

Michael Barutciski

RESPONDING JOINTLY TO RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

The symbiotic relationship
between the Ukrainian diaspora
and the Canadian government



Copyright © 2023 by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publishers, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.

The information in this study represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of KAS Canada or its staff.

ISBN 978-1-7774289-1-4

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
Canada Office
Suite 303, 8 York Street
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 5S6
info.canada@kas.de

Cover image: Renée Depocas

About the author

Michael Barutciski is Associate Professor and Coordinator of Canadian Studies at Glendon College, as well as Fellow at McLaughlin College, York University. He was previously Director of the Diplomacy Programme at the University of Canterbury Law School and worked for several years as Fellow in Law at Oxford University's Refugee Studies Centre. Upon his return to Canada, he chaired the Department of Multidisciplinary Studies at Glendon College and helped create the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs, where he served as Director of Graduate Studies for five years.

Barutciski completed his doctorate in international law at the Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas) and he was a member of the Barreau du Québec for almost three decades. He has conducted research in conflict zones and refugee camps in Europe, Africa and Asia. His academic publications have been debated in the main international journals dealing with refugees and they have been used in university courses on all continents, as well as to train government officials and humanitarian workers. His research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the British Foreign Office, the British Department for International Development, Oxford University and York University.

He has held visiting positions at the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University in Romania, the Institute of International Public Law and International Relations in Greece, the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in North Macedonia, and the University of Michigan Law School. He has authored reports for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the British government, the Parliament of South Africa and the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He has also been invited to appear

as a witness before the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.

Barutciski served as Editor-in-Chief of *Refuge* (Canada's journal on refugees) over a decade ago and he continues to serve as Associate Editor of *Global Brief* magazine. He writes regularly for Canada's national newspapers in both official languages.

Table of contents

3	About the author
6	At a glance
8	I. Introduction
12	II. Providing refuge to Ukrainians fleeing Russia's current aggression <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unlimited number of 3-year temporary visas• Transition to permanent residence after 3 years?• Ukrainians have many options compared to other refugees
21	III. Looking for leadership among the major powers <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Upbeat nature of diaspora studies in Canada• An influential Ukrainian diaspora emerges in Canada• The importance of professional advocacy• The importance of converging with Canadian national interests• Acting as facilitators in Ukraine
31	IV. EU-Canada leadership and cooperation in response to the crisis <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Need for prudent reflection despite Russian aggression• Is Canada encouraging ethnic lobbying and political pandering?• Can ideological commitment to multiculturalism create blind spots?<ul style="list-style-type: none">a) Not recognizing hardline nationalistsb) Inadvertently encouraging nationalismc) Overlooking nuances in representative legitimacyd) Is there a problem of divided loyalties?
41	V. Conclusion
43	Endnotes

At a glance

- **Canada's ambitious immigration goals and commitment to multiculturalism policy** affect how exile structures are viewed by the country's analysts. Rather than seeing potential threats to security, the tendency is to adopt a positive forward-looking lens that emphasizes the possibilities in terms of diaspora engagement. Within this pro-immigration context, the Ukraine diaspora in Canada represents a group that has integrated the country's political structures for many decades.
- **The protection options offered to Ukrainians displaced by the Russian invasion** are unprecedented in terms of the usual approaches to refugee policy. The Canadian government has innovated with a programme that offers both short and long term options for displaced Ukrainians. This generous treatment is largely the result of the diaspora's influence. Yet there is a risk that this preferential treatment will become increasingly difficult to justify when compared to the treatment of other refugees or at-risk populations around the world.
- **The Ukrainian diaspora has exercised considerable influence on Canadian foreign policy**, particularly in relation to the past Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union and the current geopolitical struggle against Russia. Through a combination of convergence with Canadian interests and effective high-level advocacy, the Ukrainian diaspora has long played a role in Canada's evolving identity and is now influencing its position concerning the current war provoked by Russia. A symbiotic relationship has developed between the government and this diaspora group, as can be seen by the various joint efforts to strengthen Ukraine's economic, political and military situation.

- **There is a tendency to avoid discussion** of the risks associated with diaspora engagement, at least amongst Canada's intellectual leaders. While the Ukrainian diaspora has generally tended to align itself effectively with Canadian interests, this positive dynamic cannot always be guaranteed. The future of diaspora engagement depends on prudent analysis of homeland struggles and the competing diaspora interests. Canada's ability to handle this challenge will ultimately impact on the credibility of the multiculturalism policy that is becoming central to its national identity.

I

Introduction

As a northern country with the second largest territory in the world, Canada has depended on immigration ever since its political structures were created by European settlers. Even amongst G7 members, Canada stands out because it has the highest percentage of foreign-born population at 21%.¹ While the country is rapidly approaching a population base of 40 million² largely due to immigration, the government has embraced this trajectory by recently announcing plans for a massive increase in immigrant intake.³

Given the importance of immigration, it is not surprising that Canada takes integration approaches seriously and has adopted an innovative multiculturalism policy. The term is used here to indicate state-promoted initiatives that are intended to celebrate and encourage the cultural diversity that results from immigration.⁴

This general environment has an important impact on policy analysis. Rather than focusing on “exile structures” that can constitute potential threats to internal security,⁵ analysts are increasingly using a framework that emphasizes diasporic groups in a positive sense.⁶ As explained by a senior official at Global Affairs Canada, the country’s foreign affairs department, who has studied the influence of diasporas by sketching out the “views and concerns of practitioners”:

Accessible communications and transportation technologies not only permit people to travel and communicate with more ease than ever before, they also allow them to maintain multiple attachments, nurture new identities and pursue a range of activities across national boundaries. This increasingly open

international environment provides fertile ground for the flourishing of diasporas – migrant communities striving to preserve their ethnic and cultural heritage and remain connected to their homelands [thus enabling the] articulation of a multicultural foreign policy where **diasporas are seen as aiding rather than hindering national interests** [emphasis added].⁷

In many ways, Canada's policy approach to immigration and diasporas on its territory can be seen as a high-level social experiment on managing mobility and diversity. There are potentially interesting lessons for other western liberal democracies.

Within this context of an unabashedly pro-immigration country, roughly 4% of Canadians report at least one of their ethnic origins as Ukrainian. Although they did not necessarily identify as "Ukrainians", the first large wave of people migrating from present-day Ukraine to Canada started over 130 years ago.⁸ Following successive waves of Ukrainian immigrants, their identity as a diaspora group solidified and they are now an important part of the Canadian political landscape.

The diaspora context outlined above, as well as the presence of many Canadians with ties to Ukraine, affects how Canada sees the developing geopolitical confrontation between Russia and western powers. Canada has positioned itself unambiguously in the western camp with its promotion of liberal democratic values against an authoritarian Russia that is perceived as challenging those values. This geopolitical positioning should be understood as somewhat distinct from other NATO partners that may have more multifaceted interests regarding Russia, such as Germany or France.⁹

It is also a fundamental dimension that helps understand the situation of Ukrainian exile structures in Canada. To a large extent, Canadian mobilization regarding Ukraine's Maidan crisis a decade ago, as well as the ensuing conflict with Russia, are influenced by the Ukrainian diaspora.

While then-Foreign Ministers Steinmeier, Fabius and Sikorski negotiated on behalf of the EU with the parties implicated in the Maidan uprising in February 2014,¹⁰ Canada was playing a discreet but

important role in the demonstrations by providing refuge to activists on the Canadian Embassy grounds situated near Maidan square.¹¹ The Canadian government's support for the demonstrators was not a secret; then-Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird had demonstrated on Maidan in December 2013 during the initial phases of the uprising.¹² This early support in the brewing conflict reflects the general role played by the Canadian government throughout the current crisis with Russia, particularly as an armed conflict erupted in the Donbass region and Crimea was annexed.

The change of ruling political party following Canada's federal elections in late 2015 did not affect in any vital way this position. Whether governed by the Conservative Party (from 2006 to 2015) or the Liberal Party (from 2015 to the present), Canada's position has been unequivocally pro-Ukrainian. The two major federal parties have often competed in their efforts to be seen as supporting the Ukrainian cause, and the large Ukrainian diaspora has played a key role in this regard. The enthusiastic national support is apparent not only in federal political structures, but also in the country's main media outlets. For example, representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress¹³ have often and regularly been interviewed in Canadian media since the early days of the Maidan uprising.

Following the Normandy format's last meeting in Berlin on 10 February 2022, it was relatively clear that the peace process related to the Minsk Agreements continued to be stalled and the parties were locked in an intransigent diplomatic standoff.¹⁴ On 24 February 2022, Russian armed forces launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine at multiple locations from the Russian Federation, Belarus and from Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine.¹⁵ The UN High Commissioner for Refugees declared that mass flows of civilian populations began fleeing the affected areas almost immediately.¹⁶

To place the outflow in broader historical context, the international refugee protection system was created in 1922 with the adoption in Geneva of a treaty protecting refugees who were fleeing the Bolsheviks and the civil war in Russia (which at the time included the Ukrainian territories where there is currently an armed conflict).¹⁷ Exactly one

century later, western powers find themselves in a similar situation with people once again fleeing Russian violence on Ukrainian territories.

Given recent examples of Grozny or Aleppo, a catastrophic scenario involving the destruction of entire neighbourhoods has become a distinct possibility and may lead to even more refugee outflows towards the centre of Europe. The specific Ukrainian context explains the record pace of the rapid and massive outflow of displaced persons. Ukrainians are able to flee westwards across land borders to neighbouring countries that are participating in the geopolitical struggle against Russia and that have encouraged the evacuation of civilians threatened by the Russian army. Although the situation of Ukrainian displaced persons is heartbreaking, from a comparative perspective they are at least fortunate that their plight attracts western attention and resources. There are over 32 million refugees around the world¹⁸ and most are forgotten in farther-away conflicts that do not attract either.

II

Providing refuge to Ukrainians fleeing Russia's current aggression

Within days of the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, the European Commission proposed that the EU's Temporary Protection Directive be activated for the first time since it was adopted in 2001. This exceptional policy measure represents the formalization of a concept developed during the crisis in former Yugoslavia. On 4 March 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted its decision to activate Council Directive 2001/55/EC which provides temporary protection to "persons displaced from Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022, as a result of the military invasion by Russian armed forces that began on that date".¹⁹

The general presumption behind temporary protection is that displaced persons will return home as soon as hostilities cease.²⁰ Given that it is difficult to imagine a long-lasting armed conflict or Russian occupation, the hope with this approach is to keep as many Ukrainians as possible in the region (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova) to facilitate their repatriation. The role of other EU members is to share the burden and responsibilities of the frontline states by admitting displaced persons on their territory.

Unlimited number of 3-year temporary visas

Shortly after the EU's adoption of temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine, Canada announced it would be implementing a special temporary resident visa for Ukrainians and their family members. The Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel

(CUAET) programme began accepting applications on 17 March 2022.²¹

The CUAET applies to Ukrainian nationals, along with their spouses and dependent children.²² As of 6 December 2022, a total of 451,258 applications have been approved (from 724,494 applications received).²³ Speaking as a witness before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 17 November 2022, the Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine claimed that 80,000-90,000 Ukrainians have arrived in Canada under the CUAET and that the authorities receive approximately 14,000 new applications per week.²⁴

Unlike other visa applications, the CUAET is free. Its beneficiaries can stay in Canada with an extended temporary status of three years, contrary to the standard six-month authorized stay for regular visitors. Most importantly, CUAET beneficiaries can also work and study in Canada during their extended stay.²⁵

Ukrainians have until 31 March 2023 to apply for the CUAET. In a letter dated 23 November 2022, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress asked the Canadian government to extend this deadline.²⁶ While presenting witness evidence to the Senate, the Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine tried to explain why less than a quarter of Ukrainians granted visas under the CUAET had actually arrived by speculating that applicants may be preparing back-up strategies. For example, she indicated, “[m]ales of fighting age, by martial law, are not allowed out – but they may have applied and gotten their visa in the hopes that they will at some point be able to leave.”²⁷ Media reporting has highlighted the following logic to this explanation: “on the discrepancy between visas issued and visas used, [Ambassador] Galadza couldn’t provide an answer – but said she felt many applicants wanted to have a ‘Plan B’ stamped into their passports in case they felt the need to flee.”²⁸

In maintaining an overall perspective on Canada’s immigration challenges, it is useful to note that the government department responsible for approving visa applications claims the CUAET applications are “prioritized for processing.”²⁹ This detail may aggrieve the numerous other immigration candidates around the world who have been waiting

several years for a decision by Canadian authorities.³⁰ There have been a growing number of lawsuits to address the systemic delays that are part of the backlogs and they are becoming a major problem for the government.³¹

Yet the apparent support for the Ukrainian diaspora is such that the government has done little to counter this appearance of preferential treatment, or acknowledge and address how it impacts other diaspora groups. While the government is upfront about the “unlimited number” of applications that will be accepted from Ukrainians, Canada will not be receiving an unlimited number of temporary or permanent residents in the coming years, nor does it have the administrative capacity to process them in a proper and timely manner. This is a “zero-sum game” in the sense that more arrivals from one group necessarily means there will be fewer from other groups. The fact that this dilemma is barely discussed in Canada suggests the Ukrainian diaspora’s unique influence.

As claimed by the Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine during her recent witness statement to the Senate, the CUAET is clearly “an unprecedented programme, [with] an unprecedented volume of applicants”.³² To the extent that the CUAET was established to address a refugee-like situation, it is remarkable when considering Canada’s refugee policy over the last decades. Beyond the extraordinary number of people who have benefitted from the emergency programme since its implementation only nine months ago, it involves unique features that in some ways combine Canada’s traditional refugee admissions policy with the European temporary protection response.

Yet temporary protection as conceived in the EU is an unusual policy for Canada. The Canadian government prefers to integrate recognized refugees permanently and it has never dealt with a mass influx of displaced persons comparable to the one currently experienced by frontline states such as Poland or key regional reception states such as Germany. Indeed, repatriation is not necessarily in the interests of an immigration country that wants to buttress its population base.

Canada traditionally offers protection to refugees with two general approaches. The first is based on the overseas selection of refugees (often

in camps supervised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) who are then resettled in Canada. The resettlement can be sponsored by private groups, assisted by the government or a combination of both. The number of refugees benefitting from the resettlement programme tends to be roughly 10,000-30,000 per year, with 2016 representing an exception due to the Syrian Refugee Initiative (a total of almost 46,000 refugees were resettled that year).³³ The second approach to refugee protection in Canada is based on allowing migrants who are in the country to claim refugee status before the country's largest administrative tribunal, the Immigration and Refugee Board.³⁴ There were roughly 25,000 refugee claimants per year prior to the Liberal Party forming government in late 2015. Under Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Canada has been receiving record numbers of refugee claimants ranging from 47,425 in 2017 to a new expected record of over 80,000 this year.³⁵ Canada usually grants permanent residence almost automatically to migrants who are recognized legally as refugees, whether through the overseas resettlement selection process or the inland refugee status determination procedure. In other words, they are quickly integrated as "landed immigrants" who enjoy almost the same rights as Canadian citizens. They can eventually apply for citizenship, usually after three years.

However, the status given to Ukrainians is fundamentally different. Using the traditional Canadian approaches to refugee protection for Ukrainians who are fleeing the Russian invasion would have taken too much time. As underlined by the Immigration Minister's press secretary, "[t]he refugee process also takes longer, [Aidan Strickland] said. 'Initiatives in Afghanistan and Syria can take years to implement.'"³⁶ Indeed, it can take years before applicants for refugee resettlement are selected and sponsored as new permanent residents arriving in Canada. Likewise, it can take years for a final decision on a refugee claim presented in Canada, and while waiting, claimants have limited rights and a somewhat precarious status.

If the objective was simply to provide superior treatment to Ukrainian displaced persons, the Syrian emergency resettlement programme was a model that could have been imitated. An estimated 39,650 Syrians were

resettled in the last emergency operation organized by the Canadian government during the height of the migrant crisis affecting European partner states over six years ago.³⁷

However, at least two factors influenced the decision to innovate with a new special programme. While the extraordinary Syrian operation benefitted many Syrians who were resettled as permanent residents in a relatively short time, the numbers involved are dwarfed by the scale of the current Ukrainian programme. With almost half a million applications already approved, the government clearly wants to make this a historically important gesture with a significant demographic impact.

The Ukrainian diaspora also apparently indicated to the Immigration Minister that it wanted a different form of protection that would be temporary. As explained by the Minister's press secretary, "In the conversations with the Ukrainian community, specifically the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, they really made it clear that many of the Ukrainians coming to Canada will want to return home when it's safe to do so".³⁸ Both these factors leading to a new programme point to the influence held by the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, particularly through the umbrella organization that presents itself as the "voice of Canada's Ukrainian community ... before the Government of Canada".³⁹

While some observers may believe the temporary visa offered to Ukrainians has some drawbacks, these have been addressed by a Canadian government clearly intent on offering preferential treatment. Following concerns raised by the diaspora, the government changed the normal rules for temporary residents so that Ukrainians benefit from a better status. For example, while temporary residents generally do not receive settlement support, this was quickly changed for the Ukrainians:⁴⁰

The federal government created an exception allowing Ukrainian newcomers to access settlement services like language classes. They also at first did not receive any financial assistance, but later the program was changed to provide a one-time cheque of \$3,000 for adults and \$1,500 per child. People arriving on chartered flights can also get accommodations for 14 days until they find a new home.⁴¹

As an example of the cross-sectoral and widespread support enjoyed by Ukrainians throughout Canadian society, many higher education institutions have voluntarily provided resources and set up initiatives for students impacted by the invasion of Ukraine.⁴²

The temporary nature of the measures, the diaspora's influence and the government's unprecedented commitment, raise the question: what will happen to the status of displaced Ukrainians after three years?

Transition to permanent residence after 3 years?

By stating on its official CUAET website that Ukrainians will be allowed to stay in Canada “until it is safe for them to return home”, the government is suggesting this form of refuge will not be revoked after three years if the war continues.⁴³

While the unique Ukrainian programme seems to go against the Canadian tradition of granting permanent residence to legally-recognized refugees, the government has improvised to allow flexibility that accommodates Ukrainians who may be undecided whether their future lies in Canada or Ukraine. Even though some Ukrainians will want to return home, many will undoubtedly prefer to start new lives in a country that welcomes them in a generous manner.⁴⁴

The issue of transitioning to a permanent status will inevitably be raised, given the government's already announced plan to increase immigration massively over the next few years and the considerable influence of the Ukrainian diaspora as can be seen from the above analysis.

The following declaration on the government website indicates the underlying assumption of a possible smooth transition to permanent residence after three years:

Ukrainians and their family members working and studying in Canada will be able to gain valuable Canadian work or education experience to help set them up for future success should they eventually choose to seek permanent residency through IRCC's immigration programs and streams [emphasis added].⁴⁵

In other words, while the government may not know the future intentions of displaced Ukrainians, it appears to be doing everything possible to accommodate by offering options. This openness to facilitate the transition appears to be implied also by Canada's Ambassador to Ukraine: "[h]ow many of those will come to Canada, we don't know – and how many of the people who've arrived will stay here and take a path towards a more permanent residence, we don't know."⁴⁶

When Canada's generous response is considered alongside the exceptional temporary measures adopted by the EU, it is noteworthy that Canadian government policy appears to include the idea of offering to Ukrainians future alternative options in case their current plans fail. Evaluation of this unusual approach to refugee outflows requires an understanding that emergency protection has traditionally been conceived as a regional response, with geographically more distant immigration countries such as Canada playing a role in terms of responsibility or burden-sharing. The response to the current Ukrainian outflow is astonishing in that almost unlimited (although temporary) regional options have been offered throughout the EU, yet Canadian authorities are still providing Ukrainians with unparalleled opportunities for protection. This policy decision to offer flexible and wide-ranging choices to displaced persons is arguably the most progressive example of protection in the international refugee regime since its formal inception 100 years ago.

Ukrainians have many options compared to other refugees

Will this innovative Canadian approach be applied to other displaced persons? Could it affect other groups negatively?

The Immigration Minister's vague announcements about admitting an unlimited number of Ukrainians has essentially not been questioned by the country's media or intellectual establishment. Shortly after the large-scale invasion started last February, Immigration Minister Sean Fraser began repeating that an unlimited number of visas would be issued to Ukrainians escaping the war. Such is the widespread Canadian support

to Ukrainians that barely anyone has really questioned this “blank cheque” promise.⁴⁷

Moreover, the current Ukrainian inflow will potentially have a large impact on the future immigration plans recently presented to Parliament. On the one hand, the preferential administrative treatment will inevitably impact applications from other troubled countries and continents that have received less international attention and resources. Less bureaucratic resources will be available to process these other applications and the current delays mentioned above will likely be aggravated. On the other hand, the net outcome in demographic terms will inevitably impact the composition of source countries for future immigration plans. If close to one million temporary visas are issued with implied commitments to facilitate transition to permanent status, then it will affect the numbers coming from source countries that have typically provided most immigrants in recent years.⁴⁸

As mentioned above, this is a “zero-sum game” and Canadians appear to shy away from frank discussions on such demographic impacts and the competing diaspora interests. Faith in the country’s multicultural integration policies appears to be so high that these types of critical questions rarely attract attention from the national news media or intelligentsia. Diaspora groups in Canada are clearly operating in an environment that is fundamentally different from the one in continental Europe.

Yet in witness evidence recently presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Canadian settlement agencies have expressed difficulty in explaining to other “client” groups the preferential treatment offered to Ukrainians.⁴⁹ Some may wonder whether Canada’s response would be equally generous if the beneficiaries of the current exceptional measures were from other continents with different cultural practices. To the extent that there has been commentary noting the unusually generous policies adopted recently by the Canadian government to help Ukrainian displaced persons, much of it focuses on racism as the problem.⁵⁰

After hearing witnesses submit evidence, the House of Commons Standing Committee mentioned above submitted its report

recommending that the government should “extend the special measures offered to Ukrainians ... to those from other countries and regions that are faced with humanitarian crises”.⁵¹ The report also includes several recommendations directly relating to anti-racism efforts.⁵² It should not be surprising that a Canadian nonpartisan news agency that showcases “immigrant journalism” has recently published an article reporting on the Standing Committee’s work with the provocative title “Racism, bias plaguing Canada’s immigration processing system”.⁵³

While it is difficult to prove the accusation that the preferential treatment accorded to Ukrainians displaced by the Russian invasion is mainly attributable to racism, at the very least the perception that it is a significant factor is in itself cause for concern. There are no signs of backlash against the Ukrainian diaspora, but such reactions may prove unpredictable in a multicultural environment that includes competition for political favour. In the likely event that the generous treatment to Ukrainians is not extended to other groups in the short or medium term, it is possible that the geopolitical factors which have been used to explain this particular and unprecedented level of support from Canada may not be persuasive in the longer term.

III

How the influential Ukrainian diaspora contributes to Canada's foreign policy

Alongside the unusually generous treatment offered to Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion, the analysis in this section shows that the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has generally achieved an extraordinary level of influence⁵⁴ in Canadian foreign policy. This influence results from at least two major factors: convergence with Canada's national interests and effective high-level advocacy. The interplay of these factors has allowed Canada to play a significant role in Ukraine's post-Soviet development, as well as the current crisis with Russia.

To grasp the situation of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, it is necessary to keep in mind the apparently unequivocal Canadian support for multiculturalism. Understanding the official state-promoted multiculturalism policy, first announced by Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1971, is fundamental to any comparative analysis or lessons that can be learned by other NATO members. While many western states have acknowledged that some of their urban areas contain *de facto* multicultural societies, Canada has taken this worldview further down an ideological path that is becoming central to its national identity.

Upbeat nature of diaspora studies in Canada

The evolution of the new academic field of "diaspora studies" in recent years suggests there are relevant underlying conceptual factors that need to be considered. As the end of the Cold War led to a unipolar world and debates about the "End of History",⁵⁵ it is not surprising

that a particularly optimistic view of the potential role of diasporas had emerged amongst academic proponents of liberal theory. An upbeat vision was developing in U.S. scholarship in the 1990s that noted changes in how foreign policy was conducted: “many ethnic groups have undergone a major transformation, changing from outsiders who struggle to penetrate the U.S. foreign policy system to insiders who act in its service as exporters of American ideals.”⁵⁶

From an original focus on U.S. politics, this viewpoint spread to include liberal internationalists and proponents of multilateral engagement throughout the western world, particularly those working in development cooperation.⁵⁷ In the Canadian context, this emerging approach gained favour as intellectual and academic leaders appreciated the new conceptual orientation that emphasized potential opportunities for multicultural societies.⁵⁸

If Canada is truly becoming a profoundly multicultural society with strong ethnic influences, then we can reasonably expect that this dynamic will affect its foreign policy.⁵⁹ While some have theorized about the extent of diasporic influence on the policies of the country of origin,⁶⁰ Canada is so committed to multiculturalism that its intellectual thinkers are explicitly reframing diasporic influence in terms of its positive contribution to the country’s foreign policy.⁶¹ The emerging hypothesis apparently guiding Canada’s establishment is boldly optimistic: diversity is not only the country’s strength and advantage in developing national economic growth, it also contributes to better foreign policy.

For example, a prominent report published a decade ago presents an optimistic vision explaining that Canadian foreign policy is not just for experts⁶² and that diasporas represent special assets in this context.⁶³ The argument goes full circle by explaining how diasporas contribute to national interests and emerging values of inclusion by engaging in foreign policy.⁶⁴ The general sentiment from this report is summarized by its sponsors in a prominent national newspaper:

As arguably the most diverse and pluralistic country on Earth, Canada is better equipped than most of its Western allies to engage its citizens in helping determine the direction and con-

tent of its foreign policy ... Much could be achieved if Canada's diaspora groups – including those originating from the world's most strategically important regions – were called upon more systematically to help strengthen the content and reach of Canada's official foreign policy. They could become huge assets to Canada's efforts at helping their homeland countries thrive, and, by extension, to realizing our global security and economic interests more broadly.⁶⁵

An influential Ukrainian diaspora emerges in Canada

Within this intellectual environment favouring diaspora engagement, Ukrainians in Canada have become over time significant players in the formulation of the country's foreign policy. However, it should be remembered that the Ukrainian diaspora does not represent the Ukraine state. Despite the common causes they may have embraced in recent years, the diaspora should be understood as independent of the Ukrainian government and diplomatic corps.⁶⁶

The Ukrainian Canadian Congress, mentioned in the preceding section, is a diaspora umbrella organization with considerable influence. Yet the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is not the community's only voice. Canadians of Ukrainian background have been elected to the federal Parliament since the mid-1920s.⁶⁷ The first Cabinet Minister of Ukrainian descent was appointed in 1959.⁶⁸

The most influential Cabinet Minister from the Ukrainian diaspora is undoubtedly the current Minister of Finance, Chrystia Freeland. She has been described as one of the “elite diaspora players” by leaders of Canada's Ukrainian community: “[w]e don't have to teach Chrystia what to do, as she knows without our briefings what Ukraine needs.”⁶⁹ Having studied at Harvard University and the University of Oxford, and then serving in senior positions at the *Financial Times* and *The Globe and Mail*,⁷⁰ her views are in line with those generally held by the Anglo-American progressive liberal establishment. She was recently named “Diplomat of the Year” by the influential U.S.-based magazine *Foreign Policy*.⁷¹

Unlike some groups in North America or Europe that have sought to emphasize their separation from mainstream society, Ukrainian Canadians have long embraced integrationist approaches and participation in the Canadian state. Perhaps in ways similar to American Jews, their case suggests the benefits of participation in official state structures to influence foreign policy.⁷² The example that may best exemplify the benefits of embracing and participating in the development of Canadian values is the Ukrainian diaspora's active involvement in the formulation of multiculturalism.

In fact, many consider Senator Paul Yuzyk, who was a Canadian academic of Ukrainian background, to be the "father of multiculturalism."⁷³ In 1964, as a Senator, he challenged the country's prevailing concept of biculturalism (English/French) by arguing that Canada was in fact a multicultural society. When Canada's Prime Minister announced the country's new multiculturalism policy in 1971, it was while speaking at the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.⁷⁴ The Canadian government established in 2009 the Paul Yuzyk Award for Multiculturalism.

As noted over two decades ago in the American context, the emerging intellectual ideas outlined above opened space for diaspora political activism.⁷⁵ The key is to recalibrate political activism in human rights terms that correspond to domestic values. In this sense, the importance of the Holodomor,⁷⁶ the 1932-33 famine in Soviet Ukraine during which several million people died, cannot be overstated. It was a central issue in mobilizing awareness amongst the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, while spreading human rights values (and arguably nationalist sentiments) within the community and eventually in Ukraine itself.

Diaspora mobilization understandably grew with the independence of Ukraine in 1991,⁷⁷ a goal long desired by many of the older members of the diaspora in Canada, who had traumatic memories, or held strong political views concerning the totalitarian character of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ Yet it should not be ignored that the Holodomor involves some contentious aspects that have divided Ukrainians:

There were (and still are) significant differences in perceptions of the Famine within the Ukrainian Diaspora, between

non-Diaspora scholars, and among the public in various parts of Ukraine. What has become clear, is that during Yushchenko's presidency, policies on the Famine followed the 'never forget' model widely supported by Ukrainian diaspora during the Cold War and transmitted to and incorporated within Ukrainian national discourse thereafter. Through that process, narratives of victimization were introduced as national doctrine through canonic interpretation provided by the Institute of National Remembrance and reinforced by the Ukrainian government's de-communisation laws.⁷⁹

Controversial issues concerning specific aspects of diaspora mobilization should not detract from the positive benefits. In a study conducted by an official at Global Affairs Canada, the author emphasizes the "positive roles diasporas could play in international relations as teachers, bridge-builders, diplomats, wealth-generators and peace-makers".⁸⁰ The logic is relatively straightforward: if members of the diaspora are taking positive practices they have learned from their Canadian experiences and applying or promoting them in their country of origin, then Canada could be seen as a force for progress in the world. The constructive political activities mentioned in the study include the following: transfer of skills and knowledge, promotion of tolerance and respect for diversity, potential roles as peace-brokers and promotion of human rights and democratic governance.⁸¹

The importance of high-level professional advocacy

The high-level professional quality of advocacy is also an important factor in explaining the influence of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.⁸² The Ukrainian Canadian Congress' activities, for example, started to evolve considerably in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War and Ukraine's independence made possible new projects that ranged from lobbying for official development aid⁸³ to pushing for electoral monitoring.⁸⁴ The Canada Ukraine Foundation, established in 1995 at the 18th Ukrainian Canadian Congress,⁸⁵ has since become one of the leading organizations providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine.⁸⁶

The events of late 2013 and early 2014 in Ukraine obviously led to greater involvement in transnational political activities by the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.⁸⁷ The Ukrainian Canadian Congress was amongst the pro-EU organizations that pressured then-President Yanukovich to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It began organizing protests across Canada when he reneged on his promise to sign at the end of November 2013.⁸⁸ The following effect has been noted regarding these public protests throughout Canada:

[they] united Ukrainian Canadians of different waves and generations, engaging those layers of Ukrainian Canadians who had previously hardly shown any interests in organised diaspora life. This turned the diaspora into a powerful civil force.⁸⁹

Indeed, the crisis of 2013-14 helped the Ukrainian Canadian Congress increase its visibility in a manner that would not have possible “without the political calamities”.⁹⁰

As has been pointed out in academic commentary, few diaspora organizations in Canada are able to use high-level techniques in political lobbying like the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.⁹¹ Following the defeat of the Conservative Party in the 2015 election, the organization’s advocacy is credited with ensuring large development aid packages continued under the new Liberal government in Ottawa.⁹²

Some academic commentary also suggests appeals from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress involve remarkably sophisticated political marketing in that they are carefully calibrated for the Canadian context with constant emphasis on the legitimacy of the group and its support of Canadian values.⁹³ Given the influence achieved by this umbrella organization, it should not be surprising that a Ukrainian Canadian Congress delegation accompanied Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during his first official visit to Ukraine in 2016.⁹⁴ It is also not by chance that the former president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress was elected in 2018 as president of the Ukrainian World Congress, which is headquartered in Toronto.⁹⁵

The importance of converging with Canadian national interests

Regardless of the diaspora's efforts, it would be difficult to achieve success if there is no convergence with Canada's national interests. It is therefore necessary to identify the relevant interests to understand the symbiotic relationship between the Ukrainian diaspora and the Canadian government.

Canada was not friendly towards the Czarist Empire in the late 19th century when the initial wave of immigrants from today's Ukrainian territories started arriving. These mostly poor agricultural workers and labourers were leaving the western part of the territory under the control of the Hapsburg Empire and their reception reflected Canadian economic and demographic interests.⁹⁶ In terms of Canada's geopolitical interests, the Ukrainian diaspora has been useful from the 1920s onwards as the Czarist Empire crumbled and the Soviets represented a new threat.⁹⁷

In this sense, the first waves of Ukrainian immigrants gave Canada a new population base generally hostile to the aggressive and expanding communism. This dynamic followed the end of the Second World War and continued for decades. We can generalize that "[t]he Ukrainian diaspora became firmly aligned with Canadian Cold War interests."⁹⁸

Canada's use of the Ukrainian diaspora in the anti-Soviet struggle eventually shifted with the end of the Cold War, when the issue of Ukrainian statehood became a central focus. Indeed, Canada was the first western country to recognize Ukraine's independence in 1991. Given that the Soviet Union was still in the process of disintegrating; this was a bold diplomatic move which reflected the Canadian government's commitment to the well-established Ukrainian diaspora.

The diaspora made sure that the government's engagement would continue as the newly-independent state struggled in a post-communist environment characterized by dysfunctional and corrupt structures still under Soviet influences.⁹⁹ Well before the current geopolitical struggle with Russia and the challenge it poses to western liberal values, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada had established itself

as a privileged partner in protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty in the face of aggressive Russian expansionism.

If we follow the logic behind traditional academic insistence on the defence of Canadian national interests rather than “playing to the ethnicities that make up our population”,¹⁰⁰ then Ukraine may represent a case where Canadian national security interests correspond to Ukrainian diaspora values. Like other NATO members since Russia launched its large-scale invasion earlier this year, the government of Canada has been repeating that Ukrainians are defending not only their country but “our shared values of peace, democracy, and human rights”.¹⁰¹ This ideological convergence was easy to identify well before February 2022.¹⁰²

With regards to influencing the struggling Ukrainian state, the Canadian government appears to have used “the well-established Ukrainian diaspora and its alignment with Canada’s foreign policy priorities in terms of state-to-state connections”.¹⁰³ Canada reacted to the crisis in 2013-2014 with measures intended to make clear its support for Ukraine and its opposition to Russian aggression.¹⁰⁴ The diaspora, and particularly the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, proved a useful collaborator.¹⁰⁵ For example, the president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress accompanied Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird to Kyiv, as noted in the introductory section, and then to the OSCE ministerial meeting in December 2013.¹⁰⁶ At that point in the developing Ukrainian crisis, it is claimed that the Canadian government was actively seeking out advice from this diaspora organization.¹⁰⁷

Whether based on ideological conviction or political opportunity, Canadian government policies coincided with diaspora goals in a manner rarely seen in Canada’s history.¹⁰⁸ It is possible to argue that Canada’s national interests and values have evolved with multiculturalism, and the Ukrainian diaspora has clearly played a key part in that evolution.

Acting as facilitators in Ukraine

The long collaboration between the Canadian government and the Ukrainian diaspora has led to various initiatives regarding Ukraine that may serve as lessons for other NATO host countries.¹⁰⁹

The current war has created hardship for Ukrainians and there is no doubt that diaspora remittances have helped to alleviate some of the difficulties. However, the Canadian state can also help with larger initiatives intended to change the existing structures in the home country. In other words, the Canadian government acting in collaboration with the diaspora can have greater long-term impact in terms of state-led commitments regarding governance structures and macroeconomic problems.¹¹⁰ While more recent Ukrainian immigrants in Canada tend to focus their efforts on sending remittances,¹¹¹ older generations of the diaspora play a more important role in socio-political mobilization by helping to focus on underlying structural changes in Ukraine.¹¹²

The recent Ukrainian experience has allowed diaspora theoreticians to propose certain complementary approaches that are necessary to achieve successful outcomes and to move Ukraine “out of its macroeconomic malaise”:

We find there are four main complementary approaches of transnational diaspora engagement for long-term impact within the current conflict context: political and economic aid, political activism and volunteering, remittances and migration, and delegating responsibilities to host country institutions.¹¹³

With the Ukrainian Canadian Congress guiding Canadian government initiatives in Ukraine, observers agree there has been considerable development aid since independence.¹¹⁴ From collaboration on post-independence elections monitoring¹¹⁵ to assisting Ukraine’s military,¹¹⁶ Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence have been particularly active.¹¹⁷

The new Free Trade Agreement between both countries is a good example of diaspora facilitation. Under then-Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2016 during a ceremony held in Kyiv with the most senior Canadian government officials accompanied by representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. This is another prominent example of the key role played by the diaspora. The Agreement entered into force a year later¹¹⁸ and bilateral merchandise trade between the two countries

has increased to an average of \$340.6 million CAD annually according to Global Affairs Canada.¹¹⁹

After years of this symbiotic relationship between the Ukrainian diaspora and the Canadian government, some may argue that lines have been blurred following events in 2014. In particular, the roles of the Canadian Embassy in Kyiv and Minister Freeland can be highlighted.¹²⁰ They appear to have defended the Ukrainian cause to such an extent that it raises complex questions about divided loyalties in a post-national era¹²¹ of diversity promotion. The following quote, from a journalistic promoter of progressive liberal values, points to potential problems:

That Chrystia Freeland, a Canadian born in Peace River, Alberta, speaks the language of Ukraine better than the country's President [Zelensky] – and that both felt it important to begin his term of office with a week in Canada, including multiple meetings with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau – is a double accident of history.¹²²

A head of state with a hostile army on his territory does not spend his first week in office visiting another state unless there are existential ties that bind them. To the extent that the Ukrainian diaspora is at the core of these ties, potential problems are explored in the next section.

IV

Does the Ukrainian diaspora challenge Canada's liberal democracy?

The preceding section focuses on the considerable influence exercised by the Ukrainian diaspora and how it can contribute to Canadian foreign policy. While Canada's extremely supportive stance towards this diaspora has helped to strengthen Ukraine's cohesion during a difficult time when its territory has been invaded by neighbouring Russia, it may have paradoxically also contributed to sharpening some divisions. The relevance of such an ambivalent assessment depends on whether peace-building efforts in this region of the post-Soviet space were ever realistic. We will never know if a different approach could have helped to avoid the brewing confrontation that has led to the current war. Even though the Ukrainian diaspora has exported a brand of nationalism which places Ukraine in opposition to Russia, it is only a partial picture that ignores the Russian role in provoking a generalised armed conflict. Russian nationalist excesses and dangerous geopolitical calculus are not, however, the subject of this report.

Nevertheless, there is an aspect of the Ukrainian diaspora's influence that is barely discussed in Canadian public debates and that deserves some attention if we want to be alert to potential challenges posed by diaspora groups. This section focuses on the problems ignored or dismissed by Canadian proponents of multiculturalism who have been unwavering in their support for Ukraine during the conflict with Russia. Like all diasporas, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada should not be given a *de facto* status that places it above scrutiny. Indeed, what

were presented as positive aspects in the preceding section could also be analyzed in a way that suggests potential problems.

Need for prudent reflection despite Russian aggression

Diaspora engagement will likely be a contentious issue for western liberal democracies in a post-pandemic context that will be increasingly characterized by international mobility. It is therefore necessary to engage in frank discussion to strengthen host country resilience in the face of challenges posed by authoritarian powers such as Russia (and China). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are understandable reasons why potentially negative aspects of the symbiotic relationship between the Ukrainian diaspora and the government are not discussed in Canada. However, this sensitive topic cannot become taboo because there are risks that active diaspora groups could try to influence foreign policy in ways incompatible with Canada's interest.

There is presently widespread consensus that the Ukrainian diaspora currently serves Canadian foreign policy goals, as well as the promotion of liberal democracy more generally. It is important to recognize that the Ukrainian diaspora includes irredentist elements with strong views on old territorial and political disputes involving neighbours other than Russia. Moreover, the positive dynamic of Ukrainian-Canadian responses to Russian aggression cannot be guaranteed for other diaspora groups with their own political causes or conflicts in their region of origin.

Critical analysis is necessary to ensure Canadian foreign policy remains far-sighted, while taking advantage of the dynamic opportunities opened by the country's multiculturalism policy. This careful self-questioning can begin by underlining that diaspora organizations will tend to present one-sided views in defending their own interests. These positions do not always align harmoniously with those held by other immigrant groups from their region of origin. In this competitive context, it is important for Canadians to be able to understand the nuances within (and between) diasporas and to be able to assess them critically. Has the Canadian public been exposed recently to any reliable

critical analysis regarding the Ukrainian diaspora? The following sub-section will first assess the more superficial and possibly cynical perspectives of Canada's political class before moving to more complex self-examination involving idealistic approaches that may inadvertently create blind spots.

Is Canada encouraging ethnic lobbying and political pandering?

The Ukrainian diaspora's success in influencing the Canadian government is likely to encourage other diaspora groups. One longstanding criticism of Canada's multiculturalism policy is that it encourages political lobbying by diaspora groups and pandering by politicians looking for the so-called "ethnic vote".¹²³ Some of this lobbying and pandering can lead to outrageous results. One of the latest examples involves a Canada-Palestine Parliamentary Friendship Group event on Parliament Hill which was attended by a notorious activist who publishes an Arabic-language community newspaper (which has benefitted from public multiculturalism funding) that wrote "approvingly in 2014 of a synagogue massacre in the Har Nof neighbourhood of Jerusalem, in which Canadian citizen Chaim Rotman was murdered with an axe while at prayer."¹²⁴

In terms of academic analysis of foreign policy, the "problematic relationship of multiculturalism and Canadian foreign policy" has been noted in the past.¹²⁵ This traditional academic view considers that diaspora politics risks exposing Canadian policymaking to manipulation by foreign actors. Canadian discourse in recent years has been relatively dismissive of the above concerns and has tended towards sloganeering self-promotion relating to how multiculturalism and diversity represent the country's strength. It is therefore important to explore whether other NATO members that have adopted a more reserved approach to multiculturalism are able to have a sophisticated public debate on both the benefits and risks of diaspora engagement.

The above potential problems need to be underlined given the lack of nuance in recent commentary regarding the Ukrainian crisis and

the dominant progressive liberal viewpoint in analysis concerning multiculturalism. As a former Canadian ambassador to both Ukraine and Russia has complained: “We’ve got a diaspora-driven foreign policy ... It might work at the polls, but it doesn’t do much good in the world.”¹²⁶

The problems of pandering to the ethnic vote¹²⁷ are compounded by ideologically-committed proponents of multiculturalism who have difficulty seeing dilemmas concerning Canada’s exaggerated pro-Ukrainian position. This is illustrated in the following statement by a prominent foreign affairs columnist: “Given the Ukrainians’ founding role in this most Canadian form of politics, it was inevitable that at some point Canada would manage to out-Ukrainian the Ukrainians themselves.”¹²⁸ While the statement is an astute description of the evolution of Canadian political life, it does not include any qualification suggesting concern about the potential for distorting the country’s foreign policy. Canada has a complicated northern border region with Russia in the Arctic and the relations between the two countries need to be managed carefully because of Russian aggressive posturing.

The potentially dangerous effects on Canada’s internal politics of diaspora lobby groups jockeying for influence need to be recognized. As noted by a government official studying the phenomena, diasporas tend to form lobby groups run by elites who try to influence governmental policy: “In democracies diasporas may have a decisive voice in winning key electoral ridings”.¹²⁹ Again, the U.S. style of political discourse is discernible and its repercussions in the Canadian context need to be examined more closely.¹³⁰ There are risks of developing U.S.-style racial and ethnic politics, along with the associated controversies regarding identity-based groups jockeying for power.¹³¹

The Ukrainian diaspora’s situation in Canada is striking in the sense that some aspects of the above dynamic are encouraged by the government and national media without any indication of potential negative dimensions.¹³² It is difficult to say whether this is the result of blind idealism, or whether there is actually a subtle wisdom underlying this accommodation and openness to an evolving national identity.

Can ideological commitment to multiculturalism create blind spots?

Given that Canada's multiculturalism policy reflects a specific worldview that is not universally shared by its NATO partners, it is possible to question whether its ideological dimension can blind proponents to the complicated subtleties of internal diaspora divisions and expose the country to manipulation by foreign influences.

a) Not recognizing hardline nationalists

Being committed to the well-intentioned ideology behind Canadian multiculturalism policy is arguably not the best standpoint for careful and critical reflection on particular diaspora groups and how they present themselves to the Canadian public. After all, the line between the sophisticated political marketing mentioned in the preceding section and propaganda is not clear-cut.

Part of the problem may be explained by basic ignorance or unsophisticated analysis of homeland conflicts. As pointed out by a Canadian foreign affairs official referring to Tamil Tigers and Sikh Khalistanis: "some would argue that [Canada's] multicultural make-up and open democratic environment make it particularly vulnerable to abuse by segments of diasporas motivated by homeland struggles".¹³³ It is likely that many Canadians today are unaware that the worst terrorist attack in Canada's history occurred in the mid-1980s and that it was perpetrated by members of another influential diaspora group. This was the Air India bombing where Sikh extremists blew up a plane carrying hundreds of passengers:

Sikhs based in British Columbia blew up an airliner in the 1980s to express their support for an independent Khalistan in the Indian subcontinent. This mass murder was plotted by Canadians on Canadian soil. It stands as a cautionary tale about the importation of a homeland conflict to Canada and of the utter inability of the Canadian Government to respond before terror struck or to resolve the matter in the courts after the fact.¹³⁴

Despite this sensitive history involving diaspora violence, Justin Trudeau joked shortly after becoming Prime Minister: “I have more Sikhs in my Cabinet than [Indian Prime Minister] Modi does”.¹³⁵ The Sikh diaspora issue continues to present complications for a Canadian government that was criticized again recently by the Indian High Commission in Ottawa for accommodating Sikh secessionists who are organizing referendums on Punjab independence.¹³⁶

The apparent Canadian openness to diasporas gaining disproportionate influence is all the more intriguing given the acknowledgment that they tend to be more nationalistic than populations in the homeland. As explained in a report advocating for more diaspora involvement in Canada’s foreign policy:

It is not uncommon for diaspora communities to adopt positions on conflict in their countries of origin that are considerably more hard-line and intransigent than those held by people actually living in the conflict zones.¹³⁷

The dynamic of “imagined communities”¹³⁸ is often at play and Canadian foreign policy professionals have used this conceptual lens to explain how some diasporas have acted as “long-distance nationalists” with regards to overseas conflicts.¹³⁹ In relation to the Ukrainian diaspora, even committed proponents of diaspora engagement are aware that it is “a Canadian diaspora that tends to be even more nationalist and anti-Russian in its sentiments than citizens of Ukraine”.¹⁴⁰

The traditional academic scepticism on this subject would consider diasporas which espouse nationalist views relating to their homelands as an integration challenge. The analytical focus would therefore be on getting them to understand and support Canada’s national interests instead of being consumed by the politics of their homeland.¹⁴¹ This view, however, does not appear to hold favour in Ottawa these days.

b) Inadvertently encouraging nationalism

There is little doubt that sophisticated political marketing has helped the Ukrainian Canadian Congress gain influence regarding Canada’s

foreign policy. This in turn has allowed the diaspora to help the homeland state of Ukraine in its struggle against an aggressive neighbour that has invaded its territory. However, in the same way that it can be difficult to delineate between healthy patriotism and chauvinistic nationalism, it is not easy to distinguish sophisticated political marketing from propaganda that manipulates susceptible Canadian politicians and journalists. The risk is that a well-intentioned Canadian political establishment may be inadvertently encouraging diaspora activists to stir nationalist sentiments.

Of course, propaganda efforts by a diaspora group can obfuscate the homeland conflict, particularly to a Canadian public unaware of the political subtleties at play. For example, the role of the Jewish diaspora has long been a controversial issue:

The Pearson-Trudeau-Axworthy school of foreign policy thought (which includes many people currently serving in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development) believes the Harper government has undermined decades of solid work at fashioning a balanced foreign policy in the Middle East by loudly and unreservedly supporting Israel.¹⁴²

Victimhood and collective historical trauma are delicately powerful issues that can mobilize communities in multiple ways.¹⁴³

The optimistic vision of diaspora engagement explored in the preceding section emphasizes the spreading of Canadian values related to multicultural coexistence and peace-building, including a certain amount of implied anti-nationalism. It is arguable whether the Ukraine diaspora in Canada has been held to that idealistic standard. To some extent, debate about controversial aspects of Ukrainian history has been muffled, while official Canadian support has encouraged enduring nationalist sentiments and grievances. Even though President Putin's aggressive nationalism of recent years has made it difficult to promote reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians, it can hardly be argued that Canadian policy has at any time encouraged such peace-building initiatives.

This is one of the paradoxes of diaspora politics: pro-immigration Canadians who want to show their multicultural *bona fides* support diaspora groups unaware that they may be encouraging nationalist sentiments. Couched in human rights language, causes that are actually chauvinistic can appear as struggles for freedom and democracy to uninitiated politicians and journalists. If the latter are unaware of the nuances and subtleties of the politics that are intrinsic to diasporas and their homelands, it is easy for them to embrace a simplistic representation of the homeland struggles. They could inadvertently be facilitating diaspora groups that are encouraging conflict abroad.¹⁴⁴

To the extent some recent studies suggest diasporas' understanding of homeland struggles may "play a role in influencing conflict from outside their homeland",¹⁴⁵ it is clear the Ukrainian Canadian Congress has held an anti-Russian position that precludes collaboration with pro-Russian Ukrainians within Ukraine itself. The latter point concerning Ukraine's historic internal divisions raises the thorny issue of diaspora representation.

c) Overlooking nuances in representative legitimacy

Just as it would be difficult to react to the current protests in Iran without considering past internal divisions within the Iranian diaspora,¹⁴⁶ a basic problem in addressing the representation of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada is that it was not a united community.¹⁴⁷ Attempts at projecting a single united community should therefore be met with a healthy dose of scepticism or suspicion,¹⁴⁸ even though Canadian politicians and media have hardly given the public any indication of this underlying problem.¹⁴⁹

As one part of the Ukrainian diaspora became more politically active after the Second World War,¹⁵⁰ it eventually assumed greater visibility and influence with the Canadian government. This partisan segment was also strongly anti-Soviet, thereby aligning well with Canada's stance during the Cold War.¹⁵¹ Led by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, this part of the diaspora eventually came to symbolize the entire community in the eyes of many Canadians who followed media reporting and the

organized events frequented by politicians. Only an attentive observer would know that the Ukrainian Canadian Congress has been criticized for being led by a specific part of the diaspora.¹⁵²

Appeals made by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress with the intention of underlining its legitimacy and its support of Canadian values could therefore be regarded as manipulative because they promote the fiction of a united diasporic community. They may also mask the promotion of irredentist sentiments even though they are presented superficially as Canadian values through the lens of multiculturalism.

Along with ignoring internal divisions, Canadian officials often do not grasp the subtleties of homeland politics and therefore have difficulty in “separating partisan agendas ... from inclusive ones.”¹⁵³ The result is that a vocal activist minority, often with specific agendas not necessarily shared by the whole group, are accepted as legitimate interlocutors by the Canadian government and, as a consequence, by the Canadian public generally.¹⁵⁴ We should not forget recent history of western military interventions where the U.S. and its allies have supported vocal exiled groups that are arguably detached from ground realities and not truly committed to liberal democratic values.¹⁵⁵

Internal divisions, however, should not be exaggerated. If election results in Ukraine are reliable indicators of where the population is leaning in terms of the country’s overall orientation, then Ukrainians seem to have embraced a future with closer ties to the European Union and the western world more generally. The Maidan uprising almost a decade ago, along with Russian military intervention in Crimea and the Donbass, appear to have cemented a deep and widespread rupture with neighbouring Russia. The current war is likely deepening that separation.

d) Is there a problem of divided loyalties?

Although it is a sensitive issue in the context of the ongoing Russian aggression, a sceptical analyst might wonder that the positions of the Canadian and Ukrainian governments occasionally seem to be indistinguishable. For example, while testifying recently before the Senate on the “Situation in Ukraine”, Canada’s ambassador to Ukraine

sounded sometimes as if she could have been a representative of the Ukraine government. The posting of ambassadors with family ties to the receiving country is in itself a delicate issue, yet Canada has been regularly sending Canadians who are of Ukrainian descent to head the diplomatic mission in Kyiv. While these diplomats may have acted professionally with the best interests of Canada always in mind, the appearance of partiality in a politicized and dramatic context cannot be ignored. There is a reason why this is not standard practice in the diplomacy of key NATO members.

After all, distinctions must surely be made between Canada's position and Ukraine's position with regards to many issues, including diplomatic negotiations to end the war with Russia. Yet these are often not apparent in statements by Canadian officials and politicians. This lack of a clear distinction may represent a serious disservice to the Canadian public when the day comes for nuanced articulation of Canada's specific foreign interests. Russia's geographic position immediately to the north of Canada should encourage caution.

Is this potential problem the result of an overly optimistic and uncritical multiculturalism ideology posing as progressive post-national policy? The answer to that question likely depends on whether one has an upbeat or a sceptical view on the bold promotion of multiculturalism in Canadian foreign policy over the last decades. Unsurprisingly, perspectives on this issue tend to divide along ideological or partisan lines with progressive academics favouring an upbeat vision of the positive role of multiculturalism, while more traditional sources underline the dangers in terms of identifying Canada's true national interests.

V Conclusion

Ukrainian exile structures in Canada represent a striking example of the benefits of diaspora engagement and integration in the host state. Over generations spanning most of Canada's existence as a federal state, Ukrainians have emigrated from their relatively poor and troubled homeland to a growing and prosperous country that has accommodated them, along with many other immigrants.

By engaging with the Ukrainian diaspora and allowing its members to participate extensively in political life, Canada has treated them as assets that help evolve and expand the Canadian identity. No longer considered a threat to internal security since the First World War, this positive dynamic has developed to such an extent that Ukrainians in Canada are now playing an active role in the country's foreign policy.

This is best represented by Canada's response to the current conflict with Russia. From providing refuge to fleeing Ukrainians on Canadian territory to diaspora representatives accompanying and advising high-level government delegations to Ukraine, a symbiotic relationship has developed. There has arguably never been an immigration country that has been more supportive of a diaspora group and its political cause relating to the homeland than this Canadian example of support to the Ukrainian diaspora.

The special immigration programme explained in this report represents an exceptional wartime measure that is allowing Ukrainians to come to Canada quickly and in record numbers. With guidance from the existing diaspora, the Canadian government has offered these new arrivals a preferential treatment that provides them with flexible migration options in the short and long term. The role of the diaspora has extended

well beyond simply ensuring Canada offers the best possible treatment to Ukrainians displaced by the war. Indeed, the report makes clear that the professional advocacy of the Ukrainian diaspora has allowed it to become actively involved in various aspects of Canada's foreign policy, particularly regarding the crisis with Russia. The diaspora's influence is such that it facilitates the Canadian government's extensive efforts to support Ukraine in its struggle for survival.

However, there are potential problems in the symbiotic relationship between the Ukrainian diaspora and the Canadian government. Compared to other refugees, Ukrainians fleeing the Russian aggression are given an unparalleled form of preferential treatment that will inevitably exasperate immigration candidates from other parts of the world. Despite the outstanding contribution of the diaspora in advancing Canadian identity through the development of multiculturalism policy, it has also included some controversial aspects regarding methods and goals. To the extent that the Ukrainian diaspora's success in influencing the Canadian government will serve as a model for other diaspora groups, peaceful objectives which converge with Canada's national interests are not always guaranteed. The relationship achieved in this case may be hard to reproduce for other diaspora groups. Although it is currently out of favour in Canada's upbeat vision of diversity and multiculturalism, there is still room for some of the traditional prudence that evaluates Canadian interests with a sophisticated understanding of homeland-related struggles. It would be foolish to neglect the risk that foreign actors may use diasporas in Canada to further their own agendas.

Yet the case of the Ukrainian diaspora remains a remarkable example of what can be accomplished in the long term when immigrants integrate into a host state and its political structures. It allows Canada to achieve some of its foreign policy goals, while helping an embattled people in their struggle against an aggressive neighbour.

Endnotes

- 1 Germany is second at 16,1%. The United Kingdom and the United States are virtually tied for third place at just under 14%. See OECD Data, “Foreign-born population” [online: <https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm>].
- 2 Statistics Canada, “Canada’s population clock (real-time model)”, last modified on 12 December 2022 [online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/71-607-x/71-607-x2018005-eng.htm>].
- 3 The government is planning projected admissions of permanent residents to reach 500,000 per year over the next three years. Canada admitted roughly 250,000 to 300,000 permanent residents per year over much of the last decade. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2022 Annual Report to Parliament, 8 November 2022, p. 34 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/annual-report-parliament-immigration-2022.html>]. See also statistics from reports for previous years on the same website.
- 4 See s. 3 of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.) [online: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html>].
- 5 See, for example, Caspar Schliephack, Sicherheitsrelevante Entwicklungen in den tschetschenischen Gemeinschaften in Deutschland, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 10 November 2022, 112 p.
- 6 The term “diaspora” is used throughout this report to emphasize the deep links between Canadians of immigrant background and their ancestral country of origin, as well as to encourage analysis that addresses transnational connections comprehensively alongside issues of subnational loyalties.
- 7 Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 92.

- 8 Max Stick and Feng Hou, “A sociodemographic profile of Ukrainian-Canadians”, Statistics Canada, 28 April 2022 [online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/36-28-0001/2022004/article/00003-eng.htm>].
- 9 For example, international trade between Canada and Russia is limited. Canadian exports to Russia represented only 0,1% of total Canadian exports in 2015 and in 2016. Imports from Russia represented only 0,2% of total Canadian imports in 2015 and in 2016. Dylan Gowans, Canadian Trade and Investment Activity: Canada-Russia, Library of Parliament, No. 2017-593-E, 18 September 2017 [online: https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/TradeAndInvestment/2017593E].
- 10 Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “Crise ukrainienne: L’UE adopte des sanctions mais maintient le dialogue”, *Le Monde*, 21 February 2014 [online: https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/02/21/l-ue-adopte-des-sanctions-mais-maintient-le-dialogue_4371101_3214.html].
- 11 Murray Brewster, “Canadian embassy used as safe haven during Ukraine uprising, investigation finds”, *CBC News*, 12 July 2015 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-embassy-used-as-safe-haven-during-ukraine-uprising-investigation-finds-1.3148719>].
- 12 Ukrainian Canadian Congress, “Canada’s Foreign Minister, the Honourable John Baird visits the ‘Maidan’ in Kyiv, Ukraine”, *Community News*, 5 December 2013 [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/2013/12/05/news-canadas-foreign-minister-the-honourable-john-baird-visits-the-maidan-in-kyiv-ukraine/>]: “Today, Canada’s Foreign Minister, the Honourable John Baird and Ukrainian Canadian Congress President Paul Grod visited ‘Maidan’. Mr Grod announced from the stage that Minister John Baird was there personally supporting the students and the people of Ukraine. Remarkably, close to 20,000 people chanted “Thank you Canada” when Mr Grod announced that the Minister was there in person!”. While embarking on a personal visit to Kyiv in December 2013 (i.e. in no official capacity), Edmonton East MP Peter Goldring stated: “One of the reasons I wanted to go was because the debate seemed very anti-Russian, and I wasn’t comfortable with that. Half of Ukraine is Russian-speaking, after all, but that doesn’t mean they want to roll back the clock into the Soviet Union ... I told them that they were citizens of a great country and they have a won-

derful future if unfettered by external influences, meaning Russia. And I reassured them they had friends around the world, not only in Ottawa, but also Edmonton and that we stand with them for what is right.” Tristan Hopper, “Conservative MP takes his freelance diplomacy to Ukraine in support of pro-EU protesters”, *National Post*, 20 December 2013 [online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/conservative-mp-takes-his-freelance-diplomacy-to-ukraine-in-support-of-pro-eu-protesters>].

- 13 For information on this diaspora umbrella organization formed in 1940, see its website [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/>].
- 14 Johannes Leithäuser and Michaela Wiegel, “Keine Fortschritte im Normandie-Format”, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 February 2022 [online: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/verhandlungen-zu-ostukraine-im-normandie-format-stocken-17798908.html>]. The previous Normandy Format meeting was held in Paris on 26 January 2022. See Nicolas Barotte, “Ukraine: Emmanuel Macron et Olaf Scholz misent encore sur le dialogue”, *Le Figaro*, 26 January 2022 [online: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/ukraine-emmanuel-macron-et-olaf-scholz-misent-encore-sur-le-dialogue-20220125>].
- 15 For reporting from the official Russian information agency, see TASS, “Voennaya operaciya na Ukraine” [online: <https://tass.ru/voennaya-operaciya-na-ukraine>]. The content on the original Russian language site is different and more detailed than the English language version.
- 16 UNHCR, Statement on the situation in Ukraine attributed to UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi, 24 February 2022 [online: <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/42817-statement-on-the-situation-in-ukraine-attributed-to-un-high-commissioner-for-refugees-filippo-grandi.html>]. See also Chris Melzer (UNHCR), “A mother from Kyiv finds safety in Poland after days on the road”, 28 February 2022 [online; <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/42947-a-mother-from-kyiv-finds-safety-in-poland-after-days-on-the-road.html>].
- 17 See the chapter entitled “Les origines du système actuel” in Michael Barutciski, *Les dilemmes de protection internationale des réfugiés*, Beau Bassin, Presses Académiques Francophones, 2018, pp. 21-41.
- 18 UNHCR estimates that total displacement, including internally displaced people, has reached 103 million at mid-2022. UNHCR,

Refugee Data Finder, last update: 27 October 2022 [online: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>].

- 19 Art. 2, Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, [online:
- 20 For a critique of the early iteration of the concept, see the section entitled “Reduced rights of temporary protection” in Michael Barutciski, “The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of UNHCR”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, vol. 8(1-2), 1996, pp. 76-80.
- 21 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Ukraine immigration measures: Key figures, last modified on 9 December 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>].
- 22 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel, last modified on 22 March 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html>].
- 23 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Ukraine immigration measures: Key figures, last modified on 9 December 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>].
- 24 Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, 17 November 2022: Testimony from Larisa Galadza, Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine (Global Affairs Canada) [online: <https://senparlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2?fk=591921&globalStreamId=3>].
- 25 For a complete list of rights and privileges concerning the CUAET, see the online government website dedicated to providing accurate information: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel, last modified on 22 March 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html>].

- 26 For a copy of the letter, see UCC’s website [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/2022/11/23/ucc-urges-government-of-canada-to-extend-visa-program/>].
- 27 Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, 17 November 2022: Testimony from Larisa Galadza, Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine (Global Affairs Canada) [online: <https://senparlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2?fk=591921&globalStreamId=3>].
- 28 Bryan Passifiume, “Fewer than 24 per cent of Ukrainians granted visas have come to Canada: ambassador”, *National Post*, 17 November 2022 [online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/fewer-than-24-per-cent-of-ukrainians-granted-visas-have-come-to-canada-ambassador>].
- 29 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel, last modified on 22 March 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html>].
- 30 See, for example, Pratyush Dayal, “With more than 2.4M immigration applications in Canada’s backlog, many here and overseas feel lost”, *CBC News*, 28 July 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/more-than-2-4-million-immigration-applications-in-backlog-1.6529154>] and Nicholas Keung, “Canada spent millions to upgrade its systems. Why are immigration backlogs still so bad?”, *Toronto Star*, 15 November 2022 [online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/analysis/2022/11/15/canada-spent-millions-to-upgrade-its-systems-why-are-immigration-backlogs-still-so-bad.html>].
- 31 See Matt Lundy, “Immigration backlog leads to surge of legal cases against federal government”, *The Globe and Mail*, 30 November 2022 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canada-immigration-legal-backlog/>].
- 32 Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, 17 November 2022: Testimony from Larisa Galadza, Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine (Global Affairs Canada) [online: <https://senparlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2?fk=591921&globalStreamId=3>].

- 33 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017 Annual Report to Parliament, 1 November 2017, p. 6 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2017.pdf>].
- 34 Refugee claimants are considered to be in Canada as soon as they arrive at the border. Most are eligible to claim refugee protection, with some exceptions outlined in the relevant legislation. See s. 101 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27) [online: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-2.5/page-12.html>].
- 35 For the latest statistics, see the following government website: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/asylum-claims.html>.
- 36 Cited in Hadeel Ibrahim, “Why Ukrainian newcomers are not refugees and why that matters”, *CBC News*, 25 June 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/ukrainian-refugee-canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel-1.6498928>].
- 37 See Annex A in Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (Evaluation Division), Syrian Outcomes Report, June 2019 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics/evaluations/syrian-outcomes-report-2019.html#s76>].
- 38 Cited in Hadeel Ibrahim, “Why Ukrainian newcomers are not refugees and why that matters”, *CBC News*, 25 June 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/ukrainian-refugee-canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel-1.6498928>].
- 39 Quote taken from the UCC’s website [<https://www.ucc.ca/>].
- 40 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “News Release: Financial assistance now available for Ukrainians in Canada”, 2 June 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/06/financial-assistance-now-available-for-ukrainians-in-canada.html>] and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Immigration measures and support for Ukrainians and their families – Our commitment to Ukraine” (last updated 8 August 2022) [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures.html>].

- 41 Spokesperson to the Immigration Minister cited in Hadeel Ibrahim, “Why Ukrainian newcomers are not refugees and why that matters”, *CBC News*, 25 June 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/ukrainian-refugee-canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel-1.6498928>].
- 42 See Universities Canada, “University efforts to support those impacted by Ukraine invasion”, 25 July 2022 [online: <https://www.univcan.ca/media-room/media-releases/university-efforts-to-support-those-impacted-by-ukraine-invasion/>].
- 43 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel, last modified on 22 March 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html>].
- 44 For example, the president of the Ukrainian Association of Saint John (New Brunswick) has expressed to the national broadcaster his impression that the Ukrainian stay will be long-term: “He said if he could give any advice to Ukrainians considering coming to Canada, it’s not to underestimate how big a move it is, despite it being temporary. ‘A rocket landed today two blocks away from my aunt and uncle. And they’re still thinking that this is going to be over in a couple of days or couple of weeks,’ he said. ‘The decision to move to Canada is permanent, with the opportunity in the future to go back to your country any time that you want when the things are settled. I think that the immigration in this particular program allows you to do that, but you need to make a firm decision that you are establishing yourself in this new country.’” Cited in Hadeel Ibrahim, “Why Ukrainian newcomers are not refugees and why that matters”, *CBC News*, 25 June 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/ukrainian-refugee-canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel-1.6498928>].
- 45 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel, last modified on 22 March 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-ukraine-authorization-for-emergency-travel.html>].
- 46 Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, 17 November 2022: Testimony from Larisa Galadza, Ambassador of Canada to Ukraine (Global Affairs Canada) [online: <https://>

senparlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2?fk=591921&globalStreamId=3].

- 47 See Michael Barutciski, “Canada’s ‘temporary protection’ for Ukrainian refugees needs clarity”, *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 March 2022 [online: <https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/barutciski-canada-temporary-protection-for-ukrainian-refugees-needs-clarity>]: “Increasing capacity with an expedited process is not a straightforward administrative decision. Character checks are complicated at the moment because it is difficult to get Ukrainian police clearances. Our bureaucratic resources are not unlimited.”
- 48 India, China and the Philippines have been the top source countries in recent pre-pandemic statistics. See also Michael Barutciski, “Il faudra clarifier la «protection temporaire» des réfugiés”, *Le Devoir*, 16 March 2022, [online: <https://www.ledevoir.com/opinion/idees/686487/idees-il-faudra-clarifier-la-protection-temporaire-des-refugies>]: “[L]a réception d’un nombre important d’Ukrainiens affectera potentiellement les candidats à l’immigration provenant d’autres pays. Il faut toujours être transparent avec une population d’accueil quand il s’agit de sujets sensibles affectant sa démographie.”
- 49 See House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Promoting Fairness in Canadian Immigration Decisions, Report 12, 16 November 2022, p. 15 [online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/CIMM/report-12/>].
- 50 See, for example, Susan Korah, “‘Racism to the core’: differential politics of Canada’s refugee programs”, *Toronto Star*, 16 March 2022 [online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2022/03/16/racism-to-the-core-differential-politics-of-canadas-refugee-programs.html>]; Veronica Øverlid, “Is the welcome to Ukrainian refugees unusually generous — or overtly racist?”, *The Conversation*, 16 March 2022 [online: <https://theconversation.com/is-the-welcome-to-ukrainian-refugees-unusually-generous-or-overtly-racist-178819>]; Ainsley Hawthorn, “How the Ukraine crisis reveals our racial empathy gap”, *CBC News*, 12 March 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/how-the-ukraine-crisis-reveals-our-racial-empathy-gap-1.6380344>]; Carol Eugene Park, “Canada’s response to Ukraine crisis reveals racism in immigration system, says lawyer”, *North Shore News*, 23 March 2022 [online: <https://www.nsnews.com/highlights/canadas-response-to-ukraine-crisis-reveals-racism-in-immigration-system-says-lawyer>].

[sis-reveals-racism-in-immigration-system-says-lawyer-5180392](#)]; Anthony Fong and Zamir Saar, “Canada needs to be as welcoming to Afghan refugees as it is to Ukrainians”, *The Conversation*, 25 May 2022 [online: <https://theconversation.com/canada-needs-to-be-as-welcoming-to-afghan-refugees-as-it-is-to-ukrainians-182363>].

- 51 See recommendation 2 in House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Promoting Fairness in Canadian Immigration Decisions, Report 12, 16 November 2022 [online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/CIMM/report-12/>].
- 52 See recommendations 4, 18 and 26-33, id.
- 53 Fabian Dawson, “Racism, bias plaguing Canada’s immigration processing system”, *New Canadian Media*, 23 November 2002 [online: <https://newcanadianmedia.ca/racism-bias-plaguing-canadas-immigration-processing-system/>].
- 54 The considerable influence is acknowledged by many analysts of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. See, for example, Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 47: “This case study shows that the influence of the Ukrainian diaspora is not an exaggeration invented by Canadian pundits. The diaspora’s success in advocating for the Ukrainian cause is the result of interconnected factors: the lobby’s organisational capacity (the diaspora’s agency), the salience of the Maidan and the Russian invasion as extraordinary international events, the absence of a competing lobby group for the opposing cause and, finally, the alignment of the diaspora’s interests with those of the state.”
- 55 For the original article on this debate, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, *The National Interest*, no. 16, 1989, pp. 3-18.
- 56 Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 70.
- 57 See, for example: Kathleen Newland, *Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin*, Migration Policy Institute, 2004, 45 p., Hein de Haas, *Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries*, Inter-

national Migration Institute (University of Oxford), June 2006, 112 p. and Cindy Horst, *Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation, International Peace Research Institute*, Policy Brief 8/2008, 4 p.

- 58 For an early example of encouraging “students to have the full exposure to [diaspora groups] as teachers”, see Lloyd Axworthy, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series, University of San Diego, 11 February 2005, p. 66 [online: https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=lecture_series].
- 59 In the U.S. context, it has been noted that “if America is becoming a multicultural society with powerful ethnic influences, one should expect to see strong ramifications in U.S. foreign affairs”. Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 73.
- 60 See, for example, Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory” *International Organization*, vol. 57(3), 2003, pp. 449-479.
- 61 Diaspora engagement in European countries usually involves projects to encourage their political participation in the home country. For an example of Germany’s efforts to help its Albanian diaspora engage in the policy structures of Kosovo, see the following round table event: “The role of the diaspora in the politics of the homeland: Advancing the democratization process”, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 17 February 2021 [online: <https://www.kas.de/en/events/detail/-/content/the-role-of-the-diaspora-in-the-politics-of-the-homeland>].
- 62 “After debunking the notion that the discernment and promotion of national interests is a matter for experts, then the field is open for more participants—indeed, citizens as such—to engage in dialogue about foreign policy matters.” The Mosaic Institute and The Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, *Tapping our Potential: Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy*, December 2011, p. 15.
- 63 Id., pp. 16-18.
- 64 Id., pp. 13-15. See also, for example, David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 25: “Assuming they have a degree of autonomy, diaspora have the potential to contrib-

ute as aspirational models demonstrating and communicating to the larger community the benefits (economic, social, political) of cooperative behaviour.”

- 65 Tom Axworthy, John Monahan and Natalie Brender, “Tap immigrants to help shape foreign policy”, *The Globe and Mail*, 20 December 2011 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/tap-immigrants-to-help-shape-foreign-policy/article4201938/>].
- 66 “While diaspora group advocacy can be extremely effective on certain issues, neither diaspora lobbyists like the UCC nor other individual non-institutionalised diaspora players can act on behalf of the Ukrainian state, as certain types of work can only be done by a direct representative of the country, like the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 40.
- 67 In 1926, Michael Luchkovich was the first politician of Ukrainian background to be elected to the House of Commons. He held his Alberta riding until he was defeated in the 1935 federal election.
- 68 Michael Starr was Minister of Labour until 1963.
- 69 Cited in Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 39. Although this citation from an interview with an “anonymous high-profile diaspora activist” can reflect different issues, at the very least it indicates that a pro-Ukrainian viewpoint is present in the highest levels of government decision-making. Minister Freeland is also Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister.
- 70 See the official government website for her biography [online: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet/honourable-chrystia-freeland>].
- 71 See the *Foreign Policy* website [online: <https://foreignpolicy.com/fp-diplomat-of-the-year/>].
- 72 See Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 78: “When it comes to foreign affairs, diaspora integrationists present their case in terms of ‘America’s best national interest’ and establish political lobbies to compete for their own interpretation of that interest. In the African American commu-

nity, the intergrationists' mode in foreign affairs is best represented by TransAfrica. From its inception, TransAfrica considered African American involvement in African and Caribbean affairs to be an additional mechanism for domestic empowerment. In the crusade to reverse America's posture toward South Africa, TransAfrica endeavored to apply Martin Luther King's domestic strategy of challenging Americans to live up to their democratic creed."

- 73 See Serge Cipko, "Paul Yuzyk", *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 27 October 2022 [online: <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/paul-yuzyk>].
- 74 See the section entitled "Our history" on the UCC's website [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/about-ucc/our-history/>]. See also David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, "Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot", *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 26: "The political engagement of the Ukrainian community within the Canadian political system solidified when Senator Paul Yuzyk, a Ukrainian Canadian, initiated policies on multiculturalism. Canada's official multicultural policy was announced at the Triennial Congress of Ukrainian Canadians (UCC) by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1971."
- 75 Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 71: "many ethnic elites have discovered that by focusing on political causes in their homelands they are better positioned to mobilize their communities for domestic empowerment in America. Moreover, efforts on behalf of ancestral countries are widely recognized as legitimate political practices, licensed and encouraged by the nature of the American party system and the power of each congressional representative."
- 76 See, for example, Anne Applebaum, "Holodomor", *Britannica*, 2 December 2022 [online: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Holodomor>].
- 77 "Ukrainian Canadians mobilized their direct support for the new country on many fronts, among them political lobbying, remittances and personal aid, cultural and heritage connections and extensive support for Ukrainian academia. But it was the transmission of ideas that was most important. The diaspora helped realize the idea of a distinct ethnolinguistic identity and shared traumatic history, among the people of Ukraine. By being strong advocates of trauma memories, diaspora representatives were

among organizers of the 60th anniversary of the Holodomor in Ukraine. The first time that a public commemoration was held in 1993.” Milana Nikolko, “Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 42(11), 2019, p. 1881.

- 78 This is a classic example of a basic point made in academic commentary: “Some diasporas have been involved in the struggle for the political independence of their stateless nations”. Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 70. The Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine was established in 1949 (it changed its name to League of Ukrainian Canadians after Ukraine’s independence in 1991). See the organization’s website [online: <https://www.lucorg.com/about/>].
- 79 Milana Nikolko, “Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 42(11), 2019, p. 1882.
- 80 Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 104.
- 81 Id., pp. 95-96.
- 82 “Had the diaspora’s institutionalised players not already elaborated a high degree of professionalism in advocacy prior to the events in Ukraine, it would have been more difficult for them to sustain cohesive advocacy during the most dramatic years.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 45.
- 83 “Since the beginning of the 1990s, the UCC saw its role as helping persuade the Canadian government to prioritise Ukraine as a recipient of Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA). Since the mid-1990s, Canada has been among Ukraine’s top 10 international donors and a large number of its programmes in Ukraine have focused on democratisation, good governance and economic reform projects.” Id., pp. 44-45.
- 84 “[W]hen the Orange Revolution was unfolding, the UCC had been instrumental in persuading the Canadian government to send bilateral electoral observer missions (EOM) as a vehicle for the democratisation of Ukraine.” Id., p. 44.
- 85 See its website at <https://www.cufoundation.ca/>.

- 86 “As the War in Ukraine became a reality, EuroMaidan Canada’s main focus was to organise a massive fundraising campaign that helped to send humanitarian aid to the frontline and civilians. Numerous local Ukrainian diaspora groups across Canada were focused on organising the fundraising campaign to support the army and people of Ukraine and on mounting political rallies to draw attention to the country. The Canada Ukraine Foundation (CUF) became one of the leading groups that coordinated medical and humanitarian aid to war-torn Ukraine.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 40.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 34: “From November 2013 to February twenty peaceful protests in support of Euromaidan rippled through Canada. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) organized political rallies across the country to raise money and bring even more attention to the dramatic events in Ukraine.” See also Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 40.
- 89 Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 40.
- 90 Id., p. 41. For the various information projects launched by the UCC following the 2013-14 crisis, see id., p. 45.
- 91 “A party leaders survey is another older instrument that has been used by the UCC during the last two federal elections. The point of this survey was to ask federal party leaders to respond to questions and declare their positions on Ukraine and community-related matters. It thus reached out to all political parties in a consistent way. To be sure, very few ethnic communities in Canada use such a tool to reach out to political parties, which indicates the Ukrainian diaspora’s high level of political activity.” Id., p. 44.

- 92 “We spent quite a bit of time working on this matter with the minister and MPs, explaining to them that they still need to help Ukraine to ensure its democratic institutions are really solidified.” UCC president cited in *id.*, p. 46.
- 93 *Id.*, p. 43: “Ukraine is an important partner for Canada and has been so since 1991; the UCC is an organisation that represents the interests of 1.4 million Ukrainian Canadians who are, first and foremost, Canadian citizens; the Ukrainian community is strong and numerous; the Ukrainian diaspora is a respectful part of Canadian society, a well-established one that has contributed much to Canada’s well-being; and Ukrainians Canadians have contributed to multiculturalism.”
- 94 UCC, Three Year Report 2013-2016, 2016 [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/UCC-Triennial-Report-2013-2016-min.pdf>].
- 95 For information on this organization formed in 1967, see <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/>. Until shortly after Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the organization was known as the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.
- 96 As Austria-Hungary was part of the enemy Central Powers during the First World War, many of these Ukrainians were interned. See the Canadian legislative act adopted in 2005 to recognize and “to express its deep sorrow for those events”: *Internment of Persons of Ukrainian Origin Recognition Act*, S.C. 2005, c. 52.
- 97 David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 26: “These traumatic narratives reflected a dominant anti-Soviet position among the Ukraine diaspora.”
- 98 *Ibid.* Although not as engaged in conflict, the Ukrainian lobby benefitted in somewhat similar ways to the Cuban diaspora which served US geopolitical interests: “The efforts of many Cuban Americans to unseat Fidel Castro have generally concurred with U.S. objectives. As a result, the Cuban American lobby has usually been well received in Washington, and its influence has grown.” Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 100, 1995, p. 71.
- 99 “During the first years of Ukraine’s independence in the early 1990s, aid from the diaspora focused mostly on influencing Canadian aid policy, such as democracy promotion, economic develop-

ment, anti-corruption measures and university level educational scholarships. On 2 December 1991, Canada became the first western country to recognize Ukraine's independence. The 1994 Joint Declaration on a Special Partnership formally recognized Canada's support in the development of Ukraine and the importance of bilateral cooperation." David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, "Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot", *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 27.

- 100 Jack L. Granatstein, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy", in David Carment and David Bercuson (eds), *The World in Canada*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008, p. 90.
- 101 Government of Canada, Prime Minister announces new measures to support Ukraine, 28 October 2022 [online: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2022/10/28/prime-minister-announces-new-measures-support-ukraine>].
- 102 "The diaspora showed that freedom and democracy were at stake in Ukraine. The occupation of Crimea and the ongoing military aggression in Eastern Ukraine were linked to human rights abuses and therefore should draw Canada's attention; supporting Ukraine would boost Canada's influence as a country that stands for democracy, freedom and peace. The Ukrainian World Congress actively identified itself as an organisation committed to supporting democracy in Ukraine. All in all, the message clearly appealed to the idea that Canada's assistance to Ukraine should be considered a natural outcome and noble cause in itself because it was congruent with Canadian values and declared national interests. The diaspora's way of communicating its cause was focused on making sure that Ukraine's interests were aligned with Canadian national interests and agenda. Canada's long record of being a country that stands for democracy, human rights and sovereignty was invoked." Klavdia Tatar, "Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada's Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine", *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 44.
- 103 David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, "Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot", *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 38.
- 104 "Prime Minister Harper became the first Western politician to voice concern openly to President Putin regarding the occupation of the

Crimea, in what was reported as his ‘get out of Ukraine’ comment (CBC 2014). Harper’s official statement assured the diaspora that Ukraine remained Canada’s top foreign policy priority. His rhetoric was further validated by sanctions imposed by the Canadian government against the Kremlin and Putin’s inner circle, partly as a result of advocacy efforts.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 42.

- 105 “Alignment between Canadian policies towards Ukraine and its diaspora were amplified after 2014; whether it be through focused political messaging at the provincial and federal levels, increased formal and informal associational activity, broadened military and security engagement, or trade promotion and development assistance.” David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 24.
- 106 Government of Canada, “Press Release: Baird to visit Ukraine during protests, attend OSCE meeting”, 3 December 2013. Reproduced on UCC website [online: <https://www.ucc.ca/2013/12/04/ucc-president-paul-grod-accompanies-minister-baird-on-visit-to-ukraine/>].
- 107 Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 40.
- 108 “The majority of diaspora interviewees highlighted Harper’s exceptional interest in helping Ukraine and his alignment with the diaspora’s cause.” Id., p. 42. See also John Ibbitson, “Harper’s foreign policy: Ukraine and the Diaspora vote”, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 19 March 2014 [online: <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/harpers-foreign-policy-ukraine-and-diaspora-vote/>]: “Canada’s foreign-affairs minister returned to Kiev within days of Mr. Yanukovich’s overthrow. And Stephen Harper is travelling to Ukraine on Saturday, the first G7 leader to do so since the interim government took power.”
- 109 “The century long history of Ukrainians in Canada has resulted in a unique Canada-Ukraine relationship resulting in extensive diaspora engagement in a domestic and foreign policy, via significant political representation and activism of Ukrainian Canadians in

both provincial and federal parliaments.” David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 37.

- 110 “Remittances and other flows may bring some much-needed relief to economic hardships in Ukraine, but the risk of dependency through reliance on these flows is high in the absence of other forms of long-term support and alternative forms of diasporic mobilization.” *Id.*, p. 25.
- 111 “Newer generations of Ukraine’s diaspora, including temporary migrants and seasonal workers, are focused on mostly short-term highly directed objectives such as supporting households through remittances.” *Id.*, p. 22.
- 112 *Id.*, p. 24: “[E]xposure to Canada’s governance and democratic norms are used by more established diaspora to shape and influence the same structures in Ukraine through election monitoring; support for democratic reform and through various aid packages focused on improving public sector accountability, transparency and capacity. In this case, second and third generation diaspora act as facilitators, if not agents of change, who adapt to the changing circumstances around them to support homeland governance structures”.
- 113 *Id.*, p. 38.
- 114 “Ukraine has, since independence, received significant amounts of development assistance from Canada; much of it in the form of democracy promotion and university scholarships.” *Id.*, p. 37.
- 115 *Id.*, p. 27: “[T]he Ukrainian Canadian Congress and the Canada Ukraine Foundation quickly moved to become the two main groups involved in international advocacy efforts providing observers for the election process in Ukraine.” See also p. 37.
- 116 For an explanation of Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces military training and capacity building mission in Ukraine (2015-2025), as well as other military assistance, see Government of Canada, “Canadian military support to Ukraine”, last updated on 24 November 2022 [online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/canadian-military-support-to-ukraine.html>].
- 117 “The key players for Canada include some of its most influential and well-endowed federal government departments including,

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Department of National Defence.” David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 37.

- 118 “This period coincides with efforts by transnational diaspora organizations like the Ukrainian-Canadian Congress to promote trade relations between home and host states despite uncertainty caused by the ongoing crisis. The Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), which came into force 1 August 2017, represents the culmination of these efforts and the commitment to a strong bilateral relationship in the face of crisis.” Id., p. 29. See also Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 46: “The ratification of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement was another important achievement that the diaspora had lobbied for.”
- 119 This represents an increase of roughly 20-25% from the pre-Maidan period. See the government’s website dedicated to the Free Trade Agreement [online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ukraine/canada-ukraine.aspx?lang=eng>] and Florian Richard, Canadian Trade and Investment Activity: Canada-Ukraine, Library of Parliament, No. 2017-597-E, 18 September 2017 [online: https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/TradeAndInvestment/2017597E].
- 120 From 2014 onwards, the diaspora collaborated extensively with the Canadian Embassy in Kyiv in getting reliable information. Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 47: “It is significant that what unites both [Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine until 2018] Waschuk and Freeland and the majority of key diaspora entrepreneurs is that they are all descendants of the third wave of post-World War II Ukrainian refugees, a mature and a well-established faction of the diaspora community. They are highly active in advocacy and presence of such individuals of Ukrainian origin in Canadian politics obviously blurs the lines between the diaspora and the Canadian government but, in this particular case, they should be conceptualised as a variation of diasporic agency.”

- 121 In his first interview with a foreign magazine following his appointment as Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau is quoted as saying “[t]here is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada, ... There are shared values – openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice. Those qualities are what make us the first postnational state.” Guy Lawson, “Trudeau’s Canada, Again”, *The New York Times Magazine*, 8 December 2015 [online: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html?_r=1].
- 122 Doug Saunders, “How Ukrainian politics became the most Canadian of politics”, *The Globe and Mail*, 5 July 2019 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-how-ukrainian-politics-became-the-most-canadian-of-politics/>].
- 123 See, for example, Duncan McCue, “Canadian politicians will court the ethnic vote, but will it benefit any one party?”, *CBC Cross Country Checkup*, 13 January 2019 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/checkup/canadian-politicians-will-court-the-ethnic-vote-but-will-it-benefit-any-one-party-1.4976273>]. Elections Canada is the independent body set up by Parliament and mandated to conduct a federal general election, by-election or referendum. It published a magazine called “Electoral Insight” and its last issue in December 2006 featured a thematic focus on “Electoral Participation of Ethnocultural Communities” [online: https://www.elections.ca/res/eim/pdf/insight_2006_12_e.pdf].
- 124 Marie Woolf, “Minister and MPs attend parliamentary reception with Holocaust denier”, *The Globe and Mail*, 1 December 2022 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-minister-and-mps-attend-parliamentary-reception-with-holocaust-denier/>]. See also Bryan Passifume, “More guests at Parliament Palestinian ‘solidarity’ event linked to antisemitic, pro-terrorist views”, *National Post*, 8 December 2022 [online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/parliament-palestinian-solidarity-event-antisemitic-pro-terrorist/>].
- 125 Jack L. Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy”, in David Carment and David Bercuson (eds), *The World in Canada*, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008, p. 78.
- 126 Christopher Westdal cited in John Ibbitson, “Harper’s foreign policy: Ukraine and the Diaspora vote”, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 19 March 2014 [online: <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/harpers-foreign-policy-ukraine-and-diaspora-vote/>].

- 127 The bipartisan dimension of this problem can be highlighted again with a historical reference: “It was Conservative prime minister John Diefenbaker [in office 1957-1963], a prairie man with a keen sense of retail politics, who most aggressively used this to electoral ends, playing to Ukrainians’ desire for an independent homeland. It didn’t hurt that their fiercely anti-Moscow views lined up neatly with the government’s Cold War perspective.” Doug Saunders, “How Ukrainian politics became the most Canadian of politics”, *The Globe and Mail*, 5 July 2019 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-how-ukrainian-politics-became-the-most-canadian-of-politics/>].
- 128 Ibid.
- 129 Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 99.
- 130 “The phenomenon is much more prevalent in the United States, where the power of the so called “ethnic lobbies” has been a subject of heated discussions in the past.” Ibid.
- 131 For an example of a crisis based on identity politics that recently engulfed the Los Angeles City Council, see David Zahniser and Rachel Uranga, “Gil Cedillo and Kevin de León stripped of City Council committee posts over racist leak”, *Los Angeles Times*, 17 October 2022 [online: <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-10-17/la-city-council-ofarrell-cedillo-deleon>].
- 132 See the following report on a recent guest appearance of the Prime Minister at the Ukrainian Canadian Congress’ 27th Triennial Congress where he delivered the opening address on 28 October 2022: Darren Bernhardt, “Trudeau announces 35 more Russian sanctions, sale of bonds for Ukraine in Winnipeg”, *CBC News*, 28 October 2022 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/ukrainian-canadian-congress-manitoba-trudeau-1.6632664>].
- 133 Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 94.
- 134 Jack L. Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy”, in David Carment and David Bercuson (eds), *The World in Canada*, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008, pp. 82-83.

- 135 *The Hindu*, “I have more Sikhs in Cabinet than Modi: Canadian PM”, 13 March 2016 [online: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/i-have-more-sikhs-in-cabinet-than-modi-canadian-pm/article8348687.ece>]. For context, see *CBC News*, “Trudeau’s cabinet brings pride to Sikh community”, 6 November 2015 [online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/trudeau-cabinet-sikh-1.3307114>]. At one point during his first mandate, the Trudeau cabinet was 11,4% Sikh (4 out of 35 Ministers) even though the Sikh community represents around 2% of the Canadian population. See Dan Bilefsky, “Finding Lessons on Multiculturalism in the Experiences of Sikh Canadians”, *The New York Times*, 9 August 2019 [online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/world/canada/sikh-canadians-politics.html>].
- 136 Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Trudeau urged to tell India to stop interfering in Canadian Sikhs’ drive for independent Punjab”, *The Globe and Mail*, 12 December 2022 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-urged-to-tell-india-to-stop-interfering-in-canadian-sikhs/>].
- 137 The Mosaic Institute and The Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, Tapping our Potential: *Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy*, December 2011, p. 17.
- 138 See generally Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition, London, Verso, 2016, 256 p.
- 139 “This is due to several inter-related factors, such as the trauma of exile, safe distance from the consequences of drastic actions, guilt and immutable perceptions about the conflict in question. Sheltered in prosperous democracies, these so called long-distance nationalists are well positioned to offer a range of resources their struggling kin at home may lack including money, weapons, shelter, combatants as well as tactical and logistical support. This is especially true when homelands are emerging democracies, failed and failing states or when they are in a midst of an independence struggle.” Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 94.
- 140 Doug Saunders, “How Ukrainian politics became the most Canadian of politics”, *The Globe and Mail*, 5 July 2019 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-how-ukrainian-politics-became-the-most-canadian-of-politics/>]. For an example of nationalist views, see the website of the League of Ukrainian Ca-

nadians (formerly known as the “Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine”) [online: <https://www.lucorg.com/about/>]. Its membership founded a weekly newspaper called *Ukrainian Echo* in 1948. The Ukrainian language version (*Homin Ukrainy*) appears to contain somewhat different content [online: <http://www.homin.ca/index.php/lang/ua>].

- 141 See generally Jack L. Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy”, in David Carment and David Bercuson (eds), *The World in Canada*, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008, pp. 78-91.
- 142 John Ibbitson, “Harper’s foreign policy: Ukraine and the Diaspora vote”, *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, 19 March 2014 [online: <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/harpers-foreign-policy-ukraine-and-diaspora-vote/>].
- 143 “In totalitarian Ukraine, the society was deprived of the right to openly discuss the traumas of Holodomor. In contrast, the Ukrainian diaspora in more open societies faced fewer restrictions, and collected, preserved and openly debated the tragedy. Victimhood thus became the core motivational factor for subsequent mobilization and Ukrainian diaspora took over the mission of being the primary if not the sole source for distributing truth and facts about mass starvation in Soviet Ukraine.” Milana Nikolko, “Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 42(11), 2019, p. 1880.
- 144 For an example comparing the Canadian situation to the German situation of Kurds supporting insurgency in Turkey, see Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 94. See also Casper Schliephack, “The Kurdish resistance”, *Exberliner*, 27 January 2015 [online: <https://www.exberliner.com/politics/the-kurdish-resistance/>].
- 145 See, for example, Helin Ünal, Özden Melis Uluğ and Danielle Blaylock, “Understanding the Kurdish Conflict Through the Perspectives of the Kurdish-Turkish Diaspora in Germany”, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 28(1), 2022, pp. 87-100.
- 146 See, for example, Michael Barutciski, “Iran”, in Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo (eds.), *Defense and Security: A Compendium of National Armed Forces and Security Policies*, vol. I, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2005, pp. 307-323.

- 147 “[I]t is clear that post-Cold war and post-Soviet diaspora identity is not as homogeneous as commonly believed”. Milana Nikolko, “Diaspora mobilization and the Ukraine crisis”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 42(11), 2019, p. 1877. See also David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 35: “[D]ifferent views between diaspora organizations persisted across Ukrainian-Canadian society”.
- 148 “In fact, most of my interviewees who were diaspora activists themselves acknowledged that they did not believe in the idea of a single united community but saw it as a purely rhetorical means to boost the image of the community in the eyes of the general public.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2020, p. 43.
- 149 The author’s discussions with former Canadian cabinet ministers suggest that at least some of them may simply be unaware.
- 150 “With the Cold War unfolding, the conservative wing of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada moved from ethnic and cultural representation to political mobilization.” David Carment, Milana Nikolko and Sam McIsaac, “Mobilizing diaspora during crisis: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the intergenerational sweet spot”, *Diaspora Studies*, vol. 14(1), 2021, p. 26.
- 151 “[T]he diaspora’s core members (including the leadership, largest donors and lay activists), along with both individual advocates and representatives of major institutionalised players, are by and large represented by an older fraction of the Ukrainian community in Canada, with a very high percentage of them being the children or grandchildren of the third wave of immigrants – those who arrived in Canada between 1948 and 1953 as post-World War II Ukrainian refugees ... [and their] political mobilisation and advocacy have, for many years, been around specific issues such as the glorification of Ukrainian participation in World War II and the drawing of attention to the Ukrainian Famine (Holodomor) as a genocide of the Ukraine people.” Klavdia Tatar, “Helping the Homeland in Troubled Times: Advocacy by Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora in the Context of Regime Change and War in Ukraine”, *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 9(2), 2000, pp. 40, 48.


- 152 “[T]he tumultuous events in Ukraine, despite having affected the general mobilisation for the cause, were unable to change the status quo in the diaspora leadership structure. Despite the fact that the recent, fourth wave of immigrants showed an interest in participating in EuroMaidan protests, humanitarian aid drives and other war-related activities, very few of them joined the ranks of the UCC’s leadership, which was considered the key player in advocacy.” *Id.*, pp. 41-42.
- 153 The Mosaic Institute and The Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, *Tapping our Potential: Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy*, December 2011, p. 18.
- 154 “[D]iaspora organisations are often driven by elites that may not fairly represent all their members ... governments are reactive in engaging diasporas and therefore leave out silent ‘diaspora majorities.’” Marketa Geislerova, “The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada”, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, vol. 1(2), 2007, p. 99.
- 155 “Yet precedent should act as a sober reminder that the U.S. and its allies have sometimes shown poor judgement in supporting exiled groups who hold a powerful megaphone but show a disconnect from the reality on the ground – and have a flexible commitment to democratic values.” Thomas Juneau, “Could the Mahsa Amini protests in Iran spark a regime change?”, *The Globe and Mail*, 7 October 2022 [online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-mahsa-amini-protests-iranian-regime/>].



The **Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.** (KAS, Konrad Adenauer Foundation) is one of six so-called political foundations of Germany and is politically associated with but legally and financially independent of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), post-war Germany's governing party for more than 50 years. As co-founder of the CDU and the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) united Christian-social, conservative and liberal traditions. His name is synonymous with the democratic reconstruction of Germany, the firm alignment of foreign policy with the transatlantic community of values, the vision of a unified Europe and an orientation towards the social market economy. His political legacy continues to serve both as our aim as well as our obligation today. **KAS** receives almost all of its funding by decision of the German parliament from the German government. The amount of funding is proportionate to the election results of the CDU to Germany's federal parliament, the Bundestag.

Nationally and internationally, **KAS** promotes freedom, peace, and justice through civic education. Our offices worldwide are in charge of over 200 projects in more than 120 countries and focus on consolidating democracy, promoting European integration, the strengthening of transatlantic relations, as well as on development cooperation. We cooperate with governmental institutions, political parties, civil society organizations and decision-makers, building strong partnerships along the way. Together with our partners we make a contribution to maintaining and developing a rules-based international system that enables every country to develop in freedom and under its own responsibility. In Canada, we also seek to intensify political cooperation between Germany and Canada to strengthen transatlantic relations and to address common challenges of global nature. For more information, please go to:

kas.de/en/web/canada/home.



Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Suite 303, 8 York Street
Ottawa, ON K1N 5S6, Canada