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Impetus for Europe's Security Policy
The time to act has come

The debt crisis and efforts to save the euro are overshadowing necessary reforms to Europe's energy policy and the further expansion of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU's credibility in terms of its ability to take effective action depends, however, on the coherent coordination of monetary, energy and security policy questions.

If it is to assert itself in the globalised world the EU, alongside its efforts in the area of monetary policy, also needs its own strong and credible security and defence policy. In view of the financial constraints in all European countries Europe's ability to act in the security sphere can only be guaranteed if there is the will to establish greater European commonality and closer cooperation. No EU Member State is still able on its own to maintain the full spectrum of military and civilian capabilities. We therefore base our considerations on three premises:

- Europe is not now and will not in the future be able to guarantee European security on its own; it requires the support of the USA.
- All Europe's efforts should be directed towards not only strengthening its ability to act but at making itself a relevant partner of the USA again. This means that all efforts must also be directed towards strengthening NATO as the essential bedrock of transatlantic relations.
- All states which wish to be involved in making Europe stronger must be prepared to share the risks and spread the burden between themselves according to their means. Those who seek an "à la carte" approach to risk sharing must be prepared to accept a corresponding loss of influence.

There is therefore a need in the EU to develop shared ideas on what military potential should be available and on how military capabilities are to be prioritised, duplication of structures avoided and interoperability and operational readiness improved. We need to decide what capabilities

we should share with others, where we can contribute them with others supranationally and what capabilities we can do without because others can provide them more reliably and at lower cost.

This requires agreement on where and under what circumstances (partially) integrated armed forces are to be deployed. It also underlines both the need and the opportunity to form a workable consensus on the future of European security provision in the 21st century.

A changed situation

Changes such as in North Africa and the Middle East will have a considerable impact on Europe's security. Iran's nuclear policy also has the potential to escalate and impact on Europe. Our relationship with Russia is based on strategic cooperation. But there are also a number of disagreements between us in relation to important security interests – our stance on the conflict in Syria and also the issue of joint missile defence. We therefore need a new quality of agreement which goes beyond the current partnership-based cooperation. If the ice cap in the Far North melts, this offers new prospects for the extraction of resources, new transport routes and long-term transatlantic cooperation. Here the EU should lose no time in developing cooperation projects with the USA and Canada and conducting strategic consultations with Russia. Another consideration is Turkey's new image of itself as a leading regional power and the consequences arising from this. At the same time we Europeans can no longer rely to the same extent as before on the support of the USA to uphold our security interests.

As yet, however, the EU has failed to establish an ability to act in the area of security commensurate with its economic weight. Despite all the institutional progress since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it is already possible to identify losses of national capabilities. These will lead to serious losses of European capabilities if these processes continue to take place in an uncoordinated manner. For this reason in particular we need far closer security cooperation and we need to take active and courageous steps towards deepening military integration while at the same time continuing to develop the transatlantic division of labour.

An enhanced CSDP will be Europe's key contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing. In this process NATO is indispensable in the areas of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, missile defence, strategic reconnaissance, cyber defence and, for the time being, strategic transport.

Examples of the type of forces Europe needs to develop and have at its disposal are, in particular, a high command and intervention forces capable of land, sea and air power projection. Europe also needs a network of constabulary forces (such as the Gendarmerie or Carabinieri, and in addition to police forces, all the forces needed to administer a territory without its own system of law and order) to be deployed in the transition period following an intervention, and stabilisation forces which provide security under civilian control as a new state is established following post-crisis management and further conflict prevention. It is particular in this networked approach that Europe can play to its real strengths.

Where and what to deploy

Europe therefore needs to formulate its strategic consensus and corresponding pragmatic work processes for the tasks ahead and to identify the geographical areas relevant to our security and the instruments to be used.

In terms of defining the tasks to be tackled, Europeans have for years had a basic consensus which is defined in the respective current versions of the European security strategy and NATO's strategic concept. What is missing, however, is any real prioritisation which would allow corresponding armed forces planning and the appropriate coordination processes.
There is a need therefore to reach a consensus on defining the priority geographical areas in which Europe wishes in future to be able to act while maintaining flexibility and the ability to respond to unforeseen developments. The current potential for crisis and conflict in North Africa and the Middle East suggests that this should be regarded as the geographically nearest challenge to European security – whereby political solutions in the Middle East must necessarily involve the USA.
Developments in other parts of Africa, too, (such as the Horn of Africa), as well as in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far North pose potential challenges to Europe's power to act in the area of security.
The further development of Europe's "toolkit" on a networked basis must ensure that it is workable in Germany and must be speeded up in the EU too to ensure its international effectiveness. The focus must be on cooperative security, civil and military conflict prevention and the projection of economic and political stability. This includes the establishment of a high-performance early-warning system incorporating HUMINT, SIGINT etc. Europe must be in a position in the 21st century to deploy military power if this is needed to uphold and enforce its interests and values and if it is both legitimate to do so under international law and politically necessary. "Military power" remains a structural principle of international relations.
In order to fulfil these tasks Europe must be able to deploy military crisis intervention and combat units rapidly over long distances, and to command and sustain them in the area of deployment, have the capability to undertake strategic troop transports by sea and air and have at its disposal strategic and operational reconnaissance assets as well as state-of-the-art munitions and command and control resources.
Enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU and mutual recourse to capabilities and structures remain a principle of collective security. There is a need at long last to examine military structures in NATO and the EU (CSDP) for duplication and to alter them accordingly. There is also an urgent need to harmonise procedures and rules in order to be able to take effective action without weak links. The Europeans must rely here on existing NATO structures and on the provision of significant military capabilities by the USA. For the foreseeable future it will be beyond the financial possibilities of the EU to maintain the full range of military capabilities. The EU does, however, have exceptional capabilities in civil crisis prevention and post-crisis management vis-à-vis other international organisations; these strengths need to be dovetailed better and more coherently with military capabilities.

The use of European resources

In order to improve Europe's ability to take credible and effective political and military action it is essential to deepen military integration in Europe and intensify security cooperation with NATO. To make Europe better able to take military action, more ambitious use should be made of both pooling and sharing and smart defence. Neither should accordingly be regarded as an opportunity to cut costs or as a substitute for sustainably financed armed forces. Rather they

should be seen as a means to facilitate the necessary building up, restructuring and expansion of Europe's military capabilities.
All EU Member States should participate in the CSDP, agree on the scope and composition of the necessary European armed forces and determine how these forces can work together better. Larger capability gaps should be closed by multinational programmes (such as the European Air Transport Fleet).
Until this can be achieved, it will be necessary to continue, deepen, expand and closely coordinate existing initiatives on the part of individual groups of Member States to strengthen capabilities, pool capacities and share tasks.
Readiness to become involved in these approaches, however, requires the political will to integrate military capabilities and a readiness to relinquish sovereignty over the deployment of military means. A Europe of different speeds or different stages of integration cannot be ruled out. Rather it should be regarded as an active offer to those countries which are ready to rely on each other to the extent that they transfer sovereignty to joint institutions. Cooperation agreements outside the CSDP framework – for example, the British-French initiative – should also be examined in this respect.
Important collaborative projects have already been introduced in the areas of logistics and training. In addition at the NATO Summit in May 2012 the following beacon projects were agreed: Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), procurement of an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, consolidation of Baltic Air Policing (APB) and strengthening of the NATO Response Force (NRF). These promising approaches need to be built on: examples of deployment-relevant capabilities might be joint helicopter units or the pooling of EU-North Sea or EU-Baltic States maritime capabilities, similar to NATO's Standing Naval Forces. There is also a need to use existing multinational headquarters to which units could be assigned on a fixed basis at least for multinational planning/exercises. They are too seldom used for operations. In the case of the missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, for example, large new structures, ISAF and KFOR, were deliberately created. There is no longer a reliance on tried and tested headquarters. Furthermore greater use should be made in mission planning of the expensive NRF and EU Battle Groups; they should be subject to common standards in terms of command and control and training.
A further opportunity for improved international cooperation lies in the more frequent use of lead/framework nation approaches in a variety of disciplines. This should include evaluation of mission experiences. There is also a need to reach workable agreements on funding deployments, headquarters and capabilities which also include an agreement on known cost problems.
Any truly workable European security policy, it should also be noted, is unthinkable without the United Kingdom, France or Poland.

A more intelligent armaments policy

In terms of armaments the state as monopolist – whether as contractor or consumer – in general has a special responsibility and particular influence. The forthcoming process of Europeanisation therefore has to be guided by the following main principles:

Convincing European corporate structures need to ensure a balance of interests in Europe in order to maintain national value added and jobs. The aim must be to establish a deliberate mutual dependency which leaves no place for national strivings for autonomy and predatory competition.

Privat-sector businesses are more likely to generate commercially efficient structures and global competitiveness than those in state hands. But if they are in competition with state-sector defence companies, they generally lose out. Where an export-oriented armaments policy is of implicit interest to the state, the interests of German defence companies generally founder in the absence of massive support from the state. Here Germany needs to develop more robust solutions in order to prevent the undermining of the German defence industry and a loss of know-how. There is a need to define the core areas of arms policy in which it is vital for Germany to retain its technological lead.

In this process it is the task of policymakers to create the necessary environment. There is a need to reach rapid agreement here in order to institute the necessary strategic steps at European level, for example in the form of a round table of selected EU countries and the defence industry, possibly moderated by the Commission or the European Defence Agency.

Consequences

The nations of Europe will have to take far-reaching decisions affecting their national sovereignty and traditional security cultures. The Federal Government and the Bundestag need to play a leading role in terms of responding to these structural questions and provide important impetus.

1. Credibility

We have to acknowledge that German security policy has a credibility problem. At least since the UN resolution on Libya some of our partners in NATO and the CSDP have renewed doubts about whether they can count on Germany in hard power conflicts. Germany must engage more intensively, more broadly and more strategically with security policy if it is to pull its weight in global politics and regain lost credibility. Not only Germany's role in NATO, but also the effectiveness of the CSDP depends on this.

Recommendation: We must find answers regarding which German security instruments should be rethought or further developed and in what form. At executive level there is the Federal Security Council, a cross-departmental instrument which is at present temporary but may become permanent in the future and include an early-warning system: its role to coordinate the planning and command of deployments and to communicate the goals and interests of German security policy to the inside and the outside. Think tanks such as the DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations) and the SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs) must also play a more prominent role in a more broadly based German security policy. At parliamentary level, too, there is a need for greater cross-committee and cross-departmental coordination. In order to meet the challenges of enhanced multinational cooperation and to create social acceptance of this, there is a need for a regular general debate on security policy in the Bundestag to identify the goals of German security policy, analyse existing challenges and designate corresponding resources and measures. Submitted each year by the Federal

Chancellor and discussed in parliament, such "security policy guidelines" could go a long way towards sharpening the focus of German security policy and making it more transparent for the German public as well as comprehensible to our partners.

2. Germany as a supporting partner

The ability to take effective action in security matters can only be strengthened if Member States give up part of their national sovereignty – in a similar way to current decisions on transferring sovereignty in fiscal and economic policy. To operate to good effect the CSDP would pool the military capabilities of Member States and share command and control responsibilities to such an extent that it would no longer be possible to enforce national reservations as an individual opinion. This would mean that German troops could be deployed on an EU mission to which the German government and the German Bundestag would not have agreed on their own initiative. Such a move would necessarily have to be preceded by a critical, comprehensive and undoubtedly controversial debate. The positive consequence of a targeted and limited transfer of sovereignty would be that in return for giving up part of their sovereignty, EU Member States would be better able to take effective foreign and security policy action and would have a more effective and affordable set of instruments.

Recommendation: Germany should offer itself as a supporting partner to countries with a comparable security culture of carefully weighed up military intervention. One important example revealing the deep-rooted differences of interest in European security policy is the contentious issue of how to address North Africa in the future. While France is pressing for the strategic focus to be on this area, the Central Europeans with Poland at the helm continue to look eastwards. Germany can play a mediating role with respect to these differing interests. With respect to CSDP missions, too, France wants (North) Africa to be the priority geographical area. This change of priority is not necessarily something we agree with. That is why we believe there is a need for a fundamental discussion on what political and strategic goals are achievable with such missions.

Since it will be impossible to establish an overarching security policy consensus with regard to regional interests in the medium term, we must rely on working with what is possible in terms of existing constellations and on security policy processes: who can and who wants to do what together?

Against this background our recommendation for a supporting partnership which Germany can offer as a framework for integration is very valuable and should be further expanded. Germany needs to trigger a strategic discussion on what Germany and in particular the EU can and wants to achieve with its civil and military missions.

It is perfectly possible that other European countries will make Germany the scapegoat if integration does not move forward. Since our country traditionally champions "integration" more than others, others will also regard us as being responsible for its success – even if it is not altogether Germany's fault if further integration is not achieved. In the area of smart defence, it can be seen that some partners are cutting capabilities unilaterally. Yet if smart defence does not come about, the failure will be laid at Germany's door. Bearing this in mind, Germany as a supporting partner can play a mediating and balancing role.

3. Pooling and Sharing

Germany should enter into concrete pooling and sharing agreements with willing partners in such areas as air defence, coastal defence, training establishments, command and control structures and a single control, command and information system. This should occur in the framework of the CSDP as a further development of the German-Swedish Ghent Initiative on Pooling and Sharing, which is an important interim step although not enough to guarantee a properly regulated procedure for role specialisation and cooperation. There is also a need to deepen the German-French cooperation agreement on creating joint capabilities and open it up to interested partners. Further possibilities include the merging of expensive special training facilities as well as sections of officer training, agreements on joint equipment, intensified and consolidated mission preparations and improved agreements on rules of engagement that are as far as possible aligned with each other and comparable.

Established pooling and sharing agreements should be incorporated in the security policy guidelines and once adopted by parliament in the general debate proposed by us, would then be mandated in the sense that the Federal Government could deploy the manpower and resources required under the agreements without the further consent of parliament. In this case, too, parliament would have the right of recall.

Recommendation: The Federal Government must work with willing partners to develop a concept for joint European defence planning in order to ensure a regulated structure and setting of priorities in the areas of role specialisation and integration of capabilities which is oriented to the above parameters. NATO's defence planning should be revitalised for this purpose. The groundwork for this could be carried out by a joint EU-NATO working group at political director level, whose remit should include defining concrete fields of work in relation to pooling and sharing arrangements and the necessary relinquishment of sovereignty.

4. Flexibilisation

The Bundestag, which has a relatively large role in decision-making in comparison with other European countries, would be particularly affected by a relinquishment of sovereignty. Such a step would have to entail reform of parliament's right of prior approval of foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr. The Bundestag must continue to have the last word in the form of a right of recall in relation to such decisions. A decision to make the German decision-making system more flexible would, however, send out a clear signal to our partners which would help to build trust. While it is true that parliament's right of prior approval has never yet been used as a reason for Germany to avoid deploying troops, it could very well be used as a reason to justify politically undesirable decisions. It is important that we, like our allies, have the certainty that we can rely on access to command and control, logistics, reconnaissance and training units which are "shared". The example of AWACS shows how important it is for the credible and sustainable deployment of this system that there should be certainty with regard to its availability, particularly since Germany supplies 40 per cent of the command and technical personnel. If Germany were to retain a reservation, use of the AWACS would be unsustainable.

Recommendation: The President of the German Bundestag and the leaders of the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag must launch a consultation process on possible approaches to making the decision-making process more flexible. One possibility would be a parliamentary decision within the framework of the annual debate on security policy guidelines on making available German troops and capabilities for integrated armed forces. Their deployment would then be subject to the unanimous decision of the European Council (or the NATO Council). Thus the executive would have the "right of deployment" while the Bundestag as legislature would have the "right of recall". This proposal to amend German law on deployment of the armed forces would have to be examined by constitutional experts at the appropriate time and any amendments to the law made in the course of the parliamentary process.

5. Partners

In the light of the dynamically changing political situation both in the ambit of the EU and in international relations, there is a crucial need to further develop strategic partnerships. Forums therefore should be established in the framework of the CFSP/CSDP for strategic dialogues with the USA, Russia and Turkey, with the focus on the USA and Turkey. In both cases Germany has a particular responsibility. In the case of the USA the strategic discussion on smart defence, defence planning and the strategic division of labour should be conducted in the framework of NATO.

Turkey is growing in self-confidence and is demonstrating this both within and outside NATO. To this extent there is good reason for it to be involved in the CFSP and CSDP. How far it can be integrated in efforts to strengthen Europe's ability to act, however, depends primarily on how much movement it shows in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The aim must be to lift the blockade on institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO that has existed since Cyprus joined the EU. Substantial concessions need to be wrested from Greece and Turkey in the framework of financial assistance and these must be incorporated in the EU's package of requirements with respect to the two countries. Alternatively Germany could launch an urgently needed, albeit inevitably time-consuming initiative, possibly in a "smart six" (D, F, GB, P, I, E) or "smart five" (D, F, GB, P, I) format, to determine "price tags" with respect to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus for substantially improved cooperation.

Recommendation: At European level Germany should work together with various partners in a "smart five" or "smart six" format to develop proposals for accommodating Turkey in European institutions: in the CFSP consultations could be held with Turkey prior to each Council of Foreign Ministers, while in the CSDP Turkey could be involved in the decision-making processes of the EU relating to crisis management operations (a model for this could be the WEU acquis – both sides benefitted particularly from this up to around 2002). Turkey should also become a member of the European Defence Agency. It is important, nevertheless, to ensure that Turkey demonstrates an awareness of its responsibilities with respect to Europe's joint collective security provision.

To conclude, these proposals will only be successful if the transfer of sovereignty to the EU becomes a reality. Without concrete steps in this direction, these proposals too will remain little more than political declamations.

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