



## The Election of The House of Representatives: The Results and The Outcomes

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*The National Independent Elections Authority* announced the results of the 2025 House of Representatives election in seven successive statements. Following the announcement, and the appointment of 5% of its members (28 deputies), the House convened in full composition. This study discusses all matters related to the election; namely, voting, vote count, and announcement of results and its implications; while focusing on particular aspects, primarily the election integrity, the significance of voter turnout, analysis of what political parties and actors have achieved, new aspects in this election, and its impact on the future of the country at large, including the anticipated presidential election – scheduled for 2030.

## Executive Summary

### First Election Integrity

The Egyptian state found it no longer necessary to engineer elections through classical methods, and employed, instead, the absolute list or party block system. The civil society, on another hand, contributed to the election integrity through two contradictory perspectives; first of which was the perspective of Egyptian and international institutions, as well as media which monitored the integrity of the electoral process under the *Authority's* conditions; calling the exercise "follow-up" rather than "monitoring," a term intended to avoid serious oversight. The second perspective involved civil society organizations being used to bribe voters.

Beyond legislation, the *Authority's* conduct seemed perplexing; it arranged the names of individual candidates in a particular order favoring *Mustaqbal Watan* "The Future of the Nation" Party. Additionally, electoral money existed as a more prevailing means of violating integrity rules.

Moreover, organizations and monitoring entities documented irregularities such as dismissal of representatives of candidates from polling stations during vote monitoring, existence of multiple counting and tallying reports for the same

ballot station (instance of Al-Jousaq station in Belbeis), candidates breaking the election blackout, and bribing voters with boxes of rationed goods and cash amounts – especially women and elderly voters. Observers also noted organized voter mobilization and guidance through mass transportation and group voting. Also, voters inside ballot booths had paper notes directing them to vote for specific individuals. Multiple ballot stations were merged into a single station, making it impossible for all registered voters to cast their ballots (instance of Balqina station in Mahalla al-Kubra).

Most of the above observations elicited a response from *the Authority* in the second phase of the election, as the *Authority's* spokesperson explicitly instructed the heads of counting stations to provide candidates representatives with copies of the count reports immediately after conclusion of the count. The instructions were in response to President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's statement which emphasized the importance of “ensuring that each candidate's representative shall receive a copy of the vote count report from the sub-committee”, a day ahead of the first phase results announcement.

As for grievances and appeals, and subsequent rulings of election reruns, it is worth noting that the Election Authority and the judiciary decided a complete reruns in 19 constituencies, followed by a *Supreme Administrative Court* decision on November 29, 2025, to rerun elections in 30 constituencies. Some appeals were also referred to the *Court of Cassation*.

Yet, there has been a pivotal concern on the *Supreme Administrative Court* rulings, that is: wouldn't it be more reasonable for the court to annul the results of the *National List* which won the ballot uncontested; since the court has already cancelled the ballot in many of the first phase constituencies, affecting – along with other rerun decisions made by the *National Elections Authority* – up to 70% of the total first phase constituencies?

It remains important—from the perspective of election integrity—to assess President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's intervention in electoral affairs, both from approving and disapproving stances.

## Second: Significance of Voter Turnout

1. Supposedly, addressing poll turnout requires certain figures and statistics – as previously indicated – to be fully available. However, such figures are not necessarily available, with *the National Elections Authority* deliberately concealing them from the public.
2. The voter turnout rates have declined in this election, both in the lists and individual systems. The turnout rate in the first phase governorates was 23.59%, declining to 17.31% in the second phase governorates. Such striking sharp decline in turnout happened because of voters' skepticism about the integrity of the election and lack of trust in the impartiality of the *National Elections Authority*, particularly following the indirect criticism of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to the work of *the Authority* on the eve of the first phase results announcement, on November 18, 2025, and less than a week ahead of the second phase ballot.
3. *The National Elections Authority's* announcement, while concluding its work on January 10, 2026, that the overall turnout was 32.41% cannot be verified and was not justified by *the Authority* at all. Doubts about this figure arise for several reasons.
4. Voter turnout rates in the 2025 elections, particularly in the individual category during rerun rounds in general, or second-round runoffs, are among the lowest of all Egyptian elections. In fact, such poor turnout makes it unimaginable for this election to bring in genuine representatives of the Egyptian people.
5. The rerun elections, after accepting grievances and subsequent court rulings, overturned the checks and balances made by political parties and actors. Originally-cooperating pro-government parties had been driven into competing against one another in some constituencies, with their candidates facing off in runoff rounds. In some cases, one party even had two candidates running for the same seat.
6. Comparing the candidates' vote count – as disclosed by *the Authority* – in the first phase's first round to the count in the rerun revealed a drop in the latter turnout, even though candidates of the first round are the same to rerun the ballot, following the decision of *the Authority* and the *Supreme Administrative Court*. Such drop indicated voters' fatigue, being overburdened by candidates call to them to vote again in a court-ruled or *Authority*-decided rerun, making them less interested to cast their votes

again. Not to mention candidates being tired out due to having to overspend dirty money as bribes to voters, either directly or through civil society organizations.

Such rational grounds for reluctance to participate, do not override one primary cause; that is *the National Elections Authority's* conduct, particularly the gravely erroneous count in plenty of instances, including, among others, its overstatement of number of voters in the first canceled round.

Finally, as concluded from the ballot count, most court rulings or *Authority* decisions (following the President's intervention) involved constituencies in which *Mustaqbal Watan* and other pro-government parties' candidates were declared winners.

The humble turnout in this election remains the hallmark which will render *the House of Representatives* flawed. It does not establish genuine legitimacy, with many figures still being questionable even after a few reruns.

### **Third: An Analysis of The Achievements of Political Parties and Actors**

Following the announcement of the election results —both for the individual seats and the closed-list system—many takeaways can be discerned out of announced results.

1. Regarding the list system ballot, conducted in four constituencies or sectors across the governorates of Egypt, the *National List for Egypt*—the sole participating list, as previously noted—secured victory in the first round after surpassing the legally required threshold of 5 % of the total number of registered voters in each sector. Thus, the 284 listed candidates—classified according to their designated quotas, either as public figures or as representatives of the seven constitutionally mandated quotas, further specified by law, (women, Christians, workers, farmers, youth, persons with disabilities, and Egyptian expatriates)—won their seats.

The data on numbers and characteristics of each quota representation revealed shortcomings, including – as previously outlined: relatives of party leaders being

placed on reserve lists (evidently with intent of inheriting their seats in case the primary membership is revoked or annulled), single candidate fitting under multiple quotas, and nominating candidates without due consideration of their place of birth or their geographic registration in voters database. Accordingly, twelve parties—the members of this list—secured their victory.

2. Data on *the Unified National List* winning candidates show that 83% are affiliated with pro-government parties, namely: *Mustaqbal Watan* (43%), *Humat Al-Watan* (54%), *The National Front* (15%), and *The Republican People's Party* (6%). Eight remaining parties along with independent candidates included in the list, were represented in no more than the remaining percentage. In other words, in the List System, the *House* holds marginal or symbolic representation the eight parties, together with independent candidates—who are going to enjoy significant status given their remarkable results in the Individual System. The eight parties are: *Al-Wafd Party*, *At-Tagammu Party*, *Al-Mo'tamar Party (The Conference)*, *Al-Adl Party (Justice)*, *the Egyptian Social Democratic Party*, *The Reform and Development Party*, *The Generation Will Party*, and *Al-Hurriya Party (Freedom)*.

3. In the Individual System, the rerun rates were high in both rounds, compounded by the rerun of the election at large due to grievances and court ruling – standing out as an unprecedented situation in the history of Egyptian elections, leading *The Authority* to announce the results in course of seven separate announcements starting 18 November 2025 through 10 January 2026.

According to the table, the first phase governorates elections were conducted over five separate days, to fill 143 seats, on dates: 18 November, 11 December, 18 December 2025, 4 January, and 10 January 2026. Two more announcements were made on 2 December and 25 December 2025, pertaining to the second phase elections, to fill 141 seats. In the former five announcements, 42, 8, 35, 9, and 49 candidates claimed victory respectively, while in the latter two announcements 40 and 101 seats were filled, respectively.

4. *Mustaqbal Watan* secured the highest number of seats in the Individual System by winning 106 seats. When added to the seats obtained through *the National List*, the party's total seats rise to 227 seats, equal 40% of the 568 elected seats in *the House of Representatives*. Assessing gains and losses under the absolute-list system is inherently relative—particularly in case of uncontested win—since real competition takes place in the individual system

aces. As evident in the table, the share of *Mustaqbal Watan* in the Individual System would have been significantly greater were it not for the presidential intervention that prompted *The Elections Authority* to overturn all preset arrangements. It is worth mentioning that *Mustaqbal Watan* occupied 315 seats in the 2020 election, out of which 145 through the list system, and 170 through the individual system. The decline in 2025 is primarily due to the establishment of *the National Front*, with subsequent deductions from the share of *Mustaqbal Watan* and other parties.

5. Independent candidates constituted the second-largest power in this election, winning 96 individual seats and 8 list seats, for a total of 104 seats, equal to 18.3% of elected seats. Apart from independent candidates running under the list system, the actual strength lies in the 96 seats earned through hard work on the ground. Independent candidates might have won more had the first-round election in the first phase been managed in the same manner as the subsequent phases.

6. *Humat Al-Watan*, *the National Front*, and *the Republican People's Party* stood out as the third, fourth, and fifth political actors in the election, securing 33, 22, and 9 seats respectively, excluding list seats. List seats, in this election, cannot be regarded as an honorary triumph, neither do they reflect real popularity for their holders. The three mentioned parties secured 79, 46, and 11 winners, respectively, yielding success rates of 41.8%, 47.8%, and 81.8% respectively. It is noteworthy that *Humat Al-Watan* occupied 23 seats (19 list seats + 4 individual seats), while the *Republican People's Party* occupied 50 seats (28 list seats + 22 individual seats).

7. Newly established parties; namely *Al-Adl*, *Al-Mo'tamar*, *Generation Will*, *the Egyptian Democratic Party*, *Al-Hurriya*, *The Reform and Development Party*, and *Al-Wa'y Party (Awareness)* seemed to have limited power, winning only crumbs of parliamentary seats. In the individual system—which is more telling of voters will than the list system—the mentioned parties only won marginal representation, with 3, 1, 0, 2, 0, 2, and 1 seats respectively. Even with adding their candidates on the uncontested absolute list, the total number will amount to 30 seats in total, which remains humble if compared to the powerful representation of pro-government parties in both list and individual systems.

8. Parties of *The Civil Democratic Movement*—established a few years after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took office in 2014, following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, to act as the backbone of The National Dialogue initiated by Sisi in April 2022—won a total of 8 seats; primarily won by *the Reform and Development Party*, *Al-Adl Party*, *the Egyptian Social Democratic Party*, and *the Conservatives*, with 2, 3, 2, and 1 seats respectively. It is worth noting that *The Civil Movement*, which involves around 11 opposition actors and public figures, has categorically washed its hands of any results achieved by the mentioned parties repeatedly, most recently in a statement issued on 7 January 2026. Such disavowal is basically because the former three parties have agreed to participate under *The National List* which follows the absolute-list system, while the *Conservatives*, although not participating in *the National List*, won a sole individual seat thanks to a declared coordination with pro-government parties.

9. Egypt's two oldest parties, namely *Al-Wafd* (established in 1919 and resurfaced in 1977) and *At-Tagammu* (established in 1976), suffered a major defeat—an unsurprising outcome given their diminished presence on the ground, particularly compared to the more prominent roles both parties played following the formation of the third partisan pluralism system on 11 November 1976. *Al-Wafd* and *At-Tagammu* were represented in *The List* with 7 and 4 candidates respectively, and won 2 and 1 seats under the individual system, respectively.

10. *Al-Adl* and *The Egyptian Democratic* parties are the two opposition parties to win the largest number of seats in both the list and individual systems (11 each), standing out as – presumptively – the potential opposition leaders in *the House of Representatives*. Such presumption could be nominally or numerically valid, yet, cannot be objectively taken into consideration, as the opposition's performance in parliament has historically been marked with weakness and inefficiency. The powers granted to members of parliament under the current constitution are neither enforced nor utilized, and the majority – by virtue of numbers – is still capable of dwarfing any opposition endeavors.

11. *Al-Nour Party*, by winning 6 seats, is among the most voted-for parties in this election. That *Party* was not included in *the List*, which means that its results are based on genuine popularity, not as fake as seats won through the flawed absolute-list system – accused of voter fraud. Therefore, if compared to parties other than the four pro-government parties, *Al-Nour* may indeed be considered as the dark horse of this race.

12. Of the 34 parties running this election, only 15 to be represented in the 2025 parliament; including 10 parties winning seats under both the list and individual systems, two parties to be represented only with *The List*, namely *Al-Hurriya* and *Generation Will*), and three parties winning only the individual system seats, namely *the Conservatives*, *Al-Nour*, and *Al-Wa'y*. Thus, the percentage of parties represented in parliament is 44.1% of all parties running this election. Without the uncontested list seats, the percentage would have fallen to 38.2%. In comparison, the 2020 parliament involved only 13 parties. This election witnessed more representation, thanks to having *The Conservatives*, *Al-Wa'y*, and *The National Front*; while *The Modern Egypt Party* is missed. Generally, any assessment of the parliamentary representation—whether in the 2025 election or earlier ones—should be approached with caution, as Egyptian partisan environment tend to be fragile and more decorative than substantive.

## Fourth: New Electoral Aspects

*The House of Representatives* election ballot began on 7 November 2025 and continued through 4 January 2026. A new House of Representatives was formed a few days later, shortly after a presidential decree appointing 5% of the members of *the House*, 28 deputies. Based on what transpired in the past weeks, it can be observed that this election was marked by distinctive aspects, some are new and some seemed more visible than earlier elections.

First Aspect: The President's intervention in the electoral process.

Second Aspect: *The National Elections Authority* failure to manage the election.

Third Aspect: The large number of court rulings and accepted grievances.

Fourth Aspect: Running competition for only half of the elected seats.

Fifth Aspect: Open and shameless sale of *House of Representatives* seats.

Sixth Aspect: Dropped turnout, compared to the Senate election.

Seventh Aspect: Diminished number of candidates.

Eighth Aspect: Planned inheritance of parliamentary seats at large scale.

Ninth Aspect: Political money being heavily used.

Tenth Aspect: The traditional media momentum faded away in favor of digital media.

Eleventh Aspect: The widespread invalidation of votes at the ballot box.

## **Fifth: Elections, Parliament, and the Future of the Political System in Egypt**

The election of 2025 *House of Representatives* concluded, ushering the formation of a new parliament. A rocky road and stumbling walk were ahead of the main actor; namely the administration, candidates, and voters, as well as those behind the scenes; especially concerned agencies which struggled and grappled over the formation, as each wished, despite their shared affiliation with the executive authority. Such dynamics foreshadow a great tragedy befalling not only the anticipated parliament, but rather the entire political landscape in Egypt.

Undoubtedly, this election stands out as the all-important election in Egypt's history, with challenges never experienced before in Egypt even in its darkest times. The vitality of this election also lies in the role of the *House of Representatives* in the public sphere in Egypt, as well as its role in the 2030 presidential election, in which – by virtue of the constitution – President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shall not participate, presumably, unless certain conditions change. It is, therefore, crucial to have a genuine outcome, seriously sought for by each and every party, to spare Egypt the bleak fate of neighboring countries which, starkly, endured destabilization, and plunged into mires of chaos.

Monumental challenges, therefore, are ahead of the public landscape in Egypt, and must be tackled with professionalism and caution, to avoid falling into the muddle of chaos. In this concluding section of this study, there will be a review of approaches deemed effective, both for the parliament, and the public sphere at large.

## First: Election Integrity

The integrity of parliamentary elections is intrinsically linked to all circumstances involving unusual interventions in the electoral process, whether financial or behavioral, that may lead to altering or tampering with the results, thereby causing a clear change in the composition of *the House of Representatives*. Such conduct, involving actions by any or all of the stakeholders; the election administration, candidates, or voters, constitutes a breach of electoral integrity.

To begin with, it is worth noting that the classical Egyptian approaches to rig the will of voters, which were in place until recently, have ceased to exist. Such approaches involved engineering the ballot through certain tools, such as gerrymandering the constituencies, hiding ballot boxes, and hindering voters access to ballot stations through direct interference by security forces; as well as voter fraud by tampering with voters database. Following the events of January 2011, with the immediate short-lived democratization of electoral procedures and rules, The Egyptian state found it no longer necessary to employ such classical approaches, and rather embraced new innovative mechanisms years later; such as enacting an electoral law based on the party bloc system—known in the media as the “absolute list”—a system that significantly shapes the composition of parliament.

Despite the inherent difficulty of constituency demarcation in Egypt due to the uneven geographical population distribution, the 2025 demarcation has produced a fairer representation than that in place since the adoption of the absolute list system. Flaws and common complaints stood out, due to the vast size of constituencies under that system, yet the major disparities between the number of voters and the number of their elected representatives in parliament have subsided greatly; which comes as a commendable act of the state, and a positive aspect of the parliamentary legislation that has been gazette on 4 June 2025, under Law No. 85 of 2025 amending *the Law on House of Representatives* No. 46 of 2014 and *Law on the Electoral Constituencies for the House of Representatives* No. 174 of 2020. In other words, the demarcation was fair from a statistical standpoint, yet from a geographic or spatial standpoint, it remained burdensome for candidates.

Despite the notable success, there still has been a drawback that undermined the integrity of the 2025 *House of Representatives* election, namely persistent control over the composition of *the House*. Such drawback was highlighted by maintaining legislation that validates a majoritarian electoral system—with both the absolute list and the individual candidacy systems. Such legislation has been in place since the 2015 election, and furthered its implications with the increase in the proportion of seats allocated to the absolute list relative to individual seats in the 2020 and 2025 elections, shifting from 21% to 79% in the former election to 50% to 50% in the latter two. Such system— as previously noted— substantially rigs the will of the voters.

The civil society, on another hand, contributed to the election integrity through two contradictory perspectives; first of which was the perspective of Egyptian and international institutions, as well as media and political parties monitoring rooms, where there was a close monitoring of the vote to ensure its fairness, particularly during and after the ballot. Despite their observations – as commonly seen in elections monitoring reports worldwide – such institutions did not go so far as to question the overall integrity of the electoral process, or to refuse to recognize it. However, concerns have been raised on placing multiple procedures and conditions to restrict free voting, in which the *National Elections Authority* itself participated. *The Authority* continued to impose constraints on the “monitoring” role of Egyptian and international civil society—favorably referred to by the legislator and the election administration as “follow-up,” a term deliberately intended to avoid genuine, substantive oversight of the elections.

The second perspective for the civil society’s role, according to the *Egyptian Organization for Human Rights* and monitoring rooms of some political parties, involved certain civil society entities—those not accredited by the *National Elections Authority* as official observers— being used by pro-government parties and independent candidates to bribe voters into voting for their favor. According to independent observers, such practice took place during both rounds of the election.

Beyond legislation, the conduct of the *National Elections Authority*—that officially supervises and manages the election—seemed perplexing and hard to comprehend. Such conduct can be addressed from several angles, two of which merit particular mention: one is procedural and the other is substantive.

The procedural aspect concerns the ambiguity and lack of transparency, as well as inadequacy of data and statistics on the election results. The substantive aspect relates to the order of candidacy submission, a process regulated by the *Authority* based on the order in which prospective candidates appear to submit their candidacy applications. The significance of this particular process lies in the fact that it determines the order in which candidates' names appear on the ballot card. Here, the *Authority* seemingly intervened in a manner that favored the individual-seat candidates of the *Mustaqbal Watan Party*, by ensuring their priority in candidacy submission. While such prioritization might be acceptable in certain instances—due to the early arrival of *Mustaqbal Watan* candidates—what rendered it unreasonable was the consistent pattern of reserving top candidacy numbers (thus top positions on the ballot card) across all constituencies, with a single exception. Such arrangement effectively facilitates directing voters into selecting the candidates listed first on the ballot card. *The National Elections Authority*, therefore, is believed to play an effective role in the electoral campaign of *Mustaqbal Watan Party*, and thereby compromising its neutrality in practice.

The conduct of *the Authority* is marked with unmistakable bias, influenced by those behind the establishment of *Mustaqbal Watan*, which infringes Clause 5 of Article 22 of Law No. 198 of 2017 on *the National Elections Authority*. It also requires the *Supreme Judicial Council* to suspend *the Authority* from performing its duties and to revoke the assignment of the ten judges who make up its Board of Directors, in accordance with Articles 25 and 26 of the aforementioned law, which grant the *Council* this power in cases where the *Authority* engages in campaigning or compromises its duty of neutrality.

Additionally, electoral money was prevalent, standing as the most common means of breaching electoral integrity rules, particularly in elections in Third World countries. Such electoral behavior is often coupled with overspending, violence, and tribalism. Even in rerunning the ballot in the 19 constituencies, dirty money stood out as the primary cause for reruns. Using dirty money usually manifests itself several manners, primarily: exceeding the prescribed spending limits, exceeding the maximum allowable donations, bribery and vote-buying especially on ballot day, spending out of registered bank accounts throughout campaign periods, failure to maintain financial expenditure records, and foreign funding. One may confirm that all the aforementioned forms, except

for foreign funding, were employed in the 2025 *House of Representatives election*. Notably, the penalties for such irregularities, except for foreign funding, do not extend to candidate disqualification; rather, according to Article 68 of *The Exercise of Political Rights Law*, penalties are limited to fines ranging between 10,000 and 100,000 Egyptian pounds, equivalent to no more than two thousand US dollars.

Many candidates, either personally or through their parties, breached their campaign spending ceilings in numerous constituencies. Such violations, despite being easy to detect, occurred openly before *the Election Authority*, which remained incapable of intervening, relying solely on monitoring the bank accounts of parties and individual candidates. Such accounts were practically proven not to be the official and sole source of candidate expenditures, given the existence of other unmonitored funding sources.

Following the implicit warning of President El-Sisi to *the National Elections Authority* on November 17, 2025, a night ahead of announcing the first-round results—directing to uphold electoral integrity and fairness—*the Authority* issued notices to three pro-government parties, directing to promptly remove campaign materials which exceeded the ceiling in various governorates.

*The Authority*, seemingly, resisted to comply with instructions from a security entity, received during the election of *The Senate* and the first phase of the election of *The House*. *The Authority*, however, favored full compliance with the instructions of the President, who seemed to be awestruck by alarming reports he received from sovereign bodies, indicating that certain security agencies aimed to lead the country into destabilization. That was a recollection of the situation preceding January 25, 2011 from various lenses; namely parliamentary election fraud as witnessed in the 2010 election *People's Assembly*. The President alluded to this concern in a statement on November 18, 2025, hours after the *National Elections Authority* announced the first phase results, stating that "Egypt was on the brink of the abyss in 2011," and describing his previous day's remarks on violations and the *Authority's* position as a "veto."

In terms of facts on the ground, *the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights*, alongside the monitoring rooms of several political parties—such as *the Egyptian Social Democratic*, *the Conservatives*, *Al-Adl*, *Al-Waa'y*, *the Democratic Generation*, and *the Conference* parties—as well as individual candidates, have reported

irregularities – committed both by the election administration and by candidates and their affiliates – to *the National Elections Authority*. The reported irregularities involved dismissal of representatives of candidates from polling stations during vote monitoring, existence of multiple counting and tallying reports for the same ballot station (instance of Al-Jousaq station in Belbeis), candidates breaking the election blackout, and bribing voters with boxes of rationed goods and cash amounts – especially women and elderly voters. Observers also noted organized voter mobilization and guidance through mass transportation and group voting. Also, voters inside ballot booths had paper notes directing them to vote for specific individuals. Multiple ballot stations were merged into a single station, making it impossible for all registered voters to cast their ballots (instance of Balqina station in Mahalla al-Kubra). The latest irregularity, reported by observers in Almatariya district in Cairo, involved the cards with QR codes so voters can use it to receive food rations. That was the most flagrant means of manipulation and result-tampering, by exploiting the economic destitute and social vulnerability of voters on the ballot day— showing a behavior that the election administration was unable to halt entirely. Most of the reported observations elicited a response from *the Authority* in the second phase of the election, as the *Authority's* spokesperson explicitly instructed the heads of counting stations to provide candidates representatives with copies of the count reports immediately after conclusion of the count. The instructions were in response to President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's statement which emphasized the importance of “ensuring that each candidate's representative shall receive a copy of the vote count report from the sub-committee – so to be assured that *the House of Representatives* shall accommodate true representation of the people under its dome”, a day ahead of the first phase results announcement. This position by the President amounted to a blow to *the National Elections Authority*, whose conduct had already been exposed by the statement of the Maritime Club of the Administrative Prosecution after the conclusion of the first phase. That statement indicated that *the Authority* had prevented members of Administrative Prosecution Office from handing over the count reports to candidates and their agents, in contravention of Article 48 of *the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights*.

In spite of *the Authority* attempts to restore its control and to resolve the problems it had created, complaints persisted back and forth among judges supervising the poll stations and candidates or their representatives, right

through the second phase. Many, on candidates' side, have subsequently been taken to court, merely for exercising their legal right to monitor the ballot, (instances of *the Conservative Party*; with its candidate in Suez, and a female member of the its board for, have both been taken to court due to monitoring the ballot in Suez and Al-Dhaheer constituencies).

Furthermore, with the second phase of the election, *the National Elections Authority* announced that it was receiving and investigating complaints, noting that irregularities had indeed occurred and were being addressed seriously, which seems not to be utterly fulfilled. Security forces, also, responded efficiently to the *Authority's* reports of irregularities during the second phase—unlike the first phase, prior to the President's warning. Observers have duly noted statements issued by the Ministry of Interior on pursuit of troublemakers and persons attempting to influence the ballot around polling stations through the use of loudspeakers or vote-buying.

As for electoral grievances and appeals, and the subsequent rulings of election reruns it is of great importance to highlight the decisions made by *the Election Authority* and the judiciary, being – from an official standpoint – the ultimate recourse to ensure justice, impartiality, integrity and transparency of the election.

On 18 November 2025—the scheduled date for announcing the results of the first round of the first phase, and only hours after President El-Sisi's implicit warning — *the National Elections Authority* decided to accept grievances filed by several candidates, and ordered a complete rerun of elections in 19 constituencies. This was followed by a ruling of *the Supreme Administrative Court* on 29 November 2025 ordering complete rerun in 26 constituencies and partial rerun in 4. In the latter, namely Giza, Al-Mahmoudiya, Aswan, and Al-Montaza, the *Court* excluded candidates whose victory had already been announced, and ordered rerun for the remaining candidates to complete the constituencies representation. Further, *the Supreme Administrative Court* referred the announced results of certain constituencies to the *Court of Cassation* to determine the validity of memberships for the declared winners.

A similar scene unfolded in the second-phase elections. The Court initially reviewed around 300 appeals against the decisions of *the National Elections Authority*. On 11 December 2025, the *Court* dismissed most of appeals, yet

referred 67 of them to *the Court of Cassation* to give final ruling on results announced by *the Authority*. *The Court* did not alter any of the results – subject of the 300 appeals – with a single exception in Talkha district, where it modified the names and order of the candidates for whom the *Authority* had ordered a rerun. Following the run-off of the second phase in mid-December 2025, and the first-round rerun in certain districts – which was held by virtue of *the Supreme Administrative Court's* ruling – at the end of December 2025 and on 1 January 2026; losers filed several appeals. Some were rejected, while others were referred to *the Court of Cassation*.

Many observations are worth to be highlighted in regards to the appeals and their rulings.

First, under the Constitution, *the Court of Cassation* is the sole entity to determine the validity of the membership of the declared winners, within 60 days of after lodging the appeal, in contradiction with the former constitution – which was in place for four decades under former Presidents Sadat and Mubarak – where the final say —after the *Court of Cassation's* decision—ultimately landed up with the Parliament itself.

Second, *the Administrative Court* has jurisdiction over appeals related to voting and counting procedures, all decisions preceding the announcement of results, irregularities affecting electoral integrity, as well as disqualification of candidates by *the Authority*. *The Court of Cassation*, by contrast, rules on the validity of membership and on appeals filed after the announcement of results.

Finally, regarding the *Supreme Administrative Court's* rulings following its decision to rerun elections in 30 constituencies, it has been noted that *the Court* subsequently referred many of the accepted appeals to *the Court of Cassation*, which seemed to reflect a reluctance to order a second rerun in certain constituencies, as such a rerun would delay the convening of the new *House of Representatives*, which was required by law to convene before mid-January 2026.

Yet, there has been a pivotal concern on the *Supreme Administrative Court* rulings, that is: wouldn't it be more reasonable for the court to annul the results of the *National List* which won the ballot uncontested; since the court has already cancelled the ballot in around 43% of the first phase constituencies, affecting – along with other rerun decisions made by the *National Elections Authority* – up to

70% of the total first phase constituencies?! The answer, undoubtedly, seems logical. The list-seats ballot was held on the very same day and in the very same polling stations with the individual-seat ballot. It is therefore impossible to decide whether or not the financial corruption that affected the individual system ballot had also affected the list system—given that the list required mobilization efforts to ensure high turnout and to secure at least 5% of the votes in its favor. Similarly, since the vote-counting process was marred by numerous errors—admitted by the *Court* itself—in most of first-phase districts (70%), nobody then can confirm beyond doubt that such errors did not also affect the tally of votes cast for the list.

It remains important—from the perspective of election integrity—to assess President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's intervention in electoral affairs, and whether this intervention should be viewed positively or negatively. The President's intervention can be seen in three senses; the first of which perceives it as a significant intervention that contributed to rectifying the situation in terms of procedural integrity after—and perhaps even before—his remarks. The President's statements on the election prompted the decision to rerun elections in districts that had witnessed unprecedented irregularities. Moreover, his intervention changed the course of the second phase in favor of further electoral integrity, and helped reducing candidates' violations, and prompted *the National Elections Authority* to exercise greater precision.

A second sense of the President's intervention argues that the President was not concerned with electoral integrity per se, but rather with preserving stability of the regime, and avoiding a scenario in which widespread violations could lead to a crisis similar to the turmoil and collapse of legitimacy that country had gone through following the 2010 elections—an episode that contributed to the events of 25 January 2011. Supporters of this view believed that what happened is a conflict between state security agencies: on one side, the National Security Sector, sought to steer the *National Elections Authority* to fulfil its own preferences; on the other—the General Intelligence Service, whose position the President ultimately supported—believed that the country was heading toward the worst-case scenario so long as the National Security Agency dominated the process.

A third sense, deemed the President's intervention misguided, as that it ultimately confirmed that the electoral process in Egypt was not conducted with

integrity, neither this year nor in previous years. This is, mainly, because the intervention demonstrated the lack of independence of *the National Elections Authority*. This view was expressed by ten Egyptian organizations in a statement issued on 22 November 2025, in which they argued that “the direct intervention of President El-Sisi in the electoral process clearly exhibits the fraudulent nature of this process, and proves the lack of independence of *the National Elections Authority*. Such exceptional intervention, and *the Authority’s* immediate compliance with it, reveals the extent to which the electoral process and the entire political sphere are subject to the will of El-Sisi.”

## Second: Significance of Voter Turnout

Participation in voting is regarded as one of the most significant indicators of voters’ confidence in the electoral process, it also reflects to what degree the voters are satisfied with their ruling regime. Conversely, reluctance to participate—whether passively by not refraining from casting the ballot, or actively by intentionally invalidating the ballot—constitutes one of the most important signs of public discontent and apathy. By reluctance, the voter seeks to convey, in practice, a message of unwillingness to engage in public affairs, primarily because their participation yields no tangible benefits. A thorough study revealed declined interest in candidacy, which is worsened as the people become more aware of the crackdown exercised on the public sphere. The question to be raised, then: What about participation in voting?

1. Supposedly, addressing poll turnout requires certain figures and statistics – as previously indicated – to be fully available. However, such figures are not necessarily available, with *the National Elections Authority* deliberately concealing them from the public. Exceptionally, *The Authority* was keen on disclosing statistics related only to *The Unified List*, in order to ensure that it shall pass the election by any means without being subjected to a court ruling of rerun. *The Authority* refrained from releasing clear, sufficient, and justified data concerning the individual-seat election. There has been no release of any factual statistics on voters’ participation, unlike the pattern of the former *High Elections Commission* during elections held in earlier years, which deprived various stakeholders – such as researchers and experts – from fundamental information such as the number of eligible voters, voters social classifications, the number of voters who certainly cast ballots, the

number of valid and invalid votes, and other figures that could have provided insight into the actual conduct of the electoral process and helped address deficiencies in the future.

However, based on the limited information and data that *the Authority* did release, the voter turnout in this election was low (see the following table).

### **Voter Turnout in 2025 Election of The House of Representatives**

Phase and Round	First Phase – First Round	First Phase – Run-off	Second Phase – First Round	Second Phase – Run-off
Individual-seat Candidates	# 1282	172	1316	202
Absolute-list Candidates (Primary/ Reserve)	568	Result decided in first round	568	Result decided in first round
Polling Stations	5606	undisclosed	5287	undisclosed
General Committees	70	47	73	55
Individual-seat System Constituencies	70	47	73	55
Number of Individual-system Seats	143	86	141	101

Number of Absolute-List Seats	142	Result decided in first round	142	Result decided in first round
Monitoring/ Follow-up and Media Coverage		62 civil society organizations and NGOs, with 22540 observers. 86 international media institutions from 32 countries; including 21 international news agencies, 6 regional and international radio and TV networks, 25 international TV channels, and 23 newspapers and magazines.		
Governorates	14	14	13	13
Total registered in voters database 69891913	35279922	The Authority did not disclose total figure	34611991	The Authority did not disclose total figure
Attending voters – cast their ballot 14314204	8323873	The Authority did not disclose total figure	5990331	The Authority did not disclose total figure
Turnout in first round	23.59%	The Authority did not disclose total figure	17.31%	The Authority did not disclose total figure
Individual-seat System <b>Valid</b> Votes	Undisclosed for the overall round	Undisclosed for the overall round	Undisclosed for the overall round	Undisclosed for the overall round

Individual-seat System <b>Invalid</b> Votes	Undisclosed for the overall round			
Individual System Invalid votes rate	Undisclosed for the overall round			
Absolute-List System <b>Valid</b> Votes	7554969	Result decided in first round	4705411	Result decided in first round
Absolute-List System <b>Invalid</b> Votes	768904	Result decided in first round	4705411	Result decided in first round
Absolute-List System Invalid votes rate	9.24%	Result decided in first round	21.45%	Result decided in first round

Source: Compiled from the data issued by the National Election Authority in press conferences held on 18 November 2025 and 2 December 2025.

# The figure pertains only to the first-round of the first-phase elections. This election was rerun in 19 constituencies by decision of the National Election Authority, and in 30 constituencies by virtue of the Supreme Administrative Court ruling—26 constituencies in full and 4 constituencies partially.

2. The voter turnout rates have declined in this election, both in the absolute-list and individual-seat systems – when run simultaneously in the first round of each phase. The decline in turnout becomes stark in comparison with the turnout for 2020 election, according to data from *The National Election Authority*, and 2015 election, according to data from *The High Electoral Commission*. In the first phase of the current election, turnout stood at 23.59%, compared to 28.06% and 26.56% in the two preceding elections of 2020 and 2015, respectively. While in the second phase of 2025 election, turnout was 17.31%, compared to 29.5% and 29.83% in the two previous elections, respectively. With this comparison, it becomes clear that likeness of the public sentiment in 2015 and 2020 elections was followed by a decline in turnout in 2025. Such deterioration in the first phase of 2025 is, presumably, attributable to Egyptian voters' perception that the crises they suffer from

remained unresolved, despite their frequent visits to polling stations in referendums and elections, both presidential and parliamentary. Further the striking sharp decline in the second phase turnout – beyond the aforementioned reason – is linked to voters' skepticism about the integrity of the election and lack of trust in the impartiality of the *National Elections Authority*, particularly following the indirect criticism of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to the work of *the Authority* on the eve of the first phase results announcement, on November 18, 2025, and less than a week ahead of the second phase ballot.

The public sentiment is entirely different from what marked the electoral processes conducted following 25 January 2011, including the constitutional referendums of 2011, 2012, and 2014, as well as the 2012 parliamentary election and the 2012 and 2014 presidential elections. It is nevertheless important to recall that turnout figures for the mentioned electoral events must be addressed delicately, due to the fluctuations in eligible voters tendency, and their interaction with the ballot box depending on the type of vote (parliamentary, referendum, or presidential).

3. *The National Elections Authority's* announcement, while concluding its work on January 10, 2026, that the overall turnout was 32.41% cannot be verified and was not justified by *the Authority* at all. Doubts about this figure arise for three reasons:
  - a. First: In its statements announcing the results of the first-round voting for both phases, *the Authority* disclosed the turnout rate. If one combines the number of eligible voters nationwide (69,891,113) with the number of attending voters (14,314,204), the result would be that overall turnout rate is 20.48%. It is certain that turnout in the six ballots which succeeded the very first ballot would be even lower, due to diminished momentum and declining voter confidence following the reruns in numerous constituencies.
  - b. Second: When announcing the results of many runoff ballots, *the National Election Authority* explicitly stated that turnout in the runoff ranged between 2% and 6%. How, then, can the Authority now claim that the overall turnout rate was 32.41%?
  - c. Third: *The Authority's* current conduct is consistent with its behavior during the 2024 presidential election, when it announced that 44 million citizens had voted, without providing turnout with adequate

granularity, on the scale of the general committees, which stirred widespread skepticism: how could such a large number of voters have participated over only three days without any detailed evidence?

4. Voter turnout rates in the 2025 elections, particularly in the individual category during rerun rounds in general, or second-round runoffs, are among the lowest of all Egyptian elections. In fact, such poor turnout makes it unimaginable for this election to yield genuine representatives of the Egyptian people, capable of legislating on behalf of the electorate at large, or overseeing the government and holding it accountable. The following table highlights the constituencies with complete declared data, strictly as cited by the media. From the data, it becomes evident that the overwhelming majority of constituencies are characterized by low turnout rates, falling to as low as only 2% or 3% of registered voters.

In Abu Hummus, a stark discrepancy can be noted between the results of November 2025 and December 2025 elections. The former was run on the first ballot day, with officially announced turnout of 40.36%, whereas the latter was held after the rerun, following the *National Election Authority* decision to annul and rerun the ballot in 19 constituencies. Turnout in this rerun of the same constituency stood at 24.73%.

The figures show that the initial turnout reflected an implausible surge, subsequently declining after the annulment of the election and the remarks of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's, which highlighted the irregularities that had marred the electoral process and exposed the true course of the election.

### Turnout in Certain Constituencies in 2025 House of Representatives Election - Individual-seat System

Constituency	Ballot date	Registered Voters	Attending Voters	Turnout	Valid Ballots	Invalid Ballots	Invalid Ballots Rate
Al-Marg	15-18 Dec 2025	502104	18966	3.78%	17465	1501	7.91%
Giza	8-11 Dec 2025	700143	12467	1.78%	11435	1032	8.28%
AL-Badrashin	8-11 Dec 2025	704991	107414	15.24%	96221	11193	10.42%
Bulaq Al-Dakrur	8-11 Dec 2025	679428	24681	3.63%	22325	2356	9.55%
Abu Hummus	7-8, 10-11 Nov 2025	527327	212850	40.36%	198688	14162	6.65%
Al-Basatin	15-18 Dec 2025	627336	15236	2.43%	12685	2551	16.74%
Abu Hummus	1-4 Dec 2025	527327	130427	24.73%	126819	3610	2.77%
October First	8-11 Dec 2025	729042	15111	2.07%	13124	1987	13.15%
Monshaet Al-Qanater	8-11 Dec 2025	1002754	92854	9.26%	83594	9260	9.97%
Al-Khankah	15-18 Dec 2025	644807	44176	6.85%	41643	2533	5.73%
Luxor	8-11 Dec 2025	362108	51815	14.31%	49176	2639	5.09%
Al-Matariya	15-18 Dec 2025	490661	33027	6.73%	30777	2250	1.47%
Itay Al-Barud	8-11 Dec 2025	542913	144497	26.62%	141399	3168	2.2 %

Source: Compiled from Arab and Egyptian newspapers and websites

5. Deliberate invalidation of ballots constitutes another remarkable aspect of this election, driven by multiple causes and motivations. At times, the rate is low, reflecting voters' desire to decisively express their preferences, and their adequate familiarity with the candidates, and their genuine intention to choose—resulting in a lowered rate of invalid ballots (as in Al-Matariya and Itay Al-Baroud). At other times, the high rate of invalid ballots reflects a conscious decision by voters to cast a punitive vote against all candidates (as seen in Al-Basatin, October, and Al-Badrashin).
6. The rerun elections, after accepting grievances and subsequent court rulings, overturned the checks and balances made by political parties and actors. Originally-cooperating pro-government parties had been driven into

competing against one another in some constituencies, with their candidates facing off in runoff rounds. In some cases, one party even fielded two competing candidates running for the same seat. For example: in Al-Montazah constituency, *Humat Al-Watan Party* faced itself for a single seat in the run-off held on 3–4 January 2026. In Samannud constituency, *Mustaqbal Watan* competed against the *National Front Party* on 17–18 December 2025, and against *Humat Al-Watan* on 10–12 December 2025. *Mustaqbal Watan* and *The Reform and The Development Party* also raced each other for a seat in Menouf constituency on 17 – 18 December 2025.

7. Comparing the candidates' vote count – as disclosed by *the Authority* – in the first phase's first round to the count in the rerun revealed a drop in the latter turnout, even though candidates of the first round are the same to rerun the ballot, following the decision of *the Authority* and the *Supreme Administrative Court*. Such drop indicated voters' fatigue, being overburdened by candidates call to them to vote again in a court-ruled or *Authority*-decided rerun, making them less interested to cast their votes again. Not to mention candidates being tired out due to having to overspend dirty money as bribes to voters, either directly or through NGOs. Many of the NGOs have ceased to exercise such roles out of fear of closure, due to tightened scrutiny over dirty spendings, which remained as a practice, though in lesser visibility. There is no doubt that young people, the driving force in election, constituting two-thirds of the electorate, are the primary group concerned with the poor turnout, as they bear the greatest responsibility to explain either their engagement or disengagement.

The previously mentioned factors are reasonable justifications for voters' lack of interest —and consequently for the reduced number of votes obtained by winners, runoff contenders, and even the losers, yet it is not categorically ruled out that among the most significant reasons of such reluctance lies in the conduct of *the National Election Authority* itself. *The Authority* committed numerous grave mistakes in vote-count, inflated the turnout in the first round, which has been later annulled, and repeatedly miscalculated turnout figures. Moreover, *the Authority* had initially declared certain candidates victorious before the annulment, and then declared same candidates' defeat or – at best – their entry to the runoff race. Such conflicting announcements resulted in stark discrepancies between the vote totals for the very same candidates before and after the annulment. For example, in Imbaba constituency, *the Authority*

announced a runoff among four candidates for two seats. After the annulment and rerun, one of the four won the first round with reportedly 25,205 votes – a figure that dropped to only 12,715. *The Authority* then announced a runoff between two candidates, excluding the fourth candidate who had originally qualified for the runoff. Also, in the rerun one of the two candidates was a female candidate whose name was not listed for the runoff before the annulment.

Another example is the *National Front Party's* candidate in Qus, who had been initially declared winner with 65,000. Later, following the court-decided rerun, the very same candidate got out of the race, for having received only 12,000 votes. Similarly, remarkable discrepancies have been seen between the first ballot on one hand, and the court-ruled rerun in Al-Qusiya and Dokki, and *the Authority*-decided rerun (following the President's intervention) in Damanhour and Nagaa Hammadi on the other hand. The gap in numbers ranged between 40,000 and 90,000 votes. In other constituencies the results amounted to a major scandal for both the *National Election Authority* and the judicial supervision of the electoral process alike.

*(For detailed figures, see for example the "Besaraha" website, 12 December 2025, and "Tahya Masr," 5 December 2025.)*

Moreover, due to the eroded trust in the electoral process which made voters reluctant and heavy-footed during the rerun polls – mainly because of *the Authority's* conduct, and paradoxically enough, some candidates secured their seats after gaining more than 100,000 votes, while others won with fewer than 10,000 votes in constituencies where the number of registered voters ranges from approximately 250,000—as in the 10th of Ramadan constituency—to 750,000 voters, as in Beba constituency. For example, candidates of *Mustaqbal Watan* won their seats in Beba, Mahmoudiya, Kafr al-Dawwar, and Samalout, with 198,823 votes, 108,312 votes, 108,178 votes, and 110,643 votes respectively, while candidates of *Al-Mo'tamar Party* and *the National Front Party* won in Hada'yeq al-Qubba and the 10th of Ramadan with only 7,197 and 7,102 votes respectively. Likewise, *Mustaqbal Watan* candidate in al-Sahel won with 9,977 votes, while *Humat Al-Watan* candidate in as-Salam secured victory with 9,866 votes. Another striking example was the announcement by the General Committee of the defeat of two female candidates—one independent and the other from *Humat Al-Watan Party*—in the Sharqiyya governorate, although they

have both received tally reports clearly confirmed their victory. In this instance, and following the candidates' public appeals to the President, *The National Election Authority* swiftly admitted and corrected the mistake. In other words, had the law not granted candidates and their agents the right to attend the count and obtain copies of the tally reports, the matter could have resulted in undetected fraud, or at the very least in countless errors that would never have come to light. Such errors were, indeed, the reason for which *the Supreme Administrative Court* annulled the ballot in 30 constituencies of the first phase. Numerous candidates submitted conclusive evidences to *the Court*, which *the Authority* had failed to refute.

Finally, and based on the count reports, it became evident that the majority of the reruns, whether court-ruled or *Authority*-decided, following the President's intervention, are conducted in constituencies in which candidates from *Mustaqbal Watan* and other pro-government parties had been declared winners!

Overall, the extremely low voter-turnout rates—whether in the individual-seat system or the absolute-list system—together with the conflicting results of the primary ballot and the rerun, as well as the discrepancies between results announced by ballot stations and those announced by the General Committee, and the contradictions between the latter and *the National Election Authority* in the very same election, shall all remain crucial elements undermining the integrity of *the House of Representatives*. Let alone the questionable published figures even after reruns, making it impossible for genuine democratic legitimacy to be established.

## **Third: An Analysis of The Achievements of Political Parties and Actors**

Following the announcement of the election results for both the individual-seat system and the absolute-list system, evidently, many takeaways can be concluded.

1. Regarding the list system ballot, conducted in four constituencies or sectors across the governorates of Egypt, the *National List for Egypt*—the sole participating list, as previously noted—secured victory in the first round after surpassing the legally required threshold of 5 % of the total

number of registered voters in each sector. Thus, the 284 listed candidates—classified according to their designated quotas, either as public figures or as representatives of the seven constitutionally mandated quotas, further specified by law, (women, Christians, workers, farmers, youth, persons with disabilities, and Egyptian expatriates)—won their seats.

The data on numbers and characteristics of each quota representation revealed shortcomings, including – as previously outlined: relatives of party leaders being placed on reserve lists (evidently with intent of inheriting their seats in case the primary membership is revoked or annulled), single candidate fitting under multiple quotas, and nominating candidates without due consideration of their place of birth or their geographic registration in voters database. Accordingly, twelve parties—the members of this list—secured their victory.

#### **Distribution of seats acquired by political actors broken down by successive rounds**

Political Actors and Parties	Ballot System								Total number of seats
	Absolute-List	Individual-seat System							
	First Phase – First Round Poll 7-8 Nov, and 10-11 Nov 2025 Result 18 Nov 2025  Second Phase – First Round Poll 21-22 Nov, 24-25 Nov 2025 Result 2 Dec 2025	First Phase – First Round Poll 21-22 Nov, 24-25 Nov, and 10-11 Nov 2025 Result 18 Nov 2025	Second Phase – First Round Poll 21-22 Nov, 24-25 Nov 2025 Result 2 Dec 2025	First Phase Poll 1-2 Dec 2025, and 3-4 Dec 2025 Result 11 Dec 2025 (1)	First Phase Poll 8-11 Dec 2025 Result 18 Dec 2025 (2)	Second Phase – Runoff Round Poll 15-18 Dec 2025 Result 25 Dec 2025	First Phase Runoff Poll 24-25 Dec 2025, and 27-28 Dec 2025 Result 4 Jan 2026 (3)	First Phase Runoff Poll 31 Dec 2025-1 Jan 2026, and 3-4 Jan 2026 Result 10 Jan 2026 (4)	
Independent Candidates	8	1	4	5	3	46	16	21	104
<i>Mustaqbal Watal</i>	121	24	22	3	2	32	7	16	227
<i>Humat Al-Watan</i>	54	9	6	-	1	8	4	5	87
<i>The National Front</i>	43	5	4	-	1	9	2	1	65

<i>The Reform and Development</i>	8	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	9
<i>Al-Wafd</i>	7	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	9
<i>Al-Nour</i>	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	1	6
<i>The People's Republican Party</i>	16	1	2	-	-	-	3	3	25
<i>Al-Adl</i>	8	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	11
<i>Al-Mo'tamar</i>	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4
<i>At-tagammu</i>	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5
<i>The Conservatives</i>	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
<i>The Generation Will</i>	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Al-Hurriya</i>	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
<i>The Egyptian Democratic Party</i>	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	11
<i>Al-Wa'y</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	284	42	40	8	9	101	35	49	568

(1) The first-round poll in the 19 *Authority*-decided reruns + Atsa constituency runoff.

(2) The first-round poll in the 30 Court-ruled reruns.

(3) The runoff poll in the 19 *Authority*-decided reruns

(4) The runoff poll in the 30 Court-ruled reruns.

1. Data on *the Unified National List* winning candidates show that 83% are affiliated with pro-government parties, namely: *Mustaqbal Watan* (43%), *Humat Al-Watan* (54%), *The National Front* (15%), and *The Republican People's Party* (6%). Eight remaining parties along with independent candidates included in the list, were represented in no more than the remaining percentage. In other words, in the List System, the *House* holds marginal or symbolic representation the eight parties, together with independent candidates—who are going to enjoy significant status given their remarkable results in the Individual System. The eight parties are: *Al-Wafd Party*, *At-Tagammu Party*, *Al-Mo'tamar Party (The Conference)*, *Al-Adl Party (Justice)*, *the Egyptian Social Democratic Party*, *The Reform and Development Party*, *The Generation Will Party*, and *Al-Hurriya Party (Freedom)*.
2. As usual with majoritarian polls, the individual-seat system rerun rates were high in both rounds, compounded by the rerun of the election at

large due to grievances and court ruling – standing out as an unprecedented situation in the history of Egyptian elections, leading *The Authority* to announce the results in course of seven separate announcements starting 18 November 2025 through 10 January 2026. According to the table, the first phase governorates elections were conducted over five separate days, to fill 143 seats, on dates: 18 November, 11 December, 18 December 2025, 4 January, and 10 January 2026. Two more announcements were made on 2 December and 25 December 2025, pertaining to the second phase elections, to fill 141 seats. In the former five announcements, 42, 8, 35, 9, and 49 candidates claimed victory respectively, while in the latter two announcements 40 and 101 seats were filled, respectively.

3. *Mustaqbal Watan* secured the highest number of seats in the Individual-seat polls by winning 106 seats. When added to the seats obtained through *the National List*, the party's total seats rise to 227 seats, equal 40% of the 568 elected seats in *the House of Representatives*. Assessing gains and losses under the absolute-list system is inherently relative—particularly in case of uncontested win—since real competition takes place in the individual system races. As evident in the table, the share of *Mustaqbal Watan* in the Individual System would have been significantly greater were it not for the presidential intervention that prompted *The Elections Authority* to overturn all preset arrangements. It is worth mentioning that *Mustaqbal Watan* occupied 315 seats in the 2020 election, out of which 145 through the list system, and 170 through the individual system. The decline in 2025 is primarily due to the establishment of *the National Front*, with subsequent deductions from the share of *Mustaqbal Watan* and other parties.
4. Independent candidates constituted the second-largest power in this election, winning 96 individual seats and 8 list seats, for a total of 104 seats, equal to 18.3% of elected seats. Apart from independent candidates running under the list system, the actual strength lies in the 96 seats earned through hard work on the ground. Independent candidates might have won more had the first-round election in the first phase been managed in the same manner as the subsequent phases. It is worth noting that independent candidates held 93 seats in the 2020 Parliament

(22 list + 71 individual). The key observation is that the number of independent candidates winning seats under the individual-candidacy system—across its seven rounds—increased steadily with the poll reruns resulting from the grievances and court rulings, following President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's intervention and his indirect warning to *the National Election Authority* on the irregularities in voting and counting procedures, and his allusion that such irregularities could be undermining political wellbeing in the country. It is well noted that independent candidates won 4 seats in the first poll—equal to 2.4% of the 42 seats decided in that round, whereas subsequent victories – marked with the President's intervention – in the six subsequent rounds—were as follows:

4 out of 40, 5 out of 8, 3 out of 9, 46 out of 101, 16 out of 35, and 21 out of 49, corresponding to successive percentages of 10%, 62.5%, 33.3%, 45.5%, 45.7%, and 42.9%. Undoubtedly, that the significant resilience demonstrated by independent candidates in the last six rounds can be attributed to the *National Election Authority's* realization of the need to ensure the integrity of count processes. It can be attributed as well to the influence of strong families, clans, and tribal affiliations. Conversely, the political parties, including pro-government parties, failed to nominate candidates who combined party affiliation with strong familial and tribal support. It is true that some of the winning independent candidates were former members of participating political parties, particularly pro-government parties. However, their number remains humble and not impactful.

5. *Humat Al-Watan*, *the National Front*, and *the Republican People's Party* stood out as the third, fourth, and fifth political actors in the election, securing 33, 22, and 9 seats respectively, excluding list seats. List seats, in this election, cannot be regarded as an honorary triumph, neither do they reflect real popularity for their holders. The three mentioned parties secured 79, 46, and 11 winners, respectively, yielding success rates of 41.8%, 47.8%, and 81.8% respectively. It is noteworthy that *Humat Al-Watan* occupied 23 seats (19 list seats + 4 individual seats), while the *Republican People's Party* occupied 50 seats (28 list seats + 22 individual seats).

6. Newly emerging parties – established after the events of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013 – namely *Al-Adl*, *Al-Mo'tamar*, *Generation Will*, *the Egyptian Democratic Party*, *Al-Hurriya*, *The Reform and Development Party*, and *Al-Wa'y Party* seemed to have limited power, winning only crumbs of parliamentary seats. In the individual system—which is more telling of voters will than the list system—the mentioned parties only won marginal representation, with 3, 1, 0, 2, 0, 2, and 1 seats respectively. Even with adding their candidates on the uncontested absolute list, the total number will amount to 30 seats in total, which remains humble if compared to the powerful representation of pro-government parties in both list and individual systems. It is worth noting that the mentioned parties in the 2020 Parliament enjoyed representation of: 2, 8, 2, 7, 7, and 9 seats, respectively. While *Al-Wa'i Party* has had not been established yet in 2020. Apparently, the mentioned parties' real power under the individual-seat system has declined compared to 2020, when their representation under this system was 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, respectively.
  
7. Parties of *The Civil Democratic Movement*—established a few years after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took office in 2014, following the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, to act as the backbone of The National Dialogue initiated by Sisi in April 2022—won a total of 8 seats; primarily won by *the Reform and Development Party*, *Al-Adl Party*, *the Egyptian Social Democratic Party*, and *the Conservatives*, with 2, 3, 2, and 1 seats respectively. It is worth noting that *The Civil Movement*, which involves around 11 opposition actors and public figures, has categorically washed its hands of any results achieved by the mentioned parties repeatedly, most recently in a statement issued on 7 January 2026. Such disavowal is basically because the former three parties have agreed to participate under *The National List* which follows the absolute-list system, while the *Conservatives*, although not participating in *the National List*, won a sole individual seat thanks to a declared coordination with pro-government parties.
  
8. Egypt's two oldest parties, namely *Al-Wafd* (established in 1919 and resurfaced in 1977) and *At-Tagammu* (established in 1976), suffered a major defeat—an unsurprising outcome given their diminished presence on the ground, particularly compared to the more prominent roles both

parties played following the formation of the third partisan pluralism on 11 November 1976. *Al-Wafd* and *At-Tagammu* were represented in *The List* with 7 and 4 candidates respectively, and won 2 and 1 seats under the individual system, respectively.

9. *Al-Adl* and *The Egyptian Democratic* parties are the two opposition parties to win the largest number of seats in both the list and individual systems (11 each), standing out as – presumptively – the potential opposition leaders in *the House of Representatives*. Such presumption could be nominally or numerically valid, yet, cannot be objectively taken into consideration, as the opposition’s performance in parliament has historically been marked with weakness and inefficiency. The powers granted to members of parliament under the current constitution are neither enforced nor utilized, and the majority – by virtue of numbers – is still capable of dwarfing any opposition endeavors.
10. *Al-Nour Party*, by winning 6 seats, is among the most voted-for parties in this election. That *Party* was not included in *the List*, which means that its results are based on genuine popularity, not as fake as seats won through the flawed absolute-list system – accused of voter fraud. Therefore, if compared to parties other than the four pro-government parties, *Al-Nour* may indeed be considered as the dark horse of this race. It is worth mentioning that in 2020 parliamentary election, *Al-Nour* acquired 7 seats, preceded by 11 seats in 2015/2016 elections; all achieved without having to be part of the “List of the State”. Most of reruns took place in the first phase governorates, with *the Authority* accepting grievances for 19 constituencies, alongside *The Administrative Supreme Court* rulings for 30 constituencies. Full governorates have been harshly accused of fraud and mismanagement, and complete reruns have been, therefore, ordered.
11. *Al-Nour Party*, by winning 6 seats, is among the most voted-for parties in this election. That *Party* was not included in *the List*, which means that its results are based on genuine popularity, not as fake as seats won through the flawed absolute-list system – accused of voter fraud. Therefore, if compared to parties other than the four pro-government parties, *Al-Nour* may indeed be considered as the dark horse of this race. It is worth mentioning that in 2020 parliamentary election, *Al-Nour* acquired 7 seats,



	5	3	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	18
Luxor	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	7
Aswan	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5
	3	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	9
Red Sea	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
	1	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Sharqia	8	4	4	1	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	21
	6	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	20
	14	5	5	1	-	1	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	11	41
Damietta	2	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4
	3	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	9
Port Said	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	4
Ismailia	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5
	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8
Suez	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
North Sinai	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	2	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
South Sinai	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
Alexandria	8	2	2	1	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
	8	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	15
	16	5	4	1	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	32
Beheira	8	3	2	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	19
	6	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	7	18
	14	5	2	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	9	37
Matrouh	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
	3	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Total	121	54	43	16	9	8	8	7	4	3	2	1	-	-	-	8	284
	106	33	22	9	2	3	1	2	1	1	-	-	1	6	1	96	284
	227	57	65	25	11	11	9	9	5	4	2	1	1	6	1	104	484

# Three figures in vertical order for each governorate: The List, The Individual-seat, and total - In same order

12. Of the 34 parties running this election, only 15 to be represented in the 2025 parliament; including 10 parties winning seats under both the list and individual systems, two parties to be represented only with *The List*, namely *Al-Hurriya* and *Generation Will*), and three parties winning only the individual system seats, namely *the Conservatives*, *Al-Nour*, and *Al-Wa'y*. Thus, the percentage of parties represented in parliament is 44.1% of all parties running this election. Without the uncontested list seats, the

percentage would have fallen to 38.2%. In comparison, the 2020 parliament involved only 13 parties. This election witnessed more representation, thanks to having *The Conservatives*, *Al-Wa'ay*, and *The National Front*; while *The Modern Egypt Party* is missed. Generally, any assessment of the parliamentary representation—whether in the 2025 election or earlier ones—should be approached with caution, as Egyptian partisan environment tend to be fragile and more decorative than substantive.

13. Regarding the governorates representations (see previous table), the figures demonstrate the anticipated nature of the parliaments legislative and oversight discussions. The numbers of seats won by parties nationwide are proportionally reflected in their victories across individual governorates. *Mustaqbal Watan*, followed by *Humat Al-Watan*, then *the National Front*, and finally *the Republican People's Party*, have secured the largest shares across various governorates, according to the number of seats each obtained. *Mustaqbal Watan* won seats across all governorates, whether under individual-seat or absolute-list systems. There were governorates, however, where it failed to secure any individual seats, namely, Port Said and New Valley governorates. *Humat Al-Watan* failed – also – to win individual seats in Kafr El Sheikh, Fayoum, New Valley, Luxor, the Canal governorates, and the two Sinai governorates. *The National Front* did not win any individual seats in Kafr El Sheikh, New Valley, Qena, Luxor, Aswan, Damietta, Port Said, South Sinai, and Matrouh. Thus, the three most-represented parties in the parliament, do not, indeed, enjoy representation in all localities and subregions. Surprisingly, *The National Front*, which is regarded as the party of the tribes, was absent from important tribal regions.

14. As for the gender representation, women received unprecedentedly large number of seats; the largest ever since women gained the right to vote and run for parliament in 1956, primarily due to the constitutional amendment granting women a quota of one-quarter of the total parliamentary seats. Despite this significant number, it remains unclear whether this will positively impact the parliament's performance. It is worth noting that parliaments have often included a fewer number of women, yet their performance deemed outstanding, and conversely,

some parliaments enjoyed larger number of women members, who have been ineffective. As for the women representation breakdown, 146 women won seats in 2025 *House of Representatives*: 142 women won through the list system, by virtue of the constitution and the law, while the remaining 4 women one under the individual-seat system (including independent candidates as well as candidates for *Al-Adl*, *Mustaqbal Watan*, and *Humat Al-Watan Parties*). Four individual-seat winners is deemed an extremely humble representation, in comparison to 167 women candidates run under individual-seat system, of whom 129 run as independent candidates.

15. In terms of faith-based representation, Christian candidates won 24 seats under the absolute-list system, alongside two seats under the individual-seat system (one for an independent candidate, and the other for *Mustaqbal Watan*). In 2020 parliament, three Christian candidates won their seats under the individual-seat system. Notably, all elected Christian members are from Cairo and Giza governorates – none from any of the governorates known for sizeable Christian population.

## **Fourth: New Electoral Aspects**

*The House of Representatives* election ballot began on 7 November 2025 and continued through 4 January 2026. A new House of Representatives was formed a few days later, shortly after a presidential decree appointing 5% of the members of *the House*, 28 deputies. Based on what transpired in the past weeks, it can be observed that this election was marked by distinctive aspects, some are new and some seemed more visible than earlier elections.

### **First Aspect: The President's Direct Intervention in the Electoral Process**

The intervention of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi stands out as the most remarkable aspect of the 2025 *House of Representatives* election. The intervention had taken place through two statements contributed to drastically changing the entire electoral landscape in favor of freedom of opinion and expression. The first statement was conveyed on the eve of *the National Election Authority's* announcement of the first-phase first-round results. The President,

through his social media account, galvanized the public into criticizing the electoral process. The second statement came a few hours after the results announcement, in a direct communication with the people.

In his first statement, the President touched upon electoral disputes. He, indirectly, criticized *the National Independent Elections Authority* due to shortcomings in its conduct of the electoral process, and strongly advised rectification, even if a complete rerun of all first phase elections shall be necessary. In the second statement, the President commented on the rampant electoral money and vote-buying, considering such money to be detrimental to the nation and the legislative authority, and that such money is unworthy the consequences that vote-buying would produce. It is noteworthy that a presidential intervention in elections an uncommon practice in Egypt. The last such intervention took place under the former President Hosni Mubarak, whose involvement was unproductive, as he criticized the opposition for their defeat in the 2010 election, and their attempt to establish an alternative parliament, with his infamous saying, "Let them play around."

## **Second Aspect: *The National Elections Authority* Failure to Manage the Elections**

For the first time in decades, the elections organizing entity fails to manage the electoral process in Egypt. Shortcomings of *the National Elections Authority's* performance have been exposed, some were the immediate result of its conduct, while others were due to its inability to take action against the misbehavior of pro-government parties or against the widespread dirty electoral money. Such shortcomings rendered the election no less rife with violations than elections previously organized by the Ministry of Interior during the early years of former President Hosni Mubarak's rule.

## **Third Aspect: Large Number of Court Rulings and High Rate of Grievance Acceptance**

Based on the statements of *the National Elections Authority*, as well as *the Supreme Administrative Court* rulings; new aspect emerged and is worthy of attention. On 18 December 2025, *the Authority* issued a decision to rerun elections in 19 constituencies of the first phase. Following the decision, *the*

*Supreme Administrative Court* issued plenty of rulings on appeals against *the Authority's* decisions, as many as hundreds of rulings for both election phases. Consequently, a substantial segment of the election were rerun (30 constituencies in the first phase), while other constituencies have been referred to the Court of Cassation for a final decision, which may take several weeks.

### **Fourth Aspect: Running Competition for Only Half of the Elected Seats**

The 2025 *House of Representatives* election was held for a number parliamentary seats as low as 284, out of total 596. This number of contested seats is equal to 45% of the total parliamentary seats. 50% of the seats were allocated to the sole and uncontested list, and 5% were appointed by the President. While this procedure had been also applied *by the National Elections Authority* in the 2020 *House of Representatives* election, and the 2020 and 2025 *Senate* election, what marked this very election is fact that it establishes a parliament expected to play a pivotal role in the 2030 presidential elections. This makes the shortfall caused by the near-appointment of half the seats the gravest calamity that may befall the legislative authority and its status within the Egyptian political system.

### **Fifth Aspect: Open and Shameless Sale of *The House of Representatives* Seats**

Under the former President Mubarak, there have always been rumors on parliamentary seats being sold. That was, undoubtedly, overstatement. Names of prominent *National Democratic Party* leaders (most of whom have since passed away) have been notorious for selling places on the party lists rather than seats in the parliament. Such practice meant that they recommended names to be included on the *National Democratic Party's* electoral lists. The NDP used to conduct majoritarian election, run through individual candidacies. The names on these lists were voted on during the ballot, and never guaranteed victories as seen in the 2025 *House of Representatives* election.

In the latest election, parties became openly infamous for receiving money in exchange for including names, whether party members or not, within their quota on the absolute list, which victory is guaranteed; not because it is state-sponsored, rather for being sole and uncontested list. Such practice had been

openly discussed, and even justified by party leaders, such as the head of the *Al-Wafd Party*, as donation for the party rather than a direct payment for inclusion. The fundamental question is: can a candidate who paid dozens of millions of Egyptian pounds be a genuine representative or legislator in parliament? And does this method lead to a sound party system?

## **Sixth Aspect: Dropped Voter Turnout, Compared to the Senate**

Voter turnout in this election was lower than turnout in the Senate election, a matter that has been subject to notable fluctuation since the formation of the third partisan pluralism system in 1976, particularly in times when Egypt had dual-chamber parliaments. Historically, in the elections of Houses of Representatives or People's Assemblies, a higher turnout has always been coupled with greater candidates engagement and interest, if the House is to enjoy broader powers compared to the Senate/Shura Council. However, this time, turnout declined in the House elections relative to the Senate, making this aspect noteworthy. Many attribute such decline, primarily, to a lack of confidence in the 2025 House elections following the ballot rerun in dozens of constituencies.

## **Seventh Aspect: Diminished Number of Candidates**

Parliamentary literature has long regarded voter turnout as a key indicator of public confidence in elections. However, a new feature of recent Egyptian elections suggests that the rate of candidacy itself has also become an important indicator of that confidence. It is noteworthy that the current *House of Representatives* election was conducted with 2,882 candidates, including 2,598 running under the individual-seat system and 284 candidates under the absolute-list system (excluding reserve lists). Both systems fall under majoritarian system, commonly referred to as the *50% + 1 system*.

A thorough review of previous Egyptian parliamentary elections reveals that numbers of candidates used to be significantly higher. In the 2000 elections, the number of candidates reached 3,957 running for 444 seats under a complete majoritarian individual-seat system with a quota for workers-and-farmers. In 2005 parliamentary election, the number surged to 5,177 running for the

number of seats and under the same electoral system. In the 2010 parliamentary election the number of candidates reached 5,411 running for 508 seats, under complete majoritarian individual-seat system with workers-and-farmers quota and a women's representation quota. The 2011/2012 parliament was composed of two-thirds proportional representation and one-third individual-seats, with a women's candidacy quota. The number of candidates for the individual seats reached 6,059, running for 498 seats. The 2015/2016 parliamentary election was conducted through 21% closed absolute lists and the remainder majoritarian individual-seats, with six quotas, and 540 elected members, the number of candidates reached 5,441 excluding reserve lists. In the 2020 election the number—excluding reserve candidates—stood at 4,248, running for 568 seats; 50% of which for closed absolute lists and 50% for majoritarian individual-seats, with six quotas. Such drop in candidacy rates indicates reduced confidence in the Parliament, and a public perception that frequent visits to the ballot box did not contribute to resolving problems nor fulfilling social and economic needs.

## **Eighth Aspect: Planned Inheritance of Parliamentary Seats at Large Scale**

Planned inheritance of seats was one of the most notable characteristics of the 2020 Parliament, and the practice expanded further in the Senate. It became common to find relatives occupying seats across both chambers. Although some believe planned seat inheritance to be an old practice, it is definitely not. The current situation is fundamentally from traditional parliamentary practices. Historically, the presence of families in the parliament stemmed from arrangements among families, clans and tribes, whereby a representative was selected through rotation, consensus, and mutual accommodation among eminent figures. Today, the matter is less about clans and tribes and more about intra-family patronage, whether between siblings or between parents and children.

By navigating through the *National Election Authority's* website, reading the candidate lists of the *Unified National List*, and tracing surnames of candidates, one may find numerous instances of planned seat inheritance, even among party leaders participating in the election. The *Egypttech* website reported that

17% of the primary and reserve seats on the sole *Unified List* have been inherited or circulated among relatives.

Planned seats inheritance creates a serious problem when a member loses their seat—through annulment, vacancy, or death—because the replacement is often inexperienced and lacking in parliamentary competence, which negatively affects both legislative and oversight functions of the parliament. A stark example is a member of *the National Front Party*, Dr. Mohamed Rabie, who was run the election on *the National List* for Cairo, South, and Central Delta, and who relinquished his position as a main candidate to his son just hours before the ballot—an early instance of planned inheritance unrelated to death or vacancy.

### **Ninth Aspect: Political Money being Heavily Used**

Political money is used in elections worldwide. Salaries and wages for poll stations staff and campaign expenditure within legally defined spending ceilings are regarded as political money – or rather *electoral* money. However, in the Egyptian context, the term “political money” commonly refers to funds used through illicit mechanisms. In this sense, the spending ceilings set by the *National Election Authority* for both individual candidates and absolute-list candidates have been widely violated. Candidates employed various evasive tactics, such as avoiding disbursements from the bank accounts monitored by *the Authority*, or labeling large and expensive campaign banners as *donations* from a certain person, in order to avoid *the Authority's* accountability. Moreover, social media platforms circulated images of many campaign offices where cash and boxes of rationed goods were openly and shamelessly distributed to voters. Some candidates and their agents went further by collecting the ID cards from voters to make sure they are going to cast their ballots on election day – in exchange for money.

### **Tenth Aspect: The Traditional Media Momentum Faded Away in favor of Digital Media**

Observers of parliamentary elections have noted that traditional media coverage, particularly on television, has nearly died out in favor of digital and online platforms. Over the past years, one could easily follow-up by watching talk shows and analytical studios on Egyptian satellite channels, which served as

a window for awareness, and provided insight into the electoral process, its environment, and the competing candidates. Today, that window has faded, replaced by mobile applications, social media networks, and online news platforms. One of the main reasons for this decline is the dominance of a single voice in the media sphere, due to the control over most Egyptian satellite channels by a single entity—the *United Media Services Company*, which is affiliated with a state security agency, a matter that stands out as a stark drawback. This has driven the public to rely increasingly on digital platforms as their primary source of information.

## **Eleventh Aspect: The Widespread Invalidation of Votes at Ballot Box**

The high rate of invalid ballots is a strikingly remarkable aspect of 2025 *House of Representatives* election. According to a statement by *the National Election Authority*, invalid ballots surged to 21% in the ballot for *the Unified List* in the Cairo and South Delta sector and the East Delta sector, which seems to be an unusual behavior. Invalid ballots are typically more common in the individual-seat system, where voters choose one or more candidates from a large pool. The fact that invalid ballots reached 21% in a vote involving a single uncontested list, is greatly suggestive of widespread voter dissatisfaction with the list system. Such dissatisfaction could be because the list is widely viewed as rigging of voters will, or due to procedural issues such as unfamiliarity with many of the candidates on the list, some of whom come from distant regions rather than the geographic sector of the list. It is worth noting that invalid ballot rates in Egyptian referendums and elections have never reached such levels. The invalid ballot rate in the March 2011 constitutional referendum—commonly known as the “*Battle of the Ballot Boxes*”—was 1%. The rate in the 2015 *House of Representatives* election, was 8.7%, and in the 2018 presidential election was 7%.

## **Fifth: Elections, Parliament, and the Future of the Political System in Egypt**

The election of 2025 *House of Representatives* concluded, ushering the formation of a new parliament. A rocky road and stumbling walk were ahead of the main actor; namely the administration, candidates, and voters, as well as those behind

the scenes; especially concerned agencies which struggled and grappled over the formation, as each wished, despite their shared affiliation with the executive authority. Such dynamics foreshadow a great tragedy befalling not only the anticipated parliament, but rather the entire political landscape in Egypt.

Undoubtedly, this election stands out as the all-important election in Egypt's history, with challenges never experienced before in Egypt even in its darkest times. The vitality of this election also lies in the role of the *House of Representatives* in the public sphere in Egypt, as well as its role in the 2030 presidential election, in which – by virtue of the constitution – President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shall not participate, presumably, unless certain conditions change. It is, therefore, crucial to have a genuine outcome, seriously sought for by each and every party, to spare Egypt the bleak fate of neighboring countries which, starkly, endured destabilization, and plunged into mires of chaos.

Monumental challenges, therefore, are ahead of the public landscape in Egypt, and must be tackled with professionalism and caution, to avoid falling into the muddle of chaos. In this concluding section of this study, there will be a review of approaches deemed effective, both for the parliament, and the public sphere at large.

## 1. Parliamentary Dimension

Undisputedly, that Parliament in Egypt is a pivotal institution, despite being talked about as a passive body that is instructed by outsiders, and is – allegedly – formed by arbitrary laws, with intent of controlling its membership, and subsequently steering its work. It is, therefore fundamental to reform this *Parliament's* performance in order to restore public confidence after the setbacks it went through in the course of its formation. *This* newly constituted *Parliament* needs to change its approach, while other institutions need to change their perception of it. *This Parliament*, thus, must undertake several key responsibilities, including:

- A. To exhibit genuine representation of interests; which can only be achieved through reforming the political environment in which *Parliament* operates. *Parliament* must remain autonomous and free from covert control of security agencies which have long directed it behind the scenes, reducing it to a mere marionette worked by

external actors. To that end, it becomes ultimately necessary to lift the pressures imposed on *the House of Representatives*, those have effectively paralyzed its work. *The House* has grown accustomed to waiting for signals from outsider actors before acting; with decisions being made through hints and tacit approvals. Meanwhile, the parliament is prevented from enforcing accountability mechanisms or advancing members' legislative motions and bills, which remain shelved indefinitely. Evidently, restoring people's confidence in their representatives remains dependent on goodwill. *The Parliament* and its members must not be deemed unpatriotic, and rather be recognized as faithful representation of the electorate and their interests. In other words, the *Parliament* must be acknowledged as the arena where diverse public interests are articulated, and MPs must be empowered to lead the legislative process without intimidation or coercion. Otherwise, *the Parliament* risks becoming a clone of authoritarian states' parliaments, labelled in Western parliamentary literature as a "*rubber-stamp legislature*."

Such autonomy does not mean that MPs should act according to personal whims or narrow interests, being protected by their parliamentary immunity. Many MPs—particularly those from pro-government parties—entered Parliament through illicit electoral money, as previously noted, and those must not be allowed to indulge in corruption activities or misconduct.

Reforming, rather than changing, the *Parliament* requires effort, in a manner that would assist the country navigate peacefully through the current hardship. It is worth recalling that the 2010 election—with their widespread fraud and lack of integrity—were the final blow to Mubarak's regime. Back then, election results excluded the entire opposition, and in a few weeks, it triggered nationwide unrest that culminated in the collapse of Mubarak's regime, as Egyptians seized the moment to express accumulated political, economic, and social crises after nearly three decades of heavy-handed authoritarian rule.

- B. To reform the legislative framework remains the primary test of *House of Representatives'* effectiveness. The *House* is now more than ever required to expeditiously enact or amend certain laws, many of which are mandated by the Constitution to be enacted within strictly set

deadlines. Yet the authorities in Egypt have consistently refused to meet the constitutional obligations, leaving draft laws dormant in the drawers, under the pretext that constitutional deadlines are merely “organizational”—an excuse that reflects rigidity and weakness. Most urgently comes the need to reforming electoral laws, particularly those central to the formation of *Parliament*, as revealed by the recent elections. It is rather well-advised to find an electoral system that remedies the flaws of the present one, particularly what pertains to candidacy procedures, illicit electoral money, failure of electoral administration to conduct its mandate effectively, and ensuring integrity both in voting and counting processes. Reforming electoral laws is not only essential for fairness and integrity of the elections; it is also fundamental for forming a parliament composed of strong political actors, rather than parties created within the state’s orbit and shaped by competing, often conflicting, state agencies. Many consider party closed-list proportional representation system, to be the fairest and most objective one, as it does not exclude political or social minorities, nor does it allow the majority to dominate by unanimity, while marginalizing others. It also reduces electoral bribery and tribalism, which are prevalent in the individual-majoritarian system. *This* system significantly limits electoral bribery because only a handful of parties—not hundreds of individual candidates—compete, making oversight of campaign financing far easier for the electoral administration. The only drawback of closed-list proportional representation is that it grants party leaders near-absolute control over candidate names order in the list. On another hand, the proportional open-lists, adopted in some European countries, remains difficult to be comprehended by Egyptian electorate due to high levels of educational and cultural illiteracy, and therefore hard to be applied in Egypt. Importantly, the proportional system can still accommodate the six constitutional quotas, unless the Constitution is amended to abolish them. No electoral system in the world has adopted such a large number of quotas simultaneously, and they have complicated Egyptian elections since their introduction.

Another critical law awaiting enactment is The Local Administration Law, which would reconstitute local councils which have been absent for more than fifteen years. The local councils are deemed the real

foundation for political mobilization, being vested with powers such as fighting against terrorism, empowering local economic development, overseeing municipal and governorates administrations, and providing essential services—relieving MPs of acting as local councilors.

The long-awaited Freedom of Information and Data Access Law is yet another absent pivotal law. It would combat rumors—an ongoing challenge for the state—restore editorial independence to online platforms, and grant the press and media greater freedom.

The Law on Prohibition of the Secondment of Judges to Non-Judicial Entities is equally important. It prevents the government from compromising judicial independence by employing judges in government offices, granting them financial incentives, and then returning them to the courts with compromised impartiality to pay it forward.

- C. To effectively enforce accountability and oversight over the executive authority remains indispensable. Neglecting oversight, while MPs focus solely on service provision to their electorate, and rely on weak tools such as questions and briefing requests, pay little attention to public policy failures and allow executive officials' shortcomings in industry, agriculture, investment, external debt, health, education, and human rights to go unchecked. This has produced widespread misdoings and rampant corruption. As an instance, *the Parliament* must activate fact-finding committees to investigate government violations, along with other strong mechanisms to address major flaws and grave misdeeds. The interpellation mechanism, although rarely leading to government dismissal, yet it provides citizens with a sense of accountability, and therefore a degree of satisfaction, and helps absorb public anger over political, economic, and social challenges. MPs and decision-makers must understand that turning a blind eye to misdoings leads to immense harm. Accountability and exposing misdeeds are the optimal means for Parliament to exercise its authority, gain popularity in constituencies, and enhance the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating responsiveness to public concerns. This ultimately reinforces the principle of ministerial responsibility, which is essential for correcting the imbalance between the executive and legislative authorities.

Thus, mending the *House of Representatives*' by is crucial to opening the door for genuine accountability and preventing parliamentary leaders—often pressured by security agencies—from obstructing opposition requests through bureaucratic delay.

## 2. Public Sphere Dimension

Public sphere involves all matters related to freedom of opinion and expression, democracy, and human rights; including the rights to a decent life, work, worship, peaceful protest, innovation, free expression of opinion, housing, freedom of movement and communication, education, health, personal rights, privacy, and equality in rights and duties without discrimination based on color, religion, or gender. Such rights are already enshrined in the Egyptian Constitution, as well as in international conventions, however, many laws and practices continue to undermine them, such as, primarily, pretrial detention, surveillance of correspondences and communications, travel bans and watch-lists, freezing of bank accounts, military trials for civilians, and discrimination based on religion, gender, or wealth.

The latter—discrimination based on wealth—has become the most prominent and widespread form of discrimination in Egyptian society due to the ongoing economic crisis, which stark inequalities in education, healthcare, housing, security, enforcement of court rulings, access to services and utilities, and employment in public offices. Such inequalities have made it impossible for the authorities to gain broad public satisfaction, especially as poverty rates continue to rise, with more than one-third of the population living below the poverty line.

There is no doubt that public freedoms are the root of Egypt's structural problems. Without them, neither economic nor social reform is conceivable. Addressing this requires:

- A. Having sensible political leadership that is able to preserve stability, grounded in the principle that Egyptian citizens are the sole source of legitimacy, and capable of ensuring equality and avoiding favoritism toward any faction, sector, or profession. In the recent years, due to unrest that followed ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood, and because the President came directly from the military, most aspects of society underwent militarization, including the economy, which sectors have been taken over by the military

institution, not only through control of investments but also through appointment of retired senior military officers – exclusively – to key public offices. This prompted the International Monetary Fund to repeatedly call for freeing the economy from military dominance. Linked to this is the rivalry among security agencies, which became evident during the parliamentary elections. Such practices must cease, as they are closely tied to political and economic corruption, driven by personal interests and shielded from accountability and oversight.

- B. Building an enlightened society through enabling sound political culture. This requires quality education capable of integrating younger generations within academic systems that raise them to enjoy right to critical thinking, debate, and question—rather than parrot-fashioned memorization and indoctrination associated with authoritarian models. Such enabling culture produces citizens fully aware of their political rights and duties, capable not only of exercising freedom of expression, assembly, and voting, but also of defending such rights for others.

Quality education enables citizens to reclaim their rights from oppressors, and to unleash their own powers, as well as strengthen role of political accountability institutions—foremost among them Parliament. Government policies have consistently weakened emerging political pluralism, leading to fragile parties and widespread public distrust. Citizens inherited a deep-seated belief in the overwhelming dominance of the state, reinforced by witnessing the direct state interference in the affairs of both opposition and non-opposition parties. This created the impression that political engagement is a form of suffering, and that party activists—especially in the opposition—are involved in unlawful activity. As a result, more than two-thirds of Egypt's political parties today are pro-government; an outcome poses a grave threat to political participation in general and parliamentary oversight in particular. Opposition activity in *Parliament* is perceived as a contest between two unequal rivals, with predetermined result, since the government implements its policies regardless of criticism—criticism that never reaches the point of threatening the ruling elite. Consequently, public trust in legislation and parliamentary oversight has eroded almost entirely.

- C. Reforming the party system as an essential step for achieving political stability, strengthening democratic norms, and improving parliamentary

performance. Through such reform, parties would be freed from state control and could function as genuine mechanisms of raising sound political culture, and for enabling *Parliament* to operate independently of outsider dominance.

Reform can be enforced by outsiders—through changing the electoral system into proportional party lists—or internally, through ensuring intra-party democracy. Both paths would lead to elections capable of producing true representatives of the people to be engaged into revitalized party structures – currently hollow and lacking membership. This would create a versatile *Parliament* with multitude of ideologies, free from excessive party discipline that suppresses minorities and enforces un genuine consensus. Such a Parliament would be beyond the control of the executive authority, capable of exercising legislation and oversight functions in a freely and far from compromises, as well as establishing new rules of engagement with the executive authority rather than being the passive side when it comes to deciding the rules.

In general run of things, amending the Constitution in preparation for the 2030 presidential election, motivated by some actors' desire to enable President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to seek another term, and by virtue of the Constitutional provisions, the following steps are likely to materialize:

- Dissolution of the current Parliament under Article 137, or through a *Constitutional Court* ruling invalidating the electoral law, following a referral from the *Court of Cassation*. Such step is particularly significant because this *Parliament's* formation is deemed questionable due to the controversial electoral process.
- The constitution, then, is to be amended by a new constitutional committee composed of non-partisan renowned experts.
- A referendum on the amended constitutional provisions shall be held.
- Then, a presidential a law-by-decree is to be issued to regulate a new election under a different electoral system.

Dozens of constitutional provisions require amendment, including: abolishing parliamentary quotas; strengthening or abolishing the Senate; enacting the Local

Administration Law; ending presidential authority to appoint heads of judicial bodies and the Prosecutor-General; abolishing military trials for civilians; ending pretrial detention in cases related to freedom of expression; eliminating privileges granted to security agencies, including incentives power of approving or disapproving ministerial appointments; halting military involvement in civilian affairs (currently framed as “protecting the civil nature of the state”); ending judicial supervision on elections processes (vote and count) given their evident failure; either abolishing the Senate, or empowering it with considerable powers, and adopting its own electoral system and to enable it to perform its role as an upper chamber; establishing a clear mechanism for political succession to prevent military intervention during transitions; expanding the powers of the *House of Representatives* to enable it to legislate and oversee without external pressure; prohibiting the creation of off-budget special funds; and taking all necessary precautions to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from resuming political activity.

A careful consideration of the aforementioned extensive reforms reveals that they are essential for achieving genuine political stability, particularly with a thorough scan of the status in neighboring and regional states. Such states have endured catastrophic consequences of human-rights collapse: Libya under Qaddafi, Tunisia under Ben Ali, Yemen under Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Syria under Assad, to name few. The mentioned rogue leaders squandered their chances, one after another, due to arrogance, monopolization of power, and corrupt entourages that encouraged their misdeeds. No wise Egyptian would wish to see their country follow such paths. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi appears to have recognized such potential fate after witnessing the events surrounding the latest ballot, and it is hoped that this awareness continues until the aforementioned rights-based reforms are set in place.

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