

# **EPP Party Barometer May 2024**

**by Olaf Wientzek** Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

22.05.2024

## Opinion polling for the EP elections and future composition of the EP


the EP)

## Composition of the EP (before the exclusion of the AfD from the ID Group)

Composition of the European Parliament with unchanged political groups (see current situation in brackets)


The projection uses EP election forecasts, where available, but otherwise has to rely on national polls and then weight these taking into account factors relevant to EP elections. The difference to the current size of the parliamentary group is shown in brackets (the enlargement of the EP by 15 seats in the next EP must be taken into account).

- > If we take the current composition of the respective groups as a basis and add the parties that have not only announced their intention to join a party family, but have also initiated it, the following picture would emerge:
  - > The EPP would retain its number of seats and remain the largest force in the EP. In all probability, the number of seats would be between 164 and 192.
  - > The Socialists would lose slightly (without the suspended Smer & Hlas (Slovakia)).
  - > There continues to be a tight race for the 3<sup>rd</sup> place.
  - > The Greens and Renew would lose a significant number of seats.



## Composition of the EP (after the exclusion of the AfD from the ID Group)

- On 21 May, the RN declared that it no longer wanted to sit in the same EP group as the AfD, on 23 May the AfD was excluded from the ID group.
- > This scenario does not take into account a possible broader reconfiguration of the two groups to the right of the EPP.
- > Although the ID Group would be out of the race for third place in the EP without new members, it would still clearly meet the numerical requirements for forming its own group.




## Potential among unaffiliated parties


- > It is likely that some forces that are still non-attached will join various parliamentary groups, and some have already declared their intention to do so.
- > Fidesz is listed as a possible candidate for both the EKR and ID and could decide which group becomes the third largest. Following Fidesz's declaration of intent to join the ECR, it seems more likely that Fidesz will join the ECR. Not included here are possible ECR departures as a result of Fidesz joining (approx. up to 13).
- > The 5-Star Movement (approx. 14 seats) is seen as a potential gain for both the Left and the Greens, although the overlaps with the latter appear to be greater. It is also possible that the 5-Star Movement will remain without a parliamentary group.
- There are several parties that would be compatible with the left-nationalist orientation of the German BSW. However, these parties together would probably not fulfil the requirements for forming a parliamentary group.



- Seats according to current group affiliation incl. probable gains from unaffiliated parties
- incl. possible gains from unaffiliated parties









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• Malta 37.90



## Consequences for the EP & Outcome for the EPP family

#### Consequences for the work of the EP

- The pro-European moderate "centre" of the EP would probably be weaker in relative terms (nevertheless there would still be a clear majority of pro-EU forces). Complex majority formation will likely remain a challenge (with consequences for the selection of the Commission leadership).
- No lasting "coalition" possible without EPP. However, the same probably also applies to the S&D. For the election of Ursula von der Leyen, at least ¾ of the S&D votes would be needed in addition to the EPP and Renew (bearing in mind that dissenting votes are common in all political groups). In addition, either votes from the Greens or a support by some ECR parties would be necessary

#### > EPP outcome

- The EPP would have a secure potential of around 3 additional seats among the non-attached members (the Dutch new party NSC is already firmly included in the EPP group) as well as a possible potential of up to 8 seats (e.g. if TISZA from Hungary were to join the EPP).
- The EPP continues to benefit from the large number of its member parties, particularly in small and mediumsized countries (especially in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe).
- In two large EU countries (France and Italy), the EPP family could achieve around or below 10%.
- The German group would still be the largest national delegation in the EPP group, closely followed by Spain and, at some distance, Poland.
- > The EPP group will probably have MEPs from all EU Member States.

Strength of the EPP family and the strongest single EPP Party in EU member states (opinion polling for national elections)


## Key developments in the reporting period

#### Situation of the EPP family in the EU


- > The EPP family is the strongest political family in polls in 10 countries (in addition, it is on a par with the left in Ireland). the socialist family in 7 (but only if the currently suspended Slovakian parties Smer and Hlas are included). The ID (right-wing fringe) in 4. The liberal Renew is ahead in 2 countries. The Eurosceptic national conservative ECR is ahead in one country. The Left and the EPP are tied in Ireland. In Hungary, Fidesz was ahead (not yet part of a party family) and in Latvia, formally independent parties were ahead.
- > The picture is tighter if you look at the strongest single party and not the largest party family: Then the EPP leads in 9 countries (additionally it is tied with the Left in Ireland), the Socialists in 8 (but only if you include Smer), the ID in 4, the ECR in 3, the Liberals in one country. In Hungary, Fidesz (has announced its intention to join the ECR in the EP) is in the lead. However, the lead over other party families or other individual parties is often very narrow (e.g. Portugal, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania) or other polls see a different party family or individual party (Ireland and Poland) in the lead.


#### **Situation in the European Council**


- > 11 of the 27 Heads of State or Government in the European Council currently belong to the EPP family. If you add the President of Cyprus (formerly a member of an EPP party, now independent, but invited to EPP summits), the EPP has 12 heads of state and government in the European Council.
- > 5 (4) belong to the Social Democrats/Socialists (S&D) (but only if you include Smer/Robert Fico despite his suspension from the PES).
- > 5 heads of state and government belong to the Liberals/Renew. Due to the upcoming change of government in the Netherlands, the number could soon fall to 4.
- > 2 belong to the Eurosceptic conservatives of the ECR.
- > 4 are formally independent, including the Prime Minister of Hungary. If the President of Cyprus is not included (see above), there are only 3 independents.



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








43.10%

16






Malta 41.74% (2027)



Malta 43.10% (2027)



## **Government participation of the EPP family**

21


Prime Minister to the S&D

\*The President of Cyprus does not belong to the EPP partner party DISY but is invited to EPP gatherings Cyprus\*

•Croatia


Slovenia

Bulgaria



Spain

over as Prime Minister



Malta

### **Remarks**

- In Belgium, polls are only conducted at regional level: In order to obtain an adequate result at national level, these individual results were weighted according to the number of eligible voters (voting is compulsory) and the actual voter turnout. This may lead to small deviations. In Belgium, the partner parties CD&V. CSP. CDH only compete regionally. The results in the individual regions are weighted accordingly. The CSP only competes in European elections. In national elections, it is part of the CDH, as the Belgian House of Representatives is composed according to regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) and not according to language communities.
- In several countries, the undecided and non-voters are included in the total (100%) in the polls. the poll results have been extrapolated accordingly. Example: Party A has 13% in the polls. 30% of respondents will not vote. 20% of respondents are undecided. Accordingly, support for party A is given as 26%.
- In Germany, the CDU and CSU are not cited as two separate parties due to the parliamentary grouping and the fact that they are always added together in polls.
- In Poland, the KO is strongly dominated by the PO, even though other smaller parties not belonging to the EPP are also members of the PO. Accordingly, the KO result is counted entirely as an "EPP result". The Third Way is an alliance of PSL and Polska 2050. Only the PSL result is taken into account for the overall result.
- In several countries, parties are part of the EPP group without belonging to the EPP. In some cases, they even belong to a different party family. This applies to CU in the Netherlands, among others. STAN in Czechia. The corresponding results are listed in brackets.
- Some of the parties belonging to the ECR family are right-wing populist or have strong right-wing populist elements. As this is now an established family of parties, parties belonging to it are listed as part of the EKR family and not as "right-wing populist".
- In Czechia, the parties that are part of the EPP group in the EP ran in an electoral alliance with non-EPP parties. The KDU-ČSL and TOP 09 with the ODS (ECR) and STAN (EPP Group) with the Pirates. The values were calculated according to the number of elected MPs of these parties in proportion to the overall result of the alliance and are therefore only approximations. The same applies to two of the EPP member parties in Bulgaria.
- In Hungary, no separate poll results are shown for KDNP (EPP) and Fidesz (no longer part of the EPP since 2021).

### **Sources**

Ipsos (Belgium). Market Links (Bulgaria). Voxmeter (Denmark). Forsa/FG Wahlen (Germany). Norstat (Estonia). Taloustutkimus (Finland). Ifop (France). Pulse/RC od. Metron (Greece). Ipsos & B&A (Ireland). Euromedia (Italy). Ipsos (Croatia). SDKS (Latvia). Spinter tyrimai (Lithuania). Ilres (Luxembourg). Malta Today (Malta). I&O (Netherlands). IFDD (Austria). Ibris (Poland). Intercampus (Portugal). INSCOP (Romania). Novus (Sweden). Focus (Slovakia). Mediana (Slovenia). NC Report (Spain). Median (Czechia). Publicus (Hungary). Sigma (Cyprus)

## **Impressum**

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