# VOICES FROM TANZANIA



November 2022, No. 3 Country Office Tanzania



# TANZANIA AND THE UKRAINE WAR

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An attempt from a German perspective to answer questions about Tanzania's abstention in the UN Resolution and what impact the relationship between the African country and not only Russia, but also China has on it.

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## 1. Background/Explanation of the Situation

In spring 2021, the whole world observed the first Russian troops marched along the Ukrainian border. This action triggered the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which has been simmering since 2014 and extends far beyond the borders of the former Soviet states. (Hamburg Statista, 2022) At that time, Russia denied any plans to attack and the accusation of being more active than usual in the border region between Russia and Ukraine.

In December 2021, Russia published a draft called "security agreement" with the US and NATO. It claimed the withdrawal of all NATO troops from the Eastern European countries that have joined since 1999, as well a halt on the admission of the successor states of the Soviet Union, which was dissolved in 1991. The US and other NATO states rejected this demand as a basis for negotiations. A recurring point of contention between Russia and NATO is Russia's claim that NATO partners made a binding commitment to the Soviet Union or Russia in the 1990s not to expand NATO further eastward. NATO denies that.

Some observers, meanwhile, argued that Putin was not just talking about NATO expansion plans. Either he would have been way more concerned with rule of law reforms, and the establishment of a functioning democracy in Ukraine poses a political risk to the authoritarian regime in Moscow. However, Ukraine's western orientation means a loss of Russian influence as well. (bpb, 2022) Beginning in 2022, the conflict escalated at the end of February, with troops sent by Putin attacking Ukraine's cities and territories of the night of February 24. (Hamburg Statista, 2022)

In Putin's speech shortly before the invasion, he justified the attack by defending those who are supposedly being abused and murdered by the Kiev regime. The Russian army would aim for a "demilitarization" of the Ukrainian territories and fight against the so called "genocide" of Russians. The international community was shocked by said action and statement against a sovereign country, condemned Putin's actions and the violation of international law in the strongest terms, and imposed harsh sanctions against Russia. (lpb, 2022)

In response, an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly was held and included several severe sanctions against Russia. The General Assembly condemned Russia's attack on Ukraine by 141 votes to 5 - only Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Russia, and Syria rejected the decision, while 35 countries abstained, including Tanzania and many other African countries. (bpb, 2022)

It was emphasized that Tanzania wanted to remain neutral, and that a unilateral positioning would not open up opportunities for bilateral relations, including with Russia. The country's decision was controversially discussed in the media. Some even condemned the abstention of complicity with Russia

as immoral. Others say that the war in Ukraine is far away and that Tanzania should not get involved, and Europe generally shows no interest in the conflicts in Africa as well.

Nevertheless, the question why Tanzania, in particular, abstained is still a large and open field. Therefore, this paper tries to find out what might have led to this decision. The paper attempts to give an overview of the relationship between Tanzania and Russia and to discover relatives between their relationship and Tanzania's decision.

The paper begins to investigate the history between these two countries and which influence the USSR had on African countries, even before Tanganyika gained its independence in 1961. (Burton 2021, p. 115)

# 2. Relationship between Tanzania and Russia

To understand Tanzania's decision to abstain, we need to take a look at the relationship between these two countries. However, this did not begin with the various economic agreements since Tanganyika's independence in 1961, but it started even earlier. (Tanzanian Embassy, 2022)

Russia's influence, or rather the former Soviet Union, with its then economic and social model, had a huge impact throughout the Global South at the beginning of the 20th century. (bpb, 2017) For that reason, the following chapter examines the impact of the USSR in Africa with a look on the independence movement in Tanzania under the leadership of the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. This time had an enormous effect on the following decades in Tanzania and on other African countries as well. (Burton 2021, p. 115)

In recent years, Russia has been serving Tanzania more as an arms supplier, after its influence decreased on the African continent by the time of USSR's collapse. Nowadays, it seems more like a process of rebuilding its power and relations. However, the economic and political link between the two countries has always remained, although in a somewhat weakened form by now. (Internationale Politik, 2021)

# 2.1 Ideological exchange between Russia and the Global South in the past

The Influence of the USSR began already in the 1917s when the Bolsheviks took power from the provisional Government and proclaimed a socialist revolution. This was also called the "Russian Revolution", which left hardly any country in the world untouched. It sparked the first global political

mass movement that included people of all ethnicities and cultures. It radicalized a generation of socialists, and it inspired artists around the world so that waves of protests and strikes went around the world. So did it also not stop in front of the African borders.

Since then, in the European colonial states in Asia and Africa national liberation fighters radicalized and saw themselves as part of a global movement. With the Russian Communists, many of them shared a messianic belief in a turn to global justice. Through the Bolsheviks, Russia became the center of rebellion against the global hegemony of the West. (bpb, 2017)

Prior to Tanganyika's Independence in 1961, the Soviet Union and its close ties to some African states played an important role in the anti-colonial movement. Many African countries gained more and more desire to finally be an independent country. (Eckert, 2007)

As soon as Tanganyika became independent from the British Empire, it immediately established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China as well. Unlike Western countries, Russia and China did not hesitate to recognize new independent states. Until its collapse in 1990, the USSR had an important Partner, providing academic scholarships and financial resources in return for its political support on geopolitical issues. Even today, some of the academic and cultural connections are still visible. Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, even used these relationships to support national liberation movements and promote socialism, which also inspired other African countries. So that Tanzania became a domicile and host for several liberation movements from Southern Africa during Apartheid times.

However, Nyerere never officially visited Russia and the media voices promised that he would not accept Russia as the dominant power in Africa. Nevertheless, he used the Russian principles of socialism when he raised Tanzania's political system and Russia was strongly involved in the economic development. Nyerere managed to unite the country and secure its independence. For that, he used a single-party system, whereby repression and censorship were used to maintain control over the country. (SAIIA, 2021)

To summarize the last page briefly: Russia, with its revolutionary movement, which started around 1917, had since then a great influence on many Third World countries, which at that time were under a colonial power. The Russian ideologies of socialism and communism have inspired the politics and economy of many of these countries, especially Tanzania. (bpb, 2017)

After the collapse of the USSR, the partnership between Russia and the Global South weakened until Russia took its chance again at the beginning of the 21st century. The country supported different actions in Tanzanian politics and picked up some economical agreements. (SAIIA, 2022) The extent of

Russia's political influence on Tanzania in the immediate aftermath of its independence and the current political exchange will be examined in the next chapter.

#### 2.2 Political Influence

As exposed in the previous chapter, Russia's influence on Tanzania's liberation movement and ideologies used to be enormous. The following chapter will dig deeper into the two countries' political relationship, as this already begun with Tanzania's independence movement and still continues today. (Internationale Politik, 2020) Both nations opened diplomatic missions in each other's national capitals, namely Moscow in Russia, and Dar es Salaam in the-then Tanganyika. Over many years remarkable and distinguished progress in these bilateral relations, mainly in political and social-cultural aspects was observed.

Political ties between the USSR and Tanzania were strengthened mainly because the USSR had a great influence on the South-Eastern African liberation movements from the 1960s to the 1980s and directed its own contribution to them. Cultural relations also developed at this time, when Kiswahili was established as a foreign language at Russian universities, including in recent years the Moscow Swahili Community (Chama Cha Kiswahili Cha Moscow-CHAKIMO), the Moscow radio station Kiswahili and the Kiswahili newspaper "Urusi LEO" (The Citizen, 2019)

Another example of political cooperation between the former USSR and Tanzania was the liberation movement of Zanzibar and the other islands belonging to Tanzania in the late 1950s and early 1960s. (Balezin, 2020) At that time, the Soviet Union was interested in spreading its communist ideas there as well. For this purpose, the USSR communicated with Zanzibar Students in England through the British Communist Party and provided many educational scholarships to them. At the end of the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964, USSR was one of the first countries to recognize the revolution and to provide military aid.

The influence of Russian socialism accounted for about one-third of the world population in the early 1980s. At the time, this ideology had a huge impact on many post-colonial states, including Tanzania. In the course of decolonization, the traditional sources of authority and the political legitimacy of agrarian societies throughout the global South collapsed. For its postcolonial elites, the one-party state offered a reproducible, non-Western model path to modern statehood.

The cadre principle demanded the highest discipline and ideological fidelity of party members. In some of the multi-ethnic countries of the global South, authoritarian socialism was probably associated with

maintaining the political stability necessary for nation-building. It was not only Nyerere who used the socialist rhetoric and organizational power of their Lenin-inspired mass parties to contain ethnic conflicts and thus guarantee territorial integrity. Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, for example, also used them. This is just one of many examples of how Russia's political principles spread across the African continent. (bpb, 2017)

Today, Interparliamentary cooperation is an important path in partnerships between Russia and the African continent. The Russia-Africa Summit's Sochi Declaration emphasized the importance of cooperation between 'the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and National Parliaments of African States, as well as setting up bilateral friendship groups among them'. These connections between Russia's Federal Assembly and African parliaments have continued from the Soviet era until today's modern Russia. In July 2019, the first parliamentary conference on 'Russia-Africa' took place, and in February 2020 prospects for a visa-free regime were discussed. Russia also promotes inter-party cooperation since these connections are an important step in rising a legislative base for international cooperation and synchronizing legislation on potentially sensitive topics such as nuclear and defense issues between these countries.

Today's political relations between Russia and Tanzania focus on cooperation in the energy sector, as well as increased commercial and military cooperation. Other areas of high-level engagement include IT, peacekeeping and conflict resolution, agriculture and tourism. In particular, Russia's military involvement has increased steadily in recent years. Since Tanzania itself does not possess nuclear weapons, Russia has also optimized its military cooperation there as well. Both nations benefit from this partnership. Whether this relationship is well balanced, is another question. However, this is not the only area in which Russia has great influence today. Russia's traces can also be found in the Tanzanian economy, with a trend moving upwards. (SAIIA 2021)

## 2.3 Economic relations

Economic relations between Russia and Tanzania, or in the early days of the country, between Tanganyika and the USSR, were already established in 1961, right after Tanganyika's independence. Together, they concluded their first trade agreement on 14 August of the same year. Under this agreement, the countries supported each other's export and import trade. In addition, the USSR has actively revived the development of the Tanzanian economy, focusing mainly on the construction

industry, the agricultural sector, and the conduct of geological exploration of solid minerals, petroleum, etc. (Patturi, 2018)

Another holdover from the era of Soviet–Africa cooperation is the connection with Russian educational institutions. The educational exchange between Tanzania and Russia in particular has shaped the relationship so strongly to this day that many Tanzanians still have a positive attitude toward Russia. One of the oldest institutions dealing with the promotion of relations between Russia and Africa is the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute was founded in 1959 and has also established links with other academic institutions on the continent. The Institute was one of the co-organizers of the Russia-Africa Summit and currently coordinates scientific cooperation within the newly established Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. To date, the Institute is very active and has even co-organized two conferences on Tanzania-Russia cooperation. This institute is a repository of information on the Soviet Union's presence on the African continent and can serve as a bridge between past and present Russian initiatives. (SAIIA, 2021)

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these relations ended abruptly. The price of maintaining them was utterly untenable for post-Soviet Russia, which then struggled to cope with its own catastrophic political, economic, and societal challenges. More than two decades later, Russia's activities in Africa were negligible, apart from occasional appearances by arms dealers. (Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 2019)

After the collapse of the USSR, other nations begun to invest in Tanzania, with China being one of the largest investors unti today. (SAIIA 2007) When Russia's economy and domestic politics finally seemed to be stabilizing, it began to regain a foothold in Africa. In the mid-2000s, it expanded its activity and influence by increasing its participation in African peacekeeping operations and its participation in the International Anti-Piracy Task Force. Since then, the manifestation of Russian influence and presence in Africa has grown exponentially. Using all the instruments of a political, economic, military, security, diplomatic and informational nature, Russia has tried to rebuild its old relations and develop new ones. (Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 2019)

In recent years, Russia's relations with Tanzania have gained new momentum. In line with Tanzania's current foreign policy, the focus has shifted to economic cooperation on trade and investment issues. Since the 2000s, the number of Russian investors and companies has increased sharply, as has the number of Russian representatives of Tanzanian companies. An important event in recent relations between Tanzania and Russia was in September 2010, when an expert meeting between the two countries on the use of debt in their relations took place in Moscow.

Therefore, Russia would finance development schemes in Tanzania, which led to the agreement that both parties would draft an intergovernmental contract. Within the process of restoring Russia's position as one of Tanzania's investment partners, a bilateral meeting was held in April 2016, including the following motto: "Russia and Tanzania: Advancing towards each other". This event brought a number of representatives from big Russian companies to Tanzania. In fact, Russian investors are very active in Tanzania again, which is also increasing numerous job accessibilities for Tanzanians. (The Citizen, 2019)

In addition to the increasing economic activity between Russia and Tanzania, Russia's military support to African countries is enormous, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. Nuclear cooperation is also one of Russia's latest strengths in Tanzania and other African countries such as Zambia. It has opened the door to Russia's continued commitment, as Russia is a world leader in nuclear technology. (SAIIA, 2021) However, these weapons are not the only area of Russia's military engagement, the supply of weapons of all kinds has increased not only in Tanzania, but also in other African countries for example in Cameroon, Congo, Uganda, and Angola. This has saved Russia's latest influence over the African continent which should not be underestimated. But in general, Russias economic influence in Tanzania is comparably low to others such as China, Europe, Turkey, Egypt and the Golf States. (EURACTIV, 2018)

# 2.4 Current Situation - Return of foreign investors

Since Tanzania's new president Samia Suluhu took office in March 2021, the relationship between the country and foreign investors has changed again. To fulfil the investigation why Russia's relationship to Tanzania might have had an impact on Tanzania's decision in the UN-Resolution, it is important to look at the recent events and how the country is seeing foreign investors. (Export Manager, 2022)

One example of the Relations between Tanzania and Russia is that the Russians are now using Tanzania as a holiday destination more than ever before. In 2021, Russian tourists were with around 85,000 people the most popular foreign visitors to Tanzania. Most of them were found on Zanzibar. Thus, not only various economic agreements between the two countries are reviving, but also tourism, from which both countries definitely benefit. (Further Africa, 2022) The previous chapter also dealt with the issue of arms supplies, recognizing that Russia is a significant supplier of arms to Africa. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Africa accounted for 18% of all Russian arms

exports between 2016 and 2020. Defense relations between Russia and Tanzania are growing as well. (SAIIA, 2021)

President Samia is seeking to improve the government's relations with foreign investors in general. They suffered significantly under their predecessor Magufuli and were very tense. Several ministers with an economical portfolio have already been appointed since Samia's presidency, and the government seems willing to improve existing dispute resolution mechanisms to attract new foreign investors. She is even appealing to the donor community and foreign investors to fund projects ranging from improving public administration to transport infrastructure to LNG projects made possible by Tanzania's enormous offshore gas reserves. (Export Manager, 2022)


Now that the current government has made it much easier for Russian investors in Tanzania, this is a good time for Russia to strengthen its presence in the country. As a result, many Russians business groups and individuals are enquiring for investment opportunities in Tanzania. This provides good prospects for a steady increase in trade between the two countries. Moreover, Russia's commitment to strengthen bilateral trade relations benefits the people of both countries. Tanzania is also socially welcoming Russia because many Tanzanians studied in Russia and master the Russian language, which eliminates barriers of communication as well. In the future, even more scholarships will be available for Tanzania in Russia to promote the networking process in this area. (AffAfrica, 2022)

Past chapters have shown that Russia had a great influence on Tanzania even before independence, including Zanzibar in 1964. In conclusion, relations between the two countries were very deep until the collapse of the USSR, so it was not too difficult for Russia to implement its plan to regain a foothold. Both countries, Russia and Tanzania, benefit from this cooperation in various areas, be it economic or political. Alongside China, Russia is now once again an important cooperation partner for Tanzania. (SAIIA, 2007)

#### 3. Other African Countries who abstained

Last chapters points may have an impact on the election decisions in the UN resolution against Russia not only in Tanzania but in other African countries as well. Tanzania is not the only country that abstained at the UN-Resolution. Twenty-eight out of a total of 54 African countries have done the same, which is just over 51% of the African continent. In the following chapter, the decision of the other African countries is examined and linked to the fact that Russia has great influence not only in Tanzania but also in many other African countries. (Brookings, 2022) The question now is whether there is a

connection between Russia's general influence on the African continent and the abstention from said election. The next chapter examines this relationship in more detail and attempts to establish a link between the above points.



The resolution, dated for the first of March, found broad support across the U.N., but African countries were divided in a range of almost fifty to fifty percent. This is a strong contrast to the 81 % of non-African countries that voted in favor of this resolution. Of the 35 countries that abstained, almost half were Africans, with only one African country, Eritrea, voting against. The following graphic shows which country on the African continent has made which decision. The declarations of African Heads of State and

Government have illustrated these divisions perfectly. For example, Kenyan Ambassador Martin Kimani strongly condemned Russia's actions, sharply criticized the invasion, and "reaffirmed Kenya's respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders." South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, on the other hand, stressed that the resolution "does not emphasize the call for meaningful engagement" between Russia and Ukraine and "does not provide the encouragement and international support that the parties need to continue their efforts." (Brookings, 2022)

The assumption that has emerged from previous studies of Russia's influence in Tanzania is that Russia generally has a great influence on many African countries. One example is South Africa, which also abstained and is part of the BRICS. This is the bloc of the major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, committing to the principles of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. These five countries have declared their willingness to abide by these principles in the face of current territorial and geopolitical tensions and are under immense scrutiny in their response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. After they refused to condemn Russia and their decision to maintain a neutral position while calling for dialogue between the two parties, their stance was interpreted as implicit support for Russia. However, South Africans' membership in BRICS is an important instrument of its foreign policy. (SAIIA, 2022)

In recent years, South Africa wanted to regain a solid foreign policy role as a bridge builder. The aim was to act as an important player for an effective African Union, to be a partner of the West with democratic and human rights principles, and at the same time to cultivate exchanges with China and Russia as a member of the BRICS. Strong party members and President Ramaphosa himself maintain close ties with Russia. This relationship begun already in early days, when the former USSR supported South Africa's liberation struggle. (SWP 2022) Whether South Africa's decision now correlates with its membership in the BRICS and its relationship with Russia can only be guessed. However, Russia's influence is growing, especially in the military sphere, while China has a significant economic presence. (Reuters, 2019)

It looks like that Russia knows what the African countries need at the moment: access to markets, political support and general influence. Indeed, that may have an influence on why half of the African continent did not want to complicate the relationship between them and Russia and therefore abstained from such crucial decisions as the resolution. (SAIIA, 2022) Russia seems to know what African countries need right now: market access, political support, and general influence. Exactly that can be given from Russia's side, without exactly clarifying, what it wants in return. Indeed, it may have an impact on why half of the African continent did not want to complicate its relations between them and Russia and therefore abstained from decisions as important as the resolution. (SAIIA, 2022)

In addition to Russia's large investments in Africa, China rises its power to be more evident rapidly as well. From multi-billion-dollar investments in oil and minerals to the influx of tens of thousands of traders, China's economic and political reach is redefining Africa's ties with the international community. (SAIIA, 2007) Although the Soviet Union and China have been asymmetrical rivals in Africa since the 1960s, their current relationship has improved. Now the two nations are coordinating with each other to challenge Western norms, undermine the unilateral sanctions initiated by the US, and support non-interference in the internal affairs of the states. (SAIIA, 2021)

The Ukraine war further tightened relations between the two countries, so voices claim that if you speak against Russia, you would also speak against China. Since China's historical influence in Tanzania seems to be much greater than Russia's, a triangular relationship between the countries can be carefully assumed. (Br24, 2022) For this assumption, the relationship between China and the former USSR has examined to this day as well as the relationship between China and Tanzania at present.

## 4. Excursus: The relation between Russia, China and Tanzania

Since 1949, the two socialist countries developed a close relationship. The former Soviet Union helped China rebuild its country after the civil war and Japanese occupation. A Close military cooperation was developed and Soviet engineers helped to build nuclear factories. (Bpb, 2019) There was also an enormous political and ideological exchange and influence in almost the same years as Russia's influence in Africa begun. The aspects of the Russian Revolution were particularly prominent in colonial Asia as well. In China, communists' parties had been created on the Leninist model with Soviet support. When Mao Zedong, the official founder of the People's Republic of China, won the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and brought tens of thousands of Soviet specialists into the country. This action can be seen as a recreation of the Chinese state after the Soviet model in the largest development aid program in world history. Many Chinese received their education in the USSR and after their return, they adapted the economic system, the educational, health, and legal systems, the mass media, and Chinese architecture and painting to the Soviet model. Another example from that time was Mao's chief of security, the action of Kang Sheng. He was a former Committer agent who had studied the methods of Stalin's security apparatus in Moscow in the 1930s and founded the Chinese Ministry of Security Gonganbu. In doing so, he created the Chinese Laogai penal camp system and initiated Stalinist purges within the CCP. (Bpb, 2017)

After Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet-Chinese friendship collapsed, and in the 1960s military disputes occurred on the Soviet-Chinese border, which led to an animosity between the two nations in the late 1970s. By the mid-1980s, however, these tensions subsided, and the border issue was finally resolved by current Russian President Vladimir Putin. (LSE, 2017) Today's relations between these two countries are more dependent on overlapping economic and geopolitical interests. Moreover, both regimes are authoritarian, and there is a common political enemy, the West, which is tightens the relations between Russia and China today. Nevertheless, both are interested in promoting authoritarian systems in the immediate neighborhood, but also beyond. In conclusion, the asymmetry in the Russia-China relationship is currently increasing and becoming more evident. Russia now lacks alternative export markets for its raw materials, whose exports to China have increased massively. (Tagesschau, 2022) Regarding the Ukraine war, China more or less speaks a language that meets international standards and stresses its neutrality at the UN stage. But however, towards its own population China speaks way more positive and clearly pro-Russian content visible. (Bpb, 2022)

Russia is a major exporter of raw materials from which China is increasingly profiting. Russia also supplies arms and the necessary military know-how to China, but on the other hand, it is increasingly dependent on imports of industrial goods, which it can no longer buy from the West due to the current situation. To sum up, the asymmetry in relations between Russia and China is growing and becoming more apparent. Russia currently lacks alternative export markets for its raw materials, whose exports to China have increased massively. (Tagesschau, 2022) Concerning the Ukraine war, China more or less speaks a language that meets international standards and emphasizes its neutrality on the UN stage. However, China speaks much more positive and pro-Russian content visibly to its population. (Bpb, 2022)

But how big is Chinas influence in Tanzania?

Already shortly after the independence of Tanganyika, the cooperation between the two countries began. Nyerere pursued a policy of African socialism and urgently needed support from abroad after the final withdrawal of the British colonial rulers. On the other hand, China was looking for international recognition and also sought to provide an ideological counterweight to the to create the former USSR. For this purpose, allies with similar ideological ideas were sought among the young African states. Tanzania was present one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations and cooperation have been agreed. (KAS Tanzania Länderbericht, 2018)

Today, China is the biggest investor in Tanzania and also the largest exporter of goods to Tanzania. We are talking about an investment Volume of 7 billion USD in 2019 and China is Tanzania's fifth largest export destination. However, this relationship seems not be equal. There is a huge trade imbalance between both economies is due to the fact that for every dollar exported to China, Tanzania receives 10 USD worth of imports from China. Besides that, the current practice of cooperation between the two countries is criticized a lot. Voices say that China is gaining much more out of its investments than its partners. Chinas is influence is enormous, but Tanzania is trying to get as much profit out as possible. (CAP, 2020)

Another thing China and Tanzania had in common in 2022 was their decision in the UN-Resolution, both abstained and voted with that action in the publics eyes in Russia's favor. (SCMP, 2022) To sum up from this chapter, China has not only enjoyed good relations with Russia since the beginning of its own history, but also with Tanzania and other African countries. All three countries benefit and influence each other more or less and their relationship could be seen as a triangle, especially regarding the UN-Resolution. However, the fact that China's foreign activities could have influenced Tanzania's and perhaps other African countries' decision to abstain can only be presumed. China's influence in

Tanzania is once again great, while Russia and Tanzania benefit from it on the one hand, but it is also manipulated by China in its political and economic decisions. Since China has also benefited significantly from its relationship with Russia, especially since the Ukraine war, it is only in its interest to maintain good relations with Russia now.

#### 5. Conclusion

Russia's influence on African countries begun already even before Tanzania got its independence. Its ideologies of socialism and communism have inspired the politics and economy of many third world countries, especially Tanzania. Even after the collapse of the USSR, Russia is now gaining back its foothold within different areas, such as military cooperation, but also in different politic agreements. As both countries do highly profit from this cooperation's, it is understandable that Tanzania probably does not want to raise its voice against Russia, as their Relationships already started that early. However, Tanzania is not the only African country, who abstained to give any statement to the current Situation. After some investigation it showed, that Russia is not just only getting its foot back into Tanzania, but also in other African countries as well.

Besides Russia, there is another big Investor taking place in African countries, whereby its investments in Tanzania are enormous by now. China invests in several multi-Billion Dollar projects in Tanzania and besides that has a good relation to Russia as well, so that some voices claim, that if someone raises its word against Russia, this goes against China as well.

Bringing these points together, it is obvious that Tanzania could not raise its voice against both of its biggest Partners since risking to lose their trust and will to cooperate as Tanzania is highly profiting from that. No matter what, to keep its good relations to the West and European partners as well, Tanzania could also not vote against said Resolution.

In conclusion, Russia and China may have had an influence of Tanzania's decision in the UN Resolution.

And maintain Tanzania's good relations and partners in near future without being critized too much from both sides, it was the only right way to stay neutral like many other African countries as well.

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