



Lebanon's National Security

Economic, Social, Environmental and Educational Approaches

By
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Introduction

The concept of National Security in the modern state is no longer confined to protecting borders and confronting direct military threats. It has become a broader and more comprehensive concept, linked to the state's ability to protect its society, ensure economic and social stability, safeguard its natural resources, provide education, health care, and essential services, preserve national cohesion, and maintain the capacity to withstand crises. A state may possess strong military and security institutions, yet become highly fragile if its economy collapses, its society is depleted, its youth emigrate, its schools and universities decline, its environment and resources deteriorate, and its citizens lose confidence in its institutions.

This approach is of exceptional importance in the Lebanese case because the crisis that became acute in **2019** was not merely a financial and monetary crisis. It evolved into a sovereign, economic, social, institutional, educational, and environmental crisis in which internal vulnerabilities interacted with external shocks. Developments have shown that the collapse of one sector or institution does not remain confined to that sphere; its effects spread to other sectors, creating an interconnected system of national fragility. Economic collapse leads to poverty, unemployment, and the erosion of the middle class; this increases emigration and dependence on non-state networks. Emigration drains human capital and weakens institutions and the economy; a weak economy reduces the state's ability to finance education, health care, infrastructure, and environmental protection; and declining services further erode confidence in institutions, weakening legitimacy and increasing the likelihood that crises will develop into social or political unrest. Recent developments have confirmed that this interdependence is not theoretical. After cautious signs of recovery in **2025**, renewed conflict in **2026** caused another setback in the economic trajectory, once again demonstrating that the economy, security, and political stability are interconnected dimensions of Lebanon's national crisis. Economic, social, environmental, and educational security should therefore not be viewed as development files separate from national security, but as components of the country's comprehensive capacity for resilience, continuity, and the protection of sovereignty.

I. Economic Collapse

Its Impact on Social Stability and the Legitimacy of Institutions

Lebanon's economic collapse is no longer merely a financial or monetary crisis; it has become a direct factor affecting social stability, institutional legitimacy, and the state's ability to perform its basic functions. Since **2019**, the collapse of the Lebanese pound, the freezing of deposits, the erosion of purchasing power, rising prices, and declining employment opportunities have broadly weakened the economic capacity of households, institutions, and the state alike. Poverty is no longer confined to the most vulnerable groups; it has extended into segments of the middle class, historically one of the pillars of Lebanese stability. This class is not merely an economic category: it usually includes a large proportion of professionals, business owners, employees, teachers, physicians, and engineers, and constitutes an essential base for moderation and civic participation. As poverty expands and the middle class contracts, the risks of social and political polarization increase. The danger of economic collapse

lies not only in lower incomes or weaker growth, but also in the way it changes social behavior and expectations about the future. When securing food, housing, education, health care, and energy becomes a daily priority, citizens move from a logic of planning and investment to one of survival and crisis management. Families become less able to build a stable future, and young people become more inclined to emigrate. More dangerous still is the collapse of hope, particularly among the young, which drives increasing numbers of skilled people to leave. Lebanon thus loses, simultaneously, the financial and human capital it needs to rebuild its economy.

a. The Banking Crisis and the Erosion of Trust in the State

The banking-sector crisis represents one of the most serious dimensions of the broader crisis, as citizens have lost confidence in banks and in the state's ability to protect their savings. This is not only a financial problem: a citizen who cannot access his or her own money may also lose confidence in the legal and institutional system that is supposed to protect private property. Addressing deposits and restructuring the banking sector are therefore not purely technical measures; they are a test of the state's fairness and legitimacy. If citizens believe that losses have been distributed unjustly, the financial crisis becomes a political and social crisis. By contrast, transparent reform based on clear rules and institutional accountability can provide a starting point for restoring trust.

b. The Economy, Clientelism, and State Legitimacy

This trajectory becomes even more dangerous when economic need turns into permanent dependence on non-state networks. The more access to assistance, medical care, education, or employment is tied to political or sectarian mediation, the weaker the direct relationship between the citizen and the state becomes. A right is transformed into a favor, and citizenship into an exchange relationship between the voter and the entity providing the service. The economic crisis thereby weakens institutions, while institutional weakness, in turn, obstructs economic reform, producing a vicious cycle: weak economy → weaker state → fewer services → greater dependence on informal networks → declining citizenship and trust → further institutional weakness → greater difficulty in economic reform. This cycle is difficult to break without simultaneous institutional and economic reform. Economic reform in Lebanon must therefore also be understood as reform of the relationship between citizens and the state.

II. The Economy and National Security

Sustainable national security cannot be built on a collapsed economy. The state needs financial resources to fund the security forces, judiciary, customs, public administration, infrastructure, education, health care, and social protection networks. When public revenues fall and public finances weaken, the state's ability to maintain its institutions and attract and retain skilled personnel declines. Falling public-sector salaries and the emigration of qualified professionals also weaken the state's institutional capacity and increase the risks of corruption, bribery, and the informal economy. This is where the concept of institutional fragility becomes evident: formal institutions may exist in name, yet

lack the resources, expertise, and independence required to perform their functions effectively. The more productive and stable the economy, the greater the state's capacity to finance its institutions; and the more efficient and transparent those institutions are, the greater their capacity to create an environment attractive to investment and production.

III. Social Fragmentation, Inequality, and Social Protection

The social dimension cannot be separated from national security. Poverty, unemployment, and inequality are not merely livelihood challenges; when they persist alongside a lack of justice and opportunity, they can intensify social tension and polarization and erode confidence in institutions. In a highly diverse society such as Lebanon, economic and regional disparities can intersect with political and sectarian divisions, turning a sense of deprivation from an economic problem into a source of political and social tension. The question then shifts from "Why are we suffering economically?" to "Who is responsible for our suffering?" In the absence of a strong and fair state that serves as a common reference point, this question may take on a political or sectarian character. Fair social protection therefore becomes part of a national security strategy because it prevents poverty from becoming a factor of fragmentation and strengthens the citizen's sense that the state is the primary guarantor of rights. Lebanon needs a sustainable national system that protects the poorest families, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, the unemployed, and groups affected by crises and disasters. The essential condition, however, is that this protection be an institutional right of citizenship rather than a service tied to political or sectarian loyalty, so that Lebanon moves from the model citizen → leader → assistance to the model citizen → state → right. This transformation is an essential part of rebuilding the Lebanese social contract and a tool for strengthening citizenship, national legitimacy, and resistance to clientelism.

IV. Education, Human Capital, and Emigration

Education has significance beyond its status as a social right: it is the principal source of the human capital the state needs to manage its economy, institutions, security, and future. Schools and universities do not produce knowledge alone; they produce physicians, engineers, judges, teachers, researchers, programmers, administrators, entrepreneurs, and leaders. The danger is that the effects of educational decline do not appear immediately. If educational standards deteriorate today, the full consequences emerge ten or twenty years later, when that generation enters the labor market and assumes responsibilities within the state. Any decline in the quality of education or the stability of educational institutions leads, over the medium and long term, to weaker skills, productivity, and innovation, while simultaneously increasing young people's desire to emigrate in search of better opportunities. A parallel cycle therefore emerges: declining education and opportunities → weaker skills and productivity → weaker economy and institutions → emigration of youth and skilled professionals → declining investment in education → reduced human capital → further decline.

a. Youth Emigration and the Depletion of the Future

Emigration is both one of the most serious consequences of the crisis and one of the factors that perpetuate it. Lebanon is losing large numbers of young people and skilled professionals at a time when it urgently needs physicians, engineers, researchers, technology specialists, administrators, and entrepreneurs. This emigration means more than the loss of individuals; it represents the loss of many years of education, training, and experience in which society invested, as well as the loss of workers, taxpayers, consumers, investors, potential entrepreneurs, new families, and future leaders. The strategic question is therefore not only: Who is leaving Lebanon today? It is also: Who will lead Lebanon twenty years from now? The realistic objective is not to prevent Lebanese citizens from emigrating—emigration is an individual right and may constitute a legitimate opportunity—but to build a Lebanon in which young people do not have to leave their country in order to succeed. The message should be: “You can succeed in the world, but you should not have to leave Lebanon in order to succeed.”

b. Education and Building National Resilience in Lebanon

Building national resilience in Lebanon begins in the school before any other institution, because the state we want tomorrow must first be planted as a concept in the minds of our children. Civic education and active citizenship should therefore become an essential and progressive part of school curricula—not as theoretical material memorized for examinations, but as a culture, behavior, and daily practice. From the earliest years, children should learn the meaning of the homeland, the Constitution and the law, rights and duties, the public interest, respect for difference, and the value of institutions. They should understand that the state is not an authority standing above the citizen, but a framework that protects rights, guarantees equality of opportunity, and enables citizens to contribute to building their future. I therefore propose compulsory national civic service for young men and women, unrelated to military service, as part of practical civic education before or during university. Students would participate, according to their fields and capacities, in projects serving society and the state in education, health care, the environment, municipalities, digital transformation, heritage protection, assistance to older persons and persons with special needs, disaster response, and other fields. Instead of learning about the state only from a textbook, young people would experience the state through serving it and see directly how taxes, laws, institutions, and public resources are transformed into real services. The objective is not merely to graduate students who hold degrees, but to form citizens who feel that they have a role and responsibility within the state. Schools and universities can thus become genuine laboratories of citizenship, civic service can become a bridge between the citizen and the state, and the process of building Lebanese national resilience can begin with the individual—with awareness, belonging, responsibility, and the conviction that reforming the state also begins with one's personal contribution.

c. The Lebanese Diaspora: Strategic Capital for Building a New Lebanon

The Lebanese diaspora is not merely a collection of communities living outside the homeland; it is an immense national strategic asset comprising skilled and experienced people across many fields—from physicians, engineers, academics, and experts in technology, finance, economics, law, and management to businesswomen and businessmen who have built successful institutions, accumulated extensive experience, and developed international, professional, and economic relationships in the countries where they live and work. This human and knowledge capital and these international networks can contribute significantly to the revival of a new Lebanon, transfer global best practices and expertise, and open markets, investments, and partnerships. Lebanon can also benefit from diaspora expertise in artificial intelligence, digital transformation, cybersecurity, digital governance, and the knowledge economy to build a modern and transparent state that uses technology to manage its institutions, reduce corruption, waste, and theft, and close loopholes that permit manipulation of public funds through traceable and accountable digital systems. The diaspora can be a principal partner in designing these systems, rather than merely a source of remittances. This requires an attractive national environment based on clear and fair laws, an independent and impartial judiciary, strong and transparent state institutions, and security and political stability that protect investment, work, and creativity. Lebanon possesses human, scientific, economic, and diaspora capacities sufficient to place itself on the path of development. What it needs is stability, the rule of law, a state of institutions, and a national political class with a strategic and objective vision that places the Lebanese interest above every other consideration. The true criteria for public officials should be patriotism, competence, integrity, vision, and the ability to serve Lebanon and its people. The new Lebanon should be built by mobilizing human capital at home and abroad, restoring trust in the state, harnessing knowledge, technology, and artificial intelligence, and establishing a legal and judicial system that protects rights, holds the corrupt accountable, and prevents theft and waste. Under these conditions, the diaspora can become an organized national force and one of the principal engines of Lebanon's renewal.

V. The Environment and Water, Food, and Energy Security

The environment is no longer a marginal or purely developmental issue; it has become an increasingly important component of national security. Water scarcity, pollution of rivers and groundwater, waste management, forest fires, land degradation, marine pollution, and climate change can develop into crises affecting health, food, agriculture, migration, and social stability. Declining water resources can reduce agricultural production, raise food prices, increase poverty, and drive migration from rural areas, placing additional pressure on cities, infrastructure, and public services. A clear chain of transmission emerges environmental risk → health risk → economic risk → social risk → demographic risk → security risk. Environmental governance should therefore be incorporated into national security planning through management of water and natural resources, protection of land, forests, and coastlines, and stronger early-warning and disaster-management systems.

a. Water and Food Security Emigration and the Depletion of the Future

Water should be treated as a strategic resource and a national security priority by protecting groundwater sources and springs, reducing waste, developing distribution networks, treating wastewater, and reusing it wherever possible. Food security does not mean achieving complete self-sufficiency—an unrealistic objective for a small, open economy such as Lebanon—but reducing Lebanon's vulnerability to external shocks, wars, supply-chain disruptions, and price fluctuations by supporting sustainable agriculture, improving productivity, developing storage, cold chains, and food processing, and diversifying import sources.

b. Energy Security

Energy security is a direct component of national security. Heavy dependence on external sources and weak infrastructure make the economy and society vulnerable to shocks. Lebanon should therefore combine electricity-sector reform with diversification of energy sources, development of solar and wind power where viable, modernization of the grid and energy storage, greater efficiency, and reduced waste. The transition toward clean energy is not only an environmental policy; it is also a means of strengthening independence and energy security. A state that is better able to secure its food, water, and part of its energy needs is less vulnerable to external pressure and better able to manage crises.

c. Sustainable Development and Intergenerational Security

Sustainable development should not be understood as an environmental slogan, but as a framework ensuring that the state can meet present needs without depleting the ability of future generations to meet theirs. Public debt, deteriorating infrastructure, depletion of natural resources, declining education, and the emigration of skilled professionals are all burdens that can become future threats if they are not addressed today. Public policies should therefore be subjected to a dual test: Do they address the current problem? And do they increase or reduce Lebanon's capacity for resilience in the future?

VI. National Resilience and Risk Management

Lebanon's real challenge is to move from managing crises after they occur to building a sustainable national capacity to prevent crises, absorb shocks, and recover from them. National security means identifying sources of vulnerability in advance, measuring them, developing scenarios, and building reserves and institutional capacities that allow the state to absorb shocks and recover without the collapse of its basic functions. "National resilience" should be adopted as an overarching framework encompassing the capacity of the state and society to confront economic crises; natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires, floods, droughts, and epidemics; energy, food, and water crises; cyberattacks; displacement; and social unrest without institutional collapse or loss of sovereignty. This requires an integrated national risk-management system involving state institutions, the army, security forces, civil

defense, municipalities, the private sector, universities, civil society, and the diaspora, together with national mechanisms for early warning, information sharing, and continuity of essential services.

VII. Governance, Data, and Cybersecurity

A modern national security strategy cannot be built without reliable data. Lebanon needs a national data system covering the economy, population, health, education, water, energy, agriculture, the environment, and infrastructure, enabling risks to be measured and anticipated and the most vulnerable areas and groups to be identified, while employing technology and artificial intelligence in early warning and resource management. Digital infrastructure itself has become part of critical national infrastructure. Disruption of banking, health, electricity, or government systems can have wide economic and security consequences. Cybersecurity, data protection, and continuity of vital systems must therefore become part of comprehensive national security. Transparency and accountability must also be strengthened, while monopolies and conflicts of interest are prevented, because environmental and social projects without good governance can become new sources of waste and corruption.

VIII. Justice, Trust, and Citizenship as Foundations of Security

A stable state cannot be built without trust, and trust cannot be built without justice. The national strategy should therefore rest on the principle: “No security without justice, and no stability without trust.” Justice includes equality before the law, transparency in the management of public funds, fairness in the distribution of burdens and opportunities, and protection of economic and social rights. When trust declines, the state’s ability to implement policies and mobilize society in the face of crises weakens. Citizenship should also be strengthened as a mechanism of national security. A state that provides services and rights on the basis of citizenship rather than sect, region, or political loyalty reduces citizens’ dependence on clientelist networks and supports a shared national belonging. Combating clientelism is therefore not only political reform; it is also a policy for strengthening security and stability because it rebuilds the direct relationship between citizen and state.

IX. From Human Security to National Security

This approach demonstrates that protecting the individual and protecting the state are not conflicting objectives. A citizen who enjoys education, health care, employment, social protection, and a safe environment is better able to participate in society, more confident in institutions, and less exposed to vulnerability, extremism, and forced migration. Conversely, a strong state with effective institutions is capable of providing and sustainably protecting these rights. In the Lebanese case, human security is therefore one of the foundations on which national security is built, not an alternative to it. The relationship is complementary: protecting people strengthens the state, and a strong state protects people. Lebanese national security thus begins before the borders—in the school, university, hospital, water, energy, employment, judiciary, and public administration.

Toward Strategic Conclusions

Lebanon's real challenge is not to address an isolated economic crisis, reform the education sector, improve environmental management, or create a social protection network separately, but to rebuild the country's comprehensive capacity for resilience by treating these files as parts of a single national security system. Economic collapse generates poverty and weakens the middle class; poverty weakens social cohesion and trust in the state; state weakness pushes citizens toward informal networks; declining education weakens human capital; emigration drains youth and skilled professionals; and environmental, water, food, and energy risks increase the vulnerability of society and the economy. When these factors interact, sectoral fragility becomes comprehensive national fragility. Lebanon's strategy must therefore move from crisis management to prevention, risk management, and national resilience. A strong state is not a state that never faces crises—this is impossible—but one that does not collapse when crises occur. This requires redefining national strength: strength is not measured by military capabilities alone, but by the state's ability to generate wealth, secure food, water, and energy, protect its citizens, educate its youth, retain its skills, manage its resources, protect its digital infrastructure, administer justice, and preserve society's confidence in its institutions. A strong army requires an economy capable of financing it; a productive economy requires educated human capital; a stable society requires justice and social protection; development requires a sustainable environment and resources; and all these elements require legitimate, effective, transparent institutions capable of making and implementing decisions. The Lebanese diaspora should be regarded as part of national strength rather than merely a remittance network, and social protection should become part of a new national contract in which citizens view the state as the primary reference for their rights and are therefore more willing to defend it and contribute to its stability.

Lebanese national security cannot be separated from human dignity and societal resilience. A state that protects its borders but cannot protect people from poverty, ignorance, illness, marginalization, or the loss of a future remains vulnerable. A state that combines sovereignty, institutional strength, development, justice, social protection, education, and sustainability is better able to confront internal and external threats. Lebanese national security should therefore rest on an integrated system encompassing military, economic, social, water, food, energy, environmental, educational, health, and cyber security, together with human capital, good governance, justice, and national resilience. These are not separate files but interconnected links in a single system. Persistent weakness in one can spread to the others, while strengthening them in an integrated manner increases the state's resilience. The ultimate objective of national strategy is not only to prevent state collapse, but to build a state capable of resilience and renewal, turning crises into opportunities to rebuild institutions and strengthen sovereignty—a state that anticipates crises rather than waiting for them, builds national capacities before disasters occur rather than relying only on post-disaster assistance, and measures security not merely by the number of weapons but by the resilience of people, institutions, society, and the economy.

Sustainable Lebanese national security begins with a secure and dignified person, a cohesive society, a productive economy, strong education, a protected environment, sustainable resources, and legitimate and effective institutions, and culminates in a state capable of protecting its sovereignty, independence, national interests, and the future of its generations. Protecting people becomes a condition for protecting the state; protecting the state a condition for sustaining human security; sustainable development a condition for the continuity of the state; and a strong state a condition for protecting all. This is the approach that should govern the formulation of Lebanese national security in the twenty-first century: security that does not merely prevent danger but builds resilience; does not merely protect the state but strengthens society; and does not merely manage the present but protects Lebanon's future and coming generations. The new equation can therefore be summarized as follows: strong state + productive economy + cohesive society + educated people + sustainable environment + institutions subject to the rule of law = a Lebanon that is more secure, resilient, and independent. This is the path from crisis management to state-building, from a fragile state to a capable state, and from fear for Lebanon to confidence in its future.

Lebanon, the Message

"Lebanon, the Message" cannot remain merely a historical idea or cultural slogan. It requires a capable state that protects freedom, pluralism, dialogue, and coexistence and transforms these values into national and strategic strength. Only then does Lebanese national security become the expression of a state that protects its territory, safeguards its society, invests in its people, preserves its resources, restores the confidence of its citizens, and invests in Lebanese capacities both at home and across the world. The ultimate aim is to build a strong Lebanese state—not at the expense of its pluralism, but to protect it; not at the expense of freedoms, but to guarantee them; and not by erasing Lebanon's distinctiveness, but by transforming it into a source of strength. Lebanon is not merely a geographic space or a political system. In this vision, Lebanon is a message. "Lebanon, the Message," as expressed by Pope John Paul II in **1989**, constitutes a strategic asset for Lebanese national security, not merely a religious or cultural slogan. It rests on freedom, pluralism, dialogue, and coexistence—elements that give Lebanon soft power and a role greater than its geographic size. Transforming this concept into a national and strategic initiative would strengthen internal unity, protect diversity, support Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, and enhance its regional and international standing in the service of the highest national interests.

Authors' Short Bio

Ahmed Muhieddine Sabra

Born in Ras Beirut, is a prominent Lebanese figure whose career combines entrepreneurship, charitable, social and political engagement, and active involvement in public affairs. With more than **28** years of experience, he has developed a national vision centered on building a strong Lebanese state, advancing the concept of comprehensive national security, and bringing together Lebanese talents and expertise both in Lebanon and throughout the diaspora. Sabra became involved in volunteer work at the age of **14**, in **1980**, through the Lebanese Scouts and Civil Defense. He participated directly in serving people during some of the most difficult periods of the Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli invasion of Beirut. He also took part in relief and humanitarian response efforts during the Sabra and Shatila massacres, including assisting in the transfer of victims' bodies and the evacuation of some survivors, under the severe humanitarian and security conditions surrounding those events. These early experiences in volunteerism and field work formed the foundation of a long-standing commitment to community service, public affairs, and initiatives that combine social responsibility with individual initiative. He studied Business Marketing at the Lebanese American University (LAU) and, in **1993**, founded **Motivation & Perception** in Beirut, a company specializing in marketing and business development. Over the course of approximately **33** years, Sabra has built extensive professional experience across Lebanon, the Gulf countries, Egypt, Europe, and Asia. His work has spanned entrepreneurship, marketing, business development, and the creation of initiatives and projects.

The Era of the late Former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri

Ahmed Muhieddine Sabra was closely associated with the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and played a prominent role in political and national marketing during the **2000** elections, through innovative communication initiatives with voters using the telephone, which was a relatively new approach at the time. He also convinced the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri of the importance of engaging directly with people in the streets, leading to the organization of a popular public rally on Sabra Street. This rally, followed by several other similar rallies, contributed significantly to strengthening direct communication with the public, mobilizing popular support, and enhancing the connection between the leadership and the people. These rallies, together with the direct engagement with voters that accompanied them, contributed to strengthening Hariri's popular presence in Beirut ultimately resulted in a decisive electoral victory for his electoral list in Beirut at the time. These initiatives subsequently extended to other areas across Beirut and Lebanon. With the personal and direct support of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, he founded **Promoliban** in **2001**, through which he undertook the mission of promoting Lebanon as a tourism destination, enhancing its image and presence on the international stage, and attracting investment to the country. The company implemented a number of high-impact initiatives and projects that contributed to strengthening Lebanon's presence on the regional and international tourism map and enhancing its investment appeal. Among the most notable were "Kids Summer Fiesta" in **2001**, which successfully attracted Gulf families to Lebanon, and "Live Lebanon" in February **2002**, which achieved remarkable success, reflected in the large number of tourists and the full occupancy of hotels across Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with its impact extending through the summer of **2002**. The company was also one of the leading organizers of the "Planet Lebanon" conference, held in Brazil in **2003**, as part of its efforts to promote Lebanon, attract investment to the country, and strengthen connections between Lebanon, its economic and diaspora communities, and international markets. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in **2005**, Sabra moved to the Sultanate of Oman, where he founded **PromoOman**, before moving more recently to the United Arab Emirates. In the UAE, he launched a platform specializing in artificial intelligence applications for the education sector in partnership with two specialized companies, while also working on other projects and initiatives in various countries.

Volunteer Activities

Sabra was elected President of the **International College (IC) Alumni Association** from **1998** to **2001**, after previously serving as its Secretary-General for three years and, before that, as a member of the association for three years. He was also a leader in the Lebanese BoysScouts Association, President of the Makassed Civil Defense Center, and, prior to that, was active in the United Front of Ras Beirut during the 80s. In his early years, he was a basketball coach, coaching at **IC School**, the **Lycée.A.K**, **Antranik Club**, and **AL Riyadi Club - Beirut**. He was one of several individuals who played a prominent role in promoting basketball, helping establish it as a popular sport in Lebanon during and after the Lebanese Civil War. He also held a number of voluntary advisory and administrative positions in local and international environmental and community organizations, including serving as Social and Environmental Advisor to the Governor of Mount Lebanon in **1986**, as well as Vice President and Secretary-General of two environmental associations. He also serves on the Advisory Board of the **Michael Haddad Foundation** - USA and a Senior Advisor at **COSMO** - Center for Oriental Strategic Monitoring, Rome, Italy.

A National Vision for Lebanon

Drawing on this accumulated experience, Sabra was present during the popular movement that began in Lebanon on October **17, 2019**, driven by his conviction that Lebanon's crises are the result of deep-rooted structural challenges requiring a long-term national project rather than temporary solutions. Since then, he has continued to develop a practical vision for restoring the role of the state and strengthening Lebanese national security through bringing together Lebanese men and women from diverse fields of expertise and competence, both in Lebanon and throughout the diaspora, around a unified national vision. This vision is based on mobilizing Lebanon's human capital and leveraging Lebanese expertise and capabilities in economics, law, engineering, medicine, education, anti-corruption, public administration, technology, artificial intelligence, digital transformation, and other fields. It also seeks to encourage a new generation of Lebanese to contribute constructively to the rescue and rebuilding of Lebanon, and to work toward reviving a sovereign, free, and independent Lebanese state.

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