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# Analysis of public opinion on Macedonia`s accession to the European Union (2014-2018)

Authors: Ivan Damjanovski and Marie Jelenka Kirchner

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# Impressum

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- Author:** Ivan Damjanovski and Marie Jelenka Kirchner
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# Conclusions

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- Compared to 2017, support for EU membership has remained the same
- The trend of growing gaps in support for EU membership among ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians continues in 2018
- The population continues to be drawn towards the EU as the percentage of respondents who consider EU membership to be important is on the rise
- A significant deviation from previous trends is notable in the perception of Macedonia's preparedness for EU membership as a decreasing number of respondents considers Macedonia to be ready for EU membership
- Informational deficits influence the unrealistic perceptions of the population on the readiness of the country to become an EU member state
- The majority of respondents acknowledge Macedonia to have progressed in the EU integration process in the last year
- The publicity surrounding the EU accession prospects stemming from the Prespa agreement and the support that it has received from both the EU and EU member state officials has had only a marginal impact on the popular perceptions on the progress made in the EU integration process in 2018
- Domestic factors and veto-power of neighbouring EU member states are seen as the two biggest obstacles to Macedonia's prospects of EU membership
- Majority of the population still credits external factors for the inability of the country to enter the EU

- Almost half of the population believes that Macedonia can become a member of the EU in the next 5 years
- The general public is still not appropriately acquainted with the dynamics of the accession process and the overall EU assessment of Macedonia's progress in compliance with EU conditionality
- Rationalist-utilitarian factors are the principal predictor of support for EU membership
- Expectations of general improvement of the standard of living are the most prominent factor of support for EU membership
- There is a significant increase of support for EU membership based on the belief that it will bring more security and stability in the country
- Economic development and unemployment are perceived as key policy areas that will be positively affected by EU membership
- Identity and value-based factors have become dominant predictors of Euroscepticism in Macedonia
- The identity implications from the name dispute significantly influence the structure of Eurosceptic attitudes in Macedonia
- The name issue has lost its potency as a predictor of Euroscepticism among ethnic Macedonians, as the number of ethnic Macedonians that support Macedonia's EU membership even if it is conditioned by changing the name of the country has more than doubled since 2014
- Party cues on the EU accession consequences of the Prespa agreement have significantly affected attitudes of SDSM supporters, whose support for EU membership even if it is conditioned by changing the country's name has grown by a third compared to the previous year

- Trends of continuously high support for EU membership can be observed among SDSM and DUI supporters
- The percentages of VMRO-DPMNE supporters that support and oppose EU membership are almost equal
- A growing number of VMRO DPMNE supporters support EU membership even if it is conditioned by changing the name
- A quarter of VMRO DPMNE supporters remain genuinely Eurosceptic

# Introduction

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Support for Macedonia's European Union (EU) membership and its process of accession has been a subject of numerous public opinion surveys. However, most of these surveys have been conducted on an ad hoc basis and they have rarely been framed in a longitudinal and consistent methodological framework. There is an obvious lack of unified data bases that would offer repetitive public opinion research which would measure public attitudes through a generalized and coherent methodological framework across multi-year time periods. With a view to filling this gap, the Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" - Skopje and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 2014 initiated the establishment of a longitudinal database about the public support for the EU accession process and Macedonia's EU membership which would be effectuated through annual public opinion surveys based on a coherent methodology and measurement of identical questions. This database focuses on two dimensions of public

opinion on the Macedonian EU accession process which are addressed in every annual survey, and whose measurement is obtained by utilization of identical batteries of survey questions. The first dimension seeks to determine the general trends of public support for Macedonia's EU membership. The second goal is to establish the determinants of such support through a long-term impact analysis of three factors: rationalist-utilitarian, identity-based and cues from political elites and political parties. Such accumulation of comparable data opens the path for establishment of more serious longitudinal analyses of the support for Macedonia's EU membership. Furthermore, as an addition to this unified design, every annual research further inspects public opinion on the EU integration process, by examining current topics, specific for concrete time periods.

The starting point of this approach are the findings of the monograph "Public opinion and Macedonia's accession



to the European Union (2004-2014)",<sup>1</sup> published in 2014, which at the same time includes the data from the public opinion survey conducted in 2014, and represents a methodological reference point for all subsequent research outputs. This comprehensive study accomplished two objectives. First, it determined general trends of support for Macedonia's EU membership pointing out a correlation between the dynamics of the support for European Union membership and the development of the Macedonian EU accession process manifested in two time-intervals: 2004-2009 as a period of consistent and exceedingly high support and 2010-2014 as a period of gradual decline of support for EU membership. Second, the study established an analytical model of the determinants of support for EU membership through the interaction of three factors of public attitude formation: rationalist-utilitarian, identity-based and cues from political parties.<sup>2</sup> The rationalist-utilitarian framework presumes the importance of calculation of material benefits as

the main factor for the formation of individuals' attitudes for support of the European integration process. In this context, support can be based on current or future perceptions on personal or societal benefit from the accession to the European Union. On the other hand, support for the European integration process may also be the result of the influence of identity and value-based factors shaping the individual's world view, which consequently is the basis of the individual's attitude formation. Thereby, the degree of national self-identification and the sense of cultural threat are manifested as the primary factors for variation in attitudes. Finally, the formation of public attitudes towards European Union membership can also be a result of the influence of cues from political parties which are capable of imposing their own attitudes regarding important social issues to their supporters. Thus, it is presumed that the variation of support for the European integration process depends on the homogeneity of attitudes of political parties about this question.

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<sup>1</sup> Damjanovski, Ivan. "Public opinion and Macedonia's accession to the European Union (2004-2014)", Konrad Adenauer Foundation / Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" – Skopje, 2014

<sup>2</sup> For a wider theoretical explication of the model see: *ibid*, pages 13-24

# About the survey

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This public opinion analysis on the Macedonian process of accession to the European Union conducted in 2018 is a continuation of the research done in 2014, 2016 and 2017. It applies the same theoretical and analytical model of the determinants of support for Macedonia's EU membership, and at the same time it compares its empirical findings with the findings of the previous surveys.

The primary data used in this analysis come from a public opinion survey research conducted in December 2018 on a sample of 1000 respondents. The sample is nationally representative according to gender, age (over 18 years of age), ethnicity, and it also covers respondents from all six electoral districts in the country. Results are presented in percentage and are subject to a statistical error of  $\pm 3\%$ .

This research uses the same methodology and questionnaire as the surveys conducted in the years of 2014, 2016 and 2017. This approach creates conditions for a mini longitudinal analysis of the support for Macedonia's accession to the European Union over the past five years. Thus, in line with the previously established analytical model, this study focuses on analysing general trends and basic determinants of support for Macedonia's membership in the European Union in the period 2014-2018.

# General Trends

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The findings of our longitudinal study of public support for EU membership in Macedonia over the past decade have indicated a general trend of gradual decline in the number of respondents that would support Macedonia's membership in the EU. This trend has been strongly correlated with the credibility of Macedonia's accession perspective as the long-standing Greek blockade of the accession process, exacerbated by a series of political crises, has significantly reduced the prospects of the country for EU membership. Hence, since 2009 when the progress in the accession process was effectively halted, the support for membership has been gradually dropping down to 73 % in 2016. On the other hand, 2018 has witnessed a series of developments that could potentially have a key impact on public opinion on EU membership in Macedonia. The signing of the Prespa agreement between the Macedonian and Greek governments

in June 2018 has presumably resolved the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia which has been the principal reason for the blockade of the accession process in the past decade. The lifting of the veto unlocks Macedonia's EU membership process and significantly raises the credibility of the accession perspective. However, the results of the following referendum which was held in September and the subsequent developments in the Macedonian Parliament in regard to the constitutional changes that introduced North Macedonia as the new name of the county have tremendously raised contention in Macedonian politics. While on one hand, the supporters of the Prespa agreement have argued that the changing of the name will finally unblock the accession process and bring long-term stability and prosperity in the country, the opposing actors which included the biggest opposition party in the Macedonian

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► Parliament claimed that the change of the constitutional name will have detrimental consequences for Macedonian identity which outweigh the benefits of the reinvigorated Euro Atlantic integration processes.

The results of the 2018 survey demonstrate that both camps have had an even effect on public opinion on EU accession. Compared to 2017, numbers of respondents in favour or against EU membership have barely changed as

in regard to general trends (Table 1). However, when respondents are divided into ethnic groups, we observe a growing gap between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in regards to their support of EU membership. The results from 2018 follow the general trend of past years, with a declining number of ethnic Macedonians (63%, compared to 68% in 2017), yet an increasing number of ethnic Albanians (96%, compared to 90% in 2017) supporting Macedonia’s potential EU membership.

**Table 1.**<sup>3</sup>

If next week there is a referendum for membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the EU, how would you vote?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
For	80	77	73	72
Against	14	17	17	17
I don't know	6	4	8	8
I won't vote	1	2	1	4

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<sup>3</sup> As a result of rounding decimals, the total sum may not amount to 100% (this remark refers to all tables).

Concerning the importance of EU membership, the results (Table 2) show that respondents generally continue to be drawn towards the EU. Overall, the percentage of participants who consider EU membership to be important rose about 6% in comparison to 2017. This is a continuation of the positive trend of past years. Going more into detail, the results however show that only the group of respondents who consider EU membership as “very important” has invariably grown, while percentages of

respondents considering EU membership “somewhat important” have been declining until 2017, to only grow again in 2018. Also, the increasing trend of respondents that don’t attach any importance to EU membership has been halted in 2018, as the percentage of respondents who consider EU membership “not important at all” fell by 4%. From a demographic stand point, however, ethnic divisions are also evident in this case, as the personal attachment to the idea of EU membership is weaker among ethnic Macedonians. ▶

**Table 2.**

How personally important is it for you for Macedonia to become a member of the EU?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Very important	48	48	54	56
Somewhat important	36	29	20	24
Somewhat not important	5	5	6	5
Not important at all	10	16	18	14
I don't know	1	1	1,5	1
No answer / Refuses to answer	0	0	0	0

► A significant deviation from previous trends can be seen in the distribution of attitudes related to the perception of Macedonia's preparedness for EU membership (Table 3), as a decreasing number of respondents considers Macedonia to be ready for EU membership. Thus, 57% believe the country not to be ready which shows a sharp increase from 43% in 2017. Comparison to previous years shows that these

numbers follow a general trend (despite a slightly more optimistic outlook in 2017). Although this trajectory indicates towards the development of a more objective perception on the positioning of Macedonia in the accession process, they also confirm that informational deficits influence the rather unrealistic perceptions on the readiness of the country to become an EU member state. The majority

**Table 3.**

Do you think that Macedonia is ready for EU membership?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Yes	51	45	46	36
No	42	49	43	57
I don't know	7	6	9	6
No answer / Refuses to answer	1	0	1	1

of respondents (66%) acknowledge Macedonia to have progressed in the EU integration process, a slight increase (2%) from the previous year (Table 4). Just like in 2017, 13% of respondents believe that Macedonia has progressed a lot. 25% consider the country to have “somewhat progressed”, a drop of 6% compared to the previous year. An increase can be observed among the group of respondents that consider Macedonia to “have progressed a little” by 8%. A decrease by

5% in the group of undecided respondents suggests that an increasing number of respondents have developed an opinion on the topic. However, the overall distribution of attitudes indicates that the publicity surrounding the EU accession prospects stemming from the Prespa agreement and the overwhelming support that it has received from both the EU and EU member state officials has had only a marginal impact on the popular perceptions on the progress made in the EU integration process in 2018. ▶

**Table 4.**

Compared to last year, how much has Macedonia progressed in the EU integration process from your perspective?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Has progressed a lot	14	11	13	13
Somewhat progressed	33	28	31	25
Has progressed a little	20	20	20	28
There was no progress at all	26	30	27	30
It has regressed	5	7	2	2
I don't know	2	3	7	2
No answer / Refuses to answer	0	1	1	1

► There has been almost no change considering the perceived reasons obstructing Macedonia to become an EU member (Table 5). An equal number of respondents (38%) consider domestic factors and veto-power of neighbouring EU member states as the two biggest obstacles to Macedonia's prospects of EU membership. The distribution of attitudes for these variables confirm the assumption of a low impact of the Prespa agreement on general perceptions about the EU accession process. Although the Prespa agreement potentially solves the

biggest bilateral dispute that has ruptured Macedonia's EU accession prospects for almost a decade, a majority of the population still credits external factors for the inability of the country to enter the EU. Yet again, significant ethnic differences exist in regard to this question. Thus, 60% of Albanians consider domestic factors as the main problem for the state of affairs in the accession process. In contrast, more than 50% of ethnic Macedonians consider the main culprit for the failure of EU membership to be outside of the domestic arena. Although

**Table 5.**

In your opinion, what is the most important reason why Macedonia is still not a member of the EU?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Non-accomplishment of domestic reforms	29	39	37	38
The EU is not ready to accept Macedonia as its member	7	10	16	16
The neighbouring countries obstruct Macedonia's membership in the EU	59	47	37	38
I don't know	4	4	7	7
No answer / refuses to answer	1	1	2	1



a vast majority of the population is certain that Macedonia will eventually join the EU, there is a significant variation in regard to the perceived time frame for the accomplishment of that goal (Table 6). In comparison to 2017, respondents have adjusted their expectations concerning the time frame of accession. A decreasing number of respondents expect the country to join the EU in the next 3 years. A successful accession in the next 10 or 5 years however seems to be more plausible for an increasing number of respondents. The group of respondents considering

EU membership to be out of discussion continues to decrease steadily. Despite a somewhat more realistic distribution of attitudes, it is evident that the general public is still not appropriately acquainted with the dynamics of the accession process and the overall EU assessment of Macedonia's progress in compliance with EU conditionality. Thus, almost half of the population believes that Macedonia can become a member of the EU in the next 5 years, a time frame which doesn't correspond to the average length of the accession negotiations which are yet to begin in the case of Macedonia.

**Table 6.**

When do you think Macedonia will become an EU member?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
In the next 3 years	14	18	27	23
In the next 5 years	18	22	22	25
In the next 10 years	21	18	12	17
In the next 20 years	12	7	7	14
Never	23	25	20	17
No answer / Refuses to answer	11	10	11	5

# Rationalist-utilitarian factors

The findings from the previous surveys have demonstrated the viability of utilitarian factors as key predictors for popular support of Macedonia's EU membership. This line of argumentation is further confirmed by the results from the 2018 survey (Table 7). The dominant reason for respondents to vote in favour of EU membership are expectations of general improvement of the standard of living. The cumulative percentage that includes other economic factors such as "reduction of unemployment" (22%)

and "mobility of workers" (6%) gives cues that rationalist-utilitarian factors are the principal predictor of support for EU membership. However, we detect a significant increase in the population that supports EU membership based on the belief that it will bring more security and stability in the country. In contrast, there is a significant drop in the percentage of respondents that attach their support for EU membership to expectations of improvement of the standard of living. This shift could be a consequence of the increased advocacy of the security aspects of Macedonia's Euro Atlantic integration that dominated the debate over the Prespa agreement and the referendum.

**Table 7.**

What is your reason for deciding to vote for membership in the EU?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Improvement of the standard of living	29	46	51	36
Reduction of unemployment	26	17	23	22
Improvement of democracy	10	5	7	9
Mobility of workers / easier access to jobs abroad	3	10	5	6
Belonging to the "European family of states"	2	5	2	4
Improved security and stability of the country	27	16	12	23
No answer / refuses to answer	2	1	1	1

In regard to perceptions of the areas that are expected to be positively affected by EU membership (Table 8), respondents continue to favour economic factors such as economic development (20%) and reduction of unemployment (19%), however with a slightly decreasing

tendency in comparison to previous years. Interestingly, only 9% consider infrastructure to benefit from EU membership despite this being one of the areas in which the EU is already investing extensively.

**Table 8.**

Which area will be the most positively affected by the membership of Macedonia in the EU?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Economic development	23	25	25	20
Stability	13	15	15	13
Reduction of unemployment	23	18	21	19
Human rights and freedoms	12	9	12	14
Improvement of infrastructure	6	5	5	9
Quality of life as a whole	16	18	11	13
Strengthening of national identity	3	4	4	7
Other	1	3	2	1
I don't know	3	3	6	3

While rationalist-utilitarian factors such as economic development draw respondents to support EU membership, opponents of EU accession show a clearly value-based reasoning to oppose

Macedonia's membership in the EU. This signals a change from previous years when EU accession was more perceived as an economic rather than a cultural threat to the country. Since 2016, a ►

► decreasing trend can be observed in the group of respondents that claim that EU membership will deteriorate the standard of living (Table 9). In contrast, there is a significant increase in the distribution of attitudes that highlight identity-based variables as a source of Euroscepticism. The change of the constitutional name and the fear of loss of national identity for the first time have become dominant

predictors of Eurosceptic energy in the country. In 2018 the group of respondents objecting membership due to the attempts to change the constitutional name increased by 10% in comparison to 2017 and by 19% in comparison to 2016. The percentage of respondents worried about the loss of national identity rose by 8% from 2017 to 2018, and by 15% in comparison to the results from 2016.

**Table 9.**

What is your reason for deciding to vote against membership in the EU?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Deterioration of the standard of living	33	37	26	16
Threats to the Macedonian economy	13	16	11	8
Attempts to change the constitutional name of the country	11	7	16	26
Loss of national identity	13	10	17	25
We will become dependent on Brussels	11	6	7	3
Loss of sovereignty and independence of the country	7	5	8	9
The EU doesn't want us	6	12	10	12
No answer / Refuses to answer	6	8	4	1

# Identity and value-based factors

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Although our longitudinal analysis of the predictors for support of EU membership in Macedonia identifies utilitarian considerations as the dominant factor of attitude formation, it has also demonstrated that there is a significant correlation with identity and value-based factors, especially in relation to the relative rise of Eurosceptic energy in the country.

Identity self-perceptions in Macedonia are comparable to other European countries where exclusive national self-identification is widely spread. A vast majority of respondents (69%) relate to an exclusive ethno-national self-identification (Table 10). The percentage has slightly changed in comparison to 2017, yet only in order to reach (almost) the same levels as in 2014. 2017 noticed a peak in exclusive national self-identification, this trend has

however not been continued. While 20% of respondents have dual identity, an ethno-national and a secondary, European identity, the number of respondents that give precedence to their European identity remains insignificant.

However, the findings from the previous surveys have demonstrated that exclusive national identity doesn't generate Eurosceptic attitudes per se. The results from the 2018 survey support this argument. Thus, more than 70% of respondents that declare exclusive ethno-national identity are at the same time supporters of Macedonia's membership in the EU, 5% more than in 2017. Expectedly, support for EU membership is higher among those respondents that declare dual (ethno-national and European) identity. ▶

► On the other hand, as our findings have also demonstrated (see Table 9), identity and value-based factors have become a significant predictor of Eurosceptic energy in the country. In this regard, the name dispute and its identity effects are viewed as a key variable of Eurosceptic attitude formation and the most important

contributor for the growing variation in support for EU membership among the two biggest ethnic groups in the country. In general, these assumptions are still valid in 2018 (Table 11). A highly emotionalized topic in 2018 has been the debate on the implications of the name change of the country into 'North Macedonia' as a

**Table 10.**

Above all do you feel as?	2014 %	2016 %	2017 %	2018 %
Only Macedonian/Albanian/other	69	70	77	69
Macedonian/Albanian/other and European	20	20	15	20
European and Macedonian/Albanian/other	6	7	3	4
Only European	3	3	3	5
I don't know	2	1	2	1

consequence of the Prespa agreement. This debate has, as results suggest, not been very relevant for ethnic Albanian respondents who overwhelmingly support EU-membership even if it is conditioned by changing the name of the country (92%). In comparison to this, only 33% of ethnic Macedonian respondents are willing to accept concessions for the country's name. 48% of ethnic Macedonians are against EU membership if conditioned with changing the name, 11% object membership altogether. However, even if these numbers concerning the objections to the name change appear to be high, the trend from recent years has actually seen a sharp decrease by 26% from 2016 when 74% of ethnic Macedonians objected EU-membership on the terms of a name change (compared to 36% ethnic Albanians). The longitudinal

analysis demonstrates that the name issue has lost its potency as a predictor of Euroscepticism among ethnic Macedonians, as the number of ethnic Macedonians that support Macedonia's EU membership even if it is conditioned by changing the name of the country has more than doubled since 2014.

These results give an insightful perspective on the effects of the name dispute on public opinion on the EU accession process in Macedonia. It becomes evident that the identity implications from the name dispute significantly influence the structure of Eurosceptic attitudes in Macedonia. If the name change as a condition for EU membership is removed, the cumulative percent of respondents that support EU membership in 2018 is 86%, 8% more than in 2017. On the other hand, only 11% come as genuine Eurosceptics.

Table 11.

Do you want/support Macedonia to become a member of the European Union?	2014			2016			2017			2018			
	General Results	Ethnic Macedonians	Ethnic Albanians	General Results	Ethnic Macedonians	Ethnic Albanians	General Results	Ethnic Macedonians	Ethnic Albanians	General Results	Ethnic Macedonians	Ethnic Albanians	
Yes, even if membership in the EU is conditioned by change in the country's name	%	26	15	61	22	13	55	33	19	80	49	33	92
Yes, but without concessions for the country's name	%	63	74	28	66	74	36	45	56	9	37	48	6
No	%	6	7	2	9	10	5	15	18	5	11	15	1
I don't know	%	4	3	8	3	2	4	6	6	5	2	2	2
No answer / refuses to answer	%	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	2	2	-



## Cues from political parties

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The analysis of previous surveys has confirmed the influence of party cues on the support for EU membership among respective party supporters. In this sense, 2018 is a particularly interesting year having in mind the contestation and highly opposing responses from the principal governing and opposition political parties in regard to the Prespa agreement and the subsequent referendum and constitutional changes in the Macedonian Parliament. On one hand, the governing coalition spearheaded by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) which supported the signing of the Prespa agreement, has used the benefits of the advancements in the EU and NATO accession processes as a key point in its public campaign of promotion of the Prespa agreement. This position has been broadly endorsed by the EU and its member states. In contrast, the main

opposition party VMRO DPMNE has been a fierce opponent of the Prespa agreement. Their firm stance in the public debate and their decision to effectively boycott the referendum has drawn significant criticism from EU officials in the second half of 2018. Consequently, we assume that these developments have influenced the support for EU membership among party supporters of the main political parties in Macedonia i.e. high support among SDSM and DUI supporters and growing Euroscepticism among VMRO-DPMNE supporters.

The survey results generally confirm this assumption. Between 2014 and 2018 supporters of SDSM and DUI have maintained their strong support for European Union membership. In 2018, 89% percent of SDSM supporters would vote for membership in the European Union, 6% more than in the previous year. Continuously massive support can also be found among the DUI electorate with an astonishing 99% supporting EU membership in 2018. On the other hand, significant shifts in attitudes can be observed among the VMRO-DPMNE ►

► electorate. While in 2014, 77% of VMRO-DPMNE supporters were in favour of EU membership, this percentage dropped to 60% in 2017 and reached its low of 49% in 2018. The evident downwards trend in support for membership is accompanied by an increase in attitudes that oppose Macedonia's EU membership. In 2018 for the first time the percentage of VMRO-DPMNE supporters in favour of (49%) and against (44%) EU membership almost

align. The impact of party cues can also be traced in the case where support for membership is confronted with the condition of changing the country's name as an additional variable. Party cues are most visible in the patterns of support among SDSM supporters. While in 2014, 59% of respondents still objected EU membership under the condition of changing the country's name, in 2018 67% of SDSM-supporters support EU

**Table 12.**

If next week there is a referendum for membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the EU, how would you vote?		2014					2017					2018				
		VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided
For	%	77	86	94	69	80	60	83	90	60	70	49	89	99	61	80
Against	%	16	12	4	21	10	31	10	7	26	17	44	5	1	21	4
I don't know	%	7	2	-	8	9	8	6	3	9	12	5	4	-	11	12
I won't vote	%	1	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	6	1	2	2	-	7	4

membership even if it is conditioned by changing the country's name, a rise of 32% in comparison to 2017. Similarly, among DUI supporters there is an evident trend of weakening of respondent attachment to the country's constitutional (at the time) name. In 2018, only 4% want to hold on to the name while 96% support EU membership regardless of its impact

on the country's name. Surprisingly, there is a clear upwards trend (from 12% in 2017 to 23% in 2018) among VMRO DPMNE supporters that would choose membership despite the change of Macedonia's name. However, roughly a quarter of VMRO DPMNE supporters remain genuinely Eurosceptic, a significant rise from the 7% recorded in 2014.

**Table 13.**

Do you want / support Macedonia to become a member of the European Union?	2014					2017					2018					
	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	None	Undecided	
Yes, even if membership in the EU is conditioned by changing the country's name	%	10	39	76	43	16	12	35	84	25	37	23	67	96	30	48
Yes, but without concessions for the country's name	%	83	59	22	45	79	60	58	10	43	51	52	29	4	45	48
No	%	7	2	2	11	5	28	8	6	32	13	25	2	-	20	-

## Information about KAS

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Freedom, justice, and solidarity are the basic principles underlying the work of the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

The KAS is a political foundation, closely associated with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) of Germany. We conduct education programs for the society and cooperate with governmental institutions, political parties, civil society organizations and handpicked elites, building strong partnerships along the way. Together with our partners, we make a contribution to the creation of an international order that enables every country to develop in freedom and under its own responsibility.

### **Contact information for KAS**

---

Address: Risto Ravanovski No 8, 1000 Skopje

Phone number/fax:

+389 2 321 70 75; +389 23 21 70 76

E-Mail: [Skopje@kas.de](mailto:Skopje@kas.de)

## Information about IDSCS

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IDSCS is a civil think-tank organisation researching the development of good governance, rule of law and Macedonia's European integration. IDSCS has the mission to support citizens' involvement in the decision-making process and strengthen the participatory political culture. By strengthening liberal values, IDSCS contributes towards coexistence of diversities.

### **Contact information for IDSCS**

---

Address: Str. Gjuro Gjakovikj No.

52/1 /2, 1000 Skopje

Phone number/ Fax: +389 2 3094 760

E-Mail: [contact@idscs.org.mk](mailto:contact@idscs.org.mk)

## Information about the authors

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**Ivan Damjanovski** is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. His research interests are focused on Europeanisation of candidate countries, EU enlargement, EU integration theory and ethnic identity politics.

**Marie Jelenka Kirchner** is a MA student of Central and Eastern European Studies at the Jagiellonian University Krakow and founder of the European Thinkers' Lab. Her research focus lies on Europeanization and European foreign policy, especially in regards to EU enlargement.

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## Analysis of public opinion on Macedonia's accession to the European Union (2014-2018)

Authors: Ivan Damjanovski and  
Marie Jelenka Kirchner

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