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Connecting the Dots: Youth Political Participation and Electoral Violence in Africa.

Donnas Ojok[a]
Tony Acol[b]

Abstract

From Cape Town to Tunis, Freetown to Djibouti, young people have played crucial roles in shaping the political discourse in Africa, both negatively and positively. Picking electoral violence as a negative component of this political engagement, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis as to why young people find themselves enmeshed in violent contestations, especially during election periods. The paper goes beyond superficial labels of criticisms tagged on the African youth by arguing that there is urgent need to understand the structural dynamics which condition violence. Using theoretical constructions by prominent scholars like Douglas North *et al.* (2014), Huerta (2015) etc., the paper provides lucid political economy explanations of youth's engagement in electoral violence. Using Uganda as a case study, the paper analyses youth's participation in violence in the recently concluded elections in Uganda and concludes by providing key recommendations to the various stakeholders, including political parties, electoral management bodies, CSOs and governments on how to dissuade young people from participating in electoral violence.

Keywords: Electoral violence, youth, political participation, Africa

1. Introduction

Between 1990 and 2015, about 60 per cent of elections in Africa experienced some form of electoral violence.[1] Violent electoral occurrences in Africa are occasioned by both strategic and incidental factors.[2] This trend not

[a]*LSE Alumnus and Program Officer at Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.*
[b]*Disability Activist and Political Analyst*

only poses a threat to peace and security on the continent, but also risks undermining the long-term sustainability of the democratisation processes.[3] Electoral violence is revealed in many ways, for instance, intimidation of both candidates and voters, physical harassment, assault on journalists, imprisonment and assassinations, confrontations with security forces and attacks on local party headquarters. This type of violence is mostly triggered by the interaction of three principal agents: political parties, elite groups, and youth groups (or party youth wings).[4]

At the centre of these violent encounters are the African youth. Many societies in contemporary Africa are now coming to terms with the fact that youth questions, if not fully addressed, are a ticking time bomb ready to explode. This concern is neither unfounded nor misplaced, not just because more than two-thirds of the continent's population are under the age of 35 years – making it the most 'youthful' continent[5] – but, more importantly, because a plethora of youth engagements are creating either progressive or digressive ripple effects across the continent.

It can be argued that young people find themselves embroiled in this undemocratic mess because of the hopeless and disadvantaged status they occupy within the current African political landscape. Admitting the fact that youth are much unrepresented in the political arena, how come they suddenly become violence actors? There are two possible explanations for this question: on the one hand, youth demographic dominance is used to champion the interests of particular dominant elites with no or little response to youth issues.[6] Many youth in Africa are exploited by the older political elites who use them as a climbing ladder to attain their own political ambitions. On the other hand, young people see electoral violence as a last resort to create their own spaces within the political arena. Young women and men are using their creativity and agency to create their own spaces for action, or 'youthscapes', in which they try to subvert authority, bypass the encumbrances created by the state, and fashion new ways of functioning and maneuvering on their own.[7] Whatever the answer it is, one fact is clear: leaving African youth out of political engagement is perilous to all sustainable development efforts.

African history is dotted with countless examples of how young people have played critical roles in either establishing or overthrowing political structures. Starting from the nascent consciousness that led to the formation of the Pan African Movement in the early 20th Century and the landmark Manchester Conference in 1945, African youth were actively involved in the struggle to liberate the continent.[8] For instance, all the 12 African participants at the Manchester Conference were youth.[9] Because

of the enormous pressure mounted by this cohort of young Africans, the conference made an unequivocal declaration on the equality of all men regardless of colour or place of birth and appealed to the colonial powers to free the African people 'forthwith from all forms of inhibiting legislation and influence and be reunited with one another.'[10]

Even today, there is increasing evidence that young people's contribution towards the dismantling of exploitative power structures in Africa is on the rise. From the recent uprising that led to the burning down of the Gabonese parliament, the coup that brought down Blaise Compoare's government in Burkina Faso, to the famous Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, there is a clear signal that young people have undoubtedly been actively involved in Africa's governance landscape.

This paper tries to answer this fundamental question: Why do youth engage in violence when non-violent methods are available and can alter outcomes? Why do young people risk retaliation and punishment – even death – on behalf of parties and candidates?[11]

The paper is organised as follows: It starts by debunking common narratives on youth participation in electoral violence. This is followed by an analysis of youth engagement in electoral violence using a theoretical framework that builds on a comprehensive analysis of youth participation during the recently concluded elections in Uganda with a specific focus on violent eruptions involving the youth. The final part of the paper concludes with some key recommendations for dissuading the youth from engaging in electoral violence.

2. Debunking Common Narratives on Youth and Electoral Violence in Africa

From the onset, it should be noted that the social, political and economic landscape in which African youth operate is fraught with gigantic difficulties. Therefore, taking a look at the structural conditions that shape youth experience and provide incentives for violent choices in the way they express 'self' is critical to having a holistic conversation about the 'youth problem'.[12] In other words, beyond youth entering popular discussions as troublesome citizens – for instance, *township youths* in the heyday of apartheid in South Africa, *rarray boys* in the ghettos of Freetown, *egbesu boys* in Nigeria's oil delta, *area boys* in Lagos – the circumstances pushing them towards the margins of society must also be taken into consideration.[13] It is important to understand that the discourse on youth in Africa cannot and should not be dominated by narratives of political violence which oftentimes tend to be too narrowly focused on youth as threats while the

underlying socio-economic and political meanings of violence, for instance with regard to legitimate claims against an authoritarian and incapable state, are ignored.[14]

We can easily establish a causal relationship between the emerging role that young people are playing in political violence and broader questions about social decomposition, economic crisis and political underrepresentation.[15]Deconstructing youth participation in violence in Africa is, therefore, incomplete without an engagement with this important phenomenon: not only does it demonstrate the deep-seated crisis of (dis) empowerment facing many societies, it also provides crucial insights into the way youth navigate this complex terrain and the weapons or tools they use to do so.[16].

3. Connecting the Dots with a Logical Thread

In deconstructing youth participation in political violence it is helpful to answer the questions of 'why' and 'how'. 'Why' helps us to understand the specific factors that draw youths into violent political conduct while 'how' explains the tactics and tools with which they navigate the dangerous geography of violent conflict. Both questions collectively provide vital insights into the dynamic engagement of youth with electoral violence in Africa and the implications for political and social change.[17]

The Models of Youth Participation in Electoral Violence

Murphy's four models of youth participation in political violence illuminate the argument further.[18] The first is the 'coerced youth model' which views youth as being brutally coerced into violence and thus as being passive victims. This model has very little applicability to the electoral violence conundrum in Africa, but it can mostly be used to explain youth engagement in political instabilities like civil wars and other protracted conflicts, for instance, when young people are abducted as child soldiers and forced to commit heinous war-time acts like murders, looting etc.

The second is the 'revolutionary youth model' which views youth as rebelling against political and economic marginalisation. A naïve analysis of events in Uganda might, for instance, suggest that the profusion of youth groups such as 'No More' Campaign, 'Jobless Brotherhood', 'Poor Youth', to mention but a few, that were formed in the run up to the 2016 general elections are examples of the revolutionary youth mode. This type of approach is motivated by propositions like that of Lindberg (2010), who argues that the use of violence and exclusionary tactics against an obviously flawed electoral processes have in many cases stimulated increased

vigilance and unity among reformers, as well as increased determination by international actors to have an impact on the nature of the regime.

The third is the 'delinquent youth model' which views youth participants in violent conflicts not as revolutionary idealists but as alienated and economically dispossessed opportunists exploiting the economic spoils of social and political turmoil. In this case, 'young people engage in violence in defence of no higher ideal, but rather for the heady adventure of violence itself'.

The fourth is the 'youth clientelism model' which emphasises how youth manage their dependency and agency within 'an institutional structure of repressive patrimonialism in which their subordination to adults is based on a cruel mixture of brutality, personal benevolence and reciprocity'. This model uses institutions built through client-patron relations to explain youth agency in violence.

The other question of 'how' relates primarily to methods and tools for navigating the complex geographies of violent political conflict in Africa. It is important to understand that the tactics with which youth engage in or navigate violent political situations cannot be explained with a mono-cultural or fossilised lens.[19] It requires a series of constantly adjusted tactics, developed in response to the constraints and incentives created, on the one hand by an unfavourable socio-economic context, and on the other by the immediate consequences of political violence.

Youth Mobilisation by the Elites as a Demonstration of Violence Capacity

Elections are inherently a competitive process. This competitiveness is further exacerbated by the 'winner-take-all' approach which is a key trait of African politics. Because of young people's relentless energy, their vast skills and knowledge, they have inevitably become the *glue* that holds together competition in electoral politics. Political agents are increasingly becoming reliant on the mobilisation abilities of African young men and women.[20].

The ability of the political agents to mobilise young people and use them as a political threat against their opponents may be viewed as a demonstration of violence capacity, a subject explored further by North, Web, Wallis and Weingast (henceforth NWWW)[21] in their classical work on the limited access order theory.[22] They argue that in most developing countries, individuals and organisations actively use or threaten to use violence to gather wealth and resources. For development to occur, violence capacity ought to be restrained. This restraint is only possible if political

elites create and share rents which incentivise them to coordinate rather than fight. At the centre of this framework are elite bargains which are the negotiation process of determining who gets what, how and why.

In a functioning limited access order framework, the elites use their privileged positions to create and distribute rents to ensure that there is maximum cooperation for peace to prevail. If the value of the rents the leaders earn from their privileges under conditions of peace exceeds that under violence, then each leader can credibly believe that the others will not fight (NWWW, 2014). The leaders remain armed and dangerous and can credibly threaten the people around them to ensure each leaders' privileges.

Using this school of thought, the fragility of violent electoral encounters among the youth in Africa can be attributed to the dysfunctional limited access order where elites fail to agree to access and share rents and end up exploiting young people's energy and drive as a tool to express their violence capacity. Young people are, therefore, used by both incumbents and challengers to manipulate electoral processes to gain advantage over their opponents.

Electoral Violence as a Blackmail Ploy

Democracy is a system that produces winners and losers.[23] This logically means that losing parties should simply accept defeat and start preparations to participate in the upcoming electoral processes. However, disputing electoral outcomes has become a normal part of opposition political engagement in Africa. As an example, the runner-up party challenged the outcome in 21 per cent of all the democratic presidential elections in the world between 1974 and 2015 (178 cases).[24] Initial challenges tend to take the form of losing parties announcing their refusal to accept the results of the election, proclaiming themselves winners, or announcing their intention to resort to legal measures or to stage protests to challenge election results.[25]

Why do opposition leaders and/or opposition political parties dispute election results? Hueta (2015) uses the electoral blackmail theory to lay down some context. He argues that electoral losers challenge electoral results to strengthen their own capacity for negotiation with the newly elected government.[26] The theory of electoral blackmail contends that losing political forces, in exchange for conceding defeat, are interested in: reforming the electoral process; legislating key issues to further their parties' agendas; getting pork barrel; filling committee chairs in congress/parliament in order to gain influence over the legislative process; obtaining cabinet positions; appointing members of their party as judges; and so on.

These benefits help increase the losing parties' chances of success in

future elections and also increases their share of power immediately after losing an election.[27] This theory is most applicable to political parties which are relatively small in size and have fewer representatives in parliament compared to the winning parties.

The electoral blackmail theory provides a stimulating explanation for the recently concluded elections in Uganda and other previous ones. In fact, all the elections held in post-independence Uganda have been disputed. Specifically, Dr Kizza Besigye, Uganda's leading opposition leader, has disputed all the four electoral competitions he contested against President Museveni. In the February 2016 polls where he garnered a trifling 39 per cent against Museveni's 60 per cent, he quickly disputed the results, called for an international audit of the elections and hastily declared himself the president of Uganda. A video of his swearing-in was posted on social media and it soon went viral. A few days later, Dr Besigye was arrested when he escaped from his home, where he had been put under house arrest, to stage an open-air talk for the benefit of onlookers in the city centre of Kampala. He was quickly rushed to a remote and isolated prison cell and charged with treason. After two months, he was released on police bond. Even after his release, Dr Besigye has never relented in his defiance campaign.[28] Besigye and his party (i.e. Forum for Democratic Change – FDC) as continued to dispute the electoral results and this has successfully played a role in keeping them significant in Uganda's political discourse.

FDC has systemically instrumentalised young people, under the Power 10 (P10) framework, to enforce its disputes of electoral outcomes.

The Economics of Youth Electoral Violence

With the skyrocketing youth unemployment and biting poverty comes frustration which is easily translated into violence during election seasons. The feeling of 'nothing to lose' and 'perhaps something to gain' tends to incentivise energetic young people to discount the risk of engaging in electoral violence.[29] It is thus logical to conclude that so long as the binding economic constraints that underpin the feeling of a hopeless future remain unaddressed, political violence, and especially that related to elections, will never cease as a feature of African politics.

A paper I recently co-authored with Mugisha *et al.* (2016) argues that unemployment and poverty have indeed compounded the attenuation of organisational capabilities within political and civic organisations, fueling clientelism and organisational capture, and thus weakening the ability of different youth groups to organise effectively so that they are able to elect leaders and subsequently hold them accountable.[30] A myriad of factors

explain the current state of underdevelopment in Africa, but a specific focus which can help us understand the current plight of the African youth ought to be turned to the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs) which Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) in their classic literature, *Our Continent, Our Future*, claim stymied most attempts to develop the capacity of young Africans, especially through education, the engine of human capital development. This, they argue, weakened the ability of political and civic organisations to build capacity for democratic practice.[31]

This argument has further been buttressed by Alcinda (2012), who opines that SAPs deeply weakened African states' ability to determine national socio-economic policies and priorities and to uphold the social contract with their citizenry, worsening the stage of life in youth that she refers to as 'waithood'.[32] Waithood, with all its challenges, also constitutes a period of experimentation, improvisation and great creativity as young Africans adopt a range of survival strategies to cope with the daily challenges in their lives. Amidst their socio-economic and political marginalisation, young people in waithood are able to develop a sense of shared identity and consciousness that leads them to challenge the establishment and fight for their rights.[33]

Most of the SAPs policies promoted private capital development to the detriment of nurturing a sustainable political system in Africa. This in effect weakened the link between political and economic democracy.[34] When the 'third wave' started sweeping across Africa, donors hastily poured billions of dollars to support civic engagement in Africa, a situation which led to the inorganic growth of what Mkandawire[35] terms as a 'socially rootless' civil society which primarily responds to donors' rather than citizens' interests.

The failure by African governments to create a robust framework for youth economic empowerment is a recipe for disaster. The 2007 World Development Report, for instance, noted that poverty is not only the result of violence but it is now a primary cause.[36] In fact, Africa's democratic stability is already under threat because there is a very positive correlation between stagnant economic development and young people's engagement in electoral violence. The political consequences are most often manifested in increased clientelism and patronage politics as survival becomes most critical. During elections, the patron-client relations trigger what Murphy (2003) calls the 'youth clientelism model' of electoral violence.

4. Partisan Youth and Electoral Violence

In Africa, political infractions, disturbances and the riotous behaviour of party supporters all contribute to violence before, during and after elections. Unfortunately, youth encounters in these violent showdowns are on an

unprecedented rise in most African countries. Whether it is the Barefoot Soldiers of the NPC Party in Ghana or NRM's crime preventers in Uganda, political parties have found a special advantage in creating pockets of youth groups and militias who count among the major instigators of what Bob-Milliar (2005) calls low-intensity electoral violence[37] in Africa.

In partisan manoeuvres, youth political activists inject enormous energy into supporting individual politicians to win elections and massively mobilise to provide this support. In return, these youths expect political elites to provide political opportunities such as jobs and contracts as personal rewards for their contributions.[38]

In this context, partisan youth use low-intensity electoral violence to respond to changes in material incentives.[39] Their activism is, however, sometimes riddled with aggression and little objectivity, stemming from the fact that most of such youth activists are naïve about the intricacies of political operations. Their brand of political activism has features of lawlessness, and the line between conventional participation and contentious politics becomes blurred.[40] This scenario is best illustrated by Murphy's (2003) 'youth clientelism model' which uses institutions built through client-patron relations to explain youth agency in violence.[41]

5. Youth and the 2016 Elections in Uganda

Prior to the return of the multi-party political dispensation in Uganda in 2005, a majority of Ugandan youth would largely be categorised as apolitical. From 2006 onwards, however, youth apathy towards political participation in Uganda has largely been on a downward spiral. The euphoria of multi-party return led more than 70 per cent[42] of the youth to throng electoral polling stations as voters. This euphoria plummeted in 2011 when only 59 per cent[43] of the youth voted.

Immediate analysis of the 2016 elections suggests that the process registered stronger citizen engagement in comparison with previous polls. Although the credibility and freeness of the elections themselves have been questioned, there is a general consensus that, for example, there is a shift in focus to real issues affecting the youth – thanks to a strong demand for programmatic positions by different groups, including youth. However, the fundamental vulnerabilities and disadvantages that hinder the youth from tapping into economic and political opportunities still largely remain glaring.

The youth are a significant segment of Uganda's population and were a considerable majority in the elections (around 42 per cent of the 15.2 million registered voters). Given their numbers, young people attracted

considerable attention from political parties and candidates who sought their votes. On their part, the youth actively organised initiatives to push for a youth agenda in the polls. Examples of these engagements include, among others, the youth manifesto, the formation of youth pressure groups, and a united youth memorandum committing to and calling for peace during the polls, to mention but a few.

However, the elections also witnessed mixed perspectives on youth engagement, with some pointing mainly to the possibility of young people perpetrating violence – as they had been recruited into militia-like groups such as crime preventers – and their engagement in other electoral irregularities, including electoral monetisation. The crime preventers – a youth armed group of the Uganda Police Force – were accused of instigating low-intensity violence during the 2016 elections in Uganda. Comprising 1.6million mostly unemployed youth, the crime preventers were recruited with the major aim to keep tabs on opposition political activities during the elections.

Many joined the vigilante group with prospects of being employed in the police force in the near future. In fact, they were promised jobs by their recruiters. 'They told me I would get a job in the army sometime after the elections,' one of them told a journalist during an interview immediately after the elections.[44] A report by CEON-Uganda, however, documented attacks by crime preventers involving batons and clubs. In the face of the vigilantes' criminality, many Ugandans have begun referring to the group as the 'crime performers'.[45]

Power10 (P10)[46], a pressure group of young FDC activists formed to 'protect against vote rigging' and mobilise party loyalists, are not exactly enamoured of peace either. In fact, they have been used as fuel for running the defiance campaign engine, an issue which led the government security apparatus to ban the campaign. After the elections, for instance, some members of the P10 formed the FDC redtop brigade to offer private security services to Dr. Kizza Besigye and other senior FDC officials.[47]

6. Electoral Violence and Partisan Youth in the Age of Social Media

At no time in Africa's history has new media induced dynamic and fluid political participation like in the recent political campaigns in various parts of the continent. Social media intensified the electoral participation as citizens – mostly in urban and peri-urban centres – took to Twitter and Facebook to campaign for and against their political candidates. These platforms were also used for mobilisation and sharing recent political

updates and events.[48] Social media has indeed become a perfect medium for untainted political engagement. It is altering power dynamics and giving all netizens the power to influence how they are governed. The Arab Spring in North Africa and other critical political activism across the continent, like in Uganda, Senegal, Congo Brazzaville etc., are indicative illustrations of the emancipatory potential of this new media.

In Uganda, many young people who had previously been apolitical joined political conversations on social media. A plethora of campaigns on social media by both the government and civil society organisations (CSOs) like '*Topowa*'[49] led to a spike, for instance, in registration by young people to vote. As a result of these social media campaigns, youth votes accounted for 44 per cent of the total votes in the 2016 elections.

Apart from individual social media engagement by youth, political parties have also found a special niche to use the dexterity and online abilities of the African youth to mobilise and engage on party positions and other political issues. Both the NRM and FDC, the two major contending political parties in Uganda, as well as the Go-Forward movement of the former prime minister, massively used social media to campaign and reach out to the electorate.

Because of its ability to easily mobilise young people, social media makes it easier for electoral violence to be ignited and subsequently spread like wildfire. Of course, there are arguments by critics like Andrew Keen in his latest work[50] that social media is leading to an uncontrolled explosion of information and creating a platform for those who want to attract the most attention by shouting loudest. The thesis of his work is that, unless social media campaigns are backed by real-life constructive offline engagement, little political or any other impact can be achieved.

But the landscape is slowly being shaped in Africa today. All around the continent, there are massive campaigns by civil society organisations (CSOs) calling upon young people to translate their online activism into offline constructive engagement. In Uganda, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a German political foundation, is one of the forerunners of this campaign in Uganda. As a think-tank, the organisation has conducted research and convened forums to discuss how constructive youth engagement can be effected both online and offline. As a result, the online enthusiasm among youth is being translated onto constructive offline political engagements. During the 2016 election campaigns, for instance, the youth mobilised both on social media and in the streets of the capital and small towns of the country. Subsequently, social media became a battleground for the contestation of ideas between youth political activists from both sides of

the political spectrum.

With these technologies, pro-democracy agitators are able to build extensive networks, create social capital, and organise political action.[51] As a result, networks are easily materialised in the streets. In Uganda, when online voices started spiralling into constructive offline engagements, the regime felt threatened and social media was shut down for up to 72 hours shortly before, during and after the elections. The government said social media posed a security threat to the peace and stability of the country. Why and how did it pose a national security threat? In my blog that I wrote shortly after the elections, I argued that the most significant reason was the fear of the voice of the ordinary citizen, especially that of the youth. A 2011 Brookings brief entitled 'The Dictators' Digital Dilemma: When Do States Disconnect their Digital Networks?'[52]answers this question more succinctly thus: 'In times of political uncertainty, rigged elections, or military incursions, ruling elites are sometimes willing to interfere with information infrastructure as a way of managing crises.'

7. Key Recommendations for Dissuading Youth from Engaging in Electoral Violence

As discussed above, electoral violence has great potential to undo the achievements of Africa's democratic struggles. As one of the most important stakeholders in this violence stake, young Africans need to be actively involved both at the policy and grass-roots levels. There are several strategies which will greatly reduce youth's tendency to engage in election violence.

There is urgent need to create multiple economic opportunities for youth across all sectors. This will play crucial roles in erasing the predisposing factors to violence such as poverty, which make youth violent. There is also an overarching strategy to sensitize youth and promote their engagement in politics always. While youth engagement during the polls heightens, there is, however, always a tendency for citizens to disengage from politics and public affairs once polls are concluded.

This phenomenon in part explains why citizens often fail to continuously monitor and hold leaders to account beyond election seasons. Thus, it is crucially important that youth sustain their active political engagement beyond the polls to ensure that their aspirations, as outlined in the different communications they set out to promote during the campaign period, stand a better chance to make it to the government's and political parties' policy agenda. Moreover, the need to promote and sustain the commitment to peace, which youth initiated during the volatile campaign season, needs to

be carried forward in view of post post-election tensions that the country continues to grapple with.

Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) should employ multi-pronged approaches to involving youth in political and electoral processes. This can be through embracing the newest advances in technology, being transparent and accountable, promoting dialogues and negotiations etc.[53]

Notes

1. Buchard,S. (2016).
2. Ibid. Strategic electoral violence is a pre-planned and methodical fashion of electoral violence, mostly committed by youth groups or party-affiliated militias, to affect the outcome of an election and ensure a certain candidate or party wins office. Elections in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe frequently exhibit this type of violence. Incidental violence, on the other hand, requires no planning and is generally borne out of frustration and circumstance. It is the result of clashes between protesters and overzealous security forces, or supporters of opposing candidates or parties. Examples include the 2012 elections in Senegal and, to some extent, the February 2016 elections in Niger.
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4. Mehler, A. (2007).
5. African Union, Youth Division. Available at http://www.africa-youth.org/
6. Mugisha *et al.* (2016).
7. Honwana, A.M. (2012).
8. Amadu, S. (2014).
9. Ibid.
10. Shepperson, G. & Drake, C. (2008).
11. Reif, M. (2011).
12. Ukeje *et al.* (2012).
13. Rashid, I. (1997).
14. Ukeje *et.al* (2012).
15. Macdonald, R.. (1997).
16. Ukeje *et al*. (2012).
17. Ibid.
18. Murphy, W. (2003).
19. Ibid.
20. *Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana: A Qualitative Study of Party Foot Soldiers' Activism.*
21. In their latest book, *In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics and the Problems of Development.*
22. LAO simply refers to the manipulation of economic interests by the political system in order to create rents so that powerful groups and individuals find it in their interest to refrain from using violence.
23. Przeworski, A. (1991).
24. Huerta (2015).
25 .Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.

28. The defiance campaign is a movement by FDC and Dr Kizza Besigye to resist any attempt to derail democracy in Uganda by the NRM government.
29. Available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/02/16/can-the-formidable-youth-vote-swing-the-political-tide-in-ugandadecides-2016/
30. Mugisha *et al.* (2016).
31. Mkandawire, P.T., & Soludo, C.C. (1999).
32. The notion of waithood encompasses the multifaceted nature of the transition to adulthood.
33. Honwana, A.M. (2012).
34. Mugisha *et al*. (2016).
35. Mkandawire, T. (2010).
36. WDR (2011).
37. Low-intensity electoral violence is election-related disturbances or infractions occurring during the pre-vote and post-vote periods in which there are no more than ten election-related deaths; violence is localised; and there is no large-scale displacement of human beings and dispossession of assets. Nonetheless, low-intensity violence is one characterised by the manipulation of formal procedures, violent assault/harassment, breach of the peace, disorderly behaviour, protests, disorderly conduct, violent intimidation, or destruction of the properties of parties and supporters, stealing or stuffing of ballot boxes.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid
41. Murphy (2003)
42. 2006 General Elections Report, EC
43. 2011 General Elections Report, EC
44. Available at https://news.vice.com/article/ugandas-vigilante-crime-preventers-could-backfire-on-the-president
45. Ibid.
46. Power10, aka P10, is a political mobilisation strategy by the FDC consisting of 10 youth in each village in Uganda to protect the party's votes and campaign for the party.
47. Available at http://www.theinsider.ug/fdc-unleashes-red-top-brigade/
48. Available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/03/02/social-media-lockdown-and-elections-in-uganda/
49. Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) in mid-September picked '*Topowa'* as the mobilisation catch-word for its civic education campaign in the run-up to the 2016 elections. It means 'never give up' in the Luganda language.
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