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نماء للإستشارات الإستراتيجية

 KONRAD
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Jordan | Foreign Relations Survey - Wave III



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Jordan
Foreign Relations Survey
Wave III

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Executive Summary

Introduction

NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions developed the Foreign Relations Survey (FRS) concept in 2017 and conducted three waves in 2018, 2019 and 2021 as part of its continuous project to study the relationship between Jordanian public opinion and Jordan's foreign relations. The three waves were made possible through a partnership with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). The third wave was conducted between September 4th-14th, 2021 on a nationally representative sample of 1,223 adult Jordanians. The survey gauged Jordanians' knowledge and preferences of Jordan's foreign relations in multiple layers. The survey delved into perceptions of Jordan's largest economic supporter, which country Jordan should have as an ally, and which country does Jordan share foreign policy objectives with, political relations and diplomatic relations, the roles played by active states in the region, Arab-Israeli conflict, instability and regional conflicts, and international rivalries. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews (CAPI), utilizing electronic tablets. This report summarizes the findings of the survey and compares the results with previously available data from NAMA surveys and other published studies to build time series.

Background

As any country, Jordan is affected by its regional and international environments. In the last two years, since the last wave of the survey, Jordan and the world were shaken by the COVID19 pandemic. Moreover, the US and Israeli administrations have changed. The new attitude of the Biden administration and the departure of Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister have put Jordan in a seemingly better diplomatic situation. Within the current regional and international dynamics, Jordan can play a more prominent role again. The present survey measures how Jordanians are perceiving their countries foreign relations after these developments.

When discussing Jordan's role in the Middle East region and beyond, it is often attributed a disproportionately large role due to its size, lack of resources, and the presence of more powerful neighbors. There is a prevalence of supranational identities such as Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities among Jordanians, which entails a cautious and a very calculated foreign policy making, often taking the shape of Omni-balancing. Omni-balancing is best defined as the process of responding to external and internal security challenges. Supranational identities are those that transcend national identities. They are cross-border identities that often supersede nation states and their associated identities.

Of the prevalent supranational identities in the Middle East and in Jordan, Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic identities are at the forefront. The World Values Survey data shows that religion is very important for Jordanians, as stated by 95.4% of the general public, with 77.2% said that religious faith should be taught to children at home, 93.1% feel close to the Arab World, and 95.6% feel close to the Islamic World.¹ Moreover, such a balance can be also explained by the geopolitical

¹ "The World Values Survey Wave 7," *The World Values Survey*, 2018.

location of Jordan where it needs to maintain its strategic interests amid the intense competition among regional and international players in the region.

As such, Jordanians place great value and identify largely with Arabs and Muslims, but how does this affect their perceptions of Jordan's foreign relations? This survey provides fresh and comparative data to shed light on how Jordanians perceive Jordan's foreign relations and what are their preferences for alliances.

Jordan's Political Relations

Our survey results show that the overall perception of bilateral political relations among Jordanians has improved in comparison with the previous waves. Between 90-95 percent of Jordanians described their country's government relations with Egypt, USA, Turkey, China, KSA, Iraq, Qatar, UAE, and UK as "very good" or "somewhat good". They also perceived their country's relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran have improved over the past 2 years but decreased slightly with Turkey (2.2% decrease). The most notable change is an increase in the percentage of Jordanians describing relations with Israel as "somewhat bad" or "very bad". In fact, 43% of Jordanians described the Jordanian government's political relations with the Israeli as "somewhat bad" or "very bad", compared to 39.8% in 2019 and 27% in 2018. This can be partly explainable by the controversial policies of the former Israeli government under PM Benjamin Netanyahu, and the latest developments in Sheikh Jarrah and Gaza.

Additionally, Jordanians were more in favor of strengthening Jordan's relations with most of the listed states, even more so than they were in 2019. The results also show that Jordanians were more polarized in their responses in comparison with the previous wave, as the percentage for "maintaining relations" decreased for all states to favor "strengthening relations". Most these "reductions" shifted to "strengthen relations" with the exception of Israel where the percentage of Jordanians who support "limiting relations" with it increased significantly compared to the previous waves from 57% in 2018, to 70% in 2019, and 74% in September 2021.

In terms of Jordan's biggest economic supporter, the United States was indicated by 49% of Jordanians (up from 25% in 2019), followed by Saudi Arabia (23%) (down from 30% in 2019), 6% for the UAE, 4% for "gulf states", and 3% for Qatar. Compared to 2019, there were less Jordanians who stated none, which shows an improvement in Jordanians' perceptions of their country's alliances.

Jordan's Diplomatic Relations: identity and interests

For Jordanians, two countries are considered to be the closest allies of Jordan: The United States and Saudi Arabia. In the three waves, Jordanians positioned them interchangeably as first and second. These empirical findings testify to the complexities of identity and interest's contestations. In this survey, the United States was named the closest ally by 28% of Jordanians, followed by Saudi Arabia 23%, Palestine 13%, Iraq 6%, Egypt 5% and the UK 5%. Compared to previous waves, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of Jordanians referring to Iraq and Egypt

as the closest allies of Jordan which shows a growing foundation for supporting Jordan's alliance with the two countries. In fact, 58% of Jordanians indicated that they have heard of this alliance, 62% indicated some level of optimism towards it, and 23% illustrated that the alliance will succeed in integrating the economies of the three states largely while 43% believe it will do so moderately. It is also important to note that there is higher level of optimism among those who have heard of the alliance.

As for the country Jordanians prefer that Jordan cooperate with more, The United States and Saudi Arabia came first at 18% each, followed by Turkey at 11%. While Jordanians' preferences increased towards USA and KSA, they decreased significantly towards Turkey by 10 points. In comparison with the 2019 wave, there is an increase in the percentage of those who want Jordan to cooperate with the United States (4.6% increase) and Saudi Arabia (0.7% increase). At the same time, there is a significant decrease when it comes to fostering cooperative relations with Turkey, manifested in a near 10 percentage points decrease, from 20.8% in 2019 to 11% in 2021.

Role Played by Active States in the Region

Looking at Jordanians' perceptions regarding the roles played by active states in the region, the survey finds that Jordanians would like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Syria to play a greater role in the region when compared to their perceptions in 2019. More specifically, there is an increase of 7.3 percentage points for Qatar to play a greater role, 3.7% increase for Saudi Arabia, 2.4% for the UAE, 9.7% for Iraq, and 10.6% for Syria. On the other hand, the survey showed an average of 2-9 percentage points decrease among Jordanians who would like the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Iran, and Israel to play a greater role in the region. The largest percentage decrease was for Israel, with a 7.3-point decrease among Jordanians who would like it to play a greater role in the region, followed by 4.4 for Iran, 3.6 for the UK, and 2.1 for the US.

With the exception of Iran and Israel, 64% of Jordanians or more were in favor of seeing the listed countries play larger roles in the region. While over 65% of Jordanians were still in support of Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Germany to play a larger role in the region, the extent of this support decreased in 2021 compared to 2019. There was an average 1.4 percentage points increase in having larger roles in the region, across the board while there was a 0.7 percentage points decrease, on average, for playing a smaller role or no role at all in the region.

As for the role Jordan should play in the region, there is a significant increase in the percentage of Jordanians who say Jordan should play a "much larger role" in the region from 43.5% in 2019 to 73% in 2021. Jordanians would like Jordan to play a larger role for the following reasons: 21% reasoned that it is for improving the economic situation, followed by 10% for its geographic location, and 7% for improving public relations and connections.

Arab-Israeli Conflict, Peace and Normalization

The survey finds, on average, that 80% of Jordanians “somewhat or strongly oppose” normalization/peace agreements between Arab states (PNA, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, UAE, KSA, and Morocco) and Israel with an average of 71% “strongly oppose”.

Overall position on US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict remains “unsatisfactory”. An overwhelming majority (83%) of Jordanians are “very unsatisfied” with “the way the US handles the Arab-Israeli conflict”, albeit there is a slight improvement in these perceptions when compared to 2019. Furthermore, when asked about whom they believe is most to blame for the lack of progress between Israel and Palestine, 42% of Jordanians blamed Israel, 25% blamed the United States, and 20% believe Arab States are most to blame for such lack of progress.

A new change of attitudes on two-state solution has surfaced as the “one state solution” received more support than “the two-state solution”. For instance, while 31% of Jordanians believe that one state solution is the ideal solution, 27% of them stated that a two-state solution is the ideal solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and 15% preferred “keeping things as they are now”.

As for major players’ position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 36% of Jordanians believe that Germany’s policy toward Palestine is Pro-Israeli, followed by 23% for balanced and 21% for indifferent. For the United States, 78% referred to its policy as Pro-Israeli. A plurality of Jordanians generally views Germany’s policy as indifferent (21%), albeit it moved by 3.2 percentage points toward being “pro-Israeli”. For France, Jordanians maintained that its stance is between “pro-Israeli” and “indifferent”. The United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the European Union were all also viewed as having policies between being pro-Israeli and being indifferent, but they are moving by an average of 4 percentage points in favor of the latter.

Instability, Sources of Threat and Conflicts

Although the majority of Jordanians believe that the region is insecure and unstable, sense of instability in the region has slightly decreased from 84% in 2019 to 76% in 2021, as the percentage of Jordanians believing that things are unstable and insecure in the Middle East region decreased. Israel was identified by 54% of Jordanians as the country most to blame for *regional instability and violence* in the Middle East, followed by the United States with 19% and 6% for Iran. Additionally, 53% of Jordanians identified Israel as the main source of *security threat to the Middle East*, followed by 20% for the United States, and 12% for Iran.

As for threats to Jordan, 50% of Jordanians believe that Israel poses the biggest security threat to Jordan (up from 47% in 2019), followed by Iran and the US with 7% (down from 10% for the US and as in 2019 for Iran), as 19% of Jordanians indicated that there are not any countries that pose a security threat to Jordan. Additionally, 48% of Jordanians indicated that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict threatens regional stability the most, followed by the Iranian-American conflict with 34% - up from 26% in 2019.

While there is a slightly growing support among Jordanians to back Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Iran, neutrality remains the overarching preference for Jordanians, manifested by 59% who believe the country should remain neutral. Neutrality carried through when scaled onto the US-Russian and the US-China rivalries. At the same time, the United States maintained its place as the

non-Arab actor which Jordanians believe it will still have the strongest influence in the Middle East in 10 years, with 42%, followed by China and Turkey with 13% each.

1. Introduction

1.1 About Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a German political foundation that promotes civic education, policy analysis and international dialogue. Active in Germany and worldwide, KAS has an office in Amman since 1982. Their programmes in Jordan provide capacity building and dialogue platforms for youth, civil society and political institutions. KAS encourages research and reflections about Jordan, its role in the Middle East and its relations with Europe.

1.2 About NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions

NAMA is a technology driven strategic intelligence solutions provider to key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. NAMA strives to advance political, social and economic development in the MENA region, and more specifically in Jordan by utilizing over 100 years of combined collective experience in polling, research, security, business consultancy, investments, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainable socio-economic development.

1.3 Research Methodology and Work Plan

NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions conducted a survey exploring Jordanians' perceptions in relation to foreign relations. The poll was conducted between September 4-14, 2021 with a nationally representative sample of 1,223 Jordanians. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews, as the field work was implemented by 32 trained enumerators, supervised by 8 field observers to monitor data collection, attend to any challenges, and ensure the implementation of quality assurance measures.

As for the questionnaire, it was designed cooperatively between KAS and NAMA. It comprised of 8 sections, as follows:

- Jordan's Political Relations
- Jordan's Diplomatic Relations
- Role Played by Active States in the Region
- Arab-Israeli Conflict, Peace and Normalization
- Instability and Regional Conflicts
- International Conflicts
- Demographics

Once the final version was approved and translated, NAMA's methodologist programmed the survey onto electronic tablets and led a training of the field research team. The training included a discussion of the research objectives, explanation of every question, and a training on using the program as well as mock interviews.

Following that, the field team proceeded with the data collection phase, whereby field supervisor provided them with daily assignments containing their daily targets of interviews as well as specific demographic factors to meet to ensure that the sample is nationally representative. Additionally, the supervisors illustrated the skipping patterns for the enumerators. The supervisors coordinated with the office team to synch the tablets on daily basis to upload the completed questionnaires to NAMA's servers.

Then, NAMA's analysts reviewed the data on daily basis to apply quality assurance measures, which reviews for logic, context, misspelling, or other unintended errors. The reviewers look at the data as a whole along with assessing each enumerator's completed questionnaires.

Once the dataset passes the quality assurance measures, it is delivered to the data analysis team, who simultaneously handle the statistical analysis of the multiple-choice questions in addition to the coding and analysis of the open-ended answers through statistical analysis software such as SPSS & CPro. The analysis also included measuring mean scores and comparisons with the 2019 wave of the same survey.

1.4 Sample

As indicated earlier, the final achieved sample comprised of 1,223 respondents, representative at the national level. 49.8% were males and 50.2% were female respondents. 36% were respondents aged 18-29; 22.6% were aged 30-39; 19.5% were aged 40-49; and 21.8% were 50 years of age or older. In terms of geographic regions, 60.7% of the respondents were from the Center Region (Amman, Balqa, Zarqa, and Madaba); 29.6% from the North Region (Irbid, Mafraq, Ajloun, and Jarash); and 9.7% from the South Region (Karak, Maan, Tafileh, and Aqaba).

For the purpose of this study, Jordanians aged 18 years and above were the targeted group. The National Census frame 2015 was used to design and draw the sample. The frame provided information on the Block level (the smallest Sampling Unit). This sample was designed to provide valid and reliable survey estimates across the entire Kingdom of Jordan including rural and urban areas, each of the twelve governorates, and smaller communities within. The sample was also designed to ensure reliable estimates on regional levels (North, Center, and South) and can provide an indication at the governorate level: North (covering Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, and Mafraq), Central (covering Amman, Balqa, Madaba, and Zarqa), and South (covering Aqaba, Karak, Ma'an, and Tafileh).

Using the 2015 Jordan Population and Housing Census as a sampling frame, a sample of 1,223 households was drawn using stratified cluster sampling with a margin of error of ($\pm 2.5\%$) with confidence level of 95%. The Kingdom was subdivided into area units called census blocks, which were then regrouped to form clusters— the Primary Sampling Units (PSU-Blocks) for this survey. Stratification was achieved on three levels: the classification of governorates into rural and urban areas, administrative divisions within each urban and rural area, and clusters will be identified and selected within each administrative division. The distribution of the sample among these strata will be distributed proportionally to the relative population size of each stratum (probability-proportional to the cluster size).

Once the clusters were sampled, a household listing operation of these clusters was conducted and a frame of the households in each cluster was developed. Collective homes such as student housing, prisons, nursing homes, factory accommodations were excluded as they do not fit the definition of a Jordanian Household. The sample was designed in way to cover the 12 governorates, using a stratified cluster proportional to size sampling method. The confidence level was about 95% at $\pm 2.5\%$ error.

2. Key Findings

This section analyzes the key results of the Foreign Relations Survey as well as in comparison with previous waves.

2.1 Jordan's Political Relations

The first section of the Foreign Relations Survey explores Jordanians' perceptions regarding the country's political relations. First, the respondents were asked to indicate the country they believe has been Jordan's greatest economic supporter. The United States was indicated by 49% of Jordanians to overtake the Saudi Arabia (23%) as Jordan's greatest economic supporter. In 2019, 30% of Jordanians referred to Saudi Arabia as Jordan's main economic supporter compared to 25% for the United States. Elsewhere, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other Gulf states followed with 6%, 3%, and 4%, respectively. It is also worth noting that the percentage of Jordanians who stated "none" dropped from 8% in 2019 to 2% in 2021, perhaps entailing a slight improvement in Jordanians' outlook towards Jordan's alliance prospects.

A deeper look into the political relations between the Jordanian government and governments of 15 regional and global governments, the results show that the overall perception of bilateral relations improved among Jordanians toward 10 governments, namely the Egyptian, American, Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Qatari, Emirati, UK, German, Syrian, and the Iranian governments. As for the largest percentage increase, it was for both the Saudi Arabian (from 85% in 2019 to 92% in 2021) and the Iranian (48% to 55%) governments with 7 percentage points increase. Jordanians' perceptions of their government's good relations with the Turkish and the Japanese government decreased with an average of 2 percentage points yet remaining at 93% for the Turkish government and 85% for the Japanese. The below table illustrates the results in detail.

Country	Good Relations (very good + somewhat good)		Bad Relations (somewhat bad + very bad)	
	2021	2019	2021	2019
Egyptian	95	93	3	5
American	94	91	3	7
Turkish	93	96	3	2
Chinese	92	89	4	3
Saudi	92	85	6	14
Iraqi	92	92	3	6
Qatari	91	87	5	10
UAE	91	89	7	8
UK	90	89	3	4
German	86	81	3	5
Japanese	85	86	6	4
Syrian	82	78	14	20
Russian	80	--	10	--
Iranian	55	48	32	39
Israeli	49	49	43	40

Table 1: How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian government and the governments of the following countries?

The next component of the survey delved into Jordanians’ perceptions regarding the outlook of these foreign relations, particularly whether they were in favor of strengthening Jordan’s relations with the aforementioned states, maintaining them, or limiting them. For that, Jordanians were more in favor of strengthening Jordan’s relations with 13 states than they were in 2019. These states were, in addition to the 10 mentioned earlier, Turkey, Japan, and Israel. The only state with which Jordanians were not more in favor of strengthening relations was China, which saw a slight 0.3% decrease. Moreover, looking more specifically at those who stated limiting relations, the results find that 2% of Jordanians indicated limited relations with Turkey compared to 17% in 2019; 6% for the UAE and the UK with 0.8% and 0.2% increase from 2019; 8% for China, compared to 4.3% in 2019; 7% for the Japanese government with 2.3% increase from 2019; and 74% for Israel with a 4.1% increase from 2019. Overall, Jordanians were more polar in their responses compared to 2019, as the percentage of those indicating “maintaining relations” decreased across the board.

Country	Strengthening Relations		Maintaining Relations as		Limiting Relations	
	2021	2019	2021	2019	2021	2019
Turkish	76	72.5	19	24.5	2	1.7
Qatari	74	62.4	20	29.5	3	6.3
Egyptian	71	55.8	24	36.2	3	6.3
Saudi	70	55.3	22	33.4	6	10.1
UAE	69	62	22	31	6	5.2
Iraqi	69	60.2	24	34.1	4	4.2
American	65	52.6	26	32.3	7	12.8
UK	64	58.1	26	32.3	6	5.8
Chinese	61	61.3	29	31.1	8	4.3
German	61	56.8	30	33.4	5	5.3
Japanese	60	59.9	30	41.8	7	4.7
Syrian	56	50	33	38.7	7	9.3
Russian	49		38		10	
Iranian	25	21.5	31	32.3	39	40.4
Israeli	8	7.1	14	19.1	74	69.9

Table 2: Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the following governments, maintaining them at the present level, or limiting them?

2.2 Jordan’s Diplomatic Relations

The second section of this survey delved into Jordan’s diplomatic relations, as the first question asked Jordanians to indicate the country they believe is Jordan’s closest ally. The United States was ranked first with 28% of Jordanians, followed by 23% for Saudi Arabia, 13% for Palestine, 6% for Iraq, and 5% for each of the UK and Egypt.

Looking at the results of 2021 in comparison with the 2019 and 2018 waves, we find that Jordanians outlook towards the United States as Jordan’s main ally recovered from 2019’s setback, which saw a decrease from 40.8% (in 2018) to 21.5%. At the same time, the percentage of those who indicated Saudi Arabia decreased from 25.2% in 2019 to 23% in 2021. Further, the results show an increase in the perceptions toward Iraq and Egypt as allies from 0.8% in 2018 to 4.7% in 2019 to 6% in 2021 for Iraq, and from 1.7% to 2% for 6% for Egypt.

This is an indication signifying a growing support for Jordan’s alliance with the two states, especially that 58% of Jordanians indicated that they have heard of this alliance. In fact, 62% of Jordanians indicated some level of optimism towards this alliance, divided between 28% who were very optimistic and 34% who were somewhat optimistic. Moreover, 23% of Jordanians illustrated that the alliance will succeed in integrating the economies of the three states largely while 43% believe it will do so moderately, as 12% and 15% outlined that it will not be able to achieve this objective or that nothing will change in that regard.

The results were also similar when it comes to the countries with which Jordanians believe that the country should cooperate more, as Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Turkey ranked highest with 18%, 18%, and 11%, respectively. There is an increase in the percentage of those who want Jordan to cooperate with the United States and Saudi Arabia in comparison with 2019’s wave, illustrating the aforementioned recovery for positive perceptions toward the US, yet, there is a significant decrease when it comes to fostering cooperative relations with Turkey, manifested in a near 10 percentage points decrease.

Looking at foreign policy interests, 35% of Jordanians believe Jordan shares the most foreign policy interests with Saudi Arabia, followed by 16% for Egypt, 11% for Palestine, and 8% for the United Arab Emirates. It is worth exploring, for future waves, what Jordanians believe to be Jordan’s main foreign policy interests.

2.3 Role Played by Active States in the Region

In the third section of the Foreign Relations Survey, we looked to gauge Jordanians’ perceptions in relation to the role played by active states in the region. As such, the first question focused on whether they believe the same states indicated earlier should play a larger role in the region, a smaller role in the region, or no role at all. The results show that with the exception of Iran and Israel, 64% of Jordanians or more were in favor of these countries playing a larger role in the region, whether it is much larger or a larger role to some extent.

In 2021, there were more Jordanians in support of Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, UAE, Iraq, Japan, Russia, and Syria playing a larger role in the region than in 2019. While over 65% of Jordanians were still in support of Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Germany to play a larger role in the region, the extent of this support decreased in 2021 compared to 2019.

Overall, there was an average 1.4 percentage points increase in having larger roles in the region, across the board while there was a 0.7 percentage points decrease, on average, for playing a smaller role or no role at all in the region. In fact, there is a 6.9 percentage points increase in the percentage of Jordanians who would like Iran to play smaller role or no role at all in the region, compared to the previous wave. This increase was also 6.8 percentage points for Israel, 5.9 for China, 5.2 for Russia, 4.4 for the United Kingdom, 4 for Turkey, 2.5 for Germany, and 1.9 for each of the United States and Japan.

Country	Larger Role in the Region		Smaller Role in the Region		No Role at All	
	2021	2019	2021	2019	2021	2019

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Jordan	90	89.3	2	3.2	3	5.1
Turkey	85	87.9	6	2.7	7	6.3
Qatar	83	75.1	7	9.7	7	12.1
Egypt	82	72.1	8	12.1	7	12.8
UAE	81	77.7	7	9.1	10	10.2
Iraq	79	68.5	10	11.7	8	16.9
United States	73	74.4	9	5.5	15	16.6
Saudi Arabia	72	77.3	7	6	9	14.6
UK	71	73.4	9	6	16	14.6
China	70	70	9	5.6	18	15.5
Japan	69	68.3	11	10.6	17	15.5
Germany	65	65.5	12	10.8	18	16.7
Russia	65	64.7	11	5.6	22	22.2
Syria	64	52.2	15	18.8	18	26.3
Iran	38	41.9	17	9.4	40	40.7
Israel	26	32.9	9	6.6	61	56.6

Table 3: Do you prefer the following to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?

Moreover, if we were to further analyze the data and produce mean scores on a scale of 1 to 4 (where 1 equals no role at all, 2 means a smaller role, 3 means a larger role to some extent, and 4 means a much larger role), there is an average of 6.4 percentage points increase in having a larger role for all these states. There is minimal change between 2021 and 2019 when it comes to grouping the states into the four groups. Jordan remained within the same group of “much larger role”, joined by Turkey in 2021 which was in the “larger role to some extent” in 2019. In 2021, Syria moved to the “larger role to some extent”, moving from the “smaller role” group 2019, leaving Iran and Israel in that group. There were no countries in the “no role at all” group.

Figure 1: Do you prefer **each of the following** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region? (Comparison between 2019 and 2021).

As Jordan remained one of two countries which most Jordanians believe it should play a greater role in the region, the respondents were asked to indicate why they believe that should be the case. 21% of Jordanians attributed their responses to improving the economic situation, followed by 10% for its geographic location, 7% for improving public relations and connections, and 5% for each of “reputation, pride, image, and status”, “Jordan is a peaceful country”, “improving the overall situation including living”, and “Jordan is a safe and secure country”.

2.4 Arab-Israeli Conflict

The next section of the Foreign Relations Survey was focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, the survey looked to gauge Jordanians’ perceptions regarding the United States’ engagement in the Arab Israeli conflict. The results show that 83% of Jordanians are very unsatisfied coupled with 6% who are somewhat unsatisfied. There is a slight improvement in these perceptions when compared to the 2019 wave, as 7% of Jordanians are very or somewhat satisfied while 3.4% of

Jordanians felt the same in 2019. Overall, looking at available data since 2004, we find that Jordanians have always been generally very dissatisfied.

The Arab- Israeli conflict is one of the most protracted conflicts in the world today. When asked about whom they believe is most to blame for the lack of progress between Israel and Palestine, 42% of Jordanians blamed Israel, down from 43.8% in 2019, as 4% blamed the Palestinians – also down from 8.8% in 2019. Additionally, 25% blamed the United States compared 30.3% in 2019. The only percentage increase between the two waves was directed at Arab Countries, as 20% of Jordanians believe they are most to blame for such lack of progress, compared to 13.9% in 2019. This could be attributed to the Abraham Accords and the normalization campaigns.

Looking at solutions for the protracted conflict, 27% of Jordanians argued that a two-state solution (Israel and Palestine living side by side) is the ideal solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which had decreased significantly from 45.6% in 2019. At the same time, 31% of Jordanians believe that one state solution for the Palestinians and the Israelis is the ideal solution, which almost doubled from 15.8% in 2019. 15% of Jordanians referred to “keeping things as they are now”, which decreased from 25.3% in 2019. These differences can be attributed to the recent acts of violence, arrests, and human rights violations carried out by the Israelis on one hand, and the widespread social media activism that sought to shed light on these actions, on the other hand. As such, there is a growing belief that, amid these developments, a two-state solution might not favor the Palestinians as much as it could, particularly that Israeli settlements encroach into territories that fall within the lines drawn for Palestine in the 1947 partition.

Following that, the survey inquired about the foreign policies of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and the European Union in relation to the Palestinian issue. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought their policies were “Pro-Palestinian”; “Pro-Israeli”; “balanced”; or “indifferent”. About 36% of Jordanians believe that Germany’s foreign policy toward Palestine is Pro-Israeli, followed by 23% for balanced and 21% for indifferent. For the United States, 78% referred to its foreign policy as Pro-Israeli, down from near 86% in 2019. Similarly, 58% of Jordanians referred to the UK’s policy as pro-Israeli, down from 67% in 2019.

Overall, the data shows that Jordanians view Germany’s foreign policy as generally indifferent, albeit it moved by 3.2 percentage points toward being “pro-Israeli”. As for the remaining governments, the results show that for France, Jordanians maintained that its stance is between “pro-Israeli” and “indifferent”, while it moved by a 1.2 percentage points in favor of the former between 2019 and 2021. The United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the European Union were all also viewed as having policies between being pro-Israeli and being indifferent, but they are moving by an average of 4 percentage points in favor of the latter, particularly the United States which saw a 6 percentage points increase.

The survey then explored Jordanians’ level of support for peace/ normalization agreements between Israel on one hand and each of the PNA, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, on the other – in addition to a potential deal with Saudi Arabia. The data shows that an average of 71% of Jordanians strongly oppose all these agreements. The mean scores reveal an average of 3.42 out of 4 (whereby 1 = strongly support, 2 = somewhat support, 3 = somewhat oppose, and 4 = strongly oppose), indicating a very high level of opposition among Jordanians.

2.5 Instability and Regional Conflicts

The fifth section of the survey looked to engage Jordanians' perceptions regarding regional instability and conflicts. The vast majority of Jordanians (76%) believe that things are unstable and insecure in the Middle East region compared to 83.7% for the previous wave. There is an increase among those who believe that things are stable and secure, as 20% of Jordanians indicated that, compared to 13.7% in 2019. Israel was identified by 54% of Jordanians as the country most to blame for regional instability and violence in the Middle East, followed by the United States with 19% and 6% for Iran.

Looking more specifically at Jordan's security, the survey finds that Israel poses the biggest security threat to Jordan, as illustrated by 50% of Jordanians, with a 3 percentage points increase compared to the previous wave. Iran was ranked second, as 7% of Jordanians identified it as its biggest source of security threat, which was the same for the United States, down from 10.3% in 2019. Further, 19% of Jordanians indicated that there are not any countries that pose a security threat to Jordan.

When exploring the sources of security threat to the Middle East region, 53% of Jordanians identified Israel, compared to 20% for the United States, and 12% for Iran. Additionally, 2% of Jordanians referred to Russia, as 1% indicated each of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates as the region's biggest sources of security threat. Moreover, 48% of Jordanians indicated that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict threatens regional stability the most, followed by the Iranian-American conflict with 34% - down from near 26% in 2019.

There was also a decrease in the percentage of Jordanians who view the Iranian-Saudi conflict as the biggest threat to regional stability, as indicated by 9% of Jordanians, compared to 16.2% in 2019. While there is a slight growing support among Jordanians to back Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Iran, as 34% of Jordanians believe Jordan should support Saudi, compared to 30.8% in 2019, neutrality remains the overarching preference. In fact, 59% of Jordanians believe the country should remain neutral, albeit down from 66.8% in 2019.

2.6 International Conflicts

Jordanians' preference for neutrality carried through when scaled onto the US-Russian and the US-China rivalries. In fact, 80% of Jordanians believe that the country should remain neutral if there were to be a conflict between the United States and Russia, albeit down from 83.7% in the 2019 wave, as 11% of Jordanians indicated that Jordan should support the United States. There was also 1.3 percentage points increase for supporting Russia, leveling at 5%, up from 3.7% in 2019.

When it comes to Jordan's stance should there be a conflict between the United States and China, 79% of Jordanians opted for neutrality, compared to 81% in 2019. At the same time, supporting the United States saw a 2.7 percentage points increase to reach 10% while supporting China decreased from 9.2% in 2019 to 8%.

The United States also maintained its place as the non-Arab actor which Jordanians believe it will still have the strongest influence in the Middle East in 10 years, with 42%, followed by China and Turkey with 13% each. While 8.1% of Jordanians identified China in 2019 compared to 13% in this


current wave, 16.2% identified Turkey in 2019, as the slight trend of decreasing favorability toward Turkey loomed again in this survey.

Another 10% of Jordanians identified Israel as the non-Arab actor that will have the strongest influence in the region, albeit down from 16.6% in 2019. Iran and Russia also saw minor decreases, as 5% and 4%, respectively, identified them as the countries that will have the strongest influence. Jordanians' perceptions of a European influence in the region halved between the two waves, as a mere 2% of Jordanians identified Europe to have the strongest influence in the region in 10 years.


3. Annex: Complete Survey Results

3.1 Jordan's Political Relations


3.1.1 *When thinking about countries that support Jordan the most these days, and based on your knowledge, which country has been Jordan's greatest economic supporter in your view?*




3.1.2 *How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Chinese governments?*




3.1.3 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the German governments?




3.1.4 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the American governments?




3.1.5 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Russian governments?




3.1.6 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Japanese governments?



3.1.7 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Israeli governments?




3.1.8 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Saudi governments?




3.1.9 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Qatari governments?




3.1.10 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Egyptian governments?




3.1.11 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Iranian governments?




3.1.12 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the UK governments?




3.1.13 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Turkish governments?




3.1.14 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Syrian governments?




3.1.15 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Emirati governments?




3.1.16 How do you describe the political relations between the Jordanian and the Iraqi governments?




3.1.17 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Chinese** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.18 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **German** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.19 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **American** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.20 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Russian** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.21 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Japanese** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.22 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Israeli** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.23 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Saudi** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.24 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Qatari** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.25 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Egyptian** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.26 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Iranian** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.27 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **UK** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.28 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Turkish** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.29 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Syrian** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?



3.1.30 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Emirati** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.1.31 Are you in favor of strengthening the political relations between the Jordanian and the **Iraqi** governments or maintaining them at the present level or limiting them?




3.2 Jordan’s Diplomatic Relations


3.2.1 In your view, which country is the closest ally of Jordan?




3.2.2 In your view, which country is the closest ally of Jordan?




3.2.3 If you were to choose, which country Jordan should cooperate with more in the future?




3.2.4 If you were to choose, which country Jordan should cooperate with more in the future?




3.2.5 Which Arab state does Jordan share the most foreign policy interests with?




3.2.6 Which non-Arab state does Jordan share the most foreign policy interests with?




3.2.7 Have you heard of the alliance between Jordan, Iraq and Egypt?



3.2.8 *Regardless if you heard of it or not, are you...*




3.2.9 *Which of the following statements best describes your view on this alliance?*




3.3 Role Played by Active States in the Region


3.3.1 Do you prefer **China** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.2 Do you prefer **Germany** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.3 Do you prefer the **US** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.4 Do you prefer **Japan** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.5 Do you prefer *Israel* to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.6 Do you prefer *Saudi Arabia* to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.7 Do you prefer **Qatar** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.8 Do you prefer **Egypt** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.9 Do you prefer *Iran* to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.10 Do you prefer the *UK* to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.11 Do you prefer **Turkey** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.12 Do you prefer **Russia** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.13 Do you prefer **Syria** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.14 Do you prefer the **UAE** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.15 Do you prefer **Iraq** to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?



3.3.16 Do you prefer *Jordan* to play a much larger role, a larger role to some extent, a smaller role or you prefer this country play no role at all in the region?




3.3.17 Why do you prefer that Jordan plays a greater role in the region?




3.4 Arab-Israeli Conflict


3.4.1 How satisfied are you with the way the USA is handling the Arab-Israeli conflict?




3.4.2 Who do you think is MOST to blame for the lack of progress between Israel and the Palestinians?




3.4.3 What is in your view the ideal solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict?




3.4.4 Which of the following statements is closest to describing **Germany's** foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.5 Which of the following statements is closest to describing the **United States'** foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.6 Which of the following statements is closest to describing the United Kingdom's foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.7 Which of the following statements is closest to describing France's foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.8 Which of the following statements is closest to describing China's foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.9 Which of the following statements is closest to describing *Russia's* foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.10 Which of the following statements is closest to describing the *European Union's* foreign policy on the Palestinian issue?




3.4.11 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and *PNA*?




3.4.12 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and **Egypt**?




3.4.13 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and **Jordan**?




3.4.14 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and the **UAE**?




3.4.15 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and **Bahrain**?




3.4.16 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and **Sudan**?



3.4.17 To what extent do you support or oppose the peace/normalization agreements signed between Israel and **Morocco**?




3.4.18 To what extent would you support or oppose a peace / normalization agreement between **Saudi Arabia** and Israel?




3.5 Instability and Regional Conflicts


3.5.1 When thinking about the region of the Middle East, do you think things are...




3.5.2 Which country do you think is MOST to blame for the regional instability and violence that exists in the region?




3.5.3 Which country is the biggest source of security threat to Jordan?




3.5.4 Which country is the biggest source of security threat to the Middle East?



3.5.5 Of the following list, which conflict, country or entity do you think threatens regional stability MOST?




3.5.6 How should Jordan act in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry?




3.6 International Conflicts


3.6.1 How should Jordan act if there was a conflict between the US and Russia?



3.6.2 How should Jordan act if there was a conflict between the US and China?




3.6.3 Which of the following non-Arab actors will have the strongest influence in the Middle East in 10 years?




3.7 Demographics


3.7.1 Gender




3.7.2 Age



3.7.3 Social Status



3.7.4 Education level



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