

A satellite night view of Europe and North Africa, showing city lights and geographical features. The image is in shades of blue and black, with white and yellow lights representing urban areas.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AFRICA

Prospects and Challenges

edited by

Adel Abdel Ghafar

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
<i>Foreword</i>	xi
CANAN ATILGAN	
1	
Introduction	1
<i>EU–North Africa Relations in an Age of Turbulence</i>	
ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR	
ANNA JACOBS	
2	
Algeria	17
<i>The EU’s Real Partner or a “Tough Suburb of a Prosperous EU Metropolis”?</i>	
DALIA GHANEM	
3	
EU-Morocco Relations	53
<i>Finding a New Balance</i>	
INTISSAR FAKIR	

4		
Tunisia and the EU		87
<i>Too Close, Too Far</i>		
YOUSSEF CHERIF		
5		
Libya-EU Relations		121
<i>Prospects and Challenges</i>		
ARTURO VARVELLI		
6		
EU-Egypt Relations		149
<i>The Delicate Balance of Economic, Security, and Political Interests</i>		
ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR		
7		
Conclusion		179
ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR		
<i>Contributors</i>		187
<i>Index</i>		191

FOREWORD

CANAN ATILGAN

The relationship between the European Union and the countries of North Africa has a long history, starting with the Barcelona Process almost a quarter century ago. Initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean have not, however, proved adequate to stabilize the EU's southern neighborhood.¹ The results of these cooperation frameworks have not been as successful as anticipated.

In recent years, and particularly with the changes that unfolded in the southern Mediterranean after the 2011 uprisings across North Africa that became known as the Arab Spring, the traditional European policy tools used to engage with the region have been challenged. EU institutions have therefore started reevaluating their partnership with North African countries on different levels with the aim of formulating new approaches. The 2015 review of the ENP was part of that attempt and led to an increased awareness within EU institutions of the need for country-tailored approaches that better considered the development priorities of their partner countries. The EU has started demonstrating more political sensitivity and

consideration for the perspectives of partner countries when designing its policy approaches. Today there is a plethora of new initiatives, instruments, and financial pledges, coupled with a broader coverage of sectors. Recognition of the expectations, priorities, and capacities of the North African partners is a precondition for mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and the countries of North Africa.

How can both sides of the Mediterranean derive optimal policy outcomes from their cooperation? Is the 2015 review of the ENP sufficient to drive the relationship between Europe and North African countries forward? How can both sides develop their cooperation further to meet the challenges of irregular migration and terrorism? Finally, what is the best way to promote stability without sacrificing democratization or the rule of law?

To answer these questions, in March 2018 the Regional Program South Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung convened an expert roundtable that brought together policymakers, academics, and think tank representatives. The purpose of this roundtable in Cadenabbia was to discuss the future of EU–North Africa relations and come up with short-term and long-term policy solutions that might achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for both sides of the Mediterranean. The workshop invited five experts to present country-specific papers examining the state of current EU–North Africa relations and identify their shortcomings and prospects over the coming decade. These papers are compiled in this book.

The book contributes to the ongoing discussion of ways to refresh and further the partnership between the North African countries and the EU by combining an assessment of the expectations and priorities of the southern neighborhood countries with concise recommendations for EU policymakers. The individual chapter authors offer long-term policy solutions and identify areas with the greatest need for action, including trade, political relations, development aid, and security. While this volume will serve academics and scholars in their research on European engagement in the southern Mediterranean, it also specifically targets EU officials and European policymakers covering the southern neighborhood.

The successful completion of this book owes first and foremost to the commitment of Adel Abdel Ghafar, whose dedication and expertise have been invaluable. We thank the contributing authors for their responsiveness in the course of this project and extend our gratitude to the international group of reviewers for their expert comments and constructive feedback.

This publication is part of the activities undertaken by the Regional Program South Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, based in Tunis, which aims to promote greater understanding of cross-national and cross-regional developments in the Mediterranean region and to further political dialogue between the EU and the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The KAS Regional Program South Mediterranean cooperates closely with local partners in the pursuit of a common vision for human development, economic progress, political and social stability, and security. Its commitment to the vision of a more deeply connected, democratic, and prosperous Mediterranean region shall also be a source of inspiration for its activities in the future.

NOTE

1. The EU defines its southern neighborhood as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia.

1

INTRODUCTION

EU–North Africa Relations in an Age of Turbulence

ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR
ANNA JACOBS

The 2010–11 uprisings in North Africa have challenged the European Union’s traditional stability-driven approach to the region. EU policymakers have been attempting to deal with the changes and turmoil that have been unfolding on the other side of the Mediterranean since mass protests began in late 2010. After years of supporting incumbent authoritarian leaders, notably Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the EU reassessed its approach and began supporting the nascent transition unfolding in each of the countries. In Morocco, the EU welcomed the constitutional reforms instituted by King Mohammed VI, which culminated in that country’s 2011 constitution, ostensibly offering more shared power between the monarchy and the head of government. The 2011 uprisings did not fully materialize in Algeria, which had gone through its own political opening and series of protests in 1988, leading to the election of Islamist factions, a military coup to regain control, and a subsequent civil war. While the EU’s approach to Algeria did not significantly change after 2011, the large protest movements in the other

four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—pushed the EU to support civil society, democratization, and the rule of law.

Eight years after the uprisings shook North Africa, much of the region remains in flux. A combination of economic and security challenges has meant that much of the aspirations of the millions of people who took to the streets have not been realized. While each protest movement had its unique set of demands, depending on the national context, they all shared common themes. These included ensuring greater job opportunities and inclusive economic growth, an end to high-level corruption, and the implementation of democratic reforms. The ongoing civil war in Libya has created a multitude of security challenges, including irregular migration and the Islamic State establishing a foothold in the country. The uprising in Libya was met with Qaddafi's iron fist, and some of the opposition turned violent. The presence of various armed factions and the subsequent power vacuum that ensued after Qaddafi's death opened the door to radical groups. In Egypt, the 2013 coup by the military set the country's politics back to pre-2011 conditions, and the country has seen a resurgence in authoritarianism.

On the economic front, substantial challenges remain. As the World Bank has highlighted, although North African countries have made macroeconomic progress since 2011, people in the region continue to feel frustrated over falling standards of living, the lack of government accountability, corruption, and increasingly higher rates of unemployment.¹ The lack of inclusive economic growth, combined with demographic pressures and the lack of formal avenues for political participation, is expected to have a continued impact on the security and stability of North African states.

In light of ongoing challenges in the region, the EU has been forced to rethink its approach to North Africa. According to the 2015 review of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) conducted by the EU Commission and the European External Action Service, "Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognizing that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU." This differentiation will be key to the EU–North African relationship in coming years as the EU seeks to recalibrate its approach to countries bordering the southern Mediterranean and North African leaders seek to continue to develop their relationship with Europe.

THE EVOLUTION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA

EU foreign policy with respect to the states of the southern Mediterranean in the last quarter century has gone through three major phases, shaped in turn by the end of the Cold War era, the transformation of certain neighboring countries into democracies, and the transition from the European Economic Community to the European Union in the 1990s. The EU exhibited unprecedented levels of economic integration and political cooperation, but one of the key challenges facing this regional bloc was the formation of a comprehensive foreign policy and security strategy. This is especially true with respect to the EU's immediate neighborhood, to the east and to the south.

Regarding the countries of North Africa, key EU member states such as France, Spain, and Italy maintained enormous influence in the post-colonial period, but the EU as an institution had difficulty developing a comprehensive policy toward the southern Mediterranean region. Steady migration flows between Europe and North Africa were a major feature of the Mediterranean region throughout the twentieth century, and the two regions have maintained political, economic, social, and cultural connections for centuries.

Phase I: Pre-2011

The first major multilateral framework that governed relations between the EU and North Africa began in 1995 in what became known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI), or the Barcelona Process. Trade relations were the backbone of this strategy, even though the Barcelona Process additionally highlighted “partnerships in political and security affairs; economic and financial affairs; and social, cultural, and human affairs.”² The North African states signed association agreements under this framework to secure aid and implement free trade agreements, even though these free trade agreements suffered from blatant imbalances, and countries such as Algeria remained hesitant for several years to sign them because of the privileging of European industry over North African agriculture and the political conditions attached to the agreements.³

As the EU was attempting to formalize and harmonize its political and economic strategy in the Mediterranean region in the 1990s, a bloody civil war raged on in Algeria and threatened to spread to neighboring countries.

This decadelong battle against a violent insurgency of Islamic militants, as well as the attacks that occurred in Europe before 2001, heightened fears about terrorism both in Europe and on its borders. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States increased the intensity of these concerns. Other issues, such as promoting democratic reforms, began to take a back seat to security in EU–North Africa relations. Europe increasingly saw the authoritarian regimes of North Africa as allies in the fight against global terrorism, and the autocratic leaders of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt were quick to embrace this role, as it meant less overt criticism of human rights violations and less talk of democratic reforms.

The EU's 2003 European Security Strategy, the principal document laying out the EU's foreign policy approach, further outlined the priorities of the new union with respect to its regional neighbors. Overall, the strategy reveals a focus on the EU's normative power, engagement, and enlargement. Increasing security in the Mediterranean region was listed as one of the principal strategic objectives, along with addressing threats and supporting a global order based on multilateral action:

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.⁴

The 2003 EU Security Strategy laid out an ambitious, normative agenda that encompassed “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, [and] establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights,” and the policy highlighted the necessity of a “more active, more capable, and more coherent” European Union.⁵ This emphasis on normative engagement and more active cooperation with neighboring regions was coupled with the largely economic nature of engagement conducted through the Barcelona Process. Furthermore, as Gerrard Quille describes in his comparative study of the 2003 EU Security Strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy, the former espoused a multilateral framework for addressing security concerns, a strategy rooted in international law. In contrast, the U.S. National Security Strategy em-

phasized the concepts of preemptive action and unilateralism.⁶ Altogether, Europe's foreign policy vision in 2003 stressed a strong commitment to normative engagement based on democratic values and human rights, a heavy emphasis on trade, and an increasingly crucial focus on security threats from terrorist groups.

In 2004, ten new member states joined the EU, and two more were granted membership in 2007.⁷ The continuing enlargement of this regional bloc, coupled with the failures of the 1995 Barcelona Process, a foreign policy framework that was heavy on rhetoric and weak on action, led to a new initiative that would govern Europe's relations with North African countries.⁸ Known as the European Neighborhood Policy, the new policy was proposed in a communiqué in 2003. Its aim was to "create a ring of friendly, stable and prosperous countries around the European Union in order to guarantee stability along the outer borders of the EU."⁹ However, rather than replace the Barcelona Process, the ENP framework would be added to the policies already in place until 2006. The new framework would start in the 2007–13 period but would still include "previous policies."¹⁰

The creation of "Action Plans," or reform packages negotiated between the European Commission and each individual state, was a major aspect of the new ENP. The idea was that if the Action Plans were met, the EU would offer remuneration in the form of closer engagement, economic deals, and aid packages. The plans included such elements as greater foreign investment, free trade agreements, more migration mobility, counterterrorism measures, governance and human rights reforms, education and poverty alleviation programs, and others.¹¹ However, they suffered from a lack of consistency, organization, and implementation.

Furthermore, the EU was keen to maintain the notion of complementary frameworks, rather than replacing an older and perhaps less efficacious framework with a new one. Nonetheless, as Michael Willis has pointed out, there were two significant differences between the Barcelona Process and the ENP:

Firstly, the multilateral approach of the Barcelona Process was replaced by a much more bilateral approach, with every country able to negotiate its own set of relations with the EU. Secondly, the "positive conditionality" of the Action Plans meant that progress would be rewarded with closer cooperation, but there would be no sanction for states that did not make progress or which undid reforms.¹²

In the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,¹³ EU policy toward the countries of North Africa increasingly focused on migration and terrorism concerns, with less emphasis on democratization, human rights, and the rule of law. In the post-9/11 world, as concerns over global terrorism grew, counterterrorism allies in the MENA region become ever more valuable. EU and U.S. policy began to coalesce around similar priorities, which became more and more amenable to working with authoritarian regimes and tamping down criticism of human rights violations.

The logic underlying this strategy was a belief that authoritarianism acted as a bulwark against instability in North Africa. The certainty of deeply rooted, autocratic regimes that Europe knew how to do business with was preferred to the uncertainty that a democratic opening could bring, especially as Islamist political parties began more overtly to enter the political scene and gain widespread popularity in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, this short-sighted, parochial strategy of supporting known authoritarian regimes in the name of stability and predictability was the backbone of the EU's foreign policy toward North Africa before the 2010–11 uprisings.

Then, on December 17, 2010, a man selling vegetables on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, set himself on fire in front of the local municipality. Less than one month later, the notoriously corrupt and brutal president of Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, fled to Saudi Arabia. After twenty-four years in power, one of Europe's closest allies in North Africa was the first authoritarian ruler to be removed in the course of the Arab uprisings of 2011.

Phase II: Post-2011 and Initial Support of Democratic Transition

No country in North Africa was left untouched by the 2010–11 uprisings, even though the dynamics in each state were different, as were the regime reactions. Of the five North African countries whose post-2011 social, economic, and political dynamics are considered in this book—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—it was in Algeria that the protest movement seemed the least threatening to the regime, even though reforms were offered to meet some of the protestors' demands.

During the turbulent period of the Arab Spring, especially in the rapid unfolding of events between December 2010 and March 2011, the EU clarified its position and announced official support for the democratic move-

ments. The Ashton/Barroso Joint Communication of March 8, 2011, thus stated:

We believe that now is the time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours. This new approach should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. The demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities expressed in recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms. The EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbours who are able and willing to embark on such reforms through a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity.” The commitment to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared. The Partnership must be based on concrete progress in these areas. It must be a differentiated approach. Despite some commonalities, no country in the region is the same so we must react to the specificities of each of them.¹⁴

In other words, it finally became clear to the EU that its previous strategy of sidelining democratic values for the sake of authoritarian stability, a narrow-sighted policy of convenience, had broken down.¹⁵ Various communications from the EU seemed to acknowledge this failure and the need for a new vision. Fortunately, a revised ENP was already in the works in 2010, and the ENP of 2011 provided the central framework for the EU’s response and eventual support for the democratic protest movements throughout North Africa, with the notable exception of the military intervention in Libya. The case of Egypt would also prove to be challenging once the military started governing the country after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. The 2011 ENP was meant to feature a substantive political conditionality to EU cooperation and support, in contrast to the relationships the EU had earlier maintained with such notorious autocratic leaders as Tunisia’s former president Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak. Starting in 2011 the EU would, in theory, offer the “3Ms” of money, markets, and mobility on the condition that partner countries in North Africa undertook genuine political reform in governance and human rights.¹⁶

All five North African states witnessed protests, and political changes occurred. Morocco’s King Mohammed VI offered reforms by way of a new constitution and holding early elections. Algerian president Abdelaziz

Bouteflika lifted the nineteen-year-old state of emergency, a tool that had been used to outlaw demonstrations. Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and elections for a constituent assembly were held. In Libya, the protests turned into a violent armed conflict that led to the eventual death of Muammar Qaddafi. Finally, in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak resigned early in the year, and power shifted to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. It is essential to highlight that, in countries such as Morocco and Algeria, most protestors were not calling for the overthrow of the regime but instead were protesting corruption, human rights abuses, ineffective governance, and dwindling economic opportunity. Also in Algeria, the protest movement never took off the way it did in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. The muted activism in Algeria is often attributed to still fresh memories of Algeria's bloody war in the 1990s, which began after a democratic opening started in the late 1980s, elections were held, Islamists won the elections in 1990 and 1991, and the military subsequently intervened.¹⁷

In 2011 the EU did offer clear support for the protestors and their demands, but as the year drew to a close, these commitments became less certain. There was understandable skepticism that the reforms offered in Morocco and Algeria constituted largely short-term, cosmetic measures to quell dissent. Tunisia began facing enormous political, economic, and security challenges as instability began to overshadow the democratization process. Libya was divided and overwhelmed by battling armed militias, and Egypt had been taken over by the military. This political and economic instability along the southern Mediterranean led to growing concerns over increasing migration flows and the possibility of terrorism. Furthermore, the 2011 uprisings and subsequent political reforms led to Islamist party victories at the ballot box, both locally and nationally, throughout North Africa, adding an additional strategic uncertainty for the EU.

Phase III: Post-2013 and the “Arc of Instability”

The European Council approved a new framework for governing EU foreign policy on June 28, 2016, less than a week after the United Kingdom's Brexit vote dealt a major blow to the EU as an institution. The realism of the 2016 Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy was met with widespread praise, in contrast to the 2003 European Strategy, which was attacked for its idealist, normative approach to engagement with its neighbors. As Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux contend,

The emphasis on “principled pragmatism”—i.e. “a foreign policy that is based both on realistic assessment and idealistic aspiration”—not only points to a less idealistic and more realistic approach than in 2003, but also to the EU’s struggle in reconciling values and interests.¹⁸

Jan Techau at the German Marshall Fund has praised the ambition and newfound realism at the core of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. He also points out that the vision represents a marked improvement from the 2003 European Security Strategy, and specifically identified four key strengths in the new framework. First, in articulating the concept of “principled pragmatism,” the strategy lays out a foreign policy that emphasizes strategic realism over normative idealism. Second, the value-laden rhetoric regarding pushing for democratic reforms has been dropped. Techau writes, “This was highly overdue, not because democracy is no longer desirable, but because promoting it is better done silently, not with missionary zeal that tends to fall flat.” Third, the “naiveté” of the ENP is on its way out, supplanted by a focus on “resilience” and “tailored approaches to individual countries.” Fourth, the strategy upholds the importance of EU collaboration in a rules-based international society structured by multilateral, international organizations.¹⁹

Overall, Techau notes, the document represents a fine balance of values and interests, one that will be better able to address the three “existential crises” currently confronting the EU: the ongoing refugee crisis, the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, and the Donald Trump administration.²⁰ The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini also highlighted this point when she stressed that the EU’s neighborhood was becoming an “arc of instability,” a term referencing especially the 2011 uprisings and the conflict in Ukraine, which have led to an increase in regional conflict and migration flows toward Europe.²¹ The EU is more aware than ever of its limitations in promoting reforms in its neighborhood; hence the slow demise of the older, values-driven ENP framework.

Current EU foreign policy is more circumscribed and strategic in its ambitions and priorities, as evidenced in its shift in emphasis to matters of security, capacity building, and resilience. There is also a more acute focus on supporting social empowerment, as opposed to the previous policy of promoting state-centric reform. The stated priority of improving “human

security and inclusive governance” also better accords with the long-held EU priority of cultivating strong regional order and a rules-based international system.²² While the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy represents a strategic and astute shift in foreign policy management, it still suffers from a lack of critical analysis of the failures of previous policies, especially the ENP framework and the increasingly bureaucratic nature of institutional decision-making.²³

The country-specific chapters in this book address some of these critical gaps and offer a variety of policy recommendations consonant with this third evolution in the EU’s foreign policy with respect to North Africa. Many of the recommendations underscore the importance of a healthy balance of strategic realism and a commitment to norms of human rights and good governance, reflecting a shift in thinking toward empowerment at the societal level. Thus the contributors recommend various reform packages that would have a broad effect on society while also proffering country-specific advice that takes into account the complexities and unique characteristics of each country’s political, economic, and social context.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The common thread linking the country-specific analyses in this book is a clear recognition of the importance of bilateral relations and of the EU’s adopting realistic approaches toward relations with each country. A more balanced relationship between Europe and the countries of the southern Mediterranean is at the base of the policy recommendations, as imbalance in EU–North Africa relations has significantly limited EU influence in the region. Each chapter focuses on shared strategic priorities relating to trade, migration, security, and political reform, and country-specific prescriptions are presented after a critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of EU foreign policy toward each state and the region as a whole.

Algeria

Dalia Ghanem begins this critical analysis with a look at the unique case of Algeria. As one of the few countries that did not experience major protests in 2011, it remained what she calls an “island of stability” during a tumultuous decade of transformation and conflict in North Africa. She also

argues that the key focus of EU-Algeria relations will continue to be shaped primarily by economic and security concerns. Algeria is a major exporter of oil and gas and acts as a key regional player in security and crisis management in both North Africa and the Sahel region. Ghanem believes that the long-standing policy of prioritizing economic and security cooperation over pushing for democratic reforms will almost definitely remain a feature of the EU-Algeria framework of engagement. However, she suggests that this near-term strategy of expediency should include a moderate and realistic push for real political reforms in Algeria. More democratization and strong commitments to sustainable development are the only true long-term guarantors of stability for Algeria, North Africa, and Europe itself.

In matters of trade relations, Ghanem encourages an enhancement of the “made in Algeria” brand to mitigate the trade imbalance between the EU and Algeria. Europe could further assist Algeria in the latter’s quest for greater economic diversification by supporting investment in renewable energy and other industries. This should help reduce the risks associated with Algeria’s heavy dependence on oil and gas exports.

Finally, Ghanem proposes that Algeria be granted a “distinguished status” in crisis management and security when it comes to matters of regional security in North Africa and the Sahel. Algeria has played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution in countries like Mali and Libya, and Algiers should be included in Brussels’s decision-making process when it comes to regional security issues.

Morocco

Intissar Fakir in chapter 3 highlights changes in Morocco’s own foreign policy and the likely impact of these changes on the country’s engagement with the EU. She describes both opportunities and challenges for the two partners in the areas of security, migration, and trade. She also identifies problems that have limited EU-Morocco relations in the recent past and highlights Morocco’s frustration with Europe’s lack of appreciation for the influential role it plays in the region. Like Algeria, Morocco seeks to build a more balanced relationship with the EU in terms of trade, and feels it should be better rewarded for the role it plays in managing migration flows to Europe. Crucially, Europe must take into account Morocco’s key foreign policy priorities: resolving the Western Sahara conflict and ensuring the legitimacy of Morocco’s control over the territory. Currently the Western

Sahara, a former Spanish colony in the Maghreb region on the northwestern coast of Africa, is partly controlled by Morocco and partly by the indigenous Sahrawi people. The non-Moroccan political leadership, the Polisario Front, in 1976 declared the territory it controls the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, which is recognized as a full member of the African Union. Thus some resolution to the stalemate is urgently needed.

King Mohammed VI implemented several reforms in the aftermath of the February 20, 2011, protests, but Fakir cautions that these measures have not gone far enough toward addressing the political, economic, and social problems confronting Moroccans today. With this context in mind, she offers a variety of policy recommendations, including balancing stability with reform, empowering institutions and people, putting trade relations on a more equitable footing, strengthening decentralization, and working toward a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is often touted as a regional exception because of the ostensibly ambitious reform program promoted in 2011. However, the optimism behind these reforms has faded, and protests continue throughout the country, most recently in the marginalized Rif region. For Fakir, Morocco can move forward, and Europe should encourage this process through political, economic, and social support.

Tunisia

Youssef Cherif in chapter 4 reviews the history of institutional relations between the EU and Tunisia and examines Tunisia's relationship with its key European partners. He argues that two central issues are endangering greater cooperation between the two partners. First, rising xenophobia and the right-wing groups that are becoming increasingly influential in European politics have led EU policymakers to clamp down on both regular and irregular migration from North Africa, straining relations with countries in the region that rely on remittances from their migrant communities in Europe. Second, heavy flows of irregular migration and the security concerns over terrorism have come to dominate Europe's relationship with Tunisia. In the immediate aftermath of Tunisia's revolution, Brussels saw Tunisia as a democratic model for the MENA region. However, this point of view has come under pressure after a series of terrorist attacks shook Tunisian politics and society. As a consequence, important industries such as tourism have taken a major hit. The political instability resulting from the revolution has also contributed to economic and financial instability. The

country's economy is suffering from record levels of inflation. Furthermore, Tunisians constituted one of the largest groups of foreign fighters who left to fight for the Islamic State group. Consequently, youth radicalization and security sector reform have become major EU priorities in Tunisia.

Ultimately, Cherif recommends that the EU more strongly consider Tunisia's strategic concerns, including its reservations about the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). From the Tunisian perspective, a more balanced trade relationship with the EU is long overdue. Cherif also encourages more cooperation at the civil society level and greater harmonization within the EU to more effectively coordinate aid packages. Finally, he argues for institutional reforms, including the establishment of an apolitical committee of technocrats committed to building strong relations between Tunisia and the EU.

Libya

Arturo Varvelli in chapter 5 lays out the complexities and singularity of the Libyan situation in his critical overview of the European response to events within the country and the consequences of the 2011 NATO military intervention. He points out that the fragmentation of the country and the migration wave emanating from its shores have made Libya a key country for the stability of the EU. He provides an overview of the evolution of the Libyan crisis, from the fall of the Qaddafi regime until today, with a special look at EU involvement during the last eight years. Varvelli posits that the EU, especially in the first four years, roughly 2011 to 2015, was not active enough in resolving the conflict because of internal rivalries between EU countries. Brussels was thus unable to construct a coherent strategy. This situation began to change in 2015 when the EU started to become increasingly involved in Libyan issues; however, the results have been mixed. Furthermore, Libya has been overwhelmed by proxy wars between various external actors. It is thus very unlikely that the EU will succeed in stabilizing Libya. Nonetheless, Varvelli offers an incisive and sobering critique of EU policy toward Libya that should prove indispensable to policymakers in future decision-making and strategy formulation. He recommends three comprehensive measures: providing support for a new international initiative, promoting good governance, and devising a long-term strategy to counter trafficking and terrorism.

Egypt

Finally, Adel Abdel Ghafar in chapter 6 encourages the EU to use its leverage over Egypt to strengthen and bolster reforms. Egypt's sensitivity to criticism over human rights, the EU's position as Egypt's most significant trading partner, and the need for EU support in resolving challenges such as that posed by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which threatens to restrict water flow to Egypt's fertile Nile Delta, all mean that the EU does retain influence, though limited, with the Egyptian government.

Abdel Ghafar urges a comprehensive strategy that addresses strategic and normative priorities to help guide Egypt toward a more sustainable and peaceful future. Overall, he suggests that the EU should focus on supporting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; developing a more unified EU approach; targeting inclusive growth, youth employment, and entrepreneurship; supporting Egyptian women and the role of Egypt as a regional gas hub; increasing educational initiatives; and finally, promoting the development of renewable energy.

NOTES

1. World Bank, "Expectations and Aspirations: A New Framework for Education in the Middle East and North Africa," November 13, 2018.

2. Michael J. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring* (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 313.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 314–15.

4. Council of the European Union, "European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World," December 12, 2003, p. 5 (https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/11/1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b/publishable_en.pdf).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Gerrard Quille, "The European Security Strategy: A Framework for EU Security Interests?," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (2004), pp. 422–38.

7. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, p. 31; European Union, "About the EU: Further Expansion" (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2000-2009_en).

8. Anthony Dworkin and Nick Witney, "A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations," European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR.eu, September 2012, p. 31.

9. Edzard Wesselink and Ron Boschma, "Overview of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Its History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures,"

SEARCH (Sharing Knowledge Assets Interregionally Cohesive Neighborhoods), WP1/04 Search Working Paper, January 2012.

10. Ibid.

11. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb*, p. 316.

12. Ibid.

13. Countries in the MENA group are usually considered to be Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.

14. European Commission, "Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" (Brussels, March 3, 2011) (https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/com_2011_200_en.pdf).

15. Ibid., p. 39.

16. Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

17. Kamel Daoud, "The Algeria Exception," *New York Times*, May 29, 2015.

18. Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, "EU Foreign Policy in Times of Existential Crises: Instability in the Neighbourhood, Brexit, Trump, and Beyond," in *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 35–60 (in the April 2017 update to chapter 2, it is on p. 3).

19. Jan Techau, "The EU's New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?" *CarnegieEurope.eu*, July 1, 2016 (<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/63994>).

20. Keukeleire and Delreux, "EU Foreign Policy in Times of Existential Crises," p. 4.

21. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Ibid., p. 4.

23. Techau, "The EU's New Global Strategy."