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# **THE ARMED FORCES NEW ROLE**

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# THE ARMED FORCES NEW ROLE

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## **1 Introduction**

Supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), the Institute of International Studies (IDEI) at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, created the Safety Policy Network in 2015. In addition to the IDEI PUCP, the network is comprised of scholars and specialists from universities in Peru's five neighboring countries, that is, from the San Andrés University (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés) in Bolivia, the University of Brasilia (Universidade de Brasilia), the University of Chile (Universidad de Chile), the Javeriana University (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana) in Colombia and the Institute of Higher National Studies (Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales) of Ecuador.

This network aims to disseminate and strengthen knowledge in the field of security in our respective countries, as well as to make collaboration proposals in design and implementation of public policies in this area.

In its fourth year since its inception, the Network produced in 2018 a new publication entitled *El Nuevo Rol de las Fuerzas Armadas en Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú (The Armed Forces New Role in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru)*,<sup>1</sup> which analyzes the evolution of competences granted to the armed forces in the region, from their participation in traditional tasks to their involvement in matters of internal order, development and security, ending up with a set of proposals for their strengthening. A brief synthesis of the studies included in such work is presented below.

## Colombian Military Forces: between overcoming conflict and new post-conflict tasks

*Eduardo Pastrana  
Diego Vera*

Colombia has the possibility of ending the internal armed conflict through peace negotiations and the consolidation of its security. However, the Colombian option tends to be the continuity of its Military Forces (FF.MM) intense domestic involvement, as long as there are armed actors with the power to destabilize the State and seriously harm the population. At the same time, the National Government and the military leadership have been drafting concepts to collaborate with activities of the Forces in foreign countries.

For the moment being, the National Government, FF.MM. and part of society do not consider aspects such as reduction of troops and budget, separation of military and police affairs and institutions or incorporation of ex-combatants.

In the international sphere, military participation initiatives abound, but there are also great questions about their direct benefits, the costs that will be assumed and the country's priorities, according to their domestic resources and national values.

### *Context: from Democratic Security to Democratic Prosperity*

Colombia's military strategy between the Uribe (2002-2006, 2006-2010) and Santos (2010-2014, 2014-2018) governments aimed at internal consolidation and projection against transnational threats, and therefore tends to be the

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<sup>1</sup> Digital version of the book:  
<https://www.kas.de/einzeltitel/-/content/el-nuevo-rol-de-las-fuerzas-armadas-en-bolivia-brasil-chile-colombia-ecuador-y-peru>  
<http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/131774>

strategy of a "premodern" state. Colombia is one of the Latin American countries that do not introduce a political or operational difference between defense and security.

Under Uribe, the emphasis was on modernization to defeat armed groups organized outside the law (GAOAL) and their ties to drug trafficking. Efforts were made to increase troop size, extend deployment areas, achieve implantation in the key zones, increase technical-operative capacity and encourage teaching and doctrine anchored in human rights and in international humanitarian law.

Despite favorable figures in insurgent casualties, captures, demobilization, as well as in regaining control of areas, towards the middle of Uribe's second term there were questions about human rights, civilian casualties, effects of derailing on neighboring countries and the inability to take the FARC to surrender. The fact that illegal GAOAL had diverse sources of funding, as well as low geographic accessibility, forced recruitment practices and use of non-conventional weapons and explosives had an influence on this.

During the first two years of the Santos administration, military offensive tended to continue, but there were some change expectations due to progress of peace negotiations with the FARC, which officially began in 2012.

The Integral Security and Defense Policy for Prosperity had the following objectives: 1) to bring narcotics production to a historical minimum; 2) to dismantle the GAOAL; 3) to create conditions for citizen coexistence; 4) to move towards a system of deterrence capacities; 5) to contribute to timely actions in natural disasters and 6) to strengthen security and defense (S & D) institutions and welfare. Component 4 (deterrence) has a relatively new definition.

This is combined with defense industry modernization plans, including INDUMIL (military industries), CIAC (aeronautical industry) and COTECMAR (navy shipyards), not only for self-supply purposes, but also with external marketing plans. However, the air fleet is very outdated, and Colombia is virtually absent in the "space race", albeit the creation of the Presidential Program for Space Development in 2013.

Santos continued with increased military spending and incorporation of troops. Despite a slight decrease in spending in 2011 and 2012, the Santos government maintained an annual expenditure higher than that of his predecessor. In terms of personnel, Uribe left some 441,828 military and police personnel in 2010. By 2016, the Santos government reported the availability of some 481,100 troops (293,200 soldiers).

Also, nine Joint Task Forces and the National Security Council, a US model, were created.

The government and the Armed Forces seem very interested in building an identity in S & D, stemming from the historical links with the Inter-American System. Values and alliances with the North have also been reinforced by the links with the US Southern Command and the new cooperation with NATO. With the UN, a framework agreement was signed in 2015 to participate in peace missions as from 2019 and provide a contingent of up to 5 thousand men called "Colombia Task Force".

They are "windows of opportunity" to maintain their current size and goals of modernization and professionalization, especially when estimating the disappearance of their main historical enemies (the FARC and the ELN). Colombia already participates in cooperation programs on defense transparency and exchange of standards, and in 2012 it carried out a "Refueling in Flight" operation for NATO within the principle of "interoperability". In June 2013, Colombia signed an Agreement with NATO to explore additional cooperation issues and request the "partner" status. Currently, the Alliance develops political dialogue and cooperation links due to issues with 41 partner States (non-members). Colombia is the only Latin American country in that status. In 2015, it contributed to combat piracy and protect navigation corridors in the Horn of Africa.

Colombia is interested in NATO's formulation of democratic defense policies, re-training of retired personnel, destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition, preparation against natural and humanitarian disasters, scientific cooperation, military diplomacy, anti-terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyber defense. What Colombia wants to transmit is its experience in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime.

The U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (2012) is the main example of external action. It consists of providing technical assistance to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic in issues such as drug trafficking and transnational crime. Some 1,494 soldiers were trained by Colombia between 2012 and 2016.

Domestically, the FF.MM. have been carrying out tasks related to protection of ex-combatants for demobilization, deployment in areas with weak government presence and support for voluntary eradication of illicit crops and for demining.

Post-conflict discussions arise for the FF.MM. with the possibility of a reform. Four concerns of the Police and the Army were identified during

the peace negotiations: job stability, trials, hiring and ideology. It is not accepted to have the Police exclusively assume current domestic functions now in charge of the Army. With the FARC's new political status, it remains a challenge to change the institutional perception of their ex-combatants, including the appearance before a single system of transitional justice.

Army transformation today takes NATO and US guidelines as reference for its modernization; some are based on the logic of confrontation between States. What would be expected is that it is in tune with the end of the armed conflict, leading to reduction and external specialization. However, the vision of irregular war persists at the same time as a new vision is constructed, evidencing a friction. The new vision highlights the creation of the Transition Strategic Command (COET) and the Army of the Future Transformation Command (COTEF). The first coordinates FARC's disarmament. The second is in charge of transformation, which consists of three phases: Army consolidation and peace process support (2014-2018), strengthening capacities by operation areas (2018-2022), and consolidating a multi-mission Army that encompasses from internal order maintenance to participation in international missions (2023-2030).

There is a thorough formulation of guidelines to re-evaluate military activities. Plans such as Sword of Honor, Victory Plan, Victory Plus Plan and the Horus Plan sought the territorial penetration and control consolidation. Doctrines such as integral action, Army of the Future, 2030 Plan and multi-mission roles, emphasized the potential contribution of the troop to achieving human security and national development. The program "Faith in Colombia" sought private company and international cooperation support so that the Army could contribute to the improvement of social-economic and infrastructure conditions of the most vulnerable people. The actions carried out by the Conflict and Historical Military Memory Research Center sought to reconstruct the narratives of FF.MM personnel and victims to contribute to the construction of the National Memory, at the same time that they promoted pacific resolution of conflicts. All this points to new civic-military relations, but the prevailing militarization of public security is a great concern for many in connection with State normalization.

In conclusion, an expansion of the Armed Forces roles has been promoted, with civic-military innovations and international opportunities, something different from the classical logic of structural reform of the S & D sector that is typical of democratic transitions derived from the collapse of dictatorships or international intervention in institutional reconstruction.

### *Recommendations*

The following recommendations for the National Government and the Ministry of Defense concerning the main challenges that these FF.MM face today arise:

- a. To face extreme decentralization and new emergence of drug trafficking in a multidimensional fashion.
- b. To analyze why new criminal gangs emerge and the consequences of using air bombardments to confront them.
- c. To analyze the causes of FARC dissidence and recidivism among those demobilized, speeding up implementation of the signed Agreement.
- d. To manage, armed pressure to the ELN towards negotiation with a reasonable and flexible approach.
- e. To fully face increase of illegal mining.
- f. To evaluate Venezuelan pressures and military incursions without falling into war provocation.
- g. To plan international participation in S & D diplomacy and to make it more transparent.
- h. To further disseminate needs and plans regarding budget, investment and marketing of military products and services.
- i. To convincingly solve FF.MM. administrative corruption cases.
- j. To actively attend to the requirements of the Special Justice for Peace (Truth Commission).
- k. To raise FF.MM. legitimacy in the face of criticism and sanctions for extrajudicial executions and links between staff members and paramilitary groups.
- l. To increase coherence between domestic tasks and offered external advisory activities.
- m. To build better civic-military relations with the most remote communities, respecting local non-violent dynamics and without entering into unfair competition with market players.
- n. To contribute to build the conflict historical memory without falling into denial of its errors or rivalry with the memory of civilian victims.





### 3

## Civic-military relations in Brazil: Challenges in the defense sector and the military role in contemporary Brazilian society

*Antonio Jorge Ramalho*

What role should the military have in Brazilian society? What are the main challenges in terms of institutional organization and budget definition in the country's defense sector?

This paper answers these questions considering a historical perspective. It is necessary to understand the context in which relations between civilians and military personnel are inserted in Brazil to identify the challenges of the defense sector. To do so, the paper is organized in three parts: the first contextualizes the relationship between civilians and the military; the second synthesizes the relevant challenges; and the third lists a set of re-commendations for political action to advance in the solution of defense sector challenges in the country.

### *Context of civil-military relations in Brazil*

Traditionally, the Brazilian military have conceived their roles broadly, that is, beyond defense against external threats, establishing a complex and ambiguous relationship with civilian elites. Perhaps because it is an intense relationship, civilians and military have different perceptions of their historical roles. For example, for military elites, the dictatorial regime that existed in Brazil is a matter for historians; for part of the civil elites, it is rather a pending issue. This makes it difficult to establish a consensus on intentions, responsibilities and facts that occurred during the 1964-1985 period.

Supervised transition towards democracy consolidated military professionalization, which doctrine focused on preparation for fighting. However, the military's ambiguous role in society persisted. On the one hand, public institutions do not meet population demands, while on the other hand, the military are respected, cultivating a sense of collective responsibility. As a result, society frequently resorts to the Armed Forces to face problems that are only remotely related to national defense.

In other words, Brazilian society relies on the Armed Forces and it attributes to them the ability to coordinate national efforts for collective goals, an essentially political task. Hence their excessive use in operations guaranteeing law and order and in subsidiary actions, in areas ranging from road construction to distribution of vaccines and contributions to social policies. It is not by chance that the Ministry of Defense (MD) takes long to fully institutionalize in the Brazilian State. Nor is it surprising that the military are now returning to politics, fully

inserted into the democratic framework, through formal candidacies for various public offices.

This context is critical to understand defense sector challenges in the future and implementation difficulties.

### *Defense sector challenges and civil-military relations in Brazil: diagnoses*

In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the Armed Forces are attributed the role of defending the country, guaranteeing constitutional powers and, only on the initiative of any of them, to protect law and order. Clear definition of these roles requires a proactive and stable Ministry of Defense, capable of formulating and conducting a defense policy that harmonizes the efforts of the three armed forces under a long-term vision.

For this purpose, it is necessary to set clear and interrelated priorities in Innovation and Defense Industry, and to assign indicators that allow measuring progress in the execution of those policies. Concerning coordination with the forces, it is necessary to more clearly distinguish the preparation and employment functions. The General Secretariat coordinates preparation with the commanders, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff leads employment. It is necessary to advance in building combined commandos and in creating a civilian career, providing the Ministry of Defense with administrative capacity to manage policy, and providing the military with better preparation conditions for combat.

As far as the minister is concerned, the challenges are even more complex, because it is necessary to promote harmony between the civilian and military elites, completing, in the cultural sphere, the transition already consolidated in the institutional sphere. The minister's cabinet needs strategic advice to enable them to speak "outwardly" in a coordinated manner, linking strategic planning actions, parliamentary advice and social communication with an institutional vision of MD institutional strengthening.

It is necessary to unify the command regarding preparation and use of Armed Forces, so as to harmonize doctrines to the point of materializing inter-operability and to enable use of teams integrated by the three forces. Finally, it is necessary to face the pension problem within the framework of national accounts, to recruit and prepare the military based on necessary capacities in the future, and to implement a solid policy of talent retention.

It is necessary to specify the number of human and material resources to be allocated to fulfill the Armed Forces' main missions, as well as the resources to be used in subsidiary missions, particularly peace operations and law and order operations. Otherwise, the defense sector



can remain hostage to urgent society needs or circumstantial political interests, disregarding their constitutional responsibilities.

### *Recommendations*

With respect to

(i) Defining a clear armed forces project, considering them jointly and depending on future defense sector needs, it would be relevant to expose a clear narrative about the major Brazilian strategy in the highest level policy documents (National Defense Policy and Strategy) . What does Brazil want on the international stage? What degree of autonomy does it want to have, in its foreign and defense policy, with respect to great and middle powers? What vulnerabilities and threats does Brazil face in the international environment? What degree of interaction does it want to have with its South American neighbors? By the way, this does not depend only on the Ministry of Defense; on the contrary, it should be the result of a consensus among national political elites, even if this is not their priority. Then it is necessary to establish a clear conceptual framework, based on the principles that guide the country's international action, in permanent dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- Strengthen institutional planning consultancies, as well as social and parliamentary communication, allowing the parliament and society to better communicate the challenges of national defense in the future. If the contributions of the defense sector to national development are not disseminated in parliament and, more broadly, in society, the Ministry of Defense will not be able to expand its budget. In addition, society will only be prepared to support investments in the defense sector if it expects returns in other areas, since resources are scarce and internal deficiencies are very important.
- Give priority and strategic sense to the international area of the Ministry of Defense, relating it with management of international relations in Brazil. Foreign perception of Brazil is in line with its self-image: a peaceful country committed to strengthening a world governed by rules, rather than by force. In fact, defense and foreign relations are two sides of the same coin and should be presented in this way in foreign policy narratives, particularly when the world becomes an increasingly dangerous place. Participation in peace operations, for example, allows building this conceptual bridge, as dual impacts of investments in the defense sector do in the economic sphere.
- Establish a permanent dialogue committee associated with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Industry and Trade, Science, Technology and Innovation, as well as Finance and

Planning in favor of consolidating the National Defense Industry and favorable conditions for innovation.

- Promote joint studies among the Armed Forces on their ideal design to face the wars of the future, considering both budget expectations and needs derived from commitments assumed with current reservists and pensioners. This may point to the need to restructure officers' careers, in which case it would be convenient to strengthen inter-operative activities and service time at the Ministry.

(ii) Centralizing Armed Forces preparation control under the commands and under Secretary General supervision, and Armed Forces use control under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This requires valuation of the Ministry's hierarchy and those bodies with broader political responsibilities among its bodies:

- Formally strengthen the General Secretariat (SG) and the EMCFA, in that order, attributing them the same capacity as that of the Commanders to replace the Minister of State in his/her absence.
- In this logic, the Commanders must maintain their prerogative concerning military preparation, in the light of hypotheses formulated within the framework of the Ministry of Defense, under SG coordination.
- The General Secretariat will need permanent cadres to function properly and continuously. Hence, it is necessary to carry out public calls to provide permanent civil or military servants to the Ministry's Central Administration. This body will gradually acquire a corporate sense at State service, as it happens with the diplomatic corps.
- This will improve ministry administrative capacity, favoring service provision centralization, equipment procurement with gains due to scale, and inter-operability expansion. More importantly, by providing services to the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense will allow the military to concentrate most of their time in adequate preparation of its members for combat, leaving administrative activities in the hands of technical staff.

(iii) Finally, effective inter-operability implementation requires:

- Ensuring that command unity on Armed Forces use falls into the EMCFA chief's hands.
- Promoting rotation of CHEMCFA among the Armed Forces, preferably by setting three-year mandates for chiefs. This would allow the three forces to start preparing officers that may be selected for the position by the president. A fixed 3-year term would confer stability on this function. Replacements would rarely coincide with changes of ministers, ensuring task

continuity and institutionalizing rotation among the Armed Forces.

- Promoting gradual conceptual unification of the Armed Forces regional mandates, making them joint. Currently each force organizes its activities according to its own definition. These definitions do not coincide: the commander of each force in a specific region needs to coordinate his/her operations in the field with more than one regional sister forces' commander, which does not make sense from the point of view of joint action. It would therefore be necessary to unify action from a geographical point of view.

#### **The Armed Forces in Chile and their multiple-use capacities**

*Jaime Baeza Freer  
María Cristina Escudero Illanes*

In view of the above, the military regime led by Pinochet began a new period in civil-military relations at the end of 1990 that had to overcome its recent past of intervention in civil affairs under the logic of the country's internal security doctrine, and had to reconnect with democratic structures. In this context, there has been a complex civil-military relationship since 1990, which took more than a decade to normalize and which was only possible after the 2005 constitutional reforms that eliminated the existence of institutional and appointed senators (a large part of which were military) and that changed the composition and powers of the Security Council that functioned as an important authoritarian enclave that supervised civil authority.

After the transition period, civil-military relations had to build a path based on an international context that was not prone to military governments and with few possibilities of external war. Therefore, just preparation for war became an insufficient role for the Armed Forces worldwide. Increasingly, Latin American countries began to include control of public order in special cases at request of democratic governments as a function of their Armed Forces, as if they were better-equipped policemen and as official anti-drug and anti-organized crime agents. They also expanded their functions to peace missions. This takes place in a context of a globalized international community that began to foster the idea that international security had a collective dimension, thus promoting cooperation in various aspects such as military missions for peace making and peace keeping, for prevention of conflict and for humanitarian intervention. In particular, Chile does not take the path of expanding internal Armed Forces functions. Constitutionally internal order is only in the hands of the police (therefore, it does not participate

in keeping internal order, nor in anti-organized crime missions) and instead develops the concept of multipurpose capacities. Their versatility depends on understanding that determining Armed Forces functions is a public policy and, therefore, should contribute to generating greater state capacity, that is, to enable connectivity within the national territory, giving it territorial continuity, preserving aid in catastrophes and providing health services where no one else can do it. In the case of Chile, which has a rugged geography, provision of these services has turned the Armed Forces into key actors of country development and welfare of the entire population.

At present, the Armed Forces have implemented several initiatives -most of them institutionalized- towards contributing to a greater State capacity. The Military Labor Corps is among them. It is in charge of connectivity and communication works throughout the territory, such as construction of roads and bridges. The Navy's Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service (SHOA) surveys hydrography, nautical charts, navigation charts and implements a national tsunami alarm system. On the other hand, the FACH's Aerial Photogrammetric Service and the Military Geographical Institute make all the official maps and is in charge of transportation to isolated places in the country.

With regard to cooperation in a catastrophe situation, the Armed Forces must adhere to constitutional laws that govern the corresponding State of Exception. This implies that the Executive Branch may suspend constitutional guarantees in certain territories and place them under a Chief of National Defense designated by the Executive who will be in charge of the Armed Forces and the police in coordination with the intendant. This figure generated tensions between civil and military authorities in the past, mainly due to the lack of regulation and practical experience and the fact that it was necessary to overcome some persistent mistrust since the time of the military regime. However, since the 2010 earthquake, permanent coordination mechanisms have helped to overcome these weaknesses.

Finally, versatility in the Armed Forces has also included development of an area aimed at international cooperation. Although Chile has participated in peace operations since 1949, this type of practice has been consolidated as robust and multinational actions since 2004, with its involvement in the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Since then, peace missions have been consolidated as a factor contributing to Chilean foreign policy, increasing its degree of international responsibility.

In short, the Armed Forces multipurpose role implies that the traditional external defense role based on deterrence and defense, must be added to support in catastrophe situations, assistance in connectivity and access

to isolated areas and different roles that they can play in international cooperation. This implies that its role has migrated from planning built on the basis of threats to one based on capabilities.

### *Recommendations*

Based on the Chilean experience, we believe that there are a number of outstanding elements in the relations between civilians and the military, which, although not advancing as fast as some social sectors would like, have generated an institutional framework robust enough to clarify certain fundamental principles that we can acknowledge as strengths in public policy in the area and that are possible recommendations from Chile for the future of the Armed Forces' operations, also acknowledging some weaknesses, namely:

- a. Differentiation between security policy and defense policy at constitutional level. We believe that this is a great contribution, since it represents the possibility of professionally enhancing the Armed Forces in its multiple role as already explained, without distorting its functions. On the contrary, the possibility of having a militarized police like Carabineros de Chile (Chilean police) takes pressure off the military presence in the fight against crime and emerging threats such as drug trafficking. The maritime police activity of the Navy and that in the airspace by the Air Force do not contradict this principle, but rather add a level of knowledge where the police have less experience. Finally, the two aforementioned military institutions only act in flagrancy and detainees must always be handed over to the police.
- b. The increasing joint complementary capacity of the Armed Forces helps in consolidating its multipurpose work, but at the same time in not having duplication in performed functions. This is particularly true in military operations other than war and has relevance in tasks such as increasing capacity and presence throughout the State's territory. In this regard, the Military Labor Corps, for example, is key, particularly in the southern zone.
- c. A defense policy integrated to the State's international responsibilities, particularly in peace operations, has brought very positive experiences.
- d. Progress made in the military presence in catastrophes is also worth noting. From the initial distrust evident in the February 2010 earthquake, the military and civilians have shown that they can work in cases of catastrophes, states of exception and others in which the rule of law requires it. Today it is a real privilege to see that the population values and admires the Armed Forces activities in these exceptional situations of republican life.
- e. However, lack of sufficient control of the Armed Forces, particularly some cases of isolated corruption that cause concern, is a weakness

to continue exploring. Also in this sense, there is lack of work to continue advancing in capacity planning, a model that will improve in resource administration and, in addition, in long-term decision making not motivated solely by the current government. These are long processes, but new missions are assured through them. This helps to continue consolidating multiple capacities in the forces and decision makers at political and strategic level.

## **The Bolivian Armed Forces in a transforming international context, 2006-2018**

*José F. Rocabado Sánchez*

The stability of Evo Morales's government has had a very important support in the Armed Forces, although not the only one, which has helped the implementation of government programs, also favoring the country's internal and external security. The essential factor in this consisted in the solid alignment of the Armed Forces with the Presidency and the Bolivian government action program. In this way, situations that once affected the economic, political and institutional stability of the State and the country were also eroded. In turn, the government gave the Armed Forces a set of tasks and prerogatives, benefiting these entities responsible for the defense and security of the territory and institutions.

The current Political Constitution of the State, enacted in 2009, updated the Armed Forces constitutional framework. It specifically establishes that the Armed Forces are made up by the Chief of Staff, the Army, the Air Force and the Bolivian Navy. This Constitution regulates the role of the Armed Forces, the mission it fulfills, its organization and agencies. Also, it rules the Supreme Defense Council of the Plurinational State, led by the President. No less important, the Armed Forces have a central role in the defense, security and control of border security zones, including development policies. The inalienable and imprescriptible right is declared on territory that gives access to the Pacific Ocean and its maritime space. The priority the State gives to the maritime, fluvial and lacustrine interests, and to the merchant marine, in which the Bolivian Navy plays a central role, is also highlighted. In addition, the current Political Constitution of the State updates the constitutional regime applicable to the Armed Forces.

Regarding the process of formulating a new doctrine for the Armed Forces, they updated some institutional policy instruments. In this framework, they formulated the so-called "Patriot Doctrine" based on key concepts such as decolonization, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism. In turn, it is nourished by foundations that reinforce sovereignty, that is, self-determination and autonomy of peoples.



Likewise, it protects natural resources and others that are part of the sovereign State heritage. The Armed Forces have had ample space for action that has allowed them to carry out a variety of actions within the framework of their institutional mission, since the beginning of President Morales's government. They were involved in various economic, social, productive and other development activities. They also participated in the development of road infrastructure. In April 2015, the Vice Minister of Strategic Planning reported that "there were 63 public companies, between nationalized and created since 2007."

Redesigning the Force System -Army, Navy and Air Force- implied the creation of 7 Joint Commands distributed in 7 geo-strategic areas. The key objectives in this redesign have been: to preserve borders, combat illicit activities -smuggling and others- and support civil defense. It also includes the creation of the School of Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff, which reports to the Armed Forces Commander in Chief. In addition, new military posts were established at the border to strengthen border security. Compulsory military service was also strengthened.

Likewise, the Equipment and Material Acquisition Programs were reinforced. Procurement of 6 Chinese K-8 fighters and 6 French Super-Puma helicopters, as well as 9 Diamond training aircraft stands out. Bolivia also bought 6 Robinson R-44, 2 Euro-copter AS350 and 2 EC145 helicopters for emergencies and aids, as well as a fleet of passenger and cargo transport aircraft. The military vehicle fleet was renovated with 148 trucks, 42 buses, 142 vans, and 40 quads and motorcycles for operations against border crimes and citizen insecurity. All of this implied important budgetary disbursements. Between 2008 and 2014, the budget increase for this item was 93%; the budget virtually doubled. To finance acquisition of arms and supplies, the government created a Defense Fund and a Fund for Supplies, Replenishment and Equipment (FARE). Subsequently, acquisition of radar technologies for air control, including border areas, was added.

President Morales widely involved the Armed Forces in government management. He gave them ample room for action. Thus, equal opportunities were fostered within the Armed Forces, including indigenous youth. Salaries and other benefits were also increased. Significant investments were made in infrastructure for the Armed Forces. Airport infrastructures were increased. They remodeled and built facilities at the borders. Women joined the military career. And in general, Armed Forces welfare and facilities were improved. He also appointed several high ranking ambassadorial officers in various countries. In this way, the civic-military relationship was significantly strengthened. The objective sought was to relaunch and strengthen the link between President Morales's government and the Armed Forces.



There has been a strategic interest in modernizing the Armed Forces, including military doctrine. They sought to strengthen and deepen their diverse capabilities, dedicated to Bolivia's defense and security. Modernization also included the acquisition of military equipment. Likewise, the Armed Forces have understood the presence of external actors, particularly regarding participation in the military sphere. While there was consensus on the importance of modernizing the Armed Forces, the paths followed were diverse.

A modern border monitoring system was implemented, allowing better control of various transnational, legal and illegal flows. Known by the name of SIDACTA, said system consists of 13 radars, 11 fixed and 2 mobile. The French company Thales was in charge of its development, installation, training and operation.

The Armed Forces have seen a fundamental path for its modernization in the renewal of military material and equipment. Another characteristic of this modernization has been the strengthening of external relations with extra-hemispheric countries, particularly Russia and China, in military matters and war equipment. Of course, in other areas too.

As for cooperation with Russia, the subscription of an agreement to build a Nuclear Technology Research and Development Center between the Bolivian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABEN) and the Russian Atomic State Company Rosatom in Vienna, is to be noted. The Center is to be built in El Alto, near the city of La Paz. This nuclear compound, at a cost of more than 300 million dollars, will consist of a low-power pressurized water research reactor of up to 200 kilowatts (kW) and a multipurpose gamma irradiation plant, as well as a pharmacy radio-cyclotron equipment, engineering facilities and several laboratories. Said Center could become operational in 2019.

As for China's military cooperation with Bolivia, it started since the beginning of President Morales's government. Indeed, as the then Minister of Defense, Reymi Ferreira, informed and fluid cooperation was implemented since 2007, when Bolivia received US \$ 1,074,000. In successive years, this amount was increased to reach US \$ 3,070,000 in 2012. As of 2013 and thereafter, China's military cooperation with Bolivia is of US \$ 7,675,000 annually. More recently, President Morales and China's President, Xi Jinping, signed eight agreements and memorandums of understanding, in the context of an official visit by President Morales to China, held on June 18, 2018. It should also be noted that the aforementioned Armed Forces modernization has been accompanied by the growth of public investment for the defense sector. Between 2008 and 2016 the defense budget of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has risen from 254.5 million dollars to 568.4 million dollars, that is, more than doubled.

### *Recommendations*

- a. Although the Armed Forces missions have been in force for more than a quarter of a century, it is important to revise them and determine

the relevance of their continuity or modification. It is also very important to identify what new missions would be required.

- b. It is also advisable to take pertinent steps to formulate a feasible "comprehensive modernization" program, covering various fields of military and far-reaching activities. Bolivia must legitimately continue to modernize its defense systems, because in late years it has only procured equipment and materials to update its defense, after more than two decades of austerity.
- c. The Bolivian Armed Forces need to strengthen their capacity to control smuggling, drug trafficking and other illegal transnational flows, acting in coordination with other prevention and control institutions in Bolivia, and counting on the cooperation of neighboring countries.
- d. In the same way, it is important to strengthen the capacities of national border control, counting on the cooperative and constructive will of Bolivia's neighboring countries. In problems of a transnational nature, cooperation between states, at various levels, in capitals or in border cities, is an urgent need.

## **Armed Forces in Ecuador. Ideology, public policies and civil-military dialogue**

*Diego Pérez Enríquez*

Decisional structure in Ecuadorian institutions linked to Ecuador's Drug Policy of (PDE) explains, albeit partially, the main State tension field. Presuming that institutions seek to depersonalize and standardize their responses to demands that arise before them is appropriate in scholarly thought, but ingenuous in political management: in the Ecuadorian system decisions are concentrated in the President of the Republic as an individual. Thus, whoever occupies the presidential palace maintains a gamut of mechanisms to exercise authority, and institutional structures that depend on the president cannot contain such push. This, which is not peculiar to Ecuador, emphasizes the fact that leadership dynamics lies more on personal characteristics than on systemic phenomena. The type of leadership is predominantly tied to personal aspects, and this has particularly marked drug policy.

Thus, and with reference to structures, drug policy noticeably depends on the leader's vision to determine operational boundaries, preferences and even power management mechanisms. However, when making decisions, a circumstantial view predominates, the political imperative over institutional construction. This view is supported by the adoption of a progressive policy on drugs between 2008-2013, and between 2014-2017 there is a "turn" towards a repressive, security-prone approach. The aforementioned periods correlate to public discourse, both of authorities and the media, on the need for greater security, which, as has

been promoted, is only achievable through a hardline policy, which points to the problem of micro-trafficking as the greatest evil.

Specifically, this has led to providing greater force to the National Police, in terms of personnel, equipment and training. Regulations on Armed Forces involvement in countering drug trafficking prevented them from taking direct actions in the field until December 2015. Since then, a constitutional amendment was passed that allowed incorporating them under the figure of contribution to integral security. Such is the constitutional paradigm, but there is lack of a more concrete definition in other regulatory or operational instruments. In this way, their involvement is lesser. Unlike the rest of the countries in the region, the military keep relative distance to the field. This generates a specialized field for the National Police (PN), which has taken advantage of it, trying to show its efficiency. In this way, institutional efficiency is considered only in terms of quantities captured, which also feeds the narrative of direct linkage with citizens through the protection of the common good, summarized in the fight against drugs. Thus, incentives fall on the side of the greatest repression, since political decision-makers' efficiency, as well as actions entrusted to operating institutions, are measured in captured tons. In this sense, the drug seizure in tons has been increasing every year, going from 57.43 tons in 2013 to 110.4 tons in 2016. Likewise, those detained for possession of drugs for micro-trafficking (minimum-scale detentions) reached 5,180 people between January 2015 and June 2016; while medium and high scale detainees reached 6,643 people between October 2015 and June 2016.

Inevitably, the narrative of progressive drug policy goes against the hand of what has been described, because although there is no empirical evidence to support the notion that the threshold tables adopted in 2013 encourage consumption, the mere notion of permissiveness weakens the narrative hitherto construed. Thus, structurally it is difficult for the PDE to walk along the path planned in the 2008 constitution when political incentives have been placed in the opposite lane.

On the other hand, it was argued that more sanctions and more captures enable construction of a supreme efficiency image, which results in greater influence on the decision structure. Faced with weak institutional counterbalances as a consequence of systemic centralism and personalism, technical criteria for reducing the penalty are in a disadvantaged position compared to politicians or, in other words, circumstances win over structure. Ultimately, the creation of a technical secretariat originally identified with police work only increases the echo. A sequence of laws was approved that should have allowed to change the PDE (COIP and its reforms and LOPID), instead law 108 prevailed. The influences of regional and global drug policy (whose agendas are primarily American) are perceived here. This does not exempt local decision makers from having perpetuated a restrictive vision in the field. In short, the necessary institutional balance between security, public health and individual decisions was not consolidated at national level. On the contrary, the security-prone path was deepened and the discourse of

imminent threat was strengthened, which could only admit a response framed in "zero tolerance".

Such dynamics is not different in the Andean region. Ecuador has developed neighborhood coordination efforts with Peru and Colombia through the binational border commission (COMBIFRON), a decisional mechanism at strategic political level that seeks to fine-tune the joint action framework on the border. This mechanism has been efficient for exchanging intelligence and for deepening cooperation actions between the police and armed forces on both sides of the border with the two neighbors. Experiences are reported as positive, although progress after each meeting is usually in the area of political correctness. In any case, it can be highlighted that the COMBIFRON meetings are characterized by their regularity and by having high level binational delegates, which allows for efficiency in the decision making process. An additional indicator of good neighborhood relationship at this time is the absence of conflict situations at the borders with Peru and Colombia.

Regarding the Ecuador-Peru relationship, the commitments contemplated the exchange of information and intelligence at presidential level in 2016; as for the Armed Forces, there was also an exchange of intelligence summaries on FARC activities in Colombia, illicit drug trafficking routes, analysis and study of flight patterns and clandestine landing stripes. In relation to the police, cooperation in intelligence is also the main commitment, with monthly iteration, or in real time, according to the needs. Ultimately, this relationship has allowed for joint and coordinated action at the border, which has primarily focused on drug interdiction and seizures.

Thus, international cooperation between the two countries for illicit drug trafficking control is remarkable, and it remains unchanged despite internal dynamics that, as previously indicated, implies important fluctuations in the field. The new president's taking of office in May 2017 has not involved a substantial redirection in the PDE so far, beyond a call to a national dialogue, which actors of the national right have joined with more repressive views on the subject, proposing greater hardening mainly without including in their considerations technical data on the consequences of more years in prison for consumers. In this way, the opportunity to discuss a progressive policy towards the inside of the country, considering issues related to consumption not so much as security affairs, without affecting appropriate balance in the fight against illicit drug trafficking, is still pending.

#### *Recommendations*

1. Political dialogue between civil decision-makers and Armed Forces is required in order to shape public policy according to the country's real needs for defense design.

2. It is essential to balance the participation of citizens, political and military decision-makers, and experts in the process of designing public defense policy.
3. Decisional structures for the defense sector in Ecuador must adapt to new security demands evidenced in the first half of 2018.
4. The Minister of Defense figure should not have implications that exceed those of any political official. However, concern for the ministers' civil or military origin reveals unfinished transitional dynamics.

## ¿Peru: new roles for the Armed Forces?

*Andrés Gómez de la Torre Rotta*

A regional debate is currently intensifying on the role that the Armed Forces will assume in the 21st century in the face of new threats to security and recent hemispheric and global contexts. Peru does not escape this controversy, which brings various aspects with it, including constitutional, political and operational issues that very likely draw a scenario of new institutional responsibilities for the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces of Peru assumed traditional roles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; such roles were included in successive Constitutions of the Republic (since 1823). Their functions oscillated between external defense and internal order, but always assuming a role outside constitutional mandates: that of political arbitrators, using the exercise of political power through coups d'état. This not established role was very common throughout the nineteenth century and until the twentieth century, taking advantage of the nation's political institutions' weakness.

After the Pacific War (1879-1883) between Peru and Chile, the Peruvian army was rebuilt according to the presence of the French military mission since the late nineteenth century. This military mission implanted in Peru, coinciding with that country's military experience, a model of administrating and colonizing soldier as inheritance of the complex relationship between France and its colonies and that fitted with the Peruvian reality of a State that had not consolidated control of its territory. Unlike Chile, where the Prussian mission modeled a strictly combat soldier.

Between 1920 and 1933, dates in which two new constitutions were enacted, the Armed Forces received the legal status of "tutelary"

institutions; that is, to assume the responsibility of enforcing the constitution and laws, as a way to avoid the *de facto* power of traditional coups d'état. Based on what was stated in the 1933 Constitution, there were three coups d'état: in 1948, in 1962 and in 1968. The Peruvian military also assumed the teachings of the French military. There was talk of an Army's "social function," by bringing the militia closer to the population and mastering communications and transport to achieve the goal of being very close to citizens, especially the most remote and least favored, with the arrival of the State through basic services provided by the army.

The Center for Advanced Military Studies (CAEM) was created by the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. Ideas produced there were taken to link security with development, taking ECOLAC's doctrine as reference regarding asymmetry of international order, center-periphery relations and the role of the State and planning. In other words, the Peruvian military took the ideas and the course of military reformism stemming from the Egyptian coup, where there was a revival of nationalist and progressive military in 1952. When they took power again in 1962, through a military junta, they created the National Institute of Planning (INP) as a sign that there was a non-liberal and controlled economic course in their approaches. In the coup 1968, during the so-called Armed Forces Revolutionary Government (GRFA), the State was given the role of national development promoter since its first phase (1968 - 1975) with General Velasco. The hemispheric security doctrine promoted by the United States after the Second World War, and in the Cold War, was not applied in Peru; the GRFA had nothing to do with the classic military coups, of a repressive nature, nor with the military attached to the doctrine of national security as in Paraguay (1954), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976). The Peruvian military took note of the 1969 lower army ranks revolution in Libya (the Lieutenants' Revolution), and they were very similar to the government of Omar Torrijos, the military nationalist in Panama (1969).

Under these conditions, they created their own "National Project" based on reformist and development-prone military approaches. Theirs was a vision of the country somewhat distant from political parties that fostered nationalism, entrepreneurial role of the State, interventionism in the economy, larger public apparatus, agrarian reform, social property, nationalizations, industrial community, social mobilization and participation of excluded population. In foreign policy, the Peruvian military joined the Non-Aligned Countries (NOAL) and the third world, regional integration in terms of closed internal markets (Grupo Andino in 1969), new international economic order and North-South dialogue, as well as center-periphery relations, establishing diplomatic relations with the former USSR and Cuba in 1972.

The experience of fighting against the guerrillas between 1960 and 1965 - Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Revolutionary Left Movement) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (National Liberation Army), more linked to Cuba - led to prioritizing social actions and population support, aiming at stopping subversive outbreaks. There was success at the time. Some simplified the strategy, combining the "carrot and the stick", also influenced by France's experience in the Algeria war.

A new Constitution was enacted in 1979, in the middle of the so-called "second phase" of military rule during Francisco Morales Bermúdez's government, which included the classic roles of the Peruvian military inherited from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in terms of foreign defense and internal order. However, it also introduced new roles: participation in economic and social development and civil defense, new roles for the Armed Forces. In the case of the role referred to participation in social-economic development, it comes from a historical tendency described in previous paragraphs.

Finally, the 1993 Constitution was drafted in the same terms regarding the roles of the Armed Forces. Currently, these constitutional roles are the following:

- a. Guarantee independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- b. Participate in keeping internal order.
- c. Participate in national, economic and social development.
- d. Participate in Civil Defense (today the National Disaster Risk Management System).

There is another role not established in the Constitution: that of Peace Operations (OPAZ) that has been carried out in support of foreign policy.

Under the umbrella of participation in economic and social development, the Armed Forces of Peru have been employed in recent years in an impressive variety of missions, we note only a few:

- a) fight against drug trafficking (maritime, land and air interdiction);
- b) "Social Action with Sustainability" (2012);
- c) traditional civic action;
- d) fight against illegal mining;
- e) State public services taken to inaccessible territory (through itinerant social action platforms - PIAS);
- f) enumerators of national censuses;
- g) fight against smuggling in coordination with other State entities (in the three-border zone with Bolivia and Chile, together with the National Police, SUNAT, etc. in 2015);
- h) consolidation of remote rural areas (Military Rural Settlement Units, since the 1970s);
- i) urban patrolling against crime as citizen security (proposed in the 2015 electoral campaign for the province and port of Callao);



- j) protecting areas of extractive mining activity (mining corridor / Las Bambas project) in social conflicts, in a State of Emergency.

Former President Ollanta Humala even spoke at the time (2012) of the need to consider "social inclusion" as the new role of the Armed Forces. Finally, the Army provided public transportation services in an urban transport strike. The list of roles does not seem to be exhausted.

Peru's Ministry of Defense passed Ministerial Resolution No. 1411-2016-DE / CCFFAA in 2016, approving the Armed Forces roles: a) Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; b) Participation in keeping Internal Order; c) Participation in National Development; d) Participation in the Risk and Disaster Management System; and, e) Participation in Foreign Policy. Each role is developed based on "Strategic Actions" of a very extensive nature.

#### *Recommendations*

The Armed Forces in Peru exercised traditional roles in the nineteenth century (external defense, sovereignty, integrity and internal order) and in part of the 20th century that were established in the Constitutions.

In the twentieth century these roles were expanded, especially since 1979 (participation in social-economic development and civil defense). However, these expansions have led to their being used in very diverse scenarios. For the 21st century there is still a tendency to involve them in very different and diverse functions, which does not seem very convenient.

Some constitutional reform might be proposed in the short term; either via a new Constitution or specific reforms to the current one, which will decide on the relevance of the current and eventual future Armed Forces roles.



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