



STOCKTAKING OF GHANA'S DEMOCRACY:

**PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON GOVERNANCE,
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, DEMOCRATIC
VALUES, AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN GHANA**

2025/2026



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2025/2026

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2025/2026**

**A JOINT STUDY
BY THE
KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG (KAS) GHANA
AND
THE GHANA INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
(GIMPA)**



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ghana's democracy is often described as one of the most stable on the African continent. But how do citizens themselves perceive the state of governance, accountability, and political leadership? This nationwide survey offers a rare and detailed look into the public mood, not only measuring support for democracy, but also assessing how people feel about institutions, political actors, economic management, and the country's future direction.

Democracy: Strong in Principle, Stable in Practice

One of the most outstanding findings is the depth of democratic commitment. An overwhelming 97% of respondents consider democracy either "very important" (69%) or "somewhat important" (28.2%) as a system of governance. Nearly 69% report being satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy works in Ghana. Perhaps even more significant: 81% believe that their votes truly count in elections. In a global climate where electoral legitimacy is frequently questioned, this level of confidence is a cornerstone of Ghana's democratic resilience.

However, this trust coexists with awareness of imperfections. While most citizens have confidence in the electoral system, 41.8% report having witnessed or experienced vote buying. The implication is clear: institutional credibility remains strong, but challenges persist at the operational level. Ghanaians believe in the ballot box, yet they remain alert to threats to fairness.

Civic Culture: Competitive, Yet Cohesive

Beyond elections, the study paints a picture of an engaged and politically tolerant society. Over 85% of respondents report at least occasional civic engagement. Political tolerance equally remains high. Over 90% describe Ghanaians as at least somewhat tolerant of opposing political views. In a polarized global climate, this culture of tolerance is a major democratic asset. 73.2% of Ghanaians feel free to express their political opinions without intimidation or fear.

This combination, high participation, high tolerance, and strong perceived freedom of expression, suggests a political culture that is competitive but not fractured and in which disagreement does not translate into hostility. Ghana's democracy appears robust not only because of institutions, but because of societal norms that sustain peaceful contestation.

Institutional Trust: Broad but not unconditional

Institutional trust is broadly positive. The Electoral Commission, Parliament, the Judiciary, and the Media all enjoy appreciable levels of confidence from the citizenry, with most citizens expressing at least moderate trust. However, trust is more often described as “moderate” than “high.” This suggests a population that supports its institutions but remains vigilant. Trust is not unconditional, but earned and sustained through performance, transparency, and fairness. Media trust shows interesting patterns: while overall confidence is solid, levels vary by education level attained. Those with higher education tend to express stronger trust, whereas respondents without formal education are more sceptical. This points to differences in media exposure and information ecosystems, a reminder that democratic resilience depends heavily on credible information reaching all segments of society.

Government Performance: Positive, high expectations remain

A majority rates the government’s overall performance after the first year as “very good” or “good”. Economic management receives 44.5% “Good” and 14.9% “Excellent” ratings from respondents. Perceptions of corruption trends are particularly noteworthy: Across age, gender, and education groups, the most common response is that corruption has “improved” under the current administration. While not universal, this perception indicates that anti-corruption efforts are being noticed.

When asked about urgent national priorities, the response is unambiguous: Employment tops the list at 18.9%, followed by reducing cost of living (13.1%). Together, these economic concerns dominate public expectations. The fight against “Galamsey” (illegal small-scale mining) ranks third (10.5%), reflecting strong concern about environmental degradation and governance enforcement. Infrastructure, education, and health also feature prominently. Economic stability, livelihoods, and environmental governance form the core of the public agenda, which leads to the conclusion that long-term democratic satisfaction is therefore closely tied to economic delivery. The overall message is clear: higher levels of approval are visible, but at the same time, expectations are - and remain - high. Citizens are watching closely to see whether early gains translate into sustained delivery.

The Road to 2028: Direction and Leadership

Looking ahead, the political landscape appears competitive but tilted. If elections were held today (at the time of data collection in December 2025), the NDC holds a noticeable lead over the NPP across age and gender groups. At the same time, the NPP retains a stable core base, and a smaller but visible segment; particularly

younger voters increasingly yearn for alternatives beyond the duopoly of NPP and NDC. Yet the study also reveals a deeper insight: political competition remains structured around the two major parties, but citizens seem increasingly focused on leadership qualities rather than partisan loyalty alone. Across genders and age groups, “Visionary leadership” emerges as the most valued presidential quality, followed closely by economic management skills and anti-corruption commitment. The consistency of these preferences suggests a public united around competence, integrity, and forward-looking governance.

Conclusion

The overall picture that emerges is neither complacent nor alarmist. Ghana’s democracy is widely supported, institutionally trusted, and socially cohesive. Elections are believed to matter. Civic space remains open. Political tolerance is strong. At the same time, citizens are pragmatic. Their support and trust seem to be tied to performance, particularly economic opportunity, cost of living, and environmental governance. In essence, Ghana’s democracy in 2026 stands on solid ground, not because it is free of challenges, but because citizens believe in it and expect it to deliver.



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Democracy does not sustain itself automatically. It requires informed citizens, strong institutions, open public debate, and reliable data. It is in this spirit that the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Ghana and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) have come together to implement this nationwide study on public perceptions of governance, democratic values, and political leadership in Ghana.

Who We Are

The **Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)** is a German political foundation committed to promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and political participation worldwide. In Ghana, KAS is working with political actors, public institutions, academia, civil society, and young leaders to strengthen democratic structures since 1966, enhance political accountability, and promote informed civic engagement. A central pillar of KAS' work is civic education and the creation of spaces for dialogue across political and social divides.

The **Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA)** is one of Ghana's leading public institutions for higher education, research, and public sector training. Its mission is to advance excellence in governance, public administration, leadership, and policy development. Through research, teaching, and policy engagement, GIMPA contributes to strengthening state institutions and fostering evidence-based decision-making in Ghana's democratic system.

Shared Mission and Partnership Rationale

KAS and GIMPA share a fundamental commitment: strengthening democratic governance through informed, data-based public discourse and institutional capacity-building. Both institutions value and actively promote platforms for dialogue, particularly for young people and emerging leaders, recognizing that democratic resilience depends on inclusive participation. By combining KAS' long-standing experience in democracy promotion and civic education with GIMPA's academic expertise and research capacity, this study seeks to actively contribute to a data-driven political conversation in Ghana.

The Study: Logic and Structure

This survey forms part of a broader series of studies conducted at regular intervals to assess the state of democracy in Ghana. The objective is not to produce a one-time snapshot, but to track trends over time, making shifts in public attitudes, institutional trust, and governance perceptions visible. By doing so, the study provides a reliable empirical foundation for policymakers, civil society actors, political parties, academia, and the general public.

At its core, the study examines key pillars of democratic governance, including:

- Support for democracy as a system of governance
- Satisfaction with democratic practice
- Trust in institutions such as the Electoral Commission, the Parliament, the Judiciary, and the Media
- Perceptions of electoral integrity and political tolerance
- Civic participation and freedom of expression

These dimensions form the backbone of this study series, allowing for a structured assessment of democratic resilience and institutional legitimacy.

In addition to these structural indicators, the data collection closely coincided with a politically significant moment: the first year of the new National Democratic Congress (NDC) government under President John Dramani Mahama. Since public perceptions of democracy are often closely linked to evaluations of government performance, the study also includes a supplementary section examining citizens' assessments of the new administration nearly one year after it assumed office.

A Contribution to Constructive Political Dialogue

KAS and GIMPA are united in the belief that democracy needs transparency, reflection, and informed debate. By regularly assessing public opinion on governance and democratic structures, this study seeks to contribute to constructive political dialogue and long-term democratic strengthening in Ghana.


The findings presented in this report are offered as a resource, for institutions, political actors, civil society, academia, and citizens alike, to support evidence-based engagement and forward-looking democratic development.



Anna Lena Sabroso-Wasserfall
Resident Representative, KAS Ghana



Prof. Samuel K. Bonsu
Rector, GIMPA



CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

METHODOLOGY

Overall Approach

This study employed a nationwide, constituency-level survey designed to capture public perceptions on governance, democratic performance, and national development generally. Data collection was conducted over a three-week period in December 2025 across all 276 constituencies in Ghana, ensuring full geographic representation. A total of 13,194 respondents participated, making the survey one of the most comprehensive perception studies undertaken during this period. A Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) system was used to collect real-time data, reducing manual entry errors, enabling automatic validation checks, and supporting secure transmission of responses to a central database. Field supervisors conducted daily verification checks to maintain data accuracy and consistency across regions. Respondent selection covered various educational backgrounds, age groups, employment categories, political affiliations, and residential types (urban, peri-urban, and rural), allowing the study to reflect Ghana's demographic and social diversity. Biographic factors such as gender, household characteristics, and community classification were integrated to support deeper data disaggregation and interpretation.

2.1. Sampling Strategy

The sampling strategy was guided by the 2021 Population and Housing Census data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) to ensure representativeness across all demographic categories. Constituency-level population proportions were used to determine respondent distribution, allowing the sample to mirror the national demographic structure. Stratified sampling ensured inclusion across gender, age, employment status, and educational background, while settlement type (urban, peri-urban, rural) formed an additional layer of stratification. Field teams used randomly generated household and respondent selection procedures within each stratum to minimise bias and enhance the validity of the sample.

2.2. Limitations

While the survey design aimed to achieve full national representativeness, certain limitations should be acknowledged. First, although all 276 constituencies were covered, accessibility challenges in two constituencies with security concerns made it difficult for enumerators to access some hard-to-reach communities, which may have affected the geographical distribution of respondents in those constituencies. Second, self-reported data may have been influenced by recall bias or social desirability bias, particularly on politically sensitive questions, a phenomenon peculiar with politically sensitive studies of this nature.

Third, although CAPI enhanced data reliability, occasional connectivity issues in remote areas delayed synchronization and required manual checks. Finally, while the sample is large and diverse, the findings may not fully capture the perspectives of transient or highly mobile populations.

2.3. Reporting and Data Analysis Procedures

Data reporting and analysis followed standard statistical procedures, beginning with data cleaning, validation, and coding immediately after fieldwork. Real-time CAPI monitoring allowed early identification and correction of inconsistencies. Descriptive statistics were generated to summarize public perceptions across demographic categories, while cross-tabulations were used to explore variations by gender, age, employment status, education, and settlement type. Visualizations were generated to improve interpretability of findings for policymakers and non-technical audiences. Analytical interpretations focused on identifying patterns, contextual drivers, and policy-relevant insights grounded in the empirical data



**CHAPTER 3:
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
AND FINDINGS**

PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS

SECTION A - DEMOGRAPHICS

A1: Gender and Representativeness




Figure 1: Gender distribution

The sample shows a slight female majority, with females accounting for 51.61% of the total and males making up the remaining 48.39%, indicating a relatively balanced gender split.

A2: Employment




Figure 2: Employment status

The largest segment of the group identifies as self-employed at 54.4%, followed by 18.2% who are unemployed and 11% employed in the private sector, with civil servants, public servants, students, and retired individuals making up the remaining 16.4%.

A3: Age




Figure 3: Age distribution

The dominant age brackets among respondents are 36–45 years and 26–35 years with 32.7% and 33% respectively, followed by those aged 18–25 (11.5%), 46–55 (16.1%), and 56+ (6.7%) form the rest of the cohort. This distribution reflects the results of the Ghana Population Housing Census from 2021, showing a tendency towards slightly middle-aged groups (36-45) due to a focus on people who are within working-age and tax-contributing cohorts, with implications for expectations about jobs, prices, and infrastructure.

A4: Education




Figure 4: Education level

In terms of schooling, 39.2% of the participants have a Secondary education, while 32.1% have attained Basic education. 15.1% have reached the Tertiary level, and 13.7% report no formal education. This again aligns with the GPHC data from 2021, which states that 17.1% of people older than 18 who have ever attended school have a tertiary education and 34.4% have a secondary education.

A5: Religion




Figure 5: Religious affiliation

The religious profile of the group is predominantly Christian at 72.6%, with 23% identifying as Muslim, and the remaining 4.4% split between Traditional Religion, Non-religious, and Other. This aligns with the GHPC 2021, which states that 74.7% of Ghana's population are Christians and 20.4% are Muslims.

A6: Ethnicity




Figure 6: Ethnic distribution of respondents

The ethnic composition is led by the Akan group at 44.1%, followed by the Mole-Dagbani at 14.9% and the Ewe at 12%, while the remaining 29% is distributed among several ethnic groups including the Guan, Ga-Dangme, and Grusi. This aligns with the GHPC 2021 which states that 45.7% the country’s population are Akan, 18.5% are Mole-Dagbani, 12.8% are Ewe and the remaining population belongs to several other ethnic groups.

A7: Residence Type




Figure 7: Type of residence

The sample reflects a diverse geographic distribution across Ghana’s settlement patterns: 41.6% of respondents live in rural areas, 32.7% reside in urban areas and 25.7% live in peri-urban communities. With the largest share coming from rural areas, the data ensures that perspectives from outside major urban centres are

strongly represented. At the same time, the significant urban and peri-urban portions allow for meaningful comparison across different socio-economic environments.

A8: Political Affiliation




Figure 8: Political affiliation with age distribution

The graph detailing political affiliation by age shows a slight majority of the respondents identifying as NDC across all age brackets (18-25: 36.87%; 26-35: 41.79%; 36-45: 43.03%; 46-55: 47.05%; 56+: 41.76%), while the NPP maintains a relatively steady presence of approximately 33% to 38% across the groups. Notably, the "Others" category sees its highest engagement among the youngest demographic (18–25) at 30%, but this figure drops significantly to its lowest point in the 46–55 age range.




Figure 9: Political affiliation with level of education

The graph categorized by educational level reveals that the NDC is the dominant choice for those with basic education and no formal education, whereas the NPP's support is remarkably consistent across all education levels, hovering around 35% for every education tier. A distinct trend is visible in the "Others" category, which starts at its lowest point among those with basic education (19.38%) and steadily climbs to its peak representation among the tertiary-educated group (25.14%).

SECTION B: DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

B1: How important is democracy to you as a system of governance?




Figure 10: Importance of democracy as a system of governance

Democracy holds high ideological value for the public with 69% of respondents considering it a "very important" system of governance, supplemented by 28.2% who view it as "somewhat important," leaving only 2.9% who do not value it.

The results indicate the universal acceptance and growth of democracy in Ghana. Ghana's democracy remains firmly rooted as the preferred system of governance. Even where citizens may express dissatisfaction with economic conditions or government performance, this does not translate into rejection of democratic rule itself. The system retains strong legitimacy. For Ghana, this is an important stabilizing factor. In a global context of democratic strain, public commitment to democratic governance strengthens electoral legitimacy, accountability, and peaceful political competition. At the same time, high support for democracy raises expectations. Citizens who strongly value democracy also expect it to deliver in terms of fairness, responsiveness, and improved living conditions. For policymakers, this means that performance and trust in institutions will be key factors shaping democratic satisfaction in the years ahead, particularly toward the 2028 elections.

B2: How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Ghana?




Figure 10: Satisfaction with democracy in Ghana

Satisfaction levels with the way democracy works in Ghana are relatively positive, with 49.8% of respondents "satisfied" and 18.9% "very satisfied," though 17.8% remain "neutral" and a combined 13.4% express some form of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country.

The results show that a clear majority of Ghanaians are satisfied with how democracy is practiced in Ghana. Together, nearly 69% express satisfaction. This suggests that while democracy is strongly supported in principle (as seen in the previous indicator), it is also viewed positively in practice by most citizens. Importantly, dissatisfaction levels remain relatively limited, which indicates that frustration with governance has not translated into widespread rejection of democracy. For policymakers, this is encouraging but not a reason for complacency. The sizeable neutral group and the minority expressing dissatisfaction signal that democratic satisfaction is conditional and can depend on continued delivery, fairness, and responsiveness. Looking ahead, maintaining and strengthening institutional trust, economic performance, and public accountability will be essential to ensuring that satisfaction with democracy remains stable.

B3: Do you believe citizens' votes truly count in elections?




Figure 12: Perceived efficacy of citizens' votes

There is high public faith in the integrity of the ballot box, with 81% of citizens believing that their votes truly count in elections, compared to 11.6% who believe their votes do not matter, and further 7.4% who remain unsure.

The findings reveal strong public confidence in the integrity of elections. A large majority believe that their votes truly count. This is a critical indicator of democratic health. Belief in the effectiveness of one's vote is fundamental to electoral participation and peaceful political competition. When citizens trust the ballot box, elections remain the primary and legitimate channel for political change. For Ghana, this level of confidence reinforces the country's reputation for credible elections and institutional stability. It suggests that despite political competition and economic pressures, the electoral process itself retains broad legitimacy. However, the minority who doubt or question whether votes count should not be overlooked. Safeguarding electoral transparency, strengthening communication by institutions such as the Electoral Commission, and maintaining bipartisan trust in electoral outcomes will remain essential.

B4: Have you ever experienced or witnessed vote buying?




Figure 13: Experience of votes buying

The electoral process faces localized integrity challenges, as 41.8% of respondents have witnessed or experienced vote buying, although a majority of 54.1% report they have not encountered such practices.

This finding is important. While confidence in elections and the ballot box remains high (as seen in previous indicators), the data suggests that irregular practices such as vote buying are still perceived as present in the political environment. The fact that more than four in ten respondents report exposure to it indicates that this is not viewed as an isolated phenomenon. For Ghana’s democracy, this creates a nuanced picture: citizens largely trust that their votes count, yet many are aware of attempts to influence voters through material incentives. This suggests that electoral integrity is strong at the institutional level, but challenges persist on the ground. For policymakers and stakeholders, the implication is clear: Continued civic education, enforcement of electoral laws, and transparency in campaign financing will be essential to protect democratic credibility. Addressing vote buying is not only about legality, but about preserving fairness, equal competition, and public trust in the democratic process.

SECTION C: ENGAGEMENT IN CIVIC EDUCATION

C1: How often do you participate in civic activities (e.g., voting, town halls, protests, etc.)?




Figure 14: Engagement in civic education

In total, more than 85% report at least occasional civic engagement. This is a strong sign of participatory citizenship. Earlier results showed that democracy is highly valued in principle and that citizens largely believe their votes count. This indicator adds to a behavioural dimension: many citizens are not only supportive of democracy, but also actively engaged in it.

Importantly, civic participation here extends beyond voting and may include other forms of engagements such as participation in town hall meetings, rallies, community meetings, political health walks, advocacy activities, or other local initiatives. Such engagement strengthens democratic accountability from the bottom up and creates channels for dialogue between citizens and institutions. At the same time, participation does not automatically translate into influence. The challenge for policymakers is to ensure that civic engagement is met with responsiveness. If citizens frequently participate but do not see tangible impact, expectations may outpace satisfaction. Overall, the data suggests that Ghana's democracy is not passive and citizens appear willing to engage, an asset for democratic resilience in the years ahead.

C2: How tolerant are Ghanaians of opposing political views?




Figure 15: Tolerance of opposing political views

Social cohesion in the political sphere appears stable, with 48.8% of the population being "somewhat tolerant" and 43% being "very tolerant" of opposing views, while only 8.2% identify as "intolerant."

In total, over 90% perceive at least a moderate level of tolerance in political discourse. This is an encouraging signal for democratic stability. Tolerance of differing opinions is essential for peaceful political competition, cross-party dialogue, and social cohesion. It suggests that, despite intense partisan competition, most citizens believe that political disagreement does not automatically translate into hostility. At the same time, the fact that nearly half of respondents describe tolerance as only "somewhat" rather than "very" strong may indicate underlying polarization or caution in political interactions. Managing political rhetoric, reducing inflammatory communication, and promoting cross-party engagement will therefore remain important. Overall, the findings point to a democracy that is competitive but not fractured, a valuable foundation as Ghana approaches future electoral cycles.

SECTION D: INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

D1: The Electoral Commission of Ghana




Figure 16: Trust in the Electoral Commission

Trust in the body managing elections is predominantly "moderate" at 50.1%, with 34.4% of respondents reporting "high" trust and 15.5% reporting "low" (13.7%) and no trust (1.8%).

The findings show generally strong confidence in the Electoral Commission. Overall, more than 84% of respondents express at least moderate trust in the institution. This is a crucial indicator for democratic stability, as the Electoral Commission plays a central role in safeguarding free and fair elections. Public trust in its neutrality and professionalism is essential for the acceptance of election outcomes and the prevention of post-election tensions. At the same time, the fact that trust is more "moderate" than "high" for many citizens suggests that confidence, while solid, is not unconditional. Transparency, consistent communication, and strict adherence to procedural fairness will remain key to maintaining and strengthening public confidence, particularly as political competition intensifies again toward future elections. In combination with the strong belief that votes count, this data suggests that Ghana's electoral framework remains broadly legitimate, though continued vigilance is necessary to sustain that trust.

D2: The Judiciary




Figure 17: Trust in the Judiciary

The legal system sees a similar distribution of public trust, where 47.1% of respondents hold "moderate" trust, 32.7% hold "high" trust, and 20.3% report "low" (18%) and no (2.3%) trust in the institution.

Public trust in the Judiciary is generally positive, though slightly more cautious compared to the Electoral Commission. Altogether, nearly 80% express at least moderate confidence in the courts. This suggests that the Judiciary continues to be seen as a legitimate and functioning pillar of Ghana's democracy. Trust in the courts is essential for resolving political disputes, enforcing accountability, and upholding the rule of law. For the justice system, public confidence depends heavily on perceived impartiality. Unlike electoral trust, which is focused on elections, judicial trust is more cumulative. It builds – or erodes – over time based on landmark cases, anti-corruption rulings, and dispute resolution outcomes.

The higher share of respondents expressing lower trust compared to other institutions indicates that confidence in judicial impartiality and independence may not be as robust as trust in the electoral system. In politically sensitive cases, perceptions of fairness become particularly important. For policymakers, this underlines the need to safeguard judicial independence from political pressure, ensure timely handling of politically sensitive cases, and increase public understanding of judicial reasoning and rulings.

D3: The Parliament of Ghana




Figure 18: Trust in the Parliament

Public trust in the legislative branch mirrors other state bodies, with 48.1% expressing "moderate" trust and 36% expressing "high" trust, while 15.9% maintain "low" (14.4%) and no trust (1.5%) in the institution.

Public confidence in Parliament is broadly positive. In total, over 84% of respondents express at least moderate trust in Parliament. This indicates that Parliament retains institutional credibility and is viewed as a legitimate arena for representation and lawmaking. However, the dominance of "moderate" rather than "high" trust suggests that citizens are supportive, but watchful. Unlike trust in electoral administration, which is primarily about procedural integrity, trust in Parliament is likely to be more closely tied to everyday political behaviour and the visibility of constituency work. Maintaining and strengthening trust will therefore depend not only on formal reforms, but also on political conduct and on making parliamentary work more transparent and understandable to the public.

D4: The Media




Figure 19: Trust in the Media with age distribution

The chart segmented by age shows that "Moderate" trust is the dominant perception for all age groups, particularly for those aged 26–35, where it reaches 49.64%. Across every age group, at least 33% of respondents trust the Media at a "High" level, while the "None" category consistently registers at 2-3%.

Public confidence in the Media can therefore be seen as broadly solid, though not overwhelming: In total, more than 83% express at least moderate confidence in the Media. The dominance of "moderate" trust suggests that citizens value the role of the Media but remain attentive to issues such as political bias, sensationalism, or misinformation. This finding is particularly significant when viewed next to earlier indicators. High belief that votes count and relatively strong institutional trust are heavily influenced by the information environment. In a competitive political environment, media credibility becomes a stabilizing factor: It shapes how citizens interpret elections, court decisions, and parliamentary debates. Trust in information is therefore closely linked to trust in institutions.

For media actors and regulators, the implication is not simply to defend press freedom, which remains essential, but to strengthen professional standards, fact-checking, and visible editorial independence. In an increasingly polarized and digital information space, maintaining public confidence will be critical to preventing misinformation from undermining the broader democratic resilience reflected in earlier findings.




Figure 20: Trust in the Media with level of education

The data segmented by educational attainment level reveals that individuals with "Basic" education report a "Moderate" trust in the Media at the highest rate (49.56%). Conversely, respondents with "No formal education" choose the "Low" trust category more frequently than any other educational group (22.08%), while "Tertiary" and "Secondary" educated individuals show a strong lean toward "High" trust at 35.24% and 38.20% respectively.

The data therefore indicates notable differences of trust in the Media based on education level. Respondents with basic education most frequently report moderate trust, close to 50%, suggesting cautious but steady confidence. By contrast, individuals with no formal education select the low trust category more often than any other educational group, indicating greater scepticism. Meanwhile, respondents with secondary and tertiary education show a stronger inclination toward high trust, at roughly 35%.

These patterns suggest that trust in the Media may partly reflect differences in media exposure, media literacy, and access to diverse information sources. However, there are various possible interpretations to explain these results:

- 1) Higher-educated respondents may report higher trust not necessarily because they are more exposed to established, mainstream outlets and better able to distinguish between professional journalism and unreliable sources. More educated individuals may also consume more media overall and therefore perceive the system as functioning, even if they criticize individual outlets.
- 2) Information Ecosystem Differences: Education level often correlates with differences in media consumption: Tertiary and secondary educated individuals may rely more on formal news outlets, while individuals with no formal education may rely more on informal networks, radio, word-of-mouth, or social media. If informal or social media spaces contain higher levels of misinformation or political polarization, trust in "the Media" as a category may be affected differently.

For policymakers and media stakeholders, this points to the importance of strengthening inclusive communication strategies, expanding media literacy initiatives, and ensuring that credible information reaches all segments of society. In an evolving digital landscape, sustaining trust in the Media will remain central to safeguarding the broader democratic confidence reflected throughout this study.




Figure 21: Trust in the Media with gender distribution

Gender perspectives on trust in the Media are remarkably aligned, with both males and females reporting "Moderate" trust at 48.54% and 45.76% respectively. The "High" trust is slightly more prevalent among females (37.53%) compared to males (roughly 34.27%), though both genders report negligible figures for no trust.

D4:1. Do you feel free to express your political opinions without fear?




Figure 22: Freedom to express political opinions

Among respondents, a strong majority (73.2%) say they feel free to express their political opinions without fear. Meanwhile, 18% report that they do not feel free to do so, and 8.8%

are unsure. This suggests that, for most citizens, political expression remains largely open. The perception of freedom is substantial and aligns with earlier findings on political tolerance and democratic legitimacy. However, nearly one in five respondents reporting that they do not feel free to speak openly is not insignificant. This indicates that while the general climate is permissive, there are still segments of society who may experience social pressure, partisan tension, or localized intimidation.

D4:2. How important is the role of civil society and the media in promoting political information?




Figure 23: Importance of Civil Society and the Media in political information with age distribution

The data categorized by age reflects a strong consensus on the importance of civil society and media, with "Very important" and "Important" being the dominant responses at over 90% across all age groups.

In total, more than 94% acknowledge that these actors play a significant role in promoting political information. This finding highlights the central importance of the information environment in Ghana’s democracy. Earlier indicators showed strong belief that votes count, high levels of institutional trust, and broad satisfaction with democratic functioning. This result suggests that citizens understand access to political information as a foundational condition for those outcomes.

Importantly, this question is not about trust in the Media (which was examined separately), but about perceived importance. Even where citizens may express moderate trust, they still overwhelmingly agree that Media and civil society are essential for informing the public and enabling participation.

It therefore becomes clear that information is viewed as a core democratic infrastructure. Supporting independent journalism, civic education, and open public debate directly reinforces democratic resilience. At the same time, high public expectations mean that credibility, factual accuracy, and inclusiveness in political communication remain critical.

This reinforces the importance of protecting civic space, supporting independent journalism, and strengthening public education initiatives. If citizens view these actors as central to democratic functioning, weakening them could likely affect democratic participation itself.




Figure 24: Importance of Civil Society and the Media in political information with level of education

The data categorized by education also reflects a strong consensus on the importance of civil society and media, with "Very important" and "Important" being the dominant responses at approximately 90% across all educational levels. Interest is particularly high among those with tertiary education, where "Very important" reaches its highest peak at roughly 54.40%, while "Not important" remains a marginal response below 10% for nearly all groups, but peaking at the no formal education group (10.12%).




Figure 25: Importance of civil society and the Media in political information with gender distribution

This bar chart illustrates the perceived importance of Civil Society and Media in promoting political information, segmented by gender. 49.69% of males and 49.54% of female respondents categorize these entities as "Very important," while 44.57% of females and 44.88% of males label them as "Important." Only a small fraction, between 5% and 6%, considers them "Not important," showing nearly identical response patterns between men and women across all categories.

SECTION E: EFFECTIVENESS OF OPPOSITION AND PARLIAMENT

E1: How effectively do you think opposition in general performs its role in holding governments accountable?




Figure 26: Effectiveness of the opposition in holding the government accountable with age distribution

The age-based graph shows that "Effective" is the leading sentiment across all age brackets, consistently staying above 45%. The "Ineffective" and "Very effective" categories follow with similar weightings of around 20-23%, while "Very ineffective" remains the lowest-rated category for every age group.

Public opinion on the opposition's effectiveness is generally positive, though not without reservations: Overall, roughly 68.5% believe the opposition is effectively fulfilling its role, while about one-third express dissatisfaction. The results offer insight into how citizens evaluate the functioning of competitive politics more broadly. The opposition is widely perceived as active and relevant, which is a key indicator of democratic pluralism. At the same time, the relatively sizeable share of respondents who view the opposition as ineffective suggests that accountability of politics is not universally trusted. This may reflect perceptions of limited influence, partisan polarization, or dissatisfaction with the quality of political debate.

Considering earlier findings; Strong support for democracy, high belief that votes counts and solid institutional trust, adds to the nuance. Citizens endorse democratic competition in principle, but their assessment of how effectively that competition translates into accountability is more divided. For long-term democratic resilience, an effective opposition should not only be about political rivalry, but credibility, policy substance, and constructive scrutiny are critical. This indicates that public confidence in democratic performance depends not only on institutions, but also on how well political actors use them.

E2. Do you think Members of Parliament adequately represent their constituents?




Figure 27: Adequacy of representation by Members of Parliament with age distribution

The graph showing responses by age group indicates that a majority across all demographics believe MPs represent their constituents adequately, with "Yes" responses peaking at approximately 52.52% for those aged 46–55. Negative sentiment is strongest among the 18–25 and 26–35 age groups at 35.94% and 35.60% respectively, while "Not sure" remains the least selected option for all ages, hovering around 14 to 16%.

While a slim majority expresses confidence in parliamentary representation, nearly half of respondents either doubt it or are uncertain. Representation, therefore, appears more contested than institutional legitimacy. Compared to earlier findings, where Parliament as an institution enjoyed broad moderate trust, this question moves from abstract trust to concrete performance. Citizens may respect Parliament as a democratic body yet remain critical of how effectively individual MPs connect with and advocate for their constituencies. The relatively high "No" response suggests that representation is experienced unevenly. Concerns may relate to accessibility of MPs, responsiveness to local needs, visibility in constituencies, or perceived prioritization of party interests over community interests. The 14.9% "Not sure" category also deserves attention. It may reflect limited direct engagement between MPs and constituents, particularly in areas where communication channels are weak.

Taken together with earlier indicators, the picture that emerges is one of democratic stability, but performance-sensitive expectations. Institutional structures are largely accepted, yet citizens are attentive to how representation is practiced in everyday political life. Strengthening constituency engagement and demonstrating tangible responsiveness may therefore be central to sustaining trust in representative democracy.

SECTION F: GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

F1: How would you rate the overall performance of the current government?




Figure 28: Performance of the current government with gender distribution

The gender-based bar graph shows a high level of consensus, with both males (42.54%) and females (42.44%) rating the government’s performance as "Good" at over 40%, while "Very Poor" remains the lowest rated category for both groups. Female respondents show a slightly higher preference for the "Very Good" rating compared to their male counterparts




Figure 29: Performance of the current government with age distribution

The age-based bar graph indicates that the "Good" rating is the most popular across all generations, peaking within the 36-45 and 46-55 age groups at 43.57% and 43.18%. Younger respondents (18-25) are more likely to rate performance as "Average" compared to older groups (with 29.03%), while the 56+ demographic shows the highest percentage of "Very Good" ratings (19.07%).

F2: How satisfied are you with the delivery of public services (health, education, infrastructure, etc.)?




Figure 30: Satisfaction with the delivery of public services with gender distribution

The bar graph by gender reveals that over 40% of both men and women are "Satisfied" with public service delivery, representing the largest segment of the population. A notable segment of both genders remains "Neutral," while "Very dissatisfied" is the least selected option, accounting for only 5.62% of Females and 5.36% of Males




Figure 31: Satisfaction with the delivery of public services with age distribution

The age-based breakdown shows that "Satisfied" is the dominant sentiment across all ages, peaking in the 36-45 group at 42.68%. Younger groups, particularly those aged 18-25 (25.21%) and 26-35 (25.18%), exhibit higher "Neutral" feelings compared to the older cohorts who lean more toward the extreme ends of the satisfaction scale.

F3: To what extent do you believe government policies address the needs of ordinary citizen?




Figure 32: Extent to which government policies address citizens' needs

When asked how well policies serve the average citizen, 17.1% who feel the government "Fully" addresses their needs while 46.9% believe they do so "To some extent." A combined 36% feel policies address their needs "Not much" (27.7%) or "Not at all" (8.3%).

F4: How transparent do you think government operations and decision-making are?




Figure 33: Transparency of government operations and decision-making

Regarding transparency, 53.9% of participants consider government operations "Somewhat transparent," whereas 26.3% feel they are "Very transparent". Only 19.7% of the surveyed cohort views the government's decision-making process as "Not transparent."

F5: How would you rate the government's handling of the economy?




Figure 34: Government handling of the economy

The government's management of the economy received a plurality of positive marks, with 44% rating it as "Good" and 15% as "Excellent." Only a combined 16% of respondents rate the economic handling as "Poor" or "Very Poor," while roughly 25% consider it "Fair."

F6: Has corruption improved, worsened, or remained the same under the current administration?




Figure 35: Perceived change in corruption under the current administration with age distribution

The age-based analysis shows that "Improved" is the most frequent response across all age groups, with the 46-55 group being the most optimistic at 49.13%. The "Same" category is the second most common response, while "Don't know" and "Worsened" consistently hover at lower levels between 10% and 13% across all demographics.




Figure 36: Perceived change in corruption under the current administration with gender distribution

The gender-based graph shows that both males and females largely believe corruption has "Improved," with females at 45.26% and males at 44.64%. Both genders share similar views on the "Worsened" category, though more men (33.16%) than women (31.44%) relatively feel the situation has remained the "Same."




Figure 37: Perceived change in corruption under the current administration with level of education

The education-based graph indicates that while "Improved" is the top choice for all tiers, those with secondary education hold this view most strongly at 45.80%. Respondents with no formal education are more likely to report that the situation has "Worsened" (16.13%) or that they "Don't know" (11.62%) compared to those with tertiary or basic education.

F7: How responsive is the government to public opinion and concerns?




Figure 38: Government responsiveness to public opinion and concerns

The majority of respondents view the government as moderately engaged with their concerns, as 53% feel the government is "Somewhat responsive." The remainder of the group is divided between those who find the government "Not responsive" (20.2%) and those who believe it is "Highly responsive" (26.8%).

SECTION G: SECURITY

G1: How satisfied are you with the government’s handling of the security situation?




Figure 39: Satisfaction with the government’s handling of the security situation

The public holds an overall positive view of national security, with the largest plurality of respondents (44.4%) feeling satisfied and 17.3% feeling “very satisfied”, with only a combined 19.4% still expressing some level of dissatisfaction.

SECTION H: GOVERNMENT FLAGSHIP PROGRAMMES

H1: Are you aware of any flagship / major programmes introduced by the current government?




Figure 40: Awareness of flagship government programmes

There is high public awareness regarding the government's major initiatives, as 61% of the population indicates they are aware of specific flagship programs currently being

implemented. The most known flagship programmes that respondents claimed they were familiar with are:

- 1) “Akoko nketenketen” Poultry Revitalisation Programme (named by 53.4% of respondents)
- 2) “Adwumawura” Programme to Combat Youth Unemployment and Foster Entrepreneurship (named by 19.9% of respondents)
- 3) “Big Push” National Infrastructure Development Programme (named by 13.5% of respondents)
- 4) Passport Reduction Programme (reduced application costs, named by 11.1%)
- 5) 100 Coders Programme (named by 6.5% of respondents)
- 6) “Others” were named by 1.3% of respondents

H2: How would you rate the effectiveness of these programmes?




Figure 41: Perceived effectiveness of government programmes

Public sentiment on the impact of these programs is overall mixed; while 28.7% find them effective or very effective (7.9%), the most common response is "Neutral" (30.2%), and a combined 33.2% view them as ineffective or very ineffective. The high levels of neutral responses indicate that people are aware and observant of government programmes, but understand that after only one year in government, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of larger-scale programmes with long-term outcomes.

H3: What are the main challenges the government must address urgently?

The gender-based breakdown reveals that men and women prioritize challenges similarly. The most frequently mentioned challenge is providing employment (females: 15.80%; males: 16.49%), making job creation the dominant public priority. This is closely followed by the reduction of the high cost of living (females: 11.01%; males: 11.26%), indicating that economic hardship remains a pressing concern. Together, these two issues alone account for nearly one-third of all responses, underscoring the centrality of economic stability and livelihoods in public expectations.

Environmental and governance concerns also feature prominently. The fight against illegal mining (Galamsey) (females: 8.68%; males: 9.16%) ranks among the top three issues, highlighting continued public concern about environmental degradation, security implications, and governance enforcement. Infrastructure remains a significant priority. Building roads and bridges (females: 8.68%; males: 9.38%) is frequently cited, reflecting the importance of connectivity and development across regions. Similarly, education (females: 6.33%; males: 6.27%) and health (females: 4.05%; males: 4.03%) remain core social sector concerns, though they rank below immediate economic pressures.

Agriculture-related priorities collectively form a notable cluster. Respondents highlight the need to provide agricultural inputs (females: 4.17%; males: 4.75%), support farmers financially (females: 4.35%; males: 3.85%), and support small-scale businesses with loans (females: 3.07%; males: 2.69%). These responses suggest strong concern for productive sectors and grassroots economic empowerment. Other issues such as improving access to potable water (females: 3.92%; males: 3.70%), sanitation (females: 2.19%; males: 2.21%), electricity (females: 1.57%; males: 1.57%), security infrastructure (females: 1.84%; males: 2.11%), and internet services (females: 0.88%; males: 0.75%) appear important but comparatively secondary.

SECTION I: OUTLOOK FOR 2028 ELECTIONS

I1: Which party's leadership team (NPP or NDC) do you believe offers stronger future direction for Ghana?




Figure 43: Perceived strength of party leadership for Ghana's future

When comparing the two major parties, 42.7% of respondents believe the NDC leadership team offers a stronger future direction for Ghana, while 32.7% favour the NPP. 14.3% of the public views both parties as equally capable, and only 5% feel that neither provides a strong direction.

This suggests many Ghanaians associate the NDC with clearer national direction while the NPP retains a strong core base. The pattern indicates expectations for stability, trust, and policy clarity, making visible delivery crucial for the government, sharper policy alternatives important for the opposition, and evidence-based dialogue necessary for civil society and partners.

I2: In your view, what are the most important leadership qualities Ghana needs in the next president?




Figure 44: Most important presidential leadership qualities in Ghana with gender distribution

Both genders identify "Visionary leadership" as their top priority, with females at 23.44% and males at 23.98%. A slight distinction appears in secondary priorities: females show a higher preference for "Anti-corruption commitment" (20.95%) compared to males (19.61%), while males prioritize "Economic management skills" at 21.85% (female respondents: 20.35%). This alignment reflects a shared desire for credible, future-oriented leadership, signalling the importance of competence, trust, and fairness for Ghana's governance stakeholders.




Figure 45: Most important presidential leadership qualities in Ghana with age distribution

"Visionary leadership" is equally the most valued trait across the board, consistently capturing 23% to 25% of responses in every age bracket. "Economic management skills" and "Anti-corruption commitment" follow as the next most significant priorities, each maintaining a steady presence between 15% and 22% across all age cohorts. This cross-demographic alignment strengthens democratic cohesion and signals the need for leadership that is credible, accountable, and aligned with long-term national planning. The "Other" category only received 0.09% of total votes.

I3: How confident are you that new leadership within NPP and NDC will improve democratic governance in Ghana?




Figure 46: Confidence in new party leadership to improve democratic governance

Public sentiment is highly positive, with 47.5% of respondents feeling somewhat confident and 40.6% feeling very confident that new leadership within the major parties will improve democratic governance. Only 9.4% of those surveyed express a lack of confidence in this transition. This optimism creates a window for reform but carries high public expectations, requiring government, opposition, civil society, and partners to act decisively on governance improvements and accountability.

SECTION J: ELECTIONS TODAY




Figure 47: Voting intention if election were held today with gender distribution

Political preference remains stable across genders, with men and women showing 50.52% and 49.44% support for the NDC. Support for the NPP is nearly identical between the two groups with males at 38.83% and females at 39.34%, with "Other" parties and candidates receiving a minimal share of 10-11% from both demographics.




Figure 48: Voting intention if election were held today with age distribution

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) is the preferred choice for all age groups, peaking at 53.42% support among those aged 46–55. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) maintains consistent secondary support, generally ranging between 37% and 40% across all age categories, while "Others" reach their highest point of 15.01% among the 18–25 group.

Overall, youth show the highest interest in possible political alternatives (up to 15%). This reflects a unified national mood favouring the NDC and highlights youth's appetite for renewal, signalling strategic implications for campaign messaging and governance priorities.



CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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CONCLUSION

The nationwide survey presents a clear picture of a democracy that remains resilient, legitimate, and widely valued by its citizens. Ghanaians overwhelmingly believe in democratic governance, express high confidence that their votes count, and demonstrate broad political tolerance. Institutional trust, though often, moderate, signals steady confidence in key state bodies such as the Electoral Commission, Parliament, the Judiciary, and the Media.

Despite these strengths, the survey also shows that public trust is performance-driven. Citizens strongly link democratic satisfaction to government delivery, especially in areas such as job creation, cost of living, environmental governance, and public service performance. This underscores a pragmatic democratic culture in which legitimacy is earned through results. As Ghana approaches the next electoral cycle, expectations for transparency, economic competence, and accountable leadership will shape public sentiment.

Overall, the findings reveal a democratic system that is stable because citizens believe in it, yet they remain vigilant and demand responsive governance. This creates both opportunity and responsibility for government, institutions, and political actors to reinforce democratic gains through effective policy delivery.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strengthen Economic Delivery and Job Creation

Employment and the cost of living stand out as the most urgent public concerns. To address these, government should scale youth employment programmes, expand apprenticeships, support SMEs through credit and tax relief, and enhance agricultural productivity through mechanisation and inputs. Targeted cost-of-living interventions, such as subsidies and stricter market regulation, are essential to reduce household economic pressure.

2. Deepen Transparency and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Although many believe corruption has improved, confidence remains conditional. Strengthening procurement integrity, publishing regular updates on corruption cases, protecting anti-graft institutions, and expanding secure whistleblowing channels will solidify trust. Digital audit systems and transparent contracting processes can further improve accountability.

3. Increase Civic Engagement and Inclusive Communication

With over 90% acknowledging the importance of media and civil society in political information, expanding civic education is critical. Media literacy initiatives, particularly for those with lower education levels can deepen trust. Government communication should be multilingual, accessible, and delivered across radio, community forums, and digital channels.

4. Improve Parliamentary and Constituency Responsiveness

While institutional trust in Parliament is high, many citizens question whether MPs effectively represent them. Introducing annual constituency scorecards, strengthening town hall engagement, and resourcing constituency offices can improve visibility and responsiveness. MPs should prioritise transparent reporting and regular community interaction.

5. Protect Electoral Integrity and Address Vote Buying

Despite strong belief in electoral fairness, the high levels of witnessed vote buying pose risks to legitimacy. Stricter enforcement of campaign finance rules, community election monitoring, public education on the dangers of vote buying, and proactive Electoral Commission transparency can safeguard electoral integrity.

6. Prioritize Environmental Governance and Anti-“Galamsey” Enforcement

Illegal mining remains a top concern. Strengthening multi-agency enforcement, providing alternative livelihoods for mining communities, expanding satellite monitoring, and establishing environmental restoration funds can curb environmental degradation and enhance public confidence in environmental governance.

7. Consolidate National Security Gains

Public satisfaction with security is high, but sustained investment is needed. Expanding intelligence-led policing, community policing structures, border security systems, and early-warning mechanisms through traditional and local authorities will reinforce public trust and stability.

8. Enhance Effectiveness of Flagship Programmes

Although awareness of flagship programmes is high, many remain neutral about their effectiveness. Transparent monitoring and evaluation frameworks, beneficiary feedback systems, and prioritisation of programmes with strong economic multiplier effects will close the credibility gap and improve policy outcomes.

9. Support Long-Term Leadership Development

Citizens prioritise visionary leadership, economic competence, and integrity. Building leadership pipelines within political parties, academia, and civil society, alongside youth leadership academies, women's leadership support, and policy innovation platforms, will strengthen Ghana's long-term governance capacity.



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