the actors truly interested in the minimization of regional vulnerabilities.

3 Perspectives from Peru

Mildred Rooney Paredes

The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School posits that a threat considered existential requires the adoption of emergency measures, of actions outside the normal limits of political procedure (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Waever, 2003). Three elements intervene in this dynamic: the referent object, the threat to the object's survival (existential threats) and the securitizing actor, who plays the role of legitimating the measures that exceed the regular norms (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). As it is an intersubjective process, the securitizing of certain agendas depends on the perceptions and interests of the actors, as well as on the contextual variable, at both the systemic and regional levels.

In this sense, the success of the securitization process occurs when the referent public accepts the characterization of the existential threat, making it possible to apply emergency measures. For this to occur, a critical component is the "securitizing actor's" agenda-setting ability (Buzan et al., 1998). Thus, just as certain agendas are "securitized," they could also no longer be considered as existential threats to the referent objects (de-securitization) but rather move to the political agendas (politicization), thus again being given regular treatment according to the existing political processes.

Based on the above, this chapter aims to answer the following question: What extra-regional security challenges is Peru facing in the regional and global context? Along these lines, it aims to address the priority extra-regional challenges that are relatively new to Peru, as well as contribute to the analysis of the securitization processes that have been experienced.

In this regard, it should be noted that Peru's White Paper on Defense conceives external threats to national security in terms of their origin: i) those that could be generated if attempts were made to apply security doctrines in South America that are incompatible with international law; ii) those that could arise from crises due to the scarcity of strategically valuable natural resources such as vital resources; and iii) terrorism, drug trafficking, and international crime.

In addition to the threats contemplated in the White Paper on Defense (under review since 2016), the identification and selection of challenges includes assessing the following aspects: i) the characterization of Peru as a South American country; ii) the external origin of the threats and/or involvement of external powers; iii) the multidimensional conceptualization of security; and, iv) the politicizing or securitizing process at the systemic, regional and/or national level.

Based on such considerations, the Venezuelan crisis, the global threat of pandemics such as COVID-19 and cyber security are seen as three extra-regional security challenges facing Peru.





Challenge 1: the Venezuelan crisis

One common challenge to the stability of the South American sub-region is the Venezuelan crisis, which serves as a remote stage for the growing tensions among the global powers: on the one hand, the Western bloc led by the United States and the European Union (albeit each international actor with its own formulas for resolving the crisis), and on the other individual disruptive powers: China, Russia and Iran. This plurality of positions is part of the transition of the international order; a re-configuration that, while still in the making, is manifested in the region from a traditional security perspective by having Venezuela with Maduro in the presidency as a forestage.

In the context of this prevailing antagonism, the multilateralism dispersed into different traditional and ad hoc political mechanisms (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - TIAR/Organization of American States – OAS, Lima Group, International Contact Group and Montevideo Mechanism) and unilateral agendas against and in favor of Maduro by the great powers contribute as a whole to the securitization of the Venezuelan crisis at a systemic and hemispheric level. Given this understanding, the involvement of external powers and the risk of an escalation of the antagonistic positions prevailing among the actors, the multidimensional Venezuelan crisis is addressed as an extra-regional challenge to Peru's security due to its geographic proximity.

In this regard, it is worth noting that Peru was a pioneer in these actions by promoting the formation of the Lima Group in 2017. Likewise, Peru's alignment with the position of the United States in dealing with the Venezuelan crisis has varied since the end of 2019. Examples of this are Peru's abstention from the vote on activating TIAR, as well as the push to expand the Lima Group's dialogue with Russia, China and Cuba, countries that openly support Nicolás Maduro regime. As with the re-emergence of systemic and hemispheric dimensions to Peru's security, the Venezuelan crisis represents various kinds of national challenges, mainly in migration, health, economic-social, labor and education areas.

Challenge 2: the pandemic produced by COVID-19

With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a trend in Peru's case towards securitizing the health agenda due to the serious consequences brought by the rapid expansion and high mortality in various areas for the countries which have the adopted exceptional measures.

The government of Martín Vizcarra has opted to implement extraordinary measures that have been catalogued as "high risk" for democracy, including limitations to the exercise of personal rights and liberties, restrictions on economic activities considered non-essential, temporary closure of borders, and Armed Forces intervention in support of the National Police for control and compliance with the decreed quarantine, among others. The exceptional measures applied are legitimated by the precariousness of the health systems and the adverse impacts the virus produces at the most primary and basic level: people's survival.

It should be noted that the securitization of the health agenda may lead to risks such as opting a priori for traditional security mechanisms such as supporting the police in their citizen control functions by assigning armed forces personnel without adequate implements or prior specialized training (as is happening in the COVID-19 pandemic), thus diverting the focus from fixing the public problem to adopting short-term measures that do not promote the long-term strengthening of public health infrastructure or the implementation of effective national policies, as well as increasing vulnerability levels in other areas besides health. Weighing the risks that securitization potentially brings with it is therefore an imperative for decision-makers.



Challenge 3: cybernetic vulnerability

With regard to cyber-vulnerability, Peru has major deficiencies in the construction of national regulations and in its participation in international regimes and their effective implementation, as well as in the development of preventive and dissuasive capacities. Cybernetic threats demand policies and strategies with an integral approach that achieves optimal levels of security and defense (treatment of risks and emerging threats through dissuasion, prevention, mitigation, resilience and retaliation) for public institutions, private organizations and individuals.

This task of directing and strategically articulating cyber security is still pending for the Peruvian State under the “politicization” approach it has chosen. It is thus urgent to design and implement a resource investment strategy that makes viable the effective implementation of the regulations created by virtue of the recommendations of the OECD in both the public and private spheres.

Moving beyond the discursive and normative aspects, the cybersecurity agenda will lean towards effective governance and management, particularly because of the agenda’s implications for national security in a context marked by the technological maelstrom of 5G and recently accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. All this is forcing us to move toward digitalizing government under a crosscutting approach, and deal with its imposed challenges through joint action, i.e., multilateralism and international cooperation, especially in the case of developing countries such as Peru.

Finally, as a crosscutting reflection, an important aspect is that the decrease in military spending does not correlate with the identifiable threats and challenges, which have not diminished. On the contrary, the trend is toward expanding the participation of the Peruvian Armed Forces in cyber-defense, disaster risk management and the pandemic produced by COVID-19. Added to these new concerns is the increased and extended areas of coca leaf cultivation. The coexistence of drug trafficking with other predatory crimes (illegal mining and logging) and their links with other illegal activities such as smuggling, human trafficking, citizen insecurity, corruption and money laundering require the design and implementation of a multidimensional strategy that articulates state action from a targeted development approach for the affected populations.

4 Perspectives from Ecuador

Diego Pérez Enríquez

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the unavoidable need to rethink the terms in which States conceive security in the 21st century, and in Ecuador's particular case, the way the State has inserted security into the structure of public security and defense policies.

Ecuador historically linked its security thinking to a Westphalian understanding of sovereignty and international conflict. The change in priorities -and in conception- has not been as rapid as the transformation of the security environment. Thus, the last few years brought complex scenarios that demanded an operational adaptation of its security and defense institutions. In the face of scenarios as different as the 2016 earthquake, the 2018 actions of FARC dissidents in national territory, the 2019 Venezuelan migration crisis and the 2020 pandemic, the State provided responses that allowed it to address the situation, but they were not the result of foresight or forward thinking.

In fact, it is postulated that looking at the international scenario from the complexity and understanding of long-term processes would allow greater assertiveness in a context characterized by uncertainty. Threats, understood as actions with a potential impact on a country's security, can be averted by recognizing the structural weaknesses, the setting's conditions and a realistic assessment of the State's capacity to react to them. The global and regional changes that constitute threats are confronted and the way they affect Ecuador is considered with these premises. This opens up the question of whether the country can adapt to the uncertainty generated by the new security dynamics, which is the central question for this document.

It takes as a starting point the period of Rafael Correa's government (2007-2017), during which the need arose for Ecuador's repositioning in the international system. In 2020, the government that succeeded him has had to face the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the least imagined events for the international scenario, but one that has highlighted the weight of uncertainty in considering the security threats that repeatedly reveal a particular pressure for Ecuador in recent years.

In view of this, it is important to consider that: 1) institutions are an instance of connection -and reproduction- of the past, present and future, 2) the political leadership operates as an executor -and potential generator of ruptures- of the State's decisions, and, 3) the scenario being faced is one of uncertainty, since it brings with it a concrete alteration or imposes a particular pressure on the response capabilities of institutions and actors in leadership positions.

With such considerations, it is important to track some changes in Ecuador's relationship with China and the United States, considering the 2007-2020 period as the most significant due to political transformations within the country, and externally due to Chinese and Russian repositioning and renewed U.S. political interest in the region. In addition, considering the COVID-19 pandemic scenario, the capabilities of Ecuadorian institutions to respond to unpredictable events are weighed, emphasizing the primary actions of the Police and Armed Forces -and reasons for them.



To this end, it is considered that threats arise from the exercise of some type of power by internal actors or those from the international system, which refers to the problem of conceptualizing it for the purposes of this document. Thus, it is thought of in five dimensions, around which potential extra-regional threats to Ecuador are evaluated. These dimensions are constructed by considering the problem of the collision of internal and international trajectories for the problems of security, since the nature of the phenomena and threats make this border increasingly diffuse (Buzan et al., 1998; Giddens, January 27, 1999). The following dimensions are therefore proposed:

- 1) Realistic, referring to interstate dynamics,
- 2) Political economy, in which the objective is the promotion of economic growth
- 3) Internal, referring to the functioning of the political system in the State, which is in permanent tension between stability and revolution,
- 4) Individual, from the conception of leadership that emerges as a consequence of the rational position someone can reach, and,
- 5) Network, in which individuals, norms and practices are intermingled to ensure social cohesion.

The different interactions between these provide a glimpse into the complexities of security, with uncertainty and certainty at its core. While there are clearly definable threats, shaped by the actions and interests of the powers that be in the region, against whose agendas a country like Ecuador has limited options, those threats that arise in an unsuspected way, and therefore alter any assessment that might be made, must also be taken into consideration.

There is thus an unavoidable condition for Ecuador: threats to the country cannot be contained in their entirety, just as they cannot be considered in their vast complexity. There is a realistic element that subsists in all of the country's relations, seen at the external level but also at the level of the political economy, which substantially reduces the country's decision-making options. In these dimensions there are important difficulties in altering the country's position, since the variables cannot be controlled, and, despite moments in which a policy of greater independence has been promoted, it has not been possible to overcome the structural and historical limitations. In short, given the threats that arise from this area, it would seem impossible to alter the dependence on the trajectory. But in recent history a possibility -albeit weak and ultimately lacking the elements that would allow it to consolidate- was observed for strengthening South America's positions by joining together in UNASUR, but it finally passed to an indefinite state of suspension that implies, for all practical purposes, its dissolution.

In addition to the threats described above, there are also those arising from the actions of illegal international organizations operating in Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador has tried to contain their attacks and channel its capacities to guarantee its security. However, it would seem that these organizations also operate within the dimensions described, and this implies a significant reduction in the State's capacity to contain them. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Ecuador, and it would seem that until a conceptual and security policy re-articulation to confront the global drug problem is achieved at least at the regional level, this would be a lost battle.

An analytical dimension was also proposed that conceived the internal, individual and network aspects, to conceive the threats a country like Ecuador faces. In that regard, it is important to conceive the structural problem for security. The tendency was to find a substitute in the action of the Armed Forces where the state institutions tended to be deficient in addressing the generality of the problems. The problem is that what was supposed to be exceptional began to become the norm, in which the first state reaction to any type of threat (from crime to population control in the midst of the pandemic) comes from the Armed Forces. The recurrent use of the Armed Forces to deal with all types of threats implies a weakening of the institutional framework, a tendency to securitize issues, and a shift in responsibilities to other actors in the political system.

While the capacity to react to traditional threats has been limited by historical trajectories and the availability of resources, it should be borne in mind that the new nature of threats demands other types of state capacity. The following is suggested for dealing with them:

- a) Conceptually, work on new definitions that provide a baseline of the complex contemporary international scenario and the threats that derive from it.
- b) It is fundamental to understand the systemic nature of many of these threats, which implies deepening their interactions, both in the external and domestic scenarios.
- c) Containing threats is not a consequence of the exercise of leadership, although it is expected to have an impact on institutional structures.
- d) The construction of security depends on institutional capacities, both for reflection and reaction; the rest are variables that cannot be controlled.

5 Perspectives from Colombia

Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas

Diego Vera Piñeros

The security agenda and efforts of the government of President Ivan Duque continue to prioritize domestic actors associated with drug trafficking and the internal armed conflict, although the official discourse avoids alluding to the existence of conflict, using instead the category of national or international terrorism. In the government perceptions, the main international connection granted to these sources of threat is currently the crisis of the Venezuelan State.

Efforts by the governments of the United States, Colombia, and other members of the Lima Group to securitize the Venezuelan issue are inconsistent because:

- 1) Donald Trump's administration has reflected ambivalent and even contradictory postures in its multiple pretexts for Nicolas Maduro's resignation.
- 2) Beyond the geopolitical struggles of the U.S. with Russia and China and the economic and military supply interests that have helped these two powers keep the PSUV regime in place, opposing any resolution against Venezuela in the UN, there is no clear process at the hemispheric level to counteract their regional penetration or dissuade them from intervening. Furthermore, the official position of both has been to disregard



the parallel government of Congressman Juan Guaidó, instead calling for a negotiated solution between the government and the opposition.

- 3) Presumably there are ideological and political links between Venezuelan public officials and elements of the ELN and the FARC dissidents, but these connections appear to intensify with Colombia's inflexible positions.
- 4) There is evidence of a very small presence of groups associated with Islamic extremism both at the Latin American level and in Colombian territory. However, the connections they might have with Venezuelan government officials and Colombian illegal armed groups are not very clear. The connection between drug cartels and officials of the neighboring country is much more compelling.

With respect to Hezbollah, there has been close cooperation between Colombia, the United States and the European Union and Interpol. It is no secret that there is a connection between the interests of countries that support the Palestinian cause and the regime in Venezuela since Hugo Chávez. What is presumed today is that there would be radical groups of that cause in alliance with Colombian criminal structures to strike at US and Israeli interests in Colombia. However, Islamic radicalism has little chance of prospering in Colombia because there are no social bases to legitimize it, due to the low level of migration and economic interdependence between Colombia and Islamic States.

- 5) There are coincidences within the channels of the illegal markets, but the alleged political-ideological and military cooperation between groups of Islamic extremism and the actors of the Colombian conflict is diffuse. The nature of their agendas and strategies is extremely diverse.

Beyond the perceptions of some people in the main governing party, the Democratic Center, Russia and China have not been firmly defined as external threats to the country, although the security and defense policy and some speeches allude to the danger represented by the regional penetration of certain powers. They should rather be understood for now as nuisance factors for the diplomatic strategy of Colombia, which is eager to induce Venezuela's democratic transformation. Unfortunately, a long history of distancing between Colombia, which has opted during many governments for an alignment with the United States, and these two powers, which are projecting themselves into new geographic orders, facilitates communicative distortions, induces precautions and heightens regional nervousness.

The current defense and security policy identifies as threats to security the existence of undemocratic regimes, the humanitarian and migration crises, and, we stress, the interference of powers outside the hemisphere. An attempt is being made to deal with several of these sources of threat, with their international or transnational expressions, through the principle of cooperative security, aimed at strengthening and deepening security and defense alliances, emphasizing greater closeness to the United States and the Southern Command. This has resulted in more frequent military exercises between Colombia and the United States, and even an increased presence of U.S. military personnel on Colombian bases.

At the same time, the PSUV regime has intensified military recruitment, significantly reducing the personnel gap with the Colombian military forces, and Venezuela maintains a significant armament asymmetry in its favor, particularly facilitated by trans-



fers from Russia. But the Colombian government is not explicitly identifying Russia or China as threats. In fact, there have been official visits to both Moscow and Beijing to strengthen cooperative ties. However, these relations have been far from strategic and Colombia has not modified the positions of these powers towards Venezuela.

Something different is happening with the closeness of Iran and North Korea to Venezuela. They have explicitly defied the international order by declaring themselves enemies of the U.S. and its allies, and their military and nuclear sectors are not very transparent. Likewise, both countries are on the White House list, which the Colombian government supports- because neither country cooperates against terrorism or promotes it together with Cuba, Venezuela and Syria.

In a multipolar context, it is foreseeable that emerging powers will provide armaments to countries that have the money and interest. Venezuela's acquisitions from Russia took place annually between 2006 and 2014 while with China they also started in 2006 but continued until 2016. There were no transfers with North Korea, and Venezuela only had one acquisition from Iran, in 2013 for a value of USD 1 million. Recently the Colombian government charged alleged plans by the Venezuelan government to buy medium- and long-range missiles from Iran.

It should be added that Russia has deployed approximately 100 Russian soldiers, who in addition to taking supplies and food will reportedly be guaranteeing the functionality of all of Venezuela's weapons and equipment, in addition to conducting military exercises. There are enormous logistical difficulties in trying to support Venezuela however, due to the geographical distance and the absence of Russian military bases in that country.

The Colombian government's reaction to the military imbalance has been one of aborted attempts to purchase recent-generation aircraft and some anti-air defense systems, but the Duque administration's current priorities remain domestic. At one point, it was noted that there would be spying or encouragement by Russian officials in the context of the citizen protests in the country, but in the end the Colombian government did not take any action. Although at some point the Colombian delegation at the OAS tried to push for a resolution condemning the interference of external powers in Venezuela, in the end the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) mechanism has only been applied against the Maduro government.

The military asymmetry over Colombia that Russia has given Venezuela should not be ignored in view of the possible rise in conflict between the two, but it should not encourage Colombian armament because it would confirm the paranoia of the most radical figures in the Venezuelan government. Unfortunately, Colombia was implicated in the failed Operation Gideon, led by US mercenaries close to Donald Trump's security delegation who were contacted by J.J. Rendon, a political advisor who has worked for Uribe in Colombia and was also supporting Juan Guaidó's committee.

There is less concern in the Colombian government about China, which shows evidence of a tenuous approach to that power despite the rumor in early 2019 about an alleged sending of a Chinese military contingent to Venezuela, which was refuted.

Colombia's position on North Korea is to reject its nuclear tests under the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty and to support negotiation efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, supporting South Korea as a close partner.



With respect to Iran, Colombia believes it has helped Maduro evade the sanctions with various economic transactions, including gold and fuel. Although it has not demonstrated this well, the Colombian government has charged a connection between the socialist party of Venezuela, Iran, the ELN and Hezbollah. It is concerned about the alleged sending of 60 Iranian soldiers supposedly to support the Venezuelan military aviation and repair some Hercules-type planes, using black market spare parts.

Fortunately, the Colombian Government's financial and security priorities have been far from acquiring deterrent capabilities. Nonetheless, Maduro's government has been put more on the defensive by the zero-tolerance foreign policy towards the PSUV in the context of the threats of military intervention implicitly left by the activation of TIAR. This, added to the dangerous White House pressure game -which includes alluding to the use of military force and perverse incentives such as rewards for the capture and extradition of functionaries- has reinforced Venezuela's discourse of combat readiness against the United States and Colombia.

Recommendations:

In this context, the following is recommended to the national government:

- a) De-Venezuelanize and de-securitize the foreign agenda with respect to the PSUV and its international allies, with the exception of the international exposure of evidence -if any- of links between Colombian cartels, FARC dissidents, the ELN and officials of the Venezuelan government or its military forces.
- b) Refocus the Lima Group to become a mediator, not a tribunal, to facilitate rapprochement between the Venezuelan opposition and the PSUV.
- c) Avoid the conducting of combined military exercises with the U.S. near Venezuela's borders.
- d) Prioritize the budget line and international cooperation to implement the peace agreement with the FARC, the reform of justice and the strengthening of the territorial entities' institutional capacities instead of planning acquisitions of dissuasive weapons.
- e) Restore channels of communication and cooperation with the Maduro government, even in limited areas (migration, transnational organized crime, COVID-19).

6 Perspectives from Chile

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
To explain how Chile addresses extra-regional threats, Putnam's (1988) argument about the two levels of decision-making - domestic and international - that guide a country's foreign policy is useful. It is also necessary to develop the extra-regional perceptions and threats to the country. In particular, the security threats generated in the South Pacific and Antarctic territory as well as those of a cybernetic and autonomous weapons nature need to be further developed. For Chile, it is impossible to deal with these threats unilaterally. Consequently, it must participate in and promote the use of multilateral cooperation mechanisms and strategic alliances with key actors to minimize them.

When facing regional and extra-regional threats, the State must consider its domestic public. More than three decades ago Putnam (1988) posited the existence of a two-tier game with respect to foreign policy. In other words, it is the result of national policy, which implies that governments must consider the organized citizenry. Decision-makers in the area of external threats cannot ignore these groups, since the results are evaluated with the dynamics of any public policy. However, governments and their negotiating agents also act at the international level. According to the same author, there is a win-set at the domestic level that is fundamental in determining the ability of decision-makers to play; the broader the win-set, the greater the support the foreign policy will enjoy.

Like foreign policy, the role of the Armed Forces must be adapted at this dual level to a balance between the internal and external. For this purpose, it is essential to know how to differentiate the threats. It is not that inter-state warfare is completely out of the question, but it cannot be the main focus of external security concerns. The cost of not adapting implies being unable to react to real threats and, therefore, succumbing to the insecurity of the national community. For this reason, we analyze its transcendence for the current Chilean reality and also how the political actors react on the domestic front.

Many extra-regional threats are not discussed domestically. Functionally, these include maritime, cyber and other issues related to human security and pandemics. However, the South American region faces other extra-regional challenges to security that are not thought of in the classic context, but generate geopolitical and territorial problems, as well as problems for the countries' political stability. It is not always the case that state actors interacting with the global order have the same responses as the political class and voters in the domestic arena, in that balance achieved by overcoming the two-tier game discussed by Putnam (1988).

As for specific threats, one reality in the medium future is that the cyberworld could cross over into the physical or kinetic world through what has been called autonomous weapons. Their main characteristic is that they could potentially operate independently of any human intervention, governed only by the computer program from the moment they are fired until they hit the target. In this regard, there is a lot





of literature (although there is currently not 100% autonomy) that discusses the ethical content or relevance of the absence of the human factor.

In the purely cybernetic area, there are attacks on the country's information control capacity and computer system. This attack may or may not have an extra-regional mark. What is certain is that it occurs frequently and affects key areas of the national State, but not yet at the level of generating such a detriment to national security that it becomes the focus of public activity, at least not for now.

The center of gravity for Chile beyond its region is in Asia and the South Pacific and is projected decisively to Antarctica. However, it must act multilaterally, and to be considered must behave as a "good global citizen." With this objective in mind, peace missions are fundamental as part of its foreign and security policy, as they must overcome domestic difficulties to moving in this direction.

The threats Chile perceives in the South Pacific have to do with the expansion of the traditional notion of borders, which considers only territorially neighboring countries, although it seeks to include those territories that share an oceanic border. The commercial exchange with China is relevant for the Chilean business sector, thus making the latter a central national actor that affects foreign policy towards the Asian giant. The conflicts between China and India, and in the South China Sea are a worrying issue given what they mean for Chile's economic development.

Within this framework, Chilean stakeholders would like to exert another kind of pressure domestically. However, given Chile's strategic size and limited relative weight in resolving the conflict, they attach little importance to Chilean diplomacy in such bodies. In other words, it is a classic problem of collective action according to which large deployments of resources at the domestic level to support the resolution of this conflict will not be justified.

Another security problem on the Asia-Pacific maritime border is piracy, which consists mainly of highly violent extortive assaults and kidnappings by armed gangs and terrorist groups. As with the conflicts in the South China Sea, the multilateral track is one of the few options the country has to manage this threat, given the need for coordination of multilateral naval forces and high-level intelligence strategies to combat it. In addition, Chile is joining forces with New Zealand and particularly with Australia, including two frigates of that origin in the national naval inventory. Here we have another complex win-set with national stakeholders, because the coalition of domestic support is lower, especially in the National Congress and many political parties. It is a pending issue to be resolved without being understood as part of an arms race.

On the other hand, Chile has an Antarctic vocation; it is a signatory of the Washington Treaty of 1959, by virtue of which the principles that have guided the actions of the seven signatory States were established. Mainly, the continent was established as a territory of peace, where scientific progress is promoted through cooperation and regulation for environmental conservation. The treaty also regulates the regime of inspections of the activity conducted in that territory by both holders and third parties and the proscription of sovereignty claims.

Climate change, the potential use of Antarctic natural resources and the growing use of the frozen continent's territory by extra-regional sources is a major security concern. Indeed, one of the most relevant sources of conflict that Chile may face in the future are the Antarctic claims and potential revisions to the Washington Treaty in 2048. It is then that the possibility opens up of reversing the decision that this territory should be a continent free of weapons and that its main motivation for exploration should be scientific. We cannot understand the country's future without the defense of its claims in that continent, and the problem of any changes in it. The possibility of fracking, excessive resource use and new or different territorial claims is a real problem for Chile's security.

Recommendations

- 1) Chile must prioritize a definition of its strategic size, analyzing the importance of establishing a network of multiple allies and identities. In this, it must place emphasis on the South Pacific Alliance without detracting from its South American vocation. Likewise, New Zealand and Australia must become strategic and central partners for a common vision of the Pacific basin that unites us.
- 2) The strategic complementation with the rest of the Pacific Alliance and the South American Pacific coast to face the extra-regional threats together.
- 3) Join forces at the global level for the absolute prohibition of autonomous weapons and for a cyber-security regulation, both essential for maintaining critical infrastructure and the permanence of human rights as founding principles.
- 4) Put Antarctica as the center of national concerns, as the peaceful and sustainable development of the white continent is the national vocation. Antarctic claims should be defended as a vital issue, but always in the field of peace-loving multilateral forums among all nations of the world, including sister nations with which there may be differences.



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