The Nexus of Security and Development

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A Proposal for a Way Forward on EU-Japan Cooperation at the Nexus of Security and Development
CONFERENCE PAPERS

The Nexus of Security and Development

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EU-Japan Relations from 2001-Today: Achievements, Failures and Prospects

Axel Berkofsky

Introduction

Back in 2001 Tokyo and Brussels had very ambitious (on paper) plans as regards international economic, political and security co-operation when adopting the so-called ‘EU-Japan Action Plan for Co-operation’ in 2001 (also ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’, for details see below). However, only few of the envisioned joint international policies in the areas of global and regional politics and security have actually been implemented from 2001 until today. The EU Commission repeatedly refers in its recent so-called ‘information notes’ (in essence the summary of official EU-Japan encounters in the framework of the ‘EU-Japan Joint High Level Group’) and official documents (some of which are being used and analyzed in this paper, see below) to the outcome of envisioned joint EU-Japan policies to as ‘disappointing’ acknowledging that the action plan suffered from a lack of focus and the (on paper ambition) to tackle too many issues and areas without sufficient resources and adequate instruments. Indeed, there is agreement in both Tokyo and Brussels that the initial project to cover and jointly deal with 100 areas of bilateral cooperation, ranging from joint peacekeeping and security cooperation to global and bilateral economic and trade cooperation (as listed in the 2001 EU-Japan Action Plan) was for too ambitious in view of the fairly limited resources in Tokyo and Brussels dedicated to EU-Japan relations in general and the implementation of the action plan in particular. The limits and the lack of political will to ‘do’ more in international security and politics notwithstanding, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last ten years established a framework for regular consultations and bilateral meetings, including regular consultations ahead of the annual session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Furthermore, the EU and Japan are jointly (at least on paper) supporting international initiatives to achieve global nuclear disarmament and efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This was accompanied by jointly signing numerous international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols. To be sure, jointly signing nuclear disarmament protocols is one thing, following up on the signatures and adopting joint policies quite another.

However, referring to EU-Japanese joint signatures under international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols as achievements of bilateral policies in the areas of international politics and security have only so much credibility if these signatures do not result in joint policies with a concrete and measurable impact on international security. That was only fairly rarely the case even if currently ongoing and in the future envisioned EU-Japan civilian and non-military security cooperation in Afghanistan (for details see below) provide evidence that Brussels and Tokyo are indeed capable and willing to

implement policies and joint missions of the kind formulated in the EU-Japan Action Plan back in 2001. In fact, given current European-Japanese reconstruction and pacification efforts in Afghanistan could-if Brussels and Tokyo intensify and honor their commitment to implement joint aid, training and reconstructing policies in Afghanistan in the years ahead-become a role model for further EU-Japan non-combat military cooperation.

As will be argued below, the possibility of the EU and Japan negotiating and eventually adopting two bilateral framework agreements—one covering cooperation in the areas of international politics and security and another one covering trade and investment (i.e. a free trade agreement)—as agreed at the EU-Japan Summit in May 2011—will most probably continue to stand and fall with Japan’s preparedness to address and indeed abolish what the EU refers to as non-tariff barriers to trade and investment for European business in Japan.

Structure of this Paper

This first part of this paper will provide an introduction into facts and events of EU-Japan relations during and after the Cold War, an overview of bilateral trade and investment relations and security cooperation in the 1990s (in the Western Balkans) and today (Afghanistan and Somalia). The second will analyze in detail the current state of EU-Japan negotiations aimed at adopting a new bilateral framework agreement for when the ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’ in 2001 runs out later this year. Based on the evidence and official documents dealing EU-Japan negotiations available to this author, this paper concludes that the adoption of a new bilateral framework agreement incorporating both EU and Japanese priorities as regards the contents of focus of institutionalized cooperation in the years ahead seems increasingly unlikely.

First Part

I. EU-Japan Cold War and Post-Cold War Relations

During the Cold War, exchanges and relations between the EU (then the European Economic Community, EEC) and Japan were fairly limited. While a divided Europe was geographically and ideologically caught in the middle of the Cold War, Japan’s main reference as regards its foreign, foreign economic and above all trade policies was the US. The ECC—and that was certainly not only the case in Japan—was not considered as policymaking institution with a global reach and impact.

Washington’s influence on Japanese foreign and security policies in the context of the US-Japan security alliance (adopted in 1952 and revised in 1960) meant that Tokyo’s relations with Europe remained a relatively insignificant part of its overall external relations. Tokyo perceived the EEC above all as political project and union to promote European political integration and Franco-German reconciliation. For Tokyo, the EEC, was an ‘intra-European affair’ with few implications for Japanese global foreign and economic policies.²

European and Japanese efforts to intensify their economic, political and security ties after the end of the Cold War took shape in July 1991, when Brussels and Tokyo adopted the

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so-called ‘The Hague Declaration.’\(^3\) The ‘The Hague Declaration’ institutionalized bilateral EU-Japan relations and was in part the result of a Japanese ‘Europhoria’ after the end of the Cold War, accompanied by Japanese political rhetoric that the first decade of the 21st century would be a “decade of Euro-Japanese cooperation” as then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono Yohei suggested.\(^4\) The declaration declared that the EU and Japan share a similar set of values such as democracy, the rule of law, commitment to human rights and resulted in the establishment an institutional consultative framework and an annual EU-Japan summit. Tokyo’s plans to expand its relationship with the EU in the 1990s were amongst others motivated by a perceived need to ‘diversify’ its regional and global security policies, which as indicated above was throughout the Cold War defined and limited by its security alliance with the US. Washington de-facto obliging Japan to financially support the US-led multinational coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraq with $13 billion during the 1990/1991 Gulf War further convinced and motivated Japanese policymakers to decrease Tokyo’s dependence on US international security policy strategies.\(^5\) Tokyo’s attempts to diversify its foreign and security policy strategies throughout the 1990s and early 2000s resulted amongst others in the establishment of the so-called ‘Task Force on Foreign Relations’, a body set up to by the Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002.\(^6\) The task force November 2002 report identified the EU as a ‘strong partner’ in selected areas of cooperation declaring that ‘In the new world order, Japanese foreign policy will require strong partners case by case. It is the EU that can reasonably be expected to be a partner in several of these cases.’

However, the task force report did not result in any new EU-Japan policy initiatives which would have suggested that the EU would become part and reference point for a ‘diversification’ of Japanese foreign and security policies decreasing Japanese dependence on US regional and global defence and security policy strategies.\(^7\) In fact, Japan’s involvement in the US-led military campaign against international terrorism initiated and strongly advocated by the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001 onwards made sure that security cooperation with the EU as part of the envisioned diversification of Japanese foreign and security policies became even less relevant.

II. Japan’s Contributions to the Reconstruction of the Western Balkans

Tokyo’s financial contributions to the reconstruction and pacification of the Western Balkans in the 1990s were significant. Tokyo channeled its assistance to the reconstruction of the war-torn Balkans through the Conference on Security and

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\(^3\) European Union-Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, Joint Declaration on Relations between The European Community and its Member States and Japan (The 1991 The Hague Joint Declaration); http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/relation/showpage_en_relations.political.hague.php

\(^4\) Kono Yohei, ‘Seeking a millennium partnership: new dimensions in Japan-Europe cooperation’, speech at the French Institute of International Relations (IFR1), 13 January 2000

\(^5\) Unable due to constitutional restraints to send military to the Persian Gulf for combat mission helping US-led international coalition forces to liberate Kuwait, Japan under strong US pressure provided the US-led multinational coalition forces with $13 billion earning itself the unfavorable reputation of conducting ‘chequebook diplomacy.’


\(^7\) See also Gilson, Julie, Japan and the European Union: A partnership for the twentieth-first century?, Basingstoke, Macmillan 2002
Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), of which it became a ‘Partner of Cooperation’ in 1998.8

Since the 1990s, Japan has contributed roughly $2 billion to the reconstruction of the Western Balkans in the context of what Tokyo referred to as ‘peace-building policies’ Japanese initiatives and operations in this area in the 1990s and 2000s included9:

- dispatching election observers to a mission under the auspices of the Council of Europe Election Observation Mission for elections in Kosovo (August 2004)
- deploying specialized personnel to train local police
- providing significant ODA payments to the Balkans and contributing financially to the ‘Trust Fund for Human Security’
- deploying peacekeepers in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina
- becoming a participant in the Steering Committee of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia-Herzegovina
- supporting the establishment of the international tribunal for war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- contributing more than $200 million to the reconstruction of Kosovo
- jointly hosting the Ministerial Conference on Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the Western Balkans in Tokyo in April 2004

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) implemented technical assistance, development and reconstruction projects on behalf of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and has worked closely with European NGOs and government agencies over the last two decades. Mainly thanks to its contribution to the pacification of the Western Balkans, Japan was granted observer status at the Council of Europe in 1996 and in return Japan supported and encouraged EU involvement in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1995.10

III. EU-Japan Security Cooperation

EU-Japan co-operation on security issues focuses on non-military (or what is referred to as ‘alternative’) security co-operation, i.e. security co-operation using financial and economic resources to contribute to peace and stability through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of development and financial aid.11 However, non-military and non-combat security cooperation with the EU continues to complement Tokyo’s close military security cooperation with the US in a very limited fashion.

From a Japanese perspective, the EU can contribute very little, if anything at all, to the Japan’s ‘hard’ national security given the security environment in Tokyo’s immediate

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8 European Commission President Jacques Santer and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu held their first talks on possible Japanese involvement in Central and Eastern Europe through its participation in the CSCE at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1994, for the first time, Japan took part in the CSCE meeting in Budapest before becoming a ‘Partner for Cooperation’ in 1998
9 See Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, Hugo Dobson (2005) Japan’s international relations (second edition), Routledge
10 KEDO was to provide North Korea with regular heavy fuel deliveries and two light-water reactors in return for Pyongyang’s assurance that it would dismantle its nuclear weapons program. However, the light-water reactors were never built
11 See Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Security Agenda-Military, Economic & Environmental Dimensions, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004
geographical neighborhood. Japan’s focus and dependence on the US for its national security notwithstanding, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last 10 years undertaken a number of bilateral and initiatives and established bilateral dialogue fora to deal with international non-proliferation and security issues.

These included\(^\text{12}\):

- Jointly signing the ‘Joint Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation’ in June 2005\(^\text{13}\)
- Joint seminar on ‘The EU-Japan Meeting on Human Security’ in the Western Balkan’s (May 2008)
- Joint promotion of the reform of the ‘Conventional Weapons Protocol on anti-Personnel Landmines’
- Joint adoption of a protocol on disarmament and non-proliferation in 2004 promoting the acceleration of the UN Action Plan on small arms and light weapons
- Joint implementation and co-ordination on small arms and light weapons in Cambodia
- Cooperation on the implementation of ‘The International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)’
- Consultations on Disarmament and Non-proliferation issues in the framework of the ‘EU-Japan Troika Working Group’
- Co-sponsorship of North Korea human rights resolutions
- Co-operation on the reconstruction and rehabilitation in Southeast Europe by supporting projects through the ‘United Nations Human Security Trust Fund’
- Launch of the ‘EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia’ with 5 meetings from 2006 to 2008
- Joint financial sponsorship of the ‘International Criminal Court (ICC)’\(^\text{14}\)

Jointly signing non-proliferation and disarmament protocols, however, is not the same as implementing joint policies as a follow-up of signatures under international nonproliferation and disarmament protocols and EU policymakers do indeed admit that much more-to put it bluntly-has been done on paper than on the ground over the last decade between the EU and Japan.\(^\text{15}\) The same is true for joint EU-Japanese human rights resolutions dealing with North Korea. It is one thing to jointly criticize the human rights situation in North Korea but quite another to jointly adopt policies promoting the protection of human rights in that country. Cynically speaking, in ‘real world’ politics, the adoption of a human rights resolution does usually not have impact than leading to the diplomatic and political friction between the interested parties as opposed to requested

\(^{12}\) Information partly provided by the Japan Desk, European Commission

\(^{13}\) The goal of this agreement is to support the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Main Battle Tank and Light Armor Weapon Law and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols

\(^{14}\) There is agreement that European and Japanese financial contributions over the years turned out to be vitally crucial for the ICC to operate and function

\(^{15}\) Author’s conversations with EU Commissions policymakers in Brussels October 2009
changes in human rights policies. What’s more, the case of the EU-Japan North Korea human rights resolution must above all most probably be understood in the context of what Japan refers to the so-called ‘abduction issue’, i.e. the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea’s secret service in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan has for years been referring to the kidnapping of Japanese citizens as the violation of human rights and the EU agreeing to jointly adopt a human rights resolution with Tokyo stood for European political support for a policy issue that has been on the top of Japan’s North Korea policy agenda for years.16

III.I. ‘EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’

In 2005 Brussels and Tokyo started to discuss Asian security issues on a regular institutional basis through the launching of the so-called ‘EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’ in September of that year. The establishment of that dialogue was preceded by the establishment of the ‘EU-US Dialogue on East Asian Security’ in 2004 and given that EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 was at all times the central issue on the dialogue’s agenda17, it is probably fair to conclude that the motivation for Tokyo to initiate regular exchanges on East Asian security was identical to Washington’s motivations in 2004: institutionalizing pressure on Brussels to leave the weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989 in place.

Throughout 2004 and 2005, Tokyo and Washington were preoccupied (unnecessarily as it turned out as the lifting of the embargo was—due to the lack of consensus amongst EU member states18—realistically never an option for the EU) that the EU would lift the embargo, and resume weapons and military technology exports to China in support of Beijing’s efforts to modernize its armed forces. In retrospect (and in view of the fact that neither Tokyo nor Washington would have suggested to set up a dialogue on East Asian security without the possible lifting of the embargo on the agenda.19 Before the controversy on the lifting or non-lifting of the EU’s China embargo gained prominence on Brussels’ foreign policy agenda in 2004, Washington and Tokyo have essentially not shown any interest in discussing Asian security with Brussels and neither the US nor Japan e.g. have never advocated a more prominent EU role in solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula such as encouraging or inviting Brussels to become a member of the ‘Six-Party Talks’, the multilateral forum charged with the task to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization.20 Today, the ‘EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’ remains hardly known outside of Brussels and will very likely continue not to lead to any concrete joint EU-Japan Asian security policies. European and Japanese officials typically counter criticism

16 For details on the ‘abduction issue’ see also Berkofsky, Axel, Japanese Security Trends, Threat Perceptions and Prospects; Asia Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, Sweden, March 2011
17 If not the only relevant issue for the US and Japan in the context of that dialogue back then
18 The lifting of the embargo would have to be unanimously approved by all EU Member States. There was never a consensus amongst EU member states to lift the embargo, a fact that was not acknowledged and indeed ignored in both Tokyo and Washington. In retrospect, a lot of time and resources have been wasted between the EU and Japan/US in view of the fact that the lifting of the embargo was never a realistic EU policy option
19 EU policymakers, of course, would disagree with this conclusion and argue (as they did when speaking with this author) that both Japan and the US were interested in discussing their respective regional security policy strategies with the EU
20 6-Party Talks: A multilateral forum hosted by China and aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 and the participating nations are the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea
on the lack of results coming out of the dialogue by arguing that the dialogue was not supposed to produce joint EU-Japan policies, but is instead to be understood as an instrument and forum to inform each other on respective security policies in East Asia.

From a Japanese perspective, the rationale for discussing East Asian security with Brussels-Tokyo’s concerns that Brussels would lift its weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989-has arguably become obsolete as the lifting of the embargo features very low (if at all) on the Brussels’s current China foreign and security policy agenda.

Today, there is no-inner EU consensus on the lifting or non-lifting of the embargo whatsoever and currently there is no ‘appetite’ in the EU to resume inner-EU controversial debates on the weapons embargo questioning (as it did in the past) the credibility and coherence of the EU as coherent foreign and security policy actor.

III.II. EU-Japan Cooperation in Afghanistan and Somalia

In November 2009, then Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced to assign $5 billion of Japanese funds towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan over the next three to four years. Out of the $US 5 billion, Tokyo has in 2010 provided assistance to Afghanistan worth $US 800 million. Tokyo plans to assign the funds towards 1) enhancing Afghanistan’s capability to maintain security (such as e.g. providing training for police and security personnel), 2) reintegration of former insurgents and 3) advancement of sustainable and self-reliant development (in sectors such as agriculture, education, infrastructure development). For the US, increasing Japanese funds for Afghanistan’s reconstruction allegedly stands for Tokyo’s willingness to support US global security policies in general and its so-called ‘war on terror’ in particular. For Japan, however, Hatoyama’s initiative to increase Japan’s financial contributions to the reconstruction and pacification of Afghanistan is not to be understood as a contribution to the US-led war against terrorism but rather (at least according to the government’s official rhetoric) a Japanese ‘soft’ and ‘civilian power’ contribution to global peace and security.

Parts the Japanese funds assigned to Afghanistan will be spent on joint projects with the EU in the years ahead. With reference to the EU’s October 2009 Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Japan’s November 2009 assistance package for Afghanistan, Brussels and Tokyo envision (as formulated in the joint EU-Japan press statement after the April 2010 EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo) joint capacity-building activities for the Afghan police in the Afghan province of Ghor.

Furthermore, the EU and Japan are planning to hold a capacity-building seminar in Tajikistan to—as the above mentioned press statement reads—‘enhance border management capacities of the countries neighboring Afghanistan.’

As regards EU-Japan counter-piracy cooperation off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, ‘Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)’ and the ‘EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Somalia Operation Atalanta’ have in 2010 and exchanged information and data on

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21 Author’s conversations with EU and Japanese ministry officials in 2009 and 2010 confirm that
22 Interviews with Japanese officials from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2009
23 ‘EU NAVFOR’s’ main tasks are to escort merchant vessels carrying humanitarian aid of the World Food Program (WFP) and to protect ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and to deter and disrupt piracy. EU NAVFOR also monitors fishing activity off the coast of Somalia; for further details see http://www.eunavfor.eu/
numerous occasions. However, to refer to EU-Japan data sharing as a ‘joint EU-Japan mission’ (as the EU Commission and Tokyo repeatedly did) is only accurate and appropriate within limits as the data sharing takes place in the framework of a multinational and UN-sanctioned mission pirating piracy off the coast of Somalia. EU-Japanese data sharing is part of that mission as opposed to a mission separately initiated by Brussels and Tokyo. Furthermore, Tokyo and Brussels announced in April 2010 to jointly support the establishment of the Djibouti counter-piracy regional training centre as well as information-sharing centers in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen.

IV. EU-Japan Trade and Investment Ties

As regards bilateral trade and investment ties, the EU and Japan launched and held a number of dialogues to increase bilateral trade and investments and to assist each other in the protection of intellectual property rights’ or patent right violations.

These dialogues are:

- ‘The High-Level Trade Dialogue’ 24
- ‘EU-Japan Industrial Policy Dialogue’
- ‘EU-Japan Energy Policy Dialogue’

In 2007, Brussels and Tokyo also adopted the so-called ‘EU-Japan Action Plan on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection and Enforcement’, a plan to strengthen und coordinate European-Japanese cooperation on IPR at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. 25 This dialogue was established not least in view of the common problems Europe and Japan are confronted with when doing business and investing in China. Unsurprisingly Beijing suspected that dialogue was targeted at China and Chinese business when the dialogue was launched back then. 26

In the 1990s, the EU and Japan established the so-called ‘EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue’ 27 aimed at facilitating European exports to Japan burdened by red tape and a complex and above all expensive Japanese distribution system and numerous non-tariff barriers to trade for European investors in Japan. As will be explained below, the persistence of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in Japan will in the months and most probably years remain the main obstacle to Japan and the EU adopting a free trade agreement.

Many industry and trade sectors in Japan are in Brussels’ view protected by regulatory and non-tariff barriers and excessive rules and requirements for foreign investors in sectors such as finance, agriculture, food safety, transport services, telecommunications and public construction, healthcare and cosmetics. Despite the obstacles for European business operating in Japan, the EU27 remains the biggest investor in Japan with

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25 ‘Target’ from a European-Japanese perspective of this dialogue of this dialogue is without a doubt China which has after the establishment of the in China.

26 And which in China was perceived as dialogue voiced claiming that Brussels and Tokyo are ‘ganging up’ on China and its difficulties implementing intellectual property rights EU-Japan dialogue ‘aimed’ at China as the author’s recent interview with Chinese officials indicate.

investments driven above all by investments in telecommunications, car manufacturing, retail and insurance sectors. European business leaders and business associations based in Japan\textsuperscript{28}, however, maintain that European FDI to Japan could and indeed should by now be much higher if it were not for the existence of regulatory and non-tariff obstacles distorting competition and rendering investments in Japan unnecessarily costly.

Second Part

I. The EU-Japan Action Plan\textsuperscript{29}

In December 2001, the EU and Japan adopted the so-called ‘Joint Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ (‘EU-Japan Action Plan’), which identified more than 100 areas of bilateral cooperation, ranging from joint peacekeeping and security cooperation to global and bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

The plan is divided into four main sections:
- ‘Promoting peace and security’
- ‘Strengthening the economic and trade partnership’
- ‘Coping with global and societal changes’
- ‘Bringing together people and cultures’

As regards cooperation in the area of security, the ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’ committed the EU and Japan to coordinate their respective development, humanitarian and peacekeeping policies, and intensify cooperation in areas such as conflict prevention, non-proliferation, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and assistance in Europe and Asia. Even if current bilateral cooperation and joint reconstruction and pacification projects in Afghanistan, other parts of Central Asia and Africa provides evidence that both Brussels and Tokyo are committed to and indeed capable of jointly implementing on-the-ground security cooperation of relevance, there is agreement amongst analysts (and European and Japanese policymakers too) that the action plan suffered from a lack of focus listing far too many areas of bilateral co-operation to be dealt with the limited available resources.\textsuperscript{30}

Consequently, there is also agreement in both Brussels and Tokyo that any new EU-Japan framework agreement will have to feature far fewer issues and areas of bilateral cooperation, not least in order to be in the future less ‘vulnerable’ to (admittedly justified) criticism that Brussels and Tokyo ‘overload’ their bilateral EU-Japan joint declarations and agreements with too many issues and areas they envision for bilateral cooperation. \textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} Author’s conversations with European business leaders in Tokyo in December 2009 suggested this and is in line with what the EU Commission in Brussels argues as regards the obstacles to European investments in Japan.
\textsuperscript{29} See ‘An Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation-Shaping our Common Future’, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/eu/kodo_k_e.html
\textsuperscript{30} The EU’s action plan with India e.g. is only but one example of the EU’s action plans with other countries or regions are typically listing too large a number of issues and areas of envisioned cooperation for policymakers to follow-up on and implement
\textsuperscript{31} Author’s conversations with EU Commission officials in 2010
II. ‘EU-Japan Joint High-Level Group’ (HLG)

After the April 2010 EU-Japan Summit, Brussels and Tokyo decided to set up the so-called ‘EU-Japan Joint High-Level Group’, charged with the task to discuss and eventually develop a format of a new bilateral EU-Japan framework agreement both Brussels and Tokyo can agree on. ‘The ‘High-level Group’ is charged with the task of conducting a joint examination of the ways to comprehensively strengthen and integrate the Japan-EU economic relationship addressing all issues of interest to both sides including, for instance, all tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment in services and non-services sectors, intellectual property rights and government procurement’, the 2010 EU-Japan summit’s joint press statement reads. The ‘High-Level Group’ was given until the next EU-Japan Summit in May 2011 to make recommendations on the future framework agreement of EU-Japan relations and cooperation in politics, economics and security (which it did, for details below).

The group (made up EU Commission and Japanese ministry officials) is meeting roughly once every three months to discuss the various options of a new EU-Japan framework agreement to replace the 2001 EU-Japan Action Plan (for a detailed description of the options suggested by the EU Commission see below).

However, it has become increasingly clear that a successful outcome of negotiations to institutionalize cooperation international politics, security and trade and investment will eventually and almost certainly stand and fall with the ability to overcome difficulties and disagreements on the bilateral EU-Japan trade and investment agenda in general and-as will shown below in detail-problems related to what the EU refers to Japanese tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in particular (e.g. non-tariff barriers in the areas of government procurement of public works and product safety in Japan). Indeed, successful and result-oriented European-Japanese negotiations on the future framework for cooperation were for a long time everything but guaranteed, above all because of Tokyo’s request and urging to adopt a free trade agreement as part of a new framework agreement with the EU. The EU on the other hand refused and arguably still continues to refuse to adopt a free trade agreement with Japan should Tokyo continue not address and abolish what Brussels refers to as non-tariff barriers to trade and investment. The fact that Brussels and Tokyo in May 2011 agreed in principle to consider negotiating a free trade agreement (see below) did not change anything about that.

While Tokyo has over the last two years insisted that trade and investment issues in general and an EU-Japan free trade agreement in particular must be part of what Tokyo wanted to be a ‘comprehensive bilateral agreement’, it was in May 2011 agreed to consider negotiating two separate framework agreements: One covering cooperation in international politics and security and another one covering trade and investment. As will be elaborated below, this is an option Brussels has long preferred, above all due to the persistence of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment for European business and investors in Japan.

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32 19th EU-Japan Summit Tokyo 28 April 2010, Joint Press Statement; Council of the European Union 28 April 2010
II.I. The ‘EU-Japan Joint High-Level Group (HLG) Midterm Report’ October 2010

The EU Commission October 2010 report covered the outcome of the high-level negotiations that took place in July and September 2010. The report notes (albeit in very general terms offering very few details) that the EU and Japan made progress as regards EU-Japan cooperation in Afghanistan countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. Furthermore, consultations have in July and September 2010 taken place on the establishment of regular EU-Japan crisis management consultations and a possible Japanese contribution to civilian missions under the ‘EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).’

Attached to October 2010 mid-term report is a (very long) list of issues in the areas of international politics and security, which were subject to discussion in the framework of the HLG meetings in July and September 2010. However, as it is often the case with EU Commission reports, it does only offer very vague details and information on what exactly the EU and Japan decided to do as regards the issues on that ‘impressively’ long list of issues on the international security agenda. The HLG reportedly discussed what the report refers to as ‘Political dialogue and consultation mechanisms and Cooperation on peace and security’ dealing with the following issues:

- Joint projects in Afghanistan
- Joint projects on border management in Central Asia
- Joint operations in crisis management and post-conflict peace-building activities
- Joint efforts on counter-piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as their disarmament
- Other peace and security issues, including North Korea, China, Middle East Peace process, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Africa
- Counter-terrorism
- UN reform
- Human security
- Human Rights/Democracy
- International Criminal Court (ICC)
- Asia-Europe Meeting
- Information sharing on the regional integration in the East Asia and the EU
- Climate change
- Biodiversity
- Millennium Development Goals/ Development assistance

Realistically, there is doubt that the HLG was during the one-day HLG meetings in July and September 2010 able to discuss all of these issues in detail and in-depth enough to follow-up on discussions with joint EU-Japan policies or policy initiatives in the short-term. In fact, the October report did (at least partially) what the EU and Japan have done over the last ten years: putting many and indeed too many issues onto the agenda of official EU-Japan encounters without being able (or willing) to follow-up on them with

33 The group met three times in 2010 (July, September and December) and so far one time in 2011—the last meeting took place in March 2011; this author obtained this report from the EU Commission—the report titled ‘Joint High-Level Group Mid-Term Report’

34 To be sure, the reports provides no details on when the establishment of such a mechanism could actually take place
concrete and tangible joint policies. Arguably, much of the above-listed areas and issues of cooperation will in the years ahead only take place on paper as opposed to in reality and on the ground as the list arguably reads like a list of unresolved issues and problems in international politics and security. To be sure, such a long list without offering details on the timing and procedures of envisioned cooperation between the EU and its partners is not untypical for what the EU Commission not jointly produces with third countries in the context of bilateral summits, joint declarations, workshops etc. Consequently, the EU has in the past fairly often and on a regular basis been criticized for drafting ‘paper tiger’ bilateral action plans and declarations listing far too many and vague-formulated issues and areas of cooperation with its partners. In fairness this is also due to the fact that the EU Commission finds itself in the position and indeed obligation to take account of 27 EU member states’ priorities and preferences as regards EU cooperation with others. In order to avoid EU member states complaining that their priorities and preferences as regards cooperation does not feature or feature prominently enough in action plans or joint declarations, the EU Commission is de-facto obliged to list an overly long list of areas and issues of bilateral cooperation.

There is e.g. very little actual value in listing the promotion ‘Human Rights and Democracy’ on that list without explaining how and where exactly Brussels and Tokyo want to promote human rights and democracy. In fact, given the past experience it is fair to assume that there were no concrete joint EU-Japan projects and initiatives to promote human rights and democracy on the bilateral agenda by the time the High-Level Group announced that Japan and the EU would cooperate in the promotion of human rights and democracy. Furthermore, envisioned joint policy training in Afghanistan training has been discussed over the last two years without such training actually taking place. Until announcements to jointly train police in Afghanistan will be followed by actual joint training soon, Brussels and Tokyo will remain vulnerable to the (arguably justified) criticism that their on paper plans and ambitions exceed the reality of bilateral on the ground non-combat security cooperation.

As discussed above, this is essentially what the above-mentioned 2001 ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’ suffered from: a plan that is listing far too many issues and areas of envisioned joint cooperation in international politics and security to be a realistic basis and framework for what the EU and Japan can actually jointly be doing together with fairly limited resources.

The list of issues in the areas of global economics and finance, research and innovation discussed in the HLG meetings in July and September 2010 is less longer than the list covering international politics and security, but it is probably nonetheless still too long to be followed-up by joint policies in the immediate or foreseeable future. As regards bilateral trade and investments ties, problems related to trade and investment relations featured prominently on the HLG agenda in July and September 2010. The HLG, the report read, discussed non-tariff measures, government procurement of public works, intellectual property rights, trade in services and tariffs.

Without unfortunately offering any information at all on the level of progress (or absence of such) on the removal of trade and regulatory barriers achieved at the HLG meetings in July and September 2010, the report states that the HLG "Exchanged views on the possible means and methods of addressing and preventing regulatory barriers such as enhanced transparency and regulatory cooperation, greater alignment on international
standards and increased cooperation for developing new international standards, better recognition of conformity assessment procedures/results.”

EU complaints about alleged trade and regulatory barriers in Japan have been discussed controversially for years and the lack of progress in removing them (or some of them) to make EU investments in Japan more profitable and less burdened by what the European business and the EU Commission typically refer to as excessive red tape as one of the reasons why it is yet unable to start FTA negotiations with Japan.

II.II. The December 2010 Meeting

The third HLG meeting took place on 15 December 2010. During that meeting Tokyo and Brussels agreed to continue to collaborate setting up a training centre for Afghan police in Afghanistan and again confirmed their interest and commitment towards holding an Afghanistan-Tajikistan donors’ coordination conference in the future. However, Brussels and Tokyo did in December 2010 not set a date for the envisioned Afghanistan-Tajikistan donors’ coordination conference and in view of the recent earthquake and nuclear disaster in Japan, it remains to be seen whether Tokyo will be able and willing to commit itself to put such a conference anywhere the top of its policy agenda in the months ahead. Furthermore, both Brussels and Tokyo again confirmed their interest in setting up a bilateral mechanism for diplomatic exchanges. Further details on the possible shape and format of such a mechanism, however, have yet to emerge. For the time being, the EU suggested to set up a so-called ‘Framework Participation Agreement’ to institutionalize such a Japanese contribution to EU CSDP missions.

In December 2010, Tokyo and Brussels also discussed the possibilities and prospects of intensifying EU-Japan cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, climate change, science and technology, transportation and mutual legal assistance. The ‘Information Note’ of the HLG December 2010 meeting, however, again offered no further details on how and when Brussels and Tokyo would seek to expand bilateral cooperation in the above mentioned areas.

II.III. The March 2011 Meeting

During the March 2011 meeting, the EU again stressed that the removal of Japanese non-tariff barriers to trade remains the very precondition for entering into free trade agreement negotiations with Japan. “On the trade and economic aspects, the parties agreed on the importance of the gains that would derive from removing Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) in any prospective trade negotiation between Japan and the EU”, the EU Commission’s ‘Information Note’ reads.

In this context, the EU Commission requested Japan to address amongst others problems and obstacles as regards public procurement in Japan, standards on medical equipment, woods and safety devices for cars. The EU Commission’s ‘Information Note’ further

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35 Information Note of the 3rd EU – Japan joint High Level Group meeting on 15 December 2010
36 The EU Commission argues out that the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty favors the establishment of such consultation mechanism without however details on why and how exactly that is the case
37 Needless to say that Japanese contributions to such EU missions after the events in Japan in March 2011 will in months and most probably years ahead become less prominent on Japan’s foreign and security policy agenda
38 Information Note 4th EU – Japan joint High Level Group meeting, Tokyo, 4 March 2011
maintained that Tokyo has yet to offer policies and strategy on how to address and indeed abolish existing Japanese barriers to trade and investment. Japan’s so-called ‘Package paper’ dealing with issues related to EU trade with and investments in Japan, the ‘Information Note’ reads, “Fails to provide a clear roadmap on what Japan is prepared to offer as regards tariffs, non Tariff measures, services and investment and government procurement.” In view of the existing problems related to regulatory non-tariff barriers to trade, the EU Commission made it again clear that it will continue to insist to negotiate a new EU-Japan framework covering cooperation in international politics, economics and security separately from possible negotiations dealing with an EU-Japan FTA (or alternatively ‘Economic Partnership Agreement’, EPA) (as it was then agreed in May 2011). “Mr. O’Sullivan⁴⁹ then recalled that should we decide to engage in the path of EPA / FTA negotiations, a Framework Agreement covering cooperation on political, global and sectoral issues should be developed in parallel”, the ‘Information Note’ read.

III. Future Framework of EU-Japan Cooperation-EU Commission Proposals

In May 2011, the EU and Japan agreed in principle to negotiate two bilateral agreements as the framework for institutionalized EU-Japan cooperation in economics and investments, politics and security (for further details of the envisioned agreements see below). However, it is nonetheless important and relevant to briefly analyse the formats and frameworks Brussels envisioned for bilateral cooperation with Japan before May 2011 in order to understand what issues and problems (above all on the trade and investment agenda) will have to addressed and solved before adopting two separate agreements, one binding agreement covering politics and security) and another agreement covering trade and investments, i.e. a free trade agreement). This is not least due to the fact that it cannot be excluded that Brussels and Tokyo might have to resort to discussing formula and frameworks for bilateral cooperation proposed by the European Commission in 2010 and 2011. This could be the case if negotiations to adopt two separate cooperation agreements should fail or not make fast enough progress in the months ahead. After the March 2011 HLG Meeting, the EU Commission published a document titled ‘Options for the Future Framework of EU-Japan Relations’ which presents the Commission’s ideas and suggestions of what shape institutionalized EU-Japan relations and cooperation could take in the years ahead.⁴⁰

In Options for the Future Framework of EU-Japan Relations, the EU Commission suggests five possible frameworks for EU-Japan cooperation.

The first framework titled ‘No multi-annual framework / Ad-hoc action’ foresaw an ad-hoc cooperation framework using the joint EU-Japan statement of the annual EU-Japan as the basis for joint European-Japanese policy initiative and policies. Such a framework for cooperation, the Commission wrote back then, is possible as “The EU-Japan Summit Statement rather than the 2001 Action Plan has de-facto set priorities and political guidance for the overall EU-Japan partnership.”

While such an ad-hoc framework for cooperation does arguably diminish the relevance and importance of the 2001 ‘EU-Japan Action’ had over the last 10 years as regards the

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⁴⁹ The EU Commission official representing the Commission’s Directorate for Trade (DG Trade) at the HLG meetings
formulation and adoption of joint EU-Japan policies, the EU Commission is correct in pointing that it was indeed the annual EU-Japan Summit which drove and defined EU-Japan (ad-hoc) cooperation on global policy areas and issues of common interest. While the EU Commission calls this option "A rather disappointing outcome for like-minded partners who aspire to play a stronger global role and who have declared a joint ambition to comprehensively strengthen their bilateral relation and cooperation activities", such an ad-hoc arrangement might in view of the existing and indeed persisting problems on the bilateral trade and investment agenda turn out be the only possible option to codify EU-Japan cooperation in the years ahead. Arguably, the suggested ‘ad-hoc cooperation’ option must be considered to be a step backwards as regards the institutionalization of international EU-Japan cooperation.

The second framework of future EU-Japan cooperation is referred to as ‘Non-binding multi-annual framework.’ The EU Commission suggests (like the current EU-Japan Action Plan) a non-legally binding document, i.e. a new comprehensive ‘EU-Japan Action Declaration’ covering both political and economic issues. The EU Commission points out that this option is ‘preferable’ to the first option of a framework of ad-hoc cooperation as a new 2001-style Action Plan "Would result in relatively greater political visibility of the overall EU-Japan partnership (political, economic and other areas) and ensures some predictability for the cooperation programmes jointly agreed." To be sure, the legally non-binding character of a new EU-Japan framework agreement as suggested by the EU Commission would almost certainly lead to the result that European and Japanese willingness and commitment to adopt and actually execute joint policies will remain limited, due to the perceived lack of ‘urgency’ and obligations to adopt and implement what is formulated in the action plan.

The third framework agreement suggested by the EU Commission would consist of one legally binding EU-Japan agreement covering both political and economic and trade issues. Given the existing problems related to regulatory non-tariff-barriers to trade, such a comprehensive agreement, however, is a very unlikely option of a future framework agreement. The EU Commission itself is fairly explicit about the fact that such a legally binding agreement incorporating trade and investment corporation is very unlikely to be the outcome of EU-Japan negotiations ahead. "The EU continues to reserve its stance on this option due to the fact that it has not yet been adequately and convincingly demonstrated so far that a negotiation which includes preferential trade aspects could secure economic interests of both sides and bring balanced and mutual benefit”, the EU Commission wrote.

The fourth option for a new framework agreement foresaw the adoption of two legally binding agreements, one covering political and sectoral non-trade and the other covering economic and trade issues. Like the third option for a framework agreement, however, the fourth option, realistically remains a hypothetical and unlikely option- for the same reasons why that is the case for the third option: The persistence of regulatory non-tariff barriers to trade (for European investors in Japan). In view of the difficulties resolving the problems related to regulatory and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in Japan in the months ahead, the EU Commission proposed what it calls a ‘variant’ of the fourth option: A "package of legally binding elements covering specific political and trade issues (e.g. on crisis management, exchange of classified information, investment, government procurement services, standards, IPR).” However, judging by Tokyo’s strong interest in making a commitment towards adopting a free trade agreement integral part
of a new (and indeed any) EU-Japan framework agreement this option is unlikely to be option to be endorsed by the EU Commission’s counterparts in Tokyo.

The fifth option suggested by the EU Commission proposes a combination of what the EU Commission calls a ‘mix of binding and non-binding elements.’ In this context, the following option are suggested:

1. Binding agreement plus ad-hoc action:

This option constituted of a legally binding agreement covering economic and trade issues. In addition to the ‘ad-hoc action’ part of a new EU-Japan framework agreement, the annual EU-Japan Summit would be the instrument through which Brussels and Tokyo would formulate and adopt joint policies covering non-economic/trade, i.e. bilateral cooperation in international politics and security.

Or—as the EU Commission suggests—vice versa: a legally binding agreement covering political, sectoral and global issues while using the annual EU-Japan Summit as instrument to cover economic and trade issues.

2. Binding agreement plus a non-binding multi-annual framework:

This option would constitute of one non-legally binding document and one legally binding framework: a revised version of the ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’ and an Economic Partnership Agreement’ (EPA) (as opposed to a ‘full-fledged’ free trade agreement (FTA). Or—the EU Commission suggested—vice versa: a legally political agreement (the revised version of the EU-Japan Action Plan) and non-binding economic partnership agreement (the above mentioned EPA). In the above-mentioned document ‘Options for the Future Framework of EU-Japan Relations’ the EU Commission makes it clear which of the above mentioned is the one (at least under current circumstances) the preferred one: “Negotiating a legally binding agreement (FTA) without accompanying it with a Framework Agreement covering political and other areas of the EU-Japan partnership is not a balanced approach nor is it consistent with the current EU policy and practice vis-à-vis its major partners. On the other hand, negotiating a Framework Agreement covering political and other elements without preferential trade aspects is possible for the EU”, the document reads.

IV. A Brand New Start—The May 2011 EU-Japan Summit

At the EU-Japan Summit in May 2011, the EU and Japan agreed to start the process for parallel negotiations for: “A deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a binding agreement, covering political, global and other sectoral cooperation in a comprehensive manner, and underpinned by their shared commitment to fundamental values and principles”, as the summit’s joint press statement read. On paper this looks like progress on the EU-Japan agenda suggesting that Brussels and Tokyo were able to jointly define the objectives and format of future negotiations to codify EU-Japan cooperation in politics, economics and security. However, while it was agreed in principle to start negotiations on two separate agreements, a timeline of when to start these negotiations was not offered, i.e. it remains yet to be seen whether Tokyo and Brussels start negotiating two separate agreements in 2011. Instead, Brussels and Tokyo announced to start negotiating ‘as soon as possible.’

As regards the adoption of a bilateral free trade agreement as a follow-up and result of the May 2011 summit, it must be pointed out that agreeing to start negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement is not the same as actually starting negotiations, not to mention adopting an agreement. Judging by the time and resources it took to adopt the EU-South Korea FTA, years could go by until Brussels and Tokyo actually adopt a similar agreement.

What’s more, the obstacles hindering (from an EU perspective)-above all the above mentioned non-tariff barriers to trade-will most likely remain in place in the months and probably years ahead meaning that EU business will continue not to be favour and support the adoption of a bilateral free trade agreement with Japan. So far, Tokyo has not made any further concessions as regards the abolishment of non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in Japan meaning that the EU Commission will continue to remain very reluctant to start negotiating a free trade agreement with Japan. The agreement to consider doing that in May 2011 is secondary or indeed irrelevant should Tokyo continue to refuse to abolish the non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.

As regards the adoption of an agreement codifying bilateral political and security cooperation, it remains yet to be seen and defined what exactly a ‘binding agreement’ turns out to be-i.e. it remains yet to be defined how and to what extent a binding (in the legal sense of the word) agreement would or could legally oblige both Brussels and Tokyo to actually implement of cooperation listed in an envisioned bilateral agreement. In fact, it is not yet clear at all whether such a binding agreement on political and security cooperation will in terms of actual commitments and obligations be any better and focussed than the current EU-Japan Action Plan and its overly long list of issues and areas to covered and dealt with in the context of EU-Japan bilateral cooperation. Predictably, the EU’s assessment of the level of progress made in May 2011 turned out to be very different, somehow suggesting that the adoption of two EU-Japan cooperation agreements is after May 2011 only a matter of time as opposed to matter conditioned by long and cumbersome negotiations in the months and indeed years ahead. Indeed, the EU Commission suggested that the EU-Japan May 2011 Summit stands for a ‘breakthrough’ as regards progress towards adopting two separate cooperation agreements soon.\textsuperscript{42} Such a reaction and EU assessment of the actual impact of putting signatures under vague-sounding agreements not offering dates and timelines, however, is not untypical in the sense that an on paper commitment to start negotiations ‘as soon as possible’ as the press statement reads is from an EU perspective more often than not than as good as actually and already negotiating. This is not least the case due to the fact that the purpose of EU summits with other countries is to produce a joint press statement even if much of what is written in joint press statements does (very often) not accurately reflect the reality and current of affairs of relations and level of cooperation but instead lists and outlines envisioned possible cooperation in the future.

\textbf{Conclusions}

As regards the May 2011 EU-Japan Summit, the problems on the bilateral trade and investment agenda are identical to those before the issuing of the joint press statement. Consequently, for the EU officially and in the record committing itself to start negotiating ‘soon’ was indeed the maximum it was able to commit itself to in view of the persistent

\textsuperscript{42} Author’s conversation with EU Commission Japan Desk official in June 2011
absence of progress as the regards the abolishing of the above mentioned barriers to trade and investment in Japan. That in turn means that starting bilateral negotiations ‘soon’ in this context stands for starting bilateral negotiations when the Japanese government has begun concrete and actual steps to address what the EU and European business refer to as market access obstacles to trade with and investment in Japan. When or indeed whether this will take place in Tokyo, remains yet to be seen.

For the reasons explained above, it remains yet to be seen whether or when the May 2011 EU-Japan summit will really stand for a ‘breakthrough’ as regards the institutionalization of binding bilateral economic, political and security cooperation in the years ahead. Judging by what the EU Commission suggested in 2010 up until May 2011 as regards a future framework and formats of bilateral cooperation in politics, economics and security, the EU it seems got it what it wanted in May 2011: Two separate agreements and the agreement to negotiate a free trade agreement separately from cooperation in politics and security. This takes away the pressure from the EU to start negotiating a free trade agreement which European business do not support until the Japanese government abolishes the existing and persisting non-tariff barriers to trade. Instead, Brussels can focus on the far less controversial and ‘easier-to-adopt’ agreement codifying EU-Japanese political and security cooperation in the years ahead. This could de-facto mean that the EU and Japan could have an agreement covering politics and security cooperation far earlier than a bilateral agreement if both Brussels and Tokyo find it acceptable to not adopt the envisioned framework agreements separately.

However, given that the nature and the level of legally binding character of the envisioned EU-Japan political agreement is yet to be defined, there is without the danger that a however-shaped new binding political agreement becomes as little focused as 2001 EU-Action Plan. This is not least due to the above-mentioned differing interests amongst EU member states as regards the nature, scope and issues envisioned. To be sure, EU and Japanese policymakers officially agree that a new agreement dealing with bilateral cooperation in international politics and economics will have to cover fewer issues focusing on a few selected areas and issues of common interest. However, whether this will mean that the new political agreement will actually be more focused seeking to cover fewer areas of cooperation remains yet to be seen. For the time, Japan too might have got what it wanted in May 2011: the on paper EU commitment to consider negotiating a free trade agreement as opposed to an EU refusal to consider negotiating a free trade agreement with Japan at all. In the meantime and before signing new agreements, EU-Japan cooperation in international politics, economics and security will continue to take place on ad-hoc basis with the annual EU-Japan Summit setting the agenda of joint EU-Japan policies.

The European Commission has many times over the last 10 years referred to Japan as the EU’s ‘natural ally’ and ‘strategic partner’ but has clearly failed to assign enough resources and energy into making sure that political reality of bilateral cooperation will be able to catch up with the political rhetoric promising such cooperation. Instead, Brussels has invested much more political capital and resources into the expansion of institutional ties with a country that has very little (if anything) in common with the EU as regards the approach towards international political and security: China. Japan too spoke (much) more about expanding political and security cooperation with the EU over the last decade than actually expanding it. This is not least due to the fact that the above-mentioned diversification of Japanese foreign and security policies has not taken place. Given Japan’s fragile regional geographical security environment and the perceived threats
from North Korea and also China, Tokyo will continue to depend on US East Asian security policy strategies making sure that the earlier envisioned diversification continues to remain of a distant goal on the Japanese security and defence policy agenda.

Concluding on a positive note, the recent intensification of on the ground EU-Japan cooperation in Afghanistan and off the coast of Somalia are positive probably standing for increased willingness in both Brussels and Tokyo to pool resources with regards to tangible and concrete cooperation in international security. The day-to-day cooperation between Japanese and European NGOs in Afghanistan e.g. is noteworthy and significant providing evidence that Japanese and Europeans can successfully work together in international politics and security.
Potential for EU-Japan Security Cooperation: A Japanese Perspective

Michito Tsuruoka

Introduction

When the Action Plan for EU-Japan cooperation was adopted in December 2001, it was recognised that there was ‘the untapped potential for more extensive contacts and co-operation’. The document also stated that ‘We have a particular ambition to develop our relations in the political sphere. Tapping the unrealised potential for co-operation in this area can help us attain the many objectives that we have in common, and also broaden the base of our relationship’. A decade has passed since then.

There are good reasons for the EU and Japan to strengthen political and security cooperation in today’s international security environment. The EU-Japan partnership has become an imperative rather than a luxury. The biggest factor that brings the EU (Europe) and Japan closer is the changing nature of international-security threats and challenges. Not least in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, there has been a growing awareness that security threats and challenges are now truly global in nature, which means that what is taking place on the other side of the planet can have an immediate and tangible impact on national security. As a result, areas of interest and activities of the EU and those of Japan have come to overlap substantially. And the two are facing many common threats and challenges that cannot be addressed alone—international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, failed or fragile states, maritime security are cases in point. Furthermore, in the context of the shifting centre of gravity of world power from the West to the East and the South, most notably to Asia, there is a growing awareness in Europe that the security situation in Asia is likely to have a more direct impact on European security in the coming years. This is likely to stimulate more European engagement in Asia, not only in economic terms, but also increasingly in political and security terms.

The main purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of EU-Japan political and security cooperation and identify the way forward. It is indeed easy and in many respects correct to argue that the ‘untapped potential’, mentioned in the Action Plan of December 2001, remains untapped ten years after the adoption of the document. This article shares this assessment.

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3 Ibid., p. 4.


case, which can be done by examining various factors that still hinder cooperation. At the same time, however, while not in the manner that was envisaged at the time of the adoption of the Action Plan, actual political, security and even defence cooperation has been taking place. This is important to acknowledge. What’s more, the cooperation that is actually taking place—for example, counter-piracy cooperation—is little known outside a small circle of officials and policymakers who are directly dealing with such bilateral cooperation.

**Record so far and New Possibilities**

In addition to the Action Plan of December 2001, successive Joint Press Statements adopted in the framework of annual EU-Japan Summits since then have mentioned a large number of joint projects and areas for cooperation. The number is impressive, but the content and results are not, at least in the fields of political and security cooperation. The Action Plan established four pillars of cooperation, one of which concerns political and security cooperation under the heading of ‘promoting peace and security’. Japanese officials in charge of drafting summit statements admit that they often find it difficult to come up with substantial political and security items to be included. As a result, it is argued, politically irrelevant or unimportant items are played up and the final lists represent little more than just listing ‘cooperation for the sake of cooperation’.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that no progress has been made over the past decade in the field of EU-Japan political and security cooperation. A couple of promising modalities or possibilities have in fact appeared that can be explored and expanded in the coming years.

The first of such possibilities is a ‘non-US’ element of EU-Japan cooperation. One has to admit the fact that the EU and Japan are not likely to be partners of first choice with each other in addressing various international challenges, not to mention high-profile ones, at least for the foreseeable future. Both for Europe and for Japan, the United States remains the natural primary partner. What is important then is not to consider this an obstacle hindering Europe-Japan cooperation. The past decade or two have shown that Washington is not always unconditionally available as a partner in regional and global security. At the same time, this emphasis of ‘non-US’ element in Europe-Japan cooperation should not be perceived as ‘anti-American’ or cooperation aimed at ‘excluding’ the US. What this means is simply that when and where cooperation with the US cannot work—there are in fact a number of such occasions—the EU and Japan can be good alternative partners.

Although just a small project, the EU-Japan joint capacity-building seminars held in Tajikistan in 2009 and 2010, which aim to develop the country’s border-management capacity, are a case in point. In light of strategic sensitivities involving Russia and Afghanistan, it would have been difficult to partner with the US in this project. However, the EU and Japan were prepared to give assistance to the Tajik authorities. The fact that the European and Japanese approaches are similar helps a lot in facilitating this sort of cooperation. The Tajik project is just a small beginning. There are actually many geographical and functional areas where cooperation with the US cannot work or is too politically sensitive and even controversial. Whether it is preventive diplomacy, crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction and development or capacity-building in

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developing countries, ‘non-US’ cooperation between the EU and Japan will be needed more and more in the future.

Secondly, it should be noted that EU-Japan operational cooperation—both civilian and military—is becoming a reality. Particularly noteworthy is the military aspect of this. What could be called ‘non-combat military cooperation’ between the EU and Japan has emerged as a new and promising field in addition to other forms of political and security cooperation. This may sound counter-intuitive given the general unwillingness and unpreparedness to use force both in Japan and the EU,\(^7\) and the resultant limited nature of the two actors’ military role in the international arena. It is obvious that EU-Japan joint combat operations remain almost inconceivable. However, as the role of military today has become more diverse and multifaceted, non-combat operations including crisis management and reconstruction assistance are becoming more common and coming to occupy a more central place.

EU-Japan non-combat military cooperation is already taking place, and it is likely that such cooperation will continue, and indeed expand as one of the main pillars of bilateral security cooperation. Counter-piracy cooperation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is one example. Japan has deployed two Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels and two patrol aircraft (P-3C), and is using Djibouti as a supply base.\(^8\) The Japanese vessels escort groups of commercial ships—both Japanese and non-Japanese. When and where to conduct such escorting is (loosely) coordinated with other countries and information is shared. However, as far as these Japanese vessels’ operations are concerned, the MSDF operation remains essentially an independent national Japanese mission. However, the aerial patrolling is firmly embedded within international cooperation.

This is facilitated by two major factors. First, the Djibouti airport (where the Japanese contingent is based) is also used by patrol aircraft belonging to the EU mission (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). This means that coordination between the two operations is relatively easy. Second, given the shortage of air assets such as patrol aircraft available for the EU operation and the international efforts there as a whole, a de facto division of labour or operational cooperation is imperative. As a result, what is taking place are de facto joint operations between EU and Japanese armed forces. The 2010 EU-Japan Summit in Tokyo acknowledged this as ‘joint efforts’ and ‘commended the fruitful interaction’ between the two forces.\(^9\) However, the fact remains that Japan is not formally participating in the EU operation. Actual cooperation in the theatre takes place on an ad hoc basis and is lacking an institutional basis.

What Japan has found in the past ten or so years of its engagement in peace support operations—including both UN operations and ‘coalition of the willing’ operations—is that whenever and wherever Tokyo sends SDF troops abroad, they encounter European forces operating in the same theatre side by side. In the Indian Ocean, Iraq and now off the coast of Somalia and Djibouti, SDF troops have been cooperating with European forces.

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\(^7\) Strategic cultures in individual EU member states vary greatly, but at least as far as the EU (in the context of CSDP) is concerned, the use of force remains controversial and it is extremely difficult to build a consensus in this regard among the EU members.

\(^8\) For details on Japan’s counter-piracy operations conducted by the MSDF, see Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: August 2011).

counterparts both bilaterally (in the cases of the Indian Ocean and Iraq) and in the EU-Japan context (as in the case of counter-piracy).

While the term ‘operational’ is primarily used in the context of military activities, it can also be used in a civilian context too. There are various possibilities. One option is for Japan to participate in CSDP civilian missions. Indeed, Tokyo expressed its interest in dispatching civilian personnel to CSDP missions on the occasion of the EU-Japan Summit in April 2010.\(^\text{10}\) While such a Japanese mission has yet to materialise, it should not be seen as a one-sided contribution from Japan to the EU. From a Japanese perspective, it means that Japan uses the EU as a framework enabling it to expand its reach and develop experience and expertise in civilian crisis management. It may be true that the EU’s record so far and capabilities in civilian crisis management are less impressive than usually argued.\(^\text{11}\) Nonetheless, at least in those areas where the EU has an established presence (and Japan does not), such as in Kosovo, cooperating with the EU would undoubtedly be in Japan’s interest. In this regard, Tokyo can ‘use’ the EU.\(^\text{12}\) The idea of using the EU as a framework from a Japanese point of view, therefore, can be applied both to military and civilian cooperation.

**Remaining Hurdles**

Despite the fact that new possibilities are emerging in EU-Japan political and security cooperation as discussed above, there are still factors that hinder cooperation. First, there is still a lack of attention to, and awareness of, each other as reliable partners in the context of international politics and security. In other words, when addressing a range of international issues, the EU does not often appear on Japan’s radar screen as a potential partner; the same is true for Japan from a European perspective. What Simon Nuttall identified in 1996 as ‘a climate of relative indifference’\(^\text{13}\) between the EU and Japan does not seem to have changed substantially since then. As discussed above, the EU and Japan will not be partners of first choice in the foreseeable future. However, in order to seize the potential benefits of cooperation, the EU and Japan, at least, need to recognise each other as available partners on a regular basis. The prospective launching of FTA and framework agreement negotiations (to be discussed in the next section) can be expected to change the ‘climate of relative indifference’ between the two sides.

Second, in thinking about EU-Japan political and security cooperation and beyond, the most difficult reality—or an ‘inconvenient truth’—that needs to be understood is the fact that the EU and Japan are sometimes rivals. This is mainly because the EU and Japan are similar actors—meaning that both have comparative advantages in similar areas like development assistance (such as Official Development Assistance, ODA). On one hand, it can be argued that being similar is conducive to cooperation as partners, because similar

\(^{10}\) Ibid., para. 9.
\(^{11}\) See, for example, Christopher Chivvis, *EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010); Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).
actors are supposed to understand each other better. In reality, however, that is not always the case and similar actors tend to end up being rivals. This is exemplified by the fact that Japan is cooperating more with NATO, not the EU, in Afghanistan. Although Japan is not a troop contributor to the NATO-led mission there (ISAF), various mechanisms have been established specifically for Japan-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan, including a scheme through which Japanese ODA funds go to local projects implemented in coordination with various Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under ISAF. Japan has also contributed funding to a NATO-led trust fund project on stockpile management and ammunition safety for the Afghan Ministry of Defence. These projects were formulated in the spirit of complementarity between NATO, which has much experience and expertise in security and military operations on the one hand and Japan, which has significant experience in economic and reconstruction assistance on the other. NATO needs Japan as a partner as much as Japan needs NATO. With respect to the EU, despite the fact that Japan and the EU have talked a lot about possible cooperation in Afghanistan, nothing substantial has yet materialised. Still, Japan has been cooperating with various individual European countries in the context of Japan-NATO cooperation. The Lithuania-led PRT in Ghor province is a good example, to which Japan has dispatched a few development experts in addition to allocating some ODA funds to the area.

Institutionalising Cooperation?

When thinking about the future direction of EU-Japan political and security cooperation, one of the main issues to be examined is what kind of framework is necessary to make bilateral cooperation more efficient and effective. Assuming that this is indeed necessary, the next question is about what options are available for what specific purposes. There are currently two possibilities for the institutionalisation of the political and security relationship—a framework political agreement and a CSDP framework participation agreement.\footnote{For more details on Japan-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan, see Tsuruoka, ‘NATO and Japan: A View from Tokyo’.
\footnote{In the trade and economic domain, the most important initiative is obviously the idea of concluding a free trade agreement (FTA). Major formal agreements that have so far been concluded between the EU and Japan include several mutual recognition agreements (MRAs), a science and technology agreement and a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT). These are often called ‘visible’ elements in EU-Japan cooperation.
\footnote{‘Joint Press Statement’, 20th EU-Japan Summit, Brussels, 28 May 2011.}}}

First, the idea of concluding a framework political agreement between the EU and Japan is now firmly on the agenda in the context of a prospective start of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The EU-Japan summit in May 2011 announced the intention to initiate ‘parallel negotiations’ for an FTA and a ‘binding agreement, covering political, global and other sectoral cooperation in a comprehensive manner, and underpinned by their shared commitment to fundamental values and principles’.\footnote{‘Joint Press Statement’, 20th EU-Japan Summit, Brussels, 28 May 2011.} It is generally understood that it was the EU that wanted to make the process a parallel one—not solely focusing on the FTA (which Japan wanted), but including the framework political agreement (which Japan accepted).

Negotiating a package consisting of an FTA and a framework agreement has become a standard EU practice, which can be seen in the case of the EU-South Korea FTA as well (despite the fact that the framework agreement is less known than the FTA). The scope of the framework agreement has yet to be decided, but it is widely assumed that provisions on political and security cooperation will be one of the important pillars of the prospective agreement. This parallel process itself can be said to be effective in terms of
stimulating a relationship that former EU Commissioner Chris Patten described as ‘the-
problem is that there is no problem’ relationship.

However, how to justify the necessity of this framework agreement is still unclear, at
best. Apart from the fact that the inclusion of the idea of the framework agreement was
needed as a precondition for the FTA process (because of Brussels’ insistence), the
rationales and benefits of concluding a legally binding treaty as opposed to a political
declaration covering political, security and other fields do not seem to have been well-
presented by either side. At least the following questions need to be asked and
answered. How, and to what extent, is the prospective framework agreement expected
to make a difference in terms of strengthening political and security cooperation? Why is
a binding agreement thought to be more effective than previous efforts, including the
Action Plan, in promoting political and security cooperation? Is having a binding
agreement a suitable way to strengthen political and security cooperation, despite the
fact that Japan is not accustomed to this kind of practice?\[7\]

While recognising the necessity of the framework agreement (partly as a necessary
counterpart to the FTA), the bottom line has to be that institutionalising the relationship
should not be perceived as an end in itself: institutionalisation for the sake of
institutionalisation would not make much sense. It should be a means to achieve
something substantial that cannot be achieved by other means. In light of the fact that
the start of negotiations for a framework agreement is imminent, it is indeed an urgent
task for both EU and Japanese authorities (and to a lesser extent for experts alike) to
formulate the set of concrete objectives that this agreement is intended to achieve.

Second, assuming that operational cooperation between the EU and Japan, like the one
on counter-piracy, will continue, it may be advisable to have a formal basis on which to
build cooperation for the purpose of making cooperative operations more predictable,
transparent, accountable and results-oriented. In this regard, a first step would be to
conclude an agreement on ensuring the secrecy of classified information. Currently,
information gathered by Japanese patrol aircraft in the Gulf of Aden is shared in real-time
with EU forces. The reason why this can be done without an agreement on classified
information is that such information is not interpreted as being classified. Nonetheless, it
is not difficult to imagine that there are gray zones regarding what information sharing is
allowed within the current rules and regulations.

Japan and NATO signed a legally binding agreement regarding classified information in
June 2010.\[18\] For historical reasons, and as a reflection of the intelligence culture in
Japan- or the lack thereof- the very idea of an information security agreement was
unpopular and the government had been reluctant to conclude such an agreement even
with the United States. Nonetheless the government managed to conclude the GSOMIA
(General Security of Military Information Agreement) with the US in August 2007, which
paved the way for similar agreements with other countries and organisations like NATO.
A similar security agreement was concluded with France in October 2011.\[19\] Negotiations
of a several additional information security agreements are still underway. Given that it is

\[7\] Japan has a binding security treaty with the US whose provisions cover not only defence of Japan, but also
general cooperation between the two countries, including economic cooperation. Apart from the Japan-US
security treaty, Japan has no legally binding agreement covering political and security cooperation.

\[18\] The official title of the agreement is the ‘Agreement between the Government of Japan and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization on the Security of Information and Material’. It was signed in Brussels on 25 June 2010.

\[19\] ‘Signing on the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the French Republic on
likely that operational cooperation between the EU and Japan will continue on counter-piracy and beyond, concluding an information security agreement with the EU might be the next logical step in consolidating such cooperation.

Another, although probably distant, possibility, would the adoption of a CSDP framework participation agreement. Every country that wishes to participate in EU-led CSDP missions needs to sign an agreement with the EU each time it participates that stipulates legal and other arrangements regarding its participation. A framework participation agreement is a standing mechanism that allows non-EU signatories a speedy process without having to conclude a separate participation agreement each time. It also signals that the signatory is willing and prepared to participate in EU-led missions on a regular basis. Japan has never participated in EU-led missions, and in the case of military missions, there are complicated questions regarding the right of collective self-defence, which the Japanese government says it possesses, but is not allowed to exercise. Civilian missions are free from such problems.

As mentioned above, Tokyo expressed its interest in participating in CSDP civilian missions at the EU-Japan Summit in April 2010. At the time of this writing, while Japan has yet to make any decision in this regard, the country’s participation in CSDP missions remains on the agenda. For Japan to participate in a CSDP mission (whether civilian or military), Tokyo needs to sign a participation agreement. The first such negotiation would, as always, be a difficult one. Nonetheless, it would pave the way for further development of cooperation in this field.

Conclusions: Using Each Other

It is still most probably the case that political and security cooperation is the weakest pillar in the overall EU-Japan relationship. Moreover, there are still difficult hurdles hindering development of cooperation in those fields. However, as this article has argued, while new possibilities have emerged it remains to be seen how non-combat military cooperation and other types of cooperation could develop in the years ahead. Regardless of specific areas of cooperation, the key to success is to move beyond the superficial nature of ‘cooperation for the sake of cooperation’. This needs to be replaced by a new spirit of ‘using each other’. In international relations—probably as in human society in general—, being useful to your partner is the surest way to build a true partnership. The EU and Japan are no exceptions to that rule. In the case of geographically distant partners like the EU and Japan, a material foundation seems indispensable for any normative or other elements to come in.

The views expressed in this paper are solely of the author and do not represent those of the NIDS, the Ministry of Defense or the Government of Japan

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Potential for EU-Japan Non-Combat Military Cooperation - Japanese Perspectives: Commentary

Paul Midford

Why should we expect EU-Japan Military Cooperation? The EU and Japan are promising partners for cooperation in non-combat Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), reconstruction and development assistance for seven reasons. First, both the EU and Japan are committed supporters of multilateral security cooperation based on liberal values. In particular, both sides share a liberal optimism that economic and social development are the best ways to resolve conflicts and build peace and stability. For example, Japan’s December 2010 Defense Guidelines call for using Official Development Assistance (ODA) “to resolve root causes of conflicts and terrorism.”1 Second, both Brussels and Tokyo seek to use multilateralism to rectify what they see as a relative lack of global influence. Third, the political spectrums of the EU and Japan are relatively compatible, in particular on the left. In particular, the Social-Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) has elected colleagues in Europe with whom they can have a dialogue on non-combat security cooperation, something that is not possible with the US due to a almost total lack of elected Social Democrats (Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont is the only notable exception).2 Fourth, the EU and Japan have relatively similar strategic cultures, especially regarding the use-of-force. In particular, both emphasize the role of non-combat approaches to peace-building and post conflict stabilization, and have very conservative Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for their militaries. Fifth, because security interdependence is low, neither the EU nor Japan poses a risk of entrapment in war for the other. Finally, despite its promotion of common liberal and democratic values with Japan, the EU is nonetheless arguably the broadest and most neutral multilateral forum outside the United Nations. This makes it relatively easy for the EU to play a neutral mediation role in local conflicts in places such as Aceh, Sri Lanka, or Mindanao. By comparison, the US is often locked out of peace-building because one or more parties see it as non-neutral (e.g. all of the conflicts cited in the previous sentence). Compatibility between the EU and Japan in these areas means that the EU is an especially promising security partner for helping Japan overcome the barriers it faces to playing a larger role in peace-building. Japan faces six significant barriers to increasing its role in peace-building, listed here in descending order from hardest to softest constraints. First, Japan’s participation must be non-combat in nature. Japanese public opinion overwhelmingly opposes the country’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) participating in combat

2 Much of this paragraph and the two that follow draw on Paul Midford, “By Land and by Sea: The Potential of EU-Japan Security Cooperation, forthcoming in Japan Forum.”
operations overseas, even for the sake of peace-building.\textsuperscript{3} Second, in order for Japan and the SDF to participate sustainably in peace-building it needs to build a broad consensus at the levels of both mass and elite opinion. This is an important lesson of the Koizumi period. Former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō expanded SDF operations overseas in support of the US war on terrorism by building narrow minimal majority coalitions in the Japanese parliament, failing to build majority public support for these dispatches. Consequently, these troop deployments were not politically sustainable, especially after Koizumi left office. All of these expanded missions were eventually terminated, and a linger “Koizumi syndrome” manifested itself in reduced public support for any kind of SDF overseas dispatch, even those for traditionally popular humanitarian and disaster relief type operations. Third, Japanese participation faces the hurdle of skepticism on the left regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of dispatching the SDF overseas for peace-building missions. As alluded to above, a dialogue between less skeptical European social-democrats and their Japanese counterparts might help to persuade the SDPJ to be more supportive of such missions. Moreover, there is evidence that since the advent of DPJ administrations the SDPJ has become less skeptical of overseas SDF deployments. In early 2010 the SDPJ, as a coalition partner, agreed to the Hatoyama Cabinet’s dispatch of the SDF to Haiti for an HADR mission (although officially this was a UN peace-keeping operation). This example shows that the SDPJ is potentially persuadable to support non-US alliance centric SDF overseas deployments overseas that are non-combat in nature.

Fourth, voters are likely to punish Japanese politicians who appear to prioritize international security and SDF overseas deployments over addressing domestic economic insecurity, especially pension reform and growing economic inequality. In July 2007 upper house election Japanese voters punished then LDP prime minister Abe Shinzō because he appeared to prioritize overseas SDF deployments over domestic economic security. At least in the short-run the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, will accentuate this trend, with voters punishing politicians who appear to be focusing on peace-building or other priorities far removed from domestic rebuilding. Fifth, the Japanese public and Japanese elites fear entrapment in US military operations and conflicts that are not in Japan’s interest. Along with the fear of being dragged into a war against its interests, is the fear of not being able to control the level of commitment once brought into a conflict. These twin fears, and indeed the danger (as opposed to the fear) of entrapment itself, are driven by Japan’s dependence on the US for security and the great asymmetry of military capabilities. This fear in Japan was stoked by the Iraq War and then Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to dispatch troops to Iraq in support of US military operations there. As discussed above, a longer-term consequence of this fear was a “Koizumi syndrome” or “Iraq syndrome” in Japanese public opinion that translated into reduced support for overseas SDF deployments for sometime after the withdrawal of the SDF from that country. The sixth barrier is the lack of a permanent law on the dispatch of the SDF overseas. Without such a law a new law needs to be enacted for

each dispatch of the SDF overseas, except for UN sponsored UN peacekeeping operations or pure HADR operations. The enactment of such a permanent law, on the other hand, would allow the cabinet to decide on its own, without a vote in the Diet, to deploy the SDF overseas for a wide range of missions. The lack of such a law is a major reason why the SDF was not dispatched to Aceh to help monitor the implication of the peace agreement there, or to Sri Lanka when an international monitoring force was deployed there. Simply put, the political capital needed to enact special laws to cover SDF deployments there was deemed too daunting a barrier to climb. Why has no such law been enacted? The major reason takes us back to fear of entrapment in US wars. In particular, there was a fear that hawks would take advantage of such a law to dispatch the SDF to combat-approaching missions in support of the US military forces overseas. The seventh constraint is the increasing tightness of the defense budget. Measured in yen, the defense budget has stagnated or declined annually since the early 1990s. Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the defense budget has grown even tighter in the face of declining tax revenues and numerous fiscal stimulus packages funded by selling government bonds, which only cemented Japan’s position as having one of the highest public debt to GDP ratios in the developed world. The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami has only added to this, as large financial resources were spent on the largest SDF mobilization of its history, more than 100,000 SDF personnel. Moreover, the SDF itself sustained significant damage from the earthquake and especially the tsunami. For example, the Matsushima Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) base was inundated by the tsunami, destroying 12 F-2 fighters (an improved version of the F-16), and badly damaging 6 others; it will cost the defense budget over $1 billion just to repair these damaged planes. SDF overseas deployments are not cheap, either financially, nor in terms of manpower, and the strains that have been put on both because of the 3-11 quake and tsunami will put a further break on overseas deployments in the short term. Finally, the nature of overseas SDF deployments is powerfully influenced by the domestic legitimization and historical role of the SDF in Japan as a disaster relief organization. The SDF built public support and legitimacy since the late 1950s by playing a large role in disaster relief, beginning after a major typhoon hit the Nagoya region in 1959. Consequently, public support for SDF activities overseas has mainly centered on the idea of this domestic disaster relief organization going international. Consequently, SDF activities overseas, with the partial exception of the Koizumi-Abe period discussed above, tended to center on HADR, reconstruction, and development operations, operations that resemble the disaster relief the SDF conducts at home. Like the restriction on involvement in combat, this also limits the types of operations the SDF can engage in overseas.

The EU is a promising partner for Japan in peace-building precisely because it is well positioned to help Tokyo overcome its barriers to greater participation in such missions. The time is ripe for the two sides to build cooperation on peace-building as the EU and Japan are now beginning negotiations on a binding political cooperation agreement as the successor to the 2001 EU-Japan Ten-Year Action Plan. The EU can help Tokyo redefine

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4 Asahi Shimbun, September 15, 2011.
SDF overseas peace-building deployments outside of a narrow alliance context, re-legitimating them in the eyes of the public and DPJ elites. However, re-legitimating these dispatches is predicated upon their continued non-combat nature. Japan’s turn to the EU for greater cooperation in peace-building also fits into a recent trend in defense policy highlighted in Japan’s new Defense Guidelines (or Defense Taiko): diversifying security cooperation beyond the US to other partners with shared liberal democratic values such as Australia and India. Ironically, Japan’s lack of any security dependence on the EU is an asset, allowing Tokyo to explore cooperation without fear of losing control of its involvement. It is also ironic that one of the EU’s greatest assets in Japan is that it is ‘boring’ if not obscure, and therefore not polarizing domestically within Japan, whereas certain aspects of the US-Japan alliance (e.g. military cooperation overseas) are highly controversial. Again, the domestic political spectrum of the EU is relatively compatible with that of Japan, especially in comparison with the US. This is especially true on the left. The SDPJ has European Social Democratic counterparts, who are relatively supportive of peace-building, and who can potentially influence the SDPJ to become more open to overseas military deployments for non-combat peace-building missions.

Finally, this discussion begs the question of whether great EU-Japan cooperation in peace-building would be bad for the US? The answer, in a word, is no. The answer is no for three reasons. First, if the EU is indeed better suited for encouraging greater Japanese activism in the service of common objectives, as argued above, then the EU playing the role of drawing out greater Japanese activism is also in the interests of the US. Second, an EU-Japan partnership in non-combat peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, while the US focuses on the global balance of power and militarized macro-conflicts such as combat operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, reflects the most viable division of labor among the advanced democracies. Clearly, the US lacks the political, financial and cognitive resources, and even the military resources to deal with all conflicts on both the macro and micro level, to deter China, fight in Afghanistan, and solve micro conflicts in Mindanao and the South Sudan. Indeed, the US simply lacks sufficient attention span to focus on these micro conflicts while also focusing on the larger macro conflicts. The US has long called on its allies to do more to contribute to maintaining international security, and peace-building in areas beset by micro conflicts is exactly where the EU and Japan, acting together, can make a real contribution that builds on their unique strengths while not unnecessarily duplicating effort with the US. Third and finally, even if we assume an element of trilateral competition among the liberal democracies, competition for the sake of achieving common objectives and values ultimately serves all of their interests.

Comments on Michito Tsuruoka’s Paper

In contrast to the claim made in Dr. Tsuruoka’s paper that the EU and Japan are competitors because they both specialize in providing non-combat HADR, reconstruction and development assistance, I would emphasize that the EU and Japan and not competitors in this respect. This can be explained using market logic: as long as the
market for assistance is not glutted with supply (in other words far more aid is on offer than is demanded), the EU and Japan cannot become rivals in providing aid. Is the market for aid today glutted? Far from it! Rather, the demand for aid, especially in areas experiencing conflicts and attempting post-conflict reconstruction far exceeds the extremely limited supply of aid from the EU and Japan. In a time of tight budgets in both the EU and Japan this is all the more true. Indeed, it is precisely because resources are so limited in both the EU and Japan that cooperating and pooling their resources makes so much sense. Moreover, it is important to note that even within the area of non-combat HADR, reconstruction and development assistance the EU and Japan often have complementary rather than overlapping capabilities. For example, Japan’s Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) are said to have perhaps the world’s best water purification units, so assigning this function to the GSDF in joint operations with EU military units would because one step toward optimizing an effective division of labor. The EU and Japan are also complementary partners for HADR and reconstruction and development assistance in geographical terms as well. Based on their colonial experience, the Europeans have a knowledge advantage in Africa, while in much of Southeast Asia Japan has greater acknowledge due to its wartime occupation of the region and, even more significantly, its deep economic integration with this region in the post-war period.

Cultural diversity between the EU and Japan is also a strength that should motivate greater cooperation. Most notably, in Islamic countries Japan does not carry the baggage of civilizational conflict that many European countries do. This has been an important asset for Japan in Mindanao, where Japan is the only non-Muslim country that the Islamic council of nations has so far turned to for assistance in helping to mediate the dispute there between an Islamic insurgency and the government of the Philippines. At the same time, Japan has proven to be more neutral and tolerant in cultural conflicts between western nations and the western world. For example, the EU monitoring force implementing the peace agreement in Aceh faced controversy in Europe because of western hang-ups and objections to the imposition of Sharia Law by the local government. By contrast, Japan has not shown any objection or hang-ups regarding the use of Sharia Law in foreign countries. Finally, Dr. Tsuruoka’s paper suggests that Japan prefers partnering with NATO over the EU in Afghanistan, and potentially elsewhere as well. However, this preference arguably reflects the political agenda of previous LDP governments, and a preference within the Japanese Ministry of Defense to use cooperation in peace-building with NATO as a way to strengthen the US-Japan security alliance. However, the LDP’s reason for preferring cooperation with NATO, namely its hawkish agenda of transforming Japan into a “normal nation” (i.e. military power), has largely vanished since the DPJ came to power. Moreover, the reasoning of many MOD bureaucrats about using cooperation with NATO in peace-keeping to strengthen the US-Japan alliance is questionable given that the US is unlikely to take notice of this cooperation. Moreover, given that the US depends upon Japan to maintain its militarily preeminent global position, fears about the US abandoning Japan are simply lacking in realism.

5 Actually this agenda had already largely vanished under the last two LDP Prime Ministers, Fukuda Yasuo and Asō Tarō.
Promoting Peace Building through EU-Japan Cooperation in ODA: Commentary

Ryutaro Murotani

Professor Söderberg’s paper highlights many positive aspects of the potential of European-Japanese cooperation in the area of peace-building. When we discuss the nexus of security and development, ODA (Official Development Assistance) in conflict-prone areas is a crucial policy tool. Both Europe and Japan have many past experiences and lessons learned in this field. ODA is of particular importance to Japan, as its pacifist constitution and war-renouncing Article 9 restricts the country’s international missions that involve the use of military force.

Amongst other points Marie Söderberg raised in her paper, I found the following three particularly important and relevant.

First of all, she rightly pointed out the commonalities between European and Japanese approaches in post-conflict assistance as a starting point to discuss the potential expansion of bilateral EU-Japan collaboration. EU and Japanese emphasis on civilian engagement over military intervention, a shared commitment to universal values such as human rights and democracy, and a commitment to contribute to peace-building can be the common grounds for strengthening the EU-Japan partnership. However, it is also important to acknowledge the differences between Europe and Japan when assessing the level of possible collaboration in the area of peace-building. European governments tend to apply the so-called ‘whole-of-government’ approach (which Japan does only within limit), and there are also different preferences on aid modalities. By looking at both commonalities and differences, we may be able to come up with more concrete ideas for partnership.

Her argument on the misleading aid statistics is also worth noting for better understanding Japanese ODA. It is true that Japanese ODA is ranked lower in the net disbursement of the OECD/DAC statistics than gross disbursement as receivers of Japanese ODA are repaying their loans. The volume of Japanese ODA in the gross disbursement remains large, and more importantly, some countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan received significant amounts of Japanese ODA. A closer look at ODA statistics reveals different dimensions of Japanese ODA payments over recent years. She could have also added that there was strong public opposition to further cutting the aid budget when the government proposed to decrease the aid budget by 20% after the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. Eventually, the budget was cut by a comparatively modest 10%, and this outcome might be interpreted as an indication that the Japanese
people recognize the importance of foreign aid, particularly after receiving wide-ranging humanitarian assistance from all over the world.

Third, I fully agree with her comments on the emergence of new actors in the field of development cooperation. It is essential to acknowledge the roles played by emerging economies such as China, Brazil, India, among others, as well as by private foundations and companies. Innovative financial tools and public-private-partnerships are also a recent and important development. With regard to peace-building assistance in particular, we also need to consider the roles of humanitarian assistance, security actors, and peace-keeping operations. Exploring the potential of partnerships with this wide variety of actors is key for tackling the nexus of security and development.

While I found many essential points already included in her paper, I would also like to add three points to further deepen the discussion. Although Professor Söderberg discussed a broad range of security issues, from the US-Japan security alliance to the concept of comprehensive security, she did not mention the concept of human security, which has been actively promoted by the Japanese government. In the early 2000s, Japan strongly supported the establishment of the UN Commission on Human Security, as well as the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. The concept of human security is of particular importance when donors provide development assistance in conflict-affected areas. JICA is making efforts to operationalize the concept of human security in post-conflict environments such as Afghanistan. It is worth analyzing how human security influences Japanese ODA when applied to peace-building policies.

Furthermore, we also need to discuss the role of civil society in both European and Japanese decision-making. Civil society plays an active role in peace-building assistance through emergency humanitarian assistance and advocacy campaigns. It also plays a vital role in the debate over deepening collaboration between security actors (including military organizations) and development actors. In Japan and some European countries, many NGOs oppose the idea of mobilizing military capacity to implement development assistance. These opinions cannot be ignored when we discuss various possible policy measures in the nexus of security and development.

For future collaboration between Europe and Japan, a bottom-up approach, realizing concrete collaboration on the ground, might be more effective than a top-down approach. While Professor Söderberg raised many good points when highlighting common European-Japanese values at the conceptual level, we have not seen concrete examples on the ground. When we discuss the potential for EU-Japan collaboration on the ground, we must not avoid mentioning the differences in policies and approaches amongst European actors: the European Commission, the UK, France, and Germany do not always have one policy approach or one policy in the areas of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction etc. It might be more realistic to institute a series of concrete measures in bottom-up approaches with each of the European partners than to put a high-level agreement into practice on the ground.
Japanese Assistance in Afghanistan
A Possible Area for EU-Japan Cooperation?

Kuniko Ashizawa

Introduction

This paper examines Japan's decade-long stabilization and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, with specific emphasis on the country's unique effort to cooperate—and collaborate—with other international donors, most notably the United States, but also the EU and its individual member countries, in implementing their assistance programs.

While Japan’s name has rarely appeared in a seemingly endless coverage on Afghanistan in the regular news media, the country assumes the position of second rank, after the US, in overall assistance disbursed between 2002 and 2010, with its assistance pledged for Afghan stabilization and reconstruction now amounting to $7.2 billion (including the $5 billion-pledge made in late 2009).1 Its assistance programs in Afghanistan have almost exclusively been of non-military nature, with no Japanese military—i.e., Self-Defense Forces (SDF)—personnel currently on the ground, and only a handful of Japanese civilians participating in the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). From the very outset of its involvement in post-Taliban Afghanistan, Tokyo has placed a strong emphasis on key aspects of peace-building and state-building, rather than counter-terrorism or contributions to the so-called US-led Global War on Terror, in its overall approach toward Afghanistan. Quite often, the country is referred to as an honest and trusted partner for Afghanistan, thanks largely to its non-involvement in past Afghan conflicts and to its steady, if not substantial, development assistance during the pre-Taliban period—and probably also due to the present lack of any Japanese military presence.

Given these characteristics, it can be concluded that Tokyo’s assistance practices in Afghanistan are fundamentally different from American ones.

Japan’s approach is by no means identical with that of the EU, now the third largest donor in Afghanistan: Japan’s reconstruction and development projects are often found in the areas of traditional, peacetime development programs, such as infrastructure and agricultural and rural development, while the EU and individual European countries tend to place conscious emphasis on the areas of governance, human rights, and gender. As such, it is not just the overall size of Japanese assistance, but also its quality, which calls for closer scrutiny of this hitherto understudied subject.

Indeed, an increasing number of experts point to the adverse aspects of military-led measures in Afghan reconstruction and, instead, privileges increased and better targeted development and governance reform assistance. More recently, the idea to link Afghanistan economically with its regional neighbours, in both Central Asia and South

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Asia, as a new strategy to help build the country’s economic foundation, has become a major agenda item for political discussions and diplomatic negotiations on Afghanistan across broader donor capitals. And this idea—also referred to as the “New Silk Road” and vigorously promoted by the US government over the past several months—in effect, elevates the relative importance of the economic sector, particularly in the area of transportation and energy infrastructure development, within overall stabilization and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. Considering these developments in the international discourse on Afghanistan, today is an opportune time to examine Japan’s primarily non-military, economic infrastructure-oriented, assistance.

Against this background, the paper firstly introduces to the reader a brief review of Japan’s involvement in the overall international effort to assist Afghanistan to rebuild itself after the fall of Taliban regime in late 2001. It then engages in a focused examination of the country’s policies and practices in implementing its stabilization and reconstruction assistance programs, in the way it articulates key characteristics of—and the rationale behind—these practices. This will be followed by a specific discussion on Tokyo’s growing effort to work together with other international donors, not just in terms of overall policy coordination, but also in terms of the actual operational implementation of programs and projects on the ground. Drawing on these discussions, the paper suggests that the case of Afghanistan presents both challenges and opportunities for promoting EU-Japan cooperation in this particular area of global security governance.

**Japan’s Involvement in Afghanistan: Overview**

Contrary to its recent, relatively low-profile on the international scene in relation to Afghanistan, the Japanese government began its involvement in Afghan reconstruction with a notable diplomatic initiative. In January 2002, about two months after the fall of Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the course of the US-led international military campaign, Tokyo hosted a major international conference, the “International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan,” that gathered the representatives of 61 countries and 22 international organizations for two-days of discussions on Afghan reconstruction. The conference served as a timely follow-up to the first international conference on post-Taliban Afghanistan, held in Bonn one month earlier, in which a three-year roadmap to establish a new democratic government in Afghanistan, termed the “Bonn Process”, was laid out and endorsed by all stakeholders. The main objective of Tokyo conference was to secure political and financial commitment from the international community to assist the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In this regard, the Japanese government succeeded in raising total a US$ 4.5 billion pledge from the participants, in which Tokyo’s share was US$ 500 million. The Tokyo conference set up the prototype of the so-called “pledging conference” that was subsequently held in Berlin, London, and Paris at two-year intervals.

Another diplomatic activity the Japanese government undertook during this early period is found in the country’s decision to assume the role, along with the United Nations, to lead one of the key “security sector reform” programs to assist the new Afghan government in establishing proper security institutions nationwide. This arrangement was agreed to at a Group of 8 (G8) meeting, where the five security-related sectors—(1) military, (2) police, (3) judicial system, (4) counter-narcotics, and (5) demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants (termed DDR)—were identified to receive urgent international support. Japan became the so-called “lead country” for the DDR sector, alongside the US (as the lead country for rebuilding the military), Germany
It has, since then, assisted the Afghan government, both financially and operationally, to introduce and manage a set of programs to demobilize and disarm former soldiers and militants, and more crucially, to bring them back and reintegrate them into society. Consistent with this lead-country business, Tokyo also convened a series of international conferences focusing on DDR in Afghanistan, in 2003, 2006, and 2007, respectively.

Furthermore, Japan made an unprecedented move to use its military forces in the larger context of its involvement in Afghanistan. From late 2001 until the beginning of 2010, it dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean to refuel US and other national naval vessels engaged in the maritime interdiction activity of the US-led multinational counter-terrorism operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). For over eight years, the MSDF provided fuel and water worth US$ 250 million to a total of twelve OEF participating countries, including the US and other NATO countries, as well as Pakistan. It was the first operation of this kind that the MSDF undertook since its inception, requiring the Japanese government to introduce a special legislation, which was first adopted in late November 2001, extended three times, and eventually expired in January 2010. Apart from this replenishment support, there has been no SDF participation in military-related operations in Afghanistan, be it the OEF or the stabilization operation undertaken by the UN-mandated multinational force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Finally, in November 2009, a few months before it terminated the MSDF’s refuelling operation in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese government announced that it would increase its stabilization and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, providing as much as US$ 5 billion over the next five years. Up to this point, Tokyo had already invested US$ 1.47 billion in assistance for this war-torn country, and with this new pledge, its total assistance will likely reach close to US$ 6.5 billion by the end of 2014. This increase in assistance has made Japan the second largest financial contributor in Afghanistan (with over US$ 3.1 billion disbursed between 2002 and 2010), after the US (37 billion) and followed by the EU (2.8 billion) and the United Kingdom (2.2 billion). At the general policy level, the Japanese government currently identifies three areas of focus for its assistance programs: (1) support for improving Afghan national security capability, (2) reintegration of former Taliban soldiers into the Afghan society, and (3) support for Afghanistan’s sustainable and self-reliant development.

The driving forces behind Tokyo’s diplomatic activism, at least in the initial period, and its notable effort to provide substantive support, both financially and militarily, for Afghan stabilization and reconstruction, are three-fold. First, Japanese policymakers view, almost intuitively, the country’s active involvement in Afghanistan as a positive measure to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Providing visible support for Washington’s decade-long effort and struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, as well as its so-called War on Terror, has been part of Tokyo’s alliance management effort, particularly since mid-2009 when the controversy over the US base relocation in Okinawa, caused by the newly elected Japanese government led by Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led to serious bilateral tensions. Second, Japanese foreign policymakers also view Japan’s engagement in Afghanistan in the context of the country’s “international cooperation”

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2 Ibid.
policy. With the SDF uniquely constrained from participating in collective security and other peace enforcement operations, playing a major role in assisting Afghan reconstruction has been considered as an opportune way to demonstrate the country’s substantive contribution in the area of global peace and security. And the third (and obviously less prominent) rationale is to forge a good relationship with a newly-born Afghanistan, to which many in Tokyo share more of a sense of affinity, as a country of greater Asia, than with other international security concerns in the Middle East and Africa. Valuing Japan’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis other major powers in terms of its past record with Afghanistan, Japanese policymakers calculate it as worthwhile to spare efforts to maintain the hitherto favourable relations with this conflict-prone country of world strategic importance.

Japan’s Assistance Practices: A Japanese Way?

Despite Tokyo’s conscious effort to make diplomatic and military contributions, especially in the early years, to Afghan stabilization and reconstruction, Japan’s involvement in Afghanistan is primarily characterized by its substantial financial contribution. This is particularly so over the past few years, given that the Japanese government ended its refuelling operation in the Indian Ocean and that major intern-governmental conferences on Afghanistan have taken place mostly in European capitals. Then, how exactly has such a large amount of money—about US$ 3.2 billion so far—been spent under the name of Japan’s assistance in Afghanistan? Four distinctive features, though not exhaustive, are identified in Japanese assistance practices; they are (1) a relatively large disbursement for reconstruction programs, (2) designating DDR as Japan’s “niche” in the area of security sector assistance, (3) substantial reliance on international organizations to channel money, and (4) growing project-base cooperation with other donors.

• Large Disbursement for Reconstruction Programs

In its periodic report on Japan’s assistance for Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) classifies the country’s assistance programs in four categories, namely “governance/political process,” “security improvement,” “reconstruction assistance,” and “humanitarian assistance.” From October 2001 to October 2011, about 10 per cent of Japanese assistance worth US$ 3.2 billion was dispersed for “governance/political process” programs, 30 per cent toward “security improvement,” 45 per cent in the area of “reconstruction assistance,” and 15 per cent for “humanitarian assistance” through relevant international organizations, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP), and International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). Although the classification method of assistance disbursement is by no means uniform across donors, it is reasonable to argue that Japan’s assistance places a relatively large emphasis on reconstruction assistance programs, which can be seen in line with traditional development assistance, such as infrastructure building and maintenance, agriculture and rural development, health and education improvement. For instance, according to a recent report by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance, 70 per cent of US assistance between 2002 and 2011 went to the security-related programs, with only 3 per cent being spent on governance. The EU, on the other hand, has aimed to allocate up to 45 per cent of its assistance (between 2011 and 2013) to the area of

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“governance/rule of law,” another 35-40 per cent to “rural development” projects, and 18-21 per cent in the area of “health and social protection.”

Within the “reconstruction assistance” category, for which Japan so far carried out US$1.5 billion-worth of programs, projects in the area of infrastructure receive the largest share—26 per cent—of total spending, amounting to roughly US$380 million.

These infrastructure-sector projects include the construction of an airport terminal and the rehabilitation of airfield pavements at Kabul International Airport, the improvement of the country’s main ring road (a section between Kandahar and Herat, and Kabul and Kandahar), city road construction in Kabul, Mazar-e-sharif, Bamiyan, and Chaghcharan, and the project to develop a master plan for Kabul Metropolitan Area development. To be sure, since infrastructure projects tend to be costly as compared with other sectors in development assistance such as education and agriculture, the fact that the infrastructure sector received the largest amount of money does not necessarily suggest the primacy of this sector in overall Japanese reconstruction assistance programs. Nevertheless, the country’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies and practices have historically placed a strong emphasis on the infrastructure sector. Also, when the new international trust fund—the Afghanistan Infrastructure Multi-Donor Trust Fund—was set up, in late 2010, to help rebuild roads and other infrastructure in Afghanistan, Japan became the first donor country to contribute USD$ 20 million to this fund. Against the background of these facts, it is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese government has placed a conscious emphasis on the infrastructure sector in delivering its reconstruction assistance projects in Afghanistan.

Following the infrastructure sector, the agriculture and rural development sector takes up about 16 per-cent of Japan’s reconstruction assistance spending. The projects in this sector include technical assistance to rice-farmers in Nangahar, the reconstruction of national agricultural experiment stations, the irrigation improvement and construction of micro-hydro power facilities in Kabul and Bamiyan provinces, and support for over 2000 small-size community-based projects to help provide a wide range of services such as school, clinics, and vocational training centres. Then, the projects specifically assisting Afghan returnees from refugee camps outside the country, as well as those who were internally displaced, amount to 11 per cent of the total reconstruction assistance. These projects have been running large-scale reintegration programs to receive 2 million returnees in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad, providing affected Afghans with emergency assistance such as shelter, lump sum cash, and food, as well as education, health and vocational training services. Besides these three sectors, “education” and “health and medical care” have been other major designated areas of Japanese reconstruction assistance (about 7 per-cent and 9 per-cent, respectively). Projects in these two sectors include literacy education, school construction and rehabilitation, polio and other vaccination, tuberculosis control, and equipment assistance to hospitals and clinics.

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For the above reconstruction assistance projects, especially those directly handled by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)—the Japanese development assistance agency—and its embassy in Kabul, the Japanese government selected four geographical regions as prioritized areas of operation: Kabul, Jalabad, Bamiyan, and Mazar-e-sharif. These regions are in the central and northern parts of Afghanistan, a relatively safe area compared with other regions, particularly in the south and the southwest. Given strict and substantive safety measures and standards adopted by MOFA and JICA, the choice of these four geographical regions was by no means coincidental. With Afghanistan comprised of 35 provinces, these four regions of Japan’s prioritized operation areas together cover far less than 10 per cent of the country’s overall geographical space.

- DDR as a “Niche” in Security Sector Reform Assistance

The second characteristic of Japan’s assistance in Afghanistan can be found in its policy and practice in the area of security sector reform assistance. As noted earlier, the Japanese government identifies improving the security of Afghanistan as one of four major categories of its assistance, and accordingly, this category—security improvement—has received about 30 per cent of the total assistance spending (hence, the second largest category after the above-discussed reconstruction assistance). Indeed, it is noteworthy that the allocation ratio for this category has steadily risen over the past several years, from 16 per cent in 2005, 17 per cent in 2007, 20 per-cent in 2009, and 30 per-cent in 2011. This suggests Tokyo’s conscious effort to make a visible contribution to the security-related area of international assistance in Afghanistan, thanks largely to its inability to send the SDF to participate in the multinational military campaign in Afghanistan. Washington’s almost exclusive preoccupation with its stabilization and counter-insurgency agenda also induced Japanese foreign policymakers to do more in this arena. One of the recent efforts in this regard was Tokyo’s decision, in early 2009, to cover the salary of the 116,000-strong Afghan National Police (ANP) for 6 months of the year, equivalent to about US$160 million in the year 2010.

Yet, the most notable Japanese contribution in the security realm has been its role to lead the DDR—demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants and soldiers—program. As touched upon in the overview section above, Japan became the lead country, together with UN, for this particular assistance agenda set forth at the outset of the decade-long Afghan reconstruction. Assuming such a major role, it first assisted, not just financially, but also politically and operationally, the Afghan government and UN Development Program (UNDP) to set up a US$141 million DDR program, called the Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (ANBP), for which Japan itself made over a US$ 91 million contribution, covering 65 per cent of the total cost. Through the ANBP, which was undertaken between 2003 and 2006, 63,800 former members of Afghan Military Force (AMF) during the Taliban regime were demobilized and disarmed, with more than 90,000 light and medium arms and 120,000 heavy weapons collected (of which 56,000 weapons were destroyed). Those disarmed former combatants, then, joined the 3-6 month reintegration program that provided a vocational training, lump-sum payment, and employment support.

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10 Ibid., 5.
12 For these data on the first phase of DDR, see UNDP Afghanistan, "DDR Fact Sheet," (2010).
This stage of the DDR program is generally considered to be a success, especially if compared with other designated security sector reform programs, such as building a viable national police, the justice system reform, and the counter-narcotics program. At the same time, the DDR agenda was by no means complete at the end of the first stage, given the fact that then estimated 120,000 former combatants (either former AMF members who refused to join the first stage DDR program or other militias who had never joined the AMF) were still at large, operating in over 1800 illegal armed groups. As a result, a new program, called the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), was established in 2005, under the above ANBP framework, in order to dismantle these militia and criminal groups nation-wide. By mid-2010, 737 illegal armed groups, out of 2000, were disbanded, with about 125,000 weapons brought under control of the Afghan government. Japan continued to play a major role as the lead nation by providing financial and diplomatic support in various forms, such as assisting the Afghan Ministry of Interior to set up an office designated to DIAG matters, funding US$ 35 million to DIAG-related development projects (to create employment opportunities for former militias), and hosting a major international conference to promote the DIAG process.

Furthermore, the growing number of attacks by the resurgent Taliban and other militant groups since late 2006, together with the slow and limited progress made in the DIAG process, led the Afghan government to initiate, in 2010, another DDR program—the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP)—aimed at disarming the Taliban and other anti-government elements and to bring both their commanders and foot soldiers back into their communities within Afghan society. In contrast to the previous two programs, the US and the UK were actively involved in conceptualizing and designing the overall structure of the APRP, including the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to cover operational costs. Japan remained as the main financial contributor to this program, providing, to date, US$52 million to the new trust fund (the US provided US$ 50 million and the UK contributed US$10 million, respectively). During the first year of the APRP process, about 1700 illegal combatants publicly joined the program, and the reintegration process has been taking place in 16 provinces.

In sum, with a total US$284 million contribution to the above three DDR programs, the Japanese government has found the DDR as Japan’s niche in the security arena of international assistance for Afghanistan. As suggested above, given Tokyo’s inability to make a direct military contribution, the DDR has been viewed as a practicable and convenient area, in which Japan can directly involve itself in the security aspects of Afghan reconstruction. Indeed, before Afghanistan, the country already had a record of supporting DDR programs, mostly through UNDP, in other post-conflict reconstruction cases, such as Kosovo, the Solomon Islands, and Cambodia. Further, after taking the lead through its contributions in Afghan DDR, Tokyo continued to promote, or get involved in, similar DDR programs in Sudan and elsewhere. In this sense, the Afghan case helped to cement the idea of DDR as Japan’s niche, not just in the thinking of Japanese foreign policymakers, but also among major international donors and other actors who would continue to get involved in this type of international assistance in post-conflict and fragile states.

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Substantial Reliance on UN Channels

Another distinctive feature observed in Japanese assistance practices in Afghanistan is the country’s substantial use of international organizations and agencies to disburse its funding. Between 2001 and 2009, about a half of Japan’s assistance of US$ 2 billion were channelled through international organizations, such as UNDP, UN Children Fund (UNICEF), the UN Education, Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Food Program (WFP). In other words, the Japanese government has placed a good amount of its grant aid to Afghanistan in existing projects managed by those international organizations, such as a literacy program for Afghan police (UNESCO), an agriculture productivity improvement program (FAO), and a polio eradication project (UNICEF). As for the remaining half, 10 per cent were spent in the form of JICA’s technical assistance for Afghan government’s development projects, while 40 per cent were disbursed as direct bilateral grants to Afghanistan handled by both MOFA and JICA.

The reason for Tokyo’s focus on international organization channels is primarily budgetary and logistic. First, since Afghan assistance has been treated in Tokyo as a special and emergency foreign policy agenda from the outset, a special arrangement for financing has been in place. Annual spending on Afghanistan comes from both the regular ODA budget and supplementary budgets, about a fifty-to-fifty ratio. Given that the approval decision on supplementary budget takes place, by its nature, in the midst of the fiscal year, when a new supplementary budget for Afghanistan is approved, there will usually be only several months left to spend the new budget (no carry-over is allowed). In such a situation, transferring money to established international organizations, in support for their ongoing, or new, projects, is generally considered as the surest and fastest way to meet the fiscal deadline. Secondly, and partly related to the first point above, the number of Japanese officials and development practitioners working at the Japanese embassy and JICA’s offices in Afghanistan is rather small, due to both the institutional constraints and the lack of available specialists. As of October 2011, the Kabul embassy staff was about thirty (excluding non-Japanese nationals) and around seventy JICA officials and consultants are implementing JICA projects on the ground. These numbers are hardly substantial, given that Germany, currently the seventh largest donor, for instance, places around 300 development managers and practitioners on the ground, while the US embassy in Kabul houses several thousand staff, including consultants. This has resulted in Tokyo’s relatively heavy reliance on international organizations and development agencies to disburse its assistance funding.

To be sure, relying on international organization channels for aid disbursement is by no means uncommon with mid- and small-size donors, particularly those from Europe, whose development implementation agencies are relatively small, or indeed non-existent. Yet, it is rather notable in the case of such a major donor country as Japan, the fifth largest in terms of the overall ODA spending globally. In this regard, it should be noted that there are competing views about the use of international organizations in the context of Afghan assistance. On one hand, it is a logically cost-effective choice for many donors, considering that these specialized international organizations maintain

17 Personal interviews with several MOFA officials in charge of Afghan assistance, June and October 2010.
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ”Nihon no Afghanistan,” 7.
19 Personal interviews with German foreign officials, September 2011, and a US official, November 2011.
cumulative expertise, human resources, and institutional capacity to carry out designated reconstruction and development assistance programs. Rampant corruption and chronic shortage of institutional and human capacity on the side of Afghan government also renders, in the eyes of donors, these international organizations with established procedural standards as more efficient than Afghan ministries and governmental agencies, not just as regards the transfer of their funds but also in terms of day-to-day work relationships.

On the other hand, there has been an increasing call in Afghanistan for channelling more assistance funds directly through the Afghan government’s systems, thanks mainly to the 2009 report, published by Afghan’s Ministry of Finance, which disclosed that only twenty per cent of international assistance between 2001 and 2009 was disbursed through the Afghan government, leaving other eighty per cent of aid directly managed by donors. Acknowledging the need to give Afghans more of a sense of ownership and control in its reconstruction and state-building, the donor community agreed, in 2010, to increase its direct funding to the Afghan government to the level of fifty per cent of total assistance. This, in turn, works as a disincentive to the option of the international organizations channel. Furthermore, some cases of operational incompetence associated with UNDP-run projects, which became the talk of the town in Kabul over the past few years, have also contributed to growing criticism questioning the desirability of extensively relying on international organizations and agencies.

Tokyo apparently shares the former position in this regard, whereas some major donors, including Washington, are more inclined toward the latter position. The recent episode highlights this divergence. When the above-mentioned new DDR program, the APRP, was being introduced in late 2010, there was a major discussion about how to channel donors’ contributions to cover the operational cost for this new program. Japan proposed the UNDP to administer a new multi-donor trust fund, while the US wanted to make direct contributions to the Afghan government and the UK promoted the idea of using a commercial bank. The outcome of the discussion was an utter compromise (or, in a sense, no compromise): three separate windows were set up to channel donors’ funds—“Window A” (direct contribution to the Afghan government), “Window B” (UNDP administered multi-donor trust fund), and “Window C” (a commercial bank multi-donor bare trust). Currently, the “Window A” channel is used by the US, Australia and Finland, the “Window B” has received contributions from Japan, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, and the “Window C” has channelled funding from the UK and Estonia.

Growing Cooperation with Other Donors

Lastly, there has been a potentially significant, if not widely known, development occurring over several years in Japan’s stabilization and reconstruction assistance practices in Afghanistan. That is Tokyo’s conscious and increasing effort to seek to cooperate with other donors—beyond the above-discussed international development and humanitarian organizations—in implementing its assistance programs in Afghanistan. Most notably, Japan has set up cooperative arrangements with several NATO member countries that contribute Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—a relatively small, military-commanded unit consisting of military officers and soldiers, diplomats, and reconstruction and development experts—to ISAF’s stabilization and counter-insurgency operations throughout the country. The mode of cooperation is primarily financing. Given

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21 "Reintegration Finance Mechanism Windows (GIROA)," (2011) available from the RONNA website.
their overall objectives (to improve security, to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, and to facilitate reconstruction efforts at local and provincial levels), PRTs engage in, among other tasks, various reconstruction and development projects, such as rebuilding schools and medical clinics, irrigation and small infrastructure, and education and vocational training. The Japanese government utilizes its “Grass Roots Grant Scheme” (a small-scale grant scheme up to US$ 100,000) to support these PRT-run development projects. In addition to the financial cooperation, MOFA has dispatched, since May 2009, four Japanese development specialists to a Lithuanian-led PRT in Chagcharan, Ghor, a central province of Afghanistan, to help implement several development projects with the Lithuanians.

So far, Japan has supported about 120 reconstruction and development projects at sixteen PRTs, led by nine NATO member countries, including the US, Sweden, Hungary, Italy and Germany. The largest recipient among these NATO countries is Lithuania, which has received Japanese financial and human-resource contributions for a total of fifty-nine development projects. The US stands as the second largest recipient with twenty-five PRT-run development projects, in the eastern region, being funded by Japan, followed by a Swedish PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif with fifteen projects receiving Japanese support. In order to facilitate these cooperation arrangements with different NATO countries, MOFA has its liaison officer in NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative office in Kabul. 22 Besides NATO, Tokyo has sought to cooperate, in the context of Afghan assistance, with two other European-oriented organizations: the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As for the former, Tokyo and Brussels co-organized, last year in Tajikistan, a two-day intergovernmental seminar on border control management between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries. 23 With the latter, MOFA has funded OSCE programs including a border guard assistance project between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, customs assistance between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and trainer training course to Afghan Police officers on counter-narcotics. 24

Tokyo’s active pursuit for donor cooperation has not been limited to those Western countries. For instance, JICA and its Korean counterpart, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), undertook in 2009 a collaborative project on training Afghan trainers who work at a newly-established (and Korean-funded) vocational training centre in Kabul, to which technical assistance professionals from Japan and South Korea were dispatched to conduct training programs in such areas as electrical wiring, sewing, auto repair, and computers. 25 With Turkey, the Japanese government in 2011 provided US$ 3-million financial support for a six-month training program on Afghan police officers at a police training centre in Turkey. About 500 Afghan police cadets participated in the program, to which Japan’s National Police Agency sent six Japanese policemen specialized in Judo training. 26 A similar format of assistance donor cooperation was pursued with Iran. In 2010, the Japanese government arranged with the Iranian government to collaborate on a one-month training course for Afghan government officials in charge of vocational training development and trainers from six different

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Nihon no Afghanistan,” 19.
vocational training schools in Afghanistan. Fourteen Afghans participated in the training that took place at a vocational training centre near Tehran, which had previously received JICA's assistance for equipment and curriculum improvement. Another arrangement of this kind is now underway for capacity building of Afghan officials at the Ministry of Energy and Water. MOFA has also funded several Iranian local authorities and NGOs to support their humanitarian projects to support Afghan refugees in Iran. 27

These growing cooperation and collaboration practices with a range of donors have been driven, in part by Tokyo’s strategic calculation, and partly out of practical necessity. On one hand, the strategic calculation is particularly the case with the aforementioned cooperation with NATO members and European institutions. As discussed elsewhere in this volume, Japanese foreign policymakers have, since the mid-2000s, consciously sought to strengthen political and strategic ties with their European counterparts, and they found, in this context, Afghanistan as a particularly opportune showcase item, for which Japan and NATO, as well as other European institutions, could, or should, work together. On the other hand, Japan’s unique collaboration with South Korea, Turkey, and Iran, reflect the fact that JICA’s activity on the ground has been increasingly constrained by the deteriorating security condition in the country, leading JICA officials to seek some improvisation measures to meet their project execution goal. As such, the mode of cooperation with European partners has been generally a top-down process (the leaders of each donor first agree for cooperation), whereas that with non-European donors tends to be a combination of a bottom-up (a collaboration idea is conceived at the practitioner level) and top-down process.

Afghanistan, A Possible Area For EU-Japan Cooperation?

What, then, do the above characteristics of Japanese assistance in Afghanistan tell us about the idea of promoting cooperation between Japan and the EU—presently the second and the third largest donors—in stabilizing and reconstructing this fragile, still conflict-prone, country? As noted above, the case of Afghan assistance has incidentally served to promote Japanese-European cooperation in several concrete ways. Specifically, Tokyo devised two patterns of cooperation: one with an individual European country in the context of Japan’s contribution to PRTs, and another with European institutions, namely the EU and OSCE, primarily in the area of capacity-building of Afghan institutions. These past and ongoing practices of Japanese-European donor cooperation, together with other distinctive features of Japanese assistance in Afghanistan, help to highlight both challenges and opportunities for promoting EU-Japan cooperation in this particular area of global security governance.

The challenge is two-fold. Firstly, the present record suggests that there seems to be some procedural or institutional difficulty to implement concrete and substantial cooperation or collaboration projects between the two donors. As touched upon in the previous section, the actual case of EU-Japan cooperation is, thus far, found in only one example (as far as publicly reported)—the joint program to organize a two-day intergovernmental seminar on border control. This is obviously far less substantial than other cases of cooperation, particularly those with several European countries participating in the PRTs, in terms of the time commitment and financial costs involved. Indeed, it should be noted that, over the past few years, Tokyo and Brussels have been trying—without avail, thus far—to work out a major cooperation arrangement in the area

of Afghan police training and capacity building. The lack of progress is largely attributed to bureaucratic procedural regulations and complex project implementation, especially on the part of EU, for which institutional decision-making mechanism is often less straightforward than those of other national governments.

Secondly, in the eyes of Japanese foreign policymakers, the incentive to cooperate with the EU has not appeared as great as that with individual European countries participating in the PRTs. This is largely because of Tokyo’s strong desire to play a visible role in the security realm of Afghan assistance, particularly in a direct relation to ISAF’s military operations. Accordingly, in their pursuit of donor cooperation on the ground, Japanese foreign policy officials have not given priority to the EU, which—like Japan—does not maintain a collective military presence in Afghanistan, over other donors engaging in military actions. Moreover, whether EU officials in Brussels and its development practitioners in Afghanistan find a strong incentive to work with their Japanese counterparts is by no means apparent. In this sense, as alluded to in Michito Tsuruoka’s paper, it may be their similarity (non-military involvement), rather than their differences, in terms of their overall approach to Afghan assistance, that limits EU and Japanese attempts to actualize their bilateral cooperation in project implementation in Afghanistan.

Such challenges notwithstanding, the case of Afghanistan still presents opportunities for cooperation between Japan and the EU. First of all, Tokyo’s demand for donor cooperation, be it in the form of project collaboration or simple financial contribution, remains high, or may even likely increase in the coming years, as the Japanese government is diligently trying to meet its 2009 pledge to provide US$ 5 billion assistance in five years. Given that there is little indication, at the moment to increase the country’s own capacity of assistance project implementation (i.e., to increase JICA’s practitioners and project-management staff at the embassy), Japanese foreign policymakers have no choice but to continue to seek various donor partners to work with and to channel their assistance funds. As a result, although the EU may not be the first choice, among other likely donor partners, the overall condition for EU-Japan cooperation is still considerably favourable in Afghanistan compared with other cases of international assistance to post-conflict and/or fragile states.

Furthermore, the recent political and security developments in Afghanistan (and the reactions to it amongst donor countries) will likely encourage Japan to look more urgently at the option to work with the EU in delivering its assistance to Afghanistan. With the 2014 deadline for a major reduction of US (and wider NATO) military engagement looming large, the current discussion on Afghanistan, among foreign policymakers and experts, revolves around, not only the challenge and uncertain prospect for successfully transferring security control from international to Afghan forces, but also—and increasingly—the need for a more effective, and better coordinated, reconstruction and development assistance for this war-torn society. According to the World Bank’s president, Robert Zoellick, international military spending in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 was estimated at more than US$100 billion, and other non-military reconstruction and economic assistance could amount to $15.4 billion. The country’s total gross domestic product (GDP) is, on the other hand, estimated as just a little short of $17 billion. Although a good portion of this assistance money would be actually spent

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28 This effort was explicitly noted at the EU-Japan summit in April 2010.
29 Personal interview with a mid-ranking EU official in charge of EU's Afghan assistance policy, August 2011.
on products and services made outside Afghanistan, the impact of the major withdrawal of the currently 100,000-strong US forces—33,000 troops by the next summer, and a total 70,000 troops anticipated by the end of 2014—on the Afghan economy would be considerable. One recent estimate warns that decreased foreign spending accompanying the 2014 military transition would likely shrink Afghan GDP by between 12% and 41%.

Given such bleak prospects, there has been an increasing call that the Afghan government and its international donor partners have to develop a viable comprehensive plan to maintain the present level of domestic economic activities, with less cash inflow from donors, over the 2014 transition, while simultaneously laying the foundation for the Afghan economy to become self-sustainable in the long run. In this context, despite Tokyo’s underlying desire to associate its assistance with military and security-related programs (and hence, to work with military-contributing donors), the demand for Japan to contribute more to Afghan’s economic reconstruction and development is now growing. This, in turn, helps to signify, in the eyes of Japanese foreign policymakers, the EU as a natural partner to collaborate with Japan. The EU’s assistance programs, like those of Japan as discussed earlier, have placed a conscious emphasis on the area of reconstruction and development. EU officials, like their Japanese counterparts, tend to portray their approaches to Afghan reconstruction and development assistance as a long-term commitment. Accordingly, although sharing such similar approaches itself may not necessarily produce concrete collaborative actions at this critical juncture of international assistance for Afghanistan, it is certainly worthwhile for Japan and the EU to more consciously explore some effective ways to cooperate in assisting Afghanistan to build its economic foundations, in order to avoid repeating another descent into chaos.
Bibliography

The Nexus of Security and Development: Addressing Local Conflicts Before They Turn Global
Japan – EU-Cooperation

Date: Tuesday, 21 February 2012, 10.00 hrs

Venue: JICA Research Institute, International Conference Hall
10-5 Ichigaya Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo 162-8433
The Linkage Between Micro Security, Development, and Global Security: Perspective from Europe

Paul Midford

Introduction

Traditionally, the motivations for providing development assistance have had little to do with national or international security. Providing economic assistance to meet the basic needs of the inhabitants in poor and undeveloped countries out of humanitarian concern is perhaps the oldest motivation for providing foreign aid. Although this has often been coupled with more ambitious aid projects to promote economic development, humanitarian motivations have nonetheless often been the underlying motivation, especially in many western European (and especially Scandinavian) aid policies, and to some extent in US aid policies as well.

Another motivation that has historically figured prominently in Japanese aid policy, and more recently in South Korean and Chinese aid, is providing economic assistance for the sake of building up trading partners, and to benefit national companies investing in aid recipient countries. Japanese aid policies from the era of reparations payments in the late 1950s through the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise to double aid to Southeast Asian countries in the mid 1970s, and into the 1980s often appear to have been based on this motivation. One can argue that the design of these aid policies, which emphasized self-help and comprehensive economic development on the part of recipient, produced less long-term dependence and greater success in meeting the human needs of citizens in recipient countries in the long run. In any case, this motivation was also not connected to security concerns, except perhaps economic security in terms of securing stable trading partners and sources of raw materials. Nonetheless, another traditional Japanese motivation for giving foreign aid does appear to have something of a security rationale in a general and long-term sense. This rationale can be called liberal developmentalism, and is based on the idea that economic development is the best way to promote peace and stability in the long-term. This is based on the old 19th century liberal idea that material progress produces a more peaceful world. Arguably, the recent intensification of geo-political tensions between a rapidly developing China and Japan has to some extent punctured the optimism of developmentalism, encouraging to some extent a move toward a more comprehensive application of liberal principles. The inclusion of democracy...
as an important factor in the 1992 ODA Charter is one indication of a shift from prioritizing the importance of economic development and toward emphasizing democracy. However, the failed attempt to introduce the concept of an Asian Arc of Freedom under former Foreign Minister Aso Taro, a concept that emphasized the importance of democracy for promoting peace and stability, demonstrates the limits of attempts to move away from developmentalism. In any case, developmentalism has seen aid as having value for national and international security only in gradual and general terms. It has not seen aid as a tool for resolving specific conflicts.

The Emergence of a Link between Micro and Macro Security

Beyond the issue of giving foreign aid for humanitarian, economic, or developmentalist reasons, there has been a tendency to dismiss the significance of micro security and instability in underdeveloped countries and regions for the global balance of power or the well being of developed rich nations. Micro security is herein defined as the absence of threats to basic human economic and well as physical well being within a single country or region. Macro security is defined as the absence of global threats, or at least the absence of threats to the developed world and/or the great powers. Micro conflicts are society-centric rather than state-centric, endanger human security, and are likely to generate non-state combatants.

Until recently, micro-conflicts have been seen as innocuous for the national self-interest of developed countries, if nonetheless tragic in themselves. However, globalization, and specific drivers of globalization, are creating means for micro-conflicts to become macro threats with global implications. The key drivers include the spread globally of ubiquitous access to the Internet, air travel, and global production networks that rely on international express delivery and sea-borne freight. Despite remaining in a state of poor underdevelopment, the very ubiquity and falling costs of these drivers have allowed for their penetration into even the most unstable regions, and in so doing have provided pathways for micro conflicts to spread globally. Globally ubiquitous Internet access provides a cheap global command, control and intelligence network, and a global broadcast network for recruiting followers, spreading ideas and propaganda. The rise of numerous Jihadi web sites is the most well-known, but by no means the only example of how the internet allows micro conflicts to go macro. Globally ubiquitous and reasonably cheap air travel provides combatants in micro conflicts the potential to deploy and act globally, as the 9-11 attacks showed.

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The growth of global production networks has produced globally ubiquitous networks of international airborne delivery services and ever denser sea-borne freight networks. As recent natural disasters such as last year’s 3-11 quake and tsunami in Japan, and subsequent flooding in Thailand demonstrate, dense global networks are highly vulnerable to even small supply disruptions, disruptions that can have global implications. Moreover, these networks provide transmission belts for micro-conflicts to become macro-conflicts. The attempt by al Qaeda of Arabia, based in Yemen, to use an airborne courier service to send mail bombs to Synagogues in the US is one clear example of this.

Afghanistan as the Archetype Case

Afghanistan is arguably the post-child for the emerging linkage of micro and macro security. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, a micro-conflict raged in Afghanistan that attracted little interest from the international community. At its base the conflict in Afghanistan was driven not only by ideological division, but by a failure to build a state strong enough to prevent anarchy. As Afghanistan slipped into anarchy human security was comprehensively degraded, not only economically but especially in terms of physical integrity rights. Afghanistan came to approximate Thomas Hobbes’ classic definition of anarchy: life was “nasty, short, and brutish.”

Into this vacuum stepped radical groups, most notably the Taliban. Although it is often overlooked in the west, the Taliban, despite its harshly puritanical policies, came to enjoy a measure of public support precisely because it was able to bring an end to anarchy worse than the most brutal dictator. As is well known the Taliban hosted ideological fellow-traveler al Qaeda, an organization with global reach. Taking advantage of the ubiquity of the drivers of globalization, most notably the internet and international air travel, al Qaeda was able to use poor and undeveloped Afghanistan as a platform for launching attacks globally, most strikingly against the US on 9/11, 2001.

The subsequent intervention by the US, NATO, and allied countries in Afghanistan is based on this realization, and the fear that if a strong, stable, and popularly supported government is not developed in Afghanistan al Qaeda or a similar group could again use the country as a launching pad for attacks. Although it is apparent that the 9-11 attacks created a “never again” obsession about Afghanistan that borders on the superstitious, in view of the fact that there are many countries that offer equal if not better platforms for launching attacks, such as Somalia, Yemen, and parts of Pakistan. Nonetheless this concern is, in its more general manifestation, arguably well taken. Resolving the micro-conflict in Afghanistan, and promoting human security and development there has thus become a macro security priority.

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7 The Leviathan (1651): chpt. 13, para. 9.
8 Another response to the 9-11 attacks is to focus on defensive measures such as better airport and maritime port security. However, whether reasonable or not, such defensive measures have been judged by a consensus of the international community to be insufficient in and of themselves. Moreover, these measures pose the threat of inhibiting the very globalization that many nations see as in their economic interest.
Somalia as a Second Model Case

The fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 produced anarchy in Somalia, micro-level insecurity with a comprehensive degradation of human security. Like Afghanistan anarchy has encouraged (albeit more slowly) the emergence of radical politics to fill the anarchic vacuum, the emergence of the al-Shabaab group being a clear indicator of this. At the same time there is some indication that Somali anarchy encouraged a global-wide exploitation of Somali waters, specifically illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somali waters. This, along with the permissive condition of anarchy itself triggered the emergence of sea militias, perhaps initially motivated to stop the global exploitation of Somali waters, but later increasingly motivated by the profits to be had by preying on cargo and other ships. In other words, despite the ostensibly defensive character of these sea militias initially, they quickly transformed into for profit pirates that preyed on peaceful shipping.

As Somali pirate attacks became increasingly brazen, and successful, bringing in millions of dollars in ransom, spread far from the Somali coast, and came to afflict important global Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), they became a magnet for foreign navies. Arguably, the range of foreign naval forces deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to respond to pirates represents the broadest naval coalition (however informal and loose) in modern history. Participating navies came to include not only the EU, and Japan, but also NATO, a separate flotilla of US allies, South Korea, India, Russia, China, and even Iran. Beyond naval vessels deployed in waters near Somalia, the EU and Japan have deployed P-3C maritime surveillance planes to Somalia to gather information on pirate activities; the EU also runs an information sharing center in Djibouti and both the EU and Japan are together investing in local counter-piracy capacity building in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania.

Despite this large investment of resources the results have at best been mixed. The pirates have simply expanded their operations, and successful hijackings that result in the payment of ransom are still far from rare. If the international community had acted earlier to help build micro security in Somalia, curtailing anarchy and promoting human security and development, it might have been able to prevent the emergence of the pirate menace to global SLOCs. Like Afghanistan therefore, Somalia is a concrete example of the new link between micro and macro security, specifically of how micro conflicts can become global threats.

The Nexus of Security and Development

Thus, what is identified here as the nexus between security and development has emerged from the increasing global inter-linkage of even underdeveloped and conflict ridden regions with the rest of the world, allowing their micro-conflicts to expand into macro conflicts threatening global security. How should the international community respond? This paper proposes the following hypothesis: resolving these sources of
micro-insecurity and promoting comprehensive human security, including physical security and human rights, and development in these regions is the best way to prevent micro-conflicts growing into threats to global security.

EU-Japan Cooperation for Addressing the Nexus of Security and Development

Often, although not necessarily always, the application of non-combat aid focused assistance to micro-conflicts, along with conflict-resolution diplomacy, is the best way to resolve these conflicts. Although we cannot always say a priori that non-combat aid and diplomatic centered approaches will always prove to be more effective than more combat focuses approaches,9 we can certainly identify cases where this has been the case. The best example is perhaps the resolution of conflict in Aceh. The Aceh conflict threatened to become both a source of piracy in waters west of the Straits of Malacca10 and possibly a hot bed for Islamic extremism.11 Both Japan and the EU were active in helping to broker a peace agreement in Aceh, and subsequently helping to implement the agreement and reintegrate former fighters into society,12 although the level of cooperation, and what could have been achieved there, could have been much greater. Most significantly, both EU and Japanese efforts in Aceh were non-combat and assistance focused. Although the EU dispatched military personnel as part of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) called for under the August 2005 peace agreement, they served as unarmed monitors of the agreement’s implementation.13

Cambodia and East Timor are also examples where the international community, including Japan and Europe, applied non-combat focused conflict resolution and assistance policies help resolve micro-conflicts and promote human security and development. A modicum of success was achieved in both cases, although instability and significant human insecurity persist in both countries, with development remaining a major challenge.

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9 As Lam Peng Er, a keen observer of Japan’s peace-building initiatives explains, the US and even NATO have “a more robust and forceful approach” to peace-building. See Lam, Japan’s Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a more active political role (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009): 5, 105-108.

10 Alan Boyd, “Piracy: Terror on the High Seas,” Asia Times, August 21, 2002. During a visit to the Information Sharing Center (ISC) of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in Singapore in November 2011, the author was told that the Aceh conflict corresponded to heightened piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters near Aceh. However, the Aceh dispute was resolved before these attacks spread toward the globally important Malacca Straits SLOCs; after the conflict was resolved the waters off Aceh became much more peaceful.


On the other hand, in the long-running micro conflict between the Tamils and the government and ethnic majority in Sri Lanka, efforts by both the EU and Japan to resolve this conflict using diplomacy and assistance ultimately failed and a military solution was eventually imposed by the Sri Lankan government. Afghanistan since 2001 can also be regarded as a mixed example. In the eastern and southern parts of the country the US has pursued a combat-focused strategy for resolving the conflict, although one that also includes attempts at building human security and promoting development through assistance. In other parts of Afghanistan, the EU and other parties have pursued non-combat focused human security and development strategies. Neither strategy has demonstrated manifest success to date.\textsuperscript{14}

Looking forward, Mindanao and perhaps Somalia are two potentially promising candidates for EU-Japan cooperation in the form of non-combat focused conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development operations. In the case of Mindanao, this conflict, which has claimed approximately 120,000 lives since the early 1970s,\textsuperscript{15} is claimed to be a significant generator of extremist Islamic terrorists (including the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group).\textsuperscript{16} Both the EU and Japan have already been active attempting to mediate an agreement between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In the case of Somalia, given the presence of radical groups such as the Shabab, and the degree of anarchy, an EU-Japan non-combat and development aid focused approach would face real challenges. Nonetheless, given that the micro conflict in Somalia has already become a threat to macro security, and that it still has unfulfilled potential to become an even greater threat, the effort would certainly be worth it.

The EU and Japan are especially well-positioned to address these and other micro conflicts for several reasons. First, both are committed supporters of multilateral security cooperation based on liberal values. In particular, both sides share a liberal optimism that economic and social development are the best ways to resolve conflicts and build peace and stability. For example, Japan’s 2010 National Defence Program Guidelines (or Defense Taiko) calls for using Official Development Assistance (ODA) “to resolve root causes of conflicts and terrorism.”\textsuperscript{17} Second, both the EU and Japan seek to use multilateralism to rectify what they see as a relative lack of global influence. Third, the EU and Japan have relatively similar strategic cultures, especially regarding the use-of-force. In particular, both emphasize the role of non-combat approaches to peace-building and post conflict stabilization, and have very conservative Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for their militaries. Fourth, because security interdependence is low, neither the EU nor Japan poses a risk of entrapment in war for the other. Finally, despite its promotion of common liberal and democratic values with Japan, the EU is nonetheless arguably the broadest and most neutral multilateral forum outside the United Nations. This makes it relatively easy for the EU to play a neutral mediation role in local conflicts.

\textsuperscript{14} It is possible that these two different strategies tend to undermine each other.  
\textsuperscript{15} “Mindanao’s nightmare continues,” \textit{Japan Times}, July 17, 2000.  
in places such as Aceh, Sri Lanka, or Mindanao, and makes the EU and good partner for Japan.

**Conclusions**

An EU-Japan partnership in non-combat micro-conflict resolution, reconstruction, and human security building, while the US focuses on the global balance of power and militarized macro conflicts such as combat operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, reflects the most viable division of labor among the advanced democracies. Clearly, the US lacks the political, financial, cognitive, and even the military resources to deal with all conflicts on both the macro and micro levels, to maintain the global balance of power, fight al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and solve micro conflicts in Mindanao and the South Sudan. The US has long called on its allies to do more to contribute to maintaining international security, and resolving micro-conflicts and promoting human security is exactly where the EU and Japan, acting together, can make a real and unique contribution that builds on their unique strengths while not unnecessarily duplicating effort with the US.
Addressing Local Conflicts Before They Turn Global: A Perspective from Japan

Michito Tsuruoka

A Distinctive Japanese Approach?

Simply put, Japan does not seem to have developed a coherent strategy of how to address local conflicts. It is true that the country often advocates a civilian and prevention approach, which is understood to be trying to address ‘root causes’ of conflicts mainly through long-term economic assistance, rather than resorting to surgical military intervention. While not presented in a coherent manner, such a basic approach fits well with the idea of ‘addressing local conflicts before they turn global’.

But there are at least two questions. First, it is not clear whether this approach is a deliberate strategy—a choice by design—or no more than a result of the lack of more robust military option—a choice by default. It is easy to argue that Japan’s civilian or ‘soft’ approach is based on the country’s comparative advantage in development assistance and other civilian fields. However, it must be taken into account that Japan lacks the military tools for its international engagement. Japan in fact had to rely on civilian policy tools in the absence of other choices. Second, there is also a problem of relatively low awareness in Japan of the degree to which Japan’s own security is connected to local conflicts in other regions. The notion of ‘addressing local conflicts before they turn global’ can work only so far as people (or at least political leaders and experts) understand that Japanese security is linked to what is happening in other critical regions.

Characteristics of Japan’s Discourse and Debates

The evolution of Japan’s international political and security engagement to date and the political discourse and policy debates surrounding it can characterised as follows. First, the term ‘international contribution (kokusai kouken)’ has often been used, which is to express the country’s overall attitude and approaches towards its role and responsibilities in the world. On the one hand, it can be said that Japan’s international activities are seen as an expression of altruism, consistent with humanitarian considerations. But on the other hand, it is also undeniable that policy objectives and national interests have often been ambiguous at best, thus demonstrating the lack of clear sense of purpose. It may still be possible to argue that for whatever purposes Japan, as a major responsible country in the international community, needs to do something as part of an international responsibility-international engagement as a club fee so to speak. If this is something the government firmly believes in, political leaders

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need to explain this approach in a clear-cut way to the public. So far, they have failed to do so.

Second, the expansion of Japan’s global political and security engagement had long been driven by conservatives—successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments—primarily in the context of the Japan-US security alliance. More ‘international contribution’ has been sought for the sake of better and stronger relations with the United States. In other words, many people have considered international contributions as synonymous with cooperation with the US. Tokyo’s decisions to send Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the Indian Ocean for refuelling operations in support for US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and to Iraq after the war for reconstruction assistance were cases in point. Beyond coalition operations, the SDF disaster relief deployment to Pakistan after the floods in the country in 2010 is also understood to be a response to US request. A large part of Japan’s aid package to Afghanistan is also seen as evidence of cooperation with the US.

Third, the culture of intervention or foreign policy activism advocated and practised in Europe and the United States has been not been endorsed by Japan’s political left. Many on the political left in Japan have essentially been isolationists in many ways, which has severely restricted the development of ‘non-US route’ to Japan’s ‘international contribution’ not least in the political and security domain.

Fourth, the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’—not least as something involving the use of force—has not been looked upon favourably in Japan’s political discourse. Conservatives and realists are sceptical about such a seemingly moralistic approach whereas liberals remain critical of the utility of armed forces in addressing humanitarian crises.

Fifth, instead of humanitarian intervention and R2P, the idea of ‘human security’ has attracted much attention and support in Japan not only among experts, but also among political leaders. Arguably, such popularity first and foremost derives from the fact that the concept is seen to be ‘soft’, not involving the use of military force in the context of contributions to international security. The concept is no longer limited to the field of official development assistance (ODA). The National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG) of December 2010, the most fundamental document in Japan’s defence in years, lists ‘contribut[ing] to creating global peace and stability and to secure human security’ as one of the main objectives of the country’s security policy. It was the first NDPG adopted by the centre-left government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which took power in 2009. It remains to be seen whether this represents an emergence of a new thinking in Japan’s international role and the birth of foreign policy activism on the left in Japan. The case of the SDF participation in the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) can be considered as an example of an allegedly new foreign and security policy activism. Although the coalition government at that time included the social democrats who normally do not like the very idea of sending the SDF abroad, the decision was fairly quick.

Sixth, what eventually determines the direction of Japan’s international role is the level of public support. People are generally not disapproval of the country’s international contributions, but it does not necessarily mean that there is a solid support for it either, particularly in light of the current economic and fiscal climate. At the more fundamental level, what seems to be a serious problem in Japan is the fact that the public awareness
of the globalised nature of international security threats and challenges remains low. Afghanistan, in fact, is typically not perceived as a security challenge in the Japanese discourse. What is more, this does not seem to be a problem limited to ordinary people: many political leaders, too, think that way. That is probably why Japan has been cutting its ODA budget in the past decade following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in spite of the fact that many other major countries have increased, rather than decreased, their aid budget considerably during the same period, mainly for the purpose of tackling the problems of poverty and underdevelopment which are thought to breed terrorism. As a result, Japan is losing its position as one of the leading donors in the world, probably affecting Japan’s soft power and image. The ODA budget has been a ‘soft target’ in the domestic political process.

In sum, while the idea of ‘addressing local conflicts before they turn global’ seems to be widely accepted in Japan, the foundation on which to develop concrete policies in this regard is everything but solid.

The Role of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the ‘Comprehensive Approach’

The SDF started what it calls ‘international peace cooperation activities’ in the early 1990s, first in Cambodia in the framework of the UN’s UNTAC mission. Since then, Japan has sent the SDF to UN missions as in the Golan Heights, East Timor, Nepal, Haiti and most recently in South Sudan. Outside the UN, Japan has sent its navy to the Indian Ocean (for refuelling operations), Iraq (for reconstruction assistance) and the Gulf of Aden (for counter-piracy operations). Japan has been, albeit slowly, expanding its experience in and contributions to UN and non-UN (non-combat) peace operations abroad.

While the idea of sending the SDF abroad used to be highly controversial in the past, today there seems to be a basic consensus now in support of Japan’s participation in international peace operations. While it is still natural that the level of domestic support varies a lot depending on individual cases, principled opposition to the idea of sending the SDF abroad that was strong in the early 1990s has almost disappeared from the discourse amongst the political mainstream. To be sure, the public is still more supportive of UN missions than US-led coalition missions. Nevertheless, government decisions to send SDF troops abroad have predominantly been driven by consideration of the Japan-US alliance so far as mentioned above.

In recent years—despite the fact that the role of the SDF has often been highlighted—what needs to be remembered is the fact that SDF contributions to international missions remain a small pillar (though visible) in the whole picture of Japan’s international engagement. ODA in many ways still shapes Japan’s international profile, which cannot be substituted by the SDF.

The SDF’s contributions will continue to remain of non-combat nature for the foreseeable future. What the SDF troops are most likely to do include disaster relief, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as well as non-combat support missions. This highlights the importance of what is referred to as ‘comprehensive approach’. The notion of ‘no security without development, no development without security’ is not particularly new to many Japanese. And the SDF has no illusion about the utility of military power in peacebuilding. Cooperation between the SDF operations and ODA projects in Iraq is often cited as an example of Japan’s success in this regard.
Nonetheless, the role of military and civil-military cooperation in peace-building is still highly contentious among practitioners and experts in general and amongst the aid community in particular. And the SDF does not seem to fully understand the aid community's concerns about the idea of working with the military and aid organisations' way of doing business either. There is still a long way to go and establishing the comprehensive approach at home (or the whole-of-government approach) remains a challenge to be tackled. Without the comprehensive approach at home, it would be impossible to practice it at the international level.

**Potentials of Japan-EU Cooperation**

Whether by design or by default, it is true that Japan’s and the EU’s approach of addressing local and international conflicts are similar, if not identical. Both are major actors in international development and believe that economic development, and reducing poverty, are indispensable for building peace. Japan and the EU both emphasise civilian and preventive approaches, which is should—at least in theory—the basis for bilateral cooperation in development.

However, the mere fact that they share similar approaches and ideas does not guarantee cooperation between the two. In fact, they may also end up being competitors. In fact, the record shows that development cooperation between Japan and the EU has not been quite successful. There have not been many concrete examples of Japan-EU development cooperation in spite of the fact that it has often been identified as a priority area for bilateral cooperation at various levels.

Beyond development, more promising fields for Japan-EU cooperation can be identified somewhere between security and development—like e.g. security sector reform (SSR) and related capacity-building. In geographical terms, Africa is likely to be where Japan and the EU could cooperate with each other as like-minded partners. As for development assistance and political engagement, Japan has traditionally been focusing on Asia. Nevertheless, as long as Japan maintains its willingness to expand its role in international peace-building and human security, the main theatre is likely to be in Africa.

As demonstrated by the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, coupled with the establishment of the first overseas permanent facility in Djibouti to support the counter-piracy mission, the SDF’s recent participation in the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and various assistance programmes to PKO centres in Africa, Japan is committed to strengthening its engagement in peace and security in Africa. This is where the Europeans have long been involved in. While Japan already has a rich and long experience of development assistance in Africa, it is still a newcomer when it comes to peace and security per se there. In terms of maximising Japan’s efforts in view of the limited available resources, the EU could in some cases be an effective and valuable partner. In short, Japan needs to think more about using the EU as a partner. At the same time, the EU may be able to use Japan as a new partner that shares fundamental values and concerns.

**Challenges Ahead**

One of the challenges in Japan is to find a policy path that pleases both the inner-Japanese ‘national interest school’ and ‘human security school’. On the surface, it may
appear to be a matter of political rhetoric, but in reality it has also to do with the fundamental philosophical question of how to make sense of Japan’s international engagement. The two sets of considerations are not mutually exclusive and can coexist—or put differently: they should be made compatible with each other. But we need to be conscious of different philosophies and demands. While the above-mentioned December NDPG introduced the idea of human security to Japan’s defence policy doctrine, it is still unclear whether this has a solid public support in light of fiscal pressures at home and a number of rather traditional security threats and challenges that the country faces in its neighbourhood.

Second, so as to 'address local conflicts before they turn global', people (including political leaders) need to be more aware of the degree to which local conflicts in other parts of the world could affect Japan’s own security. What's more, in times of austerity, it is likely to be more difficult for political leaders to sell the significance of costly international engagement to the public. Also, the fact that Japan needs to address more imminent security threats and challenges closer to the country could make the public more inward-looking and less concerned about international security issues with an impact on national security. This raises another fundamental question that Japan must address whether the country should try to become (or remain) a global player or whether being a regional player serves its interests better.

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The views expressed in this paper are solely of the author and do not represent those of the NIDS, the Ministry of Defense or the Government of Japan
Maritime Crimes in Southeast Asia: Human Securitizing the Policy Paradigm

Jun Honna

This paper deals with the problems of maritime crimes in Southeast Asia. The region, which consists of ten countries, is a hotbed of cross-border crimes, ranging from illegal-unreported fishing, unlawful dumping, drug smuggling, human trafficking, timber smuggling, illegal arms trading, to armed robbery. These criminal activities have greatly benefited from the weak capacity of the government to control territorial boundary, especially at sea. What are the features of these maritime crimes in Southeast Asia, and in what ways are they posing a threat to the human security environment in the region? How has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Southeast Asian governments identified the problem and responded to it? We examine these questions and highlight the significance for promoting a new paradigm of maritime security cooperation suitable in the age of transnational crime. It is in this context that the human security doctrine should be mainstreamed in a way to envisage the security-development nexus.

Below, we will first examine the development of maritime crimes in the region. We will then discuss major limitations of the existing maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia, which is largely ‘military-oriented’ due to the deficit of capacity among civilian law-enforcement agencies. Finally, we will argue the way to overcome these limitations by ‘human securitizing’ the policy paradigm.

Evolving Maritime Crimes and Human Insecurity

Southeast Asia waters have been subject to all sorts of cross-border crimes, and many civil society organizations question the political will of regional governments in engaging the war on crime at sea. Below, we examine six types of transnational crime, which are active both in the continental and maritime Southeast Asia. The scale of the crime is, however, overwhelmingly large in the latter.

Piracy and Armed Robberies

Since 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports travel through the Straits of Malacca and 60 percent of Australia’s oil tankers use Indonesian waters, the problem of piracy is a vital concern for ASEAN dialogue partners. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), whose reports are often quoted by the media, stated that the reported cases of piracy—which included thefts from vessels in harbors, armed robbery, and hostage-taking—amounted to 329 worldwide, with 94 of them taking place in Indonesian waters and 38 in the Straits of Malacca, in 2004.1 Despite the fact that the overall number of global piracy cases has been decreasing in recent years, those in Southeast Asia account for nearly 31 percent of the total.2 Some of them are hostage-taking seajacks of tankers, but many

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2 The region accounted 42 percent in 2003, 51 percent in 2004, 42 percent in 2005, 36 percent in 2006, 29
cases involve petty robbery targeting cargos of tugboats and small fishing boats. Thus, piracy and armed robberies have posed a common threat for those involving maritime business and local fishery sector in Southeast Asia. However, it is always the Malacca Straits that is spotlighted by the international media and observers due to its geo-economic significance for foreign vessels.

**Trafficking in Persons (TIP)**

Due to its clandestine nature, it is difficult to grasp the extent of human trafficking both globally and regionally. In the past decade, however, there has been a growing number of reports based on the investigation of international organizations and non-governmental agencies which estimate the sharp increase in the number of trafficking victims, and the scale of human trafficking in Southeast Asia has been estimated as the largest in the world. In 2000, among the estimated 600-800,000 victims of global human trafficking, transactions in Southeast Asia amounted to 220,000 or about one-third of the total in years after Asian economic crisis in 1997/8. After a decade, it is reasonably argued that the number of victims in Southeast Asia further increased following the 2008 global financial crisis. Major victims of this transnational crime are both adults and children in forced labor, bonded labor, and forced prostitution.

Trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation has become a concern to most governments in Southeast Asia since the early 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, due to a variety of factors, including the booming of sex tourism in the 1980s, the global campaign for gender equality, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the feminization of migrant workers, and the economic crisis in the 1990s. Encouraged by the development of ICT, the business of trafficking, which involves recruitment of women, preparation of travel, contract with brothels, and supervision of labors, has become increasingly sophisticated and the operational network has expanded beyond national borders. The regionalization of trafficking business has divided Southeast Asia into sending, transit and receiving countries, although these categories are not fixed as the logic of supply-demand market changes over time.

**Illegal Logging and Smuggling of Woods**

Illegal logging, destructive cutting, and wood smuggling are also important transnational maritime crimes which require an urgent response. Because the pace of forest destruction in Southeast Asia is so rapid, there is growing concern that the region’s tropical forests may vanish within ten years. The adverse impact of such a loss would be devastating and even if this apocalyptic scenario is averted, the region faces serious problems due to environmental degradation. Loss of wildlife habitat will endanger many species and barren mountainsides are prone to landslides and floods every year in Southeast Asia, swallowing villages and people who live there. The flood also destroys local fishing communities near the river and results in the flow of migrant workers into urban slums. Illegal logging has also contributed significantly to the decrease of the water-holding capacity of mountains, meaning less water flowing to dams and thus

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shortages of water. Consequently, illegal logging is a serious threat to human security. Both importing and supplying countries need to establish an improved monitoring system and effective enforcement mechanisms to curb the illicit-wood trade and smugglers’ transnational network.

Illegal logs are usually distributed to domestic and foreign markets through the collaboration of criminal groups and timber companies. In many cases, corrupt local officials are involved in the process, for example through the issuing of certificates that obscures the illicit origins of the timber being exported. One of the regional centers of the illegal log trade is in Papua, Indonesia. A credible investigation reveals the process of how the forest is destroyed by the timber mafia and how domestic legal safeguards are routinely evaded by criminals and how the illegal timber is transported and ‘laundered’ to pass inspections by importing nations. It is widely believed that Singapore is functioning as the business hub of log traffickers.

**Illicit Drugs Smuggling**

Myanmar is the second largest cultivator of opium poppies in the world after Afghanistan. While Afghanistan’s production temporary dropped after the Taliban banned poppy production in 2000, the ousting of the Taliban by US forces has, however, led to an increase in poppy cultivation since 2002. Before the comeback of Afghanistan, Southeast Asia’s ‘Golden Triangle’ which straddles the border area of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, constituted the world largest territory (96,000 hectares) of opium cultivation, accounting for nearly half of opium producing land (180,000 hectares) in the world. As the major supplier of opium in the world, Southeast Asian governments were pressured by the international community to crack down on the narcotic threat. The golden age of Golden Triangle was during the Cold War, as the drug production helped fund anti-communist military-intelligence operations by the CIA.

In the post-Cold War era, the scale of opium production in the region has decreased. An explosive boom in chemical drug production has contributed to the declining production of opium. For organized crime syndicates, the mass production of chemical drugs, namely the amphetamine-type stimulant, or ATS, can be done anywhere in a short time at low cost. Evading law enforcement is much easier. Popular drugs such as MDMA (or ecstasy) and ‘ice’ (speed) are ‘market leaders’ and distribution of these drugs has rapidly expanded in the region.

**Problems of Regional Cooperation: Towards a New Paradigm**

The problems of maritime piracy, TIP, illegal woods trading, and illicit drugs are all transnational, requiring a regional cooperative response based on securitizing these criminal activities. In the absence of a comprehensive security approach to transnational crime, national sovereignty, regime legitimacy, governance and civil society are confronted with various problems. Strong political will is required to transform the rhetorical commitment into policy implementation. In particular, the promotion of regional policing cooperation is a necessary policy to deal with the challenges of criminal

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cross-bordering, and it is in this context that the existing maritime cooperation is regarded as insufficient and ineffective. There are three reasons to support this claim.

**De-militarization: From Navy to Coast Guard**

First, it is increasingly obvious that regional military cooperation at sea faces inherent limitations. Navies are above all designed and trained to defend national sovereignty from foreign military attacks, thus it is common for them to maintain secrecy concerning fighting abilities, including the performance of vessels. This professional orientation has effectively blocked the promotion of joint military operations in, for example, the Straits of Malacca where piracy and other maritime crime rings conduct cross-border businesses. In 2004, above all due to US pressure, Indonesia began ‘coordinated’ naval patrols with Malaysia and Singapore in the troubled straits. These coordinated patrols (so-called Corpat) continue and are promoted as a progressive regional response to combat piracy, prevent maritime terrorism and fight against transnational crime. However, Corpat is a ‘show of force’ which is conducted as an event rather than the realization of ongoing cooperation for maritime policing. It is also a ‘coordinated’ joint operation in which warships of the three countries merely conduct patrols at the same time and place without having an integrated command structure. This is essential to counter cross-border criminal activities, but hard to realize due to strong mutual suspicion among these navies about the possible leaking of defense intelligence.

Therefore, it has gradually become a common practice for the regional security community to build up civilian coast guard agencies both in order to deal professionally with maritime crime in the sovereign territory and to promote regional cooperation among them. Combating crime at sea mostly requires policing capacity with speedy patrol boats, but these are not professionally associated with the navy. “The navy is ‘trained to kill the enemy’—rather than collecting evidence and apprehending perpetrators—and emphasizes expanding its fleet of large scale naval vessels with high-tech war abilities.” The navy’s warships are not equipped however, to deal with transnational crime; instead, patrol boats are more better equipped and cost less to operate. Assessing the need for building maritime security capacity, the Philippine established its coast guard (PCG) in 1998 and Malaysia (Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency, or MMEA) did so in 2004. Both expected Indonesia—the biggest maritime state in Southeast Asia—to follow the same step and play a more active role in promoting regional cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies. Clearly, the navy was out of the loop in the region’s newly emerging maritime strategic environment. Having assessed the changing strategic environment of Indonesian waters in the age of transnational crime, and the limits of the navy to deal with it, the Yudhoyono government took a domestic initiative in 2005 by issuing a presidential decree to create a new government body, the Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Badan Kordinasi Keamanan Laut, or Bakorkamla). Bakorkamla is designed to lead the formulation of national maritime policy and coordinate the activities of twelve maritime-related institutions, including the navy, water police, and customs.

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7 Interview with Captain Joel S. Garcia, Communications and Information System Command, Philippine Coast Guard, 15 August 2007.
De-Malacca-ization

The military legacy cannot be addressed and dealt with on a sustainable basis as long as the issue of piracy keeps governing maritime security concern of policy-makers both regional and international. The media coverage on piracy generally tends to ‘dramatize’ the act of armed pirates, and policy-makers similarly maximize the security concern of piracy. It is largely due to the strong demand of the foreign shipping industry calls for safer navigation. Under these circumstances, a discourse claiming that powerful navies can be mobilized to fight against armed ships of pirates is sustainably legitimized. However, as we have discussed above, reality shows that many cases of armed robberies at sea in the region are pity crimes and they are closely related to other types of illegal activities, such as smuggling of goods and people. Thus, today’s prevailing conceptualization of piracy is too narrow to embrace broader contexts of everyday maritime crimes, leading to a focus almost exclusively on the Straits of Malacca and Indonesian waters rather than the regional field of operations. It is in this sense that ‘de-Malacca-ization’ of maritime security concern is needed both in order to leave navies to more professional military functions and paving the way for civilian law enforcement agencies to establish more effective regional maritime policing cooperation.

De-maritimization

The border-surveillance in non-Malacca areas, for example, between Indonesia and the Philippines, Malaysia and the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand are also critical to curbing cross-border transgressions. In these places, villagers are mobilized in various ways by piracy groups and other criminal agencies for logistical purposes. This criminalization of coastal villages is essentially a problem of human insecurity caused by poverty and unemployment. Especially the large scale poaching conducted by domestic and foreign fishing companies is almost out of control in many countries after the economic crisis. The impact of this is the rapid diminution of fish stocks available for local small-scale fishermen. Clearly, poverty is a very significant root cause of various maritime crimes. Here we see the significance of ‘de-maritimizing’ counter-crime approaches. Promoting rural development of coastal villages may significantly contribute to the reduction of number of people involved in transnational crimes at sea. In essence, the problem of maritime crime is not the problem at sea, but it is the problem on land. Without dealing with this issue of coastal poverty, it cannot be expected to see real and sustainable success of counter-crime measures at sea. In this sense, bringing ‘human’ back into the core concern of maritime security seems to be imperative.
Addressing Structural Problems at Local Levels: Horizontal Inequalities in Africa

Mari Katayanagi

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to consider ways to address structural problems for the purpose of preventing conflicts in Africa, based on the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute (RI) research project “Prevention of Violent Conflicts in Africa: the Role of Development Assistance”. Among development cooperation stakeholders, it is increasingly accepted that more attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is required. In 2009, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) founded the International Network on Fragility and Conflict (INCAF), which works to improve international responses to challenging development settings such as conflicts and fragility. The World Development Report 2011 was entitled Conflict, Security, and Development, and it stressed that in order to break cycles of violence, it was crucial to strengthen legitimate institutions and governance that could provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. The Report dealt not only with armed conflicts but also addressed wider violence including organised criminal violence. The origin of our project was even earlier, in a conference held at Wilton Park on 8-11 November 2007, on the topic of “Integrating Conflict Prevention in Development Policy and Agendas”.

The effects of conflicts can easily spill over beyond borders, and this is arguably even more so in Africa, where the state borders were artificially drawn and a number of the same ethnic groups live on both sides of borders. Conflicts cause refugee flows, some conflicts induce military intervention by neighbouring countries, and interruption of trade affects citizens’ lives on both sides of a border. If we could address structural causes of conflicts at local levels, we would avoid many side effects of violence within and beyond borders.

The next section explains three perspectives that we have applied in our project and the third section presents examples of measures taken in African countries to address structural problems. The fourth section discusses one of our findings: the discrepancies between objective and subjective perceptions. The last section concludes with suggestions for development actors in relation to conflict prevention.

1 The results of the project will be published as a book in 2012.
Three Project Perspectives: “Prevention of Violent Conflicts in Africa”

The JICA-RI project seeks appropriate measures to prevent violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by studying the mechanisms that lead to social stability or instability. Our approach brings in three perspectives: horizontal inequalities (HIs), political institutions, and perceptions of identity and inequality.

HI studies have been developed by the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Oxford University. HIs refer to the inequality among culturally defined groups. They have multiple dimensions – political, socioeconomic, and cultural – and can be structural causes of violent conflicts. The risk of political mobilisation heightens when HIs are consistent across different dimensions.

Among multi-dimensional HIs, our studies put particular weight on the political dimension and looked into political institutions. We classified 49 sub-Saharan countries into power-dispersing (PD) and power-concentrating (PC) categories. The table below shows eight elements that we have assessed. A typical PD institution is formed by the combination of power sharing and federalism, whereas a typical PC institution is the combination of majority politics and a unitary state. According to our classification, there are countries that have undertaken radical shifts in their positioning in order to prevent or resolve violent conflicts. For example, South Africa shifted from PD to PC, while Zimbabwe moved in the opposite direction. Rwanda shifted towards the direction of PC, whereas Burundi shifted from PC to PD. The research on formal institutions is combined with case studies of ten African countries, which not only discuss formal institutions but also informal ones. Our approach involves comparative studies on four pairs of neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and Uganda and Tanzania), and also studies of chronological transformation in two single countries (Kenya and Nigeria).

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3 Recent published works include Stewart, Frances, ed. 2008. Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Palgrave Macmillan; and Langer, Arnim, Stewart, Frances, and Venugopal, Rajesh, eds. 2012. Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development, Palgrave Macmillan. Also, numerous working papers can be found at the website of CRISE: http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml.

4 This study on political institutions will be a chapter by Yoichi Mine, Mari Katayanagi, and Satoru Mikami (Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute) in the forthcoming book.

5 The case studies are contributions by the following scholars: Rwanda and Burundi by Shinichi Takeuchi (Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute); Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire by Arnim Langer (Director, Centre for Research on Peace and Development, Leuven University); South Africa and Zimbabwe by Yoichi Mine (Professor, Doshisha University; and Visiting Fellow, JICA Research Institute, and the project leader); Tanzania and Uganda by Yuichi Sasaoka (Professor, Meiji University) and Julius E. Nyang’oro (Professor, University of North Carolina); Kenya by Mwangi Kimenyi (Researcher, The Brookings Institute); and Nigeria by Ukoha Ukiwo (Lecturer, University of Port Harcourt).
We assume that people engage in the political process, including violent mobilisation, according to their perception of the prevailing situation. This is the reason why perceptions of identity and inequality are included as the third perspective in our studies. In this regard, we conducted perception surveys in seven countries (Ghana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria). The survey results are used for case studies as well as statistical analysis.

**Addressing Horizontal Inequalities**

Although collecting data on HIs in sub-Saharan countries is not an easy task, our case studies and statistical analysis both confirm their presence in different countries. While development cooperation has not paid much attention to this issue, different African states have designed and applied various measures in order to address HIs.

In the political dimension, for example, Burundi chose a remarkably rigid system of power-sharing. From the Cabinet and National Assembly to public enterprises, the maximum representation percentage of the two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi (60% and 40%, respectively), are defined under the Constitution. South Africa's formation of a grand coalition at the time of transition from apartheid is well known, and the grand coalition is becoming a popular tool in post-conflict countries.

Let us look at examples of state policy in circumstances where multiple dimensions of HIs have relevance. In Nigeria, the different dimensions of HIs play a balancing function to a certain degree. The representation of the north in political and military institutions is stronger, while economically the south is better positioned. Nigeria has introduced the "Federal Character Principle," which ensures ethnic balance in government institutions; in addition, a fund called the Federation Account was established to pool federally collected revenues, and the National Assembly discusses its redistribution. However, whether people in the north and south perceive the balance as fair is another question, as we will discuss in the following section. On the one hand, in Nigeria, the electoral system is
typically majoritarian and the President is vested with enormous power. On the other hand, ethnic-based political parties are prohibited, and there exists an informal principle of ethnic alteration in various institutions.

When ethnic groups and geographic divisions coincide, it is relatively easy to grasp the HIs through statistics. Such is the case in Kenya, because the political and administrative units during the colonial era were established along ethnic boundaries. Since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991, various political parties have been formed on ethnic bases. With regard to appointments to senior positions, political leaders tend to favour members of their own ethnic groups, and thus the President’s ethnic group benefits disproportionately, causing political HIs. If political dominance is used to direct resources, political HIs also exacerbate socioeconomic HIs. The power of the President has been gradually consolidated in Kenya to such an extent that it is called an “imperial presidency”. The new Constitution promulgated in 2010 is the latest selection of political institutions in Kenya. It devolves power to local administrative units, which is intended as a measure for equitable resource allocation. It also introduces means for checks and balances, which should be a departure from the “imperial” presidential system.

Both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire endure north-south problems, although their ethnic configurations differ: unipolar in the former and bipolar in the latter. In both countries, the quality of leadership has affected stability/instability. Kwame Nkrumah, the first national Ghanaian leader, adopted the Avoidance of Discrimination Act and promoted national integration. He demonstrated the pluralistic nature of the Ghanaian state and identity by wearing various traditional modes of dress at official ceremonies. Such a measure promoted cultural equality. Successive Ghanaian regimes following Nkrumah attempted to mitigate north-south socioeconomic inequalities, although their effects had limited success. In the political sphere, ethno-regional balance in representation is largely an informal policy among the political elites. The first President of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, addressed socioeconomic HIs by introducing the “Programme du Nord”, program of investment in the northern and central regions. He also alternated Ivorian independence festivities between Abidjan and different prefectural capitals, which resulted in the creation of a considerable number of jobs. However, ethno-nationalism and xenophobia entered the political scene during the latter days of his regime. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, introduced the concept of ivoirité, which narrowly defined who could be considered to be an Ivoirian in order to exclude his rival Alassane Ouattara (the current President) from the presidential elections in 1995. What happened in the country in 2011 is still fresh in our memory.

Despite various attempts to address HIs, the results are not always notable or long-lasting. The reason for this could be the patrimonialism undermining such efforts, or economic recession, which limits the government’s ability to redistribute resources, among other factors. Thus the potential seems to exist for development cooperation that would complement government efforts.
Perceptions of Identity and Inequality

Utilising original perception surveys conducted by JICA as well as Afrobarometer Round 4 surveys, our studies statistically confirm the existence of socioeconomic HIs in the cases of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It is noted, however, that to a certain extent individual risk factors such as level of educational attainment, employment status, and level of infrastructural development in one’s living environment also explain observed inequalities.

Another even more important finding involves the discrepancies between objective HIs and subjective HIs in some cases. In Nigeria, although the Hausa-Flani was the poorest ethnic group in objective terms, respondents among the Igbo recorded the highest proportion of inferiority perception, meaning that they considered their economic conditions to be worse than other groups. In Ghana, it was the Ewe respondents who widely held perceptions of inferiority, although the Mole-Dagbani is in fact the most disadvantaged group. In Zimbabwe, despite the Shona and the Ndebele having similar socioeconomic situations, the latter considered themselves to be seriously disadvantaged.

Statistical analysis shows us the contamination of peoples’ perceptions. In particular, how political HIs are perceived significantly affects perceptions of the socioeconomic HIs. There are arguably two reasons for this effect. Firstly, political HIs are more visible and people are likely to have informed opinions on the political status of the group. Secondly, as the State is usually the most important economic actor in African countries, as an employer as well as an investor, political control and influence can largely determine the economic situation and progress of different groups.

Feelings of political group inferiority and superiority intensify feelings of economic group inferiority and superiority, respectively, indicating the presence of cross-dimensional contamination. This suggests that in a country where an economically inferior group controls political power, discrepancies between subjective and objective socioeconomic HIs are more likely to occur, as compared to a country where an economically dominant group controls politics.

A practical implication of this analysis is that, to be effective in conflict prevention, development planning requires a high degree of sensitivity towards political and socioeconomic HIs. Even a perfect understanding of objective HIs would not be sufficient and perceptions of identity groups should be taken into account.

Role of Development Actors in Conflict Prevention

If development actors, whether development agencies, bilateral donors, or multilateral donors, aim to contribute to development cooperation that also serves to prevent violent conflicts, the first step is to understand the situation of the recipient country. The necessary data is often not readily available and data collection is one of the activities in which development actors can assist the recipient government. Our studies convince us that data on both objective and subjective HIs would be of significant importance from the perspective of conflict prevention.

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6 The statistical analysis is a contribution of Arnim Langer and Satoru Mikami and this section is based on their paper, which will be included in the forthcoming book.
To address HIs, it is necessary to grasp the country-wide situation. The information required includes not only the current economic situation but also the history of development activities and resource distribution, as well as on-going development policy. Donors must understand what one’s’ own activities mean in terms of resource distribution in the country, and how it would be perceived in the present relationship between identity groups. In this light, information sharing between the recipient government and various donors, and also between donors themselves, is imperative.

Development actors need to bear in mind the relationship between subjective HIs and objective HIs in a given country, and the importance of political HIs. Contamination of peoples’ perceptions may distort the expected path between resource distribution and social stability. For example, if the distribution only targets the poorest group, it may upset another group that has a subjective perception of inferiority. Aid distribution requires a sensitive approach, taking the group relationship into account. Transparency and accountability in development planning would help circumvent unsolicited reactions.

Development actors can complement a recipient government’s efforts to alleviate HIs. Our studies focused on the African context and we argued that the reasons for significant contamination of perceptions of socioeconomic HIs by political HIs may have to do with African features. It is therefore justifiable to emphasise, at this juncture, the importance of coordination among government and various donors in development planning and activities, given the complexity of objective and subjective HIs in Africa. It is evidently desirable to test the applicability of complex relationships between objective and subjective HIs in different regions of the world in future studies.
South Sudan – a trial ground for a “New Deal” for the engagement of fragile states?

Marie Söderberg

South Sudan, despite its abundant natural resources (including a considerable amount of oil) suffers from severe poverty. This is largely due to the fact that it has been engulfed in two civil wars spanning almost 40 years. These ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. In accordance with the CPA a referendum was held and the South Sudanese voted by an overwhelming majority for independence. A separate referendum for the region of Abyei was also required under the CPA but has not yet been held. On July 9, 2011 the new state of South Sudan was established (although its borders are not entirely clear due to the problems of the Abyei region among others).

This region is now divided into 10 states, which together form the Republic of South Sudan. It is the home to over 110 ethnic groups that suffer some of the world’s worst socio-economic conditions. According to the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), more than 50 percent of the population is poor (55 percent in rural areas and 24 percent in urban areas).1 Eighty percent of poor households depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Education and health indicators are among the lowest in the world and only 27 percent of the adult population is literate compared with 87 percent in Kenya, and less than half of all primary school-age children are in school (51 percent of boys and 37 per cent of girls). The infant mortality rate in South Sudan in 2006 was 102 per 1000 live births, while the maternal mortality rate was 2054 per 100,000 live births, the highest in the world (the rates for neighbouring Kenya and Uganda were 530 and 430 respectively).2

Most South Sudanese are engaged in agriculture and grazing activities. The difference between South Sudan and other fragile states is the almost total lack of both social and physical infrastructure. The capital, Juba, in 2007 only had one paved road. Since then the construction of government offices has been on-going and there has been a huge increase in the population as many of the South Sudanese people have been returning home from the north on a voluntary basis or, more recently, are returning home since the declaration of independence, out of the lack of choice: they lost their citizenship in Sudan and are not welcome to stay on. Many of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) are being assisted by the UN to continue from the capital out into the countryside, but a considerable number are also staying in Juba, which now has a population of between 400,000 and 800,000 people.

The starting point for the South Sudanese government and its development plan is "the need to address the key nation building, state building and peace building objectives of a new nation recovering from conflict and wishing to move onto a fast-track development path. Insecurity was highlighted in consultations as a top concern and has numerous causes, including clashes between communities over cattle and access to

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1 According to the United Nations Development (UNDP)’s "Country Programme Document for the Republic of South Sudan, 2012-13", at least 80 percent of the population is income-poor, living on less than 1 USD a day.
grazing land, breakdown of cultural values and norms, the availability of arms, and lack of economic opportunities. The consequences of insecurity include large numbers of displaced persons, continuing food insecurity, disruption to social services and widespread poverty."

Once independence was achieved it became obvious that the conflict was not only between the north and South Sudan: there are also a number of internal conflicts within the south that still persist, as well as a huge amount of armaments in circulation and a pattern of resolving conflicts by resort to violence. Security and peace building are the government’s top priorities. The cost of ensuring national security is roughly one-third of the national budget and is likely to remain so during the coming three years. State and local governments actively seek more, rather than less, security as the essential basis for all other investments and programmes in governance, economic development and human and social development. The target for the three-year period of the SSDP (2011–2013) is to complete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for almost 78,000 ex-combatants and establish a new civilian-led national security architecture which (a) transfers responsibility for local security from the military to a civilian police force, and (b) transforms the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a smaller, modern and more efficient force.

While the existence of oil resources is a blessing from the point of view of South Sudan’s development it also makes it extremely vulnerable, not only to price fluctuations and production levels, but also to the policy and regulations of the government of Sudan in Khartoum. Although the greater part of the oil resources in the area is situated in South Sudan, which is a landlocked country, all the available pipelines for the transportation of the oil go through Sudan. The major part of 2012 a fight was going on over the transportation costs for the oil passing through Sudan. The government in the South was accusing the Khartoum government of charging an unrealistic price for the transit of oil. As it was not receiving the payment it requested, the Sudanese government started selling oil itself to cover costs. This led the South Sudanese government to turn off the oil taps and not deliver oil at all. Considering that oil provides 98 percent of South Sudan’s public sector revenues and almost all foreign exchange earnings, this was a very serious situation. The same can be said for Sudan as well: its government is also heavily dependent on oil. On 27th of September 2012 the Republics of South Sudan and Sudan through mediation of the African Union and the UN reached a cooperation agreement concerning oil, status of nationals of the other state and trade. Difficulties still remain concerning implementation of this agreement as well as how the borderline shall be drawn between the two in the disputed Abyei region. Oil production as such is also considered to have peaked and is likely to decline during the coming 10 years. Thus the development plan of South Sudan includes diversification of the economy and the promotion among other things of agri-business. At the moment subsistence without oil revenues will be difficult, and plans for alternative pipelines through Kenya or other countries are likely to take a long time to be realised.

The development challenge

Around 30 percent of all overseas development assistance (ODA) is spent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. At the Busan conference on aid effectiveness at the end of

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
2011 it was revealed that, despite the significant investment and the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), results and value for money have been modest. A New Deal for fragile states was developed by the G7 and a group of countries affected by fragility, instability and the threat of violent conflicts (among which Sudan was one). This deal recognises that aid to fragile states needs to be delivered differently with a strong focus on peace building, state building and government leadership. It was endorsed by a number of countries (including Japan and the EU) at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.ô

In this deal the countries agreed to:

use the peace-building and state-building Goals (PSGs)ô as an important foundation for progress; and by September 2012 a set of indicators for these goals should have been developed by fragile states and their international partners so that progress can be tracked;

focus on an inclusive, country-led and country-owned transition out of fragility based on assessment by the G7+ with the support of international partners. There should be a country-led single vision and a single plan and a compact to implement it; and

build mutual trust by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results.

The South Sudanese government wants to be one of the countries which pioneers this New Deal in cooperation with other partners. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has been producing a Donor Book to give an overview of the aid landscape. With independence the government produced the South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 and a Donor Book 2011 giving an overview of the aid landscape and an aid strategy. The Aid Information Management System (AIMS) has been central here and makes it possible to measure progress and see how donors align with government priorities. The Donor Book also gives insight into where donors’ work overlaps and to what extent they are complying with the aid strategy partnership principles. The government of South Sudan has its own priorities and e.g. wants all outside donors to channel their assistance through the government system, indicating that general budget support is the preferred aid modality.

**UNMISS and the security situation**

After the peace agreement in 2005 the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS)û to do peace-building and lay the foundation for development. As South Sudan became an independent state this mission was wounded up, but as the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region a successor mission – the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) – was initiated on July 9, 2011 for an initial period of one year, with the intention to renew its mandate for further periods as required.û At the moment it

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û Ibid. These goals include Political Inclusivity (A State for All), Citizen Security (Safety for All), Justice (Equity for All), Economic Foundations (Jobs for All – so all citizens have a role in state building) and Revenue and Resource Management (Services for All).


has 5500 military personnel in the country. It is authorised to have 7000 although all have not yet arrived.

The mandate of the mission is as follows:

to support peace consolidation and thereby foster longer-term state building and economic development;
to support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, conflict mitigation, and the protection of civilians; and

to support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

According to Sylvia Fletcher, Recovery, Reintegration and Peace-Building Chief at UNMISS in Sudan,\(^\text{10}\) this is likely to be the most decentralized mission ever in UN history. The plan is that within a three-year period 3900 police should be deployed to 35 constituencies in all the 10 states of South Sudan to make sure that peace prevails and people are protected. UNMISS is working in cooperation with all UN-family organizations, including the UNDP, which seeks to implement the development agenda for Sudan.

**Japanese assistance to South Sudan**

Japan has been assisting in South Sudan since the CPA in 2005. It has decided to provide ODA to both parts, Sudan as well as South Sudan. Humanitarian assistance has been provided through the UN agencies. Bilateral aid to South Sudan has been provided by JICA (the Japan International Cooperation Agency). Japan is not a member of the Multi Donor Trust Fund (which is closing down in 2012).\(^\text{11}\)

JICA has so far only been active in the Juba area. One of the first projects it conducted was an Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical/Social Infrastructure in Juba town and the surrounding area 2006. That led to two other pilot projects, one for the improvement of the water supply and another on jetty construction at Juba River Port and a vocational training pilot project. It is basically in these areas that Japan has so far remained active. There are also projects for strengthening mathematics and science education and a human resource development for health project.

Another major Japanese contribution to South Sudan is the deployment of up to 350 Self-Defense Forces (mainly engineering troops). They will be under UNMISS command and will be contributing by building infrastructure such as roads, bridges and city water facilities. Some are already in place but the main body will be arriving in February–March. The GSDF (Ground Self-Defense Forces) members will take 160 light armored vehicles, heavy construction machine vehicles and trucks with them. Among the personnel there are also 30 people working with coordination, and for the first time there will be a joint UN-Japan coordination office. The forces will be working in Juba and within an area of 10 kilometers around the city. They will be responding to whatever needs there are and build, for example, supply roads for UN missions. They will be working closely together with civilians. Reconstruction and nation building overlapping with

\(^{10}\) Interviewed in South Sudan, January 27, 2012.

\(^{11}\) Interview with Atsushi Hanatani, head of the JICA office in Juba.
development and military-civil cooperation are essential. The Japanese SDF officers will be armed. Among both UNMISS personnel and South Sudanese government officials, expectations of what the SDF can achieve are very high.

**EU assistance to South Sudan**

The EU in May 2011 pledged to provide South Sudan with 200 million euros in assistance to rural development, health, education, governance and rule of law. At the end of 2011 it was announced that 80 million euros of this will be allocated to improving rural infrastructure; boosting productivity by providing easier access to services and land; support to smallholders; and strengthening water management. By developing the agriculture sector the EU hopes to contribute to a diversification of South Sudan’s heavily oil-dependent economy. Gender and good governance will be cross-cutting issues for all EU assistance. Disbursement of these 80 million euros could start straight away, whereas disbursement of the rest will have to await the signing of the Cotonou agreement (a framework for the EU’s relations with countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific).

For the first time, the EU has also adopted a common single country strategy for South Sudan. This strategy is to coordinate EU and member states’ responses to the 2011–13 SSDP and during this period extend as much as 700 million euros in assistance. By working together the EU Commission and EU member states want to reduce transaction costs and promote best practice in partnership with South Sudan, like-minded donors, non-state actors and implementing partners. The EU is also moving forward with preparations for the deployment in 2012 of a CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) mission to protect aviation security in South Sudan. Under an agreement with the Ministry of Transport, 50 people from the member states will be deployed to guarantee the security of both people and goods.

Although the EU and its member states now have a common single strategy for South Sudan, implementation may not be all that easy as aid policy varies depending on domestic politics in the individual EU member countries, and approaches may vary both according to tradition and with changes of government.

**The New Deal – What can the EU and Japan do together?**

Although general budget support is considered the preferred aid modality by the New Deal, as well as by the South Sudan government, I have found no one on the donor side who spoke in favor of that at this stage. The SSDP, the Donor Book and the aid management system are all very advanced and of high quality but one cannot help but wonder how well established they are even within the South Sudanese bureaucracy and government. The answer you get to any question will vary with time, place and person.

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12 Interview with Major Norihisa Urakami, Chief, Operation, Planning and Coordination Section Headquarters, Joint Operation Coordination Centre, Japanese Contingent in Juba, January 27, 2012.
13 Interview with Sylvia Fletcher, UNMISS, and Mr. Lumumba Makele, Director of Economic and Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Sudan.
14 For the Cotonou agreement see [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm) (accessed February 9, 2012). It will take at least six months for this to be agreed and implemented. No application has been received yet (interview with Ms Ambra Longati of the EU in South Sudan, January 27, 2012).
For aid effectiveness, however, it is clear that further donor cooperation is needed. The Donor Book has a number of suggestions for the pooling of resources in various sectors which should be taken into consideration. It points out that on a bilateral level the EU in 2010 spent substantial amounts in social and humanitarian affairs, as well natural resources, where the EU will continue to be the lead donor in 2012. In other sectors such as accountability, infrastructure and rule of law, the contribution was less than 1 million USD, and the government of South Sudan suggests that these funds should be redirected to other sectors or channeled through a pooled fund mechanism or what is referred to as ‘silent partnership’.

Japan was also recommended in the Donor Book to contribute to pooled funds such as BSF (education and health), HPF (Health) and CHF (social and humanitarian affairs). Where pooled funds were not available, for example, in the natural resource sector, Japan should consider operating in a ‘silent partnership’.

The EU and Japan both signed the New Deal in Busan and now need to live up to this commitment. If there is to be a “country-led and country-owned transition out of fragility”, why do they not follow the suggestions from the South Sudanese government? Japan could for example join the EU in the natural resources sector and the EU could join Japan in infrastructure-related projects. They have both also promised to “build mutual trust by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results” so why do they not do this? Is there a lack of trust between the EU and Japan? Or is raising the flag more important than achieving results?

As regards cooperation with Australia, the EU has a fully-fledged transfer and delegation agreement. This means that Australia will give support to the EU rural development programs in South Sudan and the EU will give support to Australian rural development programs in the Pacific.\(^\text{16}\)

The two are considered to have an equal type of assurance level when it comes to processes, transparency, accountability to taxpayers etc. This would probably also be equally true for Japan and the EU, so why do they not establish a transfer and delegation agreement?

**Some examples of possible cooperation in South Sudan**

As Japan, for security reasons, is only working in the Juba area it might have some interest in supporting EU projects in other areas. The EU is putting up a quick-impact peace dividend project with a basket fund to support cross-border dialogue, asking other donors to join.\(^\text{17}\) The EU should also consider cooperating with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for any projects in the Juba area where road building or similar infrastructure is needed in connection with other development projects.

\(^\text{16}\) Interview with Ambra Longatti, Advisor Governance, Rule of Law, Basic Services, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of South Sudan, January 27, 2012.

\(^\text{17}\) Interview with Edoardo Manfredini, Good Governance Coordinator, Governance, Economy and Social Section, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Sudan, January 30, 2012, in Juba.