Study of Perceptions and Attitudes of Lebanese Citizens Towards the Economic, Social and Political Situation in Lebanon

December 2021
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1 Foreword

After more than two years of economic decline and political crisis, the situation in Lebanon is dramatic. The currency has lost over 95% of its value, prices for food and fuel have risen by several hundred percent since the beginning of the crisis in mid-2019, and bank accounts of Lebanese savers in US dollars have been largely frozen. Electricity, fuel and medicines are in short supply. The government, formed in September 2021 after more than a year of political wrangling, has so far shown very little ability to take action in terms of crisis management and has been repeatedly paralyzed by conflicts.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the results of the public opinion poll conducted by Statistics Lebanon on behalf of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in December 2021 paints a bleak picture of the economic situation and reflects great bitterness towards the political elites. The economic crisis affects key areas of daily life and the socio-economic opportunities of the Lebanese: Food security, health and medical care, power supply, and mobility are all significantly affected by the crisis.

An end to corruption, the repatriation of capital illegally transferred abroad and a renewal of the political elites are key expectations and requests formulated by the respondents. However, the people themselves hardly believe in the possibility of a change for the better: The vast majority of respondents expects the economic situation of the country as well as of their own families to get worse in the next two years and anticipates that Lebanon’s reputation will also deteriorate further.

Hence, our poll indicates that the Lebanese have little hope that the political causes of the collapse will be addressed. The feedback on potential drivers of change reveals how little the Lebanese expect from core political institutions and offices. There are hardly any hopes placed in institutions such as the government, the parliament, political parties or high-ranking posts such as the presidency, the prime minister or the speaker of parliament. If anything, only the military and security forces, new political movements and, by some margin, the judiciary are seen as drivers of change. Yet, also the support for the October 2019 protest movements has declined significantly, dropping by half according to our survey.

Moreover, there is also little willingness to engage in politics - whether in old or new political movements. A clear majority of 60% of the people polled do not feel represented by political parties and movements. Against this background, it is also telling that only half of the respondents stated that they intend to vote in the upcoming elections in 2022. However, half of the respondents also expect that the elections could contribute to political change.

Yet, the Lebanese do not only lack confidence in their own political elites: there is also widespread mistrust of international actors. Syria and Iran score particularly badly. Only France is trusted by slightly more than half of the respondents, the EU follows in second place.

Considering the crisis and the overall public mood, it is hardly surprising that many people are thinking of leaving the country. Thus, the brain drain that Lebanon has been facing since the beginning of the crisis is set to continue. The economic, social and political consequences of the loss of talent and human resources will further complicate economic recovery and a new political start. Whereas the 2022 elections are without doubt a milestone for the political system of Lebanon, the dimension of the crisis and the loss of confidence in politics indicate that the elections cannot be more than a step in a political process that must bring about fundamental changes in Lebanon’s political practices.

Michael Bauer
Director KAS-Office Lebanon
2 Executive Summary

- Stopping corruption was ranked first with 48% as the most important economic issue that must be addressed at present and given priority, and it was quite remarkable that despite the preference of stopping corruption and the repatriation of illicit funds, the forensic audit was ranked only fifth with 4%.

- On the political level, “bringing a new and clean political class” was ranked first with 39%, and it was noteworthy that even though the majority considered this the key issue, only 4% chose the parliamentary elections as the most important issue.

- Solving political problems with the Gulf countries topped the list of international issues that should be given priority at present with 74%.

- When asked to rank between economic, political, and international issues, economic aspects topped the agenda and respondents ranked stopping corruption first and the repatriation of illicit funds second.

- A pessimistic outlook towards Lebanon's future in the upcoming two years dominates on the various levels: The Lebanese economy, the families' financial situations, the job opportunities, and Lebanon's reputation.
  - Lebanese economy: A majority of 82% of respondents believe that the Lebanese economy will be worse after 24 months, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.
  - Family’s financial situation: A majority of 73% of respondents believe that their families' financial situation will be worse 24 months from now, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.
  - Job opportunities: A majority of 80% of respondents believe that the job opportunities situation will be worse after 24 months, compared to only 11% who believe that it will be better.
  - Lebanon’s reputation: A majority of 81% of respondents believe that Lebanon’s reputation will be worse 24 months from now, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.

- 14% of respondents have access to fresh Dollars.

- The impact of the economic crisis:
  - The food security of Lebanese people has become in danger because of the economic crisis, as: 40% of Lebanese people reduced the quantity of food, while 32% reduced the number of meals per day, 83% of the Lebanese resorted to changing the quality of their food in terms of brands, while 77% resorted to changing the quality of food in terms of items.
  - Mobility: A majority of 75% of Lebanese have reduced their mobility due to the economic crisis, and 59% have resorted to using different transportation means, such as refraining from driving their own cars.
  - Health: The health security of Lebanese people has become threatened because of the economic crisis, as about half the respondents (47%) were unable to take their medications while sick (or did not take a medication for a chronic disease) due to its unavailability, while 31.4% were unable to take their medications due to lack of money. It was remarkable that 34% did not visit a doctor during illness due to lack of money, and 30% were unable to enter the hospital for the same reason. Remarkably, respondents belonging to the age category of 46 years and above are the most negatively affected in terms of health security, posing a serious threat to their lives at these advanced ages.
Energy: 46% of the respondents have resorted to reducing the amount of subscription to the power generator because of the high bill, while 22% have resorted to suspending the subscription, in light of the complete power outage.

- 39% of Lebanese people are considering emigrating, and 39% of those who are considering emigrating have started preparing themselves to leave, such as searching for work abroad, submitting their CVs, preparing their papers for leaving Lebanon, and submitting applications to embassies...

- Around 45% of respondents who are currently in the process of preparing to leave Lebanon have received higher than secondary school diplomas, while it was remarkable that around 17% of respondents who are currently in the process of preparing to leave Lebanon have received middle school education, and about 21% have received secondary school education.

- 14% of the respondents are political activists, while it was that 13% refused to answer this question.

- A majority of 60% of the respondents declared that no one represents their ideas and reflects their political orientations.

- 36% of the respondents support the protest movement in Lebanon (34% support it + 2% did not support it at first but they currently support it).

- About a third of the Lebanese might participate in a protest today (30%), compared to 10% who responded with "I don't know", and 59% announced that they would not participate.

- Half the respondents (50%) confirmed their intention to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, compared to 35% who declared their unwillingness to participate and 15% have not decided yet.

- Almost three quarters (74%) of the respondents who declared that they do not want to participate in the upcoming elections, declared that nothing would motivate them to vote.

- The factors that have been shown to influence the respondents’ electoral choices are:
  - “Protection/security”, with an average of 3.3 on a 4-point scale
  - “The candidate’s achievements”, with an average score of 3.2.

- Remarkably, "the sectarian affiliation of the candidate" scored low with an average score of 2.10, and was considered the least important factor.

- Half the respondents (50%) believe that the parliamentary elections will be a source of change, compared to 45% who believe that it will not be a source of change.

- Respondents don’t trust any of the mentioned international actors with the exception of France, albeit in varying percentages.

  France is the only actor whose role in Lebanon is considered by respondents as positive to a certain extent, where its average scored 2.52 on the 4-point scale.
3 Methodology

A Door-to-Door survey was conducted by Statistics Lebanon from 10 to 15 December 2021 in Lebanon for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Foundation based on a directive questionnaire developed for this purpose and carried out by our team of enumerators.

The n=1,200 survey with Lebanese citizens was a Probability Proportional to Size PPS sample distributed across all the main regions of Lebanon reflecting the population density of the population per region.

1) Demographics

The sample of Lebanese citizens was equally distributed between men and women aged 21 years and above reflecting the national sectarian, educational, and class distribution.

Gender-wise an n=600 was conducted with men and women for a total of n=1,200.

Respondents were segmented into three distinct age brackets to better understand the dynamics of age-related attitudes and behavior as follows:

The level of education of the respondents as displayed below shows the majority of the sample had received some to advanced education.
The sample was comprised of Christians, Sunni, Shia, and Druze. Christians comprise one collective segment reflecting cross-sectarian party affiliation where it is possible for Maronites, Orthodox, Protestants, and Catholics to belong to the same political organization while in Muslim parties are based on sectarian memberships.

2) Sampling Distribution and Fieldwork

The sample was a Probability Proportionate to Size sampling that ensures getting a representative national sample. Fieldwork was conducted based on PPS sample reflective of the population density of the Lebanese population in each of the nine governorates as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Distribution by governorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Distribution %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesrwan-Jbeil</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Nabatieh</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baalbek-El Hermel</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Main Findings

1) Priorities

   a) Economic aspects

   On the economic level, stopping corruption was ranked first with 48% as the most important issue that must be addressed at present and given priority, followed by the repatriation of illicit funds by 24% and the rebuilding of state institutions by 16%, and it was quite remarkable that despite the preference of stopping corruption and the repatriation of illicit funds, however, the forensic audit was ranked fifth with 4%.
b) Political aspects
On the political level, “bringing a new and clean political class” was ranked first with 39%, followed by accountability with 28%, and judicial independence with 12%. 8% of respondents chose the disarmament of Hezbollah as the most important issue that must be addressed at present and given priority, while 5% chose the realizing of a civil state, and it was noteworthy that even though the majority considered ”bringing a new and clean political class” the most important issue that must be addressed at present, only 4% chose the parliamentary elections as the most important issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political aspects</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A new and clean political class</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial independence</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of Hezbollah</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realizing a civil state</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary elections</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocratic government</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of the Taif agreement</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


c) International aspects
On the international level, “solving the political problems with the Gulf countries” topped the list of international issues that should be given priority at present with 74%, followed by placing Lebanon under international guardianship with 25%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International aspects</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solving political problems with the Gulf countries</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placing Lebanon under international guardianship</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Independence</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no experience in international affairs</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working to solve Lebanon's crises</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-US agreement</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to answer</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**d) Most important issue**

When asked to rank among economic, political and international issues, it turned out that the economic aspects are the most important issues that respondents want to be solved at present, as stopping corruption was ranked first with 34%, followed by the repatriation of illicit funds by 14%.
2) **Outlook towards the future**

A pessimistic outlook towards Lebanon’s future in the upcoming two years dominates on the various levels: The Lebanese economy, the families’ financial situations, the job opportunities, and Lebanon’s reputation.

**a) Lebanese economy**

A majority of 82% of respondents believe that the Lebanese economy will be worse after 24 months, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.

![Lebanese economy chart](chart.png)

**b) Family’s financial situation**

A majority of 73% of respondents believe that their families’ financial situation will be worse 24 months from now, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.

![Family's financial situation chart](chart.png)
c) Job opportunities
A majority of 80% of respondents believe that the job opportunities situation will be worse after 24 months, compared to only 11% who believe that it will be better.

![Job opportunities chart]

- Worse: 80.3%
- Better: 10.8%
- The way it is: 7.4%
- Do not know: 1.5%

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d) Lebanon’s reputation
A majority of 81% of respondents believe that Lebanon's reputation will be worse 24 months from now, compared to only 10% who believe that it will be better.

![Lebanon’s reputation chart]

- Worse: 80.8%
- Better: 9.9%
- The way it is: 7.5%
- Do not know: 1.7%
- Refuse to answer: 0.1%
3) **Access to fresh USD**

14% of respondents have access to fresh Dollars. 45% of them receive fresh Dollars from their salaries, 32% from their savings, 31% from money transfers from abroad, and 28% from children or family members. It is worth noting that respondents had the right to choose more than one answer, that’s why the sum of percentages exceeded 100%.
4) **Impact of economic crisis**

**a) Food security**

The food security of Lebanese people has become in danger because of the economic crisis, as: 40% of Lebanese people reduced the quantity of food, while 32% reduced the number of meals per day, 83% of the Lebanese resorted to changing the quality of their food in terms of brands, while 77% resorted to changing the quality of food in terms of items.

![Food security chart]

**b) Mobility**

A majority of 75% of Lebanese have reduced their mobility due to the economic crisis, and 59% have resorted to using different transportation means, such as refraining from driving their own cars...
c) Health

The health security of Lebanese people has become threatened because of the economic crisis, as 47% were unable to take their medications while sick (or did not take a medication for a chronic disease) due to its unavailability, while 31.4% were unable to take their medications due to lack of money. It was remarkable that 34.1% did not visit a doctor during illness due to lack of money, and 29.5% were unable to enter the hospital for the same reason.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Refuse to answer</th>
<th>Do not apply</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being unable to go to the hospital because of lack of money</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrain from taking medication while sick (or not taking medication for a chronic disease) because you can’t afford it</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrain from taking medication while sick (or not taking medication for a chronic disease) because of its insufficiency</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrain from visiting a doctor during illness due to lack of money</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By Age:

42.1% of the respondents aged 46 years and above refrained from visiting a doctor during illness due to lack of money, which poses a serious threat to their lives at this advanced age. It is worth noting that a remarkable number of young respondents have also refrained from visiting a doctor during illness albeit to a lesser extent (26% of respondents aged between 21 and 30 years old, and 35% of respondents aged between 31 and 45 years).

It is quite noteworthy that more than half the respondents aged 46 years and above (52%) have refrained from taking medication while sick (or not taking medication for a chronic disease) because of its insufficiency which poses a serious threat to their lives at this advanced age. Also, a relatively large percentage of youth respondents have refrained from taking medication while sick (or not taking medication for a chronic disease) because of its insufficiency (43% of respondents aged between 21 and 30 years old, and 46.2% of respondents aged between 31 and 45 years old).
A significant percentage of respondents aged 46 years and above (42%) have refrained from taking their medications while sick (or not taking medication for a chronic disease) because of their high prices, which also poses a serious threat to their lives at this advanced age.

A considerable percentage of respondents aged 46 years and above (38%) were unable to go to the hospital because of lack of money, which also poses a serious threat to their lives at this advanced age.
d) Energy

46.2% of the respondents have resorted to reducing the amount of subscription to the power generator because of the high bill, while 22% have resorted to suspending the subscription, in light of the complete power outage.

![Energy Bar Chart]

5) Emigration

a) Respondents who are considering emigration:

39% of Lebanese people are considering emigrating, and 39% of those who are considering emigrating have started preparing themselves to leave, such as searching for work abroad, submitting their CVs, preparing their papers for leaving Lebanon, submitting applications to embassies...

![Emigration Bar Chart]
Unsurprisingly, it was found that the percentage of respondents considering emigrating increases with the decrease in ages, as more than half the respondents between the ages of 21 and 30 years old are thinking of emigrating (52%), while most respondents who are currently in the process of preparing to leave Lebanon belong to the age category between 31 and 45 years old (42%).
By level of education:
Around 45% of respondents who are currently in the process of preparing to leave Lebanon have received higher than secondary school diplomas: 34.24% have obtained Bachelor’s degree, 5.43% have obtained a Master’s degree and/or higher, and around 5% have obtained a TS degree (Superior Technical Diploma). It is remarkable that around 17% of respondents who are currently in the process of preparing to leave Lebanon have received middle school education, and about 21% have received secondary school education.

The countries that respondents are considering emigrating to:
Canada was ranked first among the countries that respondents want to migrate to (35%), followed by Australia with 31% and the USA with 30%. 12% want to leave to any country.

If the answer is “yes”, where to? Please specify the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any country</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf country</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign country</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6) **Drivers of change**

The results of this poll showed the difference between the Lebanese in terms of mentality, as the majority was divided between those who believe that the security and military forces will lead to change (40%) and those who believe that the new political movements are the ones who will do so (39%). It should be noted that respondents had the right to choose more than one option to answer this question, that’s why the sum of percentages exceeded 100, and the respondents chose many institutions, such as the judiciary (26%), the government (21%), the parliament (19%), the prime minister (14%) and the president of the republic (12) ... 

![Bar chart showing the distribution of responses to the question: Which of the following institutions will be a driver of change? N=1200.](chart)

- Security and Military Forces: 40.1%
- New Political Movements: 38.8%
- Judiciary: 26.0%
- Government: 20.5%
- Parliament: 18.6%
- Prime Minister: 14.4%
- President of the Republic: 12.4%
- Political Parties: 10.3%
- Religious Leaders: 10.0%
- Speaker of the Parliament: 7.9%
- Governor of the Bank of Lebanon: 6.6%

7) **Political/civil society participation**

a) **Participation**

14% of the respondents are political activists, while 13% refused to answer this question, where it is normal for some respondents to refuse to answer this question because this is a personal question that people are afraid to answer it, as they don’t want to reveal their political participation status.

![Bar chart showing the distribution of responses to the question: Are you active in any civil society movement or political party?](chart)

- No: 73.2%
- Yes: 13.8%
- Refuse to answer: 13.0%
b) **The party that represents the respondents' ideas**

A majority of 60% of the respondents declared that no one represents their ideas and reflects their political orientations, while 10% declared that Hezbollah expresses their opinion, and 6% chose the Lebanese Forces, while the change movements/October 17 uprising groups ranked third with 5%, outperforming the rest of the parties, such as the Free Patriotic Movement (4%) and the Future Movement (4%)...
8) **October 17\textsuperscript{th} uprising**

a) **Support for the protest movement**

36% of the respondents support the protest movement in Lebanon (34% support it + 2% did not support it at first but they currently support it), compared to 65% who do not support it (37% who supported it at first but currently do not support it anymore + 28% who do not support it).

b) **Possibility of participating in a protest today**

About a third of the Lebanese might participate in a protest today (30%), compared to 10% who responded with "I don't know", and 59% announced that they would not participate.
c) **Reasons for not participating**

The most important reason for respondents for refraining from participating in any protest today is that “the protest is politicized”. 62% of the respondents who are unwilling to participate in any protest today attributed the reason to the belief that the “protest is politicized”, while 37% attributed the reason to the disorganization of the protest, and 32% considered that it would not achieve its goals... It should be noted that respondents had the right to choose more than one option to answer this question, that’s why the sum of the percentages exceeded 100.

![Reasons for not participating chart](chart.png)
9) Parliamentary elections

a) Intention to participate in the elections

Half the respondents (50%) confirmed their intention to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, compared to 35% who declared their unwillingness to participate and 15% have not decided yet. This is an indicator of the growing mistrust among Lebanese people from the existing political actors, whether from the ruling authority, or from the opposition/uprising, also being an indicator of the lost hope among the Lebanese in the possibility of changing the current political leaders, reflecting the people’s surrender to the existing status quo. However, these results are prone to change the more we approach the date of elections.

Do you intend to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections?

- Yes: 50.0%
- No: 34.8%
- I don’t know, I haven’t decided yet: 15.0%
- Refuse to answer: 0.3%
b) The party that respondents are willing to vote for

26% of the respondents who will participate in the elections will vote for “independent” candidates, compared to 15% who will vote for Hezbollah, and 12% will vote for the change movements/October 17 uprising groups. The same percentage, i.e., 12%, are willing to vote for the Lebanese Forces, followed by the Free Patriotic Movement with 7% and the Future Movement with 6% ...

For those who answered “yes”, who will you be voting for? N = 600

- Independent: 25.7%
- Hezbollah: 14.7%
- October 17 Uprising/Change Groups: 12.3%
- Lebanese Forces: 11.5%
- Free Patriotic Movement: 6.8%
- Future Movement: 6.2%
- No One: 4.2%
- Kataeb Party: 4.2%
- Do not know: 3.5%
- Amal Movement: 3.0%
- Progressive Socialist Party: 2.2%
- Sabaa Party: 1.5%
- Syrian Social Nationalist Party: 1.2%
- Refuse to answer: 0.7%
- Others: 0.7%

c) Will the respondents vote for the same party they voted for in 2018?

53% of the respondents who participated in the 2018 parliamentary elections, and who are willing to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, will vote for the same party they voted for in 2018. It is remarkable that about 45% of the respondents who participated in the 2018 parliamentary elections, and who are willing to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections will not vote for the same party they voted for in 2018, which is a relatively high percentage, reflecting their dissatisfaction with the performance of the parties and MPs they voted for in the 2018 elections, but it is still unclear who they will vote for. However, these results are prone to change the more we approach the date of elections.

Will you vote for the same party you voted for in the 2018 elections? N = 520

- Yes: 52.7%
- No: 44.8%
- I don’t know, I haven’t decided yet: 2.1%
- Refuse to answer: 0.4%
d) Factors that will motivate the respondents to vote

A majority of 74% of the respondents who declared that they would not participate in the upcoming elections, confirmed that nothing would motivate them to participate in the elections, while 7% declared that the presence of new candidates might motivate them, and 6% declared that changing the political regime might motivate them.

For those who answered “No”, what would motivate you to participate?  
N = 417

- Nothing: 73.6%
- New candidates: 7.2%
- Changing the political regime: 5.8%
- Corruption of the political class: 3.4%
- Electoral program: 2.4%
- No trust: 1.7%
- Reforms: 1.7%
- Young candidates: 1.4%
- New blocs: 1.2%
- Services provided: 1.0%
- Independent candidates: 0.7%
e) The level of support for the unification of uprising groups within unified electoral lists

Respondents were divided between supporters and opponents of the unification of the uprising groups within unified electoral lists, as 52% supported this unification, 20% of them strongly supported it, compared to 48% who opposed it, where 19% of them strongly opposed it.

To what extent do you support unifying the uprising groups in one list in each district?

- Support to a certain extent: 32.3%
- Oppose to a certain extent: 29.3%
- Strongly support: 19.7%
- Strongly oppose: 18.7%
f) The level of influence of the unification of uprising groups within unified electoral lists on the willingness of respondents to vote for them

31% of respondents declared that the unification of uprising groups within unified electoral lists would motivate them to vote for these lists, compared to 15% who responded with "I don’t know."

In case the uprising groups were unified, would this factor motivate you to vote for their list?

- No: 54.6%
- Yes: 30.8%
- Do not know: 14.7%

The extent to which some factors affect electoral choices

The factors that have been shown to influence the respondents’ electoral choices are:
- “Protection/security”, with an average of 3.3 on a 4-point scale
- “The candidate’s achievements”, with an average score of 3.2.
- “The services provided by the candidate for my area” with an average score of 3.1.
- “The candidate’s electoral program”, with an average score of 3.1.
- “Supporting candidates from the youth category”, with an average score of 3.1
- “Supporting women candidates”, with an average score of 2.9
- “Services provided by the candidate to the family”, with an average score of 2.6

It turns out that protection/security has taken the first place.
Factors were placed on a four-point scale numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, where 4 means “it affects a lot”, 3 means “it affects to a certain extent”, 2 means “doesn’t affect to a certain extent”, and 1 means “doesn’t affect at all”.

How does the following affect your electoral choices? (1 = Doesn’t affect at all; 2 = Doesn’t affect to a certain extent; 3 = It affects to a certain extent; 4 = It affects a lot)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection/security</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The candidate’s achievements</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The services provided by the candidate for my area</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The electoral program</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting candidates from the youth category</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support women candidates</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The services provided by the candidate to my family</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliation of the candidate</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party leader of the candidate</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Family Resolution</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness of the candidate from the party leader</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your relationship with the candidate/party leader</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assistance provided by the candidate</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sectarian affiliation of the candidate</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. “Protection/security”:
A majority of 85% of respondents declared that providing protection/security affects their electoral choices, of whom 47% considered this factor to affect their choices a lot, in contrast, 15% declared that it does not affect their electoral choices, of whom 4% said that it does not affect at all.

![Protection/security chart]

2. “The candidate’s achievements”:
A majority of 80% of respondents declared that the candidate’s achievements affect their electoral choices, of whom 47% declared that they affect a lot, in contrast, 20% declared that achievements do not affect their electoral choices, of whom 6% declared that they do not affect at all.

![The candidate’s achievements chart]
3. “Sectarian affiliation of the candidate”: 
62% of respondents declared that the candidate’s sectarian affiliation does not affect their electoral choices, of whom 39% declared that it does not affect at all, whereas 38% declared that it affects their choices, of whom 27% declared that it affects a lot.

h) Will elections be a source of change?

Half the respondents (50%) believe that the parliamentary elections will be a source of change, compared to 45% who believe that it will not be a source of change.
A majority of 60% of respondents considered that the ideal Lebanese political figure who is still in the political sphere does not exist, compared to those who chose the traditional political figures, as 10% chose Hassan Nasrallah, 6% chose Samir Geagea, followed by Saad Hariri with 4%, and each of Sami Gemayel, Nabih Berri, Michel Aoun, Gebran Bassil and Walid Jumblatt with 2%...

**Comparison between the results of this survey and the results of the December 2019 one:**
Comparing the answers to this question with those to a similar question asked in the December 2019 survey\(^1\), it is clear that the popularity of all politicians has decreased, with the exception of Samir Geagea, whose popularity noticed a small increase from 5.42% to 6.1%. However, this decline in the popularity of traditional Lebanese politicians does not mean the emergence of new political leaders, as the percentage of those who answered “no one” significantly rose from about 40% in December 2019 to 60% in December 2021, and only 1.3% of respondents chose Paula Yacoubian in the latest survey. This reflects the Lebanese people’s growing mistrust in the existing political figures, whether from the ruling authority or from the opposition/uprising, in light of the worsening socio-economic and political crisis, coupled with the devastating effects of the August 4 blast in 2020.

The biggest drop in popularity was recorded within President Michel Aoun’s one, as it decreased from 7.25% in December 2019 to 2.2% in December 2021, whereas the lowest drop in popularity was recorded within Hassan Nasrallah’s one, as it decreased from 11.67% in December 2019 to 10.4% in December 2021.

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1. In December 2019, the question was: “Which politician best expresses your opinion?”; while in December 2021, the question was: “Who is your ideal Lebanese political figure who is still in the political sphere?”
Who is your ideal Lebanese political figure who is still in the political sphere?

- 60.0% No one
- 39.58% Hassan Nasrallah
- 11.67% Samir Geagea
- 12.08% Others
- 4.8% Sad El Hariri
- 5.67% No answer
- 3.9% Sami Gemayel
- 2.4% Nabih Berri
- 6.58% Michel Aoun
- 10.4% Gebran Bassil
- 3.25% Walid Jumblatt
- 4.25% Paula Yacoubian
- 2.2% Others
- 1.6% Others
- 1.3% Others

2019 vs 2021
11) **Attitude towards international actors**

a) **Trust in some international actors:**

With the exception of France, respondents don’t trust any of the mentioned international actors, albeit in varying percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Actor</th>
<th>Don’t trust at all</th>
<th>Don’t trust to a certain extent</th>
<th>Trust to a certain extent</th>
<th>Strongly trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International actors were placed on a four-point scale numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, where 4 means “strongly trust”, 3 means “trust to a certain extent”, 2 means “don’t trust to a certain extent”, and 1 means “don’t trust at all”.

| Average |
|-----------------|--------|
| France          | 2.35   |
| EU              | 2.28   |
| World Bank      | 2.20   |
| IMF             | 2.20   |
| Germany         | 2.15   |
| KSA             | 2.09   |
| USA             | 1.95   |
| Turkey          | 1.95   |
| China           | 1.94   |
| Russia          | 1.85   |
| Iran            | 1.68   |
| Syria           | 1.66   |

1. IMF:
59% of respondents do not trust the IMF, of whom 33% do not trust it at all, compared to 41% who trust it, of whom 12% strongly trust it.

2. World Bank:
59% of respondents do not trust the World Bank, of whom 33% do not trust it at all, compared to 41% who trust it, of whom 12% strongly trust it.

3. Iran:
A majority of 78% of respondents do not trust Iran, 62% of them do not trust it at all, compared to 22% who trust it, of whom 7% strongly trust it.

4. KSA:
62% of respondents do not trust KSA, of whom 40% do not trust at all, compared to 38% who trust it, of whom 11% strongly trust it.

5. France:
As opposed to the other international actors, 51% of respondents trust France, of whom 11% strongly trust it, compared to 49% who do not trust it, of whom 28% do not trust it at all.

6. Turkey:
71% of respondents do not trust Turkey, of whom 39% do not trust it at all, compared to 29% who trust it, of whom 5% strongly trust it.
7. **Syria:**
A majority of 79% of respondents do not trust Syria, of whom 60% do not trust it at all, compared to 21% who trust it, of whom 5% strongly trust it.

8. **China:**
70% of respondents do not trust China, of whom 37% do not trust it at all, compared to 30% who trust it, of whom 1% strongly trust it.

9. **EU:**
55% of respondents do not trust the EU, of whom 29% do not trust it at all, compared to 45% who trust it, of whom 12 strongly trust it.

10. **Germany:**
58% of respondents do not trust Germany, of whom 31% do not trust it at all, compared to 42% who trust it, of whom 4% strongly trust it.

11. **Russia:**
76% of respondents do not trust Russia, of whom 43% do not trust it at all, compared to 24% who trust it, of whom 4% strongly trust it.

12. **USA:**
69% of respondents do not trust the USA, of whom 43% do not trust it at all, compared to 31% who trust it, of whom 8% strongly trust it.
b) Assessing the role of some actors towards Lebanon

France is the only actor whose role in Lebanon is considered by respondents as positive to a certain extent, where its average scored 2.52 on the 4-point scale.
Roles of international actors were placed on a four-point scale numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, where 4 means “it has a positive role to a large extent”, 3 means “it has a positive role to a certain extent”, 2 means “it has a negative role to some extent”, and 1 means “it has a negative role to a large extent”. Number 97 was also added, which means “it doesn’t have any role”, however, enumerators were asked to refrain from reading this option for the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **IMF:**
52% of respondents consider the IMF’s role towards Lebanon as a negative role, of whom 26% consider it largely negative, compared to 46% who consider it positive, of whom 16% consider it largely positive.

2. **World Bank:**
54% of respondents consider the World Bank’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 27% consider it to be largely negative, compared to 44% who consider it positive, of whom 16% consider it to be largely positive.

3. **Iran:**
A majority of 75% of respondents consider Iran’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 59% consider it largely negative, compared to 24% who consider it positive, of whom 10% consider it largely positive.

4. **KSA:**
58% of respondents consider KSA’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 34% consider it largely negative, compared to 41% who consider it positive, of whom 15% consider it largely positive.

5. **France:**
As opposed to the other international actors, 55% of respondents consider France’s role towards Lebanon as a positive one, of whom 17% consider it largely positive, compared to 44% who consider it negative, of whom 20% consider it largely negative.
6. **Turkey:**  
62% of respondents consider Turkey’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 29% consider it largely negative, compared to 32% who consider it positive, of whom 8% consider it largely positive. 6% considered that Turkey has no role.

7. **Syria:**  
A majority of 75% of respondents consider Syria’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 53% consider it largely negative, compared to 22% who consider it positive, of whom 6% consider it largely positive.

8. **China:**  
57% of respondents consider China's role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 27% consider it largely negative, compared to 32% who consider it positive, of whom 4% consider it largely positive. 10% considered that China has no role.

9. **EU**  
49% of respondents consider the EU’s role towards Lebanon as a positive one, of whom 14% consider it largely positive, compared to 46% who consider it negative, of whom 21% consider it to be largely negative. 6% considered that the EU has no role.

10. **Germany**  
46% of respondents consider Germany's role towards Lebanon as a positive one, of whom 21% consider it largely positive, compared to 45% who consider it negative, of whom 21% consider it to be largely negative. 9% considered that Germany has no role.

11. **Russia**  
67% of respondents consider Russia's role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 35% consider it largely negative, compared to 28% who consider it positive, of whom 6% consider it largely positive. 5% considered that Russia has no role.

12. **The USA**  
64% of respondents consider the USA’s role towards Lebanon as a negative one, of whom 37% consider it largely negative, compared to 35% who consider it positive, of whom 10% consider it largely positive.