

Indonesia: The Emerging Daesh-Centric Threat Landscape

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Introduction

In the lead-up to Ramadan, 17 May-14 June 2018, the month of mercy and compassion, Indonesia suffered a season of terror. Indonesia's changing threat landscape was evident in the repertoire of six terrorist-related events that occurred during that period – a 40-hour riot in prison by inmates of terrorism in Kelapa Dua, Depok, near Jakarta, starting on 8 May; the stabbing and killing of a police officer at the Mobile Intelligence Unit in Depok on 10 May; three church attacks combined with a failed bombing and an attack on the police headquarters (HQ) in Surabaya on 13 and 14 May; and a knife attack and running over of a police officer at the Riau police HQ in Pekanbaru on 16 May. While Daesh provided general guidance on the tactics and targets, the attacks were perpetrated by Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a Southeast Asian branch of Daesh.

Without exception, either the masterminds or perpetrators were known to the authorities but due to Indonesia's previous counter-terrorism legislation – The Law No. 15/2003 – the threats could not be pre-empted. As the support and operational infrastructure of Daesh is still intact, the new counter-terrorism law – the law (Criminal Act of Terrorism No. 5/2018) was passed on 25 May 2018 – should be followed up by a change of mechanism from cooperation to collaboration. If not, more attacks are inevitable in the coming weeks and months. The new law regulates that it is an offence to pledge support to Daesh leaders, promote Daesh propaganda or

* This paper was submitted on 7 July 2018.

raise funds, and even travel to Daesh theatres – Iraq, Syria, the Philippines and others.

Indonesia hosts a few thousand active Daesh supporters and several hundred Daesh operatives, and many of them have links to over 60 Southeast Asian threat groups that pledged allegiance to Daesh leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. The region has constantly underestimated both the al Qaeda and Daesh threat and has suffered attacks periodically since 2001. With the global expansion of Daesh, the governments have no choice but to work together or watch the region descend to chaos. The leaders should go beyond rhetoric and demonstrate the will to fight back to contain, isolate and eliminate the Daesh threat. Especially since having been voted as a member to United Nations Security Council (COP) 2019-2020 on 8 June 2018, Indonesia can encourage a global and comprehensive approach to combating terrorism, radicalism, and extremism.

The Context

As its battlefield shrinks in its heartland of Iraq and Syria, Daesh has expanded worldwide. Contrary to some governments' assessments that the Daesh phase of terror is ending, Daesh has built a state-of-the-art support and operational infrastructure globally. Motivated by the ideology of Daesh, its wilayats (territories), groups, networks, cells and groups present a long-term threat to the West, Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

Asia hosts 63% of the world's Muslim population. In Indonesia, the county hosting the largest Muslim population, the threat is in a growing phase. Contrary to assessments, with the enhanced coalition operations in Iraq and Syria, the threat in Southeast Asia, including in Indonesia, has neither plateaued nor declined. Although Indonesia's special police detachment, D88, and anti-bombing task force are very capable, they are numerically small compared to the current and emerging numbers of Daesh sympathisers, supporters and operators.


The Daesh threat has proliferated from West Papua to Sumatra despite all efforts by D88 to arrest those preparing attacks. The new Indonesian law includes provisions for the arrest of Daesh/JAD ideologues, propagandists, recruiters, operators and supporters. This is aimed at countering the ideological threat spreading in cyber space and crystallising support and operational cells. The Daesh mastery of technology, especially encryption, constrained governments from detecting some networks, cells and

personalities. Therefore it is necessary to collaborate in order to support comprehensive databases with information obtained by all elements of intelligence, instruments and experts, implement a linear programme and enhance human resource capacities with appropriate legal mechanisms.

Historic Evolution of Islamist Extremism in Indonesia

The genesis of Islamist extremism can be traced back to the year 1942, when Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo led a movement called Dārul Islām Indūnisiyyā (DI: Negara Islam Indonesia/NII) to establish an Islamic State. In its first incarnation, DI fought to establish an Islamic State in the period 1949 to 1962 when it was officially dismantled but continued to operate in the underground.

Picture 1: DI/TII PERIOD (1949 – 1954).



The formation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was started by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir in Central Jawa. In 1972 they built the Islamic boarding school Al Mukmin in Ngruki Sukoharjo. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir influenced and recruited youths through *dakwah* (missionary endeavour) and broadcast. In the year 1979, both men were apprehended and punished according to the subversive law (PNPS Law 1936). Following their release in 1983, both of them escaped in 1985 to Malaysia and built Madrasah Lukmanul Hakim in Johor Bahru Malaysia.

The role and activities of its madrasah are to prepare and to despatch youths from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for *tadrihb asyari*

(military training) in Afghanistan. The training was a joint cooperation between Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir with radical figures of Afghanistan like Syaikh Abdulah Azzam and Syaikh Rasul Sayyat – both of whom took part in the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahidin campaign (1979-1989). In the early 1990s, NII split due to differences between the groups of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir, and Ajengan Masduki.


On 1 January 1993, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir officially formed JI, with Abdulah Sungkar serving as JI's amir until 1999. JI was next led by Abu Bakar Baashir. JI carried out a series of attacks in the period 1999-2000 in Indonesia. The leadership of JI has since been taken over by Toriqudin Rusdan (2002-2003), Adung (2003-2005) and Zarkasih (2005-2007). After mounting the attack in Bali that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians, on 12 October 2002, JI transformed into Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). Although MMI was formed in August 2000, MMI absorbed JI after the Bali bombings. Due to differences of opinion between the MMI leaders Irfan Awaas and Abu Bakar Baashir, the latter left the group and created Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) in July 2008. After the proclamation of the so-called caliphate in 2014, the al Qaeda-centric threat landscape, which had dominated Indonesia, was supplanted by a Daesh-centric threat landscape. As the Daesh ideology has since then spread, this presents a long-term threat to Indonesia and the region.

While serving his sentence in prison, Abu Bakar Baashir joined Aman Abdurrahman and they created Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), today's most powerful Daesh group in Indonesia, in November 2015. Aman mentored Hari Budiman alias Abu Musa to unite several pro-Daesh groups under the JAD umbrella – namely Tawhid Wal Jihad established by Aman himself and FAKSI (Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam: Forum of Activists for Islamic Sharia) led by M. Fachry, operating in the greater Jakarta area. A prolific cleric and translator, Aman was deeply influenced by Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a founding father of the forerunner of Daesh. In November 2015, Zainal Anshori was appointed as Abu Musa's successor. Following Zainal's arrest, he was succeeded by Abu Qutaibah in mid 2017.¹

¹ cf. "The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia: From Jemaah Islamiyah to the 'Islamic State' and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and the Terrorist Threat in Indonesia," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, Volume 10, Issue 6, June 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CTTA-June-2018.pdf>.

Picture 2: Expansion JI.

JI EXPANSION 1993-2013



JAD also created a military wing known as Askariya and appointed Abu Gar as its head. In January 2016, Abu Gar conducted and coordinated simultaneous attacks in Jakarta.² Based on Daesh guidance from Syria and as advised by Aman's deputy, Iwan Darmawan, he mounted a Paris-style attack in Jakarta on 14 January 2016, targeting both a Starbucks cafe and a police post, killing four and injuring twenty-four.³ Indonesian authorities arrested several hundred JAD directing figures, from its supreme leader, Aman, to his deputy, Rois, JAD Amir's Zainal Anshori and Abu Qutaibah, and its military leader, Abu Gar. But many other JAD leaders, such as Abu Musa, live in Syria and others operate in Indonesia both from within prisons and outside, organising attacks at will.⁴ Led by Bahrumsyah, Katibah Nusantara is Daesh's Bahasa-speaking group that spread its influence from Indonesia and Malaysia to the Philippines. Bahrumsyah is a student of Aman Abdurahman and has links to the leaders of Mujahidin of East

² In an interview from an isolated cell in December 2017, Abu Gar said to Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, "More than half of the trainees travelled to Iraq and Syria starting 2012."

³ <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/indonesian-police-foil-jakarta-attack-hatched-by-militant-on-dea-8704090>.

⁴ Kharishar Kahfi, "Police nab JAD E. Java leader Abu Umar," *The Jakarta Post*, 17 May 2018, <https://www.google.com.sg/amp/www.thejakartapost.com/amp/news/2018/05/17/police-nab-jad-e-java-leader-abu-umar.html>.

Indonesia (MIT), led by Santoso until his death in 2016, and Bahrun Naim, who campaigned together with him in Syria. Katibah Nusantara appears to be being prepared by Bahrumisyah and his network to build a Daesh area in Southeast Asia.⁵

This is what Tom Plate said about Katibah Nusantara:

Katibah Nusantara embodies a direct link between the global ideology of IS and its regional aspirations, much as Jemaah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian offshoot of al Qaeda, once envisaged returning fighters from Afghanistan providing the battlehardened backbone of the militant advance into Southeast Asia.⁶

Bahrumisyah invites many people to come to Syria through social media. Bahrun Naim, who is Bahrumisyah's associate, also coordinated several bombings in Indonesia, either successfully or not. The threat of Katibah Nusantara is not only aimed at the Indonesian government, but also at the Malaysian government. The threat contains: "If you catch us, we will only increase the number of caliphs (caliph)."⁷

The Siege of the Terrorist Detention Centre

In May 2018, terrorist detainees and convicts took control of the National Police's Mobile Brigade (Mako Brimob) detention centre in Kelapa Dua, Depok, West Java. Mako Brimob Detention Centre, one of Indonesia's maximum security penitentiaries, was besieged by the terrorist detainees and convicts for 40 hours. The facility, located within the Mobile Brigade Corps, housed 155 men and women and one baby. The prison, which was jointly managed by Brimob and D88, held some of the most dangerous inmates,

⁵ Thomas Koruth Samuel, "Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines," *Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia*, 2016, https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/Radicalisation_SEA_2016.pdf, p. 42.

⁶ Tom Plate, "Guest Opinion: Why Indonesia's Secular Society Is Endangered By U.S. Indecision About 'ISIS'," *Asia Media International*, Issue No. 87, November 2015, 18 September 2015, <http://Asiamedia.lmu.edu/2015/09/18/Guest-Opinion-Why-Indonesias-Secular-Society-Is-Endangered-By-U-S-Indecision-About-Isis/> (retrieved on 2 December 2015), quoted from Thomas Koruth Samuel, "Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines," *Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia*, 2016.

⁷ Thomas Koruth Samuel, "Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines," *Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia*, 2016, https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/Radicalisation_SEA_2016.pdf, p. 35.

such as the JAD leadership and membership. In addition to the JAD Amir, Abu Qutaibah, other significant leaders included Young Farmer and Anggi Indah Kusuma, who led the Daesh propaganda network out of Hong Kong.

On 8 May, one of the terrorist detainees, the Daesh leader from Pekanbaru, Wawan Kurniawan alias Abu Affif, mobilised the other inmates in Block C over an incident related to the delivery of food from a visitor to an inmate. At around 8 pm, when Wawan incited other inmates to break free, there were eight to thirteen D88 and two to four Brimob personnel on duty. The D88 team, which is a special force, negotiated at the early stage in order to prevent the siege from deteriorating. However, various physical and non-physical environment conditions at the location caused the officers to be unable to control the prisoners. The inmates managed to seize weapons and take six D88 officers hostage. They tortured five of them to death and kept one as a hostage to deter a rescue operation. Additionally, three officers were wounded. The inmates who tortured and murdered the D88 officers took an oath of allegiance to death that night itself. The videos of “baiah to martyrdom” were circulated on their mobile phones and distributed on Daesh Telegram channels. Selamat Dunia Akhirat [stay safe on earth and in heaven] and Al-Hujarat and Ganti Presiden [Change the President] and Daesh Telegram channels also posted videos of detainees, with their faces covered, armed with weapons they had seized, against the backdrop of a Daesh flag; injured detainees receiving treatment; detainees raising their index fingers, threatening the Indonesian authorities; and detainees assembling weapons. A video focused on a member of Abu Afif’s team, Abu Ibrahim, who died of his injuries.⁸ On Telegram, Daesh also discussed plans to attack the Provost building of Brimob to free the JAD leader, Aman Abdurrahman.

Besides increasing personnel and preparing for an attack on the prison, the police also developed a parallel strategy to discuss with Aman Abdurrahman, who was held in isolation in a nearby location but within the Brimob complex, and encouraged network leaders to facilitate dialogue with inmates to end the siege on peaceful terms. This strategy was successful and demonstrated that even Daesh inmates’ intervention need not always be lethal. The hardcore inmates guided by Daesh ideology instigated all the detainees and inmates to fight but most of them were

⁸ When Abu Ibrahim was arrested, he was planning to conduct a bomb attack and had recruited suicide attackers.

reluctant to do so. A useful circumstance in this case was the good relationships that have been built up by officers with prisoners. Many feared retaliation from D88 and Brimob personnel because a very small number of detainees and convicts had killed the D88 officers. Nonetheless, the agreement reached assured the attackers that it was in their best interest to end the siege peacefully. The decision of the group to surrender was further strengthened by Aman's fatwa.

The investigation following the incident revealed that the close interaction between the officers and detainees appears to have negatively impacted the former's sensitivity and judgement as they allowed exceptions to the protocol. It shows that prisoners can affect an officer's thought either through ideological means or establishing a personal relationship. The management was also not able to map the situation and study the prisoners as a pre-emptive measure. The potential and tendency of weak supervision and control from the leadership elements in conducting checks on the relevant officers' preparedness in terms of safeguarding technical implementation, especially with regard to terrorist prisoners who have an ideology background, affected the environment and the officers in terms of their discretion with respect to the inmates.

Stabbing a Police Officer to Death

On 10 May 2018, Tendi Sumarno, 23, stabbed 41-year-old Chief Brig. Marhum Prencje of the Mobile Intelligence (IntelMob) unit, before the assailant was shot by a policeman. Marhum was standing guard at the Bhayangkara Police Hospital at around 11 pm when he arrested Tendi, who was acting suspiciously and failed to answer why he was outside the hospital premises. After two officers helped Marhum to arrest the intruder and brought him to the IntelMob police station, Tendi took out a knife that had been kept under his genitals and stabbed Marhum. Whilst attempting to attack another officer, he was shot in the chest and killed. According to D88 investigators, Tendi had joined many Telegram channels and had used Telegram and WhatsApp groups that supported and communicated about Daesh. The attack was apparently inspired by the Mako Brimob riot.

Bombings in Surabaya

In Indonesia, entire families were radicalised into extremism and indoctrinated into violence by Daesh propaganda. Just as with praying, Daesh instilled the belief in men, women and children that it was mandatory for Muslims to kill and die.⁹ Suicide attacks by women and entire families, including children, were unprecedented in Indonesia.

The very first indication of a suicide attack by an Indonesian woman was when Dian Yulia Novi wanted to attack the Presidential Palace in Jakarta in December 2016. This phenomenon was followed by the JAD leaders for Surabaya, Dita Oepriarto, Tri Murtiono, and Anton Ferdiantono, who indoctrinated their own families to stage three attacks, also a first of its case.

In the morning of Sunday, 13 May 2018, the two teenage sons of Oepriarto, aged 16 and 18, drove motorcycles to the St Maria Catholic Church at Ngagel Madya Street in Surabaya, where they detonated bombs at the gate at 7:30 am when a security volunteer prevented their entry. Oepriarto himself drove a van to the Pentecostal Central Church at Arjuno Street, where, from inside the vehicle, he detonated another bomb. Oepriarto's wife, Puji Kuswati, 42, a nurse, and their two daughters, aged nine and twelve, then detonated a bomb at the Diponegoro Indonesian Christian Church. On Sunday evening, another bomb exploded prematurely in the Wonocolo apartments, a low-cost apartment in Sidoarjo, a suburb of Surabaya. Anton Febrianto and his wife, Puspitasari, both 47, and their daughter, 17, were killed in the explosion. Although it was reported that Febrianto had threatened to activate the bomb and that D88 had shot him, he was killed before D88 arrived at the crime scene. Two other injured children, eleven and ten, were taken to hospital by their elder brother, 15. A third family staged a suicide attack on the police HQ in Surabaya at 8:50 am on Monday, 14 May. Tri Murtiono and his wife, Tri Ernawati, and their three children, two sons, 18 and 14, and a daughter, seven, rode two motorbikes. When they detonated their bombs, all died except their daughter, Ais, who was injured and rescued by a police officer. The police recovered

⁹ Charlie Campbell, "ISIS Unveiled: The Story Behind Indonesia's First Female Suicide Bomber," *Time*, 8 March 2017, <https://www.google.com.sg/amp/amp.timeinc.net/time/4689714/indonesia-isis-terrorism-jihad-extremism-dian-yulia-novi-fpi>.

54 pipe bombs in 27 containers at the home of Tri Murtiono. In total, the attacks killed 15 people, the 13 terrorists and injured 57.

The neighbours described the three families as pious but not outwardly radical.¹⁰ They were indoctrinated and socialised through a religious study session, where they watched Daesh videos glorifying violence and death. They limited the exposure of their children by home schooling, and most of them were kept away from Christians and Hindus. To them, serving God was paramount. The three men believed and convinced their families that they too will be rewarded for killing the enemies of god.

This case shows that the Daesh ideology radicalises not only individuals but also families and segments of communities. The Surabaya attacks demonstrated a new development in the terrorist trajectory. *First*, radicalisation of families is a natural progression of self-radicalisation of individuals. If the threat persists, entire communities could be radicalised. *Second*, either the husband or the wife radicalises or compels the family to participate in the terrorist activity or the attack. The belief from either of or both the parents percolates to the children. The children are either indoctrinated or blindly follow parental direction. *Third*, the breadwinner or breadwinners of the family raise the funds and engage in other support activities. The distinction between employing adult male versus female and child fighters is fading. Unless the spread of ideology is contained, the constraint against using entire families will diminish and could very well become a trend. Unless governments work with partners to counter the Daesh ideology, the Daesh subcultures will grow and expand with mass suicide attacks.

Riau Police Headquarters Attack

The multiple suicide bombings in Surabaya were followed by another attack in Pekanbaru, Sumatra where terrorists staged a ramming, knife and suicide bomb attack. In a minivan, the Riau Perpetrators (who were influenced by JAD/Daesh) struck the Riau Regional Police headquarters on Wednesday, 16 May 2018. After ramming the minivan into the police station at high speed, the attackers used katanas (swords) to attack the police.

¹⁰ Kate Lamb, "The bombers next door: how an Indonesian family turned into suicide attackers," *Guardian*, 19 May 2018, <https://www.google.com.sg/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/19/indonesia-blasts-surabaya-family-from-good-neighbours-suicide-bombers>.

One of the attackers wore a suicide belt. After a few of the attackers were gunned down, one attacker fled. The attack left one police officer dead, and two police officers and two journalists injured. The suspect who escaped was later apprehended. Mursalim (48), Suwardi (29), Adi Sufiyan (23), Suparman alias Daud (37) and Pogang (23, death) were residents of Dumai, north of Pekanbaru,¹¹ and members of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). The Daesh news agency, Amaq, claimed the attack. The four men and two others, who were previously arrested, had originally planned to take part in the Mako Brimob attack. While they were not part of JAD, they all had pledged alliance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi and belonged to the Daesh network.¹²

The NII network itself is a derivative of the DI that was created by Kartosoewiryo. Although the NII movement is not like JI or JAD, it also recognised the Caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The network is never clear and the leaders are never necessarily known because they make moves in their respective regions.

A New Law on Terrorism and Its Implementation

The 2018 revision of the Terrorism Act makes many changes with regard to criminal law, containing 10 new articles, 9 changes of articles, and 1 article of abolition. It penalizes the ownership, trade and distribution of weapons/explosives/components for terrorist acts (Article 10A), recruitment of terrorism members (Article 12A), financing of terrorism and hate speech that leads to terrorism (Article 15A). It also allows the issuing ministry to cancel the perpetrator's passport and withdraw the perpetrator's citizenship. On the formal procedural side, among others, the new law extends the powers of authorities to arrest suspects up to 21 days (Article 28), to examine witnesses for long-distance communication (Articles 32 and 34A) and to protect law enforcement (Article 33). In fact, the revision is not always guided by the addition or subtraction of articles on the Terrorism Act, but rather by the basic principles driving the revision of the Act and its objectives, namely national policies and strategies against terrorism.

¹¹ Densus 88 Data, 2018.

¹² "Riau Police Attackers IS Supporters But not JAD: Police," *Jakarta Post*, 16 May 2018, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/16/riau-police-attackers-is-supporters-but-not-jad-police.html>.

With regard to such changes, one of the enforcement phases during which stakeholders can collaborate is intelligence. The following is a collaborative model that can be achieved without neglecting the main tasks and functions of each institution.

Picture 3: Task Advisory.



Figure 4: Model of Collaboration.



Conclusion

The high number of attacks and counter-attacks throughout Indonesia demonstrate the extent of the emerging threats. The Ramadan period (17 May-14 June 2018) saw the highest terrorist threat level after Daesh struck three types of targets – government authorities such as the police, Christian and Western interests.

The attack by the Kelapa Dua terrorist prisoners shows that the strength of terror groups is still significant, that they effectively network and continue to pose a threat despite being detained. This event reminds all parties not to compromise with radicalism and terrorism as it threatens the security and ideology of the nation, and not to use ordinary standards

when dealing with terrorist prisoners because they are a high-risk category and need special handling. In this respect, the government should provide more support for improving prisons for people who have committed serious crimes. The case of the prison siege also highlights the importance of proper management of detention facilities as it can help to detect possible threats early, increase the preparedness of guards and ensure proper planning to avoid incidents which can be misused by terrorists.

In the future, there is a need for collaboration among stakeholders on handling terrorism, especially intelligence elements to strengthen law enforcement and deradicalisation. In addition to hard approaches of law enforcement, soft approaches need to be in place to guarantee human rights. As the Indonesian law enforcement, military and security and intelligence services are preparing to counter a spike in terror attacks, the new terrorism law provides them with opportunities to encourage counter-terrorism collaboration through public databases, a variety of instruments and expert support, joint exercises and operations, and legal guarantees.

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