

HOW SANCTIONS INFLUENCE THE BELARUSIAN REGIONS: A BLOW TO EMPLOYMENT AND BUDGETS, INCREASED SOCIAL POLARIZATION

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# SUMMARY

- Sanctions will deal a blow to regional growth centers: cities and districts will suffer where the local economy is not just developing on its own, but facilitates the development of the national economy through concentration of capital, significant production volumes, and foreign exchange earnings.
- Reduced revenues from foreign trade mean the national budget has fewer resources to subsidize districts and cities. In some districts, up to 80% of local budget revenues may come to depend on national subsidies.
- Regions that are highly dependent on funding from the national budget, and which also have large sanctioned enterprises, are at risk. This is especially true of the Polack, Lida, Navapolack, Orsha, and Chervien districts, as well as the city of Babrujsk.
- Minsk, despite being home to many sanctioned enterprises, has the capacity to absorb laid off workers, putting less strain on the local labor market.
- Western sanctions have become a divisive issue in Belarusian society. The urban majority supports targeted sanctions, but condemns broad, sectoral restrictive measures. Even those who support the protest movement are largely against economic sanctions against industry.
- Protest supporters do not expect sanctions to directly bring about the release of
  political prisoners or negotiations with the West. They believe that sanctions will
  hurt both the economy of the country as a whole and the well-being of ordinary
  Belarusians. However, sanctions do provide a sense of hope in the absence
  of other means of influencing the situation; supporting sanctions is seen as a
  form of passive protest, a way of expressing one's discontent with events in the
  country.

### INTRODUCTION

The Belarusian regions have been in decline for many years. While the authorities have been trying in vain to find a way to stimulate economic growth in the regions, ordinary Belarusians are becoming more and more dissatisfied with their life in Belarus. The political crisis only exacerbated the problems connected with the economy, demography, migration and the overall quality of life<sup>1</sup>.

However, after the summer of 2021, pressure from Western countries has added even more strain to existing internal challenges. Sectoral sanctions imposed after the Ryanair incident have affected dozens of enterprises in various fields. In this paper, we explore how these sanctions will influence regional development, how local residents perceive them, and which cities and regions are most vulnerable to them.

### HOW WE CONDUCTED OUR STUDY

In order to assess the possible impact of sanctions on the economies of cities and districts, we used two approaches. First, we analyzed the location of the largest sanctioned enterprises and their influence on the local economy and labor market. We also determined which districts are most dependent on the national budget and which are most vulnerable to broad sectoral sanctions.

Furthermore, we held a questionnaire via Viber together with the National Poll (Narodny Opros) initiative, which was carried out in early November 2021. The poll targeted protest sympathizers, whose attitude towards sanctions is characteristic of a certain segment of Belarusians, even though they may not adequately represent the entire gamut of political opinion in the country. After clearance, 4,323 questionnaires were used for the analysis. The author also made use of statistical data on the opinions of Belarusians from Chatham House and other institutions. He would like to thank all reviewers for their valuable comments.

<sup>1</sup> A Radniankou, What concerns Belarusians? The study of issues and fears in Belarusian regions, <u>https://newbelarus.</u> vision/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/What-concerns-Belarusians\_ENG.pdf

### THE EU AND USA AS **THE MAIN DRIVERS** OF SANCTIONS

After the 2020 elections, a number of countries imposed various sanctions on the Belarusian authorities. Countries that participated included important actors like the EU and the USA, as well as more minor players like Serbia, which has historically been friendly towards Lukashenka. Some of these measures have had a delayed effect, while others are already making a serious impact.

The most tangible are the restrictive measures of the EU and the US. EU countries are important trading partners, and Belarusian goods often pass through them to go further into the world. Meanwhile, American restrictions are primarily dangerous because of possible secondary sanctions, as these may hurt not only specific enterprises and individuals, but also their counterparties. In addition, American sanctions make it difficult to perform transactions in dollars, the main currency of the international market.

A list of companies sanctioned by the EU, USA, UK, and Canada in four packages is available in Appendix 1.

### **EU SANCTIONS**

The EU's restrictive measures were introduced in packages, and as of fall 2021, they affect 166 individuals and 15 legal entities. The sanctions freeze the European assets of companies and specific individuals, ban visa issuance, and limit or prohibit European individuals/entities from cooperating with them.

In addition, follow-up measures introduced in June 2021 established sectoral sanctions. At present, this measure is potentially the most painful for Belarus, since it covers entire sectors of the economy, rather than just specific enterprises. In addition to military and dual-use goods, these EU restrictions affect the production of tobacco products, petroleum products, and a number of products containing potassium.

The EU has also imposed restrictions on access to European financial markets for the Belarusian government and state financial institutions, as well as suspending the financing of joint projects with the Belarusian state sector. What's more, at the time of writing, the EU is preparing a fifth package of sanctions aimed primarily at individuals and legal entities involved in organizing the 2021 Belarus-EU border crisis.

#### **US SANCTIONS**

Although the United States is not a key trading partner of Belarus, the restrictive measures imposed by the US promise to be no less painful.

Early in June of 2021, Washington imposed restrictive measures on nine state-owned enterprises in the petrochemical industry; it later announced the creation of legal conditions for imposing sectoral sanctions on such fields as defense and security, power engineering, construction, transport, and trade in potash fertilizers and tobacco products.

Furthermore, 23 individuals and 21 companies were subjected to restrictive measures. US citizens were prohibited from participating in transactions with these organizations and individuals, as well as with their property.

### **OTHER COUNTRIES' SANCTIONS**

A number of non-EU countries, some of which are major economic powers, also imposed sanctions on Belarus, such as the UK, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan.

The UK's restrictions list includes 100 individuals and nine companies; it also introduced sectoral sanctions with regard to Belarusian potash and oil products, goods used in cigarette production, and dual-purpose technologies. The restrictions also affected the financial sphere.

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### HOW THE AUTHORITIES CAN MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS

Before we consider the impact of sanctions on specific regions and cities, it is necessary to understand their limitations. The effect of the sanctions will depend on the characteristics of the enterprises themselves, the margin of safety at the local level, and the actions of the authorities at the national level.

### FLEXIBILITY OF BUSINESS MODELS AND GEOGRAPHY OF PARTNERS

How exactly sanctions affect specific enterprises may vary significantly at the micro level based on their business model and geographical priorities. For enterprises that are not closely connected with contracting partners in western countries, or that are able to reshape their business model quickly, the impact of sanctions will be less tangible.

### MARGIN OF SAFETY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The initial state of individual enterprises and local budgets plays an important role. The impact of sanctions could be mitigated over a long period at the micro- and regional level. Thus, the presence of a financial "safety cushion" at the enterprise level, a low debt burden, or the ability to raise new funds at the local budget level could be a boon.

### HELP FROM THE CENTER

Potential regional-level problems can be prevented if the authorities manage to temporarily divert the effects of sanctions from specific enterprises and local budgets by means of centralized impact management. Although the central authorities don't have many tools at their disposal, it is still potentially possible.

### COUNTERWORK BY THE AUTHORITIES

The Belarusian authorities could bypass sanctions or torpedo their practical implementation, which could significantly decrease their repercussions. Much will depend on the sanctions' mechanism in practice and the success of the authorities in bypassing restrictions. If Minsk is able to cope, the challenges and problems described in this study may be less noticeable at the local level.

The effects of sanctions as outlined in this paper should be perceived as **potential**; in practice, outcomes will depend on the scenario according to which the situation develops.

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### **BLOW NUMBER ONE:** TO SANCTIONED ENTERPRISES AND MONO-CITIES

The economies of Belarusian cities and districts are facing many of the same problems as the Belarusian economy in general: dependency on large state-owned enterprises, employment issues, and a shrinking, aging population. Sanctions, whose effects will become increasingly tangible, will become yet another sore spot for the regional economy. However, the regions will feel the influence of sanctions differently than the country as a whole.

### HOW ENTERPRISES ARE CHOSEN FOR SANCTIONS: EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIES AND THE DEFENSE SPHERE

The geography of domestic industry is revealed by the enterprises that have fallen under sanctions. Belarusian industry was born of Soviet industrialization. The country's considerable petrochemical (Navapolack, Mazyr), machine-building (MAZ, BelAZ) and mining (Belaruskali) capacities were built not only to meet domestic needs, they were oriented at demand throughout the USSR, with some production even going to foreign markets.

The choice of which enterprises to sanction was dictated by more than just violations of workers' rights. To a large extent, the decision was based on the reliance of these enterprises on foreign markets, as well as the influence of their activities on the state budget in the form of foreign exchange earnings. This factor plays a very important role given Belarus's significant external debt, most of which is denominated in a foreign currency.

Another industry that has been a traditional target of sanctions is the defense sector (AGAT, MZKT, 140 Repair Plant), as well as the enterprises whose activities support the authorities (Bremino Group, ENERGO-OIL, and others).

### MONO-CITIES WILL FACE THE HARDEST TIMES

Regions that are home to sanctioned enterprises can be divided into two categories, the first being regions where the sanctioned enterprises are "city-forming," or critically important for the local economy, and the second comprising regions where sanctioned enterprises do not play such a key role, although they do remain important for the local economy.


#### Share of workforce **Total number of** Number of residents employed employed by District employed residents sanctioned by sanctioned enterprises enterprises 24% Salihorsk district 68,137 16,527 (OJSC Belaruskali) 19% Smaliavicy district 54,589 10,614 (including Zhodzina) (OJSC BelAZ) Polack district 90,014 9,873 15% (including Navapolack) (OJSC Naftan); 3,452 (OJSC Polatsk-Steklovolokno) Babrujsk district 92,356 8.239 9% (including Babrujsk) (OJSC Belshina) Mazyr district 56,992 4.956 9% (OJSC Mazyr Oil Processing Plant)

### DISTRICTS WITH THE LARGEST SHARE OF WORKERS EMPLOYED BY SANCTIONED ENTERPRISES

\*A full list can be found in Appendix 5. Data was compiled on the basis of the open statistical reporting of OJSCs as at year-end 2020.

Thus, the economies of Navapolack, Zhodzina, Mazyr, Salihorsk and Babrujsk, for example, greatly depend on the sanctioned enterprises located there. In contrast, the sanctioned enterprises located in Hrodna, Lida, Chervien, Barysau and Orsha are not city-forming.

Restrictive measures can lead to layoffs at sanctioned companies that could have significant economic repercussions. For example, BelAZ, located in Zhodzina, employs 19% of the local labor market, Belaruskali in Salihorsk employs 24%, Naftan in Navapolack and Steklovolokno in Polack employs 15%.



**Figure 1.** Distribution of nominal accrued average monthly wages in 2020 and the location of cities with the largest sanctioned enterprises.

For reference: the nominal accrued average monthly wage for the Republic of Belarus was BYN 1,255 in 2020 (Appendix 4).

Problems at such enterprises will have a negative impact on more than just employment rates and wages, which remain rather high for the regions: a significant part of the local economy will be affected by the resulting decrease in the disposable income of employees. Both local budgets and social services, which often rely on state-owned industrial giants, will suffer.

For cities where targeted enterprises are not city-forming, the sanctions will still worsen the state of the local economy and business climate, contributing to the outflow of qualified personnel in the absence of growth prospects and decent wages.

#### MANY REGIONAL GROWTH SPOTS WILL BE DESTABILIZED

Although income levels throughout the country are relatively equal, the economic advantage of the capital region and flagships of the domestic economy is still evident.

Many important companies ended up on the sanctions list, meaning they are highly likely to cease being obvious drivers of the local economy, instead becoming hotspots for socio-economic tension.

This is especially true of cities where the sanctioned enterprises are city forming; neighboring districts do not have similar drivers. Such enterprises act as islands of stability not only for their own, but also for the neighboring districts — this is the case for the oil processing plants in Polack and Mazyr districts, for example.

### MINSK WILL SUFFER THE LEAST

Although the majority of companies and enterprises subject to sanctions are located in Minsk, the capital's economy is not critically dependent on these enterprises due to the city's diversified nature and general efficiency.

Thus, several large state-owned enterprises in Minsk were simultaneously targeted for restrictive measures: MAZ, AGAT Electromechanical Plant, and MZKT. The total headcount of these three state-owned enterprises alone is about 20,000 people.

Considering the scope of the capital labor market, where over one million people are employed, layoffs will not be as painful an issue as in the regions. 4

### **BLOW NUMBER TWO:** TO THE NATIONAL BUDGET AND SUBSIDIZED REGIONS

Sanctions will deal a blow to cities and regions by causing problems for industrial enterprises. Moreover, the lowest-performing districts in many ways depend on subsidies and transfers from the national budget, which will also suffer due to sanctions' pressure.

### POTENTIAL REDUCTION IN FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCISE TAX REVENUES WILL WEAKEN THE NATIONAL BUDGET

The main blow will be borne not only by the companies included on sanctions lists, but also by the national budget, which receives taxes from foreign trade and excise taxes in full.

Belarus's budgetary policy works in such a way that if the national budget incurs significant losses, its ability to support the local budgets of regions that lag behind may weaken.

# OVER HALF OF ALL DISTRICTS DEPEND ON SUBSIDIES FROM THE NATIONAL BUDGET

On average, local budgets were able to cover 75% of their expenses with their own revenues in 2020. The remaining financing was allocated to cities and regions from the national budget. In some places, up to 80% of budget expenditures stem from federal government support.

For 65 of 129 districts, more than 50% of the local budget consists of federal aid. These districts can be divided into three groups: the first being where the share of locally derived income in the budget lies within the 40–50% range, the second being where locally derived income comprises 30%–40%, and the third being where locally derived income drops below 30% (Appendix 2).

## DISTRICTS WITH THE LOWEST LEVEL OF LOCALLY DERIVED REVENUE IN THE BUDGET

- 1. Yelsk district (Homiel region) 28%
- 2. Khocimsk district (Mahiliou region) 28,6%
- 3. Loyeu district (Homiel region) 28,9%
- 4. Slauharad district (Mahiliou region) 29,7%
- 5. Drybin district (Mahiliou region) 29,9%
- 6. Cherykau district (Mahiliou region) 29,9%
- 7. Naroulia district (Homiel region) 29,9%
- 8. Vushacy district (Viciebsk region) 29,9%




Figure 2. Location of cities with major sanctioned enterprises and the self-sufficiency of local budgets

Large sanctioned enterprises are most often located in districts and cities where budgetary revenues are higher than average, or where cities and districts lead in terms of the self-sufficiency of their budgets, as in the case for the capital city and capital region (Appendix 3).

Nevertheless, a number of sanctioned enterprises (Babrujsk, Orsha) are located in places with insufficient budgetary revenues; if the economic condition of such enterprises gets worse, local socio-economic development will also suffer.

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### WHAT BELARUSIANS THINK OF THE SANCTIONS: SOCIETY DIVIDED

Although it may seem complicated to assess the future effects of sanctions, this topic has already become important on the news agenda, influencing attitudes in society. Sanctions by the EU and the US have made it to the top five most crucial problems for contemporary Belarus in the opinion of the urban population<sup>2</sup>. Both foreign<sup>3</sup> and national media write about sanctions, and over 90% of protest sympathizers follow this topic (People's Poll, November 2021).

## THE URBAN MAJORITY SUPPORTS TARGETED SANCTIONS, CONDEMNING BROAD SECTORAL ONES

Judging by data from Chatham House, it is obvious that sanctions have become a highly polarizing subject for society. Whereas targeted economic sanctions against Lukashenka's entourage are supported by the majority of urban residents (44% of respondents approve of such measures while 32% are against them), the reverse is true for broad sectoral sanctions: 51% of respondents are against them, while 29% support them.

Protest sympathizers are highly likely to support tough sanctions against pro-government businesses: 72% are proponents, in contrast to only 2% of Lukashenka's bastion. Notably, a considerable portion — 18% — believed that sanctions against Belarusian enterprises are unacceptable, compared to 81% of Lukashenka supporters.

#### Which of the following statements do you agree with?

	Protest core	Neutral individuals	Lukashenka's bastion
I support tough sectoral Western sanctions against pro-government business	72%	11%	2%
Sanctions against Belarusian enterprises are unacceptable	18%	48%	81%

\*Research by Chatham House. October 2021.


2 Chatham House, *Belarusians's views on the political crisis (October 2021),* https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bxnNS-\_cwiuj\_h50zfqNs6\_NLcjTF0GD/view

**3** A Rudnik, *The changing media image of Belarus abroad in 2020-2021*, <u>https://newbelarus.vision/wp-content/up-loads/2021/11/The-changing-media-image-of-Belarus-abroad-in-2020-2021.pdf</u>

### PROTEST SUPPORTERS WELCOME SANCTIONS AGAINST LUKASHENKA, BUSINESSES CLOSE TO HIM, AND THE SILOVIKI

A survey conducted by Narodny Opros (National Poll) shows that the overwhelming majority of protesters completely (71%) or mostly (20%) support imposing restrictions on the Lukashenka regime. What's more, sanctions have become a part of reality, and the majority (82%) of those surveyed believe that new and tougher sanctions will be adopted in the future.

Despite this gloomy position, few want the sanctions to be directed against the Belarusian economy as a whole. Most respondents do not want serious sectoral sanctions or even restrictions against officials. Instead, sanctions should primarily be directed at Lukashenka, the business people close to him, and the siloviki (security agencies).




What individuals and entities should new, tougher sanctions target? (choose up to three options)

## SANCTIONS GIVE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY MAY CHANGE

The prospect of introducing new, tougher sanctions causes anxiety in almost a quarter of respondents, and few report feeling enthusiasm or joy. However, this perspective gives hope to an overwhelming majority (almost 85%). Given the continuing repression and the absence of street protests, sanctions remain virtually the only source of hope that the situation in the country could change.

Western countries are introducing new, tougher sanctions against Belarus. What emotions does this invoke in you? (you may choose several options)



### PROTEST SUPPORTERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SANCTIONS CAN SOLVE THE POLITICAL CRISIS, AND THEY EXPECT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY TO DETERIORATE

Only an insignificant portion of protest supporters believe that the current sanctions will somehow resolve the political crisis in Belarus. A minority believes that sanctions will force Lukashenka to resign or start negotiations with the opposition or the West, which will at least lead to the release of political prisoners.

## How likely do you think the recently imposed sanctions are to have the following consequences? (With 1 being a low probability and 5 being high probability)



#### Most political prisoners in Belarus will be released

46%	28%	17%	5%	3%

All political prisoners in Belarus will be released

73%	16%	8% 2%
		1%

Lukashenka will step down as president, new presidential elections will be held in Belarus

65%	19%	12%	2%
			2%

Lukashenka will enter into negotiations with Tsikhanouskaya

75%	17%	<mark>6%1,5%</mark>
		0,3%

Lukashenka will enter into negotiations with the West

46%	29%	18%	<b>6% 1%</b>

At the same time, the majority of protest supporters expect negative consequences from the current sanctions, including the onset of an economic crisis, layoffs, decrease in revenue, and new repressions.

### How likely do you think the recently imposed sanctions are to have the following consequences? (With 1 being a low probability and 5 being high probability)



#### An economic crisis will begin in Belarus

	4%	14%	30%	50%
2	%			

#### Sanctioned enterprises will fire workers en masse

3%10%	30%	30%	27%

#### The wages of workers employed in the public sector will fall

5%	15%	30%	48%
2%			

#### Wages will fall throughout Belarus


	5%	15%	31%	48%
2	%			

Likewise, the opinion that Western sanctions will cause the country to lose its independence is partially shared by protest supports: about half assess the likelihood of Russian military bases being deployed and sanctioned enterprises being transferred to Russian control as high. A little more than a third of respondents believe that sanctions will cause the country to lose its sovereignty.

## How likely do you think the recently imposed sanctions are to have the following consequences? (With 1 being a low probability and 5 being high probability)



#### Sanctioned enterprises will be handed over to Russian control



#### Russian military bases will be deployed in Belarus

<b>5%</b>	11%	27%	26%	31%

#### Belarus will lose its sovereignty and become part of Russia


19%	19%	27%	18%	18%

\*Survey conducted by November 2021.

Although respondents expect new and tougher sanctions to have a greater effect, the majority do not believe that they will lead to the release of political prisoners, Lukashenka's resignation, or negotiations with the West. At the same time, more than 40% of respondents believe that new and tougher sanctions could provoke a split among the elites. This is probably how many envisage regime change: tougher sanctions will lead to pressure on Lukashenka from within, ultimately bringing about his resignation. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AS A FORM OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE AND AN EXPRESSION OF DISSENT: PROTEST SUPPORTERS ARE READY TO ENDURE HARDSHIPS FOR THE SAKE OF LUKASHENKA'S RESIGNATION


Over half of protest supporters realize that both current and future sanctions will negatively affect the economy of their cities. Significant differences with regard to a city's size, type, or any other specific regional characteristics are not evident.

What impact will the **recently imposed** sanctions have on the well-being of your community in the next six months?




\*Survey conducted by November 2021.

What impact will **new and tougher** sanctions have on the well-being of your community?




Even though they are fully aware of the negative effects of sanctions, over 70% of respondents are ready to sacrifice their well-being in the hope that the situation will change, even though this is not highly likely. Such attitudes are more restrained among women and state-sector employees. Respondents with higher education, higher revenues, and elderly people are more willing to sacrifice their financial situation.

## How willing are you for the financial situation of you and your family to deteriorate because of new and tougher sanctions?



<sup>\*</sup>Survey conducted by November 2021.

**If you were sure** that new and tougher sanctions would increase the likelihood of Lukashenka's resignation, how willing would you be for the financial situation of you and your family to deteriorate?



This situation seems paradoxical: on the one hand, protest supporters do not expect that the sanctions will force the authorities to democratize, negotiate, or release political prisoners. On the other hand, the same demographic supports new sanctions, even though they could lead to serious economic problems for the country and ordinary Belarusians. In addition to a sense of hope and a lack of other options, support for sanctions signifies a kind of passive protest — an expression of dissent against what is happening in the country.

### **CONCLUSION:**

REGIONAL GROWTH SPOTS WILL STALL, POOR REGIONS WILL GET POORER, AND SOCIETY WILL BECOME EVEN MORE POLARIZED

The implications of the sanctions as described in this paper must be seen as potential: their effect will ultimately depend on the characteristics of specific enterprises, the safety margin at the local level, and the actions of the authorities at the national level. That said, external sanctions will mostly likely worsen the already poor state of the regions. Both successful and disadvantaged regions will be in the firing line.

### IMPORTANT REGIONAL GROWTH CENTERS WILL BE HARD HIT

Due to their concentration of capital, significant production volumes, and foreign exchange earnings, regional growth centers contribute to the development of the country's economy as a whole. This is expressed, inter alia, in the form of payments to the national budget from taxes on foreign economic activity and excise duties. These items are fully credited to the national budget.

### A SECONDARY BLOW TO THE NATIONAL BUDGET

The decrease of revenue from foreign trade limits the national budget's ability to support districts and cities that depend on subsidies. In such areas, the level of support needed from the federal government comprises up to 80% of the revenues of local budgets. Half of all districts may be put at risk, since for 65 of 129 local budgets, the amount of gratuitous subsidies from the national budget surpasses 50%.

### THE FATE OF SPECIFIC CITIES WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THEY ARE HOME TO CITY-FORMING SANCTIONED ENTERPRISES

Regions that are highly dependent on the national budget and that also have large sanctioned enterprises are at risk. This is especially true of the Polack and Lida districts, Navapolack, the Orsha and Chervien districts, and Babrujsk.

All of them have local budgets with an above-average level of dependence on federal aid. In the case of Babrujsk, two unfavorable factors converge: the presence of a major, city-forming sanctioned enterprise, and an especially high level of dependence on federal handouts.

Notably, in the case of Zhodzina, which is home to the sanctioned BelAZ, complications on the labor market are already being recorded, despite the relatively good shape of the local budget. Here, the problems associated with city-forming enterprises will be extremely acute due to the sanctions as well as pre-existing negative factors.

Sanctioned single-industry towns where wages on the local labor market and in neighboring districts are low (such as Mazyr and Polack districts) are especially vulnerable. This is also true of wealthier districts where a large share of the workforce is employed by sanctioned enterprises (Navapolack, Zhodzina, Salihorsk).

Minsk, in spite of its significant number of sanctioned enterprises, has the capacity to absorb victims of layoffs with less strain on the local labor market.

### SANCTIONS POLARIZE SOCIETY, BUT EVEN PROTEST SUPPORTERS DO NOT WANT BROAD SECTORAL RESTRICTIONS, EVEN IF SOME SUPPORT SANCTIONS AS A FORM OF PASSIVE DISSENT

For ordinary Belarusians, Western sanctions have become a highly polarizing issue, although they have also become a part of life. The urban majority supports targeted sanctions, but does not favor broad sectoral restrictive measures. Even protest supporters do not want economic sanctions against industry.

At the same time, protest supporters do not expect sanctions to bring about the release of political prisoners or negotiations with the West. There is an understanding that the sanctions will deal a blow both to the country's economy as a whole as well as to the well-being of ordinary Belarusians. That said, a sense of hope is associated with sanctions; in the absence of other options, support for them is seen as a kind of passive protest — an expression of dissent with what is happening in the country.



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### ABOUT THE CENTER FOR NEW IDEAS:

The Center for New Ideas is an analytical center dedicated to finding opportunities for development and ways to overcome the challenges Belarus faces in the 21st century. Our mission is to help political and civil organizations build a more open, flourishing, and sustainable Belarus.

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**1** A Radniankou, *What concerns Belarusians? The study of issues and fears in Belarusian regions*, <a href="https://newbelarus.vision/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/What-concerns-Belarusians\_ENG.pdf">https://newbelarus.vision/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/What-concerns-Belarusians\_ENG.pdf</a>

**2** Chatham House, *Belarusians's views on the political crisis (October 2021),* <u>https://drive.google.com/</u> <u>file/d/1bxnNS-\_cwiuj\_h50zfqNs6\_NLcjTF0GD/view</u>

**3** A Rudnik, *The changing media image of Belarus abroad in 2020-2021,* <u>https://newbelarus.vision/wp-con-tent/uploads/2021/11/The-changing-media-image-of-Belarus-abroad-in-2020-2021.pdf</u>

### **APPENDIX 1**

### ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON KEY BELARUSIAN ENTERPRISES

			Party imp	osing the rest	rictive measures
Enterprise name	Location	EU	USA	UK	Canada
ZAO Beltechexport	Minsk	•		•	
Dana Holdings/Dana Astra	Minsk	¢	Ŧ	Ð	
GHU – The Main Economic Section of the Administrative Affairs Office of the President of the Republic of Belarus	Minsk	¢		ŧ	
000 Synesis	Minsk	•		•	
OAO AGAT Electromechan- ical Plant	Minsk	¢		¢	
OAO 140 Repair Plant	Barysau	•		•	
OAO MZKT Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant	Minsk	•		÷	
Sohra OOO	Minsk	•			

CENTER FOR NEW IDEAS

			i arty inip		restrictive measure	
Enterprise name	Location	EU	USA	UK	Canada	
BREMINO GROUP OOO	Orsha	Ŧ	Ŧ		Ŧ	
Globalcustom Management 000	Minsk	ŧ				
OAO BELAZ	Zhodzina	•			Ŧ	
OAO MAZ	Minsk	ŧ			ŧ	
OAO Logex	Minsk	¢				
OOO NNK (Novaia Naftavaia Kampania/New Oil Compa- ny)	Minsk	¢	Ŧ		ŧ	
CJSC Belarusian Oil Com- pany (BNK UK)	UK			ŧ		
ZAO New Oil Company East	Russia		Ŧ			
RUP Belaeronavigatsyia	Minsk	ŧ		ŧ	Ŧ	
UP Belarusian Oil Trade House	Minsk		¢			

Party imposing the restrictive measures

CENTER FOR NEW IDEAS

### Party imposing the restrictive measures

Enterprise name	Location	EU	USA	UK	Canada
Belneftekhim Concern	Minsk		¢		
Belneftekhim USA, Inc. (American unit of the Bel- neftekhim petrochemical company)	USA		Ŧ		
OAO Belshina	Babrujsk		¢		
OAO Grodno Azot	Hrodna		Ŧ		
Khimvolokno Plant Branch of OAO Grodno Azot	Hrodna		Ŧ		
OAO Lakokraska	Lida		Ŧ		
OAO Naftan	Navapolack		Ŧ		
OAO Polotsksteklovolokno	Polack		Ŧ		
ODO BELNEFTEGAZ	Minsk		Ŧ		
OAO Belaruskali	Salihorsk		Ŧ		

CENTER FOR NEW IDEAS

### Party imposing the restrictive measures

Enterprise name	Location	EU	USA	UK	Canada
000 BelKazTrans	Minsk		¢		
BelKazTrans Ukraine	Ukraine		ŧ		
ZAO ABSOLUTBANK	Minsk		ŧ		
SZAO ENERGO-OIL	Minsk		Ŧ		
PUP Petroleum Bitumen Plant	Chervien district		Ŧ		
SOOO Belinte Roba	Minsk		ŧ		
1000 Zomeks Investments	Minsk		ŧ		
InterTobacco	Minsk district		ŧ		
Navapolack OOO Interser- vice	Navapolack		+		
OAO Grodno Tobacco Fac- tory NEMAN	Hrodna		Ŧ		
Shock Sports Club	Minsk		÷		

### **APPENDIX 2**

### PORTION OF LOCAL BUDGETS FINANCED BY OWN REVENUE (FOR REGIONS WHERE LESS THAN 50% OF THE BUDGET IS LOCALLY DERIVED)

Region	District/city	2018	2019	2020
For reference	Belarus (all local budgets)	79,0%	77,8%	75,5%
GROUP 1: 40-50%				
Brest region	Pinsk	<b>55,9</b> %	<b>52,8</b> %	<b>49,6</b> %
Viciebsk region	Beshankovicy district	45,6%	41,8%	<b>49,3</b> %
Minsk region	Krupki district	48,5%	<b>49,4</b> %	<b>49,1</b> %
Minsk region	Kapyl district	41,7%	47,1%	48,7%
Hrodna region	Karelicy district	48,3%	47,7%	<b>48,3</b> %
Brest region	Liakhavicy district	47,2%	<b>45,9</b> %	47,6%
Viciebsk region	Braslau district	49,3%	30,7%	47,2%
Viciebsk region	Miory district	45,3%	44,0%	47,1%
Minsk region	Staryja Darohi district	54,6%	48,5%	46,9%
Hrodna region	luye district	41,2%	<b>48,2</b> %	46,7%
Mahiliou region	Asipovicy district	70,9%	<b>58,8</b> %	<b>46,4</b> %
Minsk region	Biaroza district	47,7%	44,7%	<b>46,2</b> %
Brest region	Ivanava district	47,5%	<b>46,5</b> %	46,1%
Hrodna region	Voranava district	44,4%	<b>45,0</b> %	45,5%
Homiel region	Kalinkavicy district	49,0%	<b>49,8</b> %	45,1%
Brest region	Malaryta district	43,7%	44,3%	45,0%

Region	District/city	2018	2019	2020
For reference	Belarus (all local budgets)	79,0%	77,8%	75,5%
GROUP 1: 40-50%				
Mahiliou region	Shklou district	48,7%	47,5%	44,8%
Viciebsk region	Haradok district	<b>43,9</b> %	47,2%	44,7%
Minsk region	Miadziel district	40,3%	48,6%	<b>43,9</b> %
Mahiliou region	Babrujsk	54,4%	<b>52,8</b> %	43,7%
Mahiliou region	Horki district	48,7%	48,7%	<b>43,6</b> %
Viciebsk region	Dokshycy district	<b>45,6</b> %	<b>39,6</b> %	43,2%
Hrodna region	Masty district	<b>45,6</b> %	<b>44,1</b> %	43,1%
Mahiliou region	Bykhau district	<b>42,6</b> %	40,8%	<b>42,5</b> %
Brest region	Drahicyn district	42,0%	<b>42,0</b> %	41,9%
Brest region	Stolin district	42,9%	<b>41,3</b> %	41,5%
Mahiliou region	Babrujsk district	<b>48,2</b> %	<b>44,6</b> %	41,5%
Hrodna region	Zelva district	41,0%	<b>39,2</b> %	41,4%
Viciebsk region	Sianno district	44,7%	<b>39,4</b> %	40,9%
Homiel region	Pietrykau district	39,8%	25,5%	40,8%
Brest region	Hantsavicy district	39,9%	38,9%	40,1%
Mahiliou region	Kasciukovicy district	51,3%	42,7%	40,0%

Region	District/city	2018	2019	2020
For reference	Belarus (all local budgets)	<b>79,0%</b>	77,8%	75,5%
GROUP 2: 30-40%				
Homiel region	Akciabrski district	43,4%	42,8%	39,9%
Mahiliou region	Krychau district	<b>51,2</b> %	38,3%	<b>38,6</b> %
Mahiliou region	Klichau district	39,8%	37,5%	38,6%
Mahiliou region	Kirausk district	42,9%	<b>41,0</b> %	38,3%
Homiel region	Zhytkavicy district	38,5%	38,0%	38,2%
Viciebsk region	Rasony district	43,7%	36,2%	37,4%
Viciebsk region	Liozna district	38,0%	35,2%	37,3%
Mahiliou region	Hlusk district	37,2%	28,7%	36,9%
Viciebsk region	Sharkaushcyna district	38,1%	36,0%	36,3%
Mahiliou region	Klimavicy district	36,7%	35,0%	35,0%
Homiel region	Dobrush district	41,0%	41,2%	<b>34,5</b> %
Hrodna region	Svislach district	34,3%	36,0%	34,4%
Mahiliou region	Kruhlaye district	37,7%	37,0%	34,1%
Homiel region	Buda-Kashaliova district	37,4%	33,6%	34,0%
Viciebsk region	Shumilina district	38,9%	37,4%	33,8%
Mahiliou region	Mscislaul district	35,3%	33,5%	33,7%
Homiel region	Lielchycy district	34,2%	33,4%	<b>32,4</b> %
Homiel region	Khoyniki district	34,0%	32,5%	<b>32,4</b> %
Mahiliou region	Chavusy district	35,7%	34,1%	31,1%

Region	District/city	2018	2019	2020
For reference	Belarus (all local budgets)	79,0%	77,8%	75,5%
GROUP 3: 30% AND	BELOW			
Viciebsk region	Vushacy district	31,7%	32,9%	<b>29,9</b> %
Homiel region	Naroulia district	33,1%	30,4%	29,9%
Mahiliou region	Cherykau district	34,6%	30,5%	29,9%
Mahiliou region	Drybin district	33,9%	31,5%	29,9%
Mahiliou region	Slauharad district	34,8%	27,9%	29,7%
Homiel region	Loyeu district	28,7%	27,0%	28,9%
Mahiliou region	Khocimsk district	28,9%	24,7%	28,6%
Homiel region	Yelsk district	<b>29,3</b> %	<b>30,6</b> %	28,0%
Mahiliou region	Bialynicy district	37,0%	<b>32,3</b> %	26,3%
Homiel region	Chachersk district	27,3%	24,4%	25,2%
Homiel region	Vietka district	30,3%	25,6%	25,1%
Mahiliou region	Krasnapollie district	25,7%	25,1%	25,0%
Homiel region	Brahin district	16,8%	27,6%	24,2%
Homiel region	Karma district	21,1%	19,6%	20,4%

### PORTION OF LOCAL BUDGETS FINANCED BY OWN REVENUE (FOR REGIONS WITH LARGE SANCTIONED ENTERPRISES)

Region	District/city	2018	2019	2020
For reference	Belarus (all local budgets)	79,0%	77,8%	75,5%
Minsk	Minsk	<b>99,2</b> %	99,2%	99,1%
Minsk region	Minsk district	<b>96,5</b> %	96,2%	<b>99,1</b> %
Minsk region	Zhodzina	94,3%	94,0%	<b>96,8</b> %
Hrodna region	Hrodna	92,2%	<b>96,8</b> %	96,4%
Minsk region	Salihorsk district	93,3%	<b>86,6</b> %	86,5%
Minsk region	Barysau district	82,8%	80,2%	82,7%
Viciebsk region	Polack district	79,4%	73,1%	<b>72,5</b> %
Hrodna region	Lida district	79,4%	77,6%	71,6%
Viciebsk region	Navapolack	92,2%	77,7%	<b>68,3</b> %
Viciebsk region	Orsha district	63,7%	55,7%	<b>56,2</b> %
Minsk region	Chervien district	60,4%	67,6%	54,5%
Mahiliou region	Babrujsk	54,4%	<b>52,8</b> %	43,7%

### NOMINAL ACCRUED AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES IN 2020

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6
Brest region	1,054.6
Baranavicy district	993.7
Biaroza district	1,077.8
Brest district	1,042.9
Hantsavicy district	894.0
Drahicyn district	912.1
Zhabinka district	977.1
Ivanava district	980.0
lvatsevicy district	983.9
Kamyanec district	1,058.6
Kobryn district	1,021.9
Luninec district	984.9
Lyakhavicy district	975.3
Malaryta district	917.0
Pinsk district	953.6
Pruzhany district	1,017.4
Stolin district	863.9
Brest	1,225.2
Baranavicy	1,027.3
Pinsk	1,003.7

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6
Viciebsk region	1,038.3
Beshankovicy district	866.4
Braslau district	859.9
Vierkhniadzvinsk district	976.2
Viciebsk district	1,002.9
Hlybokaye district	933.9
Haradok district	861.5
Dokshytsy district	933.9
Dubrouna district	902.6
Liepel district	958.0
Liozna district	871.7
Miory district	866.6
Orsha district	999.5
Polack district	1,029.4
Pastavy district	914.8
Rasony district	860.1
Sianno district	851.1
Talochyn district	965.0
Vushacy district	844.8
Chashniki district	1,037.7
Sharkaushchyna district	776.1
Shumilin district	860.1
Viciebsk	1,113.3
Navapolack	1,411.6

Homiel

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN		
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6		
Homiel region	1,079.4		
Brahin district	902.4		
Buda-Kashaliova district	903.9		
Vietka district	854.5		
Homiel district	956.2		
Dobrush district	845.9		
Yelsk district	891.6		
Zhytkavicy district	914.9		
Zhlobin district	1,099.0		
Kalinkavicy district	968.4		
Karma district	793.1		
Lielchycy district	874.7		
Loyeu district	893.2		
Mazyr district	1,234.5		
Naroulia district	953.7		
Akciabrski district	869.8		
Pietrykau district	933.4		
Rechyca district	1,294.0		
Rahachou district	926.3		
Svietlahorsk district	1,200.2		
Khoiniki district	889.9		
Chachersk district	924.1		
11	4.440.0		

1,143.6

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6
Hrodna region	1,062.1
Berastavica district	1,016.2
Vaukavysk district	992.8
Voranava district	902.8
Hrodna district	1,094.7
Dziatlava district	918.0
Zelva district	922.7
luye district	878.0
Karelicy district	909.4
Lida district	992.5
Masty district	931.0
Navahrudak district	955.1
Astraviets district	1,308.8
Ashmiany district	949.4
Svislach district	892.4
Slonim district	973.7
Smarhon district	1,052.6
Shchuchyn district	977.1
Hrodna	1,211.5

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6
Minsk	1,753.4
Minsk region	1,223.5
Biaroza district	967.7
Barysau district	1,080.3
Vilejka district	962.3
Valozyn district	978.9
Dziarzhynsk district	1,305.9
Kleck district	994.7
Kapyl district	982.5
Krupki district	1,014.3
Lahojsk district	1,146.3
Lyuban district	998.5
Minsk district	1,454.7
Maladzechna district	1,037.0
Miadziel district	925.6
Niasvizh district	1,102.5
Pukhavicy district	1,123.5
Sluck district	1,025.5
Smaliavicy district	1,294.9
Salihorsk district	1,771.7
Staryja Darohi district	1,032.6
Staubcy district	1,077.1
Uzda district	1,014.6
Chervien district	1,018.1
Zhodzina	1,184.6

Territory	Nominal accrued monthly wages in 2020, BYN
Republic of Belarus	1,254.6
Mahiliou region	1,010.0
Bialynicy district	973.8
Babrujsk district	874.7
Bykhau district	881.4
Hlusk district	867.2
Horki district	953.5
Drybin district	858.7
Kirausk disrtrict	910.1
Klimavicy district	857.3
Klichau district	867.8
Kastsyukovicy district	976.5
Krasnapollie district	858.1
Krychau district	934.3
Kruhlaye district	834.0
Mahiliou district	1,077.9
Mscislaul district	805.0
Asipovicy district	1,062.1
Slauharad district	831.6
Khocimsk district	826.4
Chavusy district	854.2
Cherykau district	886.7
Shklou district	1,023.1
Mahiliou	1,126.3
Babrujsk	988.2


# DISTRICTS WITH THE LARGEST SHARE OF WORKERS EMPLOYED BY SANCTIONED ENTERPRISES

City/ districts	Population, people	Size of the workforce, people	Share of employed in the local population	Number of residents employed by large sanctioned enterprises	Sanctioned enterprises and number of employees	Share of workforce employed by sanctioned enterprises
Minsk	2,014,959	1,083,300	54%	20,242	621 people at OAO AGAT – Electromechanical Plant, 4,234 people at OAO MZKT, 15,387 people at OAO MAZ	2%
Smaliavichy district (including Zhodzina)	116,739	54,589	47%	10,614	10,614 people at OAO BelAZ	19%
Hrodna district (including Hrodna)	407,023	195,922	48%	8,131	7,328 people at OAO Grodno Azot and OAO Grodno Khimvolokno, 803 people at OAO Grodno Tobacco Factory NEMAN	4%
Salihorsk district	131,003	68,137	52%	16,527	16,527 people at OAO Belaruskali	24%
Barysau district	174,826	75,350	43%	844	844 people at OAO 140 Repair Plant	1%

City/ districts	Population, people	Size of the workforce, people	Share of employed in the local population	Number of residents employed by large sanctioned enterprises	Sanctioned enterprises and number of employees	Share of workforce employed by sanctioned enterprises
Polack district (including Navapolack)	201,238	90,014	45%	13,325	9,873 people at OAO Naftan, 3452 people at OAO Polotsk- Steklovolokno	15%
Lida district	134,884	55,602	41%	1,129	1,129 people at OAO Lakokraska	2%
Mazyr district	127,676	56,992	45%	4,956	4,956 people at OAO Mazyr Oil Processing Plant	9%
Babrujsk district (including Babrujsk)	229,891	92,356	40%	8,239	8,239 people at OAO Belshina	9%

### POLL SAMPLE

Survey sample by gender, National Poll (Narodny Opros), November 2021



#### Survey sample by region, National Poll (Narodny Opros), November 2021

Brest region	Viciebsk region	Homiel region	Hrodna region			Mahiliou region
12%	12%	13%	12%	21%	22%	8%

#### Survey sample by community size, National Poll (Narodny Opros), November 2021

Capital	Regional center	District center		Agricultural town, village
21%	28%	26%	13%	12%

Survey sample by age, National Poll (Narodny Opros), November 2021				61 vears
18-30 years old				
8%	35%	30%	20%	7%

#### Survey sample by education, National Poll (Narodny Opros), November 2021

	Secondary specialized education Higher		Higher	Post-graduate
4%	18%	5%	68%	5%
Basic/ secondary/ general		Vocatio	onal	

### QUESTIONNAIRE

### **ABOUT THE SANCTIONS**

1. Do you follow the news about Western sanctions on Belarus?

- No
- Yes
- Hard to say

2. Please indicate the sanctions that you believe have already been imposed on Belarus by Western countries

- Ban on entry to the European Union for specific individuals from Belarus, a freeze of their banking assets in the EU
- Ban on the export of Belarusian oil products and potash fertilizers to the European Union
- Termination of financing for projects in Belarus's public sector by the European Investment Bank
- Cessation of flights between European countries and Belarus
- Disconnection of the Belarusian banking system from SWIFT\*
- Complete ban on all Belarusian officials from entering the European Union\*
- Ban on the export of Belarusian agricultural products to the European Union\*
- Complete ban on international loans for Belarus\*

# 3. To what extent do you agree that recently introduced Western sanctions will lead to the consequences shown below?

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree on a 5-point scale, where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree".

- Most political prisoners in Belarus will be released
- All political prisoners in Belarus will be released
- Political repression in Belarus will intensify
- Lukashenka will resign as president, new presidential elections will be held in Belarus
- Lukashenka will negotiate with Tsikhanouskaya
- Lukashenka will negotiate with the West
- There will be splits in the Belarusian elite
- An economic crisis will begin in Belarus
- Sanctioned enterprises will fire workers en masse
- Sanctioned enterprises will be transferred to Russian control
- Wages of public-sector workers will decline
- Wages of all workers in Belarus will decline
- Russian military bases will be deployed in Belarus
- Belarus will lose its sovereignty and become part of Russia

4. Do you think Western countries will introduce new and tougher sanctions on Belarus in the next six months?

- Definitely not
- Probably not
- Probably yes
- Definitely yes
- Hard to say

# 5. Do you think Western countries should impose new and tougher sanctions on Belarus?

- Definitely not
- Probably not
- Probably yes
- Definitely yes
- Hard to say

### 6. In your opinion, what individuals/entities should these new and tougher sanctions target?

#### (select all that apply)

- The financial and banking sector
- Oil processing enterprises
- Enterprises producing potash fertilizers
- All state-owned enterprises
- Siloviki
- Officials as a whole
- Officials' families
- The Belarusian TV and Radio Corporation
- Lukashenka and the business people close to him
- Other

# 7. To what extent do you agree that new and tougher sanctions may lead to the consequences shown below?

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree on a 5-point scale, where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree".

- Most political prisoners in Belarus will be released
- All political prisoners in Belarus will be released
- Political repressions in Belarus will intensify
- Lukashenka will resign as president, new presidential elections will be held in Belarus
- Lukashenka will agree to negotiate with Tsikhanouskaya
- Lukashenka will agree to negotiate with the West
- There will be splits in the Belarusian elite
- An economic crisis will begin Belarus
- Sanctioned enterprises will fire workers en masse
- Sanctioned enterprises will be transferred to Russian control
- Wages of public-sector workers will decline
- Wages of all workers in Belarus will decline
- Russian military bases will be deployed in Belarus
- Belarus will lose its sovereignty and become a part of Russia

8. Imagine that Western countries really do introduce new and tougher sanctions against Belarus. What emotions does this invoke in you?

- Enthusiasm
- Joy
- Hope
- Anxiety
- Disappointment
- Dismay
- No emotions
- Hard to say

### 9. How willing would you be for the financial situation of you and your family to deteriorate because new and tougher sanctions are introduced?

- Definitely unwilling
- Somewhat unwilling
- Somewhat willing
- Definitely willing
- Hard to say
- The financial situation of my family would not change due to sanctions

#### 10. If you were sure that new and tougher sanctions would increase the likelihood of Lukashenka's resignation, how willing would you be for the financial situation of you and your family to deteriorate?

- Definitely not willing
- Somewhat unwilling
- Somewhat willing
- Definitely willing
- Hard to say
- The financial situation of my family would not change due to sanctions

# 11. How willing would you be to accept new and tough sanctions if it meant the strengthening of economic and political integration between Belarus and Russia?

- Definitely not willing
- Somewhat unwilling
- Somewhat willing
- Definitely willing
- Hard to say

12. If you were sure that new and tougher sanctions would increase the likelihood of Lukashenka's resignation, how willing would you be to accept them, even if it meant the strengthening of economic and political integration between Belarus and Russia?

- Definitely not willing
- Somewhat unwilling
- Somewhat willing
- Definitely willing
- Hard to say

### ABOUT THE ECONOMY OF BELARUS AND YOUR PARTICIPATION IN IT

## 13. How has the financial situation of yourself/your family changed in the last six months?

- Definitely improved
- Somewhat improved
- Remained unchanged
- Somewhat deteriorated
- Definitely deteriorated
- Hard to say

## 14. How, in your opinion, has the economic situation of Belarus changed in the last six months?

- Definitely improved
- Somewhat improved
- Remained unchanged
- Somewhat deteriorated
- Definitely deteriorated
- Hard to say

## 15. Has the economic situation of the community where you live changed in the last six months?

- Definitely improved
- Somewhat improved
- Remained unchanged
- Somewhat deteriorated
- Definitely deteriorated
- Hard to tell

# 16. Which of the following best describes your current employment?

- Employed in the public sector
- Employed in the private sector
- Business owner, self-employed
- Temporarily unemployed, looking for a job
- Not working or looking for a job
- Student
- Retired
- On maternity leave
- Other

17. In your community, do you think it will be easy or difficult for you to find a new job that is not a downgrade from your current one?

- Definitely easy
- Somewhat easy
- Neither easy nor difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Definitely difficult
- Hard to say

## 18. And do you think it will be easy or difficult for you to find such a job in another Belarusian city or village?

- Definitely easy
- Somewhat easy
- Neither easy nor difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Definitely difficult
- Hard to say

#### 19. Are you considering emigration from Belarus?

- No, I don't want to leave, and I do not plan to do so
- Yes, and I am already taking steps to achieve this
- Yes, I am thinking about it, but I haven't done nothing yet
- I would like to leave the country, but I will not be able to
- I have already left
- Hard to say

# 20. In your opinion, what impact will the recently introduced sanctions have on the well-being of your community in the next six months?

- Definitely positive
- Somewhat positive
- No impact
- Somewhat negative
- Definitely negative
- Hard to say

## 21. And what could be the impact of new and tougher sanctions?

- Definitely positive
- Somewhat positive
- No impact
- Somewhat negative
- Definitely negative
- Hard to say

22. In your opinion, can it be said that the economy of your community fully or considerably depends on the work of one or several key enterprises?

- Definitely not
- Rather not
- Rather yes
- Definitely yes
- Hard to say



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