KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG (KAS)

FOREIGN RELATIONS SURVEY - WAVE V

ANALYTICAL REPORT

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About Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung – Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a German political foundation that promotes civic education, policy analysis and international dialogue. Active in Germany and worldwide, KAS has an office in Amman since 1982. Their programs in Jordan provide capacity building and dialogue platforms for youth, civil society and political institutions. KAS encourages research and reflections about Jordan, its role in the Middle East and its relations with Europe.

About NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions – NAMA is a technology-driven strategic intelligence solutions provider to key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. NAMA strives to advance political, social, and economic development in the MENA region, and more specifically in Jordan by utilizing over 100 years of combined collective professional experience in polling, research, security, business consultancy, investments, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainable socio-economic development. We retain a highly experienced and agile team of researchers, consultants, experts, economists, and analysts that enrich and drive our multidisciplinary approach to transforming raw and big data into actionable intelligence that enables our clients to make strategic decisions, and who share our mission of enabling an environment that facilitates socio-economic development and informed policymaking.

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Executive Summary

Introduction: About this Survey

NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, in partnership with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) conducted the fifth wave of the Foreign Relations Survey, which explores Jordanians' perceptions of Jordan's foreign relations as well as their views on international affairs and regional geopolitical dynamics. Data for this wave of the survey was collected in July 2025, over a nationally representative sample of 1,248 adult Jordanians. The below table illustrates the breakdown of the sample:

Governorates		Gender		Age Groups		
		Male	Female	18-34	35-49	50+
Irbid	16.4%	47.6%	52.5%	43.0%	36.6%	20.4%
Jerash	2.0%	52.7%	47.2%	49.8%	27.8%	22.3%
Ajloun	2.4%	45.9%	54.1%	62.1%	16.0%	22.0%
Mafraq	5.9%	47.5%	52.5%	58.8%	29.8%	11.5%
Amman	43.4%	50.0%	50.0%	47.7%	32.0%	20.3%
Balqa	5.4%	48.5%	51.5%	45.4%	29.9%	24.7%
Zarqa	14.3%	51.5%	48.4%	63.2%	19.6%	17.1%
Madaba	1.9%	49.4%	50.6%	62.6%	20.2%	17.2%
Karak	3.6%	45.0%	55.1%	49.7%	28.8%	21.5%
Maan	1.5%	47.0%	53.0%	43.0%	33.2%	23.8%
Tafileh	1.1%	48.3%	51.7%	54.9%	30.3%	14.8%
Aqaba	2.3%	51.4%	48.5%	68.6%	21.8%	9.5%
Total	**100.0%**	**50.0%**	**50.0%**	**50.9%**	**29.6%**	**19.5%**

Table 1: Sample Breakdown

The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews using electronic tablets on which the survey questionnaire was programmed. The survey questionnaire was designed cooperatively between KAS and NAMA, featuring (a) General – Foreign Policy Attitudes; (b) Jordan's Foreign Relations; (c) Geopolitical Dynamics – Regional and International Conflicts; (d) The Arab Israeli Conflict; (e) Perceptions of Germany; and (f) Demographics.

General – Foreign Policy Attitudes

Findings reveal that Jordanians overwhelmingly believe their country is perceived abroad as safe, secure, and stable, with 42.5% identifying stability as the cornerstone of Jordan's global image. Cultural attributes—chivalry, generosity, and hospitality—follow closely, cited by 25.1%, while tourism and heritage are seen as key contributors to Jordan's external reputation. Negative associations remain minimal, underscoring confidence in the country's international standing.

Public perceptions of foreign policy effectiveness reflect strong confidence in Jordan's traditional and symbolic roles. Majorities rated foreign policy as very effective in promoting tourism (62.6%), safeguarding Jerusalem's holy sites (60.7%), and defending Palestinian rights (59.7%). Similarly, over half view Jordan as successful in securing refugee support and strengthening its regional presence. However, respondents were less convinced of success in economic diplomacy —only about 38% found efforts to attract investments or secure financial aid highly effective—highlighting a gap between diplomatic recognition and tangible economic returns.

When asked about foreign policy priorities, nearly half of respondents emphasized economic development —including investment attraction, job creation, and growth—as Jordan's top diplomatic goal. The Palestinian cause ranked second, reaffirming its deep connection to national identity and foreign policy. Security, bilateral relations, tourism promotion, and aid acquisition followed at lower levels, illustrating a clear hierarchy that places economic progress at the center of foreign policy expectations.

Perceptions of Jordan's regional role remain largely positive, though slightly tempered since 2023. While 68% still believe the country's influence has grown, optimism has softened, with fewer describing it as a "significant increase." Those who felt influence declined pointed primarily to regional instability (28.7%) and domestic economic hardships (28.4%), reflecting awareness of both external and internal constraints.

The Palestinian–Israeli conflict continues to resonate deeply across society. Over 70% of Jordanians reported that it affects their daily lives to varying degrees, underscoring the extent to which regional conflict shapes local realities, from perceptions of security to mobility and livelihood stability.

Jordan's Foreign Relations

Public perceptions of Jordan's alliances and international relations reveal a clear and enduring hierarchy centered around Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Egypt, underscoring the stability of Jordan's traditional partnerships. Saudi Arabia is viewed as Jordan's closest political ally (33.6%), reflecting the strength of political, economic, and security ties, followed by the United States (19.2%) and Egypt (12.7%). The Palestinian cause remains deeply intertwined with foreign relations, cited by nearly 10% of respondents, while other partners—such as the UK, Syria, and Qatar—register marginally.

Perceptions of economic partnerships similarly highlight continuity and gradual shifts. The United States (36%) and Saudi Arabia (32.6%) remain the dominant perceived economic supporters, despite declines from earlier peaks. Emerging powers such as China experienced brief spikes in optimism but failed to sustain momentum. Overall, Jordanians continue to view their economic future as tied to these two key partners, reflecting stability in long-standing relationships paired with tempered openness toward new players.

In terms of aid perceptions, Saudi Arabia (24.3%) and the United States (22.8%) again top the list, together accounting for nearly half of responses. Gulf partners—particularly Qatar (13.7%) and the UAE (11.6%)—also feature strongly, reinforcing the view that Jordan's aid flows and financial support are primarily anchored in the Gulf and the United States.

Looking forward, Saudi Arabia dominates as the country Jordanians most wish to cooperate with in the future (30.3%), while enthusiasm toward the United States continues to erode (10.6%). Palestine's rise to nearly 10% reflects growing affinity toward neighboring solidarity, while interest in China and Turkey has declined notably since their previous peaks.

Across the board, perceptions of political relations remain overwhelmingly positive with key allies: Saudi Arabia (87.7%), the United States (83.9%), Egypt (84.3%), and the UAE (81.8%) lead, reflecting robust bilateral confidence. Conversely, Israel (33.9%) and Iran (47.2%) remain at the lowest levels, illustrating deep and persistent public distrust.

Support for strengthening political relations follows similar patterns—highest with Saudi Arabia (82.1%), Qatar (83.3%), and Egypt (80%), and strong but slightly lower with China (82.8%). Conversely, support for strengthening ties with the United States has fallen from 70.6% in 2023 to 61.5% in 2025, while limiting ties with Israel remains overwhelming at 77.8%. European partners such as the EU, Germany, and France are viewed positively yet occupy a secondary tier, indicating respect but limited emotional resonance.

On security perceptions, Israel has become the overwhelming perceived threat, rising sharply from roughly 50% in 2023 to over 76% in 2025, while concerns about Iran (9%) remain secondary.

Evaluations of countries' overall roles in Jordan reinforce these patterns: Saudi Arabia, China, and Qatar rank as the most positively viewed actors, while Israel and Iran are seen as deeply negative. The EU, UN, and GCC enjoy broad support, while global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank evoke more cautious approval.

Admiration for foreign political figures remains fragmented. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains the most respected international leader (18.6%) despite a steep decline, followed by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (10%) and the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (7.5%).

Geopolitical Dynamics – Regional and International Conflicts

Perceptions of regional stability in the Middle East remain dominated by volatility and uncertainty. Although optimism briefly surged in 2023—when nearly half of Jordanians (45.6%) viewed the region as stable—confidence collapsed by early 2024, with only 9.3% describing it as stable and 90% perceiving instability. By September 2025, modest recovery was recorded (27% stable), but three-quarters still saw the region as insecure, underscoring persistent pessimism amid shifting geopolitical tensions.

When asked about countries' roles in the region, Saudi Arabia emerged as the most preferred actor (81%), followed by the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and China, all of which have strengthened their standing. Conversely, confidence in the United States declined sharply from 76% in 2023 to 64% in 2025, signaling waning faith in Western influence. Israel and Iran remain the least welcome actors, consistently viewed as destabilizing forces.

Jordanians increasingly perceive Arab and Asian powers—notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and China—as stabilizing, while trust in Western powers remains cautious. Positive views toward Saudi Arabia (83.6%), Qatar (77.8%), and Egypt and Turkey (mid-70s) reflect a tilt toward pragmatic regional diplomacy. The US saw partial recovery in favorability (60%) but still lags behind regional leaders. Meanwhile, Iran (25.9%) and Israel (4.1%) remain overwhelmingly seen as destabilizing, reinforcing deep-seated regional mistrust.

Perceptions of international influence confirm continued US dominance (83%) but also a rapidly shifting outlook. Looking ten years ahead, only 50.3% expect the U.S. to remain the leading power, while China's anticipated influence surges to 28.5%, reflecting growing expectations of multipolarity. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia (14.5%) and Israel (13.9%) are currently seen as the most influential actors, but a large share (41%) believes foreign powers hold the real sway, a view expected to persist.

Security perceptions reveal Israel's growing prominence as the principal threat, rising from around 50% in 2023 to nearly 75% in 2025, while Iran (9%) and the U.S. (11%) have declined as perceived threats. These shifts underscore a heightened focus on Israel's regional actions, particularly amid the Gaza conflict. Relatedly, 75% of respondents blame Israel for the Israel–Iran war, while 10% hold Iran responsible. Regarding Jordan's stance on the Israel–Iran conflict, half (50.2%) favor neutrality and nearly 40% advocate diplomacy, showing overwhelming support for restraint and conflict de-escalation. Only a small minority back either side, confirming Jordanians' preference for balanced foreign policy rooted in stability and peace.

Concerns over US military expansion in the Middle East are pronounced, as 60.5% believe it would make Jordan more vulnerable, while just one-third see it as a source of security. Yet, despite regional insecurity, support for strengthening Jordan's military capabilities is nearly universal (91.7% fully support). The US (24%), Saudi Arabia (16%), and Egypt (15%) are the most preferred partners for such capacity building, reflecting trust in established security allies.

On Jordan–Syria relations, the majority (58.3%) favor gradually rebuilding ties under Ahmad Al-Shara's leadership, while 37% prefer more immediate normalization. Confidence in Al-Shara himself is measured—65% express at least some trust, though few do so fully—indicating a cautiously optimistic view toward renewed engagement with Damascus.

The Arab Israeli Conflict

Public opinion on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict reflects deepening skepticism and fatigue toward traditional peace frameworks. While support for the two-state solution once dominated—reaching 46% in 2019—it declined over time amid growing disillusionment, with 52% rejecting both one- and two-state models by late 2023. Optimism briefly rebounded in early 2024, when support for the two-state framework surged to 51.1%, but by September 2025, it had dropped again to 42.8%, with nearly half of Jordanians once more rejecting all conventional options. The one-state solution remains a minority view (around 10%), suggesting limited public resonance with the idea of shared governance.

Generational divides are striking. Older Jordanians continue to back the two-state model (56.4%), while younger respondents express deeper skepticism—nearly half of those under 35 reject both frameworks. This reflects not only a loss of confidence in diplomacy but also widening generational differences in political outlook.

Jordan is overwhelmingly perceived as the strongest supporter of Palestinian statehood, cited by 77% of respondents—far ahead of all others. Yemen (5%), Qatar (2.2%), Iran (1.8%), and Saudi Arabia (1.5%) trail distantly, underscoring Jordan's central and credible role in advocating for Palestinian rights. This leadership also extends to perceptions of the Gaza conflict, where 43.5% identify Jordan's position as closest to their own—well ahead of Yemen (15.6%), Egypt (9.3%), and Qatar (8.5%)—reflecting strong alignment between national policy and public sentiment.

In contrast, at the international level, 28.3% of Jordanians see no foreign country as aligned with their stance on Gaza, signaling broad disillusionment with global powers. Among those who do, Turkey (9.5%), Germany (8.4%), and France (7.9%) top the list, while Russia (6.7%) and China

(6.6%) hold moderate appeal. Western powers such as the US (3.8%) and UK (3.9%) rank much lower, reflecting deep mistrust of their roles in the conflict.

Thirty years after the Jordan–Israel peace treaty, public opinion remains split but pragmatic. A slim majority (52.1%) favors maintaining the treaty to preserve stability, while 45.5% advocate canceling it and reverting to a "no-war, no-peace" state. Support for the treaty is strongest among middle-aged Jordanians and those residing in the North (55.1%), while calls for cancellation are slightly higher among older citizens and those in the Center (46.4%). Despite enduring mistrust toward Israel, most Jordanians appear to prioritize peace and stability over renewed confrontation, signaling cautious realism in public attitudes toward bilateral relations.

Perceptions of Germany

Perceptions of European influence and support reveal that Jordanians see Germany (24%) and the United Kingdom (23.6%) as Europe's most influential powers, followed by France (16.5%), while Russia lags far behind (4.8%). The same two—the UK (31.7%) and Germany (24.7%)—are viewed as Jordan's primary European supporters, underscoring confidence in their sustained diplomatic and economic engagement. Nonetheless, more than a quarter of respondents either see no influential European country (16.4%) or express uncertainty (8.6%), reflecting limited faith in Europe's broader strategic presence.

When asked what comes to mind when thinking of Germany, Jordanians continue to associate it strongly with industrial strength and high-quality manufacturing, though perceptions have become more polarized. While positive impressions of Germany as a technological and economic powerhouse rebounded to 31% in 2025, negative perceptions also emerged—7.5% now describe it as a "supporter of Israel" or "perpetrator of conflict," and 5.8% view it as "discriminatory." These trends suggest a mix of admiration for Germany's economic achievements and growing criticism of its political positioning, particularly regarding the Gaza conflict.

Despite these tensions, Germany's overall image improved significantly between early 2024 and late 2025. Over 90% of respondents recognize it as innovative and a producer of high-quality products, and over 80% view it as safe and stable. Positive perceptions expanded across humanitarian and democratic dimensions: recognition of Germany as welcoming to refugees rose to 73%, and as a defender of human rights to 69%. These trends mark a shift from viewing Germany merely as an industrial leader to seeing it as a moral and global actor, admired for democracy, governance, and social inclusion.

Germany's reputation as a model nation also strengthened. Nearly all respondents (92%) cite it as exemplary in product quality, while over 85% admire its economic system, public services, and leadership in green energy. Similarly, perceptions of Germany as a model for democracy, freedom, and human rights have grown, with particularly strong gains in views of refugee integration (up from 51% to 69%).

When comparing Germany's political influence today versus a decade ago, Jordanians perceive limited change. In Europe, two-thirds see Germany's influence as stronger, but in the Middle East, views are more tempered—just over half believe it has grown, while 43% in Jordan feel it remains the same. This suggests steady visibility rather than a transformative rise in regional influence.

1. Introduction

1.1 Context

In recent years, Jordan has been navigating a rapidly changing regional and international environment, marked by persistent conflict, economic challenges, and shifting alliances. Against this backdrop, foreign relations have become a cornerstone of the Kingdom's stability and resilience. Jordan's diplomacy has sought to balance its historic commitments, most notably its custodianship of Jerusalem's holy sites and its advocacy for the Palestinian cause, with the pressing need to attract investment, secure aid, and ensure security in a volatile region.

The eruption of multiple regional conflicts, coupled with global power competition, has further underscored Jordan's delicate position. From the war in Gaza and the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, to the deepening influence of Gulf states and the growing reach of China, Jordan finds itself surrounded by competing actors whose policies directly affect its security and economic prospects. At the same time, domestic pressures, including high unemployment, economic strain, and demographic shifts, have heightened the importance of foreign policy as a tool for safeguarding livelihoods and sustaining public trust.

Since 2019, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions have conducted multiple waves of the Foreign Relations Survey to capture Jordanians' evolving perceptions of their country's external relations. This fifth wave, carried out in July 2025, builds on earlier findings to provide updated insights into how citizens view Jordan's allies, its most important partners, and the role of global powers in shaping the region's future.

Particular attention is placed on Germany, reflecting the depth of its cooperation with Jordan and the need to better understand how Jordanians perceive this partnership in comparison to other regional and international actors. Through these findings, the survey sheds light on the priorities and expectations that Jordanians hold for their foreign policy, revealing the intersection between external dynamics and domestic aspirations at a critical juncture for the Kingdom.

1.2 Survey Objectives

Jordan's foreign policy has long been shaped by its unique geopolitical position, balancing deep-rooted commitments with the need to adapt to shifting regional and global dynamics. In recent years, mounting regional conflicts, economic pressures, and the intensifying rivalry between international powers have only heightened the importance of understanding how Jordanians perceive their country's external relations. The KAS Foreign Relations Survey – Wave V therefore provides an opportunity to capture these evolving perceptions, offering insights into how citizens view Jordan's allies, its strategic priorities, and the roles of global and regional actors in shaping the Kingdom's future.

This fifth wave of the survey builds on earlier editions conducted in 2019, 2021, and 2023, allowing for continuity and comparative analysis across time. By tracking Jordanians' attitudes, the survey not only highlights emerging trends but also sheds light on areas where expectations remain unmet or where new opportunities for policy development may arise. With particular attention devoted to Germany's role, the findings aim to strengthen understanding of bilateral relations and their resonance within Jordanian society. To that end, the primary objective of this survey is to evaluate Jordanians' perceptions of their country's foreign relations and the broader geopolitical environment in 2025. Specifically, the survey focuses on the following areas:

- **Perceptions of Foreign Policy** – Assess Jordanians' views on the effectiveness of their country's foreign policy in advancing national priorities, from safeguarding Jerusalem's holy sites and supporting the Palestinian cause to securing economic benefits and promoting stability.
- **Alliances and Partnerships** – Examine public opinion on Jordan's closest political and economic allies, including preferences for future cooperation, and perceptions of which countries provide the most meaningful support to the Kingdom.
- **Geopolitical Dynamics** – Capture Jordanians' assessments of regional conflicts, international power competition, and the role of different actors, both regional and global, in stabilizing or destabilizing the Middle East.
- **Perceptions of Germany** – Explore how Jordanians view Germany's role as a partner, its influence in Europe and the Middle East, and the potential areas for strengthening bilateral cooperation.
- **Public Expectations** – Identify the key foreign policy priorities that citizens believe Jordan should pursue, offering guidance for policymakers and international partners on how to align with public sentiment.

Taken together, these objectives ensure the survey provides a comprehensive picture of Jordanian public opinion, highlighting the intersection of foreign policy, regional stability, and domestic aspirations at a time of significant transformation.

1.3 Research Methodology and Work Plan

NAMA and KAS collaborated on implementing the Wave V of the Foreign Relations Survey to gauge Jordanians' perceptions of Jordan's foreign relations across multiple layers. The survey explores Jordanians' perceptions of Jordan's most important allies, economic supporters, and preferred future partners. It also looked to explore how Jordanians view the roles played by key states in the region in addition to their perceptions of regional geopolitical aspects, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, regional instability, and the international world order at large. The survey did pay a great deal of attention to German-Jordanian relations, as it looked to explore how Jordanians perceive Germany, the importance and shape of the bilateral relations, and Jordanians' preferences for German support going forward.

The survey was conducted between the second and fourth weeks of July 2025. The NAMA research team achieved a total of 1,248 survey interviews, drawn from a probability stratified sample design which ensured a systematic random distribution from 150 locations across Jordan. The sampling frame was drawn from the department of statistics census date of 2015. The margin of error in this survey was estimated at about ±2.5 points, with a confidence of 95%. The survey was carried out by 16 interviewers through face-to-face interviews, using handheld tablets to reduce human error. The survey questionnaire was designed collaboratively between the NAMA and KAS teams.

The survey questionnaire consists of five sections that serve to compile and track benchmarked data on Jordanians' perceptions of Jordan's foreign relations, with significant emphasis on German-Jordanian relations. These sections are as follows:

- Section 1 – General – Foreign Policy Attitudes
- Section 2 – Jordan's Foreign Relations
- Section 3 – Geopolitical Dynamics – Regional and International Conflicts
- Section 4 – The Arab Israeli Conflict
- Section 5 – Perceptions of Germany
- Section 6 – Demographics

Once the final version of the questionnaire was approved and translated, NAMA's methodologist programmed the survey onto electronic tablets and led a training of the field research team. The training included a discussion of the research objectives, an explanation of every question, and training on using the program as well as mock interviews.

Following that, the field team proceeded with the data collection phase, whereby the field supervisor provided them with daily assignments containing their daily targets of interviews as well as specific demographic factors to meet to ensure that the sample was nationally representative. Additionally, the supervisors illustrated the skipping patterns for the enumerators. The supervisors coordinated with the office team to synch the tablets daily to upload the completed questionnaires to NAMA's servers.

Then, NAMA's analysts reviewed the data on a daily basis to apply quality assurance measures, which reviews for logic, context, mis-punching, or other unintended errors. The review looks at the data as a whole along with assessing each enumerator's completed questionnaires.

Once the dataset passes the quality assurance measures, it is delivered to the data analysis team, who simultaneously handle the statistical analysis of the multiple-choice questions in addition to the coding and analysis of the open-ended answers through statistical analysis software such as SPSS & CSPro. The analysis also included measuring mean scores and comparisons with the 2022 and 2020 waves of the same survey.

1.4 Sample

NAMA's Methodologist designed the nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. The purpose of sampling is mainly the acquisition of survey feedback that is representative of the target audience in an informative manner. In this specific project, the target audience is those of age 18 and above on a national level.

This sample was designed in a probability proportional to size methodology to provide valid and reliable survey estimates across the entire Kingdom of Jordan, including rural and urban areas, each of the twelve governorates, and smaller communities within. The sample was also designed to ensure reliable estimates on regional levels (North, Center, and South). Jordan's regions were grouped from governorates as follows: North (covering Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, and Mafraq), Central (covering Amman, Balqa, Madaba, and Zarqa), and South (covering Aqaba, Karak, Ma'an, and Tafieleh).

Using the latest update of 2015 Jordan Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame, a sample of 1,200 respondents was drawn using stratified cluster sampling with a margin of error of (±3%) with confidence level of 95%. For that, Jordan will be subdivided into area units called census blocks, which were then regrouped to form clusters – the Primary Sampling Units (PSU-Blocks) for this survey. Stratification was achieved on three levels: (a) the classification of governorates into rural and urban areas, (b) administrative divisions within each urban and rural area, and (c) clusters will be identified and selected within each administrative division. The distribution of the sample among these stratums was distributed proportionally to the relative population size of each stratum (probability-proportional to the cluster size).

Once the clusters were sampled, a household listing operation of these clusters was conducted and a frame of the households in each cluster was developed. Collective homes such as student housing, prisons, nursing homes, factory accommodations are to be excluded as they do not fit the definition of a Jordanian Household.

The objectives of this study stipulate that these households be Jordanian and to have at least one member aged 18 and above. Following the determination of the targeted community in each cluster, a sample of 10 households was drawn from each cluster with an equal probability systematic selection. A boosting sample in underrepresented governorates was drawn to enable a better distribution and better reliability at governorate level analysis. Boosting will increase interviews to a minimum of 65 cases in each governorate. The “Kish table”, “next- birthday”, or “last birthday” respondent selection method were used to identify the respondent for which the respondent answers questions.

2. General – Foreign Policy Attitudes

When Jordanians were asked about how they think non-Jordanians perceive Jordan’s image abroad, the purpose of the question was to gauge national perceptions of the country’s soft power, reputation, and how Jordanians believe their country is positioned internationally. This provides insight into how citizens themselves interpret Jordan’s external branding and whether they feel it is associated more with stability, culture, or economic challenges.

The responses in figure 1 showed that the overwhelming majority 42.5% believe Jordan is primarily seen as safe, secure, and stable, underscoring how strongly Jordanians view stability as the cornerstone of the country’s international image-particularly significant in a region marked by volatility. The second most common perception, cited by 25.1%, was that “Jordan and its people are chivalrous, generous, and hospitable,” reflecting how Jordanians believe cultural and social values shape foreign views of the country.

Tourism was also highlighted, with 10.7% saying that Jordan is seen abroad as a “great destination for tourism, with antiquities and religious sites.” This indicates an awareness of how Jordan’s heritage and tourism sector contribute to its external profile.

By comparison, fewer respondents thought Jordan is viewed negatively or as a poor country 5.5%, while very small percentages associated its image with being a developing state at 3.1% or praised for good leadership and providing aid 3.2%. Only 2.7% thought Jordan is seen negatively overall. In sum, this question helps to gauge how Jordanians believe their country is branded abroad, revealing that they see stability and hospitality as the main pillars of Jordan’s external image, while economic hardships and developmental status are less dominant in shaping perceptions.



Figure 1:Thinking about Jordan's image abroad, how do you think non-Jordanians see Jordan?

In exploring perceptions of Jordan's diplomatic performance, the survey asked respondents to assess the effectiveness of foreign policy in achieving its core objectives (Figure 2). The question was designed to gauge how citizens evaluate the country's ability to deliver on its diplomatic priorities, highlighting where Jordan's foreign policy is perceived as most impactful and where it faces greater challenges across political, humanitarian, and economic dimensions.

The results in figure 2 show that Jordanians see foreign policy as highly effective in areas tied to the country's historic and political identity. The strongest endorsements went to positioning Jordan as a global destination for tourism 62.6% very effective, advancing Jordan's role as custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem 60.7%, and defending the rights of Palestinians 59.7%. These results highlight that Jordanians feel their foreign policy resonates most where it reinforces long-standing national roles and responsibilities of symbolic, religious, and political importance. Confidence was also high in positioning Jordan as a regional player 56.9% and in acquiring support for refugees 56.2%, reflecting the belief that Jordan is recognized abroad as both a mediator and a humanitarian actor.



Figure 2:Thinking about Jordan's foreign policy, in your opinion, to what extent would you say Jordan's foreign policy is effective in achieving each of the following objectives?

By contrast, foreign policy was seen as least effective in securing economic benefits. Only 38.6% rated attracting foreign investments as very effective, and 37.9% said the same about acquiring economic support. In both cases, more than a quarter of Jordanians rated performance as somewhat or very ineffective, underscoring skepticism about Jordan's ability to translate diplomatic outreach into concrete financial gains.

Taken together, these findings mean that Jordanians largely view their foreign policy as credible and impactful in defending national causes, safeguarding Jerusalem's holy sites, supporting refugees, and enhancing Jordan's regional standing. However, there is a clear perception that foreign policy has yet to deliver as strongly on economic diplomacy, pointing to an area where expectations remain unmet and where future improvement could strengthen Jordan's overall external strategy.

After evaluating the effectiveness of Jordan's foreign policy, respondents were asked to identify its most important objective (Figure 3). Their answers point overwhelmingly to economic development as the top priority. Nearly half highlighted the need for agreements that drive investment, growth, and employment-signaling that for many Jordanians, diplomacy is ultimately judged by its contribution to improving livelihoods.



Figure 3: In your opinion, what should Jordan's most important foreign policy priority be?

The second most significant priority, cited by just over a fifth of respondents, was advocating for Palestinian rights and protecting holy sites in Jerusalem. This underlines how deeply the Palestinian cause remains tied to Jordan's foreign policy identity and the country's role as a custodian of religious and cultural heritage. Other priorities, though less prominent, still reflect important strands of thinking. Around one in ten stressed the need to ensure Jordan's own safety and regional stability, while smaller shares pointed to enhancing bilateral relations with global powers, promoting the country internationally to draw more tourists, and securing aid to improve services. Together, these responses illustrate a clear hierarchy of priorities, with economic development at the top, the Palestinian cause in second place, and other concerns: security, diplomacy, tourism, and aid, occupying a more secondary role in the public's vision of Jordan's foreign policy agenda.

Following earlier questions on Jordan's foreign policy priorities, respondents were asked to reflect on how the country's regional role has evolved over the past five years. As Figure 4 demonstrates, most Jordanians believe the Kingdom has maintained or enhanced its standing, while a smaller share perceive a decline-a pattern that underscores the mixed but generally positive assessment of Jordan's influence in the region.

Public perceptions of Jordan's regional role remain largely positive, though slightly less enthusiastic than in 2023. In August 2023, nearly three-quarters of respondents felt Jordan's influence had increased, with 35.9% saying it had risen significantly and 38.9% somewhat. By September 2025, optimism persisted but softened, 32% saw a significant increase and 36.3% a moderate one, while 20.4% felt Jordan's role had simply remained the same since the Gaza war. Only a small minority 11% believed it had declined. Overall, Jordanians continue to view their country as a stable regional actor, though perceptions of rapid growth have cooled.



Figure 4:Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion when describing Jordan's regional role over the past five years? (Comparison to previous poll)

Respondents who viewed Jordan's regional role as having declined over the past five years pointed to a combination of external and domestic pressures driving this perception. As shown in figure 5, the most cited reasons were regional instability and conflict, mentioned by 28.7% of respondents, and worsening economic conditions, including rising unemployment and price hikes, at 28.4%.



Figure 5: If answered with "decreased", why?

Beyond these, 12.8% pointed to the general pressures Jordan continues to endure, while a smaller share criticized corruption and ineffective officials 6.9% or noted the impact of spoilers undermining peace efforts 4.6%. The challenges of an influx of refugees and overpopulation were highlighted by 3.5%, and 10.7% admitted they were unsure, with 4.3% mentioning other reasons.

Overall, the responses suggest that Jordanians perceive their country's diminished regional influence as largely shaped by a combination of external crises and internal vulnerabilities, painting a picture of a nation navigating complex regional and domestic pressures simultaneously.

The question was asked to get a sense of how much the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is felt in Jordanians' everyday lives, whether it stays at the level of politics and headlines, or whether it seeps into routines like work, mobility, and personal security.

For many, the conflict is not distant at all. As shown in figure 6, about 51.2% of Jordanians said it has affected them to a great extent, and another 20.1% reported a moderate impact. A smaller share, 7.7% said it touched their lives only a little, while around one in five 21.0% said it has not affected them at all. What this tells us is that nearly seven in ten Jordanians feel the conflict as a lived reality, shaping how secure they feel and how freely they can go about daily life.



Figure 6:To what extent has the Palestinian–Israeli conflict affected your daily life? [e.g., mobility, work, security, and others]

At the same time, the fact that a sizeable minority report no effect shows how uneven these experiences are, some people carry the weight of regional instability heavily, while others remain insulated from its direct consequences.

3. Jordan's Foreign Relations

This section discusses how Jordanians view their country's closest political allies and looks to shed light on which partnerships they believe matter most for Jordan's security and diplomacy. The results in figure 7 show a clear hierarchy of alliances in Jordanians' minds. Saudi Arabia was chosen most often, by 33.6% of respondents, underscoring the importance people attach to Amman's close political, economic, and security ties with Saudi Arabia. The United States came second at 19.2%, reflecting its role as a long-standing strategic partner, even if views toward American policy in the region are often divided. Egypt followed with 12.7%, highlighting perceptions of strong coordination between Jordan and Egypt on regional issues. Palestine was cited by 9.9%, showing how deeply the Palestinian cause remains tied to Jordanians' sense of foreign relations.

Other countries were mentioned far less frequently: the UK at 4.3%, Syria at 3.1%, Qatar at 3.0%, and Iraq at 1.7%, with the UAE barely registering at 1.0%. At the same time, 3.9% of respondents said Jordan has no close ally, while 2.9% did not know, reflecting a measure of skepticism about external partnerships.

Overall, Jordanians view their country's alliances as anchored primarily in the Arab world, particularly with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while also recognizing the United States as a central external partner. The fact that Palestine features so prominently underlines how closely public perceptions of Jordan's alliances are bound up with the ongoing conflict and its wider regional implications.



Figure 7: In your opinion, which country is Jordan's closest political ally?

After reviewing general perceptions of the country viewed as Jordan's political ally, we now turn to the public perceptions of which country Jordanians consider the closest economic supporter of the country, compared with the results of previous surveys. As shown in Table (2), the United States and Saudi Arabia dominated the scene in 2019, together accounting for more than half of all responses. The United States reached its peak in 2021, when its share jumped to nearly 50%, clearly positioning it as Jordanians' top economic partner. However, this dominance did not last long. The United States declined sharply by 2023 and settled in the mid-thirties by September 2025. A similar trajectory was recorded for Saudi Arabia, which had previously topped the list but also witnessed a gradual decline, despite remaining a strong second according to the latest data.

What is striking is not only the rise and fall in perceptions of these two countries, but also the limited space that other countries occupy in the minds of Jordanians. China briefly emerged in August 2023, reaching 7%, but quickly declined again by 2025. The UAE, Qatar, and the United Kingdom remained at low, single-digit levels without any substantial breakthrough despite their constant presence in the region. Even European countries such as Germany and France, or the European Union as a whole, failed to gain meaningful traction, as support for them did not exceed 1% at best.

Jordanians continue to view the United States and Saudi Arabia as the two main sources of economic support, despite their relatively lower standing compared with previous periods. The declining positive perception of the United States can be attributed to the economic policy repercussions during Donald Trump's second term, when reductions in aid and American spending in the region weakened the economic prospects for Jordan. These cuts affected several sectors that had long benefited from U.S. support, leading to employee layoffs, project freezes, and rising unemployment rates. As a result, many Jordanians now feel that the relationship with the United States no longer offers the same economic benefits it once did, even if it remains strategically important.

As for other countries, despite occasional small improvements, none have managed to sustain them, reinforcing the prevailing impression that the lifelines of the Jordanian economy remain concentrated in just two key partners. This stability, accompanied by minor fluctuations, reflects a mix of enduring traditional relationships and shifting public sentiment toward rising powers such as China.

Response	August 2019	September 2021	August 2023	September 2025
The United States	21.5%	28.5%	27.0%	19.2%
Saudi Arabia	25.2%	23.0%	42.9%	33.6%
Egypt	2.4%	4.7%	3.7%	12.7%
Palestine	4.8%	12.8%	7.5%	9.9%
Qatar	3.8%	2.9%	1.1%	3.0%
The UK	8.8%	5.0%	4.9%	4.3%
Iraq	4.7%	5.8%	1.8%	1.7%
UAE	5.3%	3.3%	3.0%	1.0%

Other	13.5%	9.0%	3.7%	7.9%
Don't Know	5.2%	3.2%	4.2%	2.9%
None	4.8%	1.8%	1.1%	3.9%

Table 2: In your opinion, which country is Jordan's closest political ally? (Comparison with previous polls)

After examining public perception of which country is Jordan's political ally, we turn to examine public perceptions of which country is the closest economic supporter for Jordan, in comparison to previous polls. As shown in table 3, the data shows consistent volatility in Jordanians' perceptions of their closest economic partners, with notable shifts across the past six years. The United States and Saudi Arabia remain the dominant perceived partners, but their standings fluctuate significantly. U.S. support peaks in 2021 at nearly half of respondents before dipping sharply in 2023 and stabilizing at 36% in 2025. Saudi Arabia follows a similar pattern, dropping after 2019, surging in 2023, and settling at 32.6% in 2025. These movements likely reflect changing geopolitical dynamics and aid visibility rather than long-term structural shifts.

Secondary partners maintain low but stable recognition. The UAE shows a steady downward trend from 2019 to 2025, while China remains marginal throughout, with only small variations that never indicate a meaningful rise. Qatar's fluctuations also stay within a narrow range, reflecting limited but persistent visibility.

"Other" experiences a noticeable increase in 2025, indicating a growing sense that Jordan's economic partnerships may be broadening or less easily attributed to a single state.

Overall, the 2025 results depict a more balanced perception between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, a slight rise in secondary partners, and a notable decline from the sharp peaks observed in earlier years, signaling a more diversified and less polarized view of Jordan's economic alliances.

Response	August 2019	September 2021	March 2023	August 2023	September 2025
The United States	24.6%	49.3%	20.5%	40.5%	36%
Saudi Arabia	30.6%	22.7%	40.9%	35.4%	32.6%
China	0.8%	0.65%	0.4%	7.1%	3.8%
UAE	7%	6%	5.0%	4.7%	3.7%
Qatar	3.8%	3.1%	4.9%	1.9%	3.9%
The UK	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.7%
Egypt	0.5%	0.5%	2%	1.1%	1.8%
Turkey	0%	0%	1.1%	0%	0%
EU states such as Germany and France	1.1%	0.4%	0.2%	1.1%	1.4%
Other	12.4%	9.4%	9.3%	2.8%	7.8%
Don't know	10.1%	4.7%	10.5%	3.4%	4.2%
None	8.3%	2.1%	4.3%	0.6%	3.1%

Table 3: In your view, which country is the closest economic supporter/ partner of Jordan? (Comparison with previous polls)

Other countries occasionally make small gains but fail to sustain them, underscoring the durability of the perception that Jordan's economic lifelines are concentrated in just two key partners. This continuity, paired with subtle shifts, reveals both the stability of long-standing relationships and the volatility of public sentiment when it comes to emerging players like China.

Having assessed how Jordanians view their country's international partnerships, the next question turns to perceptions of which nations contribute the most to Jordan through economic and humanitarian aid. Similar to the previous table, the responses in figure 8 show a relatively balanced distribution between Saudi Arabia and the United States, with 24.3% identifying Saudi Arabia and 22.8% identifying the United States as Jordan's main aid providers. These two countries together represent nearly half of public opinion, underscoring their dominant role in how Jordanians perceive external financial support.

Qatar and the United Arab Emirates also feature prominently, with 13.7% and 11.6% respectively, suggesting that Gulf states are broadly recognized as major sources of aid. Taken together, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE account for almost half of the total responses, highlighting the strong association between Jordan's aid flows and the Gulf region.



Figure 8: Which country do you think is giving the most aid to Jordan?

Overall, the results indicate that aid to Jordan is widely perceived as coming from a mix of Western and Gulf sources, with Saudi Arabia and the United States at the forefront. While Gulf states collectively dominate perceptions of aid flows, the role of the United States remains almost equally central, positioning these two actors as the cornerstone of Jordan's external financial support in the eyes of the public.

Looking ahead, respondents were asked which countries Jordan should seek closer cooperation within the future. The data in table 4, shows clear shifts in Jordanian public opinion regarding preferred international partners over the 2019-2025 period. Saudi Arabia consistently dominates, maintaining the highest preference despite a slight decline from its 2023 peak (32.4%) to 30.3% in 2025. The United States, once tied with Saudi Arabia in 2021 at 18%, has experienced a notable drop to 10.6% in 2025, reflecting a steady erosion of its standing.

China and the UAE, both of which rose sharply in 2023, decline again by 2025. China falls from 9.1% in 2023 to just 3%, returning near its 2019 level. The UAE similarly drops from 8.1% to 5.4%, suggesting that their earlier gains were temporary rather than part of a sustained trend.

Qatar and Egypt show moderate increases, with Qatar rising to 7% and Egypt more than doubling from 1.8% in 2023 to 5.1% in 2025, indicating growing regional relevance. Palestine records a striking rebound, climbing from only 3.1% in 2023 to 9.5% in 2025, its highest level across all years, likely driven by recent regional dynamics and solidarity sentiments.

Meanwhile, Turkey's long-term decline continues, dropping from 20.8% in 2019 to just 3.1% in 2025. Syria also rises markedly, reaching 6.9%, its highest level, after years of minimal support.

Overall, the 2025 landscape reflects renewed prioritization of traditional regional partners, weakened appeal of global powers like the US and China, and revived support for certain neighbors such as Palestine and Syria.

Response	August 2019	September 2021	March 2023	August 2023	September 2025
Saudi Arabia	17.3%	18%	32.4%	31.4%	30.3%
The United States	13.4%	18%	12.4%	17.3%	10.6%
China	4.1%	5%	1.7%	9.1%	3%
UAE	4.4%	6%	6.5%	8.1%	5.4%
Qatar	5.4%	6%	13.2%	6.8%	7%
Turkey	20.8%	11%	3.6%	4.2%	3.1%
Palestine	4.7%	9%	2.4%	3.1%	9.5%
Russia	2.3%	1.0%	0.9%	2.4%	2.2%
Egypt	2.5%	4.0%	1.2%	1.8%	5.1%
The UK	3.6%	2%	0.4%	1.7%	0%
Syria	2.3%	1%	2.2%	1.4%	6.9%
Other	15.8%	17%	15.8%	11.4%	13.8%
Don't know	3.4%	2%	7.3%	1.4%	2.9%

Table 4: If you were to choose one, with which country should Jordan cooperate more in the future? (Comparison with previous polls)

This surge reflects the enduring importance of shared political, cultural, and social ties, and a possible desire for closer alignment with neighbors who share Jordan's immediate struggles and aspirations. Similarly, Qatar and the UAE have remained consistently visible, each hovering in the mid-single digits, pointing to Jordanians' recognition of the Gulf states as important, if secondary, partners. On the other hand, Turkey's trajectory is dramatic. Once commanding over 20% in 2019, making it the second most desired partner at that time, it has steadily collapsed to just 3% in 2025.

According to table 4, Jordanians generally view their political relations with most countries as strong and stable, with Saudi Arabia clearly leading. Perceptions of ties with Saudi Arabia reached a peak of over 90 % in 2023 before easing slightly to 87% in 2025, reinforcing its role as Jordan's closest political ally. The United States also scores highly, remaining in the mid-80s despite a slight dip after 2023, reflecting its continued political weight even as economic perceptions have softened. Egypt, the UK, the UAE, Turkey, and Qatar also enjoy consistently strong ratings, often exceeding 80 %, showing that Jordanians see these states as reliable partners. China's rise into the low 80s before dropping back highlights growing respect for its political role, even if not on par with regional allies. By contrast, Israel and Iran remain outliers, with approval well below 50 %. Israel's sharp fall from just over 50 % in 2023 to 33 % in 2025 illustrates how volatile and fragile this relationship is in public opinion.

Overall, Jordanians see their political partnerships as anchored in the Gulf and key global powers, with a clear divide between trusted allies and entrenched adversaries.

Country	August 2019	September 2021	August 2023	September 2025
Saudi Arabia	75.3	82.7	90.6	87.68
The United States	82.2	87.1	89.9	83.93
UK	77.7	79.8	86.4	81.88
Egypt	75.0	83.9	87.0	84.30
UAE	75.3	80.9	85.2	81.78
Turkey	81.3	81.9	84.7	78.13
Qatar	73.7	80.4	85.0	83.33
China	70.3	76.8	81.4	79.25
Iraq	73.7	79.7	81.0	77.10
Germany	65.1	71.3	75.4	73.24
Japan	68.4	71.5	68.6	71.89
Russia	N/A	68.1	68.8	70.04
Syria	66.3	71.7	67.3	79.45
Israel	46.8	48.2	51.1	33.97
Iran	43.6	51	51.8	47.22

Table 5: How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the "………" governments? (Comparison with previous polls – Mean Scores on a scale of 0 to 100, whereby 100 means very good and 0 means very bad)

When it came to Jordanians' preferences on whether to strengthen, maintain, or limit political relations with certain governments, the findings-benchmarked against previous polls-reveal a clear and growing inclination toward strengthening ties with key regional and international partners. What the data in table 5 reveals is a consistent and growing preference among Jordanians for strengthening political relations with key regional and international partners, though the intensity of support varies across countries. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE remain the strongest anchors of Jordan's foreign relations, with support for closer ties consistently exceeding 80% in recent years.

Turkey and Egypt also command strong backing, hovering around the 80% mark, reflecting a steady perception of their strategic importance. China shows a gradual rise, reaching 82.8% by 2025, suggesting a shift toward greater acceptance of its global role.

In contrast, enthusiasm toward the United States has weakened sharply. After a peak of 70.6% in 2023, support dropped to 61.5% in 2025, while calls to limit ties rose to over 11%. Similarly, Syria reflects mixed feelings: while support for stronger relations recovered slightly to 79.2%, negative sentiment remains more pronounced than with most Arab neighbors. Iran and Israel consistently attract the weakest support, with Iran struggling to surpass a quarter of respondents and Israel facing overwhelming rejection, as limiting ties with it remains the dominant view.

Relations with European partners such as the EU, France, and Germany show moderate but stable favorability, mostly in the 65-76 % range, suggesting they are valued but secondary compared to regional alliances. Russia, at 64.8 %, also occupies a middle ground, seen positively but without the same intensity as Arab or regional powers.

Country	August 2019		September 2021		August 2023		September 2025	
	Strengthening	Limiting	Strengthening	Limiting	Strengthening	Limiting	Strengthening	Limiting
Saudi Arabia	55.3	-10.1	70.0	-6.0	84.0	-0.7	82.1	-1.8
Qatar	62.4	-6.3	74.0	-3.0	82.2	-1.1	83.3	-2.4
UAE	62.0	-5.2	69.0	-6.0	82.0	-1.9	74.2	-6.0
Turkey	72.5	-1.7	76.0	-2.0	81.8	-1.8	81.3	-1.8
Egypt	55.8	-6.3	71.0	-3.0	79.3	-1.4	80.0	-1.4
China	61.3	-4.3	60.0	-8.0	77.4	-2.2	82.8	-1.4
Iraq	60.2	-4.2	69.0	-4.0	76.2	-2.0	77.5	-1.6
UK	58.1	-5.8	64.0	-6.0	73.0	-3.2	72.0	-5.1
United States	52.6	-12.8	65.0	-7.0	70.6	-4.2	61.5	-11.2
Japan	59.9	-4.7	60.0	-7.0	70.1	-3.0	75.5	-2.4
Germany	56.8	-5.3	61.0	-5.0	68.1	-2.5	71.0	-3.8
Syria	50.0	-9.3	56.0	-7.0	58.7	-9.6	79.2	-2.4
Iran	21.5	-40.4	25.0	-39.0	26.3	-35.5	25.7	-33.2
Israel	7.1	-69.9	8.0	-74.0	10.3	-63.6	5.2	-77.8

Table 6: Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the (...) governments, or maintaining them at the present level, or limiting them? (Comparison to previous polls)

Germany's image as an industrial powerhouse continues to dominate Jordanians' perceptions of why stronger bilateral ties matter as shown in figure 9. Over half of respondents in February 2024 55.4% cited Germany's strong, industrial economy and its potential to help improve Jordan's, though this figure declined to 43.6% by September 2025.

Economic cooperation remains the most compelling motive, yet there is growing diversification in the reasons cited. Support for strengthening ties based on Germany's influence and foreign relations increased slightly to 11.4%, while motivations linked to technology and innovation also rose modestly to 9.8%. Notably, reasons such as investment and free trade 18% and technological expertise 9.8% gained relative prominence, suggesting a shift from viewing Germany merely as an economic model toward recognizing it as a strategic and innovative partner.

Meanwhile, traditional motives like education reform, tourism, and migration remained marginal, each cited by fewer than 5% of respondents. Overall, the data reflect both continuity and subtle evolution in public attitudes, economic admiration still leads, but Jordanians are increasingly valuing Germany's broader role in innovation, diplomacy, and partnership.



Figure 9: Why strengthen? N=999, of those who stated they support strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and German governments

Table 6 highlights a sharp rise in the proportion of Jordanians who view Israel as the primary threat to the Kingdom, underscoring how regional tensions have increasingly shaped public perceptions of security. From hovering around 47-50 % between 2019 and 2023, it surged to over 76 % in 2025, far outweighing all other concerns. Iran remains a secondary worry at 9 %, while

Syria and the U.S. have declined to negligible levels. The "none" category, once close to 20 %, has collapsed to just 6 %, reflecting growing insecurity overall. By 2025, Jordanians' threat perceptions are overwhelmingly concentrated on Israel, with other actors fading into the background.

Response	August 2019	September 2021	August 2023	September 2025
Israel	46.9	50.0	48.5	76.2
Syria	5.6	3.0	10.1	0.5
Iran	7.2	7.0	8.1	9.0
The United States	10.3	7.0	2.2	4.9
None	18.7	19.0	23.8	5.7
Don't know/ Refused to answer	8.4	7.0	5.7	2.1
Other	2.0	3.0	1.5	0.6

Table 7: Which country or group is Jordan's biggest security threat? (Comparison with previous polls)

In comparison to previous polls, figure 10 tends to portray Jordanian's travel preferences for different purposes, and how they have shifted between February 2024 and September 2025. The United States continues to dominate in health treatment, education, and work, with its share even rising slightly in these areas. Germany, once a strong second, has lost significant ground across all purposes, most visibly in health, work, and business.



Figure 10: If you had the choice between the following five countries to travel for each of the following purposes, which one would you travel to? (Comparison with previous polls)

The most striking trend is the rise of China. It has become the leading destination for shopping, surging from 25% to over 40%, and has made notable gains in business, professional training, and tourism. These shifts suggest that while the U.S. maintains its reputation for advanced services and opportunities, China is emerging as the practical choice for trade, training, and affordability. Saudi Arabia plays a minor but steady role, especially in health and work.

In short, the U.S. still commands prestige, but Jordanians are increasingly looking eastward, particularly to China, for business, retail, and professional opportunities.

When it comes to the role that countries play in Jordan, respondents expressed which countries they think play a positive role and which countries play a negative role in figure 11. Saudi Arabia ranks highest, with 66.58, reflecting its strong historical, political, and economic ties with Jordan, followed closely by China 64.56 and Qatar 64.27, both of which have become increasingly important partners in trade, investment, and development support. The European Union, Egypt, and Turkey also score strongly, in the 58-62 range, highlighting their steady engagement in

Jordan's economic and political landscape. Western allies such as the UK, Germany, Canada, and Japan are rated positively but at a moderate level.



Figure 11: When it comes to the role played by "………" in Jordan, do you think "………" play a positive or negative role in Jordan?

Countries closer to Jordan geographically but with more complex relations, such as Iraq, the UAE, and Syria, are clustered around the neutral mark, with scores between 48 and 51. The United States and Russia are both rated less positively, at 41.92 and 41.05 respectively, likely due to their controversial roles in Middle Eastern geopolitics. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Iran and Israel are viewed in highly negative terms, with scores of –21.19 and –69.42 respectively. These results align with broader regional tensions, public distrust, and historical conflicts, making them the least positively perceived actors in Jordan. Taken together, the findings underscore that Jordanian public opinion is shaped by both longstanding alliances and current geopolitical dynamics. Regional Arab partners and emerging global powers are seen as constructive, while Israel and Iran are viewed as deeply harmful to Jordan's interests.

Up next, respondents portrayed in figure 12, overwhelming support for stronger ties with the GCC, with nearly three-quarters fully in favor, making it the most trusted partner by far. The EU and UN also enjoy broad backing, each with about 60 % full support and another third somewhat supportive. Views of the IMF and World Bank are positive but more cautious, reflecting some skepticism about their economic policies. NATO and BRICS sit in the middle, fewer fully endorse closer ties, but large numbers are at least somewhat supportive, keeping opposition relatively low. Overall, the results highlight deep confidence in regional allies and established institutions, paired with cautious pragmatism toward global power blocs.



Figure 12: To what extent would you support Jordan to strengthen its ties with "………"?

Jordanians were asked to state which non-Jordanian living politician they respect the most. The results from figure 13 show a fragmented landscape of political admiration, with no figure commanding overwhelming respect. Erdoğan remains the most respected non-Jordanian politician, but his support has dropped from 28% in 2023 to 18.6% in 2025, signaling waning appeal. Mohammed bin Salman edges slightly higher to just over 10%, while Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani more than doubles his support to 7.5%.

Others like Ahmad Al-Shara' 6.6%, Vladimir Putin 5%, and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and King Salman (just above 2%) attract smaller shares. Notably, the "none" category remains high at 26%, down from almost 34% in 2023, suggesting enduring skepticism, while the "other" category rises to 13%, reflecting a broader diversity of admired leaders. Overall, many Jordanians remain unconvinced by international figures.



Figure 13: Which non-Jordanian living politician do you respect the most? (Comparison with previous poll)

4. Geopolitical Dynamics – Regional and International Conflicts

When it comes to perceptions of the Middle East, respondents convey a persistent sense of insecurity. As shown in Figure 14, perceptions of regional stability have fluctuated over time. In August 2019, an overwhelming majority-over 80%-viewed the region as unstable and insecure, while only about 14% considered it stable.

By September 2021, sentiment shifted slightly toward optimism, with 20% describing the region as stable, although concerns about insecurity remained high at 76%The most dramatic change came in August 2023, when nearly half of respondents, 45.6%, felt the region was stable, and the perception of instability dropped to just over 53%, marking a period of relative optimism compared to previous years. By February 2024, perceptions of stability plummeted to their lowest point across the observed period, with only 9.3% describing the region as stable and a striking 90.1% viewing it as unstable and insecure. This sharp reversal highlights how fragile confidence in regional stability remained, as optimism quickly gave way to renewed pessimism amid escalating uncertainty. By September 2025, sentiment recovered slightly, with about 27% viewing the region as stable. However, nearly three-quarters of respondents continued to perceive the Middle East as unstable, reinforcing a broader pattern of volatility in public confidence toward the region's trajectory.



Figure 14: When thinking about the region of the Middle East, do you think things are ……. (Comparison to previous polls)

Building up on perceptions about the Middle East, figure 15 tends to capture perceptions of countries' roles in the region, and how they have shifted over the past six years.

The data shows a clear shift in regional influence. Saudi Arabia has surged to the top at over 81%, with the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and China all strengthening their roles. In contrast, the U.S. has slipped sharply from 76.1% in 2023 to 63.85% in 2025, signaling waning confidence. European countries remain steady but secondary players, while Israel and Iran remain firmly at the bottom, reflecting strong opposition to their involvement.



Figure 15: I would like to ask you about a few countries that play some sort of role in the region. I would like you to tell me whether you prefer these countries to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region. (Comparison with previous polls)

Regional perceptions of stability are in flux, revealing shifting attitudes toward global and regional actors. Figure 16 shows that between August 2023 and September 2025, Jordanian respondents registered both deepening confidence in certain allies and growing skepticism toward others. Qatar and Saudi Arabia continue to stand out as the most positively viewed stabilizing forces in the region, with approval ratings climbing to 77.8% and 76.36%, respectively, reflecting their enduring soft power and active regional diplomacy. Egypt and Turkey also maintain strong standings, hovering in the mid-70s, while China's image has strengthened further, rising to 72%, consolidating its position as a reliable global partner.

Conversely, Western powers reveal a more complex picture. While the European Union, Japan, and Canada enjoy relatively stable favorability in the high 60s, key Western powers such as the United States, France, and the UK continue to evoke mixed feelings. The U.S. saw a decrease from 60% to 43.9%.

Among regional rivals, the UAE witnessed a notable decline, from 75.6% to 64%, suggesting decreased confidence in its stabilizing influence. Iraq and Syria, meanwhile, improved their standings, likely reflecting perceptions of relative internal consolidation compared to past years. In stark contrast, Iran and Israel remain at the bottom of the scale, with only 25.9% and 4.14% respectively viewed as stabilizing, highlighting their persistent association with regional tension.

Overall, the data reveals a steady tilt toward Arab and Asian powers perceived as pragmatic and balanced, while Western and adversarial actors continue to contend with legacies of mistrust. The trend suggests a recalibrated regional outlook, one that prizes assertive yet non-confrontational diplomacy over traditional power politics.



Figure 16: Now I would like you to tell me whether you believe that each of these countries is playing a stabilizing or destabilizing role in the region?

When asked about the influence of international powers in the Middle East, perceptions of the influence, both currently and projected ten years into the future, were examined in figure 17. At present, the United States is overwhelmingly regarded as the dominant external actor, with 83.0% of respondents identifying it as the most influential. China 8.9%, Europe 3.6%, and Russia 2.9% are perceived as considerably less influential, indicating a strong U.S.-centric view of current regional power dynamics. Looking ahead to the next decade, expectations shift significantly. While the United States remains the leading influence, its perceived dominance declines sharply to 50.3%, suggesting a projected diversification of influence. China rises substantially to 28.5%, reflecting anticipation of its growing economic and strategic engagement in the region.



Figure 17: Thinking about regional competition among major international powers, which of the following is currently the most influential in the Middle East? Which will be the most influential 10 years from now?

Overall, these perceptions highlight a belief that while the U.S. will continue to shape the Middle East, China is expected to emerge as a major counterbalancing power, signaling a potential rebalancing of international influence in the region over the next decade.

Building on the earlier discussion about the role of international powers, the survey next turned to the influence of regional actors in figure 18. Today, Saudi Arabia 14.5% and Israel 13.9% are seen as the most influential players in the Middle East, with Egypt and Jordan following at 5% each. Other regional states like Iran 4.6%, Qatar 4.3%, the UAE 3.6%, and Turkey 2.1% are perceived as having more limited clout, highlighting a clear hierarchy in public perception. Interestingly, a striking 41.3% of respondents feel that real influence lies primarily with foreign powers, pointing to a widespread view that international actors overshadow regional ones when it comes to shaping Middle Eastern affairs.

Looking a decade ahead, the picture shifts slightly. Saudi Arabia remains the dominant regional force, though its perceived influence dips to 12.7%, while Israel's prominence falls more sharply to 6.7%. Meanwhile, Jordan 6.4% and Qatar 5.3% are expected to gain ground, reflecting a modest reshuffling among smaller regional states. Despite these shifts, the share of respondents who believe that only foreign states hold meaningful sway stays high at 40.6%, signaling a persistent skepticism about the ability of regional powers to independently steer the Middle East's future.



Figure 18: Thinking about regional competition, which regional actor do you consider the most influential in the Middle East now? Which regional actor do you think will be the most influential in the Middle East in 10 years?

Perception of primary security threats in the MENA region were explored next, in comparison to previous polls as figure 19 indicates. The comparison across the three survey waves shows a striking shift in perceptions of security threats in the MENA region, with Israel emerging more decisively than ever as the dominant concern. Back in September 2021, just over half of respondents identified Israel as the biggest threat, and that share dipped slightly in August 2023. By September 2025, however, the figure had surged to nearly three-quarters, a dramatic increase that reflects the heightened salience of Israel's actions in the region, particularly in light of the war in Gaza and its broader regional implications.

Perceptions of Iran and the United States as threats, by contrast, have dropped significantly. In 2021, but that number has steadily declined, falling to just over 11% in 2025. Iran, which once registered at nearly 20% in 2023, now sits at under 9%, suggesting its perceived threat has receded in the public's view. Russia, Syria, and other actors remain marginal in this discussion, never rising above a few% age points.

By 2025, the overwhelming dominance of Israel as a perceived security threat signals both a concentration of regional anxieties and a narrowing of focus compared to earlier years when multiple actors competed for attention. This shift suggests that developments in the conflict with Gaza, and Israel's broader policies, have reshaped the threat landscape in the minds of many across the region.



Figure 19: In your opinion, which country or group constitutes the biggest security threat in the MENA region? (Comparison with previous polls)

As for the recent Israel-Iran war, in figure 20 respondents were asked to state who they think is responsible for the start of the war. A substantial majority, 75%, attribute responsibility to Israel, while only 10.4% hold Iran accountable. Other actors are cited by 9.3% of respondents, and 5.3% indicate uncertainty. This distribution underscores a clear consensus that Israel is viewed as the principal instigator in the conflict, reflecting strong public attribution of agency and responsibility, while Iran is seen as a significantly less culpable party.



Figure 20: In your opinion, who is responsible for the Israel-Iran war?

Regarding the Israel-Iran war, about 50.2% of Jordanians indicated they favor maintaining neutrality, reflecting a strong preference for a cautious and non-aligned position. A substantial portion, 39.8%, supports advocating for a diplomatic resolution, indicating significant backing for active but measured engagement aimed at conflict de-escalation. Only a small minority express support for fully backing Iran 8.6% or Israel 0.4%. Therefore, the data demonstrates a clear inclination toward neutrality combined with an openness to diplomacy, suggesting that the Jordanian public favors a balanced approach that prioritizes national stability and regional peace over taking sides in the conflict.



Figure 21: When it comes to the Israel-Iran war, in your opinion, what should Jordan's stance be?

In response to regional instability and the increase of US military presence in the Middle, a plurality of respondents in figure 22, 37.1%, believe it would make Jordan much more vulnerable, while an additional 23.4% consider it would make the country somewhat more vulnerable, indicating that a majority view increased U.S. military activity as a potential threat rather than a protective measure. In contrast, only 13.9% feel it would make Jordan much more secure, and 19.9% somewhat more secure, suggesting limited confidence in the stabilizing effects of foreign military intervention. These perceptions highlight a prevailing concern that foreign military escalation in the region could exacerbate Jordan's vulnerability rather than enhance its security.



Figure 22: If the US were to increase its military presence in the Middle East in response to regional instability, do you think that makes Jordan "………"?

Following the previous question, in figure 23, respondents were further asked about their extent of support for Jordan increasing its military capabilities. A striking 91.7% of respondents fully support such an initiative, with an additional 6.9% expressing partial support, indicating near-universal approval. Opposition is minimal, with only 1.2% combining those who somewhat or fully oppose. These results demonstrate that the Jordanian public strongly favors strengthening national defense as a primary strategy for safeguarding security amidst regional volatility.



Figure 23: Given the region's instability, to what extent do you support Jordan increasing its military capabilities?

Public preferences regarding which countries should support Jordan in enhancing its military capabilities were examined next in figure 24. The United States is the most favored partner at 24.2%, reflecting confidence in its military expertise and strategic influence. Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia 16.1% and Egypt 14.7% are also prominently preferred, indicating trust in neighboring states with established security roles.

All in all, the data suggests that Jordanians prioritize partnerships with countries perceived as strong, reliable, and aligned with regional or Western security frameworks, with a clear preference for U.S. and major regional allies over other international actors.



Figure 24: Which country would you want to support Jordan in enhancing its military capabilities?

With Syria's new leadership, led by Ahmad Al-Shara', a reflection of public opinion towards Jordan's approach is displayed in figure 25. A majority of respondents, 58.3%, support gradually building ties, indicating a preference for a cautious and measured engagement strategy. Meanwhile, 37.1% advocate for more immediate efforts to strengthen relations, suggesting that a significant minority favors proactive diplomacy. Only 3.9% believe Jordan should sever ties entirely, demonstrating minimal support for a confrontational approach.



Figure 25: Which of the following is closest to your personal opinion regarding how Jordan should approach Syria's new leadership, led by Ahmad Al-Shara'?

Levels of trust in Ahmad Al Shara's leadership were an important part to examine next in figure 26. Nearly half of respondents, 47.9%, report somewhat trusting him, while 17.0% express full trust, indicating a generally positive but cautious perception. Conversely, 16.3% trust him only minimally, and 13.7% do not trust him at all, reflecting a notable minority with reservations about his leadership.



Figure 26: To what extent do you trust Ahmad Al Shara's leadership?

5. The Arab Israeli Conflict

A major factor which is attributed to regional instability is the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the following figure (27) portrays public opinion on potential solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Back in August 2019, nearly 46% of respondents supported the two-state solution, envisioning Palestine and Israel living side by side along the 1967 borders. This position was the dominant view at the time, though about a quarter 25.3% rejected both solutions, and only 15.8% favored a one-state solution that grants equal rights to all under a shared system. By September 2021, support for the two-state framework declined to 27%, while preference for the one-state approach rose to 31%, nearly matching it. At the same time, skepticism deepened, as one-third of respondents 33% said they supported neither option, indicating growing disillusionment with both political frameworks and perhaps with the peace process itself. In November 2023, attitudes became even more fragmented. Support for the two-state solution remained relatively modest at 33.9%, while endorsement of a one-state system fell to 11.6%. The share of respondents who rejected both options, however, surged to 52.4%, showing a sharp turn toward pessimism and disengagement from conventional solutions during this period.

By February 2024, however, opinion shifted again, marking a rebound in optimism toward the two-state vision. A majority of 51.1% supported it, the highest level recorded, while rejection of both options dropped to 38.3%. This resurgence may reflect renewed hopes tied to regional or international diplomatic efforts during that time.

By September 2025, support for the two-state solution decreased slightly to 42.8%, while those opposing both frameworks remained high at 46.2%, suggesting that the sense of uncertainty and fatigue had returned. The one-state model continued to attract minimal support, hovering around 10%, underscoring its limited resonance among respondents.



Figure 27: Which of the following is closest to your personal opinion when it comes to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

As shown in figure 28, younger Jordanians appear more skeptical of traditional solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while older generations remain anchored to the two-state framework. The data show that support for the two-state solution rises sharply with age, from 37.4% among those aged 18-34 to 56.4% among those 50 and above, indicating that older respondents continue to see coexistence on 1967 borders as the most viable path. In contrast, nearly half of young respondents 49.4% reject both the one- and two-state models, a view shared by 47.8% of those aged 35-49, compared to only 35.4% among older adults. The one-state solution, which envisions equal rights within a shared political system, remains a minority view across all age groups but is relatively more popular among the youngest respondents 12.9%. These patterns suggest generational divides not only in political preference but in optimism toward conventional frameworks, while older Jordanians maintain faith in diplomatic resolutions, younger ones seem increasingly disillusioned and open to alternative or undefined approaches.



Figure 28: Which of the following is closest to your personal opinion when it comes to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? (Age distribution)

Regional differences in Jordan as shown in figure 29, reveal nuanced but consistent skepticism toward established solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While the two-state solution remains the most favored option overall, support varies by geography, peaking in the North 48.2% and South 42.9% but dipping slightly in the Center 40.6%.

Meanwhile, a substantial share of respondents across all regions reject both the one- and two-state models, with nearly half of those in the Center 47.3% expressing this stance, compared to 44% in the North and 44.8% in the South. The one-state solution, envisioning shared governance and equal rights, attracts limited backing, around 11% in both the Center and South and just under 8% in the North. These results suggest that, despite regional variation, skepticism toward traditional diplomatic frameworks runs deep across Jordan. The North shows slightly stronger alignment with the two-state vision, but overall, a prevailing sentiment of doubt and disengagement from existing solutions characterizes public opinion nationwide.



Figure 29: Which of the following is closest to your personal opinion when it comes to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? (Geographic distribution)

A reflection of respondent perception of which country is most supportive of establishing a Palestinian state is displayed next. Figure 30 shows that Jordan overwhelmingly dominates, with 77% of respondents identifying it as the leading supporter, highlighting strong public recognition of Jordan's historical and political role in advocating for Palestinian statehood.



Figure 30: In your opinion, which country is the most supportive of establishing a Palestinian state?

Yemen follows at 5.1%, while Qatar 2.2%, Iran 1.8%, Palestine itself 1.8%, and Saudi Arabia 1.5% receive much lower recognition. Egypt is cited by only 1.2% of respondents. There is a clear identification of Jordan's central position in public perception as the primary supporter of Palestinian statehood within the region.

Next, the data in figure 31 highlights Jordan's perceived leadership and resonance with public opinion regarding the conflict in Gaza, with Yemen and select Arab states serving as secondary reference points. Jordan stands out as the country whose stance most closely reflects respondents' views, with 43.5% identifying its position as aligned. This strong alignment likely reflects both geographic proximity and shared political perspectives. Yemen comes next at 15.6%, followed by Egypt 9.3% and Qatar 8.5%, which attract moderate support.

Other regional players, including Saudi Arabia 4.6%, Iran 3.1%, Kuwait 1.9%, Turkey 1.4%, and Iraq 1.2%, are seen as less aligned with public opinion. A small portion of respondents feel that no regional state truly represents their views 6.6%. Overall, the results underscore Jordan's central role in shaping public perception of regional positions on Gaza, with only a few other states resonating meaningfully with the populace.



Figure 31: Which regional country's position on the war in Gaza is closest to your personal views?

After examining which regional country's position on the war in Gaza is closest to respondent's personal views, an examination of international countries is next through figure 32. A substantial portion of respondents, 28.3%, feel that no international state aligns with their views, indicating widespread dissatisfaction or perceived disconnect with external actors. Among those who do identify alignment, Turkey leads at 9.5%, followed closely by Germany 8.4% and France 7.9%, suggesting that European countries and Turkey are viewed as relatively more sympathetic or aligned. Russia 6.7% and China 6.6% hold moderate positions, while the United Kingdom 3.9%, United States 3.8%, Spain 3.3%, Canada 2.2%, South Africa 1.6%, Netherlands 1.3%, and Ireland 1.2% are cited less frequently.



Figure 32: Which international country's position on the war in Gaza is closest to your personal views?

Therefore, there is a perception that most international powers are not closely aligned with public sentiment on Gaza, with only a few countries, primarily Turkey and select European states, seen as partially reflective of local perspectives.

Jordanians were asked about the 30-year-old peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Figure 33 shows that a slight majority, 52.1%, favor maintaining the treaty, indicating continued support for formal peace and stability in bilateral relations. However, 45.5% of respondents advocate canceling the treaty and reverting to the pre-1994 no-war, no-peace state, reflecting significant ambivalence and lingering opposition. The nearly even split underscores a nuanced public perspective, while there is recognition of the benefits of the treaty, a substantial portion of the population remains dissatisfied with the status quo, highlighting ongoing tension in public sentiment regarding Jordan-Israel relations.



Figure 33: 30 years have passed on the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, are you for keeping it or cancelling it and return to no-war-no-peace state of affairs that was present before the treaty was signed in 1994?

Thirty years after the signing of the Jordan–Israel peace treaty, public opinion remains divided but tilts slightly toward maintaining the status quo. Across age groups, as shown in figure 34, a slim majority supports keeping the treaty, led by those aged 35-49 55.8%, followed by younger respondents aged 18-34 52% and older adults aged 50 and above 46.7%. Interestingly, the oldest group, despite living through the pre-treaty years, shows the highest inclination 51.7% toward canceling it and returning to the tense "no-war, no-peace" situation of the past.



Figure 34: 30 years have passed on the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, are you for keeping it or cancelling it and return to no-war-no-peace state of affairs that was present before the treaty was signed in 1994? (Age distribution)

Geographically, figure 35 depicts attitudes are similarly balanced. The North shows the strongest support for maintaining the treaty 55.1%, followed closely by the South 53.3% and the Center 50.7%. Calls for cancellation are highest in the Center 46.4%, suggesting slightly greater ambivalence toward the treaty in the capital region. Across both age and regional divides, the small share of respondents who expressed uncertainty, around 1-3%, underscores how firmly Jordanians hold views on this issue. Overall, the data reveal a cautious pragmatism-while many Jordanians remain wary of Israel, most still favor preserving peace over revisiting past hostilities.



Figure 35: 30 years have passed on the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, are you for keeping it or cancelling it and return to no-war-no-peace state of affairs that was present before the treaty was signed in 1994? (Geographic distribution)

6. Section 5: Perceptions of Germany

When asked which European country is the most influential, figure 36 indicates that Germany was identified as the most influential country by 24.0% of respondents, closely followed by the United Kingdom at 23.6%, indicating near-equal recognition of their political, economic, and diplomatic weight. France is cited by 16.5%, while Russia, despite its geopolitical relevance, registers 4.8%, reflecting its contested role in European influence. Notably, 16.4% of respondents believe no European country is influential, and 8.6% are uncertain. The data highlights a perception that Germany and the United Kingdom dominate Europe's influence on regional or global affairs, while other states are less impactful or uncertain in their roles.



Figure 36: In your opinion, which European country is the most influential?

Shifting focus to perceptions of European support, Figure 37 reveals that Jordanians view the United Kingdom as their country's most significant supporter (31.7%), followed by Germany (24.7%). Together, these findings underscore the strong diplomatic presence both nations maintain in Jordan's public consciousness. Meanwhile, 16.4% of respondents believe that no European country provides meaningful support, and 12.6% are unsure. Overall, the data reinforce the perception of the UK and Germany as Jordan's key European allies.



Figure 37: Which European country is Jordan's biggest supporter?

When it comes to Germany, respondents were asked to state what comes to mind when thinking about Germany. Figure 38 highlights notable shifts in Jordanians' perceptions of Germany over time. While Germany continues to be strongly associated with its industrial strength and manufacturing quality, including its renowned car industry, this perception declined from 36% in August 2023 to 18.5% in February 2024 before rebounding to 31% in September 2025.



Figure 38: What comes to your mind when you think of Germany? (Comparison to previous polls)

Similarly, views of Germany as an economic and investment destination peaked in early 2024 24% but dipped slightly afterward 17.4%. Meanwhile, impressions of Germany's political and military strength, and its image as a cultured and civilized nation, saw moderate fluctuations, reflecting a balance between appreciation for its global stature and cultural appeal. Positive mentions of advanced technology and innovation remained steady, suggesting a consistent recognition of Germany's technological leadership. However, more negative associations have surfaced in 2025, with 7.5% describing Germany as a "perpetrator of conflict and supporter of Israel" and 5.8% labeling it as a "bad and discriminatory country," marking a growing polarization in public sentiment. While smaller segments continue to admire Germany for its democracy, rule of law, and quality public services, these remain minority views.

Overall, perceptions of Germany have become more complex and divided, blending admiration for its economic and technological power with growing political skepticism and cultural criticism.

Examining perceptions about Germany on a deeper level, respondents were provided with statements and were asked to state the degree to which they agree with such statements. Figure 39 reveals a marked improvement in Germany's overall image between February 2024 and September 2025. The most striking responses appear in perceptions of Germany as an innovative country (89.7%) and as a producer of high-quality products and services (90.2%), solidifying its reputation for excellence and technological advancement. Confidence in Germany's safety also increased significantly, from 66% to over 80%, suggesting renewed faith in its internal stability and security standards.



Figure 39: For each of the following statements, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (Comparison to previous poll)

Positive associations expanded across nearly all dimensions, including democracy, human rights, and global influence. Notably, perceptions of Germany as a country welcoming refugees rose from 59.6% to 73.3%, and as one upholding human rights globally from 48.8% to 69.2%, a substantial shift that points to growing recognition of its humanitarian role. Similarly, views of Germany as an advocate for international law and a force for good both climbed notably, reflecting improved confidence in its moral and diplomatic standing.

Overall, Germany's image evolved from one primarily rooted in economic and industrial strength to one encompassing broader values of innovation, democracy, and compassion. The only minor change was a modest increase in the perception of Germany as a "regional European power only," indicating that while its influence is widely acknowledged, some still view it as confined to Europe rather than a fully global actor.

Germany's image as a model nation has grown stronger and more multidimensional over time, reflecting a blend of industrial excellence and moral credibility. As figure 40 shows, admiration for Germany's quality of production remains nearly universal, with an impressive 92.2%, while its economic system and public service provision continue to be viewed as exemplary at 86.9% and 84.2%, respectively. Beyond its traditional economic strengths, Germany's leadership in green energy also saw gains, suggesting recognition of its forward-looking governance and environmental innovation.



Figure 40: To what extent do you consider Germany a model in each of the following aspects?

Equally notable are the improvements in softer dimensions of Germany's image. Views of Germany as a model for democracy, freedom of speech, and human rights all climbed considerably, signaling growing trust in its liberal and rights-based system. The sharpest increase came in perceptions of social integration of refugees, which jumped from 51.3% to 69.4%, underscoring a positive shift in how Jordanians perceive Germany's inclusivity.

According to figure 41, Jordanians' perceptions of Germany's political influence today in comparison to a decade ago paints a nuanced picture that varies sharply across regions. In Europe, perceptions are largely positive, with nearly two-thirds of respondents believing Germany's influence has grown 27% saying it is a lot greater and another 37% seeing it as somewhat greater. Only a quarter felt it has stayed about the same, and very few saw a decline, underscoring Germany's continued stature as a central political actor on the continent.

In the Middle East, however, the outlook is more restrained. While just over half of respondents perceived an increase in Germany's political influence, a substantial 36% felt it remains at the same level as ten years ago, and a small but notable minority saw a decline. This mix of views suggests that although Germany is acknowledged as having a stronger role in the region, its political presence is not seen as transformative and remains overshadowed by other global powers. The perception in Jordan is even more tempered. Only about 13% saw Germany's political influence as much greater, with another third saying it is somewhat greater. By contrast, nearly 43% believed it has stayed the same, and around 8% judged that it has weakened. This indicates that, from a Jordanian perspective, Germany's influence has not dramatically shifted over the past decade but rather maintained a steady profile with limited visible change.



Figure 41: When thinking about Germany's political influence today and comparing it to 10 years ago, would you say it is greater in, somewhat greater, at about the same level, less than it used to be, much less than it used to be, for "………"?

The following figure (42) measures public awareness of Germany's political transition under the new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, since May 2025. The vast majority of respondents, 83.6%, report having not heard of this change, while only 14.5% are aware of it. This overwhelming lack of awareness suggests limited public engagement with or exposure to German domestic politics, indicating that Germany's internal leadership transitions do not significantly resonate with or reach the broader public in the region.



Figure 42: Since May 2025, there is a new government in Germany and new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Have you heard about this change?

Assessing the perceptions of German foreign policy changes following the leadership transition in May 2025 followed through. As shown in figure 43, an overwhelming 91.0% of respondents report no recognition of any change, while only 6.7% believe a shift has occurred. This indicates that, from the public's perspective, Germany's regional posture is viewed as largely consistent, with the change in leadership under Friedrich Merz not yet perceived to have altered the country's approach to Middle Eastern affairs in any significant way.



Figure 43: Do you recognize any changes in Germany's foreign policy towards the Middle East since this change? [In comparison to before May 2025]

For the people that stated "yes," they were asked to state these changes that were noticed. The most commonly perceived shift seen in figure 44, cited by just over a third, was an expansion in Germany's economic engagement and a stronger diplomatic presence in the region. A smaller but still significant share highlighted Germany adopting a more critical stance towards Israel, particularly through its recognition of Palestinian rights and statehood, which suggests that some respondents associate recent developments with a recalibration of Germany's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Others saw the country as turning inward, with more isolationist tendencies shaping its bilateral relations, while another group pointed to domestic policies, namely, a greater emphasis on political openness and fairer treatment of refugees and migrants, as reflective of a broader foreign policy outlook. Taken together, these diverse perspectives illustrate not only the limited visibility of foreign policy shifts among the public, but also the fragmented ways in which such changes are interpreted, reflecting different focal points of Germany's engagement in the region.



Figure 44: If yes, what is the change that you have noticed?

When respondents were asked about the most important foreign policy priority expected by Germany's new government towards the Middle East, respondents portrayed expectations of practical and visible forms of engagement. The most prominent priority highlighted in figure 45, mentioned by nearly a third of respondents, was strengthening economic support and bilateral cooperation, particularly through trade and investment. This suggests Germany is primarily viewed through an economic lens, with people anticipating tangible contributions to development and prosperity in the region.

At the same time, a significant portion, almost one in five, placed the Israel-Palestine conflict at the center of expectations, calling on Germany to stop the war and support a two-state solution. This emphasis shows how deeply regional stability and justice in Palestine remain tied to perceptions of foreign policy relevance.

A further 16% wanted Germany to take on a broader peacebuilding and conflict resolution role, reinforcing the idea that respondents see Germany as a potential mediator and stabilizing force in regional affairs. Other priorities, while less dominant, still point to meaningful expectations. Around 5% stressed the importance of human rights and international law, while a similar share hoped Germany would adopt more flexible immigration policies. Technical cooperation in education, health, and technology also featured as an area of interest, though at a lower level, underscoring that expectations are not limited to politics and security but extend to knowledge and capacity-building.



Figure 45: What is the most important foreign policy priority you expect from Germany's new government towards the Middle East?

Awareness of German organizations operating in Jordan appears to be relatively limited. Figure 46 shows that just over one in five respondents reported that they were familiar with such entities, while the overwhelming majority, nearly four out of five, indicated they did not know of any. This suggests that despite Germany's active presence in Jordan through development cooperation, cultural institutions, and technical assistance programs, their visibility among the wider public remains quite low. The gap points to a potential need for greater outreach and communication by these organizations to make their work more accessible and recognizable, ensuring that the benefits of their presence are more widely understood and appreciated.



Figure 46: Do you know any German organizations or institutes operating in Jordan?

Among those who were able to identify German organizations or institutions operating in Jordan, the German-Jordanian University (GJU) stood out overwhelmingly. This strong recognition highlights the university's visibility and impact as one of the most prominent symbols of German–Jordanian cooperation. GIZ followed at a considerable distance, reflecting its strong role in development projects but also suggesting that its visibility is more limited compared to the university. The Goethe-Institute was recognized by just under 10%, pointing to some awareness of Germany's cultural engagement, though not at the same scale as its educational and development presence.

Other organizations, including Saudi-German Health, DAAD, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), were only mentioned by very small numbers, indicating their activities remain less known to the wider public. Taken together, the findings suggest that while certain institutions, particularly GJU, have managed to establish a strong public profile, there is still considerable room for German organizations more broadly to enhance their visibility and communicate their contributions more effectively.



Figure 47: If yes, name the organization

Next, respondent's openness to engage with projects led by German organizations were measured in figure 48. More than half of respondents said they would be very willing to join as beneficiaries if the project aligned with their interests, while nearly a quarter expressed medium interest. This suggests a broad base of potential beneficiaries who are receptive to German-led initiatives and see value in what they might offer.

At the same time, just under one in six respondents stated they would not participate at all, with a smaller segment indicating only limited interest. While this shows that enthusiasm is not universal, the overall balance leans strongly toward a positive reception.



Figure 48: If there were a project implemented by a German organization in Jordan in an area you are interested in, and you had the chance to join that project as a beneficiary, to what extent would you join?

Public sentiment toward Germany's role in the Gaza war has undergone a clear recalibration between February 2024 and September 2025, with Jordanians showing signs of a gradual softening in attitudes. While discontent remains, the intensity of backlash appears to have eased. Figure 49 reveals that in early 2024, frustration was palpable, 36% of respondents said Germany's reaction had "decreased to a large extent" their willingness to engage with German institutions in Jordan. By late 2025, that share had dropped sharply to 14.8%, suggesting that initial anger has given way to more nuanced or moderate views.

At the same time, positive engagement has grown: those saying their willingness "increased to some extent" nearly tripled, from 9.2% to 27%, while those noting a "large extent" increase rose modestly to 14.1%. The proportion of respondents who felt unaffected remained relatively stable, with around one-third continuing to report that Germany's stance "had no impact." This shift hints at a gradual normalization of perceptions, as Germany's position on Gaza, initially seen as misaligned with Jordanian public sentiment, may have become less polarizing over time.



Figure 49: To what extent has Germany's reaction to the war in Gaza increased or decreased your willingness to engage with German institutions in Jordan?

7. Sample Demographics

7.1 Age



Figure 50: Age

7.2 Gender



Figure 51: Gender

7.3 Marital Status



Figure 52: Marital Status

7.4 Education level



Figure 53: Education Level

7.5 Income Status



Figure 54: Income Status

7.6 Governorates



Figure 55: Governorates