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# NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE



**UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 2025:  
WAR-INDUCED CHANGES,  
EXPECTATIONS AND  
CHALLENGES IN  
THE TRANSITION TO PEACE.  
PUBLIC OPINION**

**THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE POLITICAL  
SYSTEM AND THE  
SPECIFIC FEATURES  
OF POST-WAR POLITICAL  
RELATIONS AND  
PROCESSES: EXPERT  
ASSESSMENTS**

# UKRAINE: SOCIO-POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE AND POST-WAR RECOVERY

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**UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES NAMED AFTER OLEXANDER RAZUMKOV**

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 **KONRAD  
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STIFTUNG**

# UKRAINE: SOCIO-POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE AND POST-WAR RECOVERY

Razumkov Centre Project



**Yuriy YAKYMENKO,**

President, Editor-in-Chief of the National Security and Defence Journal

**Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, is now in its fourth year. Ukraine and its international partners are making considerable efforts to halt Russian aggression and to achieve a just and lasting peace. However, progress towards this goal is complicated by the unpredictable and personalised policies of the United States – one of Ukraine's main strategic partners, as well as by turbulent shifts in the geopolitical landscape amid dangerous trends of militarisation and polarisation within the international community, by the detachment of countries of the Global South from the Ukraine war, by the growing «rightward shift» in political sentiment across the EU and the increasing influence of radical populist forces. The main obstacle to peace in Ukraine, however, remains Russia's aggressive neo-imperial policy and the aggressor's persistent unwillingness to end the war.**

Despite this, by the end of 2025, there were somewhat stronger grounds for optimism regarding the prospects of a peace process. Ukraine has made significant progress on its European integration path, having launched technical accession negotiations with the EU under three of the six negotiating clusters, including the first and the most important one – Fundamentals, covering democracy and the rule of law. Even in wartime, Ukrainian society is demonstrating a growing demand for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the development of civil society and democratic institutions, etc. The ongoing war with the totalitarian Russian regime and numerous examples of the imposition of the police-style «Russian world» dictatorship in the occupied territories have

entrenched within Ukrainian society a clear demand for safeguarding democratic freedoms in the country.

On the other hand, there is an increasing «fatigue» within society stemming from the immutability of the current authorities and the political elite as a whole, which is reflected in low levels of trust in the highest state institutions (with the exception of the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief), in both pro-government and opposition political forces, and in the public demand for new political forces and new political leaders. The issue of elections is increasingly being raised in political discourse, although most citizens consider it undesirable to hold elections until peace has been achieved.

It is evident that the continuation of the war will increasingly complicate Ukraine's transition to peaceful life. This is due to a number of factors.

**First.** A peaceful settlement will entail the termination of martial law, the restoration of fully functioning democratic institutions and the resumption of a competitive political process. Given that the terms of office of the President, the Verkhovna Rada and local self-government bodies in Ukraine expired during the war, there is a need to hold three different types of elections. Accordingly, open public competition between candidates and political parties, including the activity of the political opposition, will have to be restored. In the electoral process, candidates and political forces will compete for the votes of different segments of the electorate, which may have different views on the performance of the current government and on the political priorities of the future leadership.

In addition to issues related to the organisation of elections,<sup>1</sup> the return to competitive politics raises other important questions such as ensuring the participation of both existing and newly established political parties; the possibility of conducting substantive public debate on issues of concern to society; media freedom and conditions under which the media operate; equitable access to the media for different candidates and political forces; the substance of opposition politics; and the perception of opposition actors by different social groups.

**Second.** The years of war and the legal regime of martial law have affected the system of governance, leading to distortions and certain negative trends. Above all, this concerns the concentration of power with the President and the growing influence of an extra-constitutional body – the Office of the President – on other state institutions, the judiciary and law enforcement system, as well

as anti-corruption bodies. It has also entailed the reduction in the autonomy of Parliament and the Cabinet, a weakening of judicial independence and democratic civilian oversight of law enforcement agencies, a narrowing of the powers of local self-governments, and pressure on certain civil society institutions.

For a considerable period, the activities of the authorities have exhibited a number of adverse manifestations, such as the poor quality of key state decisions, the lack of transparency in their development and adoption,<sup>2</sup> controversial personnel policy, inadequate communication with society on the most pressing issues, and corruption in sectors critical to ensuring the country's defence capability in wartime. These and other factors led to a decline in public trust in most state institutions during 2022-2025.<sup>3</sup> The situation became particularly acute in the second half of 2025, when an attempt to legislatively strip anti-corruption bodies of their independence sparked mass civic protests, while investigations into corruption cases involving some government officials and individuals close to the President resulted in the dismissal of the head of the Presidential Office and significant personnel changes in the government.

Accordingly, in transition to peaceful life, one of the most important tasks will be to restore the constitutionally defined order of functioning and interaction between state authorities and local self-government bodies; to renew them through elections; and to dismantle temporary structures whose mandate is limited to the period of martial law. At the same time, given strong public demand for renewal, there is a risk that efforts by the current government to retain its positions may generate excessive tension in the course of political competition, including through the use of administrative resources, coercive pressure on competing political actors, civil society institutions and the media.

<sup>1</sup> These issues were discussed in detail in the Razumkov Centre's project «The Future of Elections in Ukraine: The Factor of War», carried out with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine in 2024. [https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/10/28/NSD195-196\\_2023\\_ukr.pdf](https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/10/28/NSD195-196_2023_ukr.pdf) (in Ukrainian); [https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/10/28/NSD195-196\\_2022\\_eng.pdf](https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/10/28/NSD195-196_2022_eng.pdf) (summary in English).

<sup>2</sup> A certain reduction in governmental openness is understandable under conditions of martial law.

<sup>3</sup> At the same time, it should be noted that the level of trust in many state institutions is higher than it was before the war. Those institutions that are directly responsible for the country's defence have mostly retained a high level of public trust. Compared with the pre-war period, trust in the President is higher, which is linked to his role as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Levels of trust in the Ombudsman and the banking system are also higher than before the war. Even in respect of institutions towards which distrust currently prevails (anti-corruption bodies, the police, the courts, and the prosecutor's office), this distrust is less pronounced than it was before the full-scale war. However, levels of trust in the Cabinet, Parliament and the state apparatus (public officials) remain as low as they were before the invasion.



The war has significantly exacerbated the socio-economic situation of citizens. Many people have faced reduced incomes, as well as loss or damage to their homes, property and land. The need for assistance has increased, both for families who have lost relatives and for citizens requiring treatment and rehabilitation as a result of hostilities. These sensitive issues and the state's ability to address them quickly and effectively will influence both public sentiment and electoral rhetoric, providing fertile ground for populist politicians and political forces.

In addition, a dangerous trend has been the weakening of civil society institutions working to ensure governmental accountability and transparency, as well as independent think tanks and media outlets. This has been driven by both external and internal factors.

**Third.** Nearly four years into the full-scale war, the social structure of Ukrainian society has undergone significant transformation. New and sizeable categories of citizens have emerged, including war veterans, active service personnel and their families; persons liable for military service who evade mobilisation; citizens who left the country during the war and have not yet returned to Ukraine; and those who remained in the country and assumed the burdens of war.

An analysis of Ukraine's information environment, including online media and social networks, as well as findings from reputable domestic research institutions, suggests the presence of tensions in relations between representatives of some of these categories. Such tensions may be exacerbated by ill-considered decisions and statements by the authorities, as well as by the aggressor's targeted actions in the information space (primarily through social media). In the context of the restoration of a democratic political process and under the influence of political competition, these tensions carry the potential to escalate into hostility and give rise to social conflict. It may also be assumed that these and other categories of citizens will have different ideological preferences and visions of state policy. Accordingly, understanding the political and ideological orientations of these groups, and their attitudes towards political alternatives in various spheres is essential for predicting the principal lines of socio-political division, the most socially desired directions of state policy,

the future structure of political competition and the contours of the new government configuration.

**Fourth.** Throughout the war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the Defence Forces have consistently enjoyed the highest level of public trust compared to other state institutions. A significant number of Ukrainians indicate their readiness to support, in future elections, political forces emerging from the ranks of the military or veterans. In turn, among service personnel and veterans of various ranks there are leaders who intend to take an active part in political life or are considering doing so. Within political consultancy circles, prospective political «projects» based on support from the veteran community are also being discussed.

At the same time, the return of war veterans to civilian life and their anticipated active participation in political processes may, on the one hand, stimulate state-building and the implementation of reforms; on the other hand, it entails certain risks. These include the potential radicalisation of politics and attempts by more experienced politicians to instrumentalise veterans in political competition. It is also necessary to take into account the heterogeneity of the veteran community, the specific experiences acquired during the war, and the need for their psychological adaptation to civilian life and new forms of interpersonal interaction. Moreover, the expectations held by part of society regarding veterans' entry into politics, in particular hopes for «simple solutions» and «radical changes», may have adverse implications for the state of democracy, contribute to the erosion of democratic values and the spread of authoritarian tendencies, provoke social intolerance and encourage the use of force in resolving political conflicts.

When addressing the challenges of the post-war period, it should also be borne in mind that the cessation of active hostilities may signify a transition from the «hot» phase of the war to a hybrid phase, in which Russia may deploy its accumulated experience of interfering in other countries' internal processes, along with its full range of instruments of influence, in order to disrupt elections or discredit their results, provoke conflicts and destabilisation, and attempt to bring to power «Eurosceptic», covertly pro-Russian forces.

**All of the above aspects of the transition from martial law to the restoration of democratic processes require thorough and comprehensive study**, as they encompass both opportunities that may positively influence the further development of the state and society, and challenges capable of complicating the restoration of the full functioning of democratic institutions, increasing the potential for conflict, and slowing Ukraine's processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

These objectives underpin the research project «Ukraine: Socio-Political Challenges of the Transition from War to Peace and Post-War Recovery. The Role of Veterans», the findings of which are presented in this issue of the «National Security and Defence» journal.

The following tasks were set in the course of the research:

- ✓ to determine the hierarchy of problems and needs of citizens in Ukraine in the fourth year of the full-scale war; to examine citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and the actions of the authorities across different spheres; and to analyse citizens' views on the problems of transition from martial law to peaceful life, the restoration of democratic processes, and the priority tasks to be addressed in this context;
- ✓ to identify the principal changes in the political, ideological and value orientations of Ukrainian citizens that have occurred under the influence of factors stemming from Russian aggression against Ukraine (including attitudes towards core political values and the incumbent authorities, expectations regarding their renewal and demands to a new government, understanding of opposition in the new context, and attitudes towards opposition actors);
- ✓ to identify the most pronounced lines of societal division that have emerged during the full-scale war and to examine the peculiarities of the views and socio-political orientations of citizens situated on different sides of these divides;
- ✓ to determine public support for various policy directions across different domains (political and legal, socio-economic, socio-cultural, foreign policy, security and others) to be implemented in the transition from martial law to peaceful recovery;
- ✓ to forecast citizens' «political demand» on political actors in the post-war period and, accordingly, the possible structure of political competition, the potential support base for various ideological orientations, as well as the principal lines of socio-political division;
- ✓ to examine the possible impact of these changes on the development of socio-political processes in Ukraine after the end of active hostilities and the lifting of martial law, including the configuration of political actors in conditions of renewed political competition and their political priorities, particularly in the post-war socio-economic recovery and the intensification of the European integration process in light of the opening of accession negotiations with the EU.

To accomplish these research tasks, a set of methodological tools was employed that enabled a comprehensive approach. In particular, the project included: a nationwide representative sociological survey; an expert survey involving specialists from various fields of social sciences, including service personnel and veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war; commissioned articles by leading scholars from academic institutions, universities, and non-governmental think tanks specialising in economics, political science, law, sociology, and social psychology; and a remote roundtable presenting expert opinions on the most pressing issues within the thematic scope of the project.

The project materials provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, including the identification of both known and hypothetical «variables» that will largely determine the nature of Ukraine's transition from war to peace and post-war recovery. The contributions of the authors and participants in the roundtable are presented in their original style, and their assessments, conclusions and proposals reflect the personal positions of the respective authors.

The Razumkov Centre expresses its sincere gratitude to its long-standing partner — the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine — for its financial support of the project.

# UKRAINIAN SOCIETY 2025: WAR-INDUCED CHANGES, EXPECTATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE, AND THE ROLE OF VETERANS IN SOCIO-POLITICAL PROCESSES

Razumkov Centre Sociological Survey

In November 2025, the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service, with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine, conducted a sociological study<sup>1</sup> that makes it possible to trace the changes that have occurred in citizens' consciousness, their assessments of political institutions and processes, their political and ideological values and orientations, as well as other important aspects of public opinion. These processes were analysed by comparing them with previous Razumkov Centre surveys conducted both before and after the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion.<sup>2</sup>

## Section I. THE CONDITION OF PUBLIC AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND CHANGES IN SOCIAL RELATION DURING THE WAR: CITIZEN'S ASSESSMENTS

### Assessment of the Situation in the Country and Prospects for Its Development

Before the large-scale Russian aggression, critical assessments of Ukraine's trajectory predominated in the country. In December 2021, the majority (65.5%) of respondents

believed that events in Ukraine were headed in the wrong direction, while only 20% considered that they were headed in the right direction. Such an emotional background to assessments of the national situation had been characteristic of Ukrainian society over recent decades, with the exception of short-lived «surges» of social optimism following the election of a new president – this was most evident in the first months after Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to power. In September 2019, 57% of respondents believed that events were headed in the right direction, and only 17% thought otherwise.

<sup>1</sup> Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (survey was only carried out in government-controlled areas not subject to hostilities).

The survey was based on a stratified multi-stage sampling with random selection at the initial sampling stages and quota selection of respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected based on gender and age quotas). The sample structure reproduces the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

A total of 2,008 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. At the same time, additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the effects of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Political and Ideological Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens in the Conditions of the Russian Aggression, National Security and Defence, No.3-4, 2022, p.4-17.

However, over time, the level of social optimism declined once again.

After Russian troops invaded Ukraine, the share of those who believed that events were headed in the right direction increased significantly compared with pre-war indicators. According to the Razumkov Centre's survey conducted in September–October 2022, 51% of respondents believed that events in Ukraine were headed in the right direction, and only 28% thought otherwise. The highest levels of positive assessments were observed in February–March 2023, when 61% of respondents were positive about the country's development, and only 21% believed that events were headed in the wrong direction.

While the rise in social optimism associated with the new leadership can be easily explained by people's hopes for positive changes, higher confidence that events were headed in the right direction amidst war may appear paradoxical. Yet this can be explained by the fact that citizens were assessing not the situation as such, but rather its direction and dynamics. The improvement in these assessments after the start of full-scale war may have been driven by several factors during the initial stage of aggression:

- ✓ the consolidation of Ukrainian society, driven by the need to fight an external enemy;
- ✓ the formation of a clear societal objective and collective purpose, centred on victory;
- ✓ the emergence of clear reference points within a «us vs them» framework, shaping perceptions of what needed to be done.

However, from mid-2023 to mid-2024, there was a downward trend in this indicator, the main reasons for which can be attributed to the protracted war, the loss of hope for its quick and victorious conclusion, numerous errors and negative aspects in the activities of the authorities (primarily corruption), and disappointment in the actions of foreign partners.

At the same time, after mid-2024 there was no further decline in the proportion of those who believed that events were headed in the right direction. **According to a November 2025 survey, the share of respondents who believe that events in Ukraine are headed in the right direction stands at 32.5%, while those who think otherwise make up 48%.**

This ratio is still better than before the full-scale war (in December 2021, the figures were 20% and 65.5%, respectively). It is also better than, for example, in a comparable period in the United States: according to an *Economist/YouGov* poll of 28 October 2025, 30% of American respondents said that the country was headed in the right direction, while 61% said it was headed in the wrong direction.<sup>3</sup>

*The proportion of those who believe that events are headed in the right direction is substantially **higher among those who trust the Ukrainian authorities** – ranging from 19% among those with no trust at all to 51.5% among those who fully trust them.*

*Those who would **vote in favour of accession to the European Union in a possible referendum** are more likely than those who would vote against to say that events are headed in the right direction (36% and 19%, respectively).*

*These assessments also depend on respondents' financial situation: those **who live a comfortable life** are more likely than those who say that they «barely make ends meet» to believe that events are headed in the right direction (38% and 28%, respectively).*

## Trust in Social Institutions

Among state and public institutions, trust is most frequently expressed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (trusted by 92% of respondents), the State Emergency Service (86%), volunteer organisations (81%), volunteer defence units (78%), the National Guard of Ukraine (72%), the Main Directorate of Intelligence (71%), the State Border Guard Service (70.5%), the Security Service of Ukraine (65%), the Church (65%), civil society organisations (64%), the Ministry of Defence

<sup>3</sup> Direction of the country % of U.S. adult citizens who say things in this country today are generally headed in the right direction off on the wrong track. – NEW Economist/YouGov, <https://x.com/YouGovAmerica/status/1983230290156732602>.

of Ukraine (63%), and the National Bank of Ukraine (54%).

Also, the share of those who express trust exceeds the share of those who do not trust the head/mayor of the respondent's city, town or village (50% and 42%, respectively); the local council of the respondent's city, town or village (49.5% and 41%, respectively); and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (48% and 34%, respectively).

The proportion of respondents who trust the President of Ukraine does not differ statistically significantly from the proportion of those who do not trust him (48% and 45% respectively). The same applies to the Ukrainian media (48% and 45% respectively) and the State Bureau of Investigations (40% and 42% respectively).

Most respondents express distrust in the Verkhovna Rada (76% do not trust it), the state apparatus (public officials) (75%), the Cabinet (73%), political parties (71.5%), courts (the judicial system as a whole, 66%), the Prosecutor's Office (60%), the political opposition (59%), and the Ukrainian authorities as a whole (57%).

The share of those who express distrust also exceeds the share of those who trust the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (50% and 32%, respectively), commercial banks (50% and 35%), the National Police (49% and 45.5%), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (47% and 37%), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (45% and 41%), and trade unions (42% and 30%).

In the first months of the full-scale war, public trust in most state institutions increased, driven by the perceived necessity of national consolidation in the face of an external threat. Over time, however, trust in state institutions declined compared with the first year of the war, although for many institutions it remains higher than in the pre-war period.

**The high level of trust remains primarily in those institutions that are directly responsible for the country's defence** (the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the State Border Guard Service, the Security Service of Ukraine, and others). Compared with the pre-war period, trust in the President is also

higher, which is linked to his functions of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Trust levels are likewise higher than before the war in volunteer and civil society organisations, the Ombudsman, and the banking system.

Even with regard to those institutions that are currently viewed with distrust (anti-corruption bodies, the police, courts, the Prosecutor's Office, trade unions), this distrust is less pronounced than it was before the full-scale invasion.

However, levels of trust in the Cabinet, Parliament, the state apparatus (public officials), and political parties remain as low as they were before the war.

Over the past year, the most notable increase has been in the share of those who trust anti-corruption institutions, which is linked to their exposure of a number of corruption cases in the highest echelons of power. Events surrounding attempts to legislatively reduce the independence of these bodies, which sparked public protests, have clearly played a role. At the same time, even now, the share of those who trust anti-corruption institutions remains lower than the proportion of those who do not trust them.

### **Attitudes Towards Specific Social Groups**

Following the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and even more so after the full-scale invasion in 2022, new social groups have emerged based on shared war-induced changes in life circumstances. These groups include veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war and active service personnel engaged in the defence of the country, volunteers, internally displaced persons, refugees who have fled abroad as a result of the war, citizens evading mobilisation, residents of temporarily occupied territories, and others. Relations between some of these groups may have a potentially conflictual character, given differences in the value priorities of their representatives.

*Respondents were asked to assess their attitudes towards different social groups on a 0-10 scale, where «0» indicated an extremely negative attitude and «10» indicated the most positive attitude. Responses in the range of 7 to 10 points may be interpreted as reflecting a positive attitude, 4 to 6 points as*

a neutral attitude, and 0 to 3 points as a negative attitude.

Most respondents express a **positive attitude** towards the following groups: service personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (94%), veterans of the russia war (92.5%), people with special needs and persons with disabilities (79%), civilians who have remained in Ukraine since the beginning of the war (75%), low income citizens (71%), internally displaced persons and refugees from occupied and frontline regions (69%), representatives of organisations combating corruption (60%), representatives of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (59%), representatives of human rights organisations (57.5%), and representatives of women's organisations and associations (57%).

A clearly positive attitude towards service personnel and veterans is also reflected in the fact that the vast majority (79.5%) of respondents view positively the provision of certain state benefits to veterans and their families (and only 2.5% have a negative attitude towards this).

A relative majority of respondents express a positive attitude towards the following groups: representatives of cultural associations of national minorities (50%), Ukrainian citizens who left the country after the start of the war and remain abroad (48%), Ukrainian citizens living in temporarily occupied territories (47%), and representatives of environmental organisations (46%).

With regard to representatives of pro-government and opposition political forces, a relative majority of respondents express a **neutral attitude** (42% and 40%, respectively). However, while attitudes towards representatives of opposition political forces show no statistically significant difference between the shares expressing positive and negative views (26% and 24%, respectively), in the case of representatives of pro-government political forces negative attitudes prevail over positive ones (29% and 21%, respectively).

This somewhat contrasts with responses to the question on trust in institutions, where citizens expressed trust in the Ukrainian authorities more frequently than trust in the opposition (33% and 21%, respectively). It may therefore be assumed that trust in the

authorities is higher than trust in the political forces that form the government.

Negative attitudes outweigh positive ones with respect to people accused of evading military service (35% and 20%, respectively) and representatives of sexual minorities (47% and 11%, respectively).

Most respondents are also negative about representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (58%), individuals accused of corruption (81%) and those accused of assisting russia and the russian army (90%).

Compared with respondents with no combat experience, war veterans are less likely to express a positive attitude towards Ukrainians who left the country after the start of the war and remain abroad (33% and 49%, respectively), and slightly more likely to express a negative attitude (16% and 10%, respectively). However, a relative majority of those with combat experience (44%) express a neutral attitude towards this group.

Respondents who have a positive attitude towards those who evade military service («draft dodgers») are more likely than those who have a negative or neutral attitude to express a positive attitude towards citizens residing abroad (69% and 44% and 42%, respectively), as well as towards citizens living in temporarily occupied territories (60%, 44% and 41%, respectively).

They also tend to have a slightly more positive attitude towards representatives of opposition political forces (30%, 25% and 23%, respectively), representatives of sexual minorities (21%, 6% and 11%, respectively), individuals accused of corruption (11%, 3% and 7%, respectively), and representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (25.5%, 9% and 13%, respectively).

Overall, respondents with positive attitudes towards draft dodgers tend somewhat more frequently to express positive attitudes towards groups that they may perceive as stigmatised within Ukrainian society.

Although the vast majority of them are negative about people accused of assisting russia and the russian army (79%), this share is lower than among those who have a negative

(95%) or neutral (90%) attitude towards draft dodgers.

At the same time, compared with respondents who express a negative attitude towards those evading military service, a smaller proportion within this group express a positive attitude towards representatives of organisations combating corruption (57% and 70%, respectively), representatives of women's organisations (50% and 55%), representatives of cultural associations of national minorities (49% and 57%), and representatives of human rights organisations (50% and 66%).

### **Assessment of Changes in Ukrainian Society During the Full-Scale War**

When discussing changes in Ukrainian society during the full-scale war, most respondents point to the increased use of the Ukrainian language and the popularity of Ukrainian-language cultural products (71%); a heightened awareness of the inevitability of a permanent threat from Russia (64%); a more negative attitudes towards oligarchs (62%); greater intolerance of social injustice (57%); support for processes of derussification (57%); the strengthening of national self-awareness among Ukrainian citizens (57%); and the level of patriotism (56%). At the same time, respondents note the growing «distance» between the authorities and society (54%) and the associated desire for change in the political elite (55%).

Respondents more frequently report an increase than a decrease in support for traditional family values (45% and 10%, respectively); in a sense of unity among residents of different regions (48% and 19%); in support for decommunization processes (43% and 15%); in belief in victory in the war with Russia (43% and 25%); in citizens' social activity (38% and 24%); in readiness to accept temporary territorial losses for the sake of achieving peace (38% and 18%); in support for democratic values (32% and 24.5%); in tolerance in inter-ethnic relations (30% and 16%); and in support for liberal values (27% and 17%).

The shares indicating increases and decreases are broadly comparable with respect to citizens' political activity (29% and

27%, respectively); tolerance in inter-church relations (25% and 26%); and the sense of unity among representatives of different social groups and classes (28.5% and 30%). Only in relation to social optimism do respondents more frequently point to a decline (38%) than to growth (24%).

### **Assessment of Problems in Ukrainian Society**

Ukrainian citizens consider the ongoing hostilities in the war against Russia to be the most pressing problem today (identified by 68% of respondents).

Other most important problems include bribery and corruption within public authorities (45%); the destruction of housing caused by missile and drone strikes (40%); damage to infrastructure (38%); disruptions in communications and the supply of electricity, water and gas (30%); low wages and pensions (29%); rising prices for essential goods and inflation (27%); and high utility tariffs (25%).

A further set of problems identified by respondents includes social stratification and the widening gap between the poor and the wealthy (19%); mobilisation (17%); bribery and corruption in the judicial system (17%); bribery and corruption in other sectors (13%); inadequate or inaccessible healthcare (13.5%); the mass exodus of citizens abroad (12%); insufficient social protection (12%); rising crime and insufficient public safety (6.5%); labour shortages (6%); lack of jobs and unemployment (6%); and inadequate or inaccessible education (5.5%).

Each of the remaining issues (drug addiction, alcoholism, lack of freedom and democracy, unfavourable conditions for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, poor environmental situation, insufficient protection of the Ukrainian language, poor state of roads, freedom of religion, problems in inter-church relations, discrimination against languages of national minorities, and inter-ethnic tensions) were mentioned by fewer than 5% of respondents.

When assessing the current level of corruption in Ukraine on a scale from 1 to 10, where «1» means «no corruption» and «10»

means «a very high level of corruption», respondents on average rate it at 8.6 points, which is significantly higher than in February–March 2023, when the corresponding figure stood at 7.1 points.

In addition, 63% of respondents believe that the current level of corruption is higher than it was before 24 February 2022 (in February–March 2023, a significantly smaller share – 33% – held this view). The proportion of those who believe that the level of corruption is now lower than before 24 February 2022 has decreased from 21% to 5%, while the share of those who consider it to be the same has fallen from 30% to 21%.

When asked, «Which problems are or will be most relevant for your family in the near future?», respondents most frequently mentioned russian shelling (60%); a decline or loss of primary income (44%); the threat of losing housing, including as a result of shelling (27%); corruption among officials and civil servants (23%); lack of access to quality and adequate medical treatment or healthcare (22%); and illness (20%).

Other concerns mentioned include loss of work or business (14%); the need to leave the country (9%); inability to find employment (8%); deterioration of working conditions (8%); the need to find housing (7%); rising crime (7%); poor environmental conditions (polluted air and water in the place of residence) (6%); and hunger (5%).

In response to the question, «Apart from expenditures on strengthening security and defence, what should Ukraine's state budget be spent on first and foremost for recovery in wartime?», respondents most frequently mentioned veterans' programmes (including treatment, rehabilitation, social reintegration), and support for war veterans (53%); strengthening civilian protection of the population (construction and equipping of shelters, provision of backup energy sources, special equipment for health facilities, etc.) (46%); construction and repair of social infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals, etc.) (32%); increases in salaries and bonuses for public sector employees (teachers, doctors, etc. ), as well as increases in pensions (31%); job creation (29%); construction and repair of nationally significant production infrastructure (roads,

bridges, ports) (26%); and construction of social housing (24%). A further 13% identified support for business and enterprises as a priority area, while 9.5% mentioned support for culture and Ukrainian cultural production.

**Based on findings presented in this section, it is possible to conclude that:**

✓ **In the first months of the full-scale war, public trust in most state institutions increased, driven by the perceived necessity of national consolidation in the face of an external threat. Over time, however, trust in state institutions declined compared with the first year of the war, although for many institutions it remains higher than in the pre-war period.**

✓ **The high level of trust remains primarily in those institutions that are directly responsible for the country's defence (the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the State Border Guard Service, the Security Service of Ukraine, and others).**

✓ **Compared with the pre-war period, trust in the President is also higher, which is linked to his functions of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Trust levels are likewise higher than before the war in volunteer and civil society organisations, the Ombudsman, and the banking system.**

✓ **Even with regard to those institutions that are currently viewed with distrust (anti-corruption bodies, the police, courts, the Prosecutor's Office, trade unions), this distrust is less pronounced than it was before 2022.**

✓ **However, levels of trust in the Cabinet, Parliament, the state apparatus (public officials), and political parties remain as low as they were before the war. The level of trust in the political opposition is also low.**

✓ **Over the past year, the most notable increase has been in the share of those who trust anti-corruption institutions, which is linked to their exposure of a number of corruption cases in the highest echelons of power. However, the share of those who trust anti-corruption institutions remains lower than the proportion of those who do not trust them.**

✓ Most respondents express a positive attitude towards the following groups: service personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, veterans of the russia war; people with special needs and persons with disabilities; civilians who have remained in Ukraine since the beginning of the war; low income citizens; internally displaced persons and refugees from occupied and frontline regions; representatives of organisations combating corruption; representatives of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; representatives of human rights organisations, and representatives of women's organisations and associations.

✓ A relative majority of respondents express a positive attitude towards representatives of cultural associations of national minorities; Ukrainian citizens who left the country after the start of the war and remain abroad; Ukrainian citizens living in temporarily occupied territories; and representatives of environmental organisations.

✓ Negative attitudes outweigh positive ones with respect to people accused of evading military service and representatives of sexual minorities. Most respondents are also negative about representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate; individuals accused of corruption; and those accused of assisting russia and the russian army.

✓ Respondents with positive attitudes towards draft dodgers tend somewhat more frequently to express positive attitudes towards groups that they may perceive as stigmatised within Ukrainian society.

✓ When discussing changes in Ukrainian society during the full-scale war, most respondents point to the increased use of the Ukrainian language and the popularity of Ukrainian-language cultural products; a heightened awareness of the inevitability of a permanent threat from russia; a more negative attitudes towards oligarchs; greater intolerance of social injustice; support for processes of derussification; the strengthening of national self-awareness among Ukrainian citizens; and the level of patriotism. There is also the growing «distance» between the authorities and

society and the associated desire for change in the political elite.

✓ Respondents more frequently report an increase than a decrease in support for traditional family values; in a sense of unity among residents of different regions; in support for decommunization processes; in belief in victory in the war with russia; in citizens' social activity; in readiness to accept temporary territorial losses for the sake of achieving peace; in support for democratic and liberal values; and in tolerance in inter-ethnic relations.

✓ The shares indicating increases and decreases are broadly comparable with respect to citizens' political activity; tolerance in inter-church relations; and the sense of unity among representatives of different social groups and classes. Only in relation to social optimism do respondents more frequently point to its decline than to growth.

Ukrainian citizens consider the ongoing hostilities in the war against russia to be the most pressing problem today. Other most important problems include bribery and corruption within public authorities; the destruction of housing and infrastructure caused by missile and drone strikes; disruptions in communications and the supply of electricity, water and gas; low wages and pensions; rising prices for essential goods and inflation; and high utility tariffs.

✓ Humanitarian, cultural, environmental issues, as well as issues related to oppression of minorities or internal conflicts are considered important by a small proportion of respondents.

✓ Citizens assess the current level of corruption in the country as higher than in 2023, with the majority of respondents believing that it is higher than before 24 February 2022.

When asked, «*Which problems are or will be most relevant for your family in the near future?*», respondents most frequently mentioned russian shelling; a decline or loss of primary income; the threat of losing housing, including as a result of

shelling; corruption among officials and civil servants; lack of access to quality and adequate medical treatment or healthcare; and illness.

In response to the question, «*Apart from expenditures on strengthening security and defence, what should Ukraine's state budget be spent on first and foremost for recovery in wartime?*», respondents most frequently mentioned veterans' programmes, including treatment, rehabilitation, social reintegration and support for war veterans, as well as strengthening civilian protection of the population.

## Section II. POLITICAL VALUES, ORIENTATIONS AND ELECTORAL PREFERENCES OF CITIZENS IN THE CONTEXT OF FUTURE ELECTORAL PROCESSES

### Citizens' Support for Democratic Values in Ukraine

After the start of the full-scale invasion, the share of citizens who consider democracy to be the most desirable system of government for Ukraine increased compared with the pre-war period (from 54% in June 2021 to 66% in September 2025). However, in November 2025 this indicator returned to approximately the same level (55.5%) as in 2021.

At the same time, **a clear majority consider a democratic political system to be a good system for Ukraine** (86.5% in 2017 and 87% in November 2025). The share of those who believe that a system with a strong leader independent of parliaments and elections is a good system has decreased compared to 2017 (from 80% to 60%).

Although, compared with 2017, the share of those who consider a country ruled by the military or a military regime to be a good system has increased from 12% to 40%, a majority (60%) continue to regard such a system as a bad one.

Moreover, among those who consider a system governed by the military or a military regime to be good, 83% also regard a democratic political system as good, while only 16% among them consider democracy to be bad.

Thus, **under conditions of war, «military rule» in Ukraine is largely perceived as a means of protecting the democratic order rather than as an alternative to it.**

Similarly, among those who consider a system with a strong leader independent of parliaments and elections to be good, 83% also consider a democratic political system to be good.

**A relative majority of respondents (49%) believe that only electoral democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary can ensure order** (this share has increased compared with March 2024, when 42% of respondents shared this view).

Compared with 2024, the share of those who believe that individual democratic procedures should be combined with a «strong hand» policy has increased slightly, from 23% to 27%, while the share of those who hold the view that all power and responsibility should be assumed by a strong political leader and his political force has decreased from 19% to 15.5%.

**A relative majority of respondents (47%) prefer freedom over prosperity when choosing between the two** (only 30% prefer prosperity). In 2010, these figures stood at 32% and 30% respectively, and in 2021, at 43% and 31%.

At the same time, **when choosing between freedom and security, respondents prioritise security** slightly more often (39% agreed that «in exchange for security, I am ready to give up some of my rights and civil liberties to the state») over freedom (33%).

Moreover, the lower the level of respondents' well-being, the more frequently they prioritise security over freedom. Among those who «barely make ends meet», these priorities are 39% and 27%, respectively, and among those who reported «living a comfortable life», they are 32% and 38%.

**Respondents with combat experience are much more likely to prioritise freedom** (47.5%) over security (31%). They are also more likely than the overall respondent group to prefer freedom (60%) over prosperity (26%).

## Assessment of the Level of Democracy

Compared with 2021, the proportion of respondents who consider Ukraine to be a fully democratic state has increased from 18% to 23%. Slightly fewer respondents hold the view that Ukraine is not yet a fully democratic state, but it is moving towards democracy (52% and 47.5%, respectively). The share of those who believe that Ukraine is not a democratic state and is hardly moving towards democracy has not changed to a statistically significant extent (18% and 20.5%, respectively).

In response to a direct question regarding how the level of democracy in Ukraine has changed compared with the pre-war period (prior to 2022), 38% state that the level of democracy is now lower than before 2022; 33% believe it remains at the same level; and 15.5% consider it to be higher than before 2022.

The belief that democracy in Ukraine has declined is more prevalent among respondents who do not trust the authorities (46% among this group) compared with those who trust them (27%).

When asked, **«To what extent do various consequences of prolonged martial law negatively affect the situation in the country?»**, respondents mostly mention the significant negative impact of restrictions on certain citizens' rights (28%) and the immutability of the authorities, including the absence of elections (28%). A further 21% indicate a negative impact from the lack of political competition and from the centralisation of power, while 20% point to restrictions on the dissemination of information. Between 31% and 41% of respondents refer to «certain negative impact» of these factors; between 19% and 22% indicate «a weak negative impact»; and between 7% and 10% report no negative impact.

Citizens who do not trust the authorities are more likely to point to a significant negative impact of these factors. Thus, 34% of them identify the immutability of the authorities as having a significant negative impact (compared with 20% among those who trust the authorities).

## Decline in Paternalistic Expectations

Compared with 2013, **the share of citizens who believe that the state should bear full responsibility for providing everyone with everything they need has declined significantly** from 42% to 29%. At the same time, the proportion of those who hold the view that the state should ensure a level playing field, while individuals themselves bear responsibility for how they use the opportunities available to them, has increased from 51% to 63%.

**Furthermore, 52% of respondents believe that the standard of living should be ensured equally by the state and by the citizens themselves.** 26% think that every citizen's standard of living (with the exception of those unable to work) should depend on the individual – this share has increased compared with March 2024, when 21% expressed this view. And finally, the share of those who believe that the state is obliged to guarantee an adequate standard of living for all citizens has decreased from 22% to 18%.

**Paternalistic expectations are most pronounced among people with low incomes:** among those who «barely make ends meet», 46% believe that the state should be fully responsible for providing everyone with everything they need, while among those who live a comfortable life, only 23% share this view. Similarly, among the least well-off, a higher proportion believe that the state is obliged to guarantee an adequate standard of living for all citizens (30%), compared with 14% among those who have a comfortable life.

## Vision of the Country's Future

**A relative majority of respondents (45%) believe that «Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic and influential European state» in the future.** A further 33% believe that Ukraine will be a country that follows its special course of development.

Only a small minority anticipate negative scenarios. Thus, 5.5% of respondents believe that Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of the West; 3% think that Ukraine will forever remain a «third world» country,

underdeveloped and uninfluential; 1% believe that Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of Russia; and 1% hold the view that Ukraine will disappear as an independent state. A further 0.4% responded stating that they «didn't care about the country's future».

Residents of the western (53%) and eastern (52%) regions, compared with 37% in the Centre and 41% in the South, are most likely to believe that «Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic and influential European state».

Also, the younger the respondents, the more frequently they hold this view (the share of such respondents rises from 39% among those aged 60+ to 51% among respondents under 30).

This vision of the future is shared by 54% of supporters of EU accession, compared with only 17% of opponents.

Among opponents of EU accession, almost one-third view Ukraine's future in negative terms (the combined share of those who believe that «Ukraine will be an underdeveloped appendage of either the West or Russia»; «Ukraine will forever remain a «third world» country, underdeveloped and uninfluential»; «Ukraine will disappear as an independent state» amounts to 31.5%).

However, a relative majority of those opposed to EU accession (38%) believe that Ukraine will be a country that follows its special course of development (among supporters of EU accession, 30% share this view).

### Attitudes Towards the EU and NATO Accession

If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the European Union were to be held in the near future, **75% of all respondents, or 88% of those intending to participate in such a referendum, would vote in favour of joining the organisation** (11% and 7%, respectively, would vote against). Prior to the full-scale invasion, in November-December 2021, 56% of all respondents, or 78% of those intending to participate in a referendum, stated that they would vote in favour of EU accession (26% and 18%, respectively, would vote against).

According to the latest survey, 88% of residents of the West would vote for EU membership, as would 79% in the East, 70% in the Centre and 58% in the South. The shares of those who would vote against are 2%, 10%, 15%, and 22%, respectively.

The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to vote in favour of EU accession: the share rises from 68% in the oldest group aged 60+ to 82% among those under 30.

Among those who trust the Ukrainian authorities, 79% intend to vote in favour of EU accession (with 9.5% opposed), while among those who do not trust the government, the figures are 74% and 14%, respectively.

Among respondents who predominantly speak Ukrainian at home, 76% intend to vote in favour of EU membership (with 10% opposed), whereas among those who mainly speak Russian, the figures are 69.5% and 17.5% respectively.

If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were to be held in the near future, **63% of all respondents, or 79% of those intending to participate, would vote in favour of joining the organisation** (21% and 14.5%, respectively, would vote against). Similarly, in November-December 2021, 48% of all respondents, or 70% of those intending to participate in the referendum, stated that they would vote for NATO membership (33% and 24.5%, respectively, would vote against).

According to the latest survey, 82% of all residents of the West, 65% of those living in the East, and 56% of residents of the Central region would vote in favour of NATO accession, but only 39% would do so in the South. The shares of those who would vote against are 6.5%, 19%, 27%, and 36.5%, respectively. Thus, unlike in other regions (where a majority is ready to vote for Ukraine's accession to NATO), in the southern region, the proportions of supporters and opponents of NATO membership do not differ to a statistically significant extent.

The younger the respondents, the more likely they are to vote for NATO membership: the share of such respondents rises from 56% in the 60+ age group to 70% among those under 30.

Among those who trust the Ukrainian authorities, 70% intend to in favour of NATO accession (with 16% opposed), while among those who do not trust the government, the figures are 59% and 25%, respectively.

Among respondents who predominantly speak Ukrainian at home, 66% intend to vote for NATO membership (with 19% opposed), while among those who mainly speak Russian, the figures are 58.5% and 25% respectively.

80% of those who would vote in favour of EU accession are also prepared to vote for NATO membership, compared with 9.5% among those opposed to EU accession.

### **Ideological Factors in Support for Political Forces**

In their activities, political parties are expected to reflect the ideological positions and preferences of citizens, otherwise they have little prospect of securing their support. Identifying these preferences therefore makes it possible to predict which political forces are likely to dominate in the near future.

In order to identify political preferences, respondents were asked to choose between alternative positions of political parties for which they would vote for in parliamentary elections. These alternatives concerned foreign and domestic policy, social and humanitarian policy, as well as economic policy. The alternatives were formulated according to the principles of a 11-point «left-right» scale.<sup>4</sup> For analytical purposes, respondents' answers were grouped into the ranges «0-3», «4-6» and «7-10», which allowed for a clearer presentation of the distribution of citizens' political preferences.

This study also sought to trace the dynamics of these preferences by comparing them with those expressed in 2018 and 2022.

**Foreign policy orientations.** If in 2018 researchers noted that significant divisions existed with regard to Ukraine's foreign policy orientations – and that within the proposed dilemmas none of the alternatives was supported by at least half of the respondents – the

latest survey indicates that **public opinion has become considerably more consolidated.** Thus, whereas in 2018 only a relative majority of respondents (46%) were ready to support a political force advocating Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the foreseeable future, after the onset of the full-scale invasion, this share increased substantially and reached 81% in November 2025. Over the same period, the share of those favouring a course towards union with Russia and Belarus dropped from 22.5% to 5%.

In 2018, the choice between NATO membership and non-aligned status divided society into three relatively comparable groups (supporters of each alternative and those undecided). According to the 2025 survey, approximately two-thirds (65%) now prefer NATO membership, while only 16% favour non-aligned status.

Whereas in 2018 significant regional differences persisted in foreign policy orientations – with a clear majority in the West and Centre supporting EU accession, a relative majority in the East favouring the Eurasian Economic Union, and substantial support for both directions in the South – at present the **vast majority of residents in all regions would support a party advocating Ukraine's accession to the EU** (96% in the West, 82% in the East, 74% in the Centre, and 70% in the South).

As for the party positions on NATO membership, in 2018 the vast majority in the West and a relative majority in the Centre supported NATO accession, while in the East and South, about half of those surveyed preferred Ukraine's non-aligned status. Currently, the majority of residents in the West (88%), Centre (56%) and East (70%) express support for NATO membership, while in the South, the shares favouring NATO accession and non-aligned status (36% and 41%, respectively) do not differ to a statistically significant extent.

**Distribution of power.** A relative majority of respondents (40%) support **reducing the functions of central government, transferring greater powers to local self-government bodies, and pursuing decentralisation.** By

<sup>4</sup> The material for analysis consists of respondents' answers to the question «On a scale of 0 to 10, where would you place the political force you would support in elections?», in which citizens were asked to decide on alternative political proposals (statements) in across different policy areas.

contrast, 21% support expanding the functions of central government, reducing the powers of local self-government bodies, and strengthening centralised control over all levels of government.

However, under conditions of full-scale war, support for decentralisation remains lower than in 2018, when it stood at 56%, and only 10% of respondents then supported expanding the functions of central government.

In 2018, the vast majority of respondents in all regions supported reducing the functions of central government and expanding the powers of local self-government bodies, i.e. decentralisation. In November 2025, this position was still supported by the majority in the West (54%) and the South (53%). In the central region, however, it was supported by only 35%, although this still exceeds the share favouring expanded powers for central government (22%). In the East, by contrast, there are fewer supporters of decentralisation (26%) than supporters of expanding the functions of central government (35%). It may be assumed that the proximity of the eastern region to areas of active hostilities influences these attitudes.

If, prior to the full-scale war, the share of those favouring strengthening the influence of Parliament over the Cabinet and the executive branch, and limiting the powers of the President, exceeded the share supporting strengthening the President's influence over the Cabinet and the executive branch while limiting the powers of Parliament (35% and 19%, respectively), then after the start of the war, in 2022, this ratio reversed (15% and 39%, respectively). In 2025, the share of those favouring a stronger presidential role (30%) still exceeds the share supporting greater parliamentary influence (23%). At the same time, both in 2018 and now, a relative majority has adopted a «centrist» position on this issue: 44.5% of respondents in 2018 and 47% in the current survey are unwilling to support either strengthening Parliament's influence over the Cabinet and the executive branch while limiting presidential powers, or, conversely, strengthening the President's role. This may be interpreted as indicating that a relative majority of citizens are reluctant to alter the existing balance of power.

**Economic and social policy.** In matters of economic policy, citizens tend to rely more on mechanisms of state regulation than on market instruments. However, while in 2018 most respondents (59%) favoured an active role for the state in managing economic processes and exercising price controls, in 2022 this position was supported by only a relative majority (46%), and in 2025 their share declined further to 39.5%. The proportion of those who support rejecting state intervention in economic processes and price regulation (that is, allowing the market to determine outcomes) increased from 11% in 2018 to 22.5% in 2022 and to 28% in 2025. Nonetheless, **support for state regulation remains somewhat higher than support for reducing the state's regulatory role in the market.**

In 2018, a relative majority of citizens (46%) supported expanding the state sector of the economy and returning previously privatised enterprises to state ownership (only 15% favoured the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and prioritising the development of the private sector). In 2022, the ratio shifted to 36% vs 27%, and it remains roughly the same in 2025 (35% and 23%, respectively). In other words, although support for the state sector still prevails, this predominance has become considerably less pronounced.

Significant changes have also occurred in perceptions of **which sectors of the economy should be prioritised.** In 2018, respondents were slightly more likely to place their hopes on the development of traditional industries – metallurgy, machine-building, extractive industries and agriculture – rather than prioritising new sectors and technologies (such as the IT sector, robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology) – 39% vs 21%. In 2022 these priorities shifted (25% vs 36.5%). In 2025, support for prioritising new industries and technologies has somewhat declined (to 30%) and no longer differs statistically from support for the development of traditional industries (28%).

Support for political forces, depending on their positions on economic and social issues, varies across age groups. **The younger the respondents, the less likely they are to rely on mechanisms of state regulation of the economy** (the share declines from 45% among

those aged 60+ to 31% among those under 30), while the proportion of those favouring reduced state regulation increases with younger age, from 24% to 34.5%.

Whereas only 23% of respondents aged 60+ support prioritising the development of new industries and technologies, this share rises to 42% among those under 30.

**In respondents' answers to questions about alternative approaches to social policy, one can observe a clear demand for the state to play an active role in this area.**

The majority favour a state-run system of social protection (pensions, subsidies and social assistance). This position was supported by 67% of all respondents in 2018, 64.5% in 2022, and 62% in 2025 (only 8%, 11.5% and 14%, respectively, held the view that the social protection system could be operated by private companies). The older the respondents, the more likely they are to believe that the social protection system should be state-run: the share rises from 55% in the youngest age group to 65% in the oldest.

Whereas in 2018 and 2022 respondents were somewhat more inclined to favour paying higher taxes in exchange for free social services provided by the state (36.5% in 2018 and 35% in 2022) rather than paying lower taxes while covering the cost of social services themselves (15% in 2018 and 26% in 2022), in 2025 the shares supporting these two positions do not differ to a statistically significant extent (29% and 27%, respectively). As can be seen, support for the first position has gradually declined, while support for the second has increased.

**Humanitarian policy.** In 2018, 49% of respondents supported **state protection and promotion of the Ukrainian language** (including mandatory instruction in Ukrainian in schools, introduction of language quotas on radio and TV broadcasting), compared with 29% who believed that the **state should treat all languages equally**, in 2022 the ratio shifted to 64% vs 16%. In 2025, support for state protection and promotion of the Ukrainian language is lower than in 2022 (52%), but still higher than in 2018; similarly, fewer respondents (22%) than in 2018 believe that the state should treat all languages equally.

In the West of Ukraine, most respondents (77%) support state protection and promotion of the Ukrainian language, while those who share this view in the Centre and East make a relative majority (49% and 44%, respectively). In the South, the proportions of those who support state protection of the Ukrainian language and those favouring equal treatment of all languages do not differ to a statistically significant extent (26% and 34%, respectively).

Among russian-speaking respondents, the shares of those supporting state protection of the Ukrainian language and those favouring equal treatment of all languages show no significant statistical differences (30% and 31%, respectively). Among those who use Ukrainian and russian equally often within the family, a relative majority supports state protection of the Ukrainian language (39% and 27%, respectively); among Ukrainian-speaking respondents, the majority supports state protection of the Ukrainian language (61% and 18%, respectively).

In 2018, 36% of respondents would have supported a political force advocating the **continuation of decommunization**, while 30% would have supported one calling for its **termination**. In 2022, the share of the former increased to 58% and the share of the latter fell to 16.5%. In 2025, support for decommunization has somewhat decreased (46% and 22%, respectively), yet remains substantially higher than in 2018.

Support for decommunization is the strongest in the West (80%). In the Centre (37% vs 27%) and the East (32% vs 25%), the share of those favouring the continuation of decommunization exceeds the share supporting its termination. In the southern region, these proportions do not differ significantly (31% and 30%, respectively).

Notable differences are observed between supporters and opponents of EU accession: while 52% of the former favour the continuation of decommunization and only 19% are against it. Among opponents of EU accession, the respective figures are 19% and 40.5%.

In recent years, traditional **understanding of marriage as a union between a man and**

**a woman** has weakened somewhat. The share of those who would support a political party advocating this definition declined from 77% in 2018 to 65% in 2025). At the same time, the proportion of those who would support a political force advocating the **right to marriage (or partnership) between same-sex couples** increased only modestly, from 4% to 11%).

Support for the idea of traditional marriage is strongest in the West (79%) and the South (74%), and weakest in the East (48.5%). In the eastern region, 19% would support a political force advocating state recognition of same-sex marriages (or partnerships).

Compared with 2018, support for the decriminalisation of the use and possession of certain soft drugs for personal use has increased slightly (from 5% to 11%). However, 74% of respondents in 2018 and **68% in 2025 support a strict anti-drug policy, including criminal penalties for use and possession**. Residents of the East are somewhat less likely to support a strict anti-drug policy (51%), although even among them only 15% would support a political force advocating decriminalisation of the use and possession of certain soft drugs for personal use.

Attitudes towards the **idea of reinstating the death penalty for the most serious and violent crimes** have fluctuated in recent years. In 2018, a relative majority (41%) supported reinstating the death penalty. In 2022, almost the same share of respondents (42%) opposed its reinstatement, with only 29% in favour. In 2025, public opinion on this issue has largely returned to its pre-war position: a relative majority (43.5%) support reinstating the death penalty, while only 24% oppose it.

Support for reinstating the death penalty is more common than in the overall respondent group among those with combat experience (54%) and residents of western regions of Ukraine (51.5%), and least common among those living in the Centre (36%). However, in all regions the share of supporters exceeds that of opponents.

A relative majority of respondents (45%) believe that **restrictions on civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression** (the same proportion as in 2018). A substantially smaller share (21.5%) considers that, under conditions

of external aggression, certain civil rights and freedoms (such as freedom of speech and assembly) may be restricted. This is only slightly higher than in 2018, when 17% held this view.

The majority or relative majority (ranging from 39% to 53%) in all regions believe that restrictions on civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression.

Those who do not trust the authorities are more likely than those who do trust them to believe that restrictions on civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression (49% and 40%, respectively).

### The Role of the Opposition in Political Life During the War

59% of respondents believe that opposition to the government is necessary during wartime, while a minority (20%) hold the opposite view. Support for the need for opposition is more widespread among respondents who do not trust the authorities (80.5%) than among those who do (72.5%), and more common among those who support Ukraine's accession to the European Union (79%) than among those who oppose it (71%).

Similarly, most respondents (56%) consider it permissible, under martial law, to criticise the country's leadership on matters of national defence, while 32% take the opposite view. Among those who believe that opposition is necessary during wartime, 60% consider such criticism acceptable, compared with only 37% among those who believe that opposition is unnecessary during war (the impermissibility of such criticism is indicated by 26% and 54%, respectively).

The lower the respondents' level of material well-being, the more likely they are to consider criticism of the authorities on defence matters acceptable (from 49% among those who live a comfortable life to 61% among those who report that they «barely make ends meet»). Likewise, those who do not trust the authorities are more likely than those who do to regard such criticism as acceptable (65% and 42%, respectively).

At the same time, the military and security spheres are the areas in which respondents most frequently state that the opposition

should unequivocally support the authorities (32.5%). By contrast, 31% believe that the opposition should necessarily propose alternative ideas, while 29% consider that its stance should depend on the circumstances.

In other spheres (foreign and domestic policy, the economy, and the social sphere), only 20–25% believe that the opposition should unequivocally support the authorities, whereas 37–41% consider that it should necessarily put forward alternative proposals.

**Based on findings presented in this section, it is possible to conclude that:**

✓ **After the start of the full-scale invasion, the share of citizens who consider democracy to be the most desirable system of government for Ukraine increased compared with the pre-war period. However, in November 2025 this indicator returned to approximately the same level as in 2021.**

✓ **At the same time, a clear majority consider a democratic political system to be a good system for Ukraine, while the share of those who believe that a system with a strong leader independent of parliaments and elections is a good system has decreased compared to 2017 from 80% to 60%. Nonetheless, most of those who consider a system with a strong leader independent of parliaments and elections to be good, also consider a democratic political system to be good.**

✓ **Although, compared with 2017, the share of those who consider a country ruled by the military or a military regime to be a good system has increased from 12% to 40%, a majority (60%) continue to regard such a system as a bad one. Moreover, among those who consider a system governed by the military or a military regime to be good, many also regard a democratic political system as good. Thus, under conditions of war, «military rule» in Ukraine is largely perceived as a means of protecting the democratic order rather than as an alternative to it.**

✓ **A relative majority of respondents believe that only electoral democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary can ensure order (this share has increased**

**compared with March 2024). Compared with 2024, the share of those who believe that individual democratic procedures should be combined with a «strong hand» policy has increased slightly, while the share of those who hold the view that all power and responsibility should be assumed by a strong political leader and his political force has decreased.**

✓ **A relative majority of respondents prefer freedom over prosperity when choosing between the two. At the same time, when choosing between freedom and security, respondents prioritise security slightly more often. However, respondents with combat experience are much more likely to prioritise freedom over security. They are also more likely than the overall respondent group to prefer freedom over prosperity.**

✓ **A relative majority of respondents hold the view that Ukraine is not yet a fully democratic state, but it is moving towards democracy.**

✓ **When asked, «To what extent do various consequences of prolonged martial law negatively affect the situation in the country?», respondents mostly mention the significant negative impact of restrictions on certain citizens' rights (28%) and the immutability of the authorities, including the absence of elections (28%).**

✓ **Paternalistic expectations in society tend to reduce. For example, compared with 2013, the share of citizens who believe that the state should bear full responsibility for providing everyone with everything they need has declined significantly, while the proportion of those who hold the view that the state should ensure a level playing field, while individuals themselves bear responsibility for how they use the opportunities available to them, has increased to 63%. Furthermore, most respondents believe that the standard of living should be ensured equally by the state and by the citizens themselves.**

✓ **A relative majority of respondents (45%) believe that «Ukraine will be a highly developed, democratic and influential European state» in the future. A further 33% believe that Ukraine will be a country that**

follows its special course of development. Only a small minority anticipate negative scenarios.

✓ If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO were to be held in the near future, the vast majority of respondents would vote in favour of joining these organisations.

✓ Whereas in 2018 significant regional differences persisted in foreign policy orientations, at present the vast majority of residents in all regions would support a party advocating Ukraine's accession to the EU.

✓ A relative majority of respondents support reducing the functions of central government, transferring greater powers to local self-government bodies, and pursuing decentralisation. However, under conditions of full-scale war, support for decentralisation remains lower than in 2018, when it was supported by the absolute majority of Ukrainians. In the East, there are fewer supporters of decentralisation than supporters of expanding the functions of central government. It may be assumed that the proximity of this region to areas of active hostilities influences these attitudes.

✓ Most respondents are currently unwilling to support either strengthening Parliament's influence over the Cabinet and the executive branch while limiting presidential powers, or, conversely, strengthening the President's role. This may be interpreted as indicating that a relative majority of citizens are reluctant to alter the existing balance of power.

✓ Although, in matters of economic policy, support for state regulation remains somewhat higher than support for reducing state involvement in market processes, recent years have seen a gradual decline in backing for the idea of state regulation. Likewise, while support for a strong state sector in the economy still outweighs support for prioritising the private sector, this predominance has become markedly less pronounced over time.

✓ While in 2018, respondents were slightly more likely to place their hopes on

the development of traditional industries – metallurgy, machine-building, extractive industries and agriculture – rather than prioritising new sectors and technologies, in 2025, support for prioritising new industries and technologies no longer differs statistically from support for the development of traditional industries.

✓ In respondents' answers to questions about alternative approaches to social policy, one can observe a clear demand for the state to play an active role in this area. The majority favour a state-run system of social protection (pensions, subsidies and social assistance).

✓ A majority of respondents would back a political party committed to state protection and promotion of the Ukrainian language, while a relative majority would favour a party advocating the continuation of decommunization.

✓ In recent years, traditional understanding of marriage as a union between a man and a woman has weakened somewhat, but the proportion of those who would support a political force advocating the right to marriage (or partnership) between same-sex couples increased only modestly to 11%.

✓ Compared with 2018, support for the decriminalisation of the use and possession of certain soft drugs for personal use has increased slightly, but the vast majority of respondents still support a strict anti-drug policy, including criminal penalties for use and possession.

✓ In 2025, as in 2018, a relative majority of citizens favour reinstating the death penalty.

✓ A relative majority of respondents would support a political party arguing that restrictions on civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression.

✓ Most respondents believe that opposition to the government is necessary during wartime. Similarly, most respondents consider it permissible, under martial law, to criticise the country's leadership on matters of national defence.

### Section III. ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE. THE NEED FOR NEW POLITICAL FORCES, THE ROLE AND PLACE OF VETERANS OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE AFTER THE END OF MARTIAL LAW

#### Attitudes Towards Political Parties, the Demand for New Political Forces and New Politicians

After the outbreak of the full-scale war, and compared with the end of 2020, there was a noticeable decline in the share of respondents who considered political parties necessary for the normal development of Ukraine as a state. Between 2014 to 2020, this share ranged from 70% to 75%, but in September–October 2022, it fell to 53%, which may be explained by the loss of public interest in political life at the beginning of the war. However, by November 2025, the figure had moved closer to pre-war levels (67%).

The share of respondents who believe that parties are unnecessary increased in 2022 compared with 2020, from 14% to 28.5%, but declined again in 2025 to 18%.

**The share of respondents who believe that there is a party in Ukraine that represents their interests has declined** significantly from 38% in 2020 to 21% in November 2025. 64% of respondents believe that no such party exists in Ukraine.

The share of those who believe that such a party does exist is slightly higher among residents of the East (32%, compared with 18–20% in other regions), among those who trust the authorities (29%) and among those who trust the opposition (30%).

However, it is somewhat paradoxical that the majority of those who trust the authorities (52%) and those who trust the opposition (55%) say that no political party represents their interests – in other words, they do not trust the political forces that form the government and the opposition.

Respondents who support Ukraine's accession to the EU are somewhat more likely than opponents to believe that there is a

party in Ukraine representing their interests (24% and 15%, respectively).

**The majority of Ukrainians (54%) do not see among the existing political forces any to which power could be entrusted in the post-war period;** only 21% give an affirmative answer to this question. In July 2023, these figures stood at 41% and 38.5% respectively.

Among those who trust the authorities, 30% give a positive answer to this question (45.5% give a negative one); among those who do not trust the authorities, the figures are 17% and 68.5%, respectively. Among those who trust the political opposition, 32.5% give a positive answer (and 48.5% give a negative answer), compared with 19% and 65% among those who do not trust the opposition.

**Compared with 2020, the share of respondents who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties has increased significantly from 35% to 58%.**

Notably, the perceived need for new political parties is even higher among those who believe that a party representing their interests does exist than among those who believe that no such party exists in Ukraine (73% and 56%, respectively). It is also somewhat higher among those who do not trust the Ukrainian authorities than among those who do (62% and 55%, respectively), and higher among Russian-speaking citizens than among Ukrainian-speaking citizens (69.5% and 54%, respectively). The highest level of demand for new political forces is observed in the eastern region (73%).

During the decade preceding the full-scale war, the demand for new political leaders was most strongly expressed by Ukrainians in 2015, when 55% indicated such a need, while 28% considered the existing political leaders entirely sufficient. By 2020, the share of citizens expressing this demand had declined to 46%. This may be explained by the fact that at that time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy's coming to power was perceived, to some extent, as the emergence of a «new leader». An even smaller proportion of respondents expressed the need for new political leaders in September–October 2022 (41%). **However, by November 2025, the share of those expressing such**

a need has risen to a «historic high» (70%), which may indicate a growing demand for renewal of the political leadership.

***The demand for new leaders is expressed by 93% of those who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties. This may suggest that, for many citizens, a «new political party» is seen primarily as a «leader-centred party», that is, a political project created to support a particular political personality.***

The demand for new political leaders is higher among those who do not trust the authorities than among those who do (74% and 65%, respectively); and likewise higher among those who do not trust the opposition, compared with those who do (73% and 68%, respectively). It is also higher among Russian-speaking citizens than among Ukrainian-speaking citizens (80% and 66%, respectively). As in the case of new political parties, the need for new leaders is expressed most frequently by residents of the eastern region (80%).

**Most respondents (56%) state that in the next elections they would be more likely to vote for «new faces» – people who have not previously held power.** By contrast, 22% would be more likely to prefer experienced politicians who have already held office.

Support for «new faces» is particularly strong among respondents who believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders (68%) and new political parties (68%), as well as among those who trust neither the authorities (62%) nor the opposition (61%).

**Citizens would like to see representatives of the military and veterans (48%) in the future Verkhovna Rada,** followed by new politicians (41%), anti-corruption campaigners (40%), experienced politicians (35%), civic activists (35%), volunteers (31%), representatives of local self-government bodies (18%), entrepreneurs (15%), and, lastly, religious figures (7%).

The presence of the military in parliament is more frequently supported by those who believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders (51.5%) and new political parties (52%), by respondents with combat experience (65%), and by residents of the Western region (59%).

**According to respondents, a political force that could be entrusted with power in the post-war period is most likely to emerge from among the military (47%).** A substantial share (40%) believe that such a force could emerge from among the humanitarian or technical professional community («intelligentsia») – a figure significantly higher than in surveys conducted in 2023–2024, when between 17% and 25% of respondents gave this answer. A further 33% believe that it could emerge from civil society organisations; 30% from the volunteer community; 25% from existing political parties; and 17% from the business sector.

Internally displaced persons are more likely than the overall respondent group to believe that such a political force could emerge from civil society organisations (53.5%) or from the intelligentsia (53%).

Respondents who trust the authorities are more likely than the overall respondent group to believe that such a force could emerge from existing political parties (37%). The same applies to those who trust the political opposition (33.5%).

Residents of the East are more likely than the overall respondent group to believe that such a political force could emerge from civil society organisations (44%), from existing political parties (34%), or from the business sector (23%). Residents of the South most frequently point to the intelligentsia (58.5%).

The view that such a political force could emerge from among the military is shared most widely in the western region (54%), followed by the Centre (48%), East (41%), and South (36%).

When asked, **«Should members of the military and veterans enter politics after the end of the war?»**, 57% of respondents state that these people should enter politics at the national level, 50% at the local level, and only 15% believe that they should not enter politics at all.

Regarding whether volunteers currently supporting the military should enter politics after the end of the war, 49% of respondents believe they should do so at the national level, 50% at the local level, and only 17% believe they should not enter politics.

The view that members of the military and veterans should enter politics at the national level is more common among those who believe that Ukraine needs new political leaders (61%) and new political parties (61%), among respondents with combat experience (70.5%), and among residents of the West (71%).

Support for volunteers entering national-level politics after the war is more frequent among those who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties (54%), as well as among Ukrainians living in the West (61.5%) and the East (55.5%).

In response to the question, **«Which qualities of veterans do you consider useful in political and civic activity?»**, respondents most frequently mention the following traits: honesty (18%), patriotism (12%), fairness (9%), resilience, fortitude, strength, endurance (7%), courage and bravery (7%), devotion to the people and to Ukraine (6%), responsibility (5.5%), determination (5%), incorruptibility and a commitment to combating corruption (5%), and experience (5%).

### Who Should Have the Right to Vote in the First Post-War Elections?

50% of respondents believe that **citizens who remain in Ukraine but have failed to update their military registration details** within the legally prescribed timeframe and are evading mobilisation should have the right to vote (elect) in the first post-war elections (30% believe they should not have this right).

49.5% believe that **those who remain in Ukraine but refuse to be mobilised on religious grounds** should be allowed to vote (30% disagree).

48% believe that **citizens who left Ukraine legally during the war and have not returned** should have the right to vote (40% disagree).

47% believe that **citizens who resided in temporarily occupied territories until the end of the war** should have the right to vote (30% disagree).

Only 25% believe that **those who crossed Ukraine's border illegally and have not returned** should have the right to vote (62% disagree).

The view that citizens who remain in Ukraine but failed to update their military registration details and are evading mobilisation should retain the right to vote (elect) is more common among those who express a positive attitude towards «draft dodgers» (69%). However, even among this group, 18% believe that such individuals should be deprived of voting rights.

Conversely, among those who hold a negative attitude towards «draft dodgers», 34.5% believe that they should retain the right to vote, although the largest share (46%) oppose this.

With regard to voting rights for those who refuse to be mobilised on religious grounds, support for granting them the right to vote is more common among respondents who express a positive attitude towards «draft dodgers» (71%). Support for this position is lowest among residents of the Centre (44%).

As for voting rights for citizens who left Ukraine legally during the war and have not returned, support for granting them the right to vote is more frequent among respondents who hold a positive view of Ukrainians who left the country after the outbreak of the war (54%). However, even within this group, 34% believe that they should not have voting rights (among those who hold a negative view of this group, the respective figures are 33% in favour and 59% opposed). Support for their voting rights is lowest in the West (41%).

Regarding citizens who resided in temporarily occupied territories until the end of the war, support for granting them voting rights is highest among those living in the South (62%) and lowest among residents of the western region (36%).

As for those who crossed Ukraine's border illegally and have not returned, people in the East are somewhat more likely than the overall respondent group to support granting them the right to vote (38%). Nevertheless, a majority of residents in this region (55%) remain opposed.

Respondents who are positive about «draft dodgers», as well as those who oppose Ukraine's accession to the European Union, are more likely than respondents overall to support granting voting rights to all of the

above-mentioned groups. Meanwhile, those who trust neither the authorities nor the opposition are more likely than respondents overall to support granting voting rights to all groups except those who crossed the border illegally and have not returned.

An overwhelming majority (71–76%) believe that in the first post-war elections, **citizens who left Ukraine during the war and have not returned should not be eligible to stand for election** as members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, mayors and local council deputies. Over the past year, Ukrainians' attitudes on this issue have softened only slightly (in June 2024, 81–82% opposed granting such eligibility).

### Citizens' Readiness to Participate in the First Post-War Elections

**Between 66% and 70% of respondents plan to participate as voters in the first post-war elections at various levels of government.** This is somewhat lower than in June 2024, when between 72% and 76% gave such a response.

The intention to participate increases with age, with older respondents being more likely to express readiness to vote; the same applies to supporters of Ukraine's accession to the European Union. Thus, the intention to vote in parliamentary elections ranges from 62% among respondents aged 18–29 to 72% among those aged 60+; the respective figures are 73% among supporters of EU accession and 55% among opponents.

2% of respondents state that they intend to stand as candidates in the first post-war elections to the Verkhovna Rada or for mayoral positions; 3% intend to run in elections for local council deputies; and 0.9% intend to stand in the presidential election. However, it is evident that, for example, the 0.9% indicating an intention to run for President likely reflects a hypothetical possibility rather than a firm commitment. The same applies to declared intentions to stand in parliamentary or local elections.

Intentions to stand as candidates in local elections are expressed more frequently by respondents with higher education. For instance, 4% of respondents with higher

education indicate an intention to run in elections for local council deputies.

**Based on findings presented in this section, it is possible to conclude that:**

✓ **After the outbreak of the full-scale war, and compared with the end of 2020, there was a noticeable decline (to 53%) in the share of respondents who considered political parties necessary for the normal development of Ukraine as a state. This may be explained by the loss of public interest in political life at the beginning of the war. However, by November 2025, the figure had moved closer to pre-war levels (67%).**

✓ **A majority of respondents believe that there is no political party in Ukraine that represents their interests.**

✓ **Only 21% of respondents state that they see among the existing political forces any that could be entrusted with power in the post-war period.**

✓ **In 2025, compared with 2020, the share of respondents who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties increased significantly, from 35% to 58%, while the share expressing a demand for new political leaders rose from 46% to 70%, which may indicate a growing need for political renewal. A majority of respondents also state that in the next elections they would be more likely to vote for «new faces» — people who have not previously held power.**

✓ **The demand for new leaders is expressed by 93% of those who believe that Ukraine needs new political parties. This may suggest that, for many citizens, a «new political party» is seen primarily as a «leader-centred party», that is, a political project created to support a particular political personality.**

✓ **Citizens would like to see representatives of the military and veterans in the future Verkhovna Rada, followed by new politicians (and the experienced ones as well), anti-corruption campaigners, civic activists and volunteers.**

✓ **According to respondents, a political force that could be entrusted with power in**



the post-war period is most likely to emerge from among the military, from the humanitarian or technical professional community, from civil society organisations, or from the volunteer sector.

✓ When asked, «Should members of the military and veterans enter politics after the end of the war?», 57% of respondents state that these people should enter politics at the national level, 50% at the local level, and only 15% believe that they should not enter politics at all.

In response to the question, «Which qualities of veterans do you consider useful in political and civic activity?», respondents most frequently mention the following traits: honesty, patriotism, fairness, resilience, fortitude, strength, endurance, courage and bravery, devotion to the people and to Ukraine, responsibility, determination, incorruptibility and a commitment to combating corruption, and experience.

It can be argued that, in the collective consciousness, the figure of the serviceman has come to represent the dominant


personality type<sup>5</sup> in contemporary Ukrainian society. Today, members of the military and veterans embody the conviction that post-war reconstruction of Ukraine will not entail a return to the pre-war order, but rather the creation of a renewed state shaped by those who defended it.

✓ Most respondents believe that citizens who crossed Ukraine's border illegally and have not returned should not have the right to vote in the first post-war elections.

✓ An overwhelming majority of respondents believe that in the first post-war elections – for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, and for mayors and local council deputies – citizens who left Ukraine during the war (including on lawful grounds) and have not returned should not be eligible to stand for elected office.

✓ Between 66% and 70% of respondents plan to participate as voters in the first post-war elections at various levels of government; however, fewer than 3% indicate an intention to exercise their right to stand as candidates.

<sup>5</sup> The dominant personality type refers to a type of individual whose representatives do not constitute a majority within the population, but who set social standards for others and embody prevailing societal expectations regarding what a person in contemporary society should be like.



	HOW DO YOU TRUST THE FOLLOWING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS? % of respondents														
	July-August 2021			September 2024			September 2025			November 2025					
	Trust*	Distrust**	Hard to say	Trust*	Distrust**	Hard to say	Trust*	Distrust**	Hard to say	Trust*	Distrust**	Hard to say	Trust-distrust balance		
Armed Forces of Ukraine	68.3	24.8	6.7	91.5	5.9	2.6	85.6	92.6	5.6	1.7	87.0	92.1	5.9	2.0	86.2
State Emergency Service	61.4	28.7	9.9	83.1	12.4	4.4	70.7	86.3	9.7	3.9	76.6	85.6	9.8	4.5	75.8
Volunteer organisations	63.6	25.1	11.3	80.3	13.7	5.9	66.6	81.5	14.8	3.7	66.7	81.1	14.3	4.6	66.8
Volunteer units	53.5	33.4	13.1	79.5	12.3	8.2	67.2	78.3	14.6	7.1	63.7	77.8	14.7	7.5	63.1
Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73.3	16.9	9.9	56.4	71.0	18.0	11.1	53.0
National Guard of Ukraine	53.6	36.0	10.4	74.4	18.5	7.1	55.9	76.6	18.4	5.0	58.2	72.4	21.3	6.4	51.1
State Border Guard Service	55	34.3	10.7	69.8	23.4	6.9	46.4	75.2	20.1	4.6	55.1	70.5	23.2	6.3	47.3
Church	63.5	26.3	10.3	62.5	26.8	10.6	35.7	62.0	26.6	11.2	35.4	64.6	24.0	11.4	40.6
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)	37.5	49.7	12.7	63.6	26.1	10.3	37.5	66.4	24.6	9.0	41.8	65.0	25.9	9.1	39.1
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine	-	-	-	62.8	29.1	8.1	33.7	66.6	26.7	6.7	39.9	63.4	28.4	8.2	35.0
Civil society organisations	47	37.4	15.5	58.8	29.3	11.8	29.5	53.9	34.5	11.6	19.4	64.0	24.6	11.4	39.4
National Bank of Ukraine	29.1	60.1	10.9	50.2	39.4	10.4	10.8	49.4	43.2	7.4	6.2	53.9	36.8	9.3	17.1
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsperson)	31.7	40.1	28.1	42.4	34.4	23.2	8.0	46.7	35.4	17.9	11.3	47.9	33.8	18.3	14.1
Local council of your city/town/village	51.4	37.8	10.7	44.6	45.9	9.4	-1.3	42.3	49.0	8.7	-6.7	49.5	41.0	9.6	8.5
Mayor of your city/town/village	57.1	33.6	9.3	47.4	44.7	7.9	2.7	48.9	45.7	5.5	3.2	50.2	42.1	7.7	8.1
Ukrainian media	45.4	45.8	8.9	44.6	48.1	7.3	-3.5	44.1	48.5	7.4	-4.4	48.0	45.3	6.8	2.7
President of Ukraine	36.2	57.6	6.2	48.5	44.5	7.1	4.0	52.4	40.4	7.2	12.0	47.8	45.3	6.9	2.5
State Bureau of Investigations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.3	48.0	17.6	-13.7	39.7	42.1	18.3	-2.4

\* The total of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».  
\*\* The total of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».



<b>HOW DO YOU TRUST THE FOLLOWING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS?</b> % of respondents																
	July-August 2021				September 2024				September 2025				November 2025			
	Trust*	Trust**	Hard to say	Trust-distrust balance	Trust*	Trust**	Hard to say	Trust-distrust balance	Trust*	Trust**	Hard to say	Trust-distrust balance	Trust*	Trust**	Hard to say	Trust-distrust balance
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)	15.2	69.6	15.3	-54.4	22.1	58.0	19.9	-35.9	30.6	55.8	13.6	-25.2	41.4	44.9	13.6	-3.5
National Police of Ukraine	38.5	52.9	8.5	-14.4	49.8	41.4	8.8	8.4	46.1	47.3	6.5	-1.2	45.5	48.7	5.8	-3.2
Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office	13.6	69.3	17.2	-55.7	19.4	58.0	22.7	-38.6	28.3	55.8	15.9	-27.5	37.0	46.9	16.0	-9.9
Trade Unions	21.2	54.8	24.0	-33.6	25.9	46.1	28.0	-20.2	27.5	50.2	22.3	-22.7	29.6	42.1	28.3	-12.5
Commercial banks	18.2	70.7	11.1	-52.5	29.3	54.9	15.8	-25.6	31.0	55.1	13.9	-24.1	35.1	49.9	15.0	-14.8
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK)	13.2	69.6	17.2	-56.4	19.2	57.4	23.4	-38.2	26.7	57.4	15.8	-30.7	31.9	50.3	17.9	-18.4
Ukrainian authorities as a whole	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33.8	56.8	9.4	-23.0	33.2	57.3	9.5	-24.1
Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine	17.8	71.1	11.1	-53.3	23.2	62.6	14.1	-39.4	26.2	62.3	11.5	-36.1	28.4	59.8	11.8	-31.4
Ukrainian opposition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.0	61.5	21.5	-44.5	21.3	59.1	19.6	-37.8
Courts (judicial system as a whole)	15.5	74.2	10.4	-58.7	16.4	70.2	13.5	-53.8	19.7	71.1	9.1	-51.4	22.5	66.3	11.2	-43.8
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	21.5	72	6.6	-50.5	20.5	72.5	7.1	-52.0	22.5	70.2	7.4	-47.7	21.4	72.8	5.8	-51.4
Political parties	16.1	71.7	12.2	-55.6	14.7	73.5	11.9	-58.8	11.5	80.7	7.8	-69.2	17.1	71.5	11.4	-54.4
State apparatus (officials)	14.9	75.7	9.4	-60.8	14.2	77.4	8.3	-63.2	12.6	79.7	7.7	-67.1	18.2	75.1	6.6	-56.9
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	18.7	75.1	6.1	-56.4	16.0	78.5	5.6	-62.5	17.2	76.7	6.0	-59.5	18.5	76.0	5.4	-57.5

\* The total of answers «fully trust» and «rather trust».


\*\* The total of answers «fully distrust» and «rather distrust».

<b>WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS?</b>					
% of respondents					
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	No answer	<i>Average score*</i>
Service personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine	0.6	4.9	94.0	0.4	9.2
Veterans of the russia-Ukraine war	0.5	6.4	92.5	0.6	9.1
People with special needs and persons with disabilities	2.4	16.7	79.2	1.6	8.1
Civilians who have remained in Ukraine since the beginning of the war	2.8	19.7	75.3	2.2	8.0
Low-income citizens	2.3	22.6	71.3	3.9	7.7
Internally displaced persons and refugees from occupied and frontline regions	3.4	25.0	69.3	2.3	7.6
Representatives of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine	8.1	22.8	59.1	10.0	7.2
Representatives of women's organisations and associations	6.1	30.4	57.0	6.6	7.1
Representatives of human rights organisations	9.2	28.5	57.5	4.8	7.0
Representatives of organisations combating corruption	10.8	26.4	59.7	3.1	7.0
Representatives of cultural associations of national minorities	7.9	33.5	49.8	8.8	6.7
Ukrainian citizens living in temporarily occupied territories	8.9	37.8	46.9	6.4	6.5
Ukrainian citizens who left the country after the start of the war and remain abroad	11.0	36.7	47.9	4.4	6.5
Representatives of environmental organisations	10.1	35.0	45.6	9.3	6.4
Representatives of opposition political forces	24.2	39.7	26.1	10.0	5.1
Representatives of pro-government political forces	29.3	41.9	20.8	7.9	4.6
People accused of evading military service	35.0	35.8	20.0	9.2	4.4
Representatives of sexual minorities	46.7	33.9	11.0	8.3	3.4
Representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate	57.8	18.3	14.3	9.6	3.0
Individuals accused of corruption	80.8	10.8	6.1	2.2	1.6
Individuals accused of assisting russia and the russian army	89.8	5.6	2.6	2.0	1.0


\* Your attitude on a scale from 0 to 10, where «0» indicates your extremely negative attitude and «10» indicates your most positive attitude.




\* Respondents could provide their own answers. Only answers given by 1% or more of respondents are shown in the figure.






\* Respondents could provide their own answers. Only answers given by 1% or more of respondents are shown in the figure.





<b>HOW GOOD FOR OUR COUNTRY ARE THESE TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS?</b>					
% of respondents					
	Very good	Rather good	Rather bad	Very bad	No answer
<b>A strong leader independent of parliaments and elections</b>					
March 2017	35.0	44.9	14.3	5.7	0.2
September-October 2022	30.3	37.4	21.1	10.9	0.3
May 2023	26.2	36.0	26.4	10.6	0.8
April-May 2025	29.3	39.6	23.1	7.4	0.6
September 2025	23.8	37.9	23.1	13.9	1.3
November 2025	23.7	36.0	28.2	11.7	0.4
<b>Country ruled by the military or a military regime</b>					
March 2017	1.7	10.7	46.7	40.7	0.3
September-October 2022	8.6	21.8	39.9	29.1	0.5
May 2023	8.5	19.8	40.5	30.4	0.9
April-May 2025	9.8	26.7	45.7	17.2	0.7
September 2025	10.4	22.2	40.2	25.8	1.4
November 2025	9.7	30.0	41.2	18.6	0.5
<b>Democratic political system</b>					
March 2017	35.8	50.7	10.3	3.0	0.2
September-October 2022	53.9	36.0	8.7	1.2	0.2
May 2023	56.7	36.1	5.3	1.2	0.8
April-May 2025	43.6	44.4	8.5	3.0	0.5
September 2025	46.6	43.4	6.3	2.8	0.9
November 2025	43.4	43.4	10.1	2.7	0.5













<b>IN UKRAINE, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE MILITARY AGGRESSION...</b>					
% of respondents					
	Increased	Did not change	Decreased	Hard to say	<i>Balance*</i>
Use of the Ukrainian language and the popularity of Ukrainian-language cultural products	71.0	20.7	5.7	2.5	65.3
Heightened awareness of the inevitability of a permanent threat from Russia	64.3	21.8	7.1	6.8	57.2
Negative attitudes towards oligarchs	62.3	26.6	7.9	3.3	54.4
Intolerance of social injustice	57.4	27.3	11.1	4.2	46.3
Desire for change in the political elite	55.1	26.4	9.0	9.4	46.1
Strengthening of national self-awareness among Ukrainian citizens	57.2	27.4	11.4	3.9	45.8
Support for processes of derussification	57.3	23.9	12.0	6.8	45.3
«Distance» between the authorities and society	54.1	30.0	10.6	5.2	43.5
Level of patriotism	56.0	22.3	18.4	3.4	37.6
Support for traditional family values	45.1	41.4	10.2	3.2	34.9
Sense of unity among residents of different regions	48.4	28.3	19.2	4.1	29.2
Support for decommunization processes	43.2	32.9	14.6	9.3	28.6
Readiness to accept temporary territorial losses for the sake of achieving peace	38.0	30.6	18.2	13.2	19.8
Belief in victory in the war with Russia	43.1	25.6	24.7	6.5	18.4
Citizens' social activity	37.5	32.7	24.1	5.7	13.4
Tolerance in inter-ethnic relations	29.8	42.4	16.4	11.2	13.4
Support for liberal values	26.6	36.8	16.6	20.1	10.0
Support for democratic values	32.2	36.5	24.5	6.8	7.7
Citizens' political activity	29.2	35.3	27.1	8.3	2.1
Tolerance in inter-church relations	25.0	35.8	26.3	12.9	-1.3
Sense of unity among representatives of different social groups and classes	28.5	35.9	29.9	5.6	-1.4
Level of social optimism	23.7	29.0	38.0	9.4	-14.3


\*\* Difference between trust and distrust.




\* Respondents were asked to select no more than five suitable options.



\* Respondents were asked to select no more than five suitable options.



\* Respondents were asked to use a scale from 1 to 10, where «1» means «no corruption» and «10» means «a very high level of corruption».



### WHICH PROBLEMS ARE OR WILL BE MOST RELEVANT FOR YOUR FAMILY IN THE NEAR FUTURE?\*

% of respondents

Russian shelling	59.7
Decline or loss of primary income	44.4
Threat of losing housing, including as a result of shelling	27.0
Corruption among officials and civil servants	23.2
Lack of access to quality and adequate medical treatment or healthcare	22.0
Illness	19.9
Loss of work or business	14.4
Need to leave the country	8.6
Inability to find employment	8.3
Deterioration of working conditions	8.3
Need to find housing	7.3
Rising crime	7.0
Poor environmental conditions (polluted air and water in the place of residence)	5.9
Hunger	5.2
Other	0.3
None of the above	3.1
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	3.0

\* Respondents could select several options.

**APART FROM EXPENDITURES ON STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND DEFENCE, WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE'S STATE BUDGET BE SPENT ON FIRST AND FOREMOST FOR RECOVERY IN WARTIME?\***


% of respondents


Veterans' programmes (including treatment, rehabilitation, social reintegration), and support for war veterans	53.4
Strengthening civilian protection of the population (construction and equipping of shelters, provision of backup energy sources, special equipment for health facilities, etc.)	46.4
Construction and repair of social infrastructure facilities (schools, hospitals, etc.)	32.3
Increases in salaries and bonuses for public sector employees (teachers, doctors, etc. ), as well as increases in pensions	30.6
Job creation	28.8
Construction and repair of nationally significant production infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports)	26.4
Construction of social housing	24.0
Support for business and enterprises	13.1
Support for culture and Ukrainian cultural production	9.5
Other	0.8
Hard to say	1.2



\* Respondents could select up to three options.


**HOW DO YOU SEE THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE?**

% of respondents









### WHEN WILL UKRAINE BE ABLE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN UNION?


% of respondents% опитаних

	September-October 2022	July 2023	January 2024	November 2025
Within 1-3 years	23.2	35.4	23.3	14.2
In 3-5 years	28.1	23.3	27.1	20.6
In 5-10 years	18.3	13.0	15.0	22.8
In 10-20 years	7.0	3.0	5.0	9.2
Never	4.5	4.6	5.7	10.1
Hard to say	18.9	20.7	23.9	23.1

### WHEN WILL UKRAINE BE ABLE TO JOIN NATO?

% of respondents

	July 2023	November 2025
Within 1-3 years	32.2	11.3
In 3-5 years	20.9	15.1
In 5-10 years	14.5	19.0
In 10-20 years	3.6	10.9
Never	5.8	19.0
Hard to say	23.1	24.7



<b>ON A SCALE OF 0 TO 10, WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE THE POLITICAL FORCE, YOU WOULD SUPPORT IN ELECTIONS?</b>						
% of respondents						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	No answer	Average score*	
<b>Ukraine's accession to the union of russia and belarus/to the Eurasian Economic Union</b>						<b>Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the foreseeable future</b>
June 2018	22.5	30.2	46.3	1.0	6.1	
September-October 2022	4.4	14.9	80.4	0.3	8.4	
November 2025	5.4	13.3	81.0	0.3	8.3	
<b>Ukraine's non-aligned status (non-membership in military alliances)</b>						<b>Ukraine's accession to NATO in the foreseeable future</b>
June 2018	34.4	27.1	37.1	1.3	5.2	
September-October 2022	11.8	17.8	70.0	0.3	7.7	
November 2025	16.2	18.5	65.2	0.1	7.2	
<b>Greater parliamentary influence over the Cabinet and executive branch, with reduced presidential powers</b>						<b>Greater presidential influence over the Cabinet and executive branch, with reduced parliamentary powers</b>
June 2018	35.2	44.5	19.3	1.0	4.4	
September-October 2022	14.9	45.4	38.9	0.7	5.9	
November 2025	22.7	46.9	30.1	0.3	5.3	
<b>Reduced functions of central government, greater powers to local self-government bodies, and decentralisation.</b>						<b>Expanded functions of central government, reduced powers of local self-government bodies, stronger centralised control over all levels of government</b>
June 2018	56.0	33.1	9.9	0.9	3.2	
September-October 2022	45.6	33.8	20.2	0.4	4.1	
November 2025	40.1	38.8	20.8	0.3	4.3	
<b>Expanded state sector of the economy and return of previously privatised enterprises to state ownership</b>						<b>Privatisation of state-owned enterprises and prioritising the development of the private sector</b>
June 2018	46.4	37.6	15.1	0.9	3.7	
September-October 2022	36.3	36.4	26.9	0.4	4.6	
November 2025	34.8	41.6	23.4	0.1	4.5	
<b>Active role of the state in managing economic processes and exercising price controls</b>						<b>Reduced state intervention in economic processes (deregulation) and price controls – the market is to determine outcomes</b>
June 2018	58.9	29.3	11.1	0.7	3.0	
September-October 2022	46.1	31.0	22.5	0.4	4.0	
November 2025	39.5	32.1	28.1	0.3	4.4	

\* On the 10-point scale, «0» denotes maximum support for the position on the left, and «10» denotes full support for the position on the right.

ON A SCALE OF 0 TO 10, WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE THE POLITICAL FORCE, YOU WOULD SUPPORT IN ELECTIONS? % of respondents (продовження)						
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	No answer	Average score*	
<b>Ukraine's economy should be based primarily on traditional industries – metallurgy, machine-building, extractive industries, and agriculture</b>						<b>Ukraine can achieve faster economic growth only through the development of new industries and advanced technologies (the IT sector, robotics, AI, nanotechnology, biotechnology)</b>
June 2018	38.9	38.9	21.3	0.9	4.3	
September-October 2022	25.1	38.1	36.5	0.3	5.4	
November 2025	28.1	41.4	30.3	0.2	5.1	
<b>Tax system, in which an individual pays higher taxes in exchange for free social services provided by the state</b>						<b>Tax system, in which an individual pays lower taxes while covering the cost of social services him/herself</b>
June 2018	36.5	47.7	15.0	0.8	4.2	
September-October 2022	35.1	38.6	26.0	0.3	4.7	
November 2025	29.4	42.9	27.1	0.6	4.9	
<b>The social protection system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) should be state-run</b>						<b>The social protection system (pensions, subsidies, social assistance) may be operated by private companies</b>
June 2018	66.9	23.9	8.1	1.0	2.5	
September-October 2022	64.5	23.6	11.5	0.3	2.9	
November 2025	61.6	23.9	14.4	0.1	3.1	
<b>State protection and support of the Ukrainian language (mandatory Ukrainian-language instruction in schools, language quotas on radio and television, etc.)</b>						<b>The state should treat all languages equally</b>
June 2018	48.6	21.5	29.2	0.7	4.2	
September-October 2022	63.6	20.0	16.1	0.2	3.0	
November 2025	52.4	25.6	21.7	0.4	3.6	
<b>Continuation of decommunization</b>						<b>Termination of decommunization processes</b>
June 2018	35.8	32.1	29.7	2.4	4.7	
September-October 2022	58.3	23.2	16.5	1.9	3.1	
November 2025	46.4	29.7	21.7	2.2	3.9	
<b>Protection of traditional social values, including the family and marriage based on the free consent of a man and a woman</b>						<b>State recognition of the right to marriage (partnership) of same-sex couples</b>
June 2018	77.1	18.7	3.6	0.7	1.7	
September-October 2022	70.7	19.9	9.0	0.4	2.3	
November 2025	64.9	23.3	10.9	0.8	2.7	

\* On the 10-point scale, «0» denotes maximum support for the position on the left, and «10» denotes full support for the position on the right.

**ON A SCALE OF 0 TO 10, WHERE WOULD YOU PLACE THE POLITICAL FORCE, YOU WOULD SUPPORT IN ELECTIONS?**

% of respondents


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
	0-3 points	4-6 points	7-10 points	No answer	Average score*	
<b>Reinstatement of the death penalty for the most serious and violent crimes against the person</b>						<b>Non-reinstatement of the death penalty for any crimes</b>
June 2018	40.6	33.9	24.8	0.7	4.3	
September-October 2022	28.6	29.2	41.6	0.6	5.6	
November 2025	43.5	31.9	24.1	0.4	4.3	
<b>A strict anti-drug policy, including criminal penalties for the use and possession of drugs</b>						<b>Decriminalisation of the use and possession of certain soft drugs for personal use</b>
June 2018	74.0	19.9	5.3	0.8	2.0	
September-October 2022	69.6	17.6	12.7	0.1	2.5	
November 2025	67.7	21.1	10.7	0.4	2.6	
<b>In conditions of external aggression, certain civil rights and freedoms (freedom of speech or assembly) may be restricted</b>						<b>Restrictions of civil rights cannot be justified by external aggression</b>
June 2018	16.6	37.4	45.2	0.7	6.2	
September-October 2022	23.3	34.7	41.6	0.4	5.8	
November 2025	21.5	32.7	45.4	0.4	6.0	

\* On the 10-point scale, «0» denotes maximum support for the position on the left, and «10» denotes full support for the position on the right.


**DOES UKRAINE NEED POLITICAL PARTIES FOR ITS NORMAL DEVELOPMENT AS A STATE?**




% of respondents










\* In 2017, the question was phrased as follows: «Is there a party among the existing ones that represents your interests?»













**FROM WHICH SPHERE IS A POLITICAL FORCE THAT COULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH POWER IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD MOST LIKELY TO EMERGE?\***  
% of respondents

	July 2023	September 2023	March 2024	September 2024	November 2025
The military	51.0	51.6	45.1	46.6	46.7
Humanitarian or technical professional community (intelligentsia), e.g., scholars, teachers	17.2	24.6	20.0	21.4	40.4
Civil society organisations	18.5	19.1	18.6	19.0	33.1
Volunteer community	24.4	29.6	21.5	23.6	29.6
Existing political parties	25.9	23.2	18.1	17.0	24.8
Business sector	7.8	7.7	6.2	8.9	16.6
Other	3.2	3.5	3.3	4.5	4.7
Hard to say	17.6	17.1	22.9	22.5	12.1


\* Respondents could select several options.




\* Respondents could select several options.



\* Respondents could select several options.



\* Respondents could select several options.



**SHOULD CITIZENS WHO LEFT UKRAINE DURING THE WAR AND HAVE NOT RETURNED BE ELIGIBLE TO STAND AS A CANDIDATE IN...**  
% of respondents

	Yes	No	Hard to say
<b>Parliamentary elections</b>			
June 2024	10.5	80.9	8.5
November 2025	12.1	76.3	11.6
<b>Presidential elections</b>			
June 2024	10.1	81.5	8.4
November 2025	12.3	76.2	11.5
<b>Mayoral elections</b>			
June 2024	9.0	82.1	8.9
November 2025	14.5	73.1	12.4
<b>Local council elections</b>			
June 2024	9.2	81.8	9.0
November 2025	15.7	71.5	12.8

<b>ARE YOU PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE AS A VOTER IN THE FIRST POST-WAR...</b>				
% of respondents				
	Yes	No	Haven't decided yet	Hard to say
<b>Parliamentary elections</b>				
June 2024	73.0	7.1	16.4	3.5
November 2025	67.7	11.2	18.3	2.8
<b>Presidential elections</b>				
June 2024	75.6	5.7	15.1	3.6
November 2025	69.5	10.7	16.9	2.9
<b>Mayoral elections</b>				
June 2024	72.9	6.9	16.4	3.9
November 2025	67.1	10.2	18.7	4.0
<b>Local council elections</b>				
June 2024	71.6	7.8	16.5	4.1
November 2025	65.8	10.7	19.7	3.8

<b>ARE YOU PLANNING TO STAND AS A CANDIDATE IN THE FIRST POST-WAR...</b>				
% of respondents				
	Yes	No	Haven't decided yet	Hard to say
<b>Parliamentary elections</b>				
June 2024	1.8	94.0	3.2	1.0
November 2025	1.7	93.6	3.4	1.3
<b>Presidential elections</b>				
June 2024	1.7	94.0	3.2	1.1
November 2025	0.9	94.3	3.2	1.6
<b>Mayoral elections</b>				
June 2024	2.1	92.8	3.7	1.4
November 2025	1.9	91.3	5.0	1.7
<b>Local council elections</b>				
June 2024	2.9	91.3	4.0	1.7
November 2025	2.4	89.5	5.4	2.6

# THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF POST-WAR SOCIO-POLITICAL PROCESSES AND RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF VETERANS IN PUBLIC LIFE, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Results of the Razumkov Centre Expert Survey

As part of the project «Ukraine: Socio-Political Challenges of the Transition from War to Peace and Post-War Recovery», the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service conducted an expert survey in November-December 2025. The survey focused on the directions of development of the country's political system, the specifics of socio-political relations and processes after the war, the role of veterans in public life, and the prospects for European integration processes.<sup>1</sup>

## DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE SPECIFICS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PROCESSES AND RELATIONS AFTER THE WAR

**Political system.** A relative majority of experts (39%) believe that after the war, Ukraine's political system will develop towards restoring the constitutionally defined role and influence of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet; 20% believe that it will evolve towards the formation of a new model of governance, providing for the constitutional consolidation of the military's participation in state administration; 16% anticipate a further strengthening the role and influence of the President of Ukraine; and 12% foresee a strengthening of parliamentarism and a gradual transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary republic.

**Assessment of changes following the end of the war.** In assessing the likelihood of changes in Ukraine's political and public life after the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, experts most frequently identify the following developments as the most probable:

- ✓ newly emerging political parties will resort to social populism (94% of experts are either certain that this will occur or consider it highly likely);
- ✓ tensions between certain social groups formed as a result of the war will increase (92%);
- ✓ the use of military and mobilisation-related themes in political competition will intensify (90%);
- ✓ new political forces will emerge and gain broad public support (90%);

<sup>1</sup> A total of 51 experts were surveyed, including university professors, members of civil society and volunteer organisations, government representatives, political analysts, serving members and veterans of the Armed Forces, as well as independent experts.



✓ former participants in combat operations will play a significant role in political life (86%);

✓ political competition between the current ruling party and competing political forces will intensify markedly (82%);

✓ the level of social and wealth stratification in society will increase (78.5%);

✓ interest in social issues (poverty, corruption, social equality, etc.) will grow significantly within political discourse (74.5%);

✓ pro-russian parties will effectively disappear from the political arena (74.5%);

✓ the issue of Ukraine's geopolitical choice between the «West» and the «East» will disappear from political discourse as a resolved issue (69%);

✓ the resumption of the decentralisation process will be slowed (65%);

✓ young people will participate more actively in political life (65%).

**More than half of experts also consider the following developments to be highly likely:**

✓ an increased role of the state in the economy (59%);

✓ a growing role of non-governmental organisations in public life (55%);

✓ an acceleration of the democratisation of public life (55%);

✓ a strengthening of the influence of right-wing parties within the party system (51%).

**With regard to challenges to democracy and the risk of authoritarian tendencies:**

✓ 47% of experts consider it highly likely that public demand for an authoritarian leader, a «strong hand», will increase, while a slight majority (51%) regard this as unlikely or are confident that it will not occur;

✓ as for a strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in the activities of the authorities and in socio-political life, the majority of

experts (55%) consider this unlikely or are confident that it will not occur;

✓ with respect to a possible strengthening of the ruling party's monopoly on power, 80% of experts believe this to be unlikely or are confident that it will not occur.

**Measures needed to return the political process to a «peace-time track».** In assessing the importance of various measures in the post-war period, the **vast majority of experts described the following as very important or rather important:**

✓ restoring the constitutionally defined balance of power and order of interaction between the President, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet (98%);

✓ restoring open and public political competition between political parties (96%);

✓ limiting the influence of the Office of the President over other state institutions, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies (96%);

✓ ensuring equal access to the media for both pro-government and opposition parties (96%);

✓ fully restoring local self-government (90%);

✓ safeguarding the rights of the opposition in parliament (90%);

✓ actively engaging veterans of the Russia-Ukraine war in political life and in the work of government and local self-government bodies (90%);

✓ strengthening democratic civilian oversight of the security and defence sector (88%);

✓ giving higher priority to security issues in the activities of state authorities and local self-government bodies (88%);

✓ removing informal restrictions on criticising the authorities for erroneous decisions, actions and abuses committed before and during the full-scale Russian invasion (86%);

✓ establishing a nationwide system of political education to prepare veterans of the

russia-Ukraine war for participation in politics and for work in government and local government bodies (86%);

✓ terminating the activities of temporary local state bodies established under the Law on Martial Law (84%);

✓ ensuring that the positions of various categories of Ukrainian citizens are represented in political discourse, including those residing abroad under temporary asylum (69%).

Experts consider the election of a candidate with combat experience as President of Ukraine to be **less important** (49% consider this to be important or somewhat important, while 45% consider it to be unimportant or not important at all).

### ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF VETERANS IN POLITICS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR

Experts assessed the *likelihood of various scenarios describing the role of veterans in post-war political life* on a scale of 1 to 7, where «1» indicated that the scenario was completely implausible and «7» indicated confidence that the scenario would materialise. In analysing responses to this set of questions, the researchers grouped answers on a scale ranging from 1 to 3, interpreting them as a low-probability scenario, and answers ranging from 5 to 7 as a high-probability scenario.

Accordingly, most experts classify the following as **high-probability scenarios**:

✓ veterans establishing one or more political parties (76.5% rated the likelihood of this scenario between 5 and 7);

✓ other political parties using war veterans as a «cover» to gain popularity and win elections, without veterans exercising real influence on the policies of these parties (71%);

✓ a candidate supported by veterans' organisations winning the future presidential election (61%);

✓ veteran-founded parties having a predominantly centre-right and right-wing orientation (59%);

✓ the activities of veteran-founded parties contributing to the democratic development of Ukrainian society and reflecting the interests of the majority of citizens (55%);

✓ veteran-founded parties winning the next local elections (53%) and the next parliamentary elections (51%);

✓ war veterans forming a social base for protest movements after the end of the war (51%).

The likelihood that veteran-founded parties will prioritise the interests of veterans while paying limited attention to the interests of other social groups received **mixed assessments**: 45% of experts consider this highly probable, while 43% regard it as unlikely.

By contrast, experts predominantly consider it **unlikely** that war veterans will have no significant influence in politics after the end of the war: 66% rated the likelihood of this scenario within the 1–3 range.

In the experts' view, **the primary objectives of veterans' participation in politics** should consist, above all, in:

✓ contributing to the strengthening of Ukraine's national security and defence capabilities (84%);

✓ countering corruption and introducing new standards of conduct in politics and governance (82%);

✓ preventing the authorities from «surrendering» national interests and monitoring its adherence to established «red lines» (72,5%);

✓ ensuring the social and legal protection for veterans and their families (65%).

Less frequently mentioned objectives include ensuring social stability and peace, preventing the manipulation of patriotic and security-related issues (41%), as well as promoting reforms and Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic integration (39%).

When asked **how military experience (participation in the russia-Ukraine war) would facilitate a candidate's election or appointment to public office**, experts most frequently believe that such experience would

strongly or rather facilitate their election to the following positions:

- ✓ the President of Ukraine (86%);
- ✓ member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (people's deputy of Ukraine) (84%);
- ✓ local council member (84%).

In experts' view, military experience would be somewhat less conducive to election to the positions of city or village mayor (74.5%), the Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (67%), and even less to appointment as Prime Minister of Ukraine or as ministers (53%) and judges (43%).

However, experts generally agree that, to varying degrees, the presence of military and combat experience would be a factor contributing to the election or appointment to all of the above-mentioned positions.

Most experts **oppose expanding the list of exceptions to the residency requirement** provided for in the Electoral Code (Articles 75 and 134) by supplementing it with provisions concerning residence outside Ukraine during the period of martial law. Such amendments would allow citizens who were abroad during the war to run for the respective elected positions. Opposition to expanding this list is expressed by 67% of experts with regard to presidential candidates (only 22% support such an expansion), and by 55% with regard to MP candidates (35% support it).

## EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN EXPERT ASSESSMENTS

**The significance of Ukraine's European integration.** All experts agree that Ukraine's European integration contributes to creating the conditions necessary for post-war recovery (100% answered «yes» or «rather yes»). The vast majority also believe that it contributes to strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine (96%); to resisting and countering Russian aggression (94%); to overcoming Ukraine's socio-political and financial-economic problems (90%); and to strengthening Ukraine's position on the international stage (90%).

**Foreign policy priorities.** The importance attached to European integration determines

its priority status among Ukraine's foreign policy objectives. In response to the question, «What should be Ukraine's foreign policy priorities in the post-war period?», most experts identify European integration and securing the conditions necessary for EU accession (98%).

Other foreign policy include integration into NATO with the prospect of membership (84%) and determining the level and format of inter-state relations with foreign countries depending on their attitude to Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine (82%). Only 11% of experts consider the pursuit of a «third path» for Ukraine, involving the acquisition of a neutral (non-aligned) status, to be such a priority.

**Timeframes for accession to the EU and NATO.** Experts are somewhat more cautious than Ukrainian citizens in their assessments of the timeframe for accession to the EU and NATO. While 35% of citizens surveyed by the Razumkov Centre's Sociological Service in November 2025 believe that Ukraine will be able to join the EU within 1-5 years, only 21.5% of experts share this view.

A relative majority of experts (43%) believe that Ukraine will be able to join the EU within 5-10 years (compared to 23% of citizens). 22% of experts and 9% of citizens cite a timeframe of 10-20 years. However, fewer experts than citizens consider that Ukraine will never be able to join the EU (2% and 10%, respectively).

With regard to NATO, 26% of citizens believe that Ukraine will be able to join within 1-5 years, compared to only 12% of experts. Experts consider timeframes of 10-20 years (31%) and 5-10 years (23.5%) to be more realistic (among citizens, the corresponding figures are 11% and 19%). 14% of experts and 19% of surveyed citizens believe that Ukraine will never be able to join NATO.

## KEY FINDINGS

**In assessing the likelihood of various post-war scenarios, a relative majority of experts believe that Ukraine's political system will develop towards restoring the constitutionally defined roles and influence of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers after the war ends.**

Assessing the likelihood of changes in Ukraine's political and social life after the end of the russia-Ukraine war, experts consider the *following developments as the most probable*: newly emerging political parties will resort to social populism; tensions between certain social groups formed as a result of the war will increase; the use of military and mobilisation-related themes in political competition will intensify; new political forces will emerge and gain broad public support; former participants in combat operations will play a significant role in political life; political competition between the current ruling party and competing political forces will intensify markedly; the level of social and wealth stratification in society will increase; interest in social issues will grow significantly within political discourse; pro-russian parties will effectively disappear from the political arena; the issue of Ukraine's geopolitical choice between the «West» and the «East» will disappear from political discourse as a resolved issue; the resumption of the decentralisation process will be slowed; young people will participate more actively in political life.

At the same time, most experts consider it unlikely that authoritarian tendencies will strengthen in the activities of the authorities or in socio-political life, or that the current ruling party will consolidate its monopoly on power.

Assessing the importance of various measures in the post-war period, the vast majority of experts pointed at the *restoration of the constitutionally defined balance between the branches of power*; the resumption of open and public political competition; and the further development and strengthening of democratic processes and civic oversight as the most important steps.

Assessing the likelihood of various scenarios describing the role of veterans in post-war political life, most experts classify the following as high-probability scenarios: veterans establishing one or more political parties; other political parties using war veterans as a «cover» to gain popularity and win elections, without veterans exercising real influence on the policies of these parties; a candidate supported by veterans' organisations winning the future presidential election; veteran-founded parties having a predominantly centre-right and right-wing orientation;

the activities of veteran-founded parties contributing to the democratic development of Ukrainian society and reflecting the interests of the majority of citizens; veteran-founded parties winning the next local and parliamentary elections; war veterans forming a social base for protest movements after the end of the war.

Experts predominantly consider it unlikely that war veterans will have no significant influence in politics after the end of the war


In the experts' view, the *primary objectives of veterans' participation in politics* should consist, above all, in contributing to the strengthening of Ukraine's national security and defence capabilities; countering corruption and introducing new standards of conduct in politics and governance; preventing the authorities from «surrendering» national interests and monitoring its adherence to established «red lines»; and ensuring the social and legal protection for veterans and their families.

All experts agree that *Ukraine's European integration contributes to creating the conditions necessary for post-war recovery*. The vast majority also believe that it contributes to strengthening democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine; to resisting and countering russian aggression; to overcoming Ukraine's socio-political and financial-economic problems; and to strengthening Ukraine's position on the international stage.

This explains why the majority of experts identify European integration and the creation of the necessary conditions for accession to the EU as key priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy in the post-war period.

Other foreign policy include integration into NATO with the prospect of membership and determining the level and format of interstate relations with other countries depending on their attitude to russian aggression and the war in Ukraine.

Experts are somewhat more cautious than Ukrainian citizens in their assessments of the timeframe for accession to the EU and NATO. A relative majority of experts believe that Ukraine will be able to join the EU within 5-10 years. Experts consider timeframes of 10-20 years and 5-10 years to be more realistic with regard to joining NATO.



### WILL THE FOLLOWING CHANGES OCCUR IN UKRAINE'S POLITICAL LIFE AFTER THE END OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR?

% of respondents

	Yes, it will occur	It is highly likely	It is unlikely	It will never happen	Hard to say
Former participants in combat operations will play a significant role in political life	43.1	43.1	11.8	2.0	0.0
The use of military and mobilisation-related themes in political competition will intensify	41.2	49.0	3.9	3.9	2.0
Political competition between the current ruling party and competing political forces will intensify markedly	39.2	43.1	7.8	7.8	2.0
Newly emerging political parties will resort to social populism	37.3	56.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
The level of social and wealth stratification in society will increase	37.3	41.2	17.6	3.9	0.0
Interest in social issues (poverty, corruption, social equality, etc.) will grow significantly within political discourse	33.3	41.2	21.6	0.0	4.0
Tensions between certain social groups formed as a result of the war will increase	33.3	58.8	3.9	3.9	0.0
The issue of Ukraine's geopolitical choice between the "West" and the "East" will disappear from political discourse as a resolved issue	27.5	41.2	13.7	15.7	2.0
New political forces will emerge and gain broad public support	27.5	62.7	5.9	3.9	0.0

<b>WILL THE FOLLOWING CHANGES OCCUR IN UKRAINE'S POLITICAL LIFE AFTER THE END OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR?</b>					
	% of respondents				
	Yes, it will occur	It is highly likely	It is unlikely	It will never happen	Hard to say
Pro-russian parties will effectively disappear from the political arena	19.6	54.9	15.7	9.8	0.0
Public demand for an authoritarian leader, a "strong hand", will increase	15.7	31.4	45.1	5.9	2.0
The role of non-governmental organisations in public life will increase	13.7	41.2	29.4	7.8	7.8
The processes of democratisation of public life will accelerate	11.8	43.1	33.3	3.9	7.8
The role of the state in the economy will increase	11.8	47.1	33.3	0.0	7.8
The influence of right-wing parties within the party system will strengthen	9.8	41.2	31.4	5.9	11.8
The resumption of the decentralisation process will be slowed	9.8	54.9	21.6	7.8	5.9
Authoritarian tendencies in the activities of the authorities and in socio-political life will strengthen	7.8	27.5	33.3	21.6	9.8
Young people will participate more actively in political life	7.8	56.9	25.5	5.9	4.0
The ruling party's monopoly on power will strengthen	3.9	11.8	43.1	37.3	3.9


<b>PLEASE ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD</b>					
	% of respondents				
	Very important	Rather important	Rather unimportant	Not important at all	Hard to say
Restoring the constitutionally defined balance of power and order of interaction between the President, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet	88.2	9.8	2.0	0.0	0.0
Limiting the influence of the Office of the President over other state institutions, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies	78.4	17.6	0.0	2.0	2.0
Restoring open and public political competition between political parties	72.5	23.5	3.9	0.0	0.0
Ensuring equal access to the media for both pro-government and opposition parties	70.6	25.5	2.0	2.0	0.0
Strengthening democratic civilian oversight of the security and defence sector	64.7	23.5	3.9	2.0	5.9
Fully restoring local self-government	62.7	27.5	2.0	3.9	4.0
Removing informal restrictions on criticising the authorities for erroneous decisions, actions and abuses committed before and during the full-scale russian invasion	60.8	25.5	11.8	2.0	0.0
Safeguarding the rights of the opposition in parliament	58.8	31.4	9.8	0.0	0.0



<b>PLEASE ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD</b>					
	% of respondents (continued)				
	Very important	Rather important	Rather unimportant	Not important at all	Hard to say
Terminating the activities of temporary local state bodies established under the Law on Martial Law	54.9	29.4	9.8	2.0	3.9
Giving higher priority to security issues in the activities of state authorities and local self-government bodies	54.9	33.3	7.8	0.0	3.9
Establishing a nationwide system of political education to prepare veterans of the russia-Ukraine war for participation in politics and for work in government and local government bodies	52.9	33.3	11.8	2.0	0.0
Actively engaging veterans of the russia-Ukraine war in political life and in the work of government and local self-government bodies	43.1	47.1	5.9	0.0	3.9
Ensuring that the positions of various categories of Ukrainian citizens are represented in political discourse, including those residing abroad under temporary asylum	25.5	43.1	21.6	9.8	0.0
Electing a candidate with combat experience as President of Ukraine	15.7	33.3	27.5	17.6	5.9

<b>WHAT ROLE ARE WAR VETERANS LIKELY TO PLAY IN POLITICS AFTER THE WAR?</b>					
	% of respondents				
	1-3 points*	4 points*	5-7 points*	Hard to say	Average score
Veterans establishing one or more political parties	13.7	9.8	76.5	0.0	5.4
Other political parties using war veterans as a "cover" to gain popularity and win elections, without veterans exercising real influence on the policies of these parties	17.6	9.8	70.6	2.0	5.3
A candidate supported by veterans' organisations winning the future presidential election	9.8	23.5	60.8	5.9	4.8
Veteran-founded parties having a predominantly centre-right and right-wing orientation	25.5	11.8	58.8	3.9	4.6
Activities of veteran-founded parties contributing to the democratic development of Ukrainian society and reflecting the interests of the majority of citizens	25.5	19.6	54.9	0.0	4.3
Veteran-founded parties winning the next local elections	15.7	29.4	52.9	2.0	4.6
Veteran-founded parties winning the next parliamentary elections	17.6	27.5	51.0	3.9	4.5
War veterans forming a social base for protest movements after the end of the war	23.5	21.6	51.0	3.9	4.4
Veteran-founded parties prioritising the interests of veterans while paying limited attention to the interests of other social groups	43.1	11.8	45.1	0.0	4.1
Veterans having no significant influence in politics after the end of the war	66.7	7.8	19.6	5.9	2.9

\* On a scale from 1 to 7, where «1» means «absolutely unlikely scenario» and «7» means «I am certain this is how it will unfold.»





\* Respondents were asked to select all applicable options.

### HOW MILITARY EXPERIENCE (PARTICIPATION IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR) WOULD FACILITATE A CANDIDATE'S ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT TO PUBLIC OFFICE?

% of respondents

	Strongly facilitate	Rather facilitate	Rather hinder	Strongly hinder	No influence	Hard to say
President of Ukraine	29.4	56.9	0.0	0.0	13.7	0.0
Member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	27.5	56.9	2.0	0.0	13.7	0.0
Local council member	23.5	60.8	5.9	0.0	9.8	0.0
City or village mayor	19.6	54.9	5.9	5.9	13.7	0.0
Prime Minister of Ukraine	17.6	35.3	5.9	0.0	39.2	2.0
Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	15.7	51.0	0.0	0.0	31.4	2.0
Judge	15.7	27.5	5.9	0.0	49.0	2.0





\* Figure does not display the share of respondents who did not answer, as their number is negligible.

