



**Making Global Gateway Work:
Reflections on the Impact so far
and the Future of the Initiative
Towards the Indo-Pacific**

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Biographies

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Olimpia Kot is Senior Project Coordinator of the Taiwan Office of the European Values Center for Security Policy. For the past seven years, Olimpia worked in Polish Office in Taipei. Her core responsibilities concentrated over public and cultural diplomacy projects. During her successful career in POT Olimpia organized and supervised dozens of public and cultural events. Her previous academic background is affiliated to work as a research assistant at Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Olimpia studied Sinology at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and earned a master's degree. At the moment she is a PHD candidate at Institute of Anthropology, National Tsing Hua University. Olimpia speaks Polish (native), English and Chinese (both at full professional working level).

Jacob Mardell is a Berlin-based China analyst whose research focuses on China's global economic footprint, the BRI, EU-China relations, and China's South-South diplomacy. He has conducted field research in dozens of Belt and Road countries and writes regularly about the initiative, contributing analysis to publications such as Politico, Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, and the Royal United Service Institute. Jacob is a Senior Fellow at the UK-based think tank Sinification, which tracks, translates and analyses key debates shaping thought and policy in China. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow for Global Realignment at the China Global South Project. Prior to these roles, Jacob worked as an analyst at the Mercator Institute of China Studies in Berlin.

Foreword

Hildegard Bentele MEP

The Global Gateway initiative has been set up as a strategic and overdue response to the new global landscape and rising geopolitical competition. With China securing global supply chains to support its burgeoning economy, the United States withdrawing from the global fight against poverty and climate change, and Russia alongside its affiliates disseminating weapons, disinformation, unrest, autocracy, and military rule, the European Union has an opportunity to assert and expand its global presence. It is not only strategic, but also essential for the future of the EU economy to enhance its outreach by fostering international partnerships and securing access to critical markets, products, and resources.

Yet, the Global Gateway initiative is still grounded in the EU's treaty obligations like poverty reduction and in its international commitments like achieving the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. At its core, Global Gateway aims to advance sustainable development through partnerships that deliver mutual benefits. It goes beyond funding infrastructure, services or supporting supply chains, focusing instead on fostering meaningful, enduring collaborations. Anchored in transparency, accountability, and respect for partner ownership, the EU seeks to position itself as a reliable and principled global actor, shaping a safer and more prosperous future globally.

Compared to conventional forms of development aid, Global Gateway's new element is its strong focus on including the private sector and new areas like digital connectivity, with the goal of emphasizing job creation. The success of Global Gateway therefore depends on robust cooperation between EU institutions, member states, development partners, and private enterprises. While European institutions provide essential support and coordination, the initiative's impact ultimately relies on actors operating at the local level. To facilitate private sector involvement, the EU deploys targeted guarantees, technical and political assistance to reduce investment risks and increase accessibility to underserved markets. Integrated into other EU strategic

policies and the already established “Team Europe”, Global Gateway has the potential to emerge as a new, more effective foreign policy tool, providing new opportunities for European companies as well.

Four years after its inception, Global Gateway needs a first reality check. Topics that need to be tackled include governance, the speed of decision-making, the current state of the desired enhanced business sector involvement, the number of investments made and jobs created as well as the prioritisation of projects. Global Gateway is certainly not a “one size fits all” approach and cannot be compared to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which mainly centres on state and state-owned company activities. Global Gateway thrives on the smart and smooth combination of the EU’s soft and hard power and its economy. Partners, not seldom from Asia, have emphasized that technical assistance and changes to the economic framework conditions under which they are operating, such as trade agreements, regional economic integration, and access to the European internal market, are crucial for them and their future engagement with the EU. This means that public funds will continue to play an important role, but they could be linked more directly to European business activities.

Asia remains a key region for the EU, reflecting our values and commitment in an ever-changing world order. The Asian continent exemplifies both the progress that can be achieved through development partnerships and the potential that still lies ahead. The region has experienced growth in several areas, including the economy, population, and human development. In 1990, 15 countries were classified as low-income, but today, only two remain. The EU recognizes this tremendous economic and social progress and intends to unlock the region’s future potential jointly with partners and the private sector through Global Gateway and Team Europe.

Today, the EU supports a wide range of initiatives - from renewable energy production in Bangladesh to port expansion in Kiribati - reflecting our diverse interests and commitment to supporting local ownership and adapting to local needs. Involving governments, civil society, and the private sector - especially small and medium-sized enterprises - promotes self-reliance in both the EU and partner countries. This is especially vital in Asia, a region marked by dynamic growth, vast diversity, and openness to innovation. Given

China's influence and dominance in Asia, the EU should therefore adapt its strategies smartly, seek out like-minded regional partners, like Australia or Japan, and give them access to the coordination and toolbox under Global Gateway and Team Europe.

Introduction

Olaf Wientzek, Louis Bout and Sven Nicolay

When the European Union launched the Global Gateway in 2021, it set out not only to mobilise investment but to redefine how Europe engages with the world. In an era of intensifying geopolitical competition, infrastructure has become a vector of influence, and connectivity a measure of strategic relevance. The initiative was conceived as Europe's response to a global landscape increasingly shaped by China's Belt and Road Initiative, America's selective retrenchment, and Russia's disruptive activities across regions. But it was also a statement of intent: that the EU can act strategically without abandoning its principles of partnership, transparency, and sustainability.

As Hildegard Bentele MEP notes in her foreword, Global Gateway represents more than an infrastructure initiative. It is the EU's attempt to fuse development cooperation with geopolitical strategy and to turn normative power into strategic presence. This dual ambition is both the initiative's strength and one of its greatest challenges. Four years after its inception, Global Gateway is on the one hand still defining its operational identity and on the other hand struggling for visibility and a consistent narrative: between aspiration and implementation, between policy design in Brussels and impact in partner countries.

This compendium consists of three policy-oriented summaries of longer publications, that can be read in their entirety on the website of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and examine this trajectory from complementary angles. Global Gateway is also a test of how the Union's strategic ambitions can be matched with its financial instruments. It draws on resources under NDICI–Global Europe and aims to mobilize investments worth 300 billion Euros until 2027, by leveraging private investments, reflecting an effort to turn the EU's budget for its global partnerships into a geoeconomic and geopolitical tool rather than a mere instrument of development cooperation. In this sense, the initiative's effectiveness depends not only on political vision, but on how flexibly and coherently the EU can use the means already at its disposal. The objective of this compendium is not to provide a comprehensive and conclusive

assessment of the Global Gateway Initiative but rather to highlight both some of the problems the initiative has faced in its implementation on the ground as well as highlighting opportunities for improvement in the future.

The first article, *Less Paperwork, Greater Presence: Why Global Gateway Disappoints on the Ground*, begins where the initiative's credibility is decided: in implementation. Drawing on insights from practitioners and local partners, it highlights the gap that still exists between ambition and delivery. Slow decision-making, and limited visibility have weakened the EU's ability to demonstrate results in partner countries. The author, Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, calls for a more agile approach, simplifies coordination, and links financing more directly to outcomes and private investment. The message is clear: Europe's strategic presence will only be as strong as its ability to deliver on the ground.

Building on this, the second contribution, *Chasing Convergence: The EU's Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and Implementation of the Global Gateway Initiative*, looks outward to the region where Global Gateway's potential is most visible. The Indo-Pacific offers both vast opportunities and intense competition. The authors, Olimpia Kot and Marcin Mateusz Jerzewski, show in their article how the EU's approach to "partnerships of equals" resonates in a region that values sovereignty and diversification, while also revealing the limits of Europe's coordination and speed. The article shows how Global Gateway can serve as a platform for cooperation with like-minded states such as Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan. The article outlines different forms for future engagement, acknowledging the different priorities and strategies the EU's partners are pursuing in their development or partnership policies towards this region.

The final article, *Lessons from China's Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Pathways for the EU's Global Gateway*, places these questions in a wider strategic context. It looks at what Europe can take away from more than a decade of Chinese infrastructure diplomacy, which blended speed and visibility with strong state direction and the backing of powerful public enterprises. That approach brought clear geopolitical returns for China, but it also left a political and economic legacy in many partner countries. While

the Global Gateway and the BRI mirror different political and economic contexts, and while the aim is not to emulate the Chinese model, this article will identify some lessons the Global Gateway should take away from the BRI. The article outlines. One issue highlighted by all three articles is the need for a better branding and visibility of the initiative.

Taken together, these three contributions, form a logical progression. They begin with the operational challenges that determine Global Gateway's credibility, move to its application in one of the world's most dynamic regions, and conclude with reflections on the global competition for influence that gives the initiative its strategic significance. The path from implementation to geopolitics mirrors the broader task facing the EU: to make its tools work efficiently, to apply them where they matter most, and to ensure that they advance a coherent vision of Europe's role in the world.

The success of Global Gateway will depend on Europe's ability to deliver strategically, visibly, and credibly. Its strength lies in combining regulatory expertise, financial capacity, and the innovation of private enterprise within a coherent strategic vision. Achieving this will require a genuine Team Europe approach that brings together EU institutions, member states, development banks, and – more than it has been done in the first years - the business community in pursuit of a shared strategic purpose. The announcement made by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the second Global Gateway Forum on 9 October, to create a Global Gateway Investment Hub so companies can suggest investments themselves is a promising step in that direction.

Ultimately, Global Gateway is about Europe's capacity to act as a meaningful global partner: one that links values with interests and translates its ambitions into lasting partnerships. The following pages aim to contribute to a fact-based, forward-looking debate and invite the reader to reflect on where Global Gateway stands today and how the potential of this initiative can be harnessed better in the future. One issue highlighted by all three articles is the need for a better branding and visibility of the initiative.

Less Paperwork, Greater Presence. Why Global Gateway Disappoints on the Ground. Insights from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy

The big picture

With the emergence of a multipolar world, connectivity has taken a geopolitical turn, forcing countries to position themselves more strategically. The US-China geostrategic rivalry has intensified under China's Xi Jinping in power since 2012. The return of Donald Trump as US president in early 2025 has ushered in a new era of transactional diplomacy. Trump's rollback of multilateral commitments is distorting intricate global supply chains and eroding economic cooperation.

In this new reality the European Union (EU) is seeking to become more geopolitical and in 2021 it launched the Global Gateway. Designed as a tool to strengthen the bloc's ability to contribute to regional and local needs, the Global Gateway committed to deliver on high-quality, safe and sustainable projects. By mobilizing up to EUR300 billion of public- and private-sector investments by 2027, the EU promised to provide "trusted connectivity" by bringing together the EU and member states with their financial and development institutions.

The big challenge

The EU and Southeast Asia (ASEAN) are both seeking to strengthen their agency, interested in securing a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. As a major global economic force, ASEAN matters to Europe. Notwithstanding enhanced alignment in economic interests, political sensitivities persist, visible in divergent foreign policy positions. ASEAN countries want options that empower them to drive their own connectivity. In response, competing alternatives have emerged. China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the US, and the EU have all claimed to provide not just more, but better options.

The EU is among ASEAN countries' preferred partners. ASEAN exudes a strategic value for the EU that it cannot ignore. In local perceptions however, Global Gateway is poorly understood. Although on paper its goals have been clearly articulated, in practice it is often projected as a response to geostrategic competition, rather than a strategy to empower. Given the EU's mixed track record, which has at times raised questions about its credibility, the tool is often dismissed as "paperwork". In local perceptions the EU continues to overpromise and underdeliver. This is the reality on the ground that the EU has yet to learn to work with, and start seeing the region on its own merit, rather than through a China lens. With an assessment of perceptions in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, this study urges the EU to adjust to local realities.

EU and ASEAN, actors in their own right

ASEAN is becoming a next-generation economic hub, supported by growing innovation capacity and digitalization, while seeking to reshape its role in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, ASEAN is more than a market, projecting itself as a stable bloc despite internal divisions, with strategic potential to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. As the EU and ASEAN are both seeking to position themselves, their response to the US-China rivalry matters just as much as the rivalry itself.

Both regions are investing in understanding their own vulnerabilities, and are seeking the best possible conditions for growth and resilience. The EU and ASEAN are highly exposed to the US-China rivalry, risking derailed growth and further instability. Washington and Beijing have both considered, and often treated, the EU and ASEAN as factors in the race for global leadership. They have also both accused one another of seeking regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, first and foremost the EU and ASEAN are actors in their own right, two internally integrated regions, albeit with different degrees of integration. They share the interest to thrive, not just survive global uncertainty.

Shared interests

A key Indo-Pacific partner, ASEAN has a crucial geopolitical position along vital sea routes between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the west,

and the South and East China Seas to the east. The EU's economy is deeply intertwined with ASEAN through trade, investment and supply chains. Indonesia is the largest economy in the region (35 percent of the total ASEAN GDP), the EU's fifth-largest trading partner in ASEAN. Malaysia recorded the highest GDP growth among ASEAN countries in 2023 with 8.7 percent, having emerged as a major target for business growth in semiconductors. The Philippines is the fifth largest economy in ASEAN based on GDP, pursuing a twin transition of digital and green initiatives, a shared ambition with the EU.

Yet, without a stable region through effective regional cooperation, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines will not be able to thrive as economic players and partners. The Southeast Asian regional security context is complex and has shaped connectivity considerations in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Manila in different ways. China's coercive actions against the Philippines have worried both Indonesia and Malaysia, fearing the potential impact on shipping lanes if tensions were to morph into open conflict. Unlike Indonesia and Malaysia, the Philippines has opted for overt security alignments. As such, the EU-Philippines Defense and Security Dialogue established in 2025 aims to foster security and defence exchanges. Nonetheless, economic linkages with China remain strong for all three, with Manila showing the most evident strategic caution towards China.

Different realities on the ground

The three Southeast Asian countries approach great power rivalry in different ways and have entertained different relations with Beijing, Washington, and the EU. Their strategic balancing abilities also diverge, hence the value of exploring how priorities and perceptions of the Global Gateway play out on the ground. All three believe in their right to shape their own development path and choose their connectivity partners, without choosing sides. The fear of becoming instruments of competing powers has bound them together. For ASEAN therefore, connectivity is not only an instrument for economic empowerment, but also a tool to hedge against uncertainty.

Priorities diverge, within ASEAN on one hand, and between the EU and ASEAN on the other. While its relations with the three countries vary, the EU has pursued the same ambition, namely to secure trade agreements and

trust-based political relations. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr national security considerations are shaping Manila's security posture. Indonesia, under President Prabowo Subianto, and Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, see connectivity primarily through the lens of economic development and the ambition to move up the global value chain. All three balance between great powers and want connectivity options. To effectively promote the Global Gateway in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, the EU must understand where individual priorities lie and where these diverge. The EU must therefore engage all three countries with offers that others cannot make.

Managing complexities

The complexity of the EU with its multi-layered governance structure has led to confusion in ASEAN about how Global Gateway actually works. "Where do member states' projects end, and where does an EU project start?", some have asked. Finding up-to-date and consistent information on the Global Gateway is hard, they noted, while information is fragmented, and lacks accuracy and transparency. The Global Gateway has a highly complex structure, and lacks an effective governance model, which has undermined efforts to communicate the instrument externally.

Adding to the complexity, the China factor has continued to play a central role in communication, shaping how the tool is perceived on the ground. Given the EU's critical dependencies, China has taken centre stage in the bloc's efforts to de-risk and adjust to a new geopolitical reality. In this process, the EU has often projected the Global Gateway as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), alienating stakeholders on the ground. A significant problem persists in how the EU projects itself and how it is therefore perceived abroad. Views on the ground in ASEAN suggest that a geostrategic shift didn't happen in practice, but has remained in narrative only. The Global Gateway is a victim of this perception.

"Stop seeing China everywhere". Views in Indonesia

Indonesia wants a connectivity partner that is "present and visible". Therefore, the absence of regular high-level EU visits to the country is

regrettable, interpreted as “lack of respect”, and a failure to recognize Indonesia’s regional significance. In Jakarta, some suggested that it would help the EU’s credibility if it started to “underpromise and overdeliver”. The EU should invest time to understand Indonesia and build relations first, before talking about regulations. Despite the geographical distance, the two sides can develop mechanisms to bridge the gap, and the Global Gateway can be the right tool. If the EU wants to work with Indonesia, it must see Indonesia first, not the region, and not China. The problem is that the EU “can’t see Indonesia because of China”. Nonetheless, with the EU-Indonesia free trade negotiations concluded in September, a new chapter in bilateral trade relations is likely to open, facilitating a more strategic engagement amid growing global uncertainty. This could further support jointly negotiated Global Gateway projects in the field of renewable energy, clean tech, digital trade, telecommunications, raw materials and more.

Malaysia, “open to all options”

Malaysia seeks to shape its regional role while managing ties with China. Kuala Lumpur wants to move up the value chain and wants options. The EU is among its preferred partners; it has “good economic reputation” in the country, and can bring a lot, namely engineering know-how, expertise in vocational training, and advanced technology in areas such as energy, climate change and environment, as well as research and innovation. Malaysia values European companies’ commitment; they come, invest in talent, in particular German companies, and they stay long-term, vs. Chinese companies that are often project-driven, short-term and therefore not sustainable. Yet, the EU’s “political reputation” tells a different a story. The way the EU has promoted the Global Gateway, namely through the China lens, “should be corrected”. It’s therefore easier to work with individual companies and member states, rather than the EU.

EU-Philippines, like-minded partners

Democracy and rule of law are concepts that resonate well with the people of the Philippines, many in Manila stressed. The EU can communicate these values well and should keep them central to its engagement. Despite its “low visibility”, the EU has a good image in the country, unlike China. Still,

there is skepticism about how much the Global Gateway can achieve. Conversations in Manila confirmed enthusiasm for closer cooperation in green and digital transition, aligned with the EU's agenda. Yet, given the delays that come with EU projects, questions remain concerning concrete benefits the EU can bring, linked to the EU's credibility to deliver, while member states enjoy higher visibility and credibility. To improve, some stressed the value of cultural diplomacy, through initiatives such as the annual EU film festival and the European Higher Education Fair.

Policy recommendations

The Global Gateway offers the opportunity to demonstrate that the EU sees ASEAN as a partner. To ensure its effectiveness, the EU must adjust to the different realities on the ground, in line with the following recommendations:

1. Invest in clear and consistent communication.

With several EU institutions and actors involved, communication on the Global Gateway remains fragmented. Better managing the complex distribution of responsibilities can be addressed through a dedicated coordination mechanism in charge of communication and stakeholder management. This must ensure regular and accessible updates on projects and facilitate engagement with the instrument. The Commission, as the lead EU institution driving the instrument, must lead discussions on how to improve communication, and ensure it is clear on the goals the Global Gateway pursues, and transparent on the process it entails.

2. Presence matters. Invest in visibility.

ASEAN countries see the EU as complex, bureaucratic and difficult to work with, and prefer working with member states. Without addressing the visibility deficit, it will remain difficult to improve interest in exploring joint projects. Building on regular high-level bilateral dialogues, and in line with the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-EU Strategic Partnership (2023-2027), the Commission, in coordination with the EEAS, should commit to regular high-level visits to improve visibility and demonstrate commitment to addressing local connectivity needs. This will help project the EU as an honest and consistent bloc.

3. Make Global Gateway inclusive on the ground.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines want to secure their connectivity in ways that may diverge. The European business community and their local partners have accumulated valuable knowledge on the ground. Yet, there is no system in place to guide local business actors, including the European Chambers of Commerce, to systematically engage with and contribute to the Commission's work when they explore, design and develop Global Gateway projects. The Commission must get more inclusive and engage business actors on the ground. This would empower EU institutions to benefit from expertise they often lack. Engaging with actors with deep understanding of local needs will also empower ASEAN countries to shape their own future.

This is an abridged version – for the more detailed version (including references), please refer to the original paper through the QR-Code below:



Chasing Convergence: The EU's Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and Implementation of the Global Gateway Initiative

Marcin Jerzewski & Olimpia Kot

As the flagship connectivity and infrastructure investment strategy of the European Union, the Global Gateway (GG) initiative does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it demonstrates that the EU is reevaluating its existing model of infrastructure and connectivity cooperation to a more novel, horizontal blueprint for partnerships in which beneficiaries “want to be more than subjects of aid.” This approach has already been embraced by numerous development partners, including China — the EU’s multifaceted interlocutor: a partner, competitor, and systemic rival — and its like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies, such as Japan and Australia. Consequently, the primary objective of this study is to encourage the EU to “chase convergence”: identify actionable spaces for cooperation in the implementation of GG projects in the Indo-Pacific region with partners who have robust networks and experience in development partnerships, and whose strategic interests align with those of the EU.

Specifically, we examined opportunities for cooperation with five partners – Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, and Taiwan – based on the relevance of these entities to the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and their potential for deepening cooperation with the EU under the GG. The present level of their engagement in GG implementation, as well as policy recommendations to increase such result-oriented interactions, is classified using a three-level typology of partnerships. Firstly, we propose **consolidation** of the existing cooperation with Japan; secondly, we recommend continued **formation** of partnerships with Korea, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand; and lastly, we advocate for **ductility** in cooperation with Taiwan. Collectively, these pathways should provide the EU with the means to accelerate the transition of GG from a mere brand

to an actionable platform for supporting co-financed projects, which in turn could meaningfully substantiate the initiative's credibility.

Among these actors, **Japan** stands as the most advanced case of institutionalized connectivity cooperation. The EU–Japan Connectivity Partnership (2019) provides a formal framework for collaboration across energy, transport, digital, and people-to-people connectivity. At the country level, the 2022 National Security Strategy, reinforced by the 2023 Development Cooperation Charter, firmly embedded official development assistance (ODA) within Japan's strategic, human security–oriented framework of its middle–power diplomacy. This demonstrates alignment in strategic thinking behind the incumbent model of Japanese development cooperation and that underpinning the GG – the guiding imperative is to adjust the course of global development cooperation by centering strategic interests and catalyzing commercial investments. Initiatives such as the Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Connectivity Initiative and its efforts to disseminate the notion of “quality infrastructure” exemplify the principles of transparency, sustainability, and proactive engagement of on-the-ground partners shared with the GG. Concurrently, Japan International Cooperation Agency's (JICA) projects like Vietnam's Bắc Ái hydropower facility and the upgrading of Fiji's Nadi Airport illustrate Japan's capacity to pair infrastructure provision with efforts to boost regulatory reform and resilience, reflecting the EU's own “360-degree approach.” Yet, EU–Japan cooperation remains fragmented, and institutionalized pipelines and joint delivery mechanisms need to be established if Brussels and Tokyo are to move beyond ad hoc coordination.

The existing cooperation frameworks between the EU and the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand present significant but currently underutilized opportunities for cooperation.

The **ROK's** approach to development cooperation is guided by the Mid-Term Sectoral Strategy of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which manages ODA grants. The document highlights twelve priority goals, including global health, humanitarian aid, the Green New Deal, diversified financing, and civil society engagement. ODA is aligned with Korea's foreign policy, notably its Indo-Pacific Strategy. At the same time, Seoul's Indo-

Pacific Strategy places strong emphasis on digital connectivity, regional integration, and ASEAN engagement—core priorities also present in the GG initiative. The country’s comparative strengths lie in digital innovation, smart infrastructure, and climate adaptation. Still, its limited experience with blended finance and private-sector mobilization may constrain the scope of large-scale joint ventures.

Australia’s 2023 International Development Policy emphasizes transparency, local ownership, and climate resilience, with particular attention to digital connectivity through submarine cables and data governance. While not overtly confrontational, the policy implicitly frames Australia’s cooperation as a normative alternative to China’s BRI, foregrounding transparency, sustainability, and respect for sovereignty. This emphasis resonates strongly with GG priorities. Canberra has adopted tailored partnership plans with several countries, including Vietnam and Fiji, emphasizing country-led priorities and locally embedded delivery. In Vietnam (2025–2030), support centers on digital transformation, infrastructure financing, and climate adaptation. In Fiji (2024–2028), the focus is on inclusive recovery, climate resilience, and transparent governance. These initiatives, implemented through local governments and trusted partners, highlight Australia’s commitment to long-term, flexible cooperation that aligns with the modus operandi of the GG initiative.

Aotearoa New Zealand, though a comparatively small development partner, commands considerable trust in the Pacific. With its pragmatic approach guided by the country’s priorities of security, prosperity, and sustainability, as expressed in Strategic Intentions 2024-2028 and the strategic review of New Zealand’s international context to 2035, it allocates 60 percent of its development assistance to this region. Its focus on climate adaptation, Pacific regionalism, and community-based delivery reflects principles of sustainability and inclusivity that are also central to the GG. Its officials stress that infrastructure and connectivity initiatives must align with the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent; implementation should be driven by high-level, multistakeholder political engagement to ensure Pacific partners’

priorities are understood. Reflecting this approach, a substantial share of resources is directed toward adaptation, the region’s foremost priority.

Despite the lack of formal relations with **Taiwan**, the EU sees the island democracy as a “like-minded partner,” sharing core values and interests. Notably, this notion of “like-mindedness” extends to the long-standing shared commitment to the provision of global public goods, including through ODA. Taiwan sent its first technical mission to the Republic of Vietnam in 1959. It promotes a society-centered model of development, with its New Southbound Policy serving as a de facto connectivity framework. Additionally, its 2023 White Paper on International Cooperation and Development Policies outlines a three-pronged approach to managing Taiwan’s technical missions: aligning with local needs, leveraging synergies with Taiwan’s industry strengths, and facilitating technology. Its informal economic relations, educational exchanges, people-to-people ties, subnational diplomacy, and foreign assistance have become vital tools in its foreign policy. Its strengths in digital governance, health, and regulatory standards complement GG priorities, while the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) enables it to overcome its international isolation by sharing its strengths and expertise in addressing global concerns. The European Parliament has already called for exploring areas of convergence between the GG and Taiwan’s NSP. Pragmatic, low-visibility cooperation—such as expanding healthcare digitalization in the Pacific—could offer tangible benefits while mitigating political sensitivities.

Together, these findings highlight a pressing need to translate strategic alignment into practical cooperation. The following policy recommendations outline how the EU can deepen and operationalize partnerships with key Indo-Pacific actors.

Consolidation: Deepening the EU–Japan Partnership

To realize the full potential of the EU–Japan Connectivity Partnership, we recommend formalizing a structured, high-level operational platform to jointly manage pipelines of GG-flagged projects in third countries, beginning with existing cases such as the Bắc Ái hydropower project in Vietnam. This platform should bring together key stakeholders—including

JICA, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and relevant EU directorates and ministries—to coordinate on co-financing arrangements, regulatory alignment, and recipient-country engagement. In parallel, the EU and Japan should co-develop joint co-investment and branding guidelines for all GG initiatives including the participation of JICA. Establishing clear visibility protocols, shared branding criteria, and a recognizable “quality infrastructure” label (akin to the Blue Dot Network) will enhance attribution, reinforce a commitment to transparency, and communicate shared values to stakeholders and beneficiaries. Finally, operationalizing and expanding co-financing mechanisms between EIB and JICA—through technical assistance funds for project preparation, sector-specific pipelines (notably in climate, transport, and digital connectivity), and shared impact metrics—will help scale up effective, values-based investment and further institutionalize this strategic partnership.

Formation: Institutionalizing Cooperation with South Korea, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand

We advocate for a common approach to advancing partnerships with South Korea, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand, involving the establishment of dedicated, institutionalized dialogues on connectivity and digital infrastructure that move beyond ad hoc collaboration. With each of these partners, capacity-building, knowledge exchange, and structured cooperation mechanisms will be key to realizing more impactful and scalable outcomes while leveraging each partner’s unique strengths.

For the **Republic of Korea**, the next step is to launch a high-level, dedicated dialogue focused on connectivity and digital infrastructure. This platform would build upon existing cooperation but anchor Seoul more firmly in GG-aligned activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Crucially, to close the gap between Korea’s emerging commitments and operational capacity in blended finance and public-private partnerships, the EU should invest in targeted capacity-building: facilitating technical exchanges, sharing best practices in de-risking mechanisms, and supporting joint feasibility studies in priority regions.

For **Australia**, we advocate initiating a formal feasibility assessment for an EU-Australia Connectivity Partnership, aligning with Canberra's growing investment in submarine cable infrastructure and regional digital hubs. Such a partnership would allow both actors to map out strategic overlaps in digital infrastructure, coordinate procurement standards and data governance, and pursue joint engagement in regional digital forums. In addition, the recently signed EU-Australia memorandum of understanding on critical minerals provides an opportunity to develop a concrete GG-branded roadmap for co-investment in sustainable mining, processing, and transport infrastructure, with explicit visibility and support for value chain resilience.

In the case of **Aotearoa New Zealand**, the report recommends deepening dialogue platforms focused on digital connectivity and infrastructure governance, with a special emphasis on aligning regulatory standards and leveraging the country's unique strengths as a trusted partner in the Pacific. Structured exchanges between EU and New Zealand officials—on Pacific cultural protocols, governance, and community-led approaches—should underpin joint scoping missions, feasibility studies, and capacity-building efforts for resilient, high-impact infrastructure in the region. Multi-stakeholder engagement that respects customary leadership structures will be essential to ensuring the legitimacy and sustainability of such initiatives.

Ductility: Flexible, Pragmatic Cooperation with Taiwan

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the EU should adopt a pragmatic and flexible approach to engagement with Taiwan, leveraging its strengths as a like-minded, high-capacity development partner. Regular, institutionalized consultations on connectivity and development would help formalize cooperation, whether through a new dedicated platform or greater EU involvement in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). Both sides should prioritize the transparent exchange of project data and visibility in third countries, especially in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and consider inviting Taiwan as an observer to EU-hosted GG roundtables, in line with established practices in other domains. Additionally, targeted matchmaking between Taiwanese ICT providers and European DFIs or implementing agencies can unlock new co-investment

opportunities, while existing dialogue platforms—such as the EU–Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue and Digital Economy Dialogue—can be leveraged to align strategic priorities on secure digital supply chains, connectivity standards, and digital literacy. This approach will allow the EU and Taiwan to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in a low-profile, politically feasible manner, consistent with the EU’s one-China policy.

This is an abridged version – for the more detailed version (including references), please refer to the original paper through the QR-Code below:



Lessons from China's Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Pathways for the EU's Global Gateway

Jacob Mardell

With a flood of easily accessible loans tied to Chinese firms, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) challenged the norms of the Western-led development finance model and offered an alternative to established heavyweights like the EU.

Global Gateway (GG) was launched in 2021 as part of a wider European course correction responding to China's rise. It is not explicitly (or at least not consistently) branded as a counter to the BRI, but the very existence of a new EU connectivity strategy implies that there is something in China's approach worth responding to.

This paper interrogates that assumption, exploring the BRI with a view to determining what, if anything, the EU might learn from China. Section one provides a brief discussion of what the BRI really means; section two assesses the initiative's successes and shortcomings; section three outlines the broad thematic lessons GG might draw from the BRI; and section four concludes with more specific recommendations.

Section one: The BRI is everything, everywhere, and above all flexible

It has been over ten years since China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was first introduced in September 2013, but defining the initiative remains difficult.

Beijing has never set criteria for what constitutes a BRI project and "joining" the BRI is as simple as signing a non-binding cooperation agreement. Although the initiative has traditionally been infrastructure focused, "film festivals," "nuclear power," and "e-commerce services," are also officially part of the BRI.

The amorphous shape of the BRI is a design feature. Leaving it open makes the BRI adaptable and allows it to dovetail with the priorities of different Chinese and host country actors.

On the ground, Chinese and local actors have considerable autonomy to implement BRI projects. State-to-state level discussions remain crucial and Beijing has the ability to intervene if it so chooses, but the BRI is more often than not ad-hoc and transactional rather than strategically coordinated.

Relative to the EU's development approach, the BRI is strongly characterised by laissez-faire governance. This lack of oversight is partly a limitation of Chinese institutions, but it is also a feature of Beijing's approach, which emphasises respect for sovereignty, equality, and providing aid without conditionality.

Chinese institutions abide by the "host country principle," meaning that they follow the standards of the host country rather than imposing their own. This approach has brought benefits, but it has also created an "accountability deficit" that is responsible for the initiative's main shortcomings.

Because it is so ill-defined, putting a price tag on the BRI is highly subjective. For the years 2014-2021, William & Mary's AidData lab lists \$724 billion in official finance from China to BRI countries.

The vast majority of this finance from China is not considered concessional and much of it is tied to the procurement of goods or services from China. Under this "tied-loan" model, a project will be financed by a Chinese policy bank on the condition that a Chinese company implements the project. China's state insurer, Sinosure, also plays an important role insuring projects.

If the BRI can be said to have one overarching policy goal, it is the expansion of Global China Inc., i.e. the intertwined power and interests of the Chinese state and its firms.

This was already the driving logic behind China's "Going Out" policy, a turn of the century strategy that is considered a precursor to the BRI. At its launch, the BRI also sought to utilize unproductive foreign exchange reserves and excess construction overcapacity, channeling dollars into policy bank loans and subsidising Chinese firms overseas. As with "Going Out," this was a policy that predates the BRI's launch in 2013.

The BRI's innovation lay in connecting these drivers to a broader narrative of Chinese global leadership. Evoking bygone glory days and the "Silk Road

Spirit,” it was an offer to the world of Chinese-led growth, sold on the back of China’s own economic success.

In reality, the BRI is highly transactional and centered around Chinese interests, but it is pitched as a “global public good” – an offer of Chinese-led development, particularly to what China refers to as the “Global South.”

Finally, it is worth noting that the BRI is a fast-moving target.

Since a peak in 2016, policy bank loans have declined dramatically, leading some to pronounce the BRI’s demise. But while it is true that Beijing is making fewer large loans, the BRI’s impact is still significant when measured in terms of trade statistics, greenfield investment, construction contracts, and the proliferation of Chinese technological standards.

Likewise, though it has been joined by several new initiatives – most recently, China’s new “Global Governance Initiative” – the BRI remains an important policy slogan.

BRI 2.0 simply has a different emphasis, on green and digital dimensions, improved risk management mechanisms, and openness to new forms of financing. Enabled by its all-encompassing nature, the initiative is constantly evolving.

Section Two: Over the Past Ten Years, the BRI has...

2.1 – Increased China’s visibility, for better and for worse

Policymakers across the world recognise the Belt and Road, even if they still struggle to define it. Especially in Africa, the BRI narrative has been broadly well received, high-profile projects providing tangible support to Beijing’s claim that it is a leader of the “Global South.”

At the same time, the BRI’s visibility has courted scrutiny from the West, providing a focal point for concerns about China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy.

2.2 – Created a sense of partnership and host country agency

Respondents in developing countries contrast the BRI with a Western development approach, which they criticise as paternalistic and overly prescriptive in comparison to the BRI.

The BRI does come with strings attached – political and commercial – but these conditions are openly self-serving, rather than rooted in prescribed principles.

Beijing claims to help partners in treading a “development path” suited to their “national conditions,” and it places a great deal of emphasis on “docking” the BRI with national initiatives.

2.3 – Provided fast, accessible infrastructure

China has served as both a lender of last resort, due to its lack of conditionality, and as a first option financier, due to its speed of delivery.

On the one hand, risk-tolerant Chinese institutions have stepped in to fund projects deemed too risky by other financial institutions. This behaviour is mirrored by Chinese firms, which, due to their late internationalisation, intense domestic competition, and state support, are more risk tolerant than Western counterparts. More flexibility and fewer requirements on the Chinese side also lower barriers to access for host governments with constrained capacity.

At other times partnership with China is preferred due to its ability to deliver projects quickly at a low initial cost. China’s speed of delivery is especially appreciated in democratic countries where politicians seek to complete projects within election cycles.

2.4 – Suffered from an accountability deficit

Both the accessibility and agency host countries associate with the BRI are related to China’s laissez-faire governance. However, the same approach has led to an accountability deficit that is responsible for the debt burdens, corruption, delay, and environmental hazards associated with some BRI projects.

While the “debt-trap diplomacy” critiques of the BRI have been thoroughly debunked, concerns about environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are more valid.

Beijing defaults to host-country standards, meaning that in countries with poor governance, BRI capital is liable to make matters worse. A lack of accountability in such countries is the fundamental problem with the BRI.

The initiative is also plagued by an almost total lack of transparency that frustrates host country governments.

2.5 – Failed to deliver on grand promises

The BRI has also failed to deliver on its grand promises of regional economic revitalisation, policy cooperation, and the co-creation of grand economic corridors. Again, laissez-faire governance factors into this failure.

Despite policy cooperation featuring alongside infrastructure in the BRI’s priorities, the BRI lacks any concrete institutional reality and the BRI’s greatest achievements under this heading are non-legally binding memoranda.

Ad-hoc flexibility and demand-driven delivery has led to the construction of many useful infrastructure projects. These contribute to the broader goal of connectivity but were selected and built largely in isolation from one another rather than being conceived of as part of a wider blueprint.

2.6 – Proved a potent economic tool

Transactional, flexible, and backed by the might of Chinese capital and industry, the BRI has proven an effective tool in encouraging alignment with Chinese policies. It has made headway in achieving many policy goals, from securing strategic resources to promoting the internationalisation of the Chinese currency, but it has been particularly successful in increasing the global footprint of Chinese firms.

Section Three: How the EU Can Respond

3.1 – Paradigm shift towards a self-interested approach

Recognising self-interest in the EU’s connectivity agenda is crucial – it is the precondition for genuinely equal partnerships, since the alternative is a donor-recipient dynamic that undermines reciprocity.

Without seeking mutual economic benefit, the EU simply cannot deliver the investment and real economic engagement that many countries value in their ties with China.

Beijing’s transactional use of the BRI unsettled the “level playing field” upheld by status-quo powers, pushing the EU to rethink how it approaches development finance. The EU does not take this decision alone – globally, development finance instruments are increasingly serving national interests, blurring the lines between trade and aid.

Global Gateway is less of a break with past instruments than an attitudinal shift – a turn towards a more competitive, interest-driven stance.

Resistance to this approach remains within parts of Europe’s development community, but the shift is essential – both for competing on an uneven playing field and for forging more equal partnerships with countries that China groups under the “Global South.”

Through GG, the EU has an opportunity to recognise itself as a genuine partner, rather than a saviour, and to seek mutual economic opportunities, rather than fulfil moral obligations.

3.2 – Balancing agency and accessibility with accountability

China’s more laissez-faire approach allows partner countries to feel in control. Lower Chinese standards and lack of oversight also provide much greater accessibility for partner countries.

Of course, the EU should not fully emulate China’s laissez-faire approach. China itself appears to be moving away from strict adherence to the host country principle in an attempt to plug the BRI’s accountability deficit.

Instead, the EU should make a greater effort to start from host country development priorities, rather than making its own assessment of host country needs. Like the BRI, GG should focus on “docking” with host country development plans, seeking to balance host country and European interests, and to balance access with accountability.

3.3 – The BRI narrative’s advantages

GG has faced criticism for being merely a rebranding exercise, but the BRI itself is primarily a brand, and Brussels is right to think carefully about marketing.

However, Beijing does not deserve full credit for the BRI’s narrative success and has benefited from circumstances that the EU might find difficult to replicate.

Firstly, the BRI is more than a brand – it is a central foreign policy concept, promulgated by the top leader in a Leninist party-state.

Secondly, the BRI benefited significantly from its timing and China’s position as a challenger to established global powers.

Rather than riding the narrative of China’s rise, GG is being offered to the world at a time when the EU is facing war at its borders, high energy prices, steep demographic decline, political crises at home, a faltering economy, and a growing innovation gap.

The EU also bears a significant burden of proof; it must overcome widespread anti-Western sentiment and the perception that European values are failing. This challenge is made all the more difficult by the promotion of these narratives by China and Russia.

Thirdly, it is noteworthy that local politicians and media in partner countries have often done more to promote the BRI than China itself. China is sensitive to the interests of local politicians and part of the BRI’s appeal is the political capital it provides them.

Beijing is not necessarily a better communicator than the EU, but it is persistent and offers a compelling narrative that is in sync with global trends and host country needs.

3.4 – Flexible governance

Beijing’s strength lies not just in its ability to enact long-term strategic plans, but in the capacity of Chinese actors for ad-hoc deal making and flexibility. To make GG an effective tool, aligning it with EU strategic thinking is insufficient. It must also be empowered to be more responsive. This will also enable the EU to be more transactional in its approach to GG.

3.5 – The EU’s “Going Out”

The BRI is fundamentally a mercantilist endeavour and part of the BRI’s flexibility is afforded by the agency of Chinese enterprises. To mirror this flexibility and maximise the potential of GG, European firms must be encouraged to “Go Out” and participate more actively in the GG. A key focus of GG should be the creation of opportunities for European firms in partner countries.

De-risking is of course an essential component of this strategy and efforts should be made to mirror the advantages of China’s greater risk appetite.

3.6 – Delivering policy cooperation

Where Beijing failed to deliver coordinated economic corridors and build institutions, the EU has the necessary expertise to succeed.

3.7 – The EU cannot rest on its laurels

The BRI is evolving. Through efforts such as vocational training centres, China is successfully gaining influence in softer areas of connectivity thought of as the EU’s domain. The EU cannot hope to replicate the BRI’s impact on infrastructure, but neither should it take for granted its competitive advantages.

Section Four: Lessons Along the BRI

4.1 – The paradigm shift – alignment and coordination

In order that the GG continue to embody the paradigm shift to a more transactional, self-interested European approach, **GG should be aligned with domestic initiatives** like the European Green Deal, the Digital Decade

strategy, the New Industrial Strategy for Europe, and the EU's de-risking agenda.

Housing GG within DG INTPA aligns the initiative with traditional development thinking, but there may be value in considering whether **shifting aspects of GG to the European External Action Service (EEAS)** could better integrate it with the EU's broader strategic objectives.

4.2 – Balancing agency and accessibility with accountability.

The EU should **take host country development priorities as a starting point** and seek to officially dock GG with national and local initiatives. Demand-driven cooperation should be emphasised internally as well as communicated in rhetoric around GG.

The EU should **provide for a fast-track approval process for projects that have significant strategic importance**. This approach has precedence, such as in the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, which expedites strategic projects with “overriding public interest.” This approach could apply to GG “flagship” projects, giving the designation real meaning.

Greater efforts should be made to **streamline bureaucratic processes**, while offering greater support to partner governments with limited capacity to navigate the complexities of stringent EU requirements.

4.3 – Lessons in marketing

Rather than restate familiar values, the EU needs to **articulate a fresh narrative alongside GG**. This narrative should promote the image of a new, resurgent Europe capable of leading global progress. It should be a bold, forward-looking vision promising local job creation, industrialisation, and better integration with the European single market.

At a time when Chinese overcapacity is creating friction with partners in the “Global South,” the EU should emphasise economic compatibility between Europe and emerging markets.

Many countries deeply resent being cast as pawns in a competition between China and the West. Cooperating in the framework of the **GG and the BRI should not be portrayed as mutually exclusive**. The EU should pre-empt

Beijing's claims of Western hostility by emphasising that the goal of the GG is neither to replace nor to compete with the BRI.

While the EU should not follow China in funding vanity projects for the sake of winning over local elites, it should **be more sensitive to the local political interests** by providing politicians with high-level facetime and publicity opportunities associated with the GG.

The Chinese system is suited to vaguely defined political campaigns, but such an approach is unsuited to the EU. Instead, the **GG should be narrowly focused and clearly delineated**. The EU's list of flagship projects should be limited to key projects that are given genuine advantages. This can be accompanied by a more encompassing "Global Gateway Approach," similar to the "Silk Road Spirit," and following from the "Team Europe Approach."

4.4 – A more flexible GG

EU institutions require more flexibility in decision-making processes. **More frequent review and adjustment periods** should be introduced within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and country-specific Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs).

The EU should emulate the BRI's flexibility by **decentralising aspects of the GG and empowering EU delegations with local expertise** to nominate projects to "flagship" status. Flagship projects are already selected in coordination with delegations, but with a more streamlined, yet empowered list of flagships, delegations should remain central to the selection process. Beyond the core flagship projects, GG can leave even greater flexibility for delegations to tailor their GG approach.

4.5 – Empowering European companies

The **EU should provide a "one-stop" integrated digital platform for business**, where they can access information on funding opportunities, connect with relevant institutions, and propose project ideas. This service might build on the work of Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI), which currently provides the most sophisticated online service to (German) businesses interested in GG.

Discussions about **establishing a European Credit Agency and a European insurer** similar to Sinosure need to progress in order to provide much needed support to handicapped European companies.

To support the vision of a European “Going Out,” the **role of the Business Advisory Group (BAG) could be expanded**, providing members greater access to decision-making processes. Membership of this group should also be extended on a rotating basis to a greater number of smaller enterprises, with participation facilitated by the EU.

The EU should also **set up a business partnership programme** dedicated to supporting private sector GG projects in emerging markets. This organisation might model itself on Finnpartnership.

4.6 – Delivering beyond the BRI

Included within a more limited list of flagship projects, the EU should **identify and showcase economic corridors** that answer to European interests and partner country development priorities. These corridors should go beyond hard infrastructure, coordinating on trade and policy, with an institutional reality the current BRI lacks.

The EU should **invest in transparency** by creating a digital window into the GG, offering significantly more detailed and concrete information than what is currently available on the GG website to leverage this transparency that the BRI lacks.

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