



THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN LEBANON

*A PILOT MAPPING STUDY
MARCH 2021*



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FOREWORD

“Is it a revolution, an uprising, or a protesting movement?” More than a year has passed since the events that began on October 17, 2019; to this day, the nature of these events remains hotly debated.

The October 17 uprising saw people from different socio-economic, religious, and political backgrounds come together in an unprecedented and organic phenomenon. This momentum pushed many CSOs, previously dormant, to rise. It equally catalysed the birth of many new ones.

As new players entered the political landscape, a shift occurred in the socio-political sphere. It was time to document some of the changes and developments the country underwent since the October 17 uprising.

In December 2020, “The Pulse” initiated this first edition of a countrywide mapping of traditional and newly emerging CSOs following the October 17, 2019, uprising, narrowing down a pool of 420 CSOs to a representative sample of 63. This study mainly aims at shedding light on these CSO’s overall status and highlight their impact on policymaking.

The significance of this mapping study resides in the fact that its issuance coincided with multiple events such as the electoral milestones, the Economic deterioration, the devastating blast on August 4th, the absence of a government, the COVID-19 pandemic and more. Poverty grows more rampant and the situation is gradually exacerbating. If left untreated, these factors will surely lead to an unprecedented social disaster since the civil war. Brain drain might constitute the most alarming consequence, as the country is deprived of its creative, innovative, and productive minds.

The main message behind this study is to push CSOs to assume a role whether big or small in political life. We as “The Pulse” believe that change must be affected sooner rather than later before we reach the point of no return. If the situation does not change, Lebanon shall lose its special democratic aspect, its openness to the entire world and its ability to act as a beacon of coexistence and tolerance.

Our study aims to constitute a reference for both CSOs and other socio-political players. It shall offer a greater understanding of the current political climate and the interplay of its different actors.

A triangulation technique was adopted in addition to advanced digital analytics tools, allowing this mapping study to provide a subjective situational analysis of the CSOs. It gives insight into their organizational structure, alliances, demands, goals, financing, behaviour, and tools. Additionally, an overview of the CSOs political views is presented and their Social Media presence is analysed.

The study concludes with a set of recommendations for the future.

“The Pulse” team endeavoured to remain as objective and scientific as possible when approaching this highly volatile, emotionally driven, and complex issue. “The Pulse” prides itself on its ability to create a comprehensive report depicting the status of CSOs as accurately and objectively as possible.

This project was conceived with a participatory approach in mind. We encourage all who believe in the importance and purpose of this study to contact us on +961 1 561615 to share with us any relevant information they believe might be enriching and enhancing its accuracy. An e-portal, open to the public, was launched for this purpose. The findings of this mapping study will be periodically updated on this portal to reflect the continuous challenges and volatility of the CSOs scope of work and to keep a track record of their progress or regression.

Scan QR Code to go directly to the portal:



Consequently, “The Pulse” takes responsibility for keeping the findings of this mapping study updated, to reflect the continuous challenges the CSOs face and the volatility of their scope of work.

The question remains, would such an initiative help create a repository of civil society activities and engagement then act as a reference for political advancement?

Huda Usta Kaskas
Founder & CEO

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Huda Usta Kaskas".

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We acknowledge the efforts deployed by the esteemed individuals who have contributed to this study, whether directly or indirectly, helped us ensure the accuracy and quality of the information provided, and opened up new horizons for future studies and insights into CSOs in Lebanon.

We extend our gratitude to the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for supporting this publication in every way. The preparation and release of this document would not have been possible without the time, efforts and contributions of The Pulse team.

DISCLAIMER

The content of this document is the sole responsibility of its author Huda Usta Kaskas and its publisher “The Pulse” – Lebanon and is strictly limited to the gathered information within the limited time frame of this mapping study: December 2020 till March 2021. Date after which “The Pulse” and its Author are no longer liable for any discrepancies due to the versatility of the situation and the constant change in the status of each CSO. It does not in any way reflect the views of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).

“The Pulse” invites interested readers to visit our portal in the following cases:

- 1.Missing information related to your CSO
- 2.Providing new insights to enrich the study
- 3.Sharing your comments on the findings
- 4.Enlisting your CSO in the study

Your contribution will help us further improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of our report to better reflect the continuously changing socio-political landscape in Lebanon.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABL	: Association of Banks in Lebanon
AKA	: Also Known As
API	: Application Programming Interface
AUB	: American University of Beirut
BDL	: Banque du Liban
CSOs	: Civil Society Organizations
COVID-19	: Coronavirus Disease 2019, short for severe acute respiratory syndrome
ECP	: Ecological Compensation Plan
FOMO	: Fear of Missing Out
FPM	: Free Patriotic Movement (Political Party)
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GOTV	: Get Out the Vote during Elections.
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INGOs	: International Non-Governmental Organizations
LAU	: Lebanese American University
LGBTIQ	: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Questioning
MOIM	: Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
MOU	: Memorandum of Understanding
MP	: Member of Parliament
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
O&M	: Operation and Maintenance
PM	: Prime Minister
RHU	: Rafik Hariri University
SWOT	: Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities & Threats
SRC	: Student Representative Committee
UAE	: United Arab Emirates
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
USA	: United States of America
USJ	: Université Saint Joseph
VAT	: Value Added Tax
VoIP	: Voice-over Internet Protocol

SIGNIFICANT TERMS

The mapping study frequently refers to entities in the areas of government, civil society, and economy of Lebanon. The below explanations of significant terms describe the usage of civil society and uprising-related wordings as well as terms used in the CSO survey and terms used with specific meanings in local political and economic contexts.

1. CIVIL SOCIETY

1.1 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION (CSO)

A CSO is defined as an organizational entity or structure where affiliated members advocate for or assist in serving a common interest or view, whether economic, political, social or other. It generally follows a democratic process. CSOs can include community-based organizations as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They often act as mediators between citizens and the Establishment or give voice to citizens' interests vis-à-vis the state. Under the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework that is affiliated with the UN Global Compact, CSOs do not include businesses or for-profit associations. This mapping study refers to CSOs as all organizations striving to promote civic participation or intra-sectarian cooperation and inclusion in the governance and political order. CSOs will include a wide range of groups who intervened directly or indirectly in the uprisings through lobbying, popular uprisings, and sit-ins, with the sole purpose of imposing a certain change and breaking the existing status-quo.

The mapping study has covered registered and non-registered CSOs from different regions of Lebanon, with or without a well-defined structure, whether leaderless or not, and englobes the below groups: Grassroots movements, NGOs, newly or previously established political factions, syndicates, professional associations and labour groups, students groups, scholars, opinion leaders, policy makers, army veterans, feminist collectives and gender groups, regional groups, individual figures, diaspora and lobby groups, among others.

There is no current official data on the size of the Civil Society (sometimes called the third sector) and the number of CSOs in Lebanon. The latest official statistics by dating to 2015¹, indicates 8,311 registered CSOs. However, data accuracy in Lebanon is often doubted; according to "The Pulse" CSO numbers as of January 2021 are estimated at 12,000² organizations. Most of the names of CSOs covered by this study (the Pool and the Sample) are based on (formal or colloquial) Arabic. Their names are transliterated in Latin letters to preserve their native significance without altering their meaning when translated from Arabic to English.

¹MOIM Official Published Data. (2015)

²The Pulse Source

1.2 THE POOL

This mapping study researched 420 CSOs and their activities in context of the popular uprising.

1.3 THE SAMPLE

The pilot sample for the mapping study. It consists of 63 CSOs, or accurately 15% of the pool, which have been individually contacted by “The Pulse” and which constitute the base of the study. It is planned to expand the sample in future editions of the mapping study

1.4 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)

For the purpose of this study, NGOs refers to charitable and volunteer organizations that have been established to address humanitarian needs and human rights concerns. NGOs may be very recent, such as organizations formed after the Beirut Blast in August 2020, or long-standing. They are distinct from CSOs in the study’s context in that they generally do not pursue protest or political activism agendas. INGOs, or international NGOs, are all those humanitarian, empowerment, rights and development focused non-profit organizations that pursue activities in Lebanon as part of foreign NGO.



1.5 UPRISINGS

Episodes of civil disobedience, mass protests, or confrontations between citizens, citizen groups, or paramilitary organizations and the Lebanese state or security organs. Uprisings for the purpose of his study are such episodes that occurred since the cessation of internal armed conflicts under the Taif Agreement and before October 2019.

1.6 POPULAR UPRISING

In this mapping study, the “Popular Uprising” refers to the so called “Uprising”, “Protest”, “Demonstration”, “Upheaval”, “Mass Protests”, “Thawra”, or “Popular Unrest” which began on October 17, 2019, and spanned more than four months. Hallmarks of the popular uprising when compared with other episodes of uprisings between 1992 and 2019 were the following:

Participation by diverse segments of the Lebanese population.

Uniform demands to end corruption and recover illicitly obtained funds from corrupt officials.

Peaceful protests of people from varying religious backgrounds and political affiliations in urban centers and across the entire country.

As such, the popular uprising inspired the breaking down of sectarian and religious barriers in the minds of a significant amount of protesters. Violence erupted at various points in the popular uprising, with multiple reported deaths. Despite the fact that no fundamental change occurred in the political organization, some call this nationwide uprising a revolution.



1.7 PROTESTERS

It refers to any individual that took part in the uprising to express his/her dissatisfaction with the way the Establishment is running the country by any means, whether through on-ground activities, Social Media and media criticism, or any other form of protest.

1.8 INFILTRATORS AND ANTI-UPRISING ACTORS

Akin to known counter-protest practices throughout history, there have been many allegations that individual infiltrators acted during the popular uprising on behalf of state organs and that organized groups have been acting to cause damages in the style of a “fifth column³”. Anti-uprising actions, sometimes in the form of violent counter-demonstrations in central public locations and sometimes in the form of intimidations such as convoys, also were observed during the popular uprising. Additionally, assaults on media, mostly reporters of audio-visual news organizations and photographers, were attributed to various parties to the protests and security personnel.



1.9 PRO-PROTEST THUGS

It represents a category of protesters who support the popular uprising, but who are affiliated with and adherent to certain political factions. They are different than the fifth column and the Intelligence Forces infiltrators. Their purpose is to interfere in the uprising in order to subtly influence the behaviour of protesters in a way that protects the image and interests of their respective factions⁴.

³Britannica. Fifth column is a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity by any means at their disposal.

⁴The Pulse Field Officer

1.10 PRO-UPRISING POLITICAL FACTIONS

When the popular uprising broke out, The Kataeb Party, the Lebanese Forces political party, the Islamic Group in Lebanon and the Independence Movement among others declared their identification with the aims of the popular uprising and their opposition to establishment policies and practices. Political leaders, members and supporters of the following political parties were present on the ground and/or resigned from political office in connection with the popular uprising:

The Kataeb party "AKA - Phalange Party", who recently (2021) changed its official name to "The Kataeb Party – Lebanese Social Democratic Party) had their 3 MP's (Sami Gemayel, Nadim Gemayel and Elias Hankach) resign in the aftermath of the Beirut blast⁵.

The Lebanese Forces ministers (May Chidiac, Kamil Bou Sleiman, Ghassan Hasbani and Richard Kouyoumjian) submitted their resignation from the Hariri cabinet on October 20, 2019 after the outburst of the uprising claiming "the failure of the Lebanese officials to address the crisis"⁶ as a reason. Their 15 MPs remained in office even after the Beirut port blast as they consider that the resignation will have no effect in enforcing a momentum of change.

The Islamic group in Lebanon is considered one of the major Sunni players in the political arena, despite the fact that they were unable to secure a seat in parliament in the 2018 elections.

The Independence Movement, represented by their sole MP member (Michel Moawad), also resigned following the Beirut blast.

It is also worth noting that 4 additional MPs have resigned following the Beirut blast, namely Paula Yacoubian, Nehmat Ephrem, Henri Helou and Marwan Hamade.



⁵Reuters. Lebanon's Kataeb party says its three MPs resigning from parliament in wake of Beirut blast. (October 8, 2020)

⁶Alarabiya. Samir Geagea announces resignation of his ministers from Hariri cabinet. (October 20, 2019)

2. POLITICAL TERMS OF GENERAL RELEVANCE

2.1 CIVIL STATE

The consociational structure of the Lebanese State, includes important constituent restraints on electability for highest offices (President of the Republic, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament) as well as meritocratic appointments to ministerial positions and ranking offices in public administration, armed forces, state-aligned enterprises and syndicates and economic associations. Proposals to shift to a laic state from this model of sectarian balances have been circulated even before the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. The Lebanese Constitution (Art 12) recognizes that every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, stipulating that “no preference shall be made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established by law.” Arguments for a state without alignments of political office with nominal religious belonging have been strengthened by clientelistic behaviour, bribery, graft, and other forms of corruption in the Establishment (see below) system.

2.2 NATIONAL PACT

The multiconfessional agreement dating back to the 1930s and 40s that has served as the basis for Lebanese political order.

2.3 ESTABLISHMENT

Lebanon is a consociational state with a power sharing system aimed at guaranteeing political representation of the country’s 18 religious sects. The constitutional division of powers into executive, legislative, and judiciary is by tradition mirrored in a tripartite segmentation of state powers whose holders are determined on basis of their religious identities. Thus, the constitutional categories have been conjoined with sectarian allegiances in the three main constituents of the Establishment, in terms of decision making and legislation:

The Executive Power, represented by the President of the Republic and the Government

The Legislative Power, represented by the members of parliament

The Judicial Power, represented by all of the Lebanese courts of law.

This structure was developed in the first half of the 20th century and severely tested during Lebanese conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, until local and international political powers reached a settlement aiming to put an end to the civil war in Lebanon. Dubbed the Taif Agreement, it integrated former warlords, militia leaders, family dynasties, feudal lords, military figures, and primary public employees affiliated with the dominant political factions at the time.

In this mapping study, the term “Establishment” refers to the above-mentioned constitutional distribution of powers as well as the political entities which constitute the current political eco-system. The stakeholders in the Establishment are regarded by many Lebanese as the ruling class or the ruling elite responsible for the situation of the country. In political grassroots mobilizations during municipal and national elections in 2016 and 2018, but especially during the popular uprising, the Establishment structure has been explicitly challenged.



2.4 MARCH 14 AND MARCH 8

Upon the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, popular outrage against the Syrian presence in Lebanon exploded and hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in increasingly vocal demands calling for the end of the Syrian occupation. The Syrian presence was a relic of the pre-1989 Lebanese conflict that was prolonged in deviation of the Taif Agreement and was perceived by many Lebanese as stifling political and economic interference. Peaceful protests against it escalated daily in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination. The calls for Syria’s withdrawal, locally known as uprising for independence, were dubbed Cedar Revolution by US officials. Syrian troops finally withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005.

A counter uprising to the calls for Syrian withdrawal was formed within weeks of the Hariri assassination. An orchestrated mass demonstration on March 8, 2005 was held with the support of several political factions to support the Syrian presence in Lebanon. A coalition of political groups was formed by parties such as AMAL and the Marada Movement and led by Hezbollah. This coalition, holding sway over a significant electoral base in Lebanon, was one of the two key alliances on the political scene for the next several years.

The other key alliance was known as the March 14 movement, named after the largest pro-independence demonstration that was organized in central Beirut on March 14, 2005. Initially, the March 14 anti-Syrian political coalition included more than six political factions and national figures such as Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblat, and Michel Aoun who later dissociated his political faction from the coalition to join March 8, based on a 2006 agreement called the Mar Michael MoU (see section on Hezbollah below).

2.5 HEZBOLLAH

“Hezbollah” is a very complex and delicate entity to be addressed, due to its controversial aspect in terms of dividing the Lebanese Citizens between those opposing it (March 14) and those supporting it (March 8).

Hezbollah is a political party and militant group established in 1982 by the Muslim Shiite community in the South of Lebanon as a resistance to Israeli occupation. Over the past decades, Hezbollah was feted in official Lebanese political language as the “Resistance”, but dubbed by some “a state within a state” in reference to its extensive security bodies, political organization and network of social services provided to its followers. Hezbollah is backed up by its Iranians, Syrians and other allies. It publicly pledges allegiance⁷ to Iran and is considerably funded by them⁸.

Hezbollah is seen by its Lebanese supporters as a legitimate national “Resistance” organization defending Lebanon against any Israeli assaults. Some foreign countries, like Russia, see it as a “legitimate socio-political force”⁹.

However, the military wing or the entire organization of Hezbollah has been designated by some member states in the Arab League, the United States of America, and several European countries (such as Germany, UK and others), as a terrorist group; also perceived by various Lebanese groups as such.

Hezbollah is one of the main constituents of the March 8 alliance, which the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) joined in 2006, following the Mar Michael Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This MoU defined and organized the relations between the FPM and Hezbollah and led to the agreement on diplomatic relations with Syria.

In recent years, Hezbollah has become engaged in the Syrian Civil War to protect and support Bashar Assad’s regime, which transformed it into an increasingly effective military force. Their experience has improved due to their engagement in combats outside Lebanese soil and in different topographical arenas such as Damascus, Homs and Aleppo, among other regions. These battles nevertheless caused Hezbollah to have high numbers of fatalities among their fighters¹⁰.



⁷Hezbollah Secretary General Televised speech pledging allegiance to Iran. (September 10, 2019)

⁸Hezbollah Secretary General Televised speech. “40-day commemoration of Mustapha Badreddine - Funding of the party is entirely from Iran”. (June 24, 2016)

⁹Arab Center Washington D.C. Statements by Russian Officials. (March, 2021)

¹⁰CSIS. The escalating conflict with Hezbollah in Syria. Seth G. Jones. (June 20, 2018)

2.6 TAIF AGREEMENT

After spanning more than 15 years, the Lebanese Civil War ended with a cease-fire supported by regional powers aiming to stop the raging war and restore peace and political normalcy to the country. The Arab League selected a committee to draw up a solution that would put an end to the hostilities.

Various political factions implicated in the war met in the Saudi city of Taif to negotiate a peace-making formula for peace restoration in the country, to suggest reforms to the nearly non-existing political system and establish an authority for the Lebanese Government in South Lebanon. Talks were headed by the-Speaker of the Parliament Hussein El-Husseini.



The outcome of the above-mentioned negotiations resulted in the drafting of the National Reconciliation Accord that was signed on October 22, 1989 and referred to as “Taif Agreement” in reference to the city in which it was signed. It was then ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on November 5, 1989.

This agreement is perceived as a second constitution. It aimed at reinstating a balance of power between the different religious groups, the reason for which they expanded the number of seats in the parliament to reach 128 divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Moreover, the Taif agreement presented notable modifications to the power sharing structure between the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Parliament Speaker.

3. POLITICAL TERMS WITH SPECIAL RELEVANCE IN “THE PULSE” CSO SURVEY

3.1 BORDER DEMARCATION

The demarcation of land and maritime borders has large implications for the territorial sovereignty and economic rights of Lebanon. In the absence of full resolution of past Lebanese-Israeli conflicts and issues of occupation of parts of Lebanon’s territory, as well as questions surrounding offshore gas and oil deposits, the demarcation of borders is a prominent topic of national debate that was covered in the CSO survey.



3.2 DEFENCE STRATEGY

The term defence strategy was introduced in 2006 during the Lebanese dialogue table called upon by the Speaker of the Parliament Mr. Nabih Berry to discuss the state’s national affairs, relations with Syria, and the status of Lebanese and non-Lebanese armed organizations. Defence Strategy encoded the purported mission of the national dialog to design the best defence strategy to protect the country from unsolicited attacks. During the national dialog, participants from prominent political factions (mainly Hezbollah, AMAL Movement, Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, Free Patriotic Movement, and Lebanese Forces), diverged on the best measures to adopt. While some called for an effective defense strategy, others called for the immediate disbanding of weapons outside the state’s jurisdiction and the immediate application of UN resolution 1559, which asks for the withdrawal of any foreign military presence from Lebanese soil.

The mapping study uses the terminology state-sponsored defence strategy based on the above, noting numerous CSOs who stress in their survey responses that the government is the only entity authorized to make decisions regarding the implementation of such strategy.


3.3 ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

The electoral machine is a mixture of different components embodied in a coherent well-structured entity. The entity entails human capital represented by professional election experts, on ground operation specialists and grassroots initiatives on one hand, and reliable logistics on the other. The electoral machine allows for efficient management of a political party's or individual candidate's electoral campaign.

The key elements to conduct a complete election campaign have to rely on the below factors:

- Political landscape assessment (Electoral Law, the district, voters' segmentation, past elections results, opposition research).
- Campaign goals and strategy set-up.
- Communication campaign.
- Campaign implementation (planning, budgeting, scheduling, recruiting adequate campaign professionals, consultants, staff, interns and volunteers, training members of the electoral machine, managing logistics, procurement, reporting and dashboarding, and ensuring legal compliance, among other activities).
- Mass mobilization and campaign events.
- Coalition building.
- Canvassing & GOTV (Get Out the Vote).
- Campaign database collection.
- Blind pull and visibility.
- Election Day management (managing key departments of the electoral machine and their relevant personnel, as well as the headquarters and polling stations).

It is worth mentioning that before the 2018 elections, the Lebanese parliamentary elections were based on a majoritarian voting system. However, lawmakers, with the consent of the Establishment, passed a new electoral law (#44/2017) in June 2017. The new law changed the electoral system to proportional representation with a preferential vote and was applied in the 2018 parliamentary elections in 15 districts, while the Municipal elections (the last one in 2016) are still conducted on a majoritarian basis, according to the law stipulated in 1977.



4. THE KEY ECONOMIC ENTITIES

The popular uprising, while triggered by a fiscal measure (a draft for a new tax imposition) and fed by demands for systemic change and dethronement of corrupt political elites, or even the entire “Establishment”, unfolded in parallel and interactive to a financial and economic crisis that engulfed Lebanon very visibly from the third quarter of 2019.

The financial system of Lebanon, which is characterized by extremely large debt finance and minimal institutionalization of equity finance and has been dominated by a very profitable banking sector with deposits reaching extreme multiples of GDP, immediately became a target of the popular uprising. Whereas the Lebanese state, administrative units, and fiscal policies were alleged by private business proponents to be main drivers of the crisis, the popular uprising focused from its beginning on the roles of corrupt political elites and the monetary and financial actions of the central bank, Banque du Liban (BDL), and Lebanese commercial banks with their umbrella organization Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL).

4.1 THE ROLE OF BDL AND ITS GOVERNOR

The central bank of Lebanon, Banque du Liban (BDL)¹¹ was established on April 1, 1964, acting as a successor organization to currency-issuing institutions that date back to the French mandate that governed Lebanon since World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. It is a public entity enjoying financial and administrative autonomy and is not subject to the administrative and management rules and controls applicable to the public sector. Its capital is appropriated by the State.

Following episodes of currency depreciation and hyperinflation during the Lebanese Civil War, BDL was instrumental in returning the country to a growth trajectory and stability of the Lebanese lira, its key mandate besides its role in supervision of the banking sector. However, the policy of pegging the Lebanese lira to the US dollar under a range of mechanisms was controversial since at least the imposition of a fixed dollar peg at 1.507 LBP/USD in 1997¹². The policy was perceived by critics as mainly beneficial to foreign Arab investors and damaging to the interests of many Lebanese.

Growing public debt and volatile developments of Lebanese GDP in the 1990s and 2000s were accompanied by a persistent monetary policy and dollar peg. However waning GDP growth and lack of fiscal policy making in serial episodes of political paralysis of the Lebanese Parliament and Government in the 2010s were answered by BDL under its governor Riad Salameh with quasi-fiscal incentive packages.

¹¹BDL. *Role & Function*

¹²EUROMONEY. *LEBANESE POUND SEES END OF DOLLAR PEG*. VIRGINIA FURNESS. (May 7, 2020)

“Financial engineering” and risky policy steps euphemized as unconventional financial measures were resorted to as the pressure on the economy continued unabated in the mid-2010s. These monetary gambles were financed by luring in hard-currency deposits with unsustainable offers of double-digit annual deposit interests to large depositors. During the popular uprising, these policies were in activist discourses denigrated as “Ponzi schemes” amid protests calling for the arrest of long-term BDL governor Salameh, against whom investigations were launched in Lebanon and several European jurisdictions.



4.2 THE ROLE OF ABL AND THE BANKING SECTOR

The Lebanese banking sector is large in terms of operator numbers and has towered over national financial markets since the end of the Lebanese civil war. Despite numbering over 50 banks in a small country, the sector has for most intents and purposes acted as a single banking entity in times of financial crises. However interests of the banking sector have been represented vis-à-vis the BDL, bank employees, and the Lebanese public by the Association of Banks in Lebanon (ABL). During the dichotomous debate over an economic rescue course for the national economy of Lebanon in 2020, an ABL proposal juxtaposed the plan developed by international consultants for the Government of Lebanon. Neither proposal proceeded beyond the initial drafting.

4.3 THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST BANKS AND CENTRAL BANK

Accusations against Lebanese banks, individual bankers, the BDL and its governor range from outrage at informal capital controls, cash withdrawal restrictions, and international transfer restrictions that were imposed since September 2019, exacerbated in November of that year, and maintained until the publication of this report. Court actions over alleged illicit money transfers, theft, and collusion with corrupt officials as well as accusations of illicit personal enrichment have been initiated, emphasized in demonstrations, and Social Media discussions. At the time of this report, the situation remains unresolved.

5. OTHER TERMS

5.1 BEIRUT BLAST



On the 4th of August 2020, Beirut witnessed what was referred to by BBC News¹³ as one of the worst non-nuclear explosions in history. According to the World Health Organization, the blast killed more than 200 people, left more than 6,500 injured, 300,000 people homeless, and severely damaged critical health infrastructure and medical supplies.¹⁴ The destruction was not only financially devastating but also psychologically traumatizing, especially for children, seniors, and adults. The blast resulted from the ignition and explosion of tons of ammonium nitrate, estimated by the experts at 2,700 tons, while the FBI report revealed only 500 tons¹⁵. This highly-dangerous material was stored unsafely in one of the Beirut port hangars (Hangar 12). The relevant authorities and the legal and administrative bodies involved in accepting and storing the cargo are being investigated by the Lebanese judiciary for negligence. Till date, no statement was made as to what the investigations have uncovered.

¹³BBC News. *Beirut Explosion: What we know so far.* (2020)

¹⁴WHO. *Lebanon emergency appeal.* (2020)

¹⁵France 24. *FBI found Beirut port blast caused by 500 tons of fertilizer.* (December 29, 2020)





I- SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT

The rise and role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs, see “significant terms” section for definition of the term as used in this study) in Lebanon is a significant aspect of the country’s changing socio-political landscape. However, whereas the culture of civil engagement in modern Lebanon has deep roots, prior to this study, little research has been conducted with the aim of mapping CSOs in Lebanon, specifically those that have been formed at inflection points during the past decade. In this sense, The State of Civil Society in Lebanon is a pioneer effort.

In the geopolitical vicinity of Lebanon, the 2010s mark a period of political awakenings in the complex region which interlinks northern Africa, western Asia, and southeastern Europe and, under western perspectives, is described as the “Middle East”. The cry for economic and civic rights first caught the world’s attention in early 2011 as the narrative of the Arab Spring originated from the squares and markets in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, and Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt. The popular outcries against poverty and authoritarianism spread to Iraq, Algeria, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and other countries far and near, triggering civil unrest, mass protests, modifications of political systems and regime changes, as well as protracted armed confrontations and totalitarian backlashes.



As the role of Lebanese CSOs remains a research challenge at time of this study, parallels and correlations between the stories of the 63 CSOs represented in the following text and civil society developments in other countries of the Middle East cannot be ignored. However, they are not part of this study, which has been conducted on a foundation of local specificities that distinguish the historic trajectory of Lebanese civil society engagements.

Since the inception of modern Lebanon as a state under European tutelage and subsequent consociational self-governance (the declaration of statehood in 1920 was followed by Lebanese Independence in 1943), civil engagement in the territory has unfolded with elements of protest against the political regime.

Other expressions of civil engagement were rooted in strong families and fragmented religious identities that distinguished Lebanon from religiously and dynastically monolithic societies in the region.

Lebanese civil actors and charitable organizations thus have been active throughout the toughest external challenges experienced by modern Lebanon in the century of its history as a state. A plethora of civil organizations, some of which have been in existence for many decades, constitute important social and political factors from long before the importation of terms such as non-governmental organization or social capital.

There were periods of post-conflict reconstruction where the role of civil organizations was less visible when compared with the last ten years. Correlated with the regional uprisings and several national crises since 2011, however, a new generation of local CSOs has come into existence. The greatest cohort of this new generation of CSOs mushroomed in the space of a few weeks after October 17, 2019, at the time of popular protests that were initially triggered by outrage over proposed tax levies on interpersonal smartphone communication.

Ignited by spontaneous protests against this “WhatsApp tax” in the downtown government district of Beirut, waves of more or less spontaneous uprising took important public squares in Beirut – such as the large Martyr’s Square and the nearby plazas of Riad Al Solh and Samir Kassir – by storm and also washed over suburban districts to the north of the Lebanese capital, such as the municipality of Jal El Dib. The wave then quickly engulfed outlying townships and population centers, prominently including the second city of Tripoli where the Sahet El Nour square saw mass gatherings.

At this stage of the 2019 uprising, communal barriers were swept away by peaceful human chains, activism from various political backgrounds was invigorated, new CSOs were born, old political factions were revived, and the entire generation of post-2011, Arab Spring-inspired, CSOs experienced a rejuvenation.

This encouraging short-term strengthening of the CSO pool must, however, be distinguished from the institutional solidification, growth and efficacy of CSOs. Experiences from the recent past suggested that short-term momentum generated by local social mobilizations, e.g. the protests during the waste crisis of 2015 and CSO electioneering efforts before the 2018 parliamentary elections, was juxtaposed with later periods where CSOs had difficulties to find direction and maintain momentum. From this background and also when seen in the context of regional social mobilizations, it is unsurprising that research for this study showed dichotomous developments of Lebanese CSOs.

In the wider assessments of regional uprisings of the 2010s, the longer-term momentum, in the view of some observers, saw the outright reversal of the “Arab Spring” to an “Arab Winter”. Perhaps different to some Arab countries, social development in Lebanon has thus far not ended in violent oppression of dissent or a sharp reversal of the momentum seen in the uprising that started on October 17, 2019. In the assessment of “The Pulse”-the authors of this study- four observations of note can be drawn for the period (approximately 18 months) between the uprising’s initial outcry and the final round of our CSO surveys and evaluation.


The first observation is that the anger that drove Lebanese of all ages and confessions to unite in their demands for political change, has remained the same. This is juxtaposed with the second observation that early hopes for far-reaching change – such as were expressed especially by first-time protesters and younger CSO organizers – have gradually faded away. This contradictory development of rising anger and waning hope is in our opinion strongly correlated with the heavy, and open-ended, economic and social strain under which the Lebanese have been living throughout 2020 and the first half of 2021.



A third and more quantitative observation, however, is to be taken into consideration when inquiring about the state and prospects of social mobilization in Lebanon. The popular uprising has succeeded in gaining institutional influence on many fronts. In November 2019, independent candidate Melhem Khalaf won the election to head the influential Beirut Bar Association. Towards the end of 2020, student body elections, which long have been perceived as exercises with foregone results due to preponderance of youth organizations of establishment parties, were won by independents (at the American University of Beirut and other high-profile universities).

Lastly, it is a justified and by our assessment important observation that hindrances to the development of the CSO pool comprise a mix of external and internal factors. External factors are related to the Establishment’s dominance over the political system and the dire circumstances of economic and social strain that have included the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2020 Beirut Port blast. Internal factors are directly related to the characteristics of the CSOs, their organizational fluidity, and the behaviours of leaders and members in different CSOs.

The aforementioned four observations were derived by “The Pulse” from a countrywide mapping and surveying study that has been supported by German Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The results of the study are detailed in the analytical segment of this report (pages 17 to 107) and a data segment with profile information and survey responses from 63 notable CSOs (the sample). The CSOs in the sample, while representing divergent and convergent views, in their aggregate constitute a key part of the popular uprising. The interviews and surveying conducted with these CSOs in several rounds of verification between December 2020 and February 2021 reveal many shared characteristics and behaviours as well as divergent and convergent positioning on critical issues.



Expectations for the highly educated millennials and digital natives of Lebanon, a generation born after the trauma of the Lebanese Civil War, suggest that this generation and its organizational expressions in CSOs would be breaking away from what are widely perceived as the shadows of past alignments with feudal and sectarian structures. However, any expectation that this generation and the CSOs embedded in it will choose a new path that differs from those taken by their forebears cannot as yet be validated. Acknowledging that the generation of under-30 voters entails both highly vocal activist minorities and those who might adhere to their families’ older affiliations, a coming test of the “different path” thesis will be the general elections, which are due in one year’s time.

Our mapping study diverges from expectations of far-reaching political and systemic change in finding that the greatest challenge for protesters and CSOs will be the continuation of existing divisions and organizational fragmentation. CSOs at time of this study differ from establishment factions by not being united around organizational platforms of creed, common identity, or allegiances. There is absence of leadership across all CSOs. They do not at this time represent a clear and unified program of political reform. Their shared characteristic is that they serve as homes of a wide diversity of individuals coming from various factions. Save for fundamental democratic principles, the members and constituents within the CSOs often differ widely on matters of sovereignty, society, or economy. If local political issues are added, the diversity of views widens and the potential for opposing positions increases.



2. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS


2.1 SEGMENTATION

Mapping the pool (420 CSOs) by background and interests, one can depict grassroots groups, NGOs, and newly established political factions, from far left to far right. In addition to syndicates, the uprising encompassed professional associations, labour groups, artists, students and alumni associations, scholars, opinion leaders, policy makers, and Research NGOs. Additional groups included army veterans, feminist collectives and LGBTIQ community, regional groups, individual figures, diaspora, and lobby groups working around policies at the social and economic levels.



2.2 COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES

The mapping illustrated 12 main interest-based coalitions or alliances that were formed (as of December 2020), each coalition gathering many CSOs under one umbrella, especially those who share common views and goals. This mainly aimed at bringing together and amplifying the collective resources and efforts, as well as creating the synergy needed to face the corrupt system. Evidence¹⁶ shows, however, that none of these coalitions are strong enough to create any real opposition; some expired the day after being established, while some are merely platforms for coordination.



2.3 DEMANDS AND GOALS

The CSOs involved in the first stage of this mapping study (the pool of 420 CSOs) unite around a multi-point demand list and aspire to a common set of goals¹⁷ that comprises the emergence of a Civil State, the formation of a responsible and honest government, the enforcement of the rule of law, a sustainable economy, a transparent juridical system, a trusted management of the banking sector¹⁸, the rise of a state that protects social and economic rights, the respect and protection of the rights of marginalized groups, gender equality, a protected natural environment, a sound urban environment, and a fair housing plan.

¹⁵Collected from follow-up interviews with the sample, and desk review

¹⁶Collected during the interviews and through publicly available documents pertaining to the CSO's demands

¹⁷Refer to definition section of this mapping study

¹⁸Data Triangulation (Interviews, MOIM data)

2.4 GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD

Geographically, CSOs are spread nationwide. Out of the 420 CSOs (the Pool), 26% have included the regions or governorate (Mohafazat) from which they originate, and in which they are currently active in their group's name.

Based on this we found that 24% of the CSO pool are active in the Bekaa, 26% in the South, 9% in Nabatieh, 22% in the North, 16% in Mount Lebanon and 3% in Beirut.

2.5 FINANCING

83% of the sample claimed to be self-financed or to have no expenses to finance in the first place. The remaining 17% disclosed receiving up to millions of dollars from regional, international, and Lebanese donors. As to the usage of received funds, communication and awareness campaigns during the popular uprising employed paid services such as branding, Social Media boosting, TV commercials and prime media exposure. Funds also were used for crowd mobilizations, logistics, and to cover costs of supplies. By public perception, CSOs are either self-financed or funded by undisclosed entities. This perception was informed mostly by CSO expenditures on visibility, namely their limited or extensive publicity campaigns.



2.6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

CSOs generally created communication platforms (online and offline) to coordinate and organize their actions. These platforms were organizational priorities of CSOs despite the popular uprising's characteristic of being leaderless and applied across the sample. Slightly more than half of the surveyed CSOs (51% of the sample) remained unregistered, preferring to be flexible and low-profile organizational structure. The other half of the 63 CSOs in the sample have either already registered (22% of the sample) or aspire to be officially registered. The rationale for seeking registration is their aspiration to present themselves as political parties that offer alternatives to the Establishment. 56% of the CSOs in the sample were created after the October 17 uprising.



2.7 BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

Since its emergence, the popular uprising has been described as decentralized and leaderless as well as spontaneous and impulsive. Although it lacks visible leadership structure, the uprising embraces a wide representation of scholars, opinion leaders and activists. While this organizational informality facilitated a wide range of activist contributions and is perceived as safer (vis-a-vis the authorities) and more flexible due to its decentralization, it constitutes a major threat to the popular uprising in terms of lack of structure on the long run.

This leaderless structure implied the need for an in-depth analysis involving social behaviour components of the protesters. Here the mapping reveals common patterns: The popular uprising represents a microcosm of the Lebanese society and the political landscape. During our interviews, the CSO representatives shared their observations regarding the pervasiveness of an inflated sense of self-worth among many individuals who are playing, or would like to play, important roles within the CSOs. This ego factor is leading to increased disagreement between the different CSOs as well as internally, among members of the same group or organization. Fear of missing out (FOMO) is also evident and reflected in misleading (i.e., often exaggerated) supporter numbers. Activists and pro-uprising citizens display FOMO as they join the WhatsApp groups of various CSOs and follow their online activities in order not to miss out on any current happenings. Most importantly, victimization seems to be used by some CSOs to gain sympathy and attract public attention, which is harmful to their cause in the long run as it makes them appear weak and puts them in a constant state of defensiveness.

It is important to note, however, that despite their differences and occasional displays of self-centredness, there is still a sense of comradery and shared purpose, reflected in their open dialogue and teamwork.

On a security level, considering the rising levels of state violence and oppression, CSO leaders and activists have been targeted, intimidated, or even imprisoned by the Establishment to instil fear among protesters, curtail their will to change the system and ensure they remain in power. The threats are not only limited to physical ones, but they also extend virtually. The latter intimidations are associated with the “digital armies” of the Establishment which include infiltrators, pro-protest thugs, and “fifth column” agents.

Although most CSOs agree on many of their goals, they still disagree on the means of implementation and execution. For instance, adherents to the top-to-bottom approach call for government leaders to step down, without exception. Supporters of the bottom-up approach are part of a category of CSOs that believe that attacking will only consolidate the position of the traditional political factions. These CSOs prefer to work at the grassroots, labour union and syndicate level. The third category preferably advocates on-ground popular protests; under this category, some advocate for using violence as a means of reiterating their message.

2.8 OUTREACH TOOLS

While at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Establishment's public relations machines and mainstream opinion makers, CSOs deployed their messages to the public in Lebanon and succeeded in acquiring international attention. Outreach to the advantage of CSOs was achieved via traditional news and audio-visual media, general Social Media, and proprietary media platforms. As noted in the above section on financing (2.5), the variance in the intensity and reach of CSO campaigns was interpreted by the public as indication of their external funding.



2.8.1- NEW MEDIA PLATFORMS

The mapping study reveals the highly effective usage of media platforms that emerged in affiliation with the popular uprising. These platforms have provided reliable time-sensitive information, using many digital and traditional news channels that countered the dominance of politically affiliated media.

2.8.2- GENERAL SOCIAL MEDIA

Social Media played a major role in de-monopolizing the established media outlets' control on the narrative in Lebanon. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and WhatsApp were the cornerstones of communication and awareness creation during the uprising, sustaining the social mobilization movement's local visibility from the beginning until the conclusion of the mapping study. Facebook was largely used by CSOs, activists and protesters to discuss political issues, organize, and coordinate among each other. Along with WhatsApp, it helped facilitate the logistics of the uprising. WhatsApp also allowed on-the-ground reporting of events.

2.8.3- INTERNATIONAL MEDIA

International and Arab media, such as Sky News, al Jazeera and al Arabia, provided large coverage of the protest movement, giving activists considerable airtime compared with what is usually allocated to Lebanese politicians.

2.9 ALLIANCES AND DIASPORA SUPPORT

Besides succeeding in usage of media for commanding public attention despite the overpowering role of establishment-affiliated media in Lebanon, CSOs garnered important support locally by forming alliances with legacy charities as well as old and rising NGOs. Additionally, significant external support came from the Lebanese diaspora, the ranks of which include expatriates and economic migrants in many developed countries and emerging markets as well as many descendants of earlier out-migration waves who continue to maintain links of identity with their homeland. The number of persons who consider themselves to be members of the Lebanese diaspora is a multiple of the resident population in Lebanon.



2.9.1- ALLIANCE WITH NGOS

CSOs have built liaisons and alliances with renowned and/or newly created NGOs. The social assistance and empowerment focuses of long-established charities made numerous of these organizations into natural allies of CSO demands for poverty relief, women's empowerment, and economic justice. Also, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and the August 2020 blast, political groups started forming NGOs to be able to better coordinate their relief and efforts on rebuilding. The immense need for social relief corresponded to the CSOs' focus on civil mobilization. According to our CSO survey, 24% of the sample may utilize their previously established or newly formed NGOs to advance their political endeavours.

2.9.2- SUPPORT BY ARTISTS AND THE YOUNG GENERATION

All the while the support of the popular uprising by artists and university students lacks formality and strict organization, CSOs were boosted by artists who came out in numbers in their support for the popular uprising. Although views found in the young generation span the whole breadth of the political and social spectrum, including allegiances with establishment parties, the young generation remains the backbone of the popular uprising. In this context, the increasing influence of CSOs that began with the popular uprising, was reflected in the breakthrough of the independent and secular representatives against the establishment supporters in several student council elections in late 2020. Voting results gave independents, 79% of the seats at AUB, 75% at USJ, 60% at LAU Beirut, 33% at LAU Jbeil, and 44% at RHU, which are unprecedented numbers.



2.9.3- DIASPORA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SUPPORT

On an international level, the mapping study revealed that the diaspora supporting the protesters has succeeded in exerting pressure on the international community to enact the necessary political and economic interventions that can save the country. They did so through networks of highly affluent and powerful Lebanese descendants in various parts of the world and were able to raise substantial relief funds and aid¹⁹. As a show of support for the popular uprising, the Lebanese diaspora also demonstrated in their respective countries against the Establishment.

¹⁹Undisclosed lobbying confirmed by a leading Lebanese newspaper owner, a key diaspora lobbyist, and an army veteran. The level of lobbying cannot be independently verified.

2.10 THE ELECTORAL MACHINE

Electoral fragmentation and different election laws have up to the time of this study put the Establishment at an insurmountable advantage, leaving not only independent candidates but even women candidates highly disadvantaged in general elections up to the most recent, 2018, parliamentary elections. On a technical and logistic level, the CSOs that have led election campaigns in the past (most notably the 2016 municipal and the 2018 general election) managed to build internal electoral machines and recruit experts in campaigning²⁰ These politically minded CSOs also today seem to be taking the election milestones seriously, while others remain reluctant due to their lack of organization and sustainable structures.



On a national scale, in 2018, the most prominent alternative coalition to run against the Establishment was represented mainly – but not solely - by a joint list called "Kollouna Watani" among which "Sabaa", "Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla", "LiBaladi" and others are included. This coalition gained approximately 45,000²¹ votes: only 2.5% of the total number of voters all over Lebanon, and 1.2% of the total number of registered voters. To many observers, this is not a promising result to build on for the upcoming elections of 2022. However, knowing that the average electoral threshold is approximately only 10,000 voters, and that the number of votes for independents was estimated at around 74,000 across Lebanon, such numbers could foreshadow a more encouraging outcome in the upcoming elections, which under the stipulations of the Constitution are due in mid-2022. We conclude that more efforts are needed, as the CSOs' electoral machines are relatively inexperienced compared to those of the prominent political factions (which are popularly referred to as "Bulldozers" by election experts).

²⁰Known to experts in the field and confirmed by CSO leaders during the interviews.

²¹The Pulse mapping study, based on the MOI website and disclosed numbers from the political factions' electoral machines. (+ or – 2000 votes)

²²The Pulse analytics detailed in section V.A of this mapping study

3. CSO SURVEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

3.1 PRESENCE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Social Media platforms were the main tools used by the sample of which 89% are present on Facebook, followed by 68% on Instagram and 59% on Twitter.²² 11% of CSOs are either sceptical or against embracing technology and thus absent from Social Media platforms. 54% of the sample is present on three Social Media platforms (Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook). This mapping study includes an analysis correlating the number of likes with the interactivity of the CSO. A more sophisticated model using specific metrics ranked the most active CSOs, the most popular, and the ones with the highest overall scores on Social Media.

3.2 POLITICAL VIEW ON A CIVIL STATE

The survey reveals a strong aspiration to a transition towards a Civil State, where “the evils of fanaticism and sectarianism that led to the country’s collapse would be stricken out and removed at the roots” as stated by one of the major leaders of a reputed coalition. In fact, the respondents of the 63-sample unanimously call for a “secular state”. However, the term “Civil State” resonates better with them, as they believe that it better illustrates the separation of state and religion. Those who consider themselves as left-wingers even condemn the use of religion by religious leaders to the benefit of some politicians, through indirect statements and speeches that influence the affiliation of their faithful.



3.3 POLITICAL VIEW ON NEUTRALITY AND BORDER DEMARCATION

Lebanon’s stance on regional conflicts is one of the most controversial political issues where dialogue is needed. The survey revealed that neutrality and border demarcation of the disputed land and maritime zone were largely approved by the respondents. 73% of the respondents say that Lebanon’s limited resources and small surface dictate that the country should distance itself from conflicts and wars in the region. On the other hand, while realizing the importance of a neutral Lebanon, 27% call the issue sensitive and say that it cannot be viewed in isolation from the regional context, thus the issues of neutrality and border demarcations should remain in the hands of the state.

²²The Pulse analytics detailed in section V.A of this mapping study

3.4 POLITICAL VIEW ON WEAPONS POSSESSION OUTSIDE STATE JURISDICTION

The surrender of all weapons to the state, which was stipulated in the Taif Agreement, has been subject to fierce controversy over the years. It must be noted here that this dispute is focused not on individual rights to bear arms but on the weapons and weapons systems controlled by the organization, mainly Hezbollah. Despite the complexity and delicacy of this hot topic, 92% of the sample say that disarming Hezbollah is a necessary step. Nevertheless, the views diverge when it comes to timing and mechanism; CSOs also differ in the use of terminologies.

This overwhelming opposition against weapons possession illustrates the impact that the popular uprising has had on Hezbollah and all other political factions. 38% of respondents represent two radically opposed standpoints, marking a departure from the widely held convictions: 30% of the CSOs are radically against the weapons, and 8% are radically supporting weapons possession. 62% of the respondents supported a moderate approach, saying they were in favour of the implementation of a national defence strategy, which is at this stage non-defined due to the lack of consensus among the Lebanese on this matter.



In our assessment, the fact that support of the national defence strategy approach is the majority view of CSOs, implies positively that they can form a strong community base of sovereignty advocates who can exert pressure towards a rapid implementation of the defence strategy and are best placed to play a moderating role and bridge the gap between the extremes. The survey demonstrated nuanced answers: 30% of the respondents are with the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on the Constitution and the resolutions of international legitimacy (UN). 42% support the disbanding of militia factions within the frame of a state-sponsored defence strategy; 20% believe in the “Resistance”, but also find it necessary to eventually incorporate “Resistance” arsenals into the Lebanese Armed Forces’ arsenal. The remaining 8% endorse Hezbollah’s right to keep their weapons with the argument that this is correlated with the region’s development.

3.5 POLITICAL VIEW ON EXPANDED ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

Regarding the implementation of the expanded administrative decentralization agreed upon in the Taif agreement, the results revealed the frustration felt by the sample towards the government's failure to provide basic services, mainly in the fields of health and social welfare. The implementation of efficient administrative reforms in their view would have helped lay the ground for a more productive and prosperous economy through decentralization and other constructive measures. Consequently, the survey exhibits that the respondents unanimously favour administrative decentralization.



3.6 POLITICAL VIEW ON ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN

As for the economic situation, the state's failure in ensuring a stable economic model over the past decade has pushed renowned economists, economy experts, and local consultancy firms closer towards the CSOs to jointly come up with economic solutions, often tailor-made to their own aspirations. Whereas establishment parties historically focused on communal identities of their electoral bases and not on economic party programs, a large sway of CSOs in the sample say they have developed such perspectives, with 43% of the respondents saying they have elaborated a detailed economic plan. 46% are engaged on a lighter scale with the economic challenges of the country. The proposed plans have been influenced by different ideologies ranging from communist-inspired proposals to liberal economic models, as well as some innovative solutions like green economy and smart economy. As of this mapping study's publishing, only 11% of the sample does not specifically address economic reform topics in their mission statement.

3.7 STRENGTH, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS ANALYSIS - SWOT

Based on all the above, a SWOT analysis was conducted as part of this mapping study to summarize our findings and to use the outcome as a base to move forward. (Section IV-3)

4. EXECUTIVE OUTLOOK

In 2022, Lebanon is expected to achieve democratic milestones, especially the Parliamentary, Municipal and Presidential elections scheduled to be held according to the constitutional deadlines. Are the Civil Society Organizations ready to shoulder such challenges in such a limited period?

In order to rise up to the expectations of the Lebanese and embrace a positive way forward before the old system digests the new political players, the mapping study concludes with three recommendations:

4.1 ESTABLISH A SUPREME COUNCIL

First, while keeping their individual identities, all Civil Society Organizations will benefit if they regroup or stand to expand their influence, and consequently, establish a supreme council for the popular uprising which will lay down a road map that positions them as a reliable alternative political coalition.

4.2 AGREE TO DISAGREE MODUS VIVENDI

For the above to succeed, the protesters ought to start by formulating an “Agree to Disagree” modus vivendi scheme, firstly to agree on what they are all fighting against; secondly, to agree on what they all have in common; hence, clearly defining the common beliefs and goals that unite them all. Thirdly, CSOs should agree on what they do not agree on. Conflict resolution as well as team and capacity building workshops should be conducted to optimize the benefits of such negotiations.

4.3 BUILD CREDIBILITY AND ALLIANCES

As the political economy of Lebanon worsens, and crucial social and economic needs have yet to be addressed while the time for election preparations is ticking away, it is vital to work on building credibility and creating synergy, extending collaboration and alliances with other political, social, and media stakeholders on the local, national, and international levels.



4.4 START CAMPAIGNING AND INFLUENCING POLICY MAKERS

CSOs should thoroughly study the current election law and all other relevant laws to formulate the adequate representation model and work closely on influencing policy makers toward transparent application of election laws and monitoring. They should also share with the Lebanese diaspora the political agenda, set forth a coherent political plan for the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2022 and exert international pressure towards having monitored elections by foreign institutions.

4.5 CONSTRUCT AN INTEGRATED ELECTORAL MACHINE

Lastly, they should campaign and build a centralized and integrated electoral machine to revitalize the election process and endow Lebanese politics with a new meaning, thus gradually saving the country from sectarian polarization and political stalemate. They must present themselves as “The Alternative”, confronting the establishment parties in the ballot boxes, and not merely as a “virtual” opposition.



5. CONCLUSION

Will the newly nascent CSOs acquire the right tools and expertise to shoulder the challenges and obstacles they will face? Will they succeed in having a breakthrough in the next democratic milestones? Will they manage to forge political alliances that will reinforce their position during the elections?

Many questions arise in terms of the path CSOs will draw for themselves as well as the political developments that will shape the entire political scene. Civil Society Organizations have an unprecedented and serious opportunity for changing and redefining the political scene in Lebanon by expanding on their democratic representation in the next elections. This formula might seem far-fetched, but is achievable with the proper awareness, acquired skills and persistence.

AWRALEBANONCHAN
USTAINABILITYSECURE
SINGAGAINMOVINGNO
VERNANCETOLERAN
CHANGESUSTAINABIL
ARETHEPULSELEBAN
VERSITYEQUITYJUSTI
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REEDOMDEVELOPME
CENGAGEMENTFUTU
LAWJUSTICESOLIDARI
LEBANESEREVOLUTIO
NGEPROTESTFREEDU
AWRALEBANONCHAN
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II- PROJECT OVERVIEW

1. CONTEXT

Lebanon has a diverse and active civil society that includes NGOs, movements, syndicates, coalitions and much more.

CSOs experienced continuous shifts during the past. Indeed, before the civil war (between 1960 and 1975) the founded CSOs played important roles in steering away from sectarianism, instead endorsing non-confessional and non-political agendas. During the civil war, they operated free from any government interference and developed a high degree of political autonomy. However, after the political assassinations from 2005 onward, the CSO's development became limited, reflecting the power and influence of political factions in the country. This situation started to change in 2011 with the start of the Arab Spring. The 2011 Lebanese popular uprising were calling for political reforms, particularly against confessionalism in Lebanon. In 2015, thousands of Lebanese rallied under "the garbage crisis movement" in response to the government's failure to find solutions to the waste crisis that was plaguing the country.



On October 17, 2019, Lebanon witnessed an unprecedented popular uprising sparked by frustration, anger and disappointment at the continuous failures of successive governments, the corruption rooted out among the political class, the injustice prevailing within society, and the utter apathy of those in power towards citizens' basic rights and interests. These systemic problems mainly stem from:

- **The sectarian political system**, which fosters clientelism and corruption, and a lack of trust among the different communities.
- **The lack of accountability**, due to a corrupted or non-independent judiciary, and widely practiced favouritism and nepotism within the public sector.
- **The lack of transparency** within the various institutions and how they operate.

- :
- **The exploitation of state resources for illicit enrichment**, associated with excessive, non-transparent government expenditures and questionable financial engineering schemes.
 - **The financial crisis**, partly due to the monetary and exchange rate policies adopted against the dollar.
 - **The windfall economy**, based on rents rather than production, which led to a lack of job opportunities, low wages, and weak social protection.
 - **The ineffectiveness of public services**, felt in every sector, from education, healthcare, electricity and water supply, to infrastructure, public transportations, waste management, and urban planning...
 - **The lack of state support and social protection systems** left the most vulnerable groups helpless and entirely marginalized, among whom are the refugees, the foreign workers, and the stateless persons.
 - **The inequality between men and women**, which deprives women from granting the Lebanese nationality to their children if married to non-Lebanese individuals on one hand, and on the other hand—in some religions—their rights to inheritance, divorce, and custody are debatable. This may indirectly discourage them from being active in the public sector
 - **The environmental degradation and pollution**, due to a total lack of effective environmental policies.

The uprising led to the emergence of many CSOs manifesting their wish to build a state free from corruption and impose a government capable of enacting reforms based on transparency and accountability. However, many of those CSOs could not manage to uphold their progress. This was mainly due to the government's suppression towards activists. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic had emerged, making the situation even harder for those organizations.

On the 4th of August 2020, Beirut witnessed what was referred to by BBC News as one of the worst non-nuclear explosions in history claiming the lives of more than 200 victims²³ and leaving thousands of houses damaged. The government in our, and most citizens' perception, was to blame for this tragedy, which refuelled the anti-corruption uprising in the country. Thus, a series of protests by families victimized by the Beirut Blast, people who lost their livelihoods, retirees who lost their life savings, and activists from all corners demanding relief from the disastrous economic policy inertia sustains the assessment that the sentiment and views of many Lebanese have changed. In the short-term political scenario of the Establishment's crisis response, people are clearly disappointed with the caretaker government and are looking for change. How deep the desire

²³UNHCR. Briefing. (2020)


for change runs and how far it will force a revision of the legacy systems, will be most informative to observe for both the stakeholders in the popular uprising and the concerned analysts of these developments, including “The Pulse”.

2. CSO POOL VS SAMPLE

Throughout the wide mapping study, we highlighted the activities of a pool of 420 CSOs in the uprisings, out of which we have retained a sample of 63 due to their political aspirations and their will to enforce changes and reforms and based on the matrix highlighted in *(Figure 1 in section III.2 of this mapping study)*

3. PROJECT GOALS

This project will serve as the baseline to get better acquainted with all the old and new organizations that have newly emerged or evolved in the context of the popular uprising in the last few years. This will help us know more about their objectives, views, and weight in the political sphere.




The three main objectives of this project are:

- 1- Identifying and analysing the pool of 420 CSOs operating on Lebanese territory, based on their prominence and effectiveness in making a difference in policy discourse, to come up with a sample of 63 CSOs
- 2- Uncovering commonalities among the CSOs in the sample. Developing emphases of mutual objectives based on shared values, in order to join hands and collaborate , creating a synergy and thus bolstering a unified alliance
- 3- Providing CSOs with a tool that will help strengthen their common points and positions as well as foster inclusivity and efficient dialogue.
- 4- Providing recommendations for the way forward, based on the above findings

4. TIMELINE AND MILESTONES

In the first post-conflict decade of the 1990s, external crises and political disruptions took center stage, however, and localized uprisings such as the hunger revolution headed by former Hezbollah secretary general Sheikh Toufeili, were horizontal political disruptions. The 2000s ushered in a new era characterized by perpetual challenges and disruptions. The below table showcases the main milestones of the CSOs' evolution (*Table 1 here below*):

4.1 TABLE 1 - BEFORE OCTOBER 2019



²⁴World bank group – Lebanon Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 2016 – Eric Le Borgne and Thomas J. Jacobs

4.2 OCTOBER 17 POST-UPRISING EVENTS

The outbreak of the popular uprising was initiated by an accumulation of shocks starting with a series of forest fires in the Chouf district and other areas across Lebanon towards the end of summer 2019. Although such fires have been common occurrences in the country, the 2019 blazes were extreme in displacing hundreds of civilians while the government failed to deploy its firefighting helicopters due to lack of maintenance. Thus, the country had to rely on the help of neighbouring countries like Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

In parallel, the economic situation continued to deteriorate, as demonstrated by continually contracting GDP per capita, reduced deposit inflows, staggering public deficits and debt to GDP ratios that were among the world's worst.

Subsequent to the deterioration of dollar inflows and erosion of depositor confidence, the country fell into a liquidity crisis and hard currency shortage, which forced the central bank to announce an economic strategy that promised to provide US Dollars to companies importing first necessities such as fuel, medicine, and wheat.



As the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri struggled with the harsh fiscal outlook and non-credible deficit reduction promises a cabinet session was convened on October 17, 2019. It proposed a catalogue of measures including collection of added fiscal revenue by way of imposing 0.20\$ charges on VoIP calls. The measure was insignificant in comparison to other, better-known proposals such as increasing value-added tax (VAT) from 11% to 12%²⁵.

Within hours of these new proposals, CSOs called for hundreds of civil activists to hit the streets in protest against the proposed taxes.

The popular uprising burst on all the Lebanese territories and near Lebanese embassies worldwide, calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister for his failure in halting the deterioration of the country's economic situation.


Below are the post-uprising events: *(Table 2)*

²⁵Aljazeera. *Cash-strapped Lebanon plans to charge for WhatsApp calls.* (October 17, 2019)

Table 2- Post-events October 17, 2019 Popular Uprising

October 29 2019	Resignation of Prime Minister Hariri	Protesters swept the streets few hours after PM Hariri Resigned celebrating the occasion
December 29 2019	Designation of New Prime Minister Hassan Diab	Right after the designation, protesters hit the streets protesting against Diab's nomination
January 21 2020	Formation of a "Technocrat" cabinet	Protesters accused the political factions of being involved in the formation of the cabinet
February 21 2020	The first case of COVID-19 was recorded	First measures to combat the COVID-19 were taken a week after the first case appeared.
March 9 2020	Default payment of Eurobonds	
March 15 2020	Emergency State announced	Closure of all land borders, seaports and the airport until March 29 due to COVID-19
March 27 2020	Clearing Protesters' camps	Protester camps were cleared by Lebanese Security Forces from Beirut Central District - COVID Claim
June 18 2020	Resignation of the advisor for Lebanon's Minister of Finance during the IMF negotiations	Protesters blocked several roads which led to an escalation between them, and the security forces followed by arrests of activists. The Big Downtown popular uprising resumed almost every Saturday. Formulations of New CSOs expanded.
June 29 2020	Resignation of the Finance Ministry Director General and Negotiator with IMF	
August 3 2020	Resignation of Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti as he feared that the country was turning to a failed state due to the inability of the country to enact reforms	During the day, protesters entered by force the Headquarter of the Ministry of Energy due to power outages in several areas
August 4 2020	Beirut Blast: a horrific blast at the Port of Beirut claimed the lives of hundreds and wounded thousands	CSOs were mobilized to humanitarian and social relief
August 8 2020	Almost 190 dead, 6,500 injured, and few missing, and 300,000 people homeless, \$15 billion in direct damages. 50,000 houses, 9 major hospitals and 178 schools damaged. (Reuters)	Protesters stormed several Ministry offices such as the Ministries of Economy, Environment, and Energy. Protesters were fired at by security forces using metal pellets, wounding more than 250 persons.
August 9 2020	Lebanese officials stepped down, among which 3 Ministers and 8 Parliament Members	Angry protesters attempted to break into the Parliament building and were dispersed by security forces using tear gas. By the end of the day, 3 Ministers and 8 PMs resigned.
August 10 2020	Resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab who became interim prime minister until the formation of a new government	Protesters maintained their position and persisted in their popular uprising. They rallied to form alliances and impose themselves as a solution toward the creation of a transitional government
August 31 2020	Designation of Prime Minister Mustapha Adib	President Emanuel Macron visit to Lebanon

September 26 - 2020	Failing to form a cabinet, Mustapha Adib stepped down as he encountered deadlocks in nominating someone to handle the Ministry of Finance	
October 17 2020	Celebration of the popular uprising first year anniversary	Roads were blocked, protesters gathered in Martyr's Square, others marched next to the Central bank and gathered later near the Port. They demanded the President to step down
October 22 2020	Saad Hariri was re-appointed as Prime Minister after almost a year following his resignation	
January 8 2021	Total lockdown	
January 25 2021	Popular uprisings are back again mainly in the North - Tripoli	Following the extended lockdown, angry protesters took to the streets causing heavy clashes with security forces mainly in the Northern part of Lebanon – Tripoli. Popular uprisings have been occurring on a daily basis since January 25, 2021.
February 4 2021	Assassination of Lokman Slim (Lebanese publisher and independent social and political activist)	The murder of Lokman Slim once again stirred anger towards an incompetent, corrupt and powerless state that has not been able to bring forward any criminal for any previous committed crimes so far, reason for which several CSOs and some political factions held an emergency meeting calling activists for unity against the current criminal political setting.





III- QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

1. SEGMENTATION OF CSOS

Civil society organizations can vary in type and scope, from organic grassroots movements to artists and well-established political factions. Based on the data collected from the pool (420 CSOs), we were able to categorise the CSOs that are currently active in Lebanon as follows:

1.1 GRASSROOTS

Grassroots mobilization was commonly seen during the October 17 uprising, occurring naturally as individuals from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and different age groups met on the same streets, mingling and coordinating on the spot.

1.2 NGOs

They contribute to promoting civic engagement, citizenship, human rights, environmental solutions, and sustainable development initiatives. Many NGOs are politically affiliated, while others are new in the political landscape, and have emerged after the Beirut blast.²⁶

1.3 POLITICAL GROUPS/NEWLY ESTABLISHED PARTIES

CSOs in Lebanon are a microcosm of the Lebanese society and the political landscape. Many among them include members affiliated with political factions or mere supporters, who joined the CSO to express their anger. The right wing/left wing political conflict within the Lebanese population is clearly reflected in the CSO political mapping. The popular uprising has revived the egalitarian old leftist dream in certain people; though a minority on the political scene, their presence in the uprising is quite significant. Some speeches calling for class struggle were heard during the popular uprising, and anti-capitalistic messages seen on the facades of luxury boutiques destroyed by some protesters. Many CSOs in this left-wing category are affiliated with the global economic doctrines of communism. The above-mentioned right-leaning groups included part of the bourgeoisie, traditionalists, and independents. Previous supporters of traditional Lebanese political factions (Future Movement, Hezbollah, Free Patriotic Movement) joined the popular uprising, in addition to supporters of the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb party, and the Islamist movements²⁷, who gathered from different regions to take part in the uprising²⁸. Amidst the popular uprising, new political entities were formed: some of these newly formed groups boasted

²⁶More details in the Terminologies Section

²⁷The Pulse field officer.

²⁸Refer to Terminologies Section

complete independence, others closely coordinated with foreign parties and forces. Some groups within the popular uprising are focusing on one topic that they emphasize above all others, such as recovery of illicit wealth, whereas others insist on all-encompassing system change, Syndicates, Professional Associations, and Labour Groups.

These include the Order of Physicians, the Order of Engineers, the Bar Association, independent professionals, employee groups, journalists, university professors, and other professionals, all of whom were protesting in front of the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers building, the headquarters of unions and various government ministries, among others. These groups have been quite active in suggesting alternative policies and proposing solutions to the socio-economic crisis. Throughout the uprising, businesses and restaurant owners were supporting protesters with donations and supplies. Alternative associations of journalists and media were created and also, a group of lawyers. This legal collective, “The Lawyers’ Committee for the Defence of Protesters”, offered their services, with the support of non-profit research and advocacy organizations to defend people arrested during the crackdown. Similarly, special groups were created to follow up on depositors’ rights.



1.4 ARTISTS

The Lebanese artistic community encompasses the contemporary art community, art centres, singers, actors, painters, photographers, art directors, to name but a few disciplines, who view arts and culture as parts of a broader civic, political, economic, and ideological context, and as tools that can help capture the historical moments Lebanon is witnessing. The most prominent group among them in context of the popular uprising was “Tajamoh’ al Fananin Min Ajel el Taghyeer” (meaning The Gathering of Artists for Change) It included singers, dancers, musicians, painters and more. Many exhibitions were organized during the popular uprising at Martyr’s Square in Beirut and in many regions contributed to spreading positive vibes that enriched the whole experience, and to arousing the interest of the international community as well as the Lebanese diaspora. Groups of sportsmen and wellbeing practitioners also shared in this effort and contributed in promoting the protests; namely through Yoga sessions that were held in various regions, such as Beirut and Aley, and which were performed in the middle of the roads as a form of peaceful protest.

1.5 STUDENTS AND ALUMNI ASSOCIATIONS

These groups gather young people from different student clubs in different universities: The American University of Beirut, Notre-Dame University, Saint-Joseph University, the Lebanese American University, and the Lebanese University, among others.

1.6 SCHOLARS, OPINION LEADERS, POLICY MAKERS, RESEARCH NGOS

This category of people was taking charge of coordinating with other groups within the popular uprising. They were also organizing daily discussions in the different squares in Beirut and other regions, addressing issues related to politics, law, socio-economic policies, and human rights. They spoke about people's concerns, proposed solutions and alternatives, and analysed the government propositions.



1.7 ARMY VETERANS

Retired Lebanese soldiers, also known as Army Veterans, joined the protests at the beginning against the government's decision to decrease and abolish certain benefits for veterans, including cutting their pensions and delaying their end of service payments. As the uprising escalated, many CSOs backed them, allowing them to play an important role during the first few weeks. When a successor to Prime Minister Saad Hariri was chosen and negotiated cabinet formation in January 2020, the new Prime Minister Hassan Diab attempted to communicate with leaders of the Army Veteran Groups offering them seats in the upcoming cabinet²⁹. However, when the popular uprising's demands started shifting towards the disarmament of Hezbollah, this took a toll on the veteran group as points of views diverged on this topic. At this stage, many generals, like General Chamel Roukouz tried to play a role in regrouping them, but their efforts were in vain. At a later stage, many subgroups emerged, each in their respective region. One can identify the following: "National Veterans Authority", "National Rescue Movement", "Associations of Veterans of the Armed Forces", and indirectly the "October 17 Front". Other related CSOs are more involved in research.³⁰

²⁹As shared with us by one of the leading Army Generals siding with the revolution

³⁰Interviews with Gen Nader, Gen Hamadeh and other security key figures. "Revolution Document". (May 16th, 2020)



1.8 FEMINIST COLLECTIVES, MINORITY AND GENDER ADVOCACY GROUPS

This category includes advocates of human rights fighting against discrimination in the Lebanese society. They advanced anti-discrimination and feminist agendas and voiced the vulnerable communities' needs while participating in protest of solidarity with women, people with special needs, domestic workers, and the LGBTIQ community through marches and rallies.



1.9 REGIONAL GROUPS

On the level of Lebanese districts, regional groups formed in various areas, including but not limited to Tripoli, Zgharta, Saida, Nabatieh, Tyr, Hasbaya, Aley, El Iklim, Zahle, Baalbek, Jounieh, Jal el Dib, Jbeil, and Halba. The list extends further; however, these are the most prominent cities and villages where protesters staged demonstrations regularly in "Plazas", or at least commenced their gatherings at known meeting points.

1.10 INDIVIDUAL FIGURES

Some personalities worked solo to uplift their profile and calibre, thus presenting themselves as the alternatives to current heads of public offices.

1.11 DIASPORA

From the popular uprising's first spontaneous protest on October 17, 2019 Lebanese people across the world have joined in solidarity, whether by peaceful popular uprisings in their city, mostly in front of Lebanese embassies, or by lobbying and sponsoring. Like the popular uprising, they started as spontaneous gatherings, but quickly got themselves organized in an impressive chain of communication and coordination. Social Media was enough to unite them.

1.12 LOBBY GROUPS

Lobbying and pressure groups used the popular uprising as an opportunity for advocating policies and choices at the social and economic levels. Their actions concentrated on through the implementation of innovative methods of influence on the decision-making centres, both locally and internationally.

2. COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES

Interest-based initiatives were formed, each coalition gathering many CSOs under one umbrella, especially those who share common views and goals. This mainly aimed at bringing together and amplifying the collective resources and efforts, as well as installing the synergy needed to face the corrupt system.

The most well-known ones of these coalitions and alliances are listed in table 3. None of these seem to be impactful enough as a coalition, some expired the day after, and some like “Drabzine” remained an efficient platform for strong coordination and promotion. The prominent purpose of regrouping components of the popular uprising under these alliances was to attempt to insinuate to both external and internal decision makers that one leader is capable of uniting the popular uprising, therefore positioning themselves as the suitable leader of the uprising. However, these efforts did not reach the point of leading the entire popular uprising on the political level but instead led to internal disputes, power struggles, and the birth of multiple new CSOs.


Table 3 - CSOs Major Coalitions List

MAJOR COALITIONS LIST			
	COALITION NAME	DATE	NOTES
1	Revolution Coordination Committee هيئة تنسيق الثورة	Oct-19	Martyr Square
2	Revolution Coordination Commission هيئة تنسيق الثورة	Dec-8-19	Smallville Hotel
3	Field Group Alliance تحالف مجموعات الأرض	2019	WhatsApp Group
4	Daleel Thawra دليل ثورة	2019	Online Group
5	Civic National Front الجبهة المدنية الوطنية	July-15-2020	Open Platform
6	The Initiative - Drabzine Oct. 17 المبادرة - درابزين ١٧ تشرين	Aug-20-2020	Open Platform
7	Civic Front Alliance تحالف الجبهة المدنية	Aug-30-2020	Martyr Square
8	Electoral Groups of the Candidates Council of the Revolution المجموعات الناقية لمجلس مرشحي مجموعات من الثورة	Sep-18-2020	Hayat Arslan Initiative
9	National Rescue Initiative المبادرة الانقاذية الوطنية	Sep-23-2020	Melhem Khalaf Initiative
10	National Rescue Conference المؤتمر الوطني للانقاذ	Oct-26-2020	Le Royal Hotel
11	University Students Support Coalition Tuition Fees	Dec-20	Online
12	January 6 Front جبهة ٦ كانون الأول	Jan-6-2021	Unofficial Public Coalition with Lebanese Kataeb Party

Additionally, “The Pulse” gathered a scoring scheme, based on informed sources and popular uprising keys, in addition to other public sources, and created a Matrix of CSOs/Coalitions for assessment purposes. (Figure 1 below).

As we write this mapping study, a newly established coalition was formed upon the assassination of Lokman Slim, on February 6, 2021. “The National Meeting of Forces from the popular uprising in Rejection of Political Assassination” was not included in the list, a similar one “Nahwal Watan”, and a third “Judicial Independence Coalition”, are all established after February 7th, 2021 or are still under formulation. It is worth noting that “The Alliance” which has been under-construction for months is a political coalition that all protesters are aspiring for.

Figure 1- Coalitions versus CSO Matrix



Coalitions depicted above	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	
Lihaqqi			x		x	x					x		o	x	x	x	x	x	x	11
Minteshreen					x	x	x		x		x		x		x		x	x		9
Aamieh 17 October					x				x		x	x	x			x	x	X		8
Beirut Madinati					x				x				x		x	x	x	x	x	8
Massirat Watan					x	x	x		x					x		x		x		7
ReLebanon			x		x	x	x		x		x			x						7
Aan Haqqaq Dafeh					x	x					x			x	x		x			6
Loubnan Yantafed		x			x								x		x	x	x			6
Marsad Shaabi Li Mouharabat El Fasad					x	x					x		x			x		x		6
Hawa Teshreen					x						x		x			x	x			5
Liqaqa Teshreen									x		x	x					x	x		5
National Bloc			x		x								x				x		x	5
Tahalof Watani	x		x		x				x								x			5
Civic National Front		x							x			x		x			x			5
Taqqadom							x				x	x		x				x		5
Ana Khat Ahmar							x					x				x	x			4
Green Party	x	x						x									x			4
Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla					x										x			x	x	4
Rebels Souwar 17												x			x	x	x			4
Revolutionary Bloc											x		x	x			x			4
Shabab Dod Nizam	x				x											x			x	4
Street								x					x		x		x			4
Thawrat Loubnan		x						x					x				x			4
Beirut Revolutionaries					x									x		x	x			4
Retired Military - General Georges Nader	x	x												x			x			4
Sabaa Party	x													x			x		x	4
Takatol Ouaa								x						x		x	x			4
Ana El Arar								x									x	x		3
Bala Esm					x									x			x			3
Harakat El Chaab	x	x															x			3
Madraset El Mouchaghibin					x											x		x		3
Majmouaat Shabeb El Masref											x			x		x				3
United For Lebanon	x	x															x			3
Waey	x	x															x			3
Kafeh														x		x			X	3
Mada											x			x		x				3

Coalitions depicted above	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	
Thawra Unsa								x						x			x			3
October 17 Front		x															x			2
Al Mountadayat														x		x				2
Civil Society Table of Dialogue								x									x			2
Kantari Group																x	x			2
Lajnat El Difah Aan El Moutazahirin – (Protester Defence committee)			x														x			2
Nabad El Janoub El Mountafed											x	x								2
New Lebanese Party								x											x	2
Tajamoh Isti’adat al Dawla		x															x			2
Depositors Union														x		x				2
Haraket El Waii									x					x						2
Komsan Bid														x			x			2
Troisième Voix Pour Le Liban								x						x						2
National Rescue Movement - General Chamel Roukoz		x												x						2
National Veterans Authority		x												x						2
10452 Party																	x			1
Houras El Madina – (City Guards)																	x			1
Kulluna Irada					x															1
Regional Forum for consultancy and Studies														x						1
Right of Speech														x						1
Sovereign Forum														x						1
3rd Republic														x						1
Bidayat Watan														x						1
Center 17 For Research														x						1
Loubnan El Risala														x						1
Mihaniyat Mihaniyoun Handasa														x						1
Pyramid Lebanon														x						1



3. DEMANDS OF THE CSOS

All CSOs believe that only the implementation of the following multi-point demand list will pull Lebanon out of its crisis and help it reach the set objective³¹:

1. The resignation of the government (at the start of the popular uprising)
2. The formation of a transitional salvation government, whose members are independent and impartial experts
3. The adoption of a new electoral law, free of sectarian restrictions and guaranteeing proper representation
4. Early parliamentary elections
5. A transparent and productive public sector, free of clientelism and corruption, and guaranteeing a transparent system for public tenders
6. The establishment of an independent judiciary, which will work towards recovering looted public funds and penalize corruption in all its forms
7. The implementation of an economic rescue plan, including financial, monetary and tax reforms, without imposing a heavy burden on the middle and lower classes
8. The restructuring of public debt
9. Banking sector reform, which should include the lifting of banking secrecy, the taxation of profits, and the resignation of the governor of Banque du Liban
10. The reform of social and economic policies, which should encompass the health and social care systems, and the protection of the rights of marginalized groups
11. The adoption of laws guaranteeing gender equality, including the right for women to grant the Lebanese citizenship to their children
12. The implementation of reform policies regarding the natural and built environment, including the adoption of environmental regulations, and the development of urban planning policies.

³¹Collected during the interviews and through publicly available CSO demand papers

4. GOALS OF THE CSOs


The common goals that unite all CSOs can be summarized as follows³²:

1. The emergence of a Civil State
2. The formation of a responsible and honest government
3. The enforcement of the rule of law
4. A sustainable economy
5. A trusted management of the banking sector
6. The emergence of a state that protects social and economic rights
7. The respect and protection of the rights of marginalized groups
8. Gender equality
9. A protected natural environment
10. An all-inclusive urban plan.

5. GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CSOS

CSOs are spread nationwide. For instance, out of the 420 CSOs included in this mapping study, 113 are directly linked to their respective regions and governorates (mohafazat). We used a simple metric, i.e., the CSOs' names, for this association, which provided us with approximate data on their area of activity. We were able to do so as they are all simply called "Protesters of" followed by the name of the village or city where they are active. These are distributed as follows – (Figure 2). Please note that the governorate administrative organization has been reshuffled. We used the old governorate distribution in our analysis.


Figure 2- Distribution of the Regional CSOs among Mohafazat – Original list of 420



As for the survey, the below figure (Figure 3) displays the geographic location in which the sample (63 CSOs) are mostly active. By choice our sample has eliminated regional CSOs, and only accommodated a few for sampling purposes.

³²Collected during the interviews and through publicly available CSO demand papers


Figure 3- Pilot CSOs Geographical scope of work



6. CSOs FINANCING

Although 83% of the sample (63 CSOs) claim to rely on self-financing or to have no expenses to finance in the first place, 17% admit to receiving significant funding, up to several million dollars, from regional, international and Lebanese donors. The extensive campaigns and tools used during the uprising such as branding, Social Media boosting, TV commercials, prime media presence, costs of supplies, logistics and crowd mobilization resources represent a likely indicator of such funding. Based on either the extravagant or the modest campaign tools used, CSOs are perceived by the public as either funded by undisclosed entities or self-financed³³.

Figure 4 - Financing



³³As collected by us through interviews with CSOs representatives

7. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE CSOS

The October 17th popular uprising is decentralized yet harmoniously spread across the entire country, with no central leadership. It mainly consists of cross-regional coordination using new communication technologies in a decentralized system.

Activists successfully managed to bridge geographical and class divides as well as combine between offline and online activism. They activated a hybrid network to facilitate collective actions. According to respondents of this survey, who are leading many of these groups, about 700 WhatsApp groups exist, in which respondents range from 20 to 200 members per group. Actually only 11% of the sample have physical headquarters³⁴. This structure was very beneficial in solidifying the non-homogeneous movement, as it gave the popular uprising enough space to grow big and fast. However, the drawback of this system manifested itself as inefficiency in swift decision making or in initiating big projects, due to a difficulty in relying on committed members.

In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that the dissolution of these CSOs is as easy as their formation. WhatsApp coordination has become so popular that certain high-ranking members of these CSOs seem to believe that managing a team is the same as running a WhatsApp group, and this is leading to a highly unstable support base.

Slightly more than half of the surveyed CSOs (51% of the sample) remained unregistered, and prefer to keep a low profile organizational structure and simplify the administration process, like “Lihaqqi”. The other half of the sample (22% of the sample) aspire to register as political factions, like “Minteshreen”, who present themselves as the alternative to the Establishment. The former keeps a decentralized format, while the latter has a well-structured hierarchy. The below graph (Figure 5) depicts the registration status and level of interest in registration of the CSO sample.


Figure 5 - CSOs Official Registration Status



³⁴As collected by us through interviews with CSOs representatives


Only 27% of the sample under study is officially registered at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. (Figure 6 Below)

Figure 6- Distribution according to CSOs official Status




When we tried to gauge the approximate time the CSOs launched their activities, we noticed that there were no accurate answers. The following graph (Figure 7 below) depicts the years during which their work started, whether officially or unofficially.

Figure 7 - CSOs Creation Period



Subsequent to the October 17 uprising, 56% of the sample CSOs (63 CSOs) were newly created. (Figure 8 - Below)³⁵

Figure 8 - CSOs Creation Period vis a vis October 17 Popular Uprising



The above percentages entail an element of fluidity. In fact, most of the groups emerged in 2011 from the original groups “The people want to overthrow the sectarian system”, “The Way of the Bees” and “Bringing down the system of armed sectarian domination – for a liberal Establishment”. In 2015, these groups reshaped themselves in light of the waste management crisis, trimmed their memberships, split, and gave birth to “You Stink”, “We Want Accountability”, “Youth against the System” and others.

Later that year, “Beirut Madinati”, and others joined the club. They took part in the municipal elections and were backed up by the three above-mentioned CSOs. Their efforts were successful by drawing attention to the social mobilizations on the municipal level in the conurbation of the Lebanese Capital; however, instead of capitalizing on this achievement, the groups split into many entities. In preparation for the 2018 Parliamentary Elections, “Libaladi”, “Sah”, “You Stink”, “Sabaa”, and others unified their efforts under “Koullouna Watani”. Most of the “Libaladi” members used to be “Beirut Madinati” members.

This metamorphosis is considered by many as part of the activists’ evolution. Some observers believe this phenomenon to be a weakness, while others see it as a sign of maturity and a means of gaining experience in a country like Lebanon. The above examples are only a few among many samples; we can notice many similar transformative evolutions in other CSO groups. It is also worth mentioning that “Baladi – Baldati – Baladiyati” and “LADE”, founded in 1997 and 1996 respectively, are a softer and more reformist but equally important version of the latter CSOs that proclaimed the same reform goals in conjunction with demands for political change.

These metamorphoses seem to be a never-ending process, some CSOs by mid-2021 have been changing visions and missions, examples being “Ana Khat Ahmar” and “Massiret Watan”. Some even revealed in their conversations with “The Pulse” that they might reinvent themselves and change their names.

³⁵Reached from desk research, interviews and MOIM data



8. BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

8.1 A STATE OF FEAR

Amid daily threats, protesters have been living in a constant state of fear when conducting their activities, due to fears for their personal security.

During our interviews with CSO leaders, they confirmed that the state's institutions, their thugs, and even the judicial system, have all come together to serve the political factions in power. In the perception of CSO leaders, these endeavours aimed to silence the opposing voices of the civil society activists. Disturbingly, the actions taken by anti-uprising factions included a myriad of means and escalating degrees of violence according to the CSO leaders. Activists were being systematically called in for questioning, undergoing humiliating arrests, and facing prosecution, they say. They were also forced to sign legal agreements vowing to never speak up against the political powers, among other things. Wide intimidation campaigns were used, from physical assault on activists in public places, to kidnapping, torturing, and assassinations etc. On the virtual level, the digital armies of the political powers orchestrated attacks against activists on various Social Media platforms, namely Twitter. Highlighting the randomness of attacks and prosecutions, even Facebook posts have been cited as reasons to be called in for questioning or to be assaulted. SMEX is one of Lebanon's Civil Society Organizations with the mission of recording attacks on online freedom of speech. By its assessment, such attacks have witnessed an exponential surge, with the number of incidents recorded in 2019 four times higher than the ones recorded in 2017³⁶.

The "Legal Agenda", a Civil Society Organization that takes up advocacy from a legal perspective, published a report about the crackdown between October 17, 2019 (the start of the popular uprising) and April 15, 2020 (the date of the COVID-19 lockdown enforcement). They found that at least 967 people were arrested in connection with the popular uprising. 58 of which were minors and 46 were non-Lebanese nationals. From April 16 to June 30, 2020; an additional 208 people were arrested³⁷. This state of fear and insecurity within the civil society ranks was worsened by the increasing number of infiltrators, pro-protest thugs, and "fifth column" agents of the Establishment, who were implanted among them, and in many cases contributed to their arrest. As this mapping study was prepared its first draft analysis in February 2021, the country was shaken over by storm with the news of the assassination of Lokman Slim, political activist and renowned Lebanese researcher. Pending the outcome of the investigation, Slim's murder was one of the latest in a series of incidents that on one hand shook the protesters' courage; but on the other hand, increased and piled up their anger towards this system. On the quantitative level, this fear was clearly evident when activists were asked to fill in some personal info in the questionnaire. They are described in the "Limitation Section" of this mapping study.

³⁶SMEX Report. *Analysing Freedom of Expression Online in Lebanon*.

³⁷Open Democracy.net. (October 16th, 2020).

8.2 LACK OF LEADERSHIP

Since its emergence, the popular uprising, has been described as spontaneous, impulsive and leaderless³⁸. Despite this, it embraces a wide representation of scholars, activists and opinion leaders actively contributing to its organization. In this leaderless approach the popular uprising is a near replica of the yellow jacket movement across France, whereby protesters have demonstrated that crowds can exert power and influence as much as an individual leader.

This model has been challenged under different perspectives:

■ A leaderless movement is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it provides more security and flexibility, shields the protesters against intimidation, threats and blackmail by the Establishment, facilitates coordination and organization through unconventional channels, enhances team spirit, and develops a sense of belonging and a strong identity for each group member.



■ On the other hand, the fact of being leaderless could be linked to a need for more charisma, and a deficiency in role models and highly visible personalities. This puts the resilience of the movement in the long run into question. Effectively, an absence of clear and successful leadership leads to a lack of a unifying program that rallies the different CSOs together towards a common cause. It also nurtures egocentrism by reinforcing the “we are all leaders” mentality, which pushes activists to compete with each other for influence, and to seek power and authority. All of this ultimately creates a lack of accountability and a power vacuum due to a lack of teamwork and proper command. This consequently leads to late decision making and friction between members. Also, the desire for leadership is fundamentally rooted in Lebanese society, as it gives a sense of security, reassurance, and satisfies a deep need to belong. In fact, the Lebanese culture lacks a genuine national identity, which puts one’s country before any ethnic or religious affiliation. A leader or key figure is not needed just to speak to the public, but also to steer and motivate the masses by inspiration, and appeal to them. This “No Leader” endeavour is a major detriment in elections.

³⁸Fanack. *Lebanon's Leaderless Uprising Facing Possible Stalemate*. (December 3, 2019).

8.3 INFLATED SENSE OF SELF-WORTH

Shying away from taking a leadership position has produced an amplified sense of self-worth, dubbed by people in the popular uprising as “ego”.

This phenomenon has caused them difficulty in uniting under one leadership that might be perceived as representing the popular uprising.

This elevated sense of self-worth is evidenced by the lack of coordination and agreement between different segments on specific issues. It has caused a constant migration of members who leave one CSO only to join or create other ones, saying they have no tolerance for the monopolization of decision-making in what is meant to be a democratic political group.

This so called “ego” is being amplified every day by media exposure and high levels of boosted Social Media engagement. Some of the groups became quite attached to the branded identity they created for themselves, to the extent that they overlooked the main objectives of the uprising. It was also greatly augmented by the heroic confrontation with security forces or militia thugs as well as the meetings they were invited to attend with politicians and embassy representatives.

8.4 OPEN DIALOGUE AND TEAMWORK

In spite of some displays of self-centeredness among the leaders of the CSOs, countless events have proven that they hold each other in great esteem; they respect their peers even if they do not agree on all points ; and are even ready to hold a dialogue for the greater good of Lebanon. It has also been noticed that these different CSOs never defame or plot against one another in spite of having many differences at times. Multiple forums of discussions were held between various components of the popular uprising, with leaders and members sharing their views, plans, schemes and programs. This attests to their ability to accept one another, tolerate a different point of view, and rise above points of divergence when put in situations of opposition with the political rulers; qualities rarely exhibited among the political Establishment. Despite the collaboration and teamwork, however, the dialog culture of CSOs may prove insufficient to convince voters when the elections are held, unless a coalition or alliance is born, something highly possible given their persistence to win.

8.5 PLAYING THE VICTIM

A lot of the group key figures are aware that victimizing themselves would attract more supporters and capture the attention of the public opinion. In one way this is true, nevertheless, it perpetuates a victimhood frame of mind, which keeps individuals or groups on the defensive instead of creating solutions and new paradigms, and promotes reactionary behaviour instead of proactiveness.

8.6 FEAR OF MISSING OUT

FOMO, or fear of missing out, is clearly evident among activists. The new developments that were taking place on the ground during the popular uprising were quite exciting, to the point that protesters always wanted to be informed and stay in the know. As most organizations are digitally based, many activists were subscribing to as many groups as possible at the start, without necessarily being aware of their standpoints on critical issues, or long-term objectives. This is the main reason why an accurate count of dedicated followers in any group might never reflect the true number of loyal and committed members to the group's mission. One can find a member being part of up to 60 groups, without really belonging to any³⁹.



8.7 MEANS OF PROTESTING

CSOs belong to different categories and follow a different approach in their activities; however, they are all working towards the same goal. They wish to drive change and reform on the political, social, and economic levels.

In this endeavour, the below approaches were observed:

■ One segment of civil society groups took an **top to bottom approach** and adopted the slogan “all of them means all of them”. It calls for all the government leaders in power to step down, not singling out any specific political faction. This approach considers that the political factions who were in power are all to blame for the situation the country is in. Moreover, these groups are even calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah and actively lobbying for it. Achieving a certain level of success in the 2022 elections is the main target for this group. Nevertheless; some divergence is observed among adherers of the “all of them means all of them” slogan, as some parties within this group have accepted lobbying with the Kataeb (The Phalange Party) and the Independence Movement⁴⁰.

We can mention the following CSO names as belonging to these groups: “National Front” and similar lobbying groups, “Taqaddom”, “Ana Khat Ahmar”, and “October 17 front”, among others.

Another CSO segment adopted a bottom-up approach. Partisans of this tactic believe that attacking political leaders and portraying them as victims in the eyes of their popular base does not constitute the solution, but would rather

³⁹Claimed by many active protesters

⁴⁰Kataeb and the Independence movement Members of Parliament resigned after Beirut Blast

strengthen these leaders' position by rallying their followers against a perceived threat and consolidating their support. These CSOs' approach is to attract the political affiliation of the establishment's popular base by raising awareness among ex-partisans and followers toward the root cause of the problem, in an attempt to persuade them to change sides. Such an approach may be fruitful, although the process of implementation may take longer, with the elections not necessarily being the ultimate target. Examples of CSOs adhering to this approach are "Drabzine Initiative", "Beirut Madinati", and "Mada", among others.

■ Another adopted approach consists of **on-ground** uprisings. It is considered the most frequently used strategy and has been employed for decades by protesters to achieve many goals and purposes. This type of activity involves popular uprising in the streets, peaceful sit-ins, protests in front of ministries, public authority houses, justice palaces, and other locations. October 17, 2019 protesters adopted these decentralized and rotational tactics during the first few months to make a clear stance and voice their concerns. Examples of CSOs adopting this approach are "Loubnan Yantafed", "Streets", "Rebels Souwar 17", and "Revolutionary Bloc".

■ The means of self-expression never lacked creativity in the Lebanese civil society. Recently, activists have adopted very creative and out of the box approaches to voice their contempt towards politicians. Examples are "Bala Esm" campaigns, prohibiting politicians from visiting restaurants and public places: upon learning of a political figure's presence at a restaurant or public place activists would chant "all of them means all of them" near to this place until the politician leaves. Another strategy adopted by youth entailed them going into banks and campaigning for depositors' rights loudly, refusing to be removed, and passing around petitions to exert pressure on the political class and the banks. They also utilized this "infiltration" strategy in government buildings and ministries, as well as in public spaces which they deemed to be illegally controlled by private entities and persons. These forms of popular uprisings are normally adopted by the CSOs that keep a low profile and whose members are not present on Social Media.

■ As the tension grew during the popular uprising, certain groups resorted to using violence as a means to get their message heard. In certain cases, audacious confrontations took place where these groups were the front-liners, arriving at the public square or protest site fully equipped with masks, shields, and other protective and retaliatory gear—like tennis racquets used to throw back tear gas at law enforcement—to persevere during the popular uprising. Confrontations would mostly end with an immense amount of tear gas being fired at the protesters by the security forces to get them to retreat. Another strategy that was prominently used throughout the uprising, and especially during its first three months was using burning tires, garbage bins and other items found on the street to block roads.



9. OUTREACH TOOLS

While at a disadvantage to the Establishment and mainstream opinion makers, CSOs deployed their messages to the public in Lebanon and also succeeded in acquiring international attention. Outreach to the advantage of CSOs was achieved via traditional news and audio-visual media, general Social Media, and proprietary media platforms.

9.1 THE NEW MEDIA

Many media platforms have emerged since October 17. Social Media played a major role in de-monopolizing the established media outlets' control on the narrative in Lebanon. Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp were the cornerstones of communication and awareness creation during the uprising, sustaining the social mobilization movement's local visibility from the beginning of the uprising until the conclusion of this study. Facebook was largely used by CSOs, activists and protesters to discuss political issues, organize, and coordinate among each other. Along with WhatsApp, it helped facilitate the logistics of the uprising. WhatsApp also allowed on-the-ground reporting of events. Everyone with a cell phone was able to document their treatment by security forces, warn of potential dangers, and stay in the loop on what is happening not just in one area, but in all areas involved in the uprising. The traditional media could not fulfil this role due, at least in part, to a limited number of news reporters and camera crews. WhatsApp was the preferred means of communication between the different CSO's both internally and externally, and allowed for very rapid dissemination of information and mobilization of activists.

International and Arab media, such as "Sky News", "Al Jazeera" and "Al Arabia" provided large coverage of the protest movement as well, giving activists much more airtime than has been allocated to Lebanese events in recent years, even to Lebanese politicians.

Lebanese protesters have also created their own news outlets, providing reliable, timely, and time-sensitive information through multiple digital and traditional news media that countered the dominance of politically affiliated media.

However, they did not just cover daily news, they also conducted live coverages and debates, all with the aim of providing insights and analysis, and of raising awareness on political, economic, and cultural issues and their potential solutions.

These were initiated by journalists, digital marketing experts and amateurs, some of whom were expats. Among them we mention:


- Television Al Thawra
- Fawra
- Seventeen TV
- Meghterbin Mejtemiin
- Thawra TV
- Propaganda
- Daleel Thawra
- Akhbar El Saha
- Megaphone
- Ajjanoub

While the media proved to be effective, the real test lies in its objectivity and loyalty to the original mission. Many tittle-tattle talks in TV outlets highlighted some profiles of the popular uprising at the expense of others, and shed light on the question of funding and sponsorship. Some of the respondents in this survey also accuse news organizations of demonizing some of the protesters.

Another disadvantage would be the accentuation of the SELF, branded identities, and individualistic ingenuities outside the scope of the group, considered by the majority as outside the limit, thus causing major problems⁴¹. For keyboard warriors of all factions, “platforms” provided a fertile ground for political arguments, blame games and hate speech to spread between supporters and opponents of the uprising.

A Social Media presence analysis was conducted and included media outlets that followed the popular uprising in Lebanon. Data was gathered on the 7th of February 2021. A simple ranking based on the number of followers and likes was firstly created. As seen in (Figure 9), “Megaphone” had the most followers on Instagram and Twitter while “Akhbar al Saha” had the highest Facebook likes, followed by “Thawra TV”. And again, Facebook seems to have the highest reach among the three platforms.


Figure 9- Social Media Followers



⁴¹Revealed to the Pulse by many protesters during focus group meetings prior to the lockdown and the spread of Corona virus

The more complete presence and activity model was then used to rank the media outlets based on more features (ex: average likes, favourites etc.) The following graph (Figure 10) summarizes all the scores and ranks the CSOs based on their overall score.

Figure 10- Social Media Popularity & Activity Scores



“Megaphone” had the highest overall score and highest popularity score, while “Daleel Thawra” got the highest activity score (5.88/6).



BEIRUT



BLAST



9.2 ALLIANCES WITH NGOs

As the COVID-19 pandemic first began, it coincided in Lebanon with a pronounced economic collapse, which resulted in a consequent social downfall. The livelihoods of many were severely affected, especially as the Lebanese Pound exchange rate plunged and many day-by-day workers were forced to stay home due to the lockdown. In light of these developments, the youth Civil Society Organizations mobilized or coordinated closely with renowned and/or newly created NGOs in an attempt to help alleviate the economic and social pressures.

They became more involved in direct service work, providing a whole spectrum of needed resources such as housing, food, health care, and childcare, especially in light of the non-satisfaction of basic needs that the government is supposed to provide⁴².


However, as the 4th of August, 2020 blast led to heavy destruction in the city and the exacerbation of the already-pronounced social and economic crisis, the aid previously provided by Civil Society Organizations became more urgent and expanded to include more life-altering and impactful interventions on a much larger scale. At this stage, CSO activists were on the field daily, cleaning the rubble, helping the residents of Beirut recover from the blast, serving food, and gathering donations etc. Political groups started forming NGOs to be able to coordinate better and to have an official financial body capable of receiving donations targeting a niche of trusted protesters. The services expanded to cover legal support and defence, as well as psychosocial support and mental to help individuals affected by the blast cope with the trauma and the emerging problems.



This social arm of the Civil Society Organizations seemed quite beneficial and useful in collecting data and engaging with the grassroots and social segments who were not originally physically taking part in the popular uprising. Through field work and frequent visits, they felt that it was easy to indirectly promote their political views within the communities they serve. Such a dissipation of political viewpoint greatly resembles the patterns used by the existing political factions who normally impose their views on the citizens they offer assistance and aid to; thus, recruiting them onto their political camp. This form of political mobilization is frequently referred to as clientelism. Only 24% of the CSOs in our sample are affiliated with NGOs, as depicted in *(Figure 11- next page)*.

⁴²Many initiatives led informally by known figures of the uprising

Figure 11- CSOs Affiliation to NGOs



The above-mentioned Civil Society Organizations have been active on the field, relying on social work to serve as a strong platform for mass mobilization, all the while staying very faithful to the original cause. For instance, the initiative known as “Basecamp” was first established during the October 2019 uprising to pool resources to offer humanitarian relief. Right after the August 4th blast, under the slogan “Together, we’re stronger; we are the real government”, the “Basecamp” resumed its humanitarian work by forming a national response hub, which coordinated the voluntary services of “Embrace”, “Baytna Baytak”, “Mouwatin Lebanese”, and “Minteshreen” (a political group currently working on transforming to a political party).

Some of the NGOs that are directly affiliated to CSOs, indirectly associated with them, or simply founded by one of their leaders, are:

- Baytna Baytak
- Shreek
- Khebz w Meleh
- Afaq
- Waey
- Khaddit Beirut
- Green Minds
- Arc En Ciel
- Offre Joie

Most of the above NGOs have come to thrive as a result of years of hard work in the field of sustainable development. While others are genuinely and unconditionally helping the communities in need without necessarily having a political agenda. Additional scrutiny of these NGOs will help shed the light on any possible correlation between their work and their political aspirations. It is important to note that leftist groups were against CSOs taking the role of the government and providing the much-needed aid during these hard times. They believed the distress and pain felt towards the Establishment should not be tamed, as it is needed to rekindle the fire of the popular uprising.

A DISSECTION
OF THE UPBRIDINGS

9.3 ART AND ENTERTAINMENT

Art has proven to be essential in pumping life into the popular uprising and making a lasting impact. It was a strong tool in the protesters' hands, allowing them to reach not only the Lebanese but also the entire world.

The popular uprising has inspired many artists to work on numerous projects that reflect their political views or their support of the October 17 movement. Most of the artwork aimed at promoting peace, reconciliation, and compassion, using elements that reflected the popular uprising at its best. Tens of artists exhibited their work in makeshift outdoor art galleries and street theatres using graffiti, murals, sculptures, and artistic structures. Protesters used elements that they found in Martyrs Square or items that were associated with the popular uprising to create art sculptures. Some of the items used were tear gas canisters, stones, the remnants of burnt tents, pieces of metal barriers, kitchen pots used for banging during marches, and recyclable materials. Other artistic activities conducted included artistic exhibitions, shows, yoga and meditation sessions, even writing songs and hymns. Artists and their supporters believe that these creations will tell the story of the popular uprising and capture its spirit. Among the most memorable pieces of art created for the popular uprising, we mention "The Fist of the Revolution", considered the symbol of the uprising; It was erected in the middle of several squares throughout Lebanon such as Beirut, Jal el Dib, and Tripoli, among others. Other prominent pieces were "The Iron Phoenix", which was produced from the rods and Christmas trees burned by thugs sent by political actors, as well "The Heart of the Popular Uprising", "The Independence Lady", "The Torch of the Revolution and much more".

In most of the field protests, a full stage was installed with lighting and sound systems. DJs were present at their decks playing patriotic songs and hymns to rile up people's emotions. The "Revolution Bus", the "Human Chain", "The Parade of Independence", "Mothers' Peaceful March" in conflicting areas, "The Pots & Pans" cacophony, were endeavours that projected a very theatrical image of the popular uprising and drove the attention and interest of many international and local supporters.

Nevertheless, not everyone was enthusiastic about resorting to art as a form of expression for the popular uprising. For them, the concerns mainly revolved around the deteriorating economic and living conditions, therefore, they did not consider art to be a priority. Others considered that such events and shows were derailing the popular uprising, which they believed should adopt a more violent approach. In their opinion these light forms of popular uprising were downplaying the reality and did not reflect the rage of the people; for them "A Revolution is Rage not a Folkloric Show". Within the same context, the question about funding these shows was also divisive.



9.4 INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND DIASPORA SUPPORT

Lebanon has a very long history with emigration. Its population is by far trumped by its diaspora, which is thought to exceed 16 million⁴³, residing mainly in the USA, Canada, France, Australia, Germany, UK, UAE, Kuwait, and South America. For decades, the Lebanese diaspora has contributed substantially in preserving the economy and driving it forward.

The economy of Lebanon, highly relies on imports and does not drive inflow of cash towards the economy through export. The highly negative trade balance that resulted from this was ignored by advocates of the dollar peg on grounds that the balance of payments, fed by foreign deposits, was positive over a very long period. This has created an imbalance in the country's economy and, along with other factors, has led to the current economic crisis. In 2018, the total value of exports was US\$ 2,953 million in comparison with a total value of imports amounting to US\$ 19,983 million⁴⁴.

The Lebanese diaspora is a substantial source of income to their mother country as they inject into the banking sector between 7 to 8 billion dollars per annum. Total deposits reached of \$175 billion against a GDP less than \$50 billion⁴⁵ in October 2019, representing among the highest deposits to GDP ratio in the world.

Upon the uprising of October 17, 2019; the Lebanese diaspora manifested worldwide in demonstrations against the Establishment simultaneously with the popular uprising taking place in Lebanon, adopting their demands and calling for drastic economic and political reforms.

Following the Beirut Port blast on August 4th, 2020, the well-connected Lebanese diaspora, lobbied on multiple levels and in multiple circles to raise relief funds and aid. This was mainly done through public fundraisers on internet platforms, personal donations, outreach to global firms and employers etc. The Lebanese community abroad also used their leverage in their hosting countries as well as among the international community to create the political pressure necessary to campaign for reforms that would revamp the economy and restructure the banking sector.

More importantly, by enjoying the support and backing of the Lebanese diaspora, the popular uprising could count on the international community's support when attempting political lobbying. Through the network of highly affluent and powerful Lebanese descendants in various parts of the world; the popular uprising has managed to let the entire world know about its demands and sympathize with them. They have also succeeded in exerting pressure on the international community to support the enactment of the necessary political interventions, insisting on a cessation of aid before any reforms are implemented in Lebanon⁴⁶.

⁴³Executive Magazine. May Nasrallah. *The role of the Diaspora in Healing Lebanon*. (October 28, 2020)

⁴⁴World Bank. *Overall Exports and Imports for Lebanon 2018*.

⁴⁵Executive Magazine. May Nasrallah. *The role of the Diaspora in Healing Lebanon*. (October 28, 2020)

⁴⁶Confirmed by a leading Lebanese newspaper owner, key diaspora lobbyist and an army veteran



9.5 YOUTH, THE REAL CHANGE MAKERS

The youth are the backbone of the popular uprising and the loudest voices against unemployment, immigration, and the drain of Lebanese brains.


In 2019, youth unemployment rate reached 30%, and labour market participation rate was only 41% for 15-29 year olds, which is a very low percentage⁴⁷. It is also important to note that 44% of Lebanon's tertiary education graduates emigrate⁴⁸.

Many reasons are behind the emigration of youth, among which: the lack of job opportunities due to outrageously pervasive nepotism, tuition fee dollarization that led to a huge increase in the cost of higher education, the on-going impediments of money transfers to students studying abroad, and the voting age being set at 21—which inspires in people younger than this age a sense of hopelessness, as they cannot enact the change they would like to see.

Despite the increasing percentages in youth emigration, a category among the Lebanese youth has decided to stay and defy the Establishment. The popular uprising held in its early days (November 2019) brought together hundreds of university students. These movements were successfully translated into a series of wins during the student faculty elections in some private universities.

The unprecedented breakthrough of the independent and secular representatives against the political establishment supporters in several student council elections in late 2020 are highlighted in the below (Figure 12): AUB 79% of the seats, USJ 75%, LAU Beirut 60%, LAU Jbeil 33%, and RHU 44%⁴⁹.

Figure 12- University Elections Results



⁴⁷IMF Country Report No. 19/312. Lebanon: 2019 Article IV Consultation. Press Release; Staff Report; Informational Annex; and statement by the executive director for Lebanon. (October 2019)

⁴⁸World Bank Reference

⁴⁹Mada (CSO) & RHU representative

Further achievements in the education sector are worth mentioning:

1-The University Students Faculty Committee (USFC) at AUB, won 79% of the seats (15 out of 19 seats)⁵⁰.

2-The council of delegates of the independent professors at the Lebanese University won 40% of the seats (63 out of 159 seats). A huge win (compared to only 4% during past election)⁵¹ in a highly politically affiliated university⁵².

People are putting high hopes on the youth as being probably the last resort in making the change citizens have always longed for.

However, it should be noted that some students who adhere to the parties of the political Establishment did not participate in the elections based on orders from their party leaders. This was done in order to avoid showing a weakening loyal base and creating greater friction between pro-protest and anti-protest citizens.



Whether or not this will translate into greater wins in the municipal and parliamentary elections is yet to be seen. University students come from a vastly diverse number of areas, and while the secular movement is prominent in universities, it is much less popular among the general Lebanese population, especially the Civil War generation, whose loyalties are much more entrenched.

⁵⁰Mada (CSO)

⁵¹Aliwaa Newspaper. (December 11, 2020).

⁵²Universitaires independants CSO



9.6 THE CSOs ELECTORAL MACHINES

Electoral fragmentation and different election laws have up to the time of this study put the Establishment at an insurmountable advantage, leaving not only independent candidates but even women candidates highly disadvantaged in general elections up to the most recent 2018, parliamentary elections. On a technical and logistic level, a few among the active CSOs on the Lebanese political scene acquired internal electoral machines and have experts in campaigning. Such CSOs seem to have a serious attitude towards possible upcoming elections; all the while others remain reluctant due to their inability to organize and reach stability.

Following the 2015 garbage crisis and the government's failure in addressing the issue with a national strategy that would ensure the proper treatment of waste; new stakeholders have emerged such as the "Beirut Madinati" (an independent and non-sectarian group). The latter aimed at standing up against the aggressive sectarian system. It did so by having one of their candidates run in the municipal elections of 2016 in the city of Beirut in addition to presenting and advocating for a full-fledged electoral program. Even though the movement did not win a seat in the elections, they achieved a breakthrough by acquiring 33% of the votes (highest score was 31,822/total votes were 97,347)⁵³. The success of "Beirut Madinati" on the municipal level, which notably included receiving some indirect votes from political factions who attempted to back this alternative list as a statement against their opponents' lists, was not sustained nor mirrored in the parliamentary elections (in the opinion of "The Pulse", the case of Beirut Madinati requires a mapping study of its own).

The voting percentages in the municipal elections revealed without the shadow of a doubt the looming challenges to be faced by the emerging Civil Society Organizations. On a national scale, at the parliamentary level (2018), the most prominent alternative coalition to run against the establishment was represented mainly, but not solely, by a joint list "Koullona Watani", "Sabaa", "Libaladi", "Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla" and other Civil Society Organization groups. They gained approximately 45,000 votes; 2.5% of total number of voters all over Lebanon, and 1.2% of total number of eligible voters. The lists were represented by 66 candidates running in 9 different districts: Beirut I, Bekaa I, Mount Lebanon, North II, North III, and South III; in addition to Rifi's lists in Beirut II, and North.⁵⁴ These numbers do not constitute promising results to build on for the upcoming elections of 2022. However, knowing that the average electoral threshold is approximately only 10,000 voters; and that the number of votes for independents (not in Koullouna Watani lists) was estimated at around 74,000 across Lebanon, a more encouraging outcome might linger on the horizon.

The individual preferential votes which were given in the 2018 elections to many of the candidates who would emerge in 2019 as leaders of the popular uprising

⁵³The Pulse mapping study based on the MOI website

⁵⁴The Pulse mapping study based on MOI website and disclosed numbers of Political factions electoral machines

uprising was insufficient to project straight roads to their success in the elections scheduled for 2022. Analysts, including “The Pulse”, consider the low numbers of votes achieved by leading independents in 2018 as a clear indication that the CSOs with political ambitions, notwithstanding their prominence during the popular uprising, must exert a lot of effort toward improving the public knowledge about the candidates they want to present as their top choices in the upcoming elections.

One of the major challenges to the uprising’s CSOs is their lack of support from traditional Beirut families. Beirut has socio-political dynamics that reflect the city’s multi-confessional composition and the city’s undisputed standing as Lebanon’s hub of political, economic, and cultural activities. It is the center of trade, finance, and economic activity and the center of legislative and political power symbolized by the governmental buildings of the Ottoman-era Grand Serail (headquarters of the Council of Ministers, or cabinet), the equally historical Parliament in the nearby downtown, and the Prime Minister’s Residence. Running an intensive electoral campaign in the capital of Lebanon by default ranks as the top of the major voting battles in any Lebanese election. Irrespective of the outcomes, whether a win or breakthrough, conveys a message to the nation and the entire world.

The results of the 2018 parliamentary elections clearly illustrate this. “Koullouna Beirut” had 6,842 votes in District II, 15% of the district total. This district constitutes only 23% of Beirut. However, In District II, the list created by civil society actors gained only 5% of the votes: In Beirut, the Sunnis constitute almost half of the registered voters, and more than approximately over 60% of the city’s likely voters. In spite of this, Civil Society Organizations have a very shy relationship with the registered Sunni voters⁵⁵.

Nine lists competed in District II. The strategy adopted by the opposition in splitting the candidates’ votes into different lists proved unsuccessful. Had these lists been combined, their collective potential would have brought about much more promising results.

The Sunni voters in Beirut have the power to shape the outcome of the parliamentary elections and will certainly have to be taken into consideration in future campaigns. It is worth noting that the youth category is the best place to start as they probably have a fresh outlook on political life and are either unbiased or less biased by their parents’ political views.

Also, worth mentioning before concluding the above analysis is that the university elections and the win of secular clubs is not a clear indication or a projection of voting during parliamentary elections. This is mainly due to the fact that university students who voted for the secular clubs are actually below the official voting age. According to the current electoral law, the voting age is 21,

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

while most university students are between 18 and 21 of age. Also, they do not constitute a big part of the resident Beirut population (the average participation in student council elections is 2000 voters per university, coming from more than 35 districts around Lebanon and constituting a very different voting demographic from the one in electoral districts that are based on confessional belonging).

A survey conducted in November 2020⁵⁶ on the general public (not only the protesters) revealed that 60% of Lebanese are against all political factions with no exception. In a sectarian distribution, almost half of the Shias (51.5% + 1.5% refusing to answer) expressed this aversion while 72.4% of Sunnis, 57.9% Christian, 55.7% Druze shared the same sentiment. This unprecedented level of resentment recorded in 2020 represents a significant increase in comparison with July 2020, when other surveys conducted by the same company found that an average of only 40% of the Lebanese were against political factions. In the same context, another survey conducted before the eruption of the popular uprising revealed a level of resentment amounting to 28%.

The Lebanese might be voting against the system in 2022; however, a strong and united list is needed instead of a collection to choose from.




⁵⁶Statistics Lebanon. (November 2020).

IV- FINDINGS & ANALYSIS

1. PRESENCE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

As mentioned in the Social Media methodology, data relating to the presence and activity of each CSO from Twitter, Instagram and Facebook was collected and analysed.


Figure 13- Frequency of Social Media Platform Used by CSOs



Not all CSOs were active on the three platforms. As clearly shown in (Figure 13), the CSOs were least active on Twitter with only 59% of the sample registered on it, while 68% were registered on Instagram, and 89% on Facebook. This shows the important role of Facebook in Lebanese politics.



Figure 14- CSOs Social Media Platform Presence



Also, only 54% of the pilot sample was active on all three platforms, while 11% were not present on any platform as seen in the bar chart (Figure 14). After this preliminary distribution analysis, a simple ranking was created based on the number of followers and likes on each platform.



For instance, “Ana Khat Ahmar” had the highest number of followers on Instagram, followed by “Beirut Madinati” and “Minteshreen”. (Date reference: 30-01-2021). The following chart (Figure 15) shows the ranking based on the number of Instagram followers:

Figure 15- CSOs Instagram Followers




Figure 16- CSOs Twitter Followers



A similar analysis was made for Facebook and Twitter. We found that “Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla”, “Beirut Madinati” and “Majmouaat Shabeb El Masref” had the highest number of followers on Twitter. (Figure 16)

Figure 17- CSOs Facebook Likes




While “Sabaa Party”, “Loubnan Yantafed” and “Houras El Madina” had the highest number likes on Facebook. (Figure 17).

As mentioned in the methodology, the number of followers is not always an accurate measure of the popularity of an organization. For this reason, a more sophisticated model, which included other features such as the average number of likes, retweets etc. was used to increase accuracy when ranking the CSOs.

The following graph (Figure 18) summarizes all the scores and ranks the CSOs based on their overall score. “Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla”, “Ana Khat Ahmar” and “Beirut Madinati” have the three highest overall scores. For the activity score, “Loubnan Yantafed” has the highest score (5.3/6) and “Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla” got the first position for popularity score (6.7/8).



Figure 18- CSOs Ranked by Popularity and Activity



To conclude, although the research reveals the most active CSOs on Social Media, a deeper investigation and analysis on the reasons behind their popularity and activism is required to validate the findings. The analysis should cover the below:

1- **History:** the background of the CSO and its level of expertise in the digital world. Are there any public figures among the members? When was the platform created?

2- **Structure:** presence of a well-defined department with Social Media experts such as content managers, designers etc.

3- **Reach:** engagement and organic reach and whether boosting is used or not—this is a reflection of the financing of the CSOs.






2. POLITICAL VIEWS

Many have raised an intriguing question as to why CSOs are not united. To better understand the reason behind this, a series of questions were raised covering topics on politics, economy and public administration to highlight the discrepancies that may be the reason behind the difficulty in creating a strong opposition to the Establishment. It is worth mentioning that the pilot mapping study alienated 3 CSOs out of the 63 as they decided to maintain their Apolitical status: "Depositors Union", "Lajnat El Difah Aan El Motazahirin", and "Kantari Group".

2.1 CIVIL STATE

Although there are many nuances in the perspectives of CSOs, such as disagreements over usage of terms such as "secular state" versus Civil State, the move to a Civil State is a joint core demand of the popular uprising. The respondents unanimously call for a "secular state"; however, the term "Civil State" resonates better with them, as it better illustrates the separation of state and religion. The will to distinguish between politics and religion is clear in all their words and actions. For them, religious belonging does not have to dictate political choices and does not need to imply adherence to the political faction representing the community they belong to. Far left wingers even condemn the use of religion by religious leaders to the benefit of some politicians. On a separate note, many of the respondents' favour adopting an optional civil Personal Status Law that would ensure equal rights for all Lebanese regardless of gender or religion, operating alongside religious laws. This further discussion was not quantified in the survey as it is not within the scope.

Figure 19- CSOs Standpoint on Civil State



This result in (Figure 19) reveals a strong aspiration for a real transition towards a Civil State.

2.2 NEUTRALITY AND BORDER DEMARCATION


Lebanon’s stance on regional conflicts is one of the controversial political issues where dialogue is needed. The issue of Lebanon’s neutrality was raised by the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al Rai in July 2020. In a similar context, the first round of sea border demarcation talks between Lebanon and Israel were launched on October 14, 2020, under UN sponsorship and in the presence of the US State Department’s top officials, to resolve a dispute over an area in the sea between the two countries.

The survey revealed that neutrality and border demarcation of the disputed land and maritime zone were largely approved by most of the respondents.

As shown in (Figure 20 here below), 73% of the sample say that Lebanon’s limited resources and small size dictate that the country should distance itself from conflicts and wars in the region. For these CSOs, adopting neutrality is likely to promote better relations with neighbouring countries and the international community. Within the same category, many expressed radical positions: *“Sacrificing Lebanon for the sake of others cannot continue”* is an opinion we repeatedly heard, *“The country’s mission is to be a place of encounter and coexistence, as stated in the constitution.”*

The remaining 27% of the respondents, while realizing the importance of a neutral Lebanon, call the issue sensitive and say that it cannot be viewed in isolation from the regional context, and should therefore remain in the hands of the state. These respondents were supportive of the demarcation talks, their main reasons being the benefits gas extraction and the ensuing reduction of national debt would bring to the country; in addition to their firm belief that successful negotiations would largely reduce the likelihood of a war on Lebanon. Supporting the principle of negotiation, they would rather see the next independent government decide whether these talks are in the best interest of the country or not.

Figure 20- CSOs Standpoint on Neutrality and Border Demarcation



Besides their differences, almost all of the respondents agree that enacting reforms related to neutrality and border demarcation will relieve Lebanon from international pressures and sanctions. It is worth noting that the normalization process was omitted from the mapping study as it is still considered far too critical an issue. The analysis of opinion also encompasses the topic of weapons possession outside any legal framework, detailed in the following section.

2.3 WEAPONS POSSESSION OUTSIDE STATE JURISDICTION

The Taif Agreement stipulated, among other things, the reestablishment of the central state authority, the dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and the surrender of all weapons to the state within a period of six months. However, this clause of the agreement was never complied with and has even caused fierce controversy over the years. It has to be noted here that this dispute is focused not on individual rights to bear arms but on the weapons and weapons systems controlled by organizations, mainly Hezbollah. Due to the complexity and delicacy of the subject, and the sometimes-nuanced answers, we have decided to split the responses into 4 opinions (A, B, C & D) for more accuracy.



Opinion A: With the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah and the implementation of a National Defence Strategy based on the constitution, the laws, the requirements of coexistence, and the resolutions of international legitimacy:

30% of the respondents are in favour of lobbying and advocating for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 adopted in 2004, which calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, the extension of the Lebanese government's control over all its territories, and the strict respect of Lebanese sovereignty. They also call for the enforcement of UN Security Council resolution 1701, which came as a response to the 2006 war and called for the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, and the creation of a buffer zone or a "weapon free zone" between the blue line—the southern part of Lebanon and the Litani River—monitored by the UN. They also stand firmly against the creation of mini-states and believe that such a stance constitutes a guarantee for them that the weapons will not be used internally against Lebanese citizens. Despite the above-mentioned demands, they still consider Lebanon as part of the Arab league and hence Israel as a hostile enemy, clearly and undoubtedly.

Opinion B: with disbanding of militia factions, as Lebanon's sovereignty is of the highest importance, and placing the weapons under the sole authority of the state, within the framework of a state-sponsored defence strategy:

This position was adopted by 42% of the respondents, who strongly believe that it should be implemented by the new government, leaving the peace and war decision in the sole hands of the state. It further dictates the integration of the arsenal and the trained fighters into the Lebanese Armed Forces, coupled with a rehabilitation program that facilitates this process and ensures loyalty to the state and not political factions.



Opinion C: It is necessary to find a solution to the legal “Resistance”, and incorporate its weapons within the Lebanese armed forces arsenal:


20% of the respondents consider that Hezbollah is not violating national sovereignty by carrying weapons, since this right was acknowledged in a ministerial statement. According to these respondents, “Resistance” is a right and a duty, and should be open to all segments of the nation. In light of the rising tension in the region and the continuous Israeli violations of the Lebanese airspace, they have concerns about a possible war breaking out; hence the importance of elaborating a national defence strategy that would place Hezbollah’s weapons under the control of the state, and integrate its fighters in the army’s ranks. The new government should address this issue with careful consideration of the different factors involved, all the while working to ensure and safeguard the nation’s best interests and taking into consideration the regional context. In light of the dire economic situation and the increasing international pressure and sanctions, this segment believes that it has become critical to implement a state-sponsored defence strategy in which the Lebanese Armed Forces are the sole defenders of the country against enemy attacks.

Opinion D: The weapons issue is correlated with the region’s developments. The decision to relinquish weapons shall be taken in close coordination and with the consent of the concerned parties, which are the threatened ones, within the framework of a state-sponsored defense strategy:

The remaining 8% endorse Hezbollah’s right to keep their weapons which, in their opinion, is the only means to deter Israeli attacks given the incapacity of the Lebanese government to defend the country. This status quo legitimizes the role the “Resistance” plays, thus leading to the belief that weapons should not be dissolved before a regional agreement has been reached and a national defence strategy has been developed accordingly. These partisans must alienate the use of any slogan against the illegitimacy of Hezbollah’s weapons during the popular uprising.

An analysis of the above results depicted in (*Figure 21*), and a mapping of (*Figure 22*), reveal that despite the complexity and delicacy of addressing this hot topic, 92% (Opinion A + Opinion B + Opinion C) of the CSOs believe that disarming Hezbollah is a necessary step; nevertheless, they diverge when it comes to timing and mechanism and disagree on the proper usage of terminologies. This high percentage of views against weapons possession illustrates the impact that the popular uprising has had on Hezbollah and all other political factions, and the distance it has created between Hezbollah and its allied parties on one side, and their supporters on the other, exacerbated by the deep economic and financial crisis.

Figure 21- CSOs Standpoint on Weapons possession outside State Jurisdiction



38% of the respondents (Opinion A + Opinion D) represent two radically opposed standpoints; marking a departure from the widely held convictions. Another moderate approach, represented by 62% (Opinion B + Opinion C) of the respondents is in favour of the implementation of the national defence strategy. They can form a strong community base of sovereignty advocates, who can exert pressure towards a rapid implementation of the defence strategy, and are best placed to play a moderating role and bridge the gap between the extremes.

Opinion B respondents have always advocated for the sovereignty of Lebanon, but are now just expressing it more openly. This reveals that their significantly increasing number is encouraging them to voice out their convictions.

Opinion C is proof of the increasing divisions among the 2006 supporters of the “Resistance” and even among an increasing number of Shiites, caused by the deterioration of the economic situation in Lebanon. Change is palpable even in the villages and rural areas of the Bekaa and the South, where ideological convictions are deeply rooted. Protesters from Tyre, Nabatyeh, Baalbek, Bekaa, and other regions dominated by Hezbollah and its ally, the AMAL Party, are raising their voices against these two so far untouchable parties. A detailed survey will shed light on this phenomenon. From the discussions conducted, we could derive conclusions as to the reasons behind this shift:



- Through its ongoing involvement in the war in Syria and the region, Hezbollah has deviated from its original mission and purpose. This involvement was considered unjustified, causing many supporters to lose their loved ones as casualties of the war. The cause is also not considered as “divine” since it implies killing “brothers in religion” in Syria⁵⁷. Lebanon is facing significant challenges, and efforts would be better concentrated on solving them.
- Many Shiites outside of Hezbollah’s direct circle who have lost their jobs or are receiving a fraction of their salaries think that it is urgent to give priority to Lebanon’s internal problems.
- The Shiites belonging to a higher social class and referred to “White Shiites”, who lost their jobs or the support of regional stakeholders in the Gulf area, have also started to see things from a different perspective. Many lobbying groups are joining efforts and using their networks, together with “White Shiites”, to trigger change through contacts at an international level.
- An increasing number of Lebanese fear the consequences of international sanctions and realize that the current situation is no longer sustainable.

Respondents belonging to (opinion BC) are best placed to play a moderating role and bridge the gap between the extremes.

To conclude the weapon possession analysis, we believe that if united, Opinion B + C can form a strong community base of sovereignty advocates, who can exert pressure towards rapid implementation of the defence strategy agreed upon in the Taif Agreement. These two opinions can be backed up by the general public to lobby for more pressure.

Our findings are a clear reflection of the general public’s view, which is mostly unfavourable standpoints towards political factions; nevertheless, these percentages might differ from a component of the population to the other (as the CSOs are equally a biased section of the whole population and they are the agents of change). These findings are thoroughly detailed in Section I-6 of this mapping study revealing increased levels of resentment among the Lebanese people in general toward political factions, including Hezbollah.

⁵⁷ A term used by some Shiite intelligentsia to refer to themselves





Figure 22- Mapping of CSOs according to their Standpoint regarding Weapons Possession outside State Jurisdiction

A

- October 17 Front
- 3rd Republic
- Aamieh 17 October
- Ana El Arar
- Ana Khat Ahmar
- Civic National Front
- La Troisieme Voix Pour Le Liban
- Liqaa Teshreen
- Loubnan El Risala
- Nabad El Janoub El Mountafed
- Pyramid Lebanon
- Rebels Souwar 17
- Retired Military- General Georges Nader
- Revolutionary Bloc
- Sovereign Forum
- Taqaddom
- Thawra Unsa
- Komsan Bid

C

- 10452 Party
- Beirut Revolutionaries
- Lihaqqi
- Marsad Shaabi Li Mouharabat El Fasad
- Mouwatinoun Wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla
- National Rescue Movement
- National Veterans Authority
- ReLebanon
- Right of Speech
- Tajamoh Isti'adat al Dawla
- United For Lebanon
- Waey

B

- Aan Haqaq Dafeh
- Al Mountadayat
- Bala Esm
- Beirut Madinati
- Bidayat Watan
- Center 17 For Research
- Green Party
- Haraket El Waii
- Hawa Teshreen
- Houras El Madina
- Kulluna Irada
- Civil Society Table of Dialogue
- Loubnan Yantafed
- Mada
- Madraset El Mouchaghibin
- Massirat Watan
- Mihaniyat Mihaniyoun Handasa
- Minteshreen
- National Bloc
- New Lebanese Party
- Regional Forum for consultancy and Studies
- Sabaa Party
- Street
- Tahalof Watani
- Thawrat Loubnan

D

- Harakat El Shaab
- Kafeh
- Majmouaat Shabeb El Masref
- Shabab Dod Nizam
- Takatol Ouaa

MAPPING OF CSOs ACCORDING TO THEIR STANDPOINT REGARDING THE WEAPONS POSSESSION OUTSIDE STATE JURISDICTION


30%	OPINION A	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolution no. 1559
42%	OPINION B	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state-sponsored defence strategy as stated in Taif Agreement
20%	OPINION C	The legal Resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
8%	OPINION D	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
62%	OPINION BC	With the disarmament of everyone as part of a state-sponsored defence strategy
72%	OPINION AB	With the implementation of sovereignty unconditionally
28%	OPINION CD	With the right to Resistance given regional developments
92%	OPINION ABC	It is time to phase out Lebanon from external conflicts and focus internally on implementing the defence strategy

2.4 EXPANDED ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

The expanded administrative decentralization agreed upon in the Taif Agreement should have been adopted at all levels, from the smaller administrative units to the elected council headed by a district officer. This seems to be regarded by many respondents as the best solution to the current bureaucracy's outdated policies and procedures, and the best way to provide a higher level of services to citizens. Nevertheless, this clause has not been implemented yet and remains a hotly debated subject.

All of the respondents have no objections with regards to the implementation of the expanded administrative decentralization (figure 23 here below) as long as the nuances are well-interpreted. It is when the topic of political decentralization is addressed, which constitutes a transition towards a federal system, that opinions become more mixed, this model is being viewed by many as a threat to the principle of coexistence.

Figure 23- CSOs Standpoint on Expanded Administrative Decentralization




The results also revealed the frustration felt by the respondents towards the failure of government and local administrations in providing basic services, mainly in the fields of health and social welfare, and the smouldering resentment fuelled by the insubstantial policies that led to the economic crisis. Whereas the implementation of efficient reforms would have helped lay the ground for a more productive and prosperous economy, through decentralization and other constructive measures.

2.5 THE ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN

What kind of economic system best suits Lebanon, and what kind of governance is needed to implement such a system?


Hundreds of studies and references have been published, written by renowned economists, scholars, economic experts, and local consultancy firms close to the CSOs. They propose a strategy to alleviate the Lebanese economic crisis. Critical discussions about the different possible approaches were initiated, covering the courses of action to be followed, the role of banks and institutions, the Lebanese currency, and the taxation system, bailouts, foreign lending programs under monitoring institutions, further cuts to public spending, funding safety nets for the underprivileged, and well-grounded policies towards key sectors dealing with non-tradable basic services (health, education, housing, electricity, etc.), were some of the major solutions proposed. The respondents to this survey subscribe to most of the proposed solutions.



As shown in (Figure 24), 43% of the respondents have elaborated a detailed economic plan, proposing an exhaustive solution for the country, and were excited to share it with “The Pulse”. Some of these stated that they are updating it and they will be issuing a new version of their proposal. 46% are engaged on a lighter scale with the economic challenge of the country. The remaining 11% are more focused on developing their mission statement away from economic reforms.

The ideas submitted are as diverse as the CSOs themselves, ranging from communist-inspired proposals to entirely free and liberal economic models, bringing out the variances between the different CSOs: fluctuating between the implementation of a green economy or smart economy as a solution to Lebanon’s problems; to complex, all-inclusive proposals gathered in a book, like the one written by Charbel Nahas entitled “An Economy and a State for Lebanon”. All agree that a strong economy can only be built when the best interests of all citizens, without discrimination of any kind, are taken into consideration; an essential condition for the emergence of a more cohesive and more supportive society. While there is no doubt that many of the elaborated economic reforms mentioned above can efficiently contribute to stopping the current downfall, some seem unrealistic or hard to implement, while others do not clearly identify the means of implementation.

Figure 24- CSOs Stanpoint On Economic Reform Programs



All respondents believe that the Lebanese economic wheel has undoubtedly witnessed a sudden stop, as it is facing an accumulation of interrelated political, social, economic, financial and environmental crises, feeding off each other and aggravating the current situation. The import-export imbalance has caused a deficit of approximately 25% in the GDP⁵⁸, leaving the bank functionality almost paralyzed. Lebanon has become the third most indebted country in the world, with a debt to gross domestic product ratio of 150% in 2018, now estimated at 156% by the IMF.



⁵⁸AUB. 2020 Outlook: Lebanon between the economic crisis and the aspirations of the October uprising. (17 Feb. 2020).

3. SWOT: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES & THREATS

Based on our findings, a SWOT Analysis was conducted on CSOs (Shown in Figure 25), summarizing the following:

3.1 INTERNAL FACTORS

STRENGTH

- Well-established presence in the public affairs arena given their coverage by traditional media, their Social Media outreach, the emergence of notable key figures among them, and the diverse on-going activities and projects, etc.
- The existence of a wealth of research and studies outlining the means to solving the Lebanese issues. This constitutes a strong basis for successful and promising political work
- Good communication skills and ability to voice ideas clearly and convincingly
- Strong skills for advocacy, mobilization, organization, planning, logistical capabilities, higher political knowledge and experience, as well as all the necessary tools to actually make a difference. (Winning Bar of Lawyers and student elections, and the successful stop of the Bisri Dam project are best examples).
- The presence of electoral machines for some of the CSOs based on previous experience with elections, although not as developed as those of the political factions.
- Strong NGO involvement and relief work. These kinds of services are dear to the hearts of the Lebanese.
- The emergence of tens of independent candidates qualified to run for elections, which gives them a larger pool of candidates to nominate
- A pool of eager volunteers with the right spirit, who can constitute a strong human resource base for future projects and endeavours
- A young generation who, in the majority, willingly positioned itself away from grudges and sectarianism and opted for peace building and change
- A pool of intelligentsia and businessmen with international reach, who can lobby and secure funds for Lebanon
- Integrity and genuine belief in Lebanon.

SWOT



WEAKNESSES

- A limited political experience and a theoretical approach to elections and politics by some newly nascent CSOs, especially when compared with the Establishment's experience
- Internal instability and constant change in coordinators and members
- Failure to centralize efforts due to convergences in political views
- Relative lack of communication between the CSOs, leading to uncoordinated efforts on the ground⁵⁹
- Conflictual opinions on the demands within the same groups
- Absence of a centralized leadership that can drive and represent the views of all the segments of the popular uprising
- Inflated sense of self-worth, nourished by the media
- Limited finances for most CSOs
- Lack of knowledge or clarity on governmental procedures and laws
- Under resourced to be able to face the Establishment
- Immigration of many activists following the Beirut Port blast, which led to further brain-drain for Lebanon and also for the popular uprising
- Loss of jobs for many activists and protesters involved in the uprising due to the economic situation, hence giving personal concerns priority over the popular uprising
- Infiltration by the "fifth column"
- Fear of confrontation with armed forces and infiltrators, who may cause physical harm to protesters and activists.

⁵⁹The Pulse field officers. Observed during the celebration of the Uprising's first anniversary (October 17 2020), among other events

3.2 EXTERNAL FACTORS

OPPORTUNITIES

- Diminishment of the allure of power certain leaders have and the limitation of politicians' ability to move freely within the country
- The successes of the popular uprising over the past year, and the potential creation of a wider network:
 - Head of the Bar of Lawyers Melhem Khalaf defeated the alliance of political factions
 - Students won the elections in major universities and defeated political factions
 - Activists stopped the Bisri Dam project
- The political support of some CSOs by international entities
- The rise of a coordinated diaspora that is more involved in Lebanese politics
- New paradigms in politics and increased political awareness among the public
- Availability of training by international NGOs to help the public base build their own political mindset
- The birth of independent media and the spread of tens of political communication platforms. This constitutes a great step in consecrating freedom of expression and freeing the media from the influences of the Establishment
- Availability of funds from international donors as well as the diaspora for their sister NGOs
- People's anger towards corruption, which is perceived as the main driver of the current financial and economic crisis
- A lot of common ground for the CSOs to cooperate on
- Successful lobbying by the Lebanese activists who emigrated after the blast
- The use of art by talented Lebanese artists in raising awareness about the Lebanese situation
- Bank depositors being an immense source of grassroots support after suffering financial loss due to political and banking mismanagement, when taken from an electioneering perspective.

OPPORTUNITIES

- The empowerment of women and the increase in their confidence and ability to express their opinions and socio-political needs, growing the pool of active independent voters
- The revival of many people's dream in a prosperous, safe, and united Lebanon and the aspiration of many Lebanese for success, creating synergistic solidarity
- Increased media coverage of political corruption and of the people's demands and struggles, as well as greater media exposure for activists who champion these demands
- The availability of "CEDRE" and the IMF's loan, and the possibility of still receiving the funds.

THREATS

- The risk of violence and confrontations with the police, which at times lead to material damage and physical injuries
- Lack of readiness for elections, evidenced by delayed mobilization of electoral machines
- The current electoral law and the potential lack of transparency and accountability in its execution
- Unorthodox approaches adopted by current political factions and their adoption of creative ways to weaken the uprising
- Easier infiltration of the groups due to the disclosure of the identities and activities of the CSOs over time
- The loss of motivation among the activists and protesters of the uprising
- High rate of COVID-19 cases leading to reluctance to gather over fear of contracting the virus
- Falling for donor-driven and directed partnerships with international organizations, which can lead to deviation from original goals on one hand and to increased tension between CSOs due to the controversy related to foreign funding
- Weakness in grassroots outreach, especially towards traditional voters
- The aftermath of the Beirut blast and the stifling economic situation, which have left many people jobless and homeless, pushing them to rely on the clientelism of the political factions
- Non-unified standpoints on controversial topics

Figure 25 - CSOs SWOT Analysis

STRENGTHS

- Well-established presence in public affairs arena
- Existence of a wealth of research and studies
- Good communication skills
- Skills for advocacy, mobilization organization, planning, logistical
- Presence of electoral machine
- Strong NGO Involvement and relief work
- Emergence of qualified candidates to run for elections
- A pool of eager volunteers
- A young generation positioning itself away from sectarianism
- A pool of intelligentsia with international reach
- Integrity

WEAKNESSES

- Limited political experience
- Theoretical approach
- Instability and constant change
- Failure to centralize efforts
- Lack of communication between CSOs
- Conflictual opinions on demands
- Absence of a centralized leadership.
- Self Worth
- Limited finances of CSOs
- Lack of Knowledge on governmental procedures & laws
- Under resourced to face the Establishment
- Immigration of activists
- Loss of jobs
- Infiltration by 5th column
- Fear of confrontation

OPPORTUNITIES

- Limiting the politicians' movements
- Successes: Bar of Lawyers (2020) and University elections
- International political support
- Coordinated diaspora
- New paradigms in politics
- Training provision by INGO's
- Upsurge of independent media
- Availability of funds for sister NGOs
- Independent Media surge
- International donors fund
- Popular anger towards corruption
- High coordination on common grounds
- Lobby of activists who emigrated after the blast
- Art attraction
- Raising awareness of Lebanon's situation by Lebanese artists
- Growing grassroots support
- Women empowerment
- Reviving the dream of a prosperous Life in Lebanon
- Increased media exposure
- Fund through Loans "CEDRE" & IMF

THREATS

- Confrontation with Police
- Lack of Readiness for elections
- Current electoral law
- Lack of transparency and accountability in execution of electoral law
- Unorthodox approaches used d by used by the Establishment
- Easy Infiltration of the CSOs
- Protesters low motivation
- COVID-19
- Falling for donor driven partnership
- Vulnerability in grassroots outreach
- Stifling economic situation on their supporters
- Non unified standpoints on Controversial topics



V- EXECUTIVE OUTLOOK

Several months after the eruption of the October 17 popular uprising, the anger remains, while the hope for change has weakened, especially with the heavy economic and social strain under which every Lebanese citizen is living. Having said that, such a change is not inevitable, however, it must not be taken for granted.

In 2022, Lebanon and its citizens are expected to achieve democratic milestones, which include prominently the Parliamentary, Municipal and Presidential elections scheduled to be held according to constitutional deadlines. There is a serious opportunity for redefining the political scene, within the upcoming few months or maybe even less, given that the Holy Month of Ramadan coincides with this series of important events and milestones. All Civil Society Organizations should work hand in hand to preserve the gains they have achieved and build on them as they start mobilizing for the big battle.



CSOs diverge greatly from a political and agenda standpoint, consequently Lebanese citizens may assume that they only desire to gain political power, similarly to the Establishment. Protesters will be reluctant to follow them, given that they are already running away from power-starved politicians.

The findings of this mapping study aims at providing enough insights, some of which still need further elaboration, so that actual gains achieved during the uprising are sustained and a way forward is identified. Therefore, we present the following five major goals toward which the popular uprising needs to work on. Bold and necessary steps must be taken on all fronts to embrace a positive way forward:

1. ESTABLISH A SUPREME COUNCIL:

All Civil Society Organizations will benefit if they regroup or stand to expand their influence and consequently establish a supreme council for the popular uprising, which will lay down a road map that positions them as a reliable alternative political coalition.

- Positioning themselves as a new major political bloc to be underestimated. Thus, it is crucial for the popular uprising to coordinate together and to be well organized, but above all, to impose itself as a “reliable alternative political coalition” to the Establishment. Two approaches may be applicable: This alternative coalition can gather two to three major CSO coalitions under one leadership, based on socio-economic interest and differences, and thus better activate their networks while preserving the identities of each CSO used as scaffolders. Another, but less recommended approach—although more realistic—is to form a steering committee of a maximum of four major coalitions that act as incubators and catalysts for the process of rebuilding the state and enacting the necessary reforms needed for the country. Leaders of any of the above-mentioned approaches must be well identified.
- Create working platforms that include organizations/entities and individuals, aiming at defending and consolidating the gains of the uprising. These platforms shall continuously build on the commonality of their members by gathering ideas, activating, and coordinating them to generate and promote initiatives.
- Work on reformulating the current political rhetoric to include a compelling speech to which people can relate, tackling their day-to-day fears and concerns, away from victimhood and inapplicable recommendations. Urgent social reforms are much needed, especially ones that cater to the well-being of the citizens. Other components such as transparency may also be included, thus keeping every Lebanese citizen abreast of any development.





- Invest in creative, innovative, out-of-the-box ways to create new and modern approaches to politics. Raise awareness among all the Lebanese that a radical transformation is required to get Lebanon out of the hole it has dug itself into, focusing on:
 - The importance of raising awareness on making the right choice on Election Day. The state of the country today is a direct repercussion of previous electoral decisions.
 - The psychology of codependency the Lebanese suffer from and which leads to appointing manipulative and power-hungry leaders.
 - The change of leadership perception, by highlighting the abuse of power and extravagance that traditional leaders follow (noisy convoys of tinted-window cars, excessive numbers of bodyguards, unjustified belongings and lifestyles, without specifically pointing out to a specific person).
- The encouragement of depositors' to demand their rights to withdraw their money from the banks.
- Initiate an opposition crowdfunding through legitimate donations, to be able to implement the above efficiently and professionally. To ensure transparency, money shall be accepted based on well-defined criteria and policies, so as to guarantee that individual donations are unconditional and evenly acknowledged (No monopoly). International auditors can also be appointed to monitor the fund.
- Protect themselves from infiltrators.

2. FORMULATE THE “AGREE TO DISAGREE” MODUS VIVENDI SCHEME

In order to be able to achieve the above, the CSOs have to brainstorm, create and formulate an “Agree to Disagree” modus vivendi scheme: first, agree on what they are all fighting against; second, agree on what they all have in common, hence, clearly defining the common ground that unites them all, and third, agree on what they don’t agree on.

What they are fighting against

What are they all fighting against? It is evident that the driving force of these groups is the opposition to the Establishment and powers. They are all gathered around opposition:

- The Establishment
- Partisanship
- Stagnation and status quo
- Clientelism
- Sectarianism

What they agree on

What do they all agree on? They need to find out what the numerous factions of the civil society agree on, from far right to far left.

- The shared goals (Section IV.C of this mapping study)
- The demands (Section IV.D of this mapping study)
- Civil State and Expanded Administrative Decentralization as per sections V.B.4 of this mapping study.
- Will to sacrifice for change
- Love for Lebanon

What they disagree on

What do they disagree on? Some of the Civil Society Organizations did not completely succeed in breaking away from a system that keeps regenerating itself in a vicious cycle of indoctrination. In result of this, CSOs disagree on a long list of basic principles and policy issues:

- An economic model to be used (Liberal or communist or in between)
- Approach: violent, not violent, direct top-bottom, indirect bottom-top
- Definition of the relationship with international community (Friends or masters)
- Funding resources (Crowdfunding, Donor Driven funding)

- Election Alliances with political factions (No alliance, electoral alliance, on ground alliance, funding alliance)
- Tolerance of religious taboos (Too conservative, too liberal)
- The Disarmament of Hezbollah (Under defence strategy, under 1559, only when feasible)

Conflict resolution in addition to team building and capacity building workshops need to be conducted. War trauma healing is also highly recommended. As a result of the above, CSOs need to prioritize their central demands and agree on the mechanisms to induce social pressure and policy advocacy.



3. BUILD CREDIBILITY AND CREATE SYNERGY

CSOs must concentrate their efforts on building their credibility on the ground, extending collaboration and creating synergies with other CSOs as well as other political, social, and media stakeholders with whom they share common goals, and who are willing to prioritize the interest of the country above all. They need to be available everywhere and with everyone. This might include a clear formulation of an outreach plan on the following levels:

- Local Level (Grassroots).
- National Level (Coalition building, joint efforts, MoUs).
- International level (Lebanese diaspora and the international communities)

4. START CAMPAIGNING AND INFLUENCING POLICY MAKERS

Civil Society Organizations are directly responsible for changing the electoral scene in Lebanon. They must present themselves as “The Alternative”, the strong, reliable, local, trustworthy replacement, capable of confronting the Establishment on the ground and not merely being a “Virtual” opposition.

- Formulate and propose the adequate representation model of election law to accommodate district distribution, voting age and female quota. Also, enforce the role of the election monitoring authority, and free it from the MOIM official dominance, while ensuring its neutrality after thoroughly studying current and all possible election laws

- Work closely on influencing policymakers toward transparent application and monitoring of election laws, and sharing with the Lebanese diaspora the political agenda and plan set forth for the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2022, to exert international pressure and have elections monitored by foreign institutions. Thus, we can avoid fraud and breaches, and prevent us from ending up with the reformulation of the Establishment.

5. CONSTRUCT AN INTEGRATED ELECTORAL MACHINE

Create an outstanding electoral machine that revitalizes the election process and endows Lebanese politics with a new meaning, saving it from sectarian polarization and political stalemate.

- Framing a clear and understandable electoral program, discussing and forming one big list across Lebanon (a electoral alliance of the coalitions mentioned in A.1 of this section) where the victory of one is the victory of the other.

- Building a centralized professional electoral machine capable of mobilizing swing voters and convincing them to translate their votes to the benefit of the CSOs in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

- Recruiting a balanced number of candidates, both on the gender and religious level, then preparing them to undertake the electoral battle, marketing them as the right choice, and lobbying for them to ensure they have a chance. Then appointing a leader who would champion the critical issues for each electoral district, and positioning and branding them as “Change Ambassadors”.

- Working on public motivation, mobilizing grassroots outreach and door to door campaigning. The popular uprising needs to break free from being a movement for intellectuals and scholars at one end of the spectrum, or


leftist street protesters at the other . It must reach out to the masses, the majority of actual voters. These need to be addressed, invited to join, engaged and mobilized because winning elections starts there. The Civil Society Organizations must also abstain from provoking followers of traditional political factions by accusing them of “being sheep”⁶⁰, at a time when they see their political affiliation as loyalty to a cause or to a martyr.

- Assessing the political and electoral landscape and focusing on districts with high potential success rate, while focusing on the Capital in order to make a strategic political breakthrough and thus create a snowball effect in other districts.

- Getting out of the protest squares and offices, and beginning to rally in multiple neighbourhoods and areas in the Capital, suburbs, and various regions and districts, holding debates and discussions open for the public and tackling the most important topics.

- Avoiding weighing results based on simulations with previous elections: the majoritarian electoral system of the municipal elections is different from the proportional law of the parliamentary elections, and the secular base of universities does not constitute the majority of the voting population. Similarly, they must not mistake uprising votes for core votes. They must also keep in mind that the support that some political factions show towards protesters and CSOs stems from self-interested and will not persist if the popular uprising’s electoral program threatens their fundamental interests or power.

- Viewing the results from a realistic perspective and resorting to scientific methods to manage their expectations for the electoral battle. These include studying the voters’ lists, acknowledging the electoral landscape, expecting variances linked to potential electoral fraud tactics, prepacked blocks of voters, voters under patronage, unregistered voters and low electoral participation, and not counting solely on citizens who have never voted. Especially seeing as these elections will constitute an unprecedented event, CSOs must expect that the traditional political factions will severely amplify and capitalize on their old-fashioned and renowned winning oratory of sectarian fear, which has never failed them, especially at the last moments before the election date.



⁶⁰Terminology commonly used by protesters



فكّ عن
يازنا



VI- CONCLUSION

Some refer to it as a revolution, while others call it a popular uprising, and some simply say it is a protest movement. One thing is certain: a revolution is a process, and a long-term one. Once it is initiated, it has a snowball effect that builds up; paving the way for important changes to take place on the Lebanese national political scene.

The CSOs need to find a common ground that unites all their efforts; then put together their resources in a melting pot of change-makers, who might disagree on many things, but whose main objective, agenda and priority is Lebanon. Nevertheless, as the political future grows more ambiguous and uncertain, many questions arise in terms of the path CSOs will draw for themselves as well as the political developments that will shape the entire political scene. Will all the CSOs succeed in transcending sect, religion, or regional affiliations and fears? This formula might seem far reached, but can be doable with the proper awareness, acquired skills, and persistence.



Many variables also play a vital and crucial role in the future that awaits all the stakeholders in Lebanon. What would the Lebanese political life look like if the elections were postponed? In case they were held on schedule, will the Establishment adopt the current law of 2018 parliamentary elections or will the alternative coalition promulgate a modern impartial law enabling CSOs' best representations in the upcoming election? In light of this, what will be the threshold CSOs need to cross to achieve a breakthrough?

Equally, will the CSOs overcome all challenges and obstacles that might hinder their journey and pass the next milestone in the next democratic milestones? Will they manage to build successful, long-lasting and fruitful political alliances?


How will political factions react to the progress CSOs make in order to achieve their political breakthrough? Will they further attempt to infiltrate those organizations? Alternatively, will they resort to direct or indirect confrontation; or maybe continue with their propaganda campaigns aiming to tarnish the reputation of the uprising and its prominent figures?

In the event of a stalemate or a worsened situation, will the international community be willing to interfere in Lebanon's political life? What will the level of interference be? Will it be limited to funding, training and capacity building, or will it extend to military intervention?

While the biggest question remains who are the top 30 faces – from all over Lebanon and the Capital - who have the best chance of winning any upcoming major election and how will they start working on their image and persona to rally further support? Equally, how aggressively will the current regime act to ensure their power is not compromised by these faces?

And finally, following the elections, if held, how many new faces will succeed in ascending into the new parliament or the municipal councils to affect change from there?

But however many questions have yet to be answered as Lebanese CSOs march toward their next electoral battles. Our analysis on the state of civil society in mid-2021 leaves us convinced that the establishment-preserving legacy system is a dead end. For a more vibrant, equitable democratic future we need a productive civil society and successful CSO participation in the legislative as it was seen in the public discussion that for a few months in the popular uprising was a testimony to the great social mobilization capacity of our fledgling democracy. Today, as we write in the middle of 2021, Lebanese citizens and their international friends have passed through month after month of dangerous social and economic disruptions while the Establishment and its top exponents have for the most part been looking away. As a general election scheduled for next year offers a faint hope for positive political change, the success of these CSOs grows ever more necessary as Lebanon draws closer to the point of no return. A drastic change in the Establishment is vital to start the path of correction and recovery after decades of corruption.



APPENDIX 1 - METHODOLOGY & FRAMEWORK


1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology used encompasses a mixed method of data collection. Different analytical approaches were also utilized in the interpretation of the data. This enables the generation of a comprehensive assessment of CSOs in Lebanon and their impact on policy making, as well as their capabilities, priorities, and readiness to stand up to the established political powers and shoulder the elections.

Each CSO underwent at least one of the following data gathering methods, which are based on quantitative and qualitative social science methodologies. Additionally, an in-depth triangulation method was used to consolidate the findings.

- 1- Electronic and physical surveying
- 2- In-depth interviewing with the popular uprising opinion leaders
- 3- Structured interviewing with CSO representatives
- 4- One-on-one phoning or meetings
- 5- Activist listening sessions (via Zoom)
- 6- Focus group discussions (limited number due to COVID-19)
- 7- Scoring systems

The project was implemented in six phases:



1.1 PHASE ONE: DESK RESEARCH – INITIAL CSOS SELECTION

As an initial step, an exhaustive desk review was conducted on all local CSO types; officially registered or not, operating in Beirut and/or other regions.

The review was intended to shape the mapping study's methodology, chart the implicated CSOs in the popular uprising, and classify them based on the below key indicators:

- Each CSO's behavioural reaction
- Coalitions and alliances between CSOs and possible political factions and/or other NGOs
- Important statements pursuant to critical events
- Joint press conferences
- On ground activism
- Available outer information, namely:



The above search criteria resulted in a compilation of a pool of approximately 420 CSOs with very basic information. (See Appendix 3)

1.2 PHASE TWO: CONSULTATION MEETINGS WITH OPINION LEADERS - FINAL SELECTION

For the purpose of revealing the best sampling selection, consultation meetings took place with major popular uprising opinion leaders and alliance initiators. To consolidate our findings, a cross-matching screening was performed with two renowned popular uprising activist leaders closely connected to "The Pulse". Combining that information with the desk research performed in phase 1, a scoring system was performed based on how each CSO was involved in recent and important initiatives. The matrix below portrays the results obtained.

(Table 3 in section III.2 of this mapping study)

The scoring system revealed the presence of around 100 CSOs worth looking into. However, given the time constraint, we restricted our research to a sample of 63 CSOs depicted in Appendix 5 of this mapping study.

1.3 PHASE 3: QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT – THE SURVEY

After narrowing our list down to 63 Civil Society Organizations referred to as the sample in this mapping study, a survey was conducted to know more about each CSO's structure, views and positions on certain topics. The survey consisted of three main parts:

- CSOs' contact information: name, address, numbers and Social Media
- CSOs' general profile and identity: organization type, founder, board members, registration status, vision, mission, and objectives.
- Standpoint and position of the CSOs on major issues and hot topics, namely:
 - a. The Civil State
 - b. Neutrality and border demarcation negotiations (split into 2 questions)
 - c. Economic reform plan
 - d. Weapon possession outside state jurisdiction
 - e. Expanded administrative decentralization

The survey was created using Limequery and the questionnaire can be found in (See Appendix 2).



Between the 15th of December 2020 and the 20th of January 2021, the survey was sent online to 41 CSOs. The response rate was however shy; only 13% of the respondents completed the survey through the electronic link.


We attributed the low digital response rate to the following elements:

- **Cautiousness:** Some questions in the survey (despite being optional) asked for personal information such as address, phone number, funding means etc., which might have discouraged respondents from submitting their answers. Moreover, some questions might have been labelled as sensitive or controversial.
- **Inactive emails:** Many emails were collected through websites or Social Media, which may cause some to be inaccurate and not updated.
- **Fear of accountability:** The survey addressed each CSO as an entity. Given the loose structure of the CSOs and leaderless set-up in many organizations, few considered themselves to have the authority to respond.
- **General cultural behaviour:** respondents might not have any direct benefit to responding or may not be accustomed to participating in surveys
- **Situational factors:** Mainly Christmas Holidays and COVID-19 Lockdown.

1.4 PHASE 4: STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

To collect the remaining data, thorough one-to-one zoom meetings and interviews were conducted with 65% of the sample's leaders and committee members. Those one-to-one meetings made the data collection much easier. The respondents were more comfortable sharing their information and views given the trust built between them and "The Pulse".

The remaining 22% were gathered through consultation with junior members of the CSOs or through desk research, given that many organizations clearly state their views and positions on their Social Media platforms.



1.5 PHASE 5: SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS

An additional layer of data was collected from Social Media platforms. Indeed, Social Media holds a lot of interesting data, especially when it comes to civil society and political organizations. Social Media data was thus extensively scraped, analysed and used as a proxy for the popularity and activity for each CSO. The social media platforms studied were Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Facebook constitutes one of the most established social platforms among the three and caters both to a younger and older public. However, gathering data from Facebook was quite limited given the strict scraping rules of Facebook. Instagram, which is also owned by Facebook, was also used for data collection. This platform is continuously growing and has become quite important in recent years, especially for the younger generation. Finally, Twitter provided most of the data for the analysis. Twitter is widely used for opinion sharing and political reach. Thanks to its well-documented API which allows extensive data collection, Twitter played a major role in the following Social Media model.

Python, a programming language, was used for this task and the data collection took place on the 30th of January 2021, for the most up to date results.

This automated process features a very interesting added value: it can be routinely and automatically activated at any point in time to keep the numbers up to date, if need be.

1.5.1 A STRAIGHTFORWARD MODEL HEADLINE ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE DATA

The data collected consisted of the following:

■ Twitter:

- ✓ Date Joined
- ✓ Number of followers
- ✓ Number of accounts followed
- ✓ Number of tweets
- ✓ Most recent tweet dates
- ✓ Average retweets (for the last 20 tweets)
- ✓ Average favourites (for the last 20 tweets)
- ✓ Average date between tweets (for last 20 tweets)

■ Instagram:

- ✓ Number of followers
- ✓ Number of following
- ✓ Most recent post dates
- ✓ Average likes (for the last 12 posts)
- ✓ Average comments (for the last 12 posts)
- ✓ Average video views (for the last 12 posts)
- ✓ Average days between posts (for the last 12 posts)

■ Facebook:

- ✓ Date Joined
- ✓ Number of followers

Some direct insights were drawn from this data. For instance, based on their number of followers and likes, the organizations were ranked. This gave a general idea of the most active CSOs on each platform.

1.5.2 A MORE ELABORATE RANKING MODE:

This simple ranking analysis can be quite useful and provides an interesting perspective on the Lebanese civil society. However, looking only at the “following” number is not always an accurate measure of the popularity of an organization. Indeed, Social Media “likes” and followers can simply be bought, which dilutes the accuracy of the above analysis. For this reason, another ranking model was created to rank the CSOs based on additional factors.

In addition to the number of followers, the new model also took into consideration the average number of “likes” on Instagram as well as favourites and retweets on Twitter. Also, a following/follower ratio was calculated for both Twitter and Instagram. This gave a measure of how organic the followers were since many users on those platforms use the follow-unfollow technique to get a higher number of followers on their pages.



Additionally, as a measure of activity, the average post and tweeting frequency were calculated for both Instagram and Twitter. Facebook was not used much in this model given the scraping limitation of the platform, only the number of “likes” was used as an additional measure for estimating the popularity of each CSO.

This data gave us more information about two main areas for each CSO:

1. **Popularity:** Do the CSOs have a high reach?
2. **Activity:** Is the CSO active? Does it post regularly?

To be able to compare the CSO’s popularity and activity, a score was attributed for each of those areas. To do so, most of the data was normalized using a min-max normalization i.e., all values were transformed to a number between 0 and 1, for easier comparison.

The algorithm and detailed scoring system of this elaborate model can be found in *(Appendix 2)*.

1.6 PHASE 6: LONGITUDINAL STUDIES AND CROSS-MATCHING

After gathering all the data, whether through desk research, surveying or phoning, focus groups with CSO activists and community listening sessions (over zoom) were informally conducted for further data validation.

Some government agents, journalists and lobbyists were also consulted for further validation. Pre-existing formal and informal studies were used for baseline references, cross-matching, and longitudinal studies.

2. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

It is important to highlight some facts before getting into the details of the mapping study for a better understanding of the outcome.

2.1 GENERAL LIMITATIONS:

LACK OF OFFICIAL OR FORMAL DATA

Due to the lack of official data related to the numbers of CSOs, our baseline list was constructed following data collection from activists, public information and popular uprising leaders connected to “The Pulse”.

CONFUSING AND MISLEADING INFORMAL DATA

Since the beginning of the uprising, protesters have launched dozens of pages on Social Media platforms as a main vehicle to organize, plan and promote their activism. In light of the spontaneous nature of the uprising, and the changes that many of the CSOs went through, whether in leadership or direction, there was a possibility for many platforms to be formed and become digitally active, sometimes under similar identities. As a result of the absence of a sole representative of a CSO, identifying the formal platform was almost impossible for many of them. For instance, there are two Facebook accounts for “Beirut Revolutionary”, 3 Facebook accounts for Loubnan Yantafed, and two Facebook accounts for “17 October Front”, among other examples.

VOLATILITY

The volatility of CSOs on many issues such as standpoints, positioning towards major topics, group alliances and mutations constituted a major impediment to this mapping study, to the extent of spotting one leading member of a former group move to several others in a limited time frame within the same year. Therefore, the collected data between December 2020 and February 7th, 2021, may not be legitimate after this date due to unpredicted escalations that might affect their decision. To minimize the margin of such probable discrepancies, “The Pulse” has archived supportive documents and minutes of meetings in its records.

PILOT SAMPLING LIMITATIONS

The mapping study is only a pilot. It is important to highlight that the chosen sample is not representative of the whole population that took part in the uprising and consequently generalizations pertaining to the entire population cannot be made. For instance, the regional CSOs that were omitted from the sample might possess a whole different perspective due to the differences in demographics and culture among Lebanese districts, cities, and villages.

CHALLENGING TIMING

The mapping of the Lebanese CSOs was initiated around mid-December 2020, right before the Christmas and New Year holidays, followed directly by two major lockdowns due to the ever-increasing cases of COVID-19. The lockdowns were enforced directly after Armenian Christmas. This period was characterized by an impediment in reaching some of the key players in each CSO. Additionally, between January 25 and January 30, 2021, CSOs were not reachable for a follow-up due to the popular uprising in Tripoli.

QUANTIFICATION OF VIEWS ON VERY DELICATE TOPICS

The analysis of the political views in this survey was very delicate especially when tackling sensitive topics such as neutrality, border demarcation and above all others, the question related to the possession of weaponry outside the state jurisdiction. We note that only 4 opinions on the topic were retained. While, because of our commitment to confidentiality and also because of issues of practicality, some of the views represented in this study thus were not cited in full, these restrictions may have led to alterations of some nuances that were highly valued by the respondents.



DAILY GROWTH OF DATA OVER THE MAPPING STUDY PERIOD

The initial list of CSOs was estimated to constitute 300 CSOs. This list was subject to continuous expansion over the mapping study period until it reached 420 CSOs until the date this mapping study was written. (Appendix 3).

MARGINS IN CITED ELECTION NUMBERS

The election numbers mentioned in this mapping study are indicative of actual voting results, although a more detailed analysis or breakdown of numbers would reveal a slight modification within +/- 3%. (Blank votes, preferential vote versus list vote, independent votes in other lists, alliances of a list under other lists, infiltration of a list by a candidate not disclosing his/her political affiliation, etc.). Election results are not within the scope of this mapping study, they are used only for indication.

2.2 SOCIAL MEDIA LIMITATIONS

ABSENCE OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS

Many of the CSOs do not have Social Media or any digital presence due to limited financials, administrative and human resources, resistance towards digital technologies, a low profile attitude for security reasons, a weak structure characterized by absence of defined goals, an uncommitted superficial existence, or simply due to being coalition-based groups, thus having no independent identity.

PYTHON METRICS LIMITATIONS AND WEIGHTING BIAS

The Social Media model used took into consideration various metrics from Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. However, some of those metrics were limited. Indeed, given the timeframe, only the last 12 Instagram posts and last 20 tweets were gathered. Also, Facebook data was pretty scarce in the model, given its strict data collection limitation. This data limit might have made the scores biased, putting more weight on the CSOs' Twitter and Instagram presence rather than their Facebook presence. In real life, this is not accurate, given that Facebook is largely used for political reach, as was seen above, through the high Facebook "likes" when compared to the same metric on Twitter and Instagram. The model's weighing could thus be improved with the availability of more time and data. Also, the weighing should be adjusted based on how popular each platform is for the Lebanese society.

TIMING OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT COLLECTION

The political situation and events, during which the data was collected, can lead to bias in the metrics used. Indeed, all the data was collected on the 30th of January 2020. During that time, uprisings in the city of Tripoli were taking place. The CSOs, who were highly involved in this uprising probably posted and tweeted more during this period of time, increasing their activity score. This external factor might have caused distortions in some of the scores that were calculated.

INACCURACY OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PROXY FOR POPULARITY

In the model adopted, Social Media metrics were only used as a proxy for each CSO's popularity and activity. Indeed, those metrics can give an idea of the overall situation but are not entirely accurate by themselves. In fact, some CSOs might be quite active through phoning or other Social Media platforms such as WhatsApp or YouTube etc. thus, combining the Social Media metrics with other involvement metrics could give more accurate scores for each CSO.

Based on all of the above, this mapping study reserves a 3% (2 out of 63 sample) error margin in addition to a probable discrepancy attributed to the CSOs' volatile opinion which is often interrelated with regional events and turmoil, and that can change from day to day based on new occurrences and shifting alliances.





APPENDIX 2 - SOCIAL MEDIA SCORING SYSTEM

For the **popularity score**, the following features were used:

$$\begin{aligned} & \textit{popularity score} \\ & = \text{instafollowers}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{instalikes}_{\text{normalized}} \\ & + \text{instafollowerratio}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{twitfollowers}_{\text{normalized}} \\ & + \text{twitfollowerratio}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{twitretweets}_{\text{normalized}} \\ & + \text{twitfavourites}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{fblikes}_{\text{normalized}} \end{aligned}$$

Where:

-instafollowers, twitfollowers and fblikes are respectively the number of followers on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook page likes.

-instafollowerratio and twitfollowerratio are the ratio between the number of following and number of followers. Those numbers were then inversely normalized, since a lower ratio shows that more people followed the people organically and not on a follow unfollow basis

-instalikes represent the average number of likes per Instagram post, using the data of the last 12 instagram posts

-twitfavourites and twitretweets represent the average number of favourites and retweets, using the data of the last 20 tweets

Based on those features, each CSOs got a popularity score out of 8.

For the **activity score**, the following features were used:

$$\begin{aligned} & \textit{activity score} \\ & = \text{instaposts}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{instapostfrequency}_{\text{normalized}} \\ & + \text{instalastpost}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{twittweets}_{\text{normalized}} \\ & + \text{twitfrequency}_{\text{normalized}} + \text{twitlastpost}_{\text{normalized}} \end{aligned}$$

Where:

-instaposts and twittweets are respectively the number of posts on Instagram and tweets on Twitter for each CSOs. Those numbers were min-max normalized.

-instapostfrequency is the average day between posts, using the most recent 12 insta posts. And since the lower, the better, those numbers were inversely min-max normalized.

-twitfrequency is the day difference between the most recent and 20th last recent tweet. And since the lower, the better, those numbers were inversely min-max normalized.

-instalastpost and twitlastpost are the days between the last post and today's date. The lower this number is the better. This is why they were inversely normalized as well.

Based on those features, each CSOs got an activity score out of 6.

An overall score was then calculated as the sum of the popularity and activity score:

$$\text{overall score} = \text{popularity score} + \text{activity score}$$

Thus, in a nutshell, this model quantified all the data gathered into two numbers that summarized the CSOs popularity and activity among all Social Media platforms. A total score was then calculated to provide a general idea of the situation.



APPENDIX 3 - SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

I - Organization Contact - كيفية الاتصال بالمنظمة

1- Organization Name

اسم المنظمة

2- Organization Address

عنوان المنظمة

3- Email Address

البريد الإلكتروني

4-CSO representative in filling in this questionnaire - contact name

ممثل المنظمة لتعبئة هذه الاستمارة - اسم المعني بالاتصال

5- Landline Number

رقم الهاتف الأرضي

6- Mobile Number

رقم الهاتف الخليوي

7- Social Media Platforms

منصات التواصل الاجتماعي

Twitter	<input type="text"/>
Facebook	<input type="text"/>
Instagram	<input type="text"/>
Website	<input type="text"/>
Other	<input type="text"/>

II - Organization General Information - معلومات عن المنظمة

1-Type of Organization

نوع المنظمة

- Political Party - حزب سياسي
- Movement - تحرك/مجموعة
- NGO - جمعية
- Syndicate - نقابة
- Coalition - تحالف
- Other - آخر _____

2- Is the organization registered at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities?

هل المنظمة مسجلة في وزارة الداخلية والبلديات؟

- Yes - نعم
- No - لا

If Yes, under which number - رقم التسجيل _____

3- In which areas or directorates is the organization active?

في أي محافظات او مناطق تنشط المنظمة؟

4- Date in which the organization started its work (DD.MM.YYYY)

متى بدأ عمل المؤسسة؟

5- Board Members or official representatives of the organization

أعضاء مجلس الهيئة الإدارية أو الممثلون الرسميون للمنظمة

6- What are the Mission, Vision and Objectives of the organization?

ما هي مهام ورؤية واهداف الجمعية؟

Mission – مهام

Vision – رؤية

Objectives - اهداف

7- Does the Organization have an intention to be politically involved through upcoming elections?

هل تسعى المنظمة الى لعب دور سياسي من خلال الانتخابات المقبلة؟

- Yes - نعم
- No - لا
- Undecided - متردد

8- How does the organization finance itself?

ما هو مصدر تمويل المنظمة؟

- Donations - تبرعات
- Personal Financing - تمويل ذاتي
- Other – آخر _____

III - Organization Standpoint on Following Subjects - **مواقف المنظمة من المواضيع التالية**

1- What is the organization's standpoint on political sectarianism and the civil state?

ما هو موقفكم من الطائفية السياسية والدولة المدنية؟

2- What is the organization's standpoint on the country's neutrality?

ما موقفكم من مبدأ النأي بالنفس أو الحياد للبنان؟

3- Is the organization in favour of the border limitations?

ما هو موقفكم من ترسيم الحدود؟

4- What is the organization's Economic Reforms plan?

ما هو مشروع الإصلاح الاقتصادي الذي تطرحه منظماتكم؟

5- What is the organization's standpoint on weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?

ما هو موقفكم من حيازة السلاح خارج نطاق الدولة؟

6- What is the organization's standpoint on administrative decentralization?

ما هو موقفكم من اللامركزية الإدارية؟

APPENDIX 4 – LIST OF 420 CSOS
(EXCLUDING THE 63 CSOS LISTED IN APPENDIX 5)

	Name Eng.	Name Ar.		Name Eng.	Name Ar.
1	3rd Republic	الجمهورية الثالثة	30	Al Mountada El Watani - National Forum	المنتدى المدني
2	Active only Activists	Active only Activists	31	Al Moustakelloun - The Independents	المستقلون
3	Adel Loubnan (Paris)	عدل لبنان (باريس)	32	Al Nahda El Qawmieh Movement	حركة النهضة القومية
4	Agapios Kfroui Group	مجموعة اغابوس كفوري	33	Al Nas Li Baada	الناس لبعضها
5	Ahrar El Dahie	احرار الضاحية	34	Al Sulta Lil Chaab	السلطة للشعب
6	Ain El Thawra	عين الثورة	35	Al Tamwil Bi El Nomou	مركز التمويل بالنمو للدراسات
7	Akkar Tantafed	عكار تنتفض	36	Al Thawra Bil Aamal Aala El Ared	الثورة بالعمل على الارض
8	Al Asatiza Al Ahrar	الاساتذة الاحرار	37	Al Thawra Kouwa	الثورة قوة
9	Al Bekaa24	البقاع 24	38	All -Means -All	All -means -all
10	Al Chaab Youkawem El Fasad	الشعب يقاوم الفساد	39	Alpha Octopus	Alpha Octopus
11	Al Chaab Yourid Iskat El Nizam	الشعب يريد اسقاط النظام	40	Ana El Mouwaten	انا المواطن
12	Al Chouf Tantafed	الشوف ينتفض	41	Ana Mich Defih - I Am Not Paying	انا مش دافع
13	Al Faihaa Chorus	كورال الفيحاء	42	Ana Moustakel - I am independent	انا مستقل
14	Al Hached El Maliouni	الحشد المليونى	43	Arab NGO Network for Development	Arab NGO Network for Development(annd)
15	Al Hamla El Wataniya Li Himayat Chat El Mina	الحملة المدنية لحماية شاطئ الميناء	44	Art Populi	تجمع فنانون من الشعب
16	Al Hamla El Wataniya Lil Hifaz Ala Marj Bisri	الحملة الوطنية للحفاظ على مرج بسري	45	Association of Veterans of the Armed Forces	رابطة قدامى القوات المسلحة
17	Al Itihad El Loubnani Lihoukuk El Achkhas El Maoukin Hirakian	الاتحاد اللبناني لحقوق الاشخاص المعوقين حركيا	46	Avengers	Avengers
18	Al Karar Lana	القرار لنا	47	Baalbek Professionals	مهنيون ومهنيات / مهنيات مهنيون - يعلبك
19	Al Liqaa El Janoubi	اللقاء الجنوبي	48	Badna Hkoukna - We Want Our Rights	بدنا حقوقنا
20	Al Liqaa El Mihani El Handasi	اللقاء المهني الهندسي	49	Badna Watan - We Want a Nation	بدنا وطن
21	Al Liqaa El Tachawouri El Madani	اللقاء التشاوري المدني (اقليم الخروب)	50	Beirut - My Case	بيروت قضيتي
22	Al Majles El Thakafi Li Loubnan El Janoubi	المجلس الثقافي للبنان الجنوبي	51	Beirut El Thawra	بيروت الثورة
23	Al Marsad El Loubnani Li houkuk El Mouwazafin	المرصد اللبناني لحقوق العمال والموظفين	52	Beirut Qalb El Watan	بيروت قلب الوطن
24	Al Minia Youth Union	اتحاد شباب المنية	53	Board of Trustees TV 17	Board of Trustees TV 17
25	Al Moubadara El Wataniya	المبادرة الوطنية	54	Chabeb El Masajed-Saida	شباب المساجد صيدا
26	Al Moukafaha El Chaabiya	المكافحة الشعبية	55	Change Starts Here AUB	التغيير من الجامعة الاميركية في بيروت
27	Al Mounasikiya El Aama li Chabakat El Amen Wal Aman	المنسقية العامة لشبكة الأمان للأهل	56	Chevrolet Revolutionaries	ثوار الشفروليه
28	Al Mountada El Taqqadomi	المنتدى التقدمي	57	Citizens' Movement	حركة المواطنة
29	Al Mountada El Thakafi El Adabi El Janoubi	المنتدى الثقافي الأدبي الجنوبي	58	Civic Influence Hub	ملتقى التأثير المدني


	Name Eng.	Name Ar.		Name Eng.	Name Ar.
59	Civil Disobedience	عصيان مدني	90	Hamlat Islah El Nizam	حملة اصلاح النظام
60	Civil Marriage in Lebanon	مجموعة الزواج المدني في لبنان	91	Harakat El Mahroumin Tripoli	حركة المحرومين طرابلس
61	Civil Society Movement	تيار المجتمع المدني	92	Harakat El Nahda El Kawmia	حركة النهضة القومية
62	Civil State Gathering	لقاء الدولة المدنية	93	Harakat El Thawra Tounadik	حركة الثورة تناديك
63	Coalition for the Independence of the judiciary in Lebanon	ائتلاف استقلال القضاء في لبنان	94	Harakat El Waii (Zahle)	حركة الوعي (زحلة)
64	Coffee & Politics	coffee & politics (جبيل)	95	Harakat El Walaa Lil Watan	حركة الولاء للوطن
65	Collectif Libanais de France	Collectif Libanais de France	96	Harakat Hak	حركة حق
66	Comite Preparatoire du Congres National	Comite Preparatoire du "Congres National"	97	Harakat Mawtini El Thawria	حركة موطني الثورية
67	Communist Action Organization In Lebanon	منظمة العمل الشيوعي	98	Harakat Thawret El Jabel	حركة ثورة الجبل
68	Communist Party	الحزب الشيوعي	99	Harakat Thawret Watan	حركة ثورة وطن
69	Council groups of revolution	مجلس مجموعات من الثورة	100	Hariri University RHU	Hariri University
70	Cross Arts	جمعية فنون متقاطعة ثقافية (طرابلس)	101	Hayaat Abnaa El Arkoub	هيئة ابناء العرقوب
71	Dar El Moussawer	دار المصور	102	Hayaat Al Ahliya lil Amal Al Madani	الهيئات الاهلية للعمل المدني
72	Darsouna	درسونا	103	Hayaat Daam El Thawra	هيئة دعم الثورة
73	Democratiyoun - Democrates	ديمقراطيون	104	Hayaat Inmaa Marjeyoun Hasbaya	هيئة انماء مرجعيون حاصبيا
74	Dental Association in Saida & the South	رابطة اطباء الاسنان في صيدا والجنوب	105	Hela Hela Ho	فوج هيللا هيللا هو
75	Direct Action	فعل مباشر	106	Helem - Dream	حلم
76	Economy for Lebanon	الاقتصاد من اجل لبنان	107	Hello Aanna	حلو عنا - شباب 17 تشرين
77	Eltimas El Sirriya El Masrifiya	التماس السرية المصرفية	108	Hermel 17 October	الهرمل 17 تشرين
78	Emergency Authority to save the city of Tripoli - SOS	هيئة الطوارئ لأنقاذ مدينة طرابلس	109	Hirak Baalbeck El Hermel	حراك بعلبك الهرمل الشعبي
79	Eres Loubnan Litawthik El Video	عرس لبنان لتوثيق الفيديو	110	Hirak Bcharri	حراك بشري
80	Fawj El Tanajer	فوج الطناجر	111	Hirak Bednayel	حراك بدنايل
81	Fekr w Insan	جمعية فكر وانسان (معركة / صور)	112	Hirak Bent Jbeil	حراك بنت جبيل
82	Film Makers United	Filmmakers united	113	Hirak Brital	حراك بريتايل
83	Food for Quarantine	Food for Quarantine	114	Hirak El Hermel	حراك الهرمل
84	For a Better Lebanon	من اجل لبنان افضل	115	Hirak El Janoub	حراك الجنوب
85	Forever lebanon	الى الابد لبنان	116	Hirak El Maten El Aala	حراك المتن الاعلى
86	Free Professions Group in Saida and Suburbs	تجمع المهن الحرة في صيدا والجوار	117	Hirak El Wehda El Wataniya	حراك الوحدة الوطنية
87	Free Revolutionaries	ثوار احرار	118	Hirak Jezzine	حراك جزين
88	General Federation in Lebanon	الاتحاد العام لنقابات عمال لبنان	119	Hirak Madani El Akkari	الحراك المدني العكاري
89	Gherbal Initiative	غربال	120	Hirak Nabatieh	حراك النبطية

	Name Eng.	Name Ar.		Name Eng.	Name Ar.
121	Hirak Sour	حراك صور	152	Kulluna lil Watan	كلنا للوطن
122	Hirak Tollab Saida	حراك طلاب صيدا	153	KYK group	KYK group
123	Hizb Taliaat Loubnan El Arabi El Ichtiraki	حزب طليعة لبنان العربي الاشتراكي	154	LADE	الجمعية اللبنانية من أجل ديمقراطية الانتخابات
124	Houras El Ard	حراس الارض	155	Lahon w Bas	لهون وبس
125	Houras El Madina (Nabatiye)	حراس المدينة (النبطية)	156	Lahon w Bas	لهون وبس
126	I Am Starving Too	انا جعت كمان	157	Lajnat Abnaa El Watan	لجنة أبناء الوطن (صيداء، صور، بيروت، طرابلس)
127	Independence Movement	حركة الاستقلال	158	Lakad Han El Wakt Li Inkaz Loubnan	لقد حان الوقت لإنقاذ لبنان
128	Independent Engineers and Architects	Independent Engineers and Architects	159	Lakad Kholikna li Naatared - We were born to contest	لقد خلقنا لنعترض
129	Independent Group of Doctors at Sacred Heart Hospital	Independent group of doctors at sacred heart hospital	160	LAU Independents	LAU Independents
130	Independent Lawyers	محامون مستقلون	161	League for Lebanese Women's Rights	لجنة حقوق المرأة اللبنانية
131	Independent lebanese Coordination	التنسيقية اللبنانية المستقلة	162	Lebanese Civil Coalition	الائتلاف المدني اللبناني
132	Independent Unionist Movement in Lebanon	التيار النقابي المستقل	163	Lebanese Democratic Women's Gathering RDFL	التجمع النسائي الديمقراطي اللبناني RDFL
133	Infactleb	شبكة المساءلة والحكم الرشيد	164	Lebanese DNA	Lebanese DNA
134	Inform to Weaponise	Inform to Weaponise	165	Lebanese DNA	Lebanese DNA
135	Intifadat Sour w Mintakatiha	انتفاضة صور ومنطقتها	166	Lebanese Energies	الطاقات اللبنانية
136	Itihad Thouwar Beirut	اتحاد ثوار بيروت	167	Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace	المؤسسة اللبنانية للسلم الاهلي الدائم
137	Itihad Thouwar El Chamal	اتحاد ثوار الشمال	168	Lebanese International LOBBY	Lebanese International LOBBY
138	Itihad Thouwar El Bekaa	اتحاد ثوار البقاع	169	Lebanese Kataeb Party	حزب الكتائب
139	I'tilaf Binaa Dawla	ائتلاف بناء الدولة	170	Lebanese Liberal Party	الحزب الليبرالي اللبناني
140	I'tilaf El Watani El Loubnani	الائتلاف الوطني اللبناني	171	Lebanese Oil and Gas Initiative	المبادرة اللبنانية للنفط والغاز
141	Jabhat Moustakilin El Jabal	جبهة المستقلين الجبل	172	Lebanese Organization For Justice in Saida	المنظمة اللبنانية للعدالة صيدا
142	Jamiyat Fekr El Tamwil Bil Nomow	جمعية فكر التمويل بالنمو	173	Lebanese Transparency Association	الجمعية اللبنانية لتعزيز الشفافية
143	Jinsiyati Karamati	جنسيتي كرامتي	174	Lebanon Today	لبنان اليوم
144	Justice FTR (for the revolution)	Justice FTR (for the revolution)	175	Legal Agenda	المفكرة الوطنية
145	KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation	جمعية كفى	176	Li Trablous - For Tripoli	لطرابلس
146	Karma Daem El Atfal Wa Morahikin Fi Loubnan	كارما دعم الاطفال والمراهقين المرضى في لبنان	177	Liberal Syndicates	نقابيون احرار
147	Kelloun Yaani Kelloun	كلن يعني كلن	178	Life Lebanon	لايف لبنانون
148	Khaymet I'tisam Halba	خيمة اعتصام حلبا	179	Liqaq El Bekka El Thawri	لقاء البقاع الثوري
149	Khaymet Khaldeh	خيمة خلدة	180	Lisan El Hal Majles Ahel Beirut	لسان الحال مجلس اهل بيروت
150	Khaymet Souk El Khan (Marjeoun-Hasbaya)	خيمة سوق الخان (مرجعيون - حاصبيا)	181	Loubnan Balad Sayed, Horr, Moustakel	لبنان بلد سيد حر مستقل
151	Kitlet El Asatiza El Moutaakidin	كتلة الأساتذة المتعاقدين - الأساس	182	Loubnan El Mouwatiniya	لبنان المواطينية

	Name Eng.	Name Ar.		Name Eng.	Name Ar.
183	Loubnan Hawiyati	لبنان هويتي	214	Naijihi Majles El Khedma El Madaniya	ناجحي مجلس الخدمة المدنية
184	Loubnan Khat Ahmar	لبنان خط احمر	215	Nakaba Tantafed	النقابة تنتفض
185	Loubnan Yaklob El Tawila	لبنان يقلب الطاولة	216	Nassawiyah	نسوية
186	Loubnaniyoun	لبنانيون	217	National Democratic Assembly	التجمع الوطني الديمقراطي
187	Loubnaniyoun	لبنانيون	218	National Party - Intifada	الحزب القومي، الانتفاضة
188	LPHU	اتحاد المقعدين اللبنانيين LPHU	219	National Youth Union	اتحاد الشباب الوطني
189	Ma Mnetkhalla Aan Loubnan Group	مجموعة ما منتخلى عن لبنان	220	Nehna El Chaab	نحن الشعب
190	Maharat Foundation	مهارات	221	New Lebanon	New Lebanon
191	Majles El Janoub Front 17 Oct	مجلس الجنوب جبهة 17 تشرين	222	NGO Forum in Tripoli	ملتقى الجمعيات الاهلية في طرابلس
192	Majles Momathili El Thawra	مجلس ممثلي الثورة	223	NGO St pantaleimon	NGO St pantaleimon
193	Majmouaat Al Ghad	مجموعة الغد	224	North Coordination	من الشمال
194	Majmouaat El Chouf wa Aley	مجموعة الشوف وعاليه	225	October Fist Revolutionaries	ثوار قبضة تشرين
195	Majmouaat El Masref Wel Chabibe Lil Taghyir	مجموعة المصرف والشبيبة للتغيير	226	Official Page Teacher's Committee in the governmental education	الصفحة الرسمية للجنة الأساتذة المتعاقدين في التعليم الرسمي الأساسي
196	Majmouaat El Qarar El Saab	مجموعة القرار الصعب	227	Old Beirut Revolutionaries	قدامى ثوار بيروت
197	Majmouaat Touyour El Janna	مجموعة طيور الجنة	228	One Hand (Koura)	One hand (Koura)
198	Markaz El Kifah El Istratiji El Loubnani	مركز الكفاح الاستراتيجي اللبناني	229	Parlement El Dawla El Adila	برلمان الدولة العادلة
199	Mich Defiin - We Are Not Paying	مش دافعين	230	Peace Revolution	ثورة السلام
200	Mihaniyat Wa Mihaniyoun	مهنيات ومهنيون صحة (طب اسنان)	231	Peaceful Protests	Peaceful Protests
201	Min Ajl El Hifaz Aala El Thawra	من اجل الحفاظ على الثورة	232	People Want Curing The System	الشعب يريد اصلاح النظام
202	Mithak El Thawra	ميثاق الثورة	233	Phoenician Movement	الحركة الفينيقية
203	Mouhamoun Fi El Hirak	محامون في الحراك	234	Platform One	Platform One
204	Mouhandisou Saida Wal Jiar - Saida and Suburbs Engineer	مهندسو صيدا والجوار	235	Pollitical Science Graduate Assocation in Bekaa	رابطة خريجي العلوم السياسية في البقاع
205	Moultaka Hiwar W Aata' Bila Houdoud	ملتقى حوار وعطاء بلا حدود	236	Proud Lebanon	براود لبيانون
206	Mounadiloun	مناضلون	237	Public Works	ستديو اشغال عامة
207	Mountada Sour El Thakafi	منتدى صور الثقافي	238	Raise Your Voice	عل صوتك
208	Moustamiroun	مستمرون	239	Rally For the Lebanon	Rally for the Revolution
209	Nabad El Nabatiyeh	نبض النبطية	240	Rebels	ثائرون
210	Nabad El Thouwar	نبض الثوار	241	Recycle Lebanon	ريسايل لبنان
211	Nachitoun	ناشطون (مستقلة)	242	Revolution # Lawledna	ثورة # لولادنا
212	NAHNOO	نحن	243	Revolution 2019 Demands	مطالب ثورة 2019
213	Nahwa El Watan	نحو الوطن	244	Revolution Movement Trust	حركة الثورة ثقة

245	Revolution Protection Committee	هيئة حماية الثورة	276	Tajamoh El Mouwazafin El Mostakilin Fi El Idara El Ama	تجمع الموظفين المستقلين في الادارة العامة
246	Revolution Union	اتحاد احرار الثورة	277	Tajamoh l'lam 17 October	تجمع اعلام 17 تشرين
247	Ring group	Ring group	278	Tajamoh Li Inkaz Loubnan	تجمع لانتقاد لبنان
248	Sahat Chmistar	ساحة شمسطار	279	Tajamoh Maan Liwatan Afdal	تجمع معا لوطن افضل
249	Sahat El Aalm (Sour)	ساحة العلم (صور)	280	Tajamoh Min Ajl Loubnan	التجمع الوطني من اجل لبنان/ التجمع من اجل لبنان
250	Sahat El Hermel	ساحة الهرمل	281	Tajamoh Shabeb Zahle	تجمع شباب زحلة
251	Sahat Kassernya	ساحة قصرنيا	282	Tajamoh Thouwar Baalbeck	تجمع ثوار بعلبك
252	Sahat Wa Masahat Tripoli	ساحة ومساحة طرابلس	283	Takatol El Tolab El Mostakilin Fi EL Jamiaa El Loubnaniya	تكتل الطلاب المستقلين في الجامعة اللبنانية
253	Sakker El Dekene	سكر الدكانة	284	Takatol Thouwar El Ahrar	تكتل الثوار الاحرار
254	Sarkhat Chaab	صرخة شعب	285	Takatol Thouwar Loubnan El Ahrar	تكتل ثوار لبنان الاحرار
255	Sarkhat El Moudiin	صرخة المودعين	286	Tansiq Entifadat Chark Zahle	تنسيق انتفاضة شرق زحلة
256	Sawt El Imraa El Loubnaniya	صوت الامراة اللبنانية	287	Tarik El Thouwar	طريق الثوار
257	Sawt El Thawra	حركة صوت الثورة	288	Tayyar El Khat El Tarikhi	التيار الخط التاريخي
258	Secular Democratic Assembly	التجمع الديمقراطي العلماني	289	Thairat 17 Tchrin	ثائرات 17 تشرين
259	Seeds for legal initiatives	سيدات للمبادرات القانونية	290	Thawra Bus	بوسطة الثورة
260	Social Radical Change	لقاء في خدمة الثورة	291	Thawra Map	ثورة ماب
261	Souk Saida El Tijari	سوق صيدا التجاري	292	Thawra Mich Hirak	ثورة مش حراك
262	Southerners For Freedom	جنوبيون للحرية	293	Thawra Moustamira	حركة الثورة مستمرة
263	Strategia For Lebanon	استراتيجية من اجل لبنان	294	Thawrat Ahrar Beirut	ثورة احرار بيروت
264	Strike/ Active only	Strike/ Active only	295	Thawrat El Awedem	ثورة الاوادم
265	Switzerland of the Middle East	لبنان سويسرا الشرق	296	Thawrat El Jabal	ثورة الجبل
266	Syrian Social Nationalist Party	الحزب السوري القومي الاجتماعي الانتفاضة	297	Thawrat Shabeb El Bekaa Alloubnani	ثورة شباب البقاع اللبناني
267	Taa Nehke Siyese (Tripoli)	تعا نحكي سياسي (طرابلس)	298	Thawratna lil Watan	حركة ثورتنا للوطن
268	Taalabaya El Izza Wal Karama	تعابايا العزة والكرامة	299	The Lebanese Association For Taxpayers' Rights	الجمعية اللبنانية لحقوق ومصالح المكلفين
269	Taawniyat Aghora Al Faniya	تعاونية اغورا الفنية	300	The Lebanese Home	البيت اللبناني
270	Tahalof Kiwa Althawra	تحالف قوى الثورة	301	The Lebanese Popular Movement	الحركة الشعبية اللبنانية
271	Tahwrat El Chaab Al Loubnani El Anid	ثورة الشعب اللبناني العنيد	302	The Nasserite Popular Organization - Al Tanzim Al Chaabi El Naseri	التنظيم الشعبي الناصري
272	Tajamoh Abnaa Baalbeck	تجمع أبناء بعلبك	303	The National Movement in Barja	الحراك الوطني برجا
273	Tajamoh El Chabibe El Democrati	تجمع الشبيبة الديمقراطي	304	The Platform of the independent Hasbaya region	منصة مستقلي منطقة حاصبيا
274	Tajamoh El Irada El Chaabiya El Nabatiye	تجمع الارادة الشعبية النبطية	305	The Popular Movement in Minia	الحراك الشعبي المنيه
275	Tajamoh El Moasasat El Ahlia Fi Saida	تجمع المؤسسات الاهلية في صيدا	306	The Renaissance of a Nation	نهضة وطن
307	The Social Grocery	الدكانة الاجتماعية (طرابلس)	333	Thouwar Taalabaya	ثوار تعابايا

308	Thouwar Ahrar Rachaya Wal Bekaa Al Gharbi	ثوار احرار راشيا والبقاع الغربي	334	Thouwar Tarik El Jdideh	ثوار طريق الجديدة
309	Thouwar Akkar	ثوار عكار	335	Thouwar Tripoli	ثوار طرابلس
310	Thouwar Aley / Aley Tantafid	ثوار عاليه او عاليه تنتفض	336	Thouwar w Ahrar Saida	ثوار واحرار صيدا
311	Thouwar Barja	ثوار برجنا	337	Thouwar Zahle	ثوار احرار زحلة / ثوار زحلة
312	Thouwar Byblos	ثوار جبيل / ثورة تشرين جبيل	338	Together We Stand (Tripoli)	Together we stand (Tripoli)
313	Thouwar El Abde	ثوار العبدية	339	Tomato Party	حزب بندورة
314	Thouwar El Iqlim	ثوار الإقليم	340	Tripoli One and Only	طرابلس فوق الجميع
315	Thouwar El Marj	ثوار المرج	341	UJDL - ULDY	اتحاد الشباب الديمقراطي اللبناني
316	Thouwar El Metn El Aala / Thouwar El Metn	ثوار المتن الأعلى او ثوار المتن	342	UMAM Documentation &Research	أمم للتوثيق والابحاث
317	Thouwar El Mina	ثوار الميناء	343	Universitaires Independants	جامعيون مستقلون
318	Thouwar El Minye	ثوار المنية	344	University freelance doctors	اطباء مستقلين جامعيين
319	Thouwar El Nabatiye El Moustakelin	ثوار النبطية المستقلين	345	USJ University	USJ University
320	Thouwar El Sahel	منسقية ثوار السهل	346	Very Proud Free Lebanese	Very Proud Free Lebanese
321	Thouwar Hasbaya	ثوار حاصبيا	347	Wakilni	وكلي
322	Thouwar Jabal Loubnan	ثوار جبل لبنان	348	Warchet Watan (Jbeil)	ورشة وطن جبيل
323	Thouwar Jal El Dib	ثوار جل الديب	349	Watani Hawiyati	وطني هويتي
324	Thouwar Kesserwan	ثوار كسروان	350	Wehdat Thouwar Beirut Wa Dawahiha	وحدة ثوار بيروت وضواحيها
325	Thouwar Kfareman	ثوار كفر رمان	351	Wihdat El Takhtit Wal Mousaale	وحدة التخطيط والمساءلة
326	Thouwar Majdel Anjar	ثوار مجدل عنجر	352	Winch	ونش
327	Thouwar Majdel Anjar 17 October	ثوار مجدل عنجر 17 تشرين	353	Workers Art Culture	عاملات وعاملون في الفن والثقافة
328	Thouwar Nabatieh / Hirak Nabatieh	ثوار النبطية او حراك النبطية/ الصفحة الرسمية	354	You Stink - Tol'et Rihetkon	طلعت ريحتكم
329	Thouwar Ras Baalbek	ثوار راس بعلبك	355	Youth Dialogue	حوار الشباب
330	Thouwar Saadnayel	ثوار سعدنايل	356	Youth For Beirut	شباب لبيروت
331	Thouwar Saida	ثوار صيدا	357	Zgharta El Zewye Tantafed	زغرنا الزاوية تنتفض
332	Thouwar Sour / Sour Tantafed	ثوار صور او صور تنتفض			



APPENDIX 5 - THE PILOT SAMPLE - 63 CSOS

The mapping study was restricted to a sample of 63 CSOs referred to as the “Pilot Sample” listed in the below table (Table 3) and as a listing in (Appendix 5). A detailed ID card for each CSO is highlighted in (Appendix 6)

Appendix 5 - 63 CSOs

1	10452 Party		حزب 10452	12	Center 17 For Studies & Research		مركز 17 للبحوث
2	3rd Republic		الجمهورية الثالثة	13	Civic National Front		الجبهة المدنية الوطنية
3	Aamieh 17 October		عامية 17 تشرين	14	Civil Society Table of Dialogue		طاولة حوار المجتمع المدني
4	Aan Haqaq Dafeh		عن حقاك دافع	15	Depositors Union		رابطة المودعين
5	Al Mountadayat		المنتديات	16	Green Party		حزب الخضر
6	Ana El Arar		انا القرار	17	Harakat El Chaab		حركة الشعب
7	Ana Khat Ahmar		انا خط احمر	18	Haraket El Waii		حركة الوعي (د عصام خليفة)
8	Bala Esm		حركة بلا اسم الثورية	19	Hawa Teshreen		هوا تشرين
9	Beirut Madinati		بيروت مديني	20	Houras El Madina		حركة حراس المدينة
10	Beirut Revolutionaries		ثوار بيروت	21	Kafeh		كافح
11	Bidayat Watan		بداية وطن	22	Kantari Group		مجموعة القنطاري

23	Komsan Bid		القمصان الأبيض	34	Marsad Chaabi Li Mouharabat El Fasad		المركز الشعبي لمحاربة الفساد
24	Kulluna Irada		كلنا إرادة	35	Massirat Watan		مسيرة وطن
25	La Troisieme Voix Pour Le Liban		الصوت الثالث للبنان	36	Mihaniyat wa Mihaniyoun Handasa		مهنيات ومهنيون هندسة
26	Lajnat El Mouhamin Lil Difah Aan El Moutazahirin		لجنة الدفاع عن المتظاهرين	37	Minteshreen		منتشرين
27	Lihaqqi		لحقي	38	Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla		مواطنون ومواطنات في دولة
28	Liqa Teshreen		لقاء تشرين	39	Nabad El Janoub El Mountafed		نبض الجنوب المنفض
29	Loubnan El Risala		لبنان الرسالة	40	National Bloc		الكتلة الوطنية
30	Loubnan Yantafed		لبنان ينتفض	41	National Rescue Movement - General Chamel Roukoz		حركة الإنقاذ الوطني - شامل روكز
31	Mada		مدى	42	National Veterans Authority		الهيئة الوطنية للمحاربين القدامى
32	Madraset El Mouchaghibin		خيمة مدرسة المشاغيبين	43	New Lebanese Party		البنانيون الجدد
33	Majmouaat Shabeb El Masref		مجموعة شباب المصرف	44	October 17 Front		جبهة 17 تشرين

45	Pyramid Lebanon		بيراميد لبنانون	55	Street		الشارع اللبناني
46	Rebels Souwar 17		ريبلز ثوار 17	56	Tahalof Watani		تحالف وطني
47	Regional Forum for consultancy and Studies		المنتدى الإقليمي للاستشارات والدراسات	57	Tajamoh Isti'adat al Dawla		تجمع استعادة الدولة
48	ReLebanon		لبنان عن جديد	58	Takatol Ouaa		تكتل اوع
49	Retired Military - General Georges Nader		حراك العسكريين المتقاعدين - العميد جورج نادر	59	Taqaddom		تقدم
50	Revolutionary Bloc		الكتلة الثورية	60	Thawra Unsa		الثورة انثى
51	Right of Speech		جمعية صون حق التعبير	61	Thawrat Loubnan		ثورة لبنان
52	Sabaa Party		حزب سبعة	62	United For Lebanon		متحدون
53	Shabab Dod Nizam		الحركة الشبابية للتغيير	63	Waey		مبادرة وعي
54	Soverign Forum		الملتقى السيادي				

APPENDIX 6 - 63 CSOS ID CARDS



10452 Party



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The party aims to achieve the following goals in various ways and forms of work and peaceful pressure:

Building a strong nation in which women have a pioneering role to the benefit of Lebanese citizens
Emphasis on the principle of equality in rights and duties among all citizens, and work to enhance the citizen's dignity and secure his full rights and reject all forms of discrimination based on gender, race, religion, disability and colour. Affirm that the law is above all and applies on all the Lebanese territory

CSO Name - Arabic	حزب 10452
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	North
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Roula Mrad
Email	afaq.rola@hotmail.com
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	10452party
Website	10452party.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

October 17 Front

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Support the Lebanese people's popular uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	جبهة 17 تشرين
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	General Georges Nader Lina Hamdan
Email	hamdanlina@hotmail.com
Instagram	17octfront
Twitter	17octfront
Facebook	17octfront
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

3rd Republic



I-CSO Self-Presentation

We are united on the necessity to change the existing system towards a secular, civil, democratic state, a state of social justice and equality

CSO Name - Arabic	الجمهورية الثالثة
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information


Contact Person	Wissam Ahmad
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	The3rdRepublic
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Aamieh 17 October



I-CSO Self-Presentation

It is a group of young protesters men and women against the corrupt sectarian regime and financial system.

CSO Name - Arabic	عامية 17 تشرين
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Walid Fakhreddine Farouk Yacoub
Email	N/A
Instagram	aamieh17oct
Twitter	Aamieh17oct
Facebook	Aamieh17oct
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Aan Haqqaq Dafeh



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A civil movement of independent people that has no leadership other than the group's goals and the demands of the October 17 popular uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	عن حقك دافع
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Mount Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Carole Abou Jaoude
Email	3anha2akdafe3@gmail.com
Instagram	3anha2akdafe3
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	3anha2akdafe3
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Al Mountadayat



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A movement of young adults trying to advocate for new socio-economic policies and achieve some demands to the deprived areas such as Tripoli and the Center Bekaa

CSO Name - Arabic	المنتديات
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2018

II-Contact Information


Contact Person	Bassem Hamad
Email	mountada.albekaa@hotmail.com
Instagram	mountada.akkar
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	almountadaalikhbari
Website	almountada.net

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Ana El Arar



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Movement created from the heart of the popular uprising calling for a sovereign country based on a liberal economy.

CSO Name - Arabic	انا القرار
Type of CSO	Group & Media
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Walid Fakhreddine
Email	dinasue606@gmail.com
Instagram	ana_al_arar
Twitter	AnaAlArar1
Facebook	AnaAlArar
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Ana Khat Ahmar



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Group of Business Owners of the private sector fighting against anti-corruption

CSO Name - Arabic	انا خط احمر
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Sami Saab Waddah Sadek
Email	sami.saab@phenomena-lb.com
Instagram	anakhatahmar
Twitter	AnaKhatAhmar
Facebook	AnaKhatAhmar
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021 + Consultation with Agent & Desk Review

Bala Esm

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Discrete CSO, not much Functional. Under Alketla El Thawriah. Follows Politicians to restaurants

CSO Name - Arabic	حركة بلا اسم الثورية
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Jad El Rayes
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Beirut Madinati



I-CSO Self-Presentation

It is a civil, not sectarian, political movement that seeks building an alternative political project. It was founded by a group of academics, mostly from the American University of Beirut and activists, a few months before the municipal elections in Beirut

CSO Name - Arabic	بيروت مدينتي
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Tarek Ammar Paul Saber Diana Menhem
Email	contact@beirutmadinati.com social@beirutmadinati.com
Instagram	beirutmadinati
Twitter	BeirutMadinati
Facebook	BeirutMadinati
Website	www.beirutmadinati.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Beirut Revolutionaries



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Beirut Revolutionary created from the heart of the Oct. 17, 2019 popular uprising to demand for the rights of Beirut Citizens

CSO Name - Arabic	ثوار بيروت
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Beirut
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Amine Ammourieh Ruchdi Kabbani Marwan Ayoubi
Email	info@beirutrevolutionaries.com amine_kam@live.com
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	BeirutRevolutionaries
Website	beirutrevolutionaires.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Bidayat Watan

بداية
وطن

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Group of young men and women calling for a better country

CSO Name - Arabic	بداية وطن
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Anthony Doueihy
Email	anthonydouaihy9@gmail.com
Instagram	bidayatwatan
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	بداية-وطن-100796368438144
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

Center 17 For Studies & Research



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The 17th Center for Studies and Research was established to rationalize the Lebanese popular uprising and to provide alternatives for the transitional revolutionary government with legislative powers. Center 17 will also contribute to drawing the parameters of the next phase in Lebanon

CSO Name - Arabic	مركز 17 للبحوث
Type of CSO	Research Center
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Walid Moheb Mahmoud Kaaki
Email	mahmoudkaaki89@gmail.com walid.elmoheb@gmail.com
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

Civic National Front



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The National Civil Front is an open platform for young women and men in Lebanon, activists and opinion leaders to meet on the principles of the October 17 popular uprising and unify efforts to achieve change

CSO Name - Arabic	التيبة المدنية الوطنية
Type of CSO	Lobbyist Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Ahmad Zoabi
Email	cnfleb@gmail.com
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	CNFLeb
Facebook	CNFLeb
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Civil Society Table of Dialogue

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Forum for NGOs and CSOs all over Lebanon raising political awareness

CSO Name - Arabic	طاولة حوار المجتمع المدني
Type of CSO	Lobbyist Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2017

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hayat Arslan
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Depositors Union



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A consolidated confrontation that seeks to establish five non-negotiable basic pillars, to solve the financial crisis that will be anchored by the power of the popular uprising, and the law: Fair cost distribution, Debt restructuring, Inclusiveness, Transparency, and Accountability. Any solution that does not rely upon these five pillars will not be able to secure the urgent interests of depositors and is thereby definitely unacceptable.

CSO Name - Arabic	رابطة المودعين
Type of CSO	Syndicate
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2010

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hadi Jaafar
Email	info@bdalebanon.com
Instagram	bdalebanon
Twitter	bdalebanon
Facebook	bdalebanon
Website	depositorsunion.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Green Party



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The Party believes in the richness of diversity and the right to be different. The Party respects political, cultural, religious, ethnic and gender diversity and endeavours to improve interaction and dialogue.

CSO Name - Arabic	حزب الخضر
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2000

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Nada Zaarour
Email	info@greenpartylebanon.org
Instagram	greenpartylebanon
Twitter	Gplebanon
Facebook	GPLebanon
Website	greenpartylebanon.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Harakat El Chaab



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A Political Party established by Najah Wakim in 2000

CSO Name - Arabic	حركة الشعب
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2000

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Ibrahim El Halabi
Email	info@ashaab.org
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	Ashaab_org
Facebook	ashaab.org
Website	ashaab.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Haraket El Waii



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The movement was created by Dr. Issam Khalifa, a historian and researcher in history and sociology, who has many books and is one of the most prominent Lebanese scientific intellectuals. He has a long history of national struggle, especially since he was a student at the Lebanese University until he became one of the most important history professors in it. He fought for many years to develop the university and liberate it from hotbeds of corruption, political favouritism and sectarianism.

CSO Name - Arabic	حركة الوعي
Type of CSO	University
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	1969

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Dr. Issam Khalifeh
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	groups/1486240285001604/about
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Hawa Teshreen



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Revolutionary group created within the October 17 popular uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	هوا تشرين
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information


Contact Person	Issam Bou Khaled
Email	N/A
Instagram	hawa_teshrin
Twitter	HawaTeshreen
Facebook	هوا-تشرين-100100438099955
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Houras El Madina



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A voluntary youth civic campaign aimed at ending the harm to the city of Tripoli

CSO Name - Arabic	حركة حراس المدينة
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	North
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Abou Mahmoud Chok
Email	hourasalmadina@gmail.com
Instagram	horras_al_madinah
Twitter	hourass_tripoli
Facebook	حراس-المدينة-1464020147261039
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Kafeh



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Free effective anarchist cadres

CSO Name - Arabic	كافح
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2018

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	N/A
Email	info@kafeh.org
Instagram	kafeh_leb
Twitter	kafehleb
Facebook	kafeh.lebanon
Website	www.kafeh.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Kantari Group

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Young group of adults created from the heart of October 17 popular uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	مجموعة القنطاري
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Roy Deeb Rawan Nassif
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Komsan Bid



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of independent doctors and pharmacists dedicating their work for humanitarian aids. The group includes more than a hundred doctors from various hospitals in Lebanon, shedding light on the files of corruption in the health sector and illegal medicine

CSO Name - Arabic	القمصان البيض
Type of CSO	Syndicate
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hadi Mrad
Email	N/A
Instagram	komsanbid
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	Al-Komsan-Al-Bid (White Shirts) - القمصان-البيض- 106065507482620
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Kulluna Irada



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Civic organization for political reform in Lebanon

CSO Name - Arabic	كلنا ارادة
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2017

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Nasser Saidi
Email	info@kulluna-irada.org
Instagram	kullunairada
Twitter	KullunaIrada
Facebook	KullunaIradaLebanon
Website	kulluna-irada.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

La Troisieme Voix Pour Le Liban



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The Third Voice for Lebanon is the voice that rises above the clamouring of personal interests and parochial politics. It is the voice of wholeness that claims Lebanon as one nation, undivided, sovereign, independent, and harmonious. It is the voice of reason, of compassion, of magnanimity, and honour. It is a voice that is calling for the emergence of a different future. A future built on better standards and values where we focus on the elements that unite us rather than divide us.

CSO Name - Arabic	الصوت الثالث للبنان
Type of CSO	Diaspora
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2012

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Lina Hamdan
Email	3vlebanon@3vlebanon.org hamdanlina@hotmail.com
Instagram	3vlebanon
Twitter	3VLebanon
Facebook	3VLebanon
Website	3vlebanon.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Lajnat El Mouhamin Lil Difah Aan El Moutazahirin



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of Lebanese lawyers and jurists who volunteered to defend protesters and sit-ins since the garbage movement in 2015 and during the October 2019 popular uprising.

CSO Name - Arabic	لجنة المحامين للدفاع عن المتظاهرين
Type of CSO	Syndicate
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Wael Hammam
Email	N/A
Instagram	thawra_lawyers
Twitter	LawyersThawra
Facebook	lawyersprotestleb
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	Not within the scope of the CSO
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Lihaqqi



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Socio-political organization committed to fight for people's rights

CSO Name - Arabic	لِحَقِّي
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2011

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Imad Amer
Email	media@lihaqqi.com
Instagram	lihaqqi
Twitter	Li_Haqqi
Facebook	LiHaqqi
Website	Lihaqqi.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Liqa Teshreen



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A political group of Lebanese keen to achieving the October 17 goals

CSO Name - Arabic	لقاء تشرين
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information


Contact Person	Ziad Abdel Samad
Email	liqa.teshrin@gmail.com
Instagram	liqa.teshrin
Twitter	liqaTeshrin
Facebook	لقاء-تشرين-LIQAA-Teshrin-113531546864660
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Loubnan El Risala



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A social, spiritual, humanitarian group whose goal is to spread spiritual human thought away from sectarianism and partisanship

CSO Name - Arabic	لبنان الرسالة
Type of CSO	Veterans
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2009

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Khalil El Helou
Email	N/A
Instagram	loubnan_al_risala
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	LoubnanAlRisala
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Loubnan Yantafed



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Our main goal is to reach a civil state in which freedom of thought, belief and opinion is respected. Striving to spread awareness among the citizens and to achieve the goals of October 17, 2019 uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	لبنان ينتفض
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Marwa Ghaziri Hiba Fatha
Email	info@lubnanyantafed.com
Instagram	lebprotests
Twitter	lebprotests
Facebook	lebprotests
Website	lubnanyantafed.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

Mada



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A political network of young adults fighting for regaining their political role

CSO Name - Arabic	مدي
Type of CSO	University
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2017

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Karim Saadeh
Email	madanetwork.leb@gmail.com
Instagram	madanetwork
Twitter	MadaNetworkLEB
Facebook	MadaNetwork
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Madrasat El Mouchaghibin



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A spontaneous idea created by a group of activists during the Tripoli uprising. The idea is similar to the comedy play that sheds light on a group of students considered unsuccessful in the eyes of the administration, but their perseverance led them to success. The name also embodies the authority's view of the demonstrators in this popular movement who aspire to bring change in power.

CSO Name - Arabic	مدرسة المشاغيبين
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	North
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Nazem
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	108966520529408-مدرسة-المشاغيبين-إنتفاضة_طرابلس
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Majmouaat Shabeb El Masref



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of young adults against political sectarianism working on developing an alternative solution towards a civil state

CSO Name - Arabic	مجموعة شباب المصرف
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hiba Habib Maymoon Chaddad
Email	msmasref@outlook.com
Instagram	msmasref
Twitter	msmasref
Facebook	msmasref
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Marsad Shaabi Li Mouharabat El Fasad



I-CSO Self-Presentation

It is a human rights group working in public affairs aiming at building a productive, fair and capable citizen state

CSO Name - Arabic	المرصد الشعبي لمحاربة الفساد
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2018

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hadi Moulla Wassef El Harake
Email	marsad.shaabi@gmail.com
Instagram	marsad.shaabi
Twitter	Marsad_Shaabi
Facebook	Marsad.Shaabi
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Massirat Watan



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A social democratic party carrying a project to rebuild a state of justice

CSO Name - Arabic	مسيرة وطن
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2017

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Halima Kaakour
Email	info@massiratwatan.org
Instagram	massiratwatan
Twitter	massiratwatan
Facebook	massiratwatan
Website	massiratwatan.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Mihaniyat wa Mihaniyoun Handasa

مهنيات
ومهنيون
هندسة
التقنية
تتفضل

I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of engineers who took part in the uprisings of October 17.

CSO Name - Arabic	مهنيات ومهنيون هندسة
Type of CSO	Syndicate
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Imad Amer
Email	N/A
Instagram	mmhandassa
Twitter	mmhandassa
Facebook	mmhandassa
Website	mmhandassa.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Minteshreen

منتشرين

I-CSO Self-Presentation

A progressive youth movement was born from the womb of the October 17 popular uprising

CSO Name - Arabic	منتشرين
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hussein Ashi
Email	N/A
Instagram	minteshreen
Twitter	minteshreen
Facebook	minteshreen
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Mouwatinoun wa Mouwatinat fi Dawla



I-CSO Self-Presentation

An organized political movement contributing to the establishment of an effective and fully fledged state. A capable and democratic civil state

CSO Name - Arabic	مواطنون ومواطنات في دولة
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2016

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Charbel Nahas Josephine Zgheib
Email	mmfidawla@gmail.com
Instagram	mmfidawla
Twitter	mmfidawla
Facebook	mmfidawla
Website	mmfidawla.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Nabad El Janoub El Mountafed



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Group of young adults created from the heart of the October 17 popular uprising active in the South

CSO Name - Arabic	نابض الجنوب المنتفض
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	South
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Ali Ezzeddine
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	نابض-الجنوب-المنتفض-108387614084649
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

National Bloc



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Present an alternative political and effective structure based on democracy, transparency. Fighting for a green Lebanon. The bloc has elaborated a complete annual plan

CSO Name - Arabic	الكتلة الوطنية
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	1936

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Salam Yammout
Email	info@nationalbloc.org salam.yamout@nationalbloc.org
Instagram	nationalbloc_lb
Twitter	nationalbloc_lb
Facebook	Nationalbloc.lb
Website	nationalbloc.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

National Rescue Movement

I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of retired Army veterans - General Shamel Roukoz Initiative

CSO Name - Arabic	حركة الإنقاذ الوطني
Type of CSO	Veterans
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	General Chamel Roukoz
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

National Veterans Authority



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of retired Army veterans - General Khreish Group

CSO Name - Arabic	الهيئة الوطنية للمحاربين القدامى
Type of CSO	Veterans
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	General Maroun Khreish
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	groups/630841887417394
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

New Lebanese Party



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The new Lebanese is a secular Lebanese Party that was founded in 2006. This party is represented by a group of Lebanese youth who believe in putting an end to the traditional oligarchic regime and paving the way to the youth. The party calls for peace and dialogue towards building a secular state

CSO Name - Arabic	اللبنانيون الجدد
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2006

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Dani Abdelkhalek
Email	info@newlebanese.org
Instagram	new_lebanese_party
Twitter	new_lebanese
Facebook	newlebanese.org
Website	newlebanese.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

Pyramid Lebanon



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Pyramid is a group of activists who believe in a new Lebanon, free of the clientelism so far maintained by the traditional sectarian political factions of the so-called ruling oligarchy. We are open for collaboration with all free advocates of a modern sovereign state where citizens have equal rights

CSO Name - Arabic	بیرامید لیبنان
Type of CSO	Syndicate
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Majed Fattal Suzane Serbey Danielle Zakher Kawsar Chaaya
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	groups/1470526836441499
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Rebels Souwar 17



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A revolutionary civil political movement that was born from the womb of the October 17 popular uprising seeking to establish a state of law and institutions.

CSO Name - Arabic	ريبيلز
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Omar Jouzou Sahar Arabi
Email	N/A
Instagram	rebelssouwar17
Twitter	rebels_souwar17
Facebook	RebelsSouwar17
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Regional Forum for consultancy and Studies

I-CSO Self-Presentation

A research institute by General Khaled Hamadeh

CSO Name - Arabic	المنتدى الإقليمي للاستشارات والدراسات
Type of CSO	Research Center
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	General Khaled Hamade
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

ReLebanon



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A political movement that works for the development of Lebanon and the building of a democratic, just and capable civil state. We believe in the freedom of expression for every citizen. We believe in a Nation free from political sectarianism. We trust the correlation of politics, ethics, the state of right and law, and the establishment of the principles of accountability and transparency. We are loyal to our country and to give priority to the supreme Lebanese interest. We seek to develop a civil state. We work to secure a greater role for young women and men in public affairs, and we seek their involvement in the process of building a new Lebanon

CSO Name - Arabic	لبنان عن جديد
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Beirut
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Ziad Abs Hisham Haddad
Email	relebanon2019@gmail.com
Instagram	relebanon
Twitter	Relebanon
Facebook	RELebanon2019
Website	relebanon.net

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Retired Military

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Group of retired Lebanese Army soldiers - General Georges Nader

CSO Name - Arabic	حراك العسكريين المتقاعدين
Type of CSO	Veterans
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	General Georges Nader
Email	N/A
Instagram	generalgeorgesnader
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	GeneralGeorgesNader
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Revolutionary Bloc



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Lebanese, independent, revolutionary and militants. Lebanon is free, sovereign and independent. A definitive homeland for all of its children who are equal before the law and enjoy equal civil and political rights. The popular uprising called us from the various Lebanese regions, we crossed the sects and parties with our various ideological, social and cultural affiliations and the revolutionary bloc gave birth to an internal system that reflects the image of the state that we aspire to build away from sectarianism and sectarianism. And partisan. The bloc is interested in political and social activities to build a civil state that purifies public administrations from the rampant corruption in them. And the removal of hunger and deprivation from the poor and destitute groups.

CSO Name - Arabic	الكتلة الثورية
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Anthony Doueihy Khalil El Dene Mohamad Jammoul
Email	N/A
Instagram	revolutionary.bloc
Twitter	revolutionarybk
Facebook	Revolutionary.Bloc
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected via Interview

Right of Speech



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The Association for Preserving the Right of Expression is one of the Lebanese civil bodies that believes in the necessity of immunizing society from sedition. Therefore, it not only pursues peaceful means to achieve its goals, but also begins on its own and calls for the adoption of the most peaceful and culturally finest means of expressing opinion among the total means available legally for that. The peoples of the Third World have always exercised their right of expression - whenever they are able to do so - by means and methods that denote a bit of backwardness, ignorance and the absence of a sense of responsibility, for example blocking roads and burning tires, or setting flags of hostile countries and entities and trampling on them with burning, and other methods of expression that it is by no means the best alternative out of all the available or possible alternatives. Spreading the right of expression through seminars, publications and media presentations, and demonstrating its importance in the field of security, development, fighting corruption Transferring the right of expression from an understanding of controversy to an understanding of conviction, and transforming this right into a lived reality Spreading awareness of the importance of the right of expression, purifying the concept of the right of expression from its flaws, motivating media professionals to play their role in activating the rights and freedoms provided by laws, promoting high-end methods in the exercise of the right of expression, providing appropriate platforms for those with suppressed opinions to be able to make their voice heard

CSO Name - Arabic	صون حق التعبير
Type of CSO	Group & Media
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2009

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Walid Moheb
Email	walid.elmoheb@gmail.com adm@rssa.org
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	جمعية-صون-حق-التعبير-1410307599221013
Website	rightofspeech.org www.rssa.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected via Questionnaire, January 2021

Sabaa Party



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Seven is the new broad party in Lebanon, the only real, national and cross-sectarian platform for organizing citizen participation in public affairs and creating new leaderships in the international concept of parties.

CSO Name - Arabic	حزب سبعة
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2016

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Dr. Rania Bassil Eter Mariam Majdolin
Email	info@sabaa.org
Instagram	sabaapolitics
Twitter	SabaaPolitics
Facebook	sabaapolitics
Website	sabaa.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Shabab Dod Nizam



I-CSO Self-Presentation

It is a youth organization Left-wing progressive with a scientific vision of reality in its quest to build a change project. The movement strives to confront all forms of domestic violence by issuing legislation and laws to account for every use of force and verbal, physical or sexual abuse by one of the family members against another member within the same family, and it strives for the establishment of civil rights for Palestinians, the preservation of the right of return and the prevention of resettlement.

CSO Name - Arabic	الحركة الشبابية للتغيير
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Abou Leila
Email	dodnizam@gmail.com
Instagram	al_haraka_al_shababia
Twitter	YCM_Leb
Facebook	shababdodnizam
Website	dodnizam.wordpress.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Sovereign Forum

I-CSO Self-Presentation

The Newly established political Forum of Bahaa Hariri

CSO Name - Arabic	الملتقى السيادي
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2021

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Bahaa Hariri Fadi Ghalayini
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	N/A
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Street



I-CSO Self-Presentation

We are diverse community and a catalyst for socio political change.

CSO Name - Arabic	ستريت
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Karl Karam Samira Azar
Email	karamka@gmail.com
Instagram	street.lb
Twitter	Street_LB
Facebook	street.leb
Website	gf.me/u/ymxxit

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Tahalof Watani

تحالف وطني

I-CSO Self-Presentation

A political organization that aspires to rebuild a pluralistic, democratic, sovereign and just state of citizenship

CSO Name - Arabic	تحالف وطني
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2017

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Mark Geara Tatiana Skaff Makram Oueiss Paula Yacoubian
Email	N/A
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	TahalofWatani
Facebook	Ta7alofWatani
Website	ta7alofwatani.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Tajamoh Isti'adat al Dawla



I-CSO Self-Presentation

The State Restoration Rally is neither left-wing nor right-wing. He is a left-right and a right-wing man who aspires to create a strong and just civil state

CSO Name - Arabic	تجمع استعادة الدولة
Type of CSO	Lobbyist Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Hassan Khalil
Email	N/A
Instagram	stateretrieval
Twitter	stateretrieval
Facebook	fihalwnos
Website	bit.ly/fihalwnoss

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Takatol Ouaa



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Ouaa Group is a transient conglomeration of parties and sects established from the womb of the movement of people who have participated in popular movements since 2011

CSO Name - Arabic	تكتل اوع
Type of CSO	Political Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2015

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Youssef
Email	N/A
Instagram	takatolou3a
Twitter	ouaatollab
Facebook	ou3arevolution
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The weapon's issue is correlated with the region's development
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Taqaddom



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A Democratic progressive party working for social justice and sustainable development

CSO Name - Arabic	تقدم
Type of CSO	Political Party
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Laury Haytayan Mark Daou Hussam Ayach Jad Chaaban Najat Saliba
Email	info@taqaddomlb.org
Instagram	taqaddomlb
Twitter	taqaddom1
Facebook	taqaddomLB
Website	taqaddomlb.org

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Thawra Unsa



I-CSO Self-Presentation

A group of ladies who dream of building a real home and provide assistance to every needy person

CSO Name - Arabic	الثورة انثى
Type of CSO	Feminist Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Pascale Zeina Karam
Email	thawraunsa@gmail.com
Instagram	thawraunsa
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	الثورة-انثى-106489904599643
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With immediate disarmament of Hezbollah, based on UN Security Council resolutions.
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Not within the scope of the CSO

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

Thawrat Loubnan

I-CSO Self-Presentation

Group of protesters believing in a new Lebanon

CSO Name - Arabic	ثورة لبنان
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2020

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Joanna Majzoub Steeve Khayat Hadi Aitour
Email	info@lebaneserevolution.org
Instagram	N/A
Twitter	N/A
Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-101608981284008
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	With the disarmament of all militias as part of a state sponsored defence strategy as stated in the Taif Agreement
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data acquired by Interview, January 2021

United For Lebanon



I- CSO Self-Presentation

A group of independent lawyers specializing in combating corruption and combating all its forms in public and private institutions and aims to separate politics from the judiciary.

CSO Name - Arabic	متحدون
Type of CSO	Group & Media
Geographic Coverage	South
Date Started Work	2016

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Rami Ollaik
Email	info@unitedforlebanon.com
Instagram	unitedforlebofficial
Twitter	UnitedForLeb
Facebook	UnitedforLebanon
Website	UnitedforLebanon.com

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, but not drafted

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

Waey



I-CSO Self-Presentation

Initiative to raise awareness about the Lebanese situation

CSO Name - Arabic	مبادرة وعي
Type of CSO	Group
Geographic Coverage	Lebanon
Date Started Work	2019

II-Contact Information

Contact Person	Neamat Badreddine
Email	waey-lebanon@outlook.com
Instagram	waey_lebanon
Twitter	Waey_lebanon
Facebook	waylebanon
Website	N/A

III-Positioning

Are you in favour of a civil state in Lebanon?	Yes
Are you in favour of neutrality and border demarcation?	Yes, with a state-sponsored Neutrality and Borders demarcation
Are you in favour of administrative decentralization?	Yes
Are you in favour of weapon possession outside the jurisdiction of the state?	The legal resistance has to be part of a state-sponsored defence strategy. This strategy is regarded as urgent
Does the organization have an economic reform plan?	Yes, a detailed plan

Data collected by Desk Review & Consultation with popular uprising Keys, January 2021

ABOUT THE PULSE

The Pulse is a Public Affairs consultancy company that provides corporate, political marketing, electoral, and public affairs strategies, supported by research, public opinion polling, big data analytics, grassroots advocacy, communication services, and sustainability and impact assessment.

Bound by evidence-based practices, “The Pulse” is committed to empowering its stakeholders through the provision of policy recommendations and capacity building services. “The Pulse” enjoys the fruit of its founder’s and CEO’s thirty years of extensive experience in the field.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



Huda Usta Kaskas, is the Founder and CEO of The Pulse. She enjoys a proven track record in the fields of sustainable development, public affairs, and elections based on her extensive involvement in strategic research, planning communication, management, and execution paired with her computer science degree.

Huda has worked as an elected councillor of Beirut Municipality since 2016. She tendered her resignation in 2019, after the uprising, but never enacted it. She successfully managed one of the toughest parliamentary electoral races in 2018 in Beirut for the National Dialogue Party leader. This success story expanded to encompass municipal, syndicate, association, and university student council elections.

Huda believes in consolidating democratic and liberal values to endorse and stimulate dialogue, safeguard elections and advocate for parliamentary and electoral reforms. Founder of "Beirutiyat " NGO, Founder and president of "Beirutopia" NGO, she advocates for local governance, as well as youth and women empowerment and the active participation of women in the political ecosystem.

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