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UPDATING AFRICAN NDCs IN TIMES OF COVID-19 LOST MOMENTUM?

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Table of contents

1. Executive Summary	2
2. Introduction	4
3. NDCs under the Paris Agreement	6
4. NDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa	8
5. The role of the EU	14
6. Outlook and Recommendations	16
Contacts	20

1. Executive Summary



COVID-19 has important consequences for the full operationalisation of the Paris Agreement including the fundamentally important mechanism for increased domestic climate change ambition, namely the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted by country Parties to the Agreement. Every effort should be made to maintain the progress that has been achieved in framing national mitigation and adaptation efforts as NDCs, since the Paris Agreement was concluded.

Review and updating of African NDCs is at risk including from lack of finances and pandemic restrictions and connectivity challenges which hamper the required specialist input and stakeholder engagement processes. These issues are particularly acute in African Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Despite these factors, the African continent has considerable global strategic value and influence and increases in African climate change ambition, as expressed in NDCs, will likely have cross pollinating effects on other developing countries.

The following illustrative approaches might be applied to overcoming the above-mentioned hurdles to African NDC development:

- use of developed country Party delegation country-offices and their internet connectivity to facilitate meetings on host country NDCs between local players, including the public and private sectors, civil society and specialist advisors;
- development of awareness campaigns of the NDC review process;
- support for public gatherings that conform to local pandemic requirements and outdoor venues, and similar actions tailored to local requirements.

Whilst seemingly inconsequential in scale, these types of actions of support can have far reaching implications for LDC governments and the wider public. Unquestionably, climate finance also continues to play a dominant role in the region's NDC review process and in this context, developed countries should be particularly attuned to ensuring that outgoing financial support for their review and implementation remains forthcoming.



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2. Introduction



The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that urgent and transformational mitigation and adaptation action is needed to restrain increases in global temperatures and to reduce climate change risks. (1) The Paris Agreement is the primary multi-lateral legal mechanism framing the global climate change response, including the so-called “long-term temperature goal” of seeking to limit the average global temperature increase to well-below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit such increase to 1.5°C. (2)

Country Parties to the Paris Agreement have expressed their domestic intentions to address climate change in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); (3) and, before the end of 2020, new or revised NDCs reflecting increased ambition, were to have been communicated to the UNFCCC. (4) There is a significant distance between the level of ambition in existing NDCs, (5) and that required to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, commonly referred to as the “emissions gap”. (6) It is for this reason that revisions of the NDCs were intended to kick-start a “decade of ambition” (7), and why 2020 was hailed as a “super year for the environment”. (8)

The advent of COVID-19 has not only resulted in the delay of COP 26 by a year, but has added layers of complexity to addressing the climate challenge. There are particular concerns that the delay will impede NDC-driven greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions, with the potential for country Parties citing COVID-related economic contraction to retreat from previously expressed mitigation ambition. The World Bank anticipates a shrinking of the global economy by approximately 5.2%, in 2020, (9) and the World Food Programme has warned that up to 265 million people will suffer from starvation, (10) with considerable Sub-Saharan Africa poverty impacts. (11) It is predicted that national priorities may shift inwards, with collective international climate action becoming relegated to a lesser priority. (12)

Whilst there is a legal obligation to revise NDCs in 2020, it is possible that various country Parties either delay until the rescheduled COP26 or simply fail to update their national plans. Even revised NDCs may exhibit reduced ambition resulting from redirected national priorities and investment capital. This is especially true for highly vulnerable regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where climate adaptation needs are greatest but the costs of taking action are already prohibitive. (13)

The process of updating NDCs will be a litmus test for the global climate change response. If momentum is lost at this critical stage of the Agreement’s implementation then we risk plunging the negotiations back into the political and diplomatic stasis that plagued the multi-lateral process prior to the Paris Agreement. For this reason, every effort needs to be made to ensure that the pandemic does not interrupt or undermine the timely submission of NDCs but also their ambition.

In this policy brief we consider the extent to which NDCs have been updated and revised and the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on this process, focusing on African NDCs; and, we explore how the revision and updating of NDCs might be supported by developed country Parties, particularly those in the European Union (EU).

3. NDCs under the Paris Agreement



The Paris Agreement provides for periodic review and updating of NDCs as a mechanism to achieve a “ratcheting” of climate ambition. There are multiple benefits to this approach, including the opportunity to incorporate incremental advances, over time. For example, new forestry data has informed Cote d’Ivoire’s recent development of a plan to reduce short lived climate pollutants, which will be included in its updated NDC. (14) The review process is also an opportune moment to link COVID-19 support measures to low carbon and climate resilient growth. (15)

Only a handful of countries have updated and revised their NDCs, (16) while the UNFCCC estimates that only eighty revised NDCs will be submitted, in 2020, out of 194 country Parties to the Paris Agreement. (17) China is not expected to update its NDC, despite having re-confirmed its intention of doing-so in a pre-pandemic agreement with French President, Emmanuel Macron; (18) and, the COP 26 host (United Kingdom) has also declined to commit to updating its NDC, this year. (19)

Those NDCs that have been updated, have received mixed reviews. Among developed country Parties only Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway have submitted revised NDCs; and, all of these - save for Norway’s which expresses greater levels of mitigation ambition, for 2030 - simply reaffirm existing ambition.



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4. NDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa



Figure 1, below, is a map by Climate Watch illustrating countries which have stated their intention to update their NDCs by 2020, and/or which have expressed a desire to enhance their NDC's ambition. A striking feature is that almost all Sub-Saharan African countries have expressed an intention to enhance ambition or action in their NDCs, by 2020. This confirms a substantial appetite and support for increased ambition under the Paris Agreement within the Region, and is contrary to the notion that such country Parties lack political appetite for implementing mitigation and adaptation actions. Thirty-five Sub-Saharan African countries have signaled their enhanced ambition under the auspices of the Climate Ambition Alliance, (20) while various other Sub-Saharan African countries have expressed similar intentions in a variety of ways, including through Twitter, (21) direct interviews, (22) and public statements. (23)

Notwithstanding these expressions of intent, only Rwanda has submitted a revised NDC, dated May 2020. (25) Some have achieved a measure of progress - Kenya is apparently in the final stages of updating its NDC, as are Senegal and Gabon. (26) Zambia, after expressing an intention to revise its NDC and committing to a timeframe of June 2020 missed this date for submission. (27)

There are multiple reasons motivating the need to update Sub-Saharan African NDCs. Whilst the continent emits less than 4% of total global GHGs, it has significant renewable energy potential which could ensure that low carbon growth is secured in the longer term. (28) Equally, Sub-Saharan Africa is extremely vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change, including 7 out of 10 countries, worldwide, that are considered to be the most threatened (the largest of any geographical region). (29) However, the majority of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by African countries were hastily compiled and many neglected to take their long-term effects on national development goals into consideration. (30) Given that most INDCs are now NDCs, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has been prompted to argue that they require revision to properly reflect national needs. (31)

Updating the existing set of NDCs may be delayed after international organisations and bodies such as the NDC Partnership, which support NDC development, postponed national coordination meetings due to Covid-19. (32) The issue is particularly acute in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 33 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa. (33)




Figure 1: 2020 NDC Ambition (24)

According to the African Group of Negotiators (AGN):

- As a result of the pandemic, the development of and ultimately the communication of updated and revised NDCs has been difficult. It has been challenging to collect data and information from stakeholders because of social distancing and national prohibitions on social gatherings imposed by several governments.
- Government officials have relied on online meetings with international partners who are able to engage in this way, but similar contact with local stakeholders have been hampered by a lack of any or reliable internet connectivity.
- External consultants have found it challenging to communicate due to connectivity issues or have been unable to travel internationally to provide expertise and support in the NDC development process. (34)

Flowing from the above, it has been speculated that many African countries will be unable to submit NDCs in 2020 particularly since the process will usually require in-country stakeholder engagement, and as the commentary from the AGN suggests, the pandemic makes such engagements highly risky, and unfeasible. (35) Not only does inadequate stakeholder engagement jeopardize the timely submission of NDCs but it also affects their quality and prospects for implementation. Following from the Nigerian example (see box 1), a lack of stakeholder participation in the NDC process undermines the inclusivity of and public-buy-in to the process. This, in turn, hampers the ability of stakeholders to ensure the NDC's implementation and participate in and support enhancement of policy and ambition. Such participation is critical to the coordination and integration of NDC-driven actions across multiple and cross-sectoral processes including those within government, academia, organised labour and the public and private sectors.

Funding also remains a challenge. A number of LDCs require funding to review their NDCs and there is a concern that the pandemic could impact the ability of partner organisations and donors to release funds. (36) The AGN has noted that "some [finance] partners are re-channelling some resources towards the COVID-19...(and)...the pandemic has become a priority as opposed to climate change." (37)

In 2009, developed countries pledged to mobilise US\$100 billion in climate finance for developing countries every year by 2020, from both public and private sources. This amount is meant to increase to a new revised amount in 2025 pursuant to negotiations which were supposed to take place this year, but which are now due to take place in 2021. Prior to the pandemic, the UNFCCC's Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have, both, noted improvements in the availability of climate finance, (38) partly due to an elevated investment in private sector renewable energy. However, only a fraction of finances have benefitted Sub-Saharan Africa. (39) The Sub-Region has previously secured an estimated 12% of the global total for 2017. (40) At the same time it has been estimated that these same African countries will require approximately US\$3 trillion by 2030 to implement their current NDCs. (41) During the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) initial resource mobilisation period starting in 2014, some US\$10 billion was pledged. The pledge amount for the first replenishment period for 2020 to 2023 has remained static now at approximately \$US9.8 billion. According to reports by the OECD, climate finance to developing countries reached USD 71.2 billion in 2017, up from USD 58.6 billion in 2016. (42) Notwithstanding this historic positive trend, it remains to be seen what impacts the pandemic will have on the adequacy of climate finance during the course of 2020 and the foreseeable future, particularly given the global recession.

Not only is the availability of finance a concern but the procedures to access finance have also been impacted by COVID-19. For example, the pandemic-driven downscaling of the GCF Secretariat is hampering that organisation's processing of project and climate change readiness proposals. (43)

The availability of adequate donor funding for actions to achieve Sub-Saharan African NDC targets will have direct impact on NDC effectiveness and domestic ambition in their subsequent iterations. This is because all Sub-Saharan African NDCs have incorporated two GHG mitigation targets: an unconditional target that will be financed using national resources and a conditional target which can be met if financial support is received from the global community. The AfDB has noted that, generally-speaking, African countries are able to spend approximately 15% of their resources on achieving the unconditional target, leaving a remaining 85% to come from other sources of finance in order to achieve the conditional (more ambitious) targets. (44)

While some NDCs acknowledge the benefits of attracting private sector finance, many emphasise the importance of bilateral and multilateral donorfunding. This approach is fair and equitable considering Africa's minimal contribution to the industrial-scale GHG emissions that are driving anthropogenic climate change.

If increased NDC ambition is required of all country Parties to the Paris Agreement, then adequate financial support must be forthcoming to support the additional ambition of developing and LDC country Parties. In light of the pandemic-driven global economic contraction such support is likely to be, either unavailable or significantly constrained.

Whilst there is clear need for introspection and action from developed country Parties states on these issues, Sub-Saharan African countries are advised to take proactive steps to secure funds and support that are not entirely dependent on the action of developed countries.

Such proactive steps on the part of Sub-Saharan countries might include:

- the development of investment plans for NDC implementation; (45)
- prioritisation of NDC actions highlighting issues of greatest, need, risk and vulnerability;
- focusing efforts on private sector investment for NDC implementation; and,
- strengthening mechanisms to promote donor and investor confidence such as robust systems and processes for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions, and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation, climate finance and technological support outcomes. (46)



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NDC Updates in Nigeria

- *Current state of affairs:* Zambia is in the middle of a steep recession as a result of the pandemic. It has reported 13,446 confirmed Corona Virus cases and 312 deaths, however reported numbers are likely to be misrepresentative as a result of low levels of testing.
- *Willingness to update NDC:* Zambia expressed an intention to update its NDC in early 2020. Zambia confirmed it wished to increase ambition by adding more sectors to the scope of its mitigation target, such as transport, industrial waste and coal production/use. It also expressed an intention to strengthen the NDC's adaptation component, as well as its monitoring system. Zambia has been working with UNDP's NDC Support Programme with the aim of submitting a revised NDC in June 2020, however it was unable to achieve this deadline.
- *Challenges:* Zambia has stated that it requires approximately \$50 billion to implement its NDC. Recently it has received \$2.1 million from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to develop a National Adaptation Plan and Resource Mobilisation Strategy, however it will still require considerable additional resources to implement its NDC.

NDC Updates in Rwanda

- *Current state of affairs:* As of 13 September, Rwanda had a total of 4565 Corona Virus cases, with only 22 deaths. This is partially attributable to a robust and rapid national response to the virus, with a nationwide lockdown commencing on 20 March 2020. Whilst Rwanda has experienced strong GDP growth in recent years of up to 9.4%, the impacts of the virus are anticipated to slow it considerably to 3.6%. This impact will be additional to the net economic costs of climate change which are estimated to be equivalent to losses of approximately 1% of GDP each year until 2030.
- *Willingness to update NDC:* Rwanda is one of the few African countries to have already updated and submitted its revised NDC in May 2020. Although it remains the only African country to have done so to date, its level of ambition has been praised for its renewal of "climate optimism". Despite its relatively small GHG emissions profile, and the substantial economic, and health challenges arising from the pandemic, Rwanda intends to reduce emissions by 38% by 2030. It proposes nearly equal spending on mitigation and adaptation of up to US\$11 billion, which is approximately a tenth more than the total value of its annual national domestic economic output. The country is in the process of mainstreaming the actions in its NDC into other national plans and instruments. Rwanda has received notable support through the NDC Partnership for the update of its NDC, including emissions data quantification to update targets.
- *Challenges:* The Rwandan example evidences that it is possible to submit a revised NDC with enhanced ambition notwithstanding economic challenges during the pandemic. The future challenge however will lie with implementation. The NDC assumes the continued use of existing and planned national and international financial sources. The 2015 NDC's implementation plan, however, acknowledges a strong dependency on foreign aid flows, which currently constitute 30-40% of the national budget, rendering the country vulnerable to cuts in donor finance.

NDC Updates in Zambia

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5. The role of the EU



The EU has traditionally been a strong supporter of low carbon and climate resilient growth in developing countries and has been a significant contributor to the GCF, pledging nearly half of the initial pledge of US\$10 billion in 2014. EU Member States represented the majority of the 27 states which pledged to replenish the GCF with a further \$US9.8 billion. (47) The EU also provides climate finance in multiple forms, including through the European Commission's direct grants; participation in the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus; finance through the EU External Investment Plan; and, most notably, through participation in the NDC Partnership, (48) and the UNDP's NDC Support Programme. (49) The continued provision of funds and related support through these and other avenues as well as scaled up finance during the pandemic will undoubtedly assist in NDC implementation. For example, the work of the NDC Partnership and UNDP's NDC Support Programme in Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia, as outlined above, undoubtedly has advanced the NDC revision process and has facilitated stakeholder consultations in each of these countries.

However, in the context of COVID-19, much can still be done to support the revision and update of NDCs, and their enhanced ambition. This includes addressing the key issues of concerns raised by African states, primarily relating to a lack of alternative means of communication with stakeholders which are not reliant on stable internet connections. Options to support alternatives include measures which facilitate virtual consultations between experts and government, as well as with the wider public. Examples of such support include a suggestion by the AGN to utilise Africa-based offices of the United Nations Development Programme to secure improved internet connections and create more conducive meeting environments. (50) Similarly it is likely that support which facilitates the participation of stakeholders in the review process outside of in-person or online meetings, such as short emailed surveys, comment and response websites and associated awareness campaigns, may serve to foster stakeholder participation. In some instances it may simply be support for the provision of PPE and outdoor venues to enable stakeholder engagements to take place safely that may be of greatest use.

Despite challenges with international travel EU delegations or within local networks of such delegations could continue to play meaningful roles in NDC reviews and updates. For example, through written commentary and advice or the provision of direct expert support to national governments. (51)

Internet challenges plague the Sub-Saharan Region and enhanced access to online climate change publication subscription resources would support NDC review processes by improving access to published climate change science, economic and other research works. Free or discounted internet access would provide additional resources and information to governments on a multitude of issues, including climate change actions and issues requiring priority in the NDC revision and new quantitative and qualitative data relating to mitigation and adaptation approaches.

Lastly, much has already been written on the need for national responses to the pandemic to promote a low carbon and climate resilient development pathway. The provision of donor climate finance in the region should be equally sensitive to the need to ensure that the application of such finance, particularly where it seeks to serve as a pandemic stimulus package, has dual climate change benefits. This requires careful scrutiny and revision of the purposes to which such finance is applied and any related conditions attached to its issue. It is worth noting that the EU has recently made an important step in this regard by committing 30% of its development cooperation to climate-related projects.



THE EU'S CONTINUED PROVISION OF CLIMATE FUNDS AND RELATED SUPPORT DURING THE PANDEMIC WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASSIST IN NDC IMPLEMENTATION.

6. Outlook and Recommendations



The pandemic continues to have important consequences for the Paris Agreement, and it remains to be seen to what extent these will adversely affect its most important tool, namely the ratchet mechanism of increased ambition in NDCs. Every effort should be made to ensure that continued momentum is maintained throughout the pandemic to avoid scuppering gains achieved to date. The African continent is of considerable strategic value to global powers for multiple reasons, (52) and any increase in ambition within NDCs will likely have cross pollinating effects on other developing countries. However, the review and update of the ambition within national NDCs in the region remains at risk as a result of a lack of finances, pandemic restrictions hampering stakeholder engagement processes and connectivity challenges particularly within LDC African countries.

Within the constraints of the pandemic little can be done directly to revolutionise accessibility and stakeholder engagement challenges, however, potentially much can be achieved by offering the use of existing in-country resources. This includes the use of delegation country-offices as meeting venues, or the use of internet connections within such offices for smaller meetings. It may also be support in smaller practical but effective ways, such as the development of awareness campaigns of the NDC review process, support for public gatherings that conform to local pandemic requirements and outdoor venues, and similar actions tailored to the local requirements and needs of each country.

Whilst seemingly inconsequential in scale, these types of actions of support can have far reaching implications for LDC governments and the wider public. Unquestionably, climate finance also continues to play a dominant role in the region's NDC review process and in this context, developed countries should be particularly attuned to ensuring that outgoing financial support for their review and implementation remains forthcoming.



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- 1 UNEP (2019). Emissions Gap Report 2019. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi 2019.
- 2 The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21) is the formal outcome of the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
- 3 NDCs were first submitted in anticipation of COP 21, during the course of 2015, in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), pursuant to the Lima Call for Climate Action (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.20). Pursuant to the Paris Agreement country Parties are invited to communicate their NDCs to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) no later than their ratification of the Paris Agreement, provided that a country Party that has communicated an INDC prior to joining the Agreement will be considered to have satisfied the NDC requirement (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21 paragraph 22).
- 4 The duty to revise applies if an NDC ends in 2025, alternatively an update is required if the first NDC ends in 2030. This will ensure that as of 2030, countries will have a common time frame for NDCs (UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21 paragraphs 23 and 24).
- 5 Current NDCs put the world on a trajectory of global temperature increases between 2.9 to 3.4 degrees C, well above the 1.5°C that scientists say is necessary for preventing the worst effects of climate change.
- 6 The 2030 emissions gap is defined as the difference between global total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from least-cost scenarios and the expected global total GHG emissions, if NDCs are fully implemented. The emissions gap in 2030, compared with least-cost pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C, ranges between 12-18 GtCO₂e for the full implementation of the conditional and the unconditional NDCs respectively. This gap increases to between 29-35 GtCO₂e to limit global warming to 1.5°C (UNEP 2019, paragraph 2.3).
- 7 Statement by Belize on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the opening plenary meeting of COP, CMP, CMA, SBSTA and SBI (2 December 2019).
- 8 Including not only revisions of the NDCs under the Paris Agreement, but also COP 15 on Biodiversity where Parties are to negotiate a new post-2020 global biodiversity framework (Editorial "A Super Year for the Environment" (January 2020) 4 *The Lancet Planetary Health* 1.
- 9 World Bank, Global Economic Prospect (Washington: World Bank Group, June 2020).
- 10 World Food Programme, 'WFP Chief Warns of Hunger Pandemic as COVID-19 Spreads – Statement to the UN Security Council,' April, 21 2020.
- 11 See A Sumner, C Hoy and E Ortiz-Juarez, "Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty", (Working Paper 43/2020, UNU WIDER); and, E Davies, S Fakir and M Nagiah "How will COVID-19 impact South Africa's climate change diplomacy?" South African Institute for International Affairs (26 August 2020).
- 12 E Davies, S Fakir and M Nagiah "How will COVID-19 impact South Africa's climate change diplomacy?" South African Institute for International Affairs (26 August 2020).
- 13 African Development Bank Gap Analysis Report: African Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (2018).
- 14 UNFCCC "Insights from Africa: Why Countries Should Revise Their Climate Plans by 2020" (16 May 2019).
- 15 It has been argued that there is a strong correlation and interrelationship between COVID and climate responses. See: Gilder A & Rumble R "Implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for global climate change responses" Policy Briefings South African Institute for International Affairs.
- 16 These include Japan (who called it a revised first NDC), Singapore, Chile, New Zealand, Rwanda, Norway, Moldova, Switzerland, Suriname, Andorra, the Marshall Islands, and Jamaica.
- 17 Climate Home News "China among nations likely to miss 2020 deadline for climate plans – UN's Espinosa" (2 September 2020).
- 18 *Beijing Call for Biodiversity Conservation and Climate Change*, 6 November 2019.
- 19 Climate Home News "UK risks missing UN climate deadline, in headache for hosts of key summit".
- 20 COP 25 "Climate Ambition Alliance: Nations Renew their Push to Upscale Action by 2020 and Achieve Net Zero CO₂ Emissions by 2050". The group was established at COP 25 (November 2019) pursuant to a request from the UN Secretary-General, and represents a renewed alliance between various country Parties and Non-State Actors that determined to follow the recommendations of climate science and (in respect of the former) to submit enhanced NDCs. The Sub-Saharan African countries that have joined the Alliance include: Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
- 21 Cote D'Ivoire and Gambia; Kenya and Nigeria.
- 22 Algeria, in reply to queries from Climate Watch.
- 23 In the case of South Africa in a statement by the President to the UN Secretary General at UN Climate Action Summit held on 23 September 2019.
- 24 Climate Watch NDC Content. 2018. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
- 25 Republic of Rwanda *Updated Nationally Determined Contribution*.
- 26 Reuters News, "Despite the pandemic, frontline nations push ahead on stronger climate plans".
- 27 Communication and update on Zambia's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in accordance with the UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21 of the Paris Agreement.
- 28 African Development Bank Gap Analysis Report: African Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (2018). For example, the estimated potential of hydro-power on the continent is 1,750TWh and that of geo-thermal energy is estimated at 9,000MW.
- 29 Ibid. Including the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid. INDCs were submitted prior to COP 21 pursuant to the Lima Call for Climate Action (UNFCCC Decision 20/CP.1). In terms of UNFCCC Decision 21/CP.1, para. 22, country Parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to communicate their NDCs to the UNFCCC no later than their ratification of the Paris Agreement, provided that a country Party that has communicated an INDC prior to joining the Agreement will be considered to have satisfied the NDC requirement.
- 32 Climate Home News, "Coronavirus slows developing nations' plans to step up climate action in 2020".
- 33 Only 14 African countries are not LDCs.
- 34 Statement by the African Group of Negotiators (undated).
- 35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid. UNFCCC Summary and Recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, page 7. The OECD found the following: Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries reached USD 71.2 billion in 2017, up from USD 58.6 billion in 2016 (a 21% increase). (OECD (2019), Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, page 8.

39 C Chikwendu "Closing the gap in climate finance in Sub-Saharan Africa" *Nigeria Financial – Development and Finance*, 26 September 2017, last accessed 20 June 2019. The AfDB has also noted that annual climate finance flows across Sub-Saharan Africa have remained static at 12 US\$ billion for 2015/2016. Further, considerable portions of this finance has been directed South Africa amounting to over 20% of total approved funding (AfDB above note 33).

40 Climate Policy Initiative Global Climate Finance: An Updated View 2018 (November 2018).

41 African Development Bank "Climate Action: African Development Bank calls for global collaboration to turn Nationally Determined Contributions into investment plans" (20 March 2019).

42 OECD (2019), Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, page 8.

43 Statement by the African Group of Negotiators (above footnote 37).

44 AfDB (above note 31).

45 Ibid. A well-developed NDC that has an associated investment plan with costed actions will boost investor confidence and can serve as a good resource mobilisation tool.

46 Ibid.

47 European Commission "Climate Finance".

48 The NDC Partnership supports countries in advancing integrated climate and development actions. UNDP is a Steering Committee member of the partnership, along with Germany, Spain, Morocco and the European Commission.

49 The NDP Support Programme was launched in 2017 by UNDP together with the EU and the governments of Germany and Spain. The programme is implemented in contribution to the NDC Partnership.

50 African Group of Negotiators "Covid 19 Implications on Capacity Building" (undated).

51 Channels to offer such support already exist through the NDC Partnership and UNDP's NDC Support Programme and in many instances meaningful support could be provided by aligning and expanding such existing support mechanisms.

52 Davies *et al* (above note 12).

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Olivia Rumble is a Director of Climate Legal with 10 years' legal practice experience specialising in environmental law, energy law policy and governance, climate change, climate finance, carbon markets, and carbon tax. Olivia is admitted as an attorney of the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng and Western Cape), and holds a PPE (Politics, Philosophy and Economics, University of Stellenbosch); an LLB (University of Cape Town); and an LLM in Environmental Law (University of Cape Town - with distinction). She has a strong background in water law as well as climate change law, and has acted for governments and regional institutions by pioneering legal reform initiatives in climate change and water law in South Africa and SADC. She regularly counsels clients on the legal considerations relevant to emerging opportunities in low carbon development and sustainable energy practices and has expertise in South Africa's complex air quality and greenhouse gas legal regime.

Andrew Gilder is a Director of Climate Legal, with 17 years' legal practice experience specialising in climate change, climate finance and development, carbon markets, carbon tax, environmental and energy law, policy and governance. Andrew is admitted as an attorney of the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng and Western Cape) and holds a BA LLB (University of Natal - now KwaZulu-Natal) and LLM (Marine and Environmental Law, University of Cape Town). He has practical experience which expands over a range of African jurisdictions and including advice to public and private sectors on the development and implementation of climate change, climate finance, carbon markets, carbon tax, environmental and energy law, policy and governance as well as regulatory and transactional advice to industries, foreign embassies and municipalities on the implementation of infrastructure development projects.

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