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Israel After the 1996 Elections

Likud Leader Netanyahu Becomes New Prime Minister

 

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On 29 May 1996, nearly four million eligible Israeli voters cast their ballots in a historic double election for both the Prime Minister and the Knesset (Parliament). With an extremely narrow majority of 50.4 per cent of the vote, former opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu – leader of Likud – emerged as the winner and became Israel's new Prime Minister. Incumbent Prime Minister Shimon Peres received 49.5 per cent of the vote.

The elections for the 14th Knesset resulted in a significant loss of votes for the two major parties – that is, the Labour Party and Likud. Compared with in 1992, the Labour Party lost ten seats (going from 44 to 34), while Likud lost eight seats (going from 40 to 32). On the other hand, the National Religious Party and the ultra-Orthodox parties experienced a strong upswing: Together, they went on to hold a total of 23 seats – the largest representation they had ever had in the Knesset since the founding of the State of Israel. Newcomers included the Israel Ba'Aliya party of Russian immigrants – with seven members of parliament – and the Third Way group – which had split from the Labour Party – with four seats in the Knesset. The 120 Knesset seats were divided among 11 parties and organisations.

The elections of 29 May 1996 can be regarded as a turning point for both Israel and the Middle East region in many ways. By voting for opposition leader Netanyahu, a narrow majority of Israeli citizens had rejected the political course of Shimon Peres in the peace process with both the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbours. Netanyahu's electoral success came as a surprise, especially since early exit polls on election night had shown a slight lead for Peres. Even in opinion polls in the weeks and months leading up to 29 May 1996, Peres had consistently maintained a more or less stable lead in voter preferences. In fact, the very evening before the election, surveys by the daily newspaper Yediot Achronot had indicated a three per cent lead for Peres, with three per cent of voters still undecided.

Below, we present and analyse the political developments in the months leading up to the elections and explore the factors that contributed to the fact that Shimon Peres – the architect of the peace process – did not receive a mandate from Israeli voters to continue his political course.

 

Political developments before the elections – Background and causes of the election result

The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin

The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin on the evening of Saturday, 4 November 1995, deeply shocked the entire Israeli public. This shock resonated even within the right-wing camp. The idea that a religious Jew could assassinate Israel's Prime Minister for political reasons was something that most Jews had considered inconceivable. The right wing lost massive support that it had previously enjoyed before this tragic event. It should not be forgotten that in the weeks leading up to Rabin's assassination, the governing coalition was supported by no more than about 40 per cent of the entire Israeli population, with support for the government’s policies from the Jewish population being even lower.

The assassination of Rabin by a right-wing extremist Jew completely changed this dynamic. The right wing was held responsible for creating the climate that had made such an act possible. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu was accused of failing to oppose right-wing radical agitation – or at the very least, of tolerating or even fostering it. Lea Rabin – the widow of the slain Prime Minister – openly blamed Netanyahu for her husband's death during the funeral.

Public support for the entire right-wing camp declined sharply. New Prime Minister Shimon Peres enjoyed unprecedented approval. As the mentor of the Oslo process, he was able to continue his course with renewed energy. The right-wing parties no longer seemed to pose a serious threat to him.

 

Continuation of the peace process

In accordance with the Oslo II agreements, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were further redeployed. In the first phase, which aimed to facilitate the holding of elections on 21 January 1996, the Israeli military was to withdraw from the urban areas of the West Bank as well as from the cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem (with special security arrangements applying to the city of Hebron) and from 450 smaller towns and villages. By the end of the withdrawal, there was to be little to no IDF presence in the Palestinian urban centres.

In terms of internal security, three types of areas were established according to the agreements:

  • Zone A included the six cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. In these areas, the Palestinian Authority had full responsibility for internal security, public order, and civilian affairs.
  • Zone B included Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank. In these areas, where about 68 per cent of the Palestinian population lived, Israel retained responsibility for security and counterterrorism. In designated cities and villages, 25 Palestinian police stations were established. The actions of the Palestinian police were coordinated with the Israeli security forces.
  • Zone C included sparsely populated areas, areas of strategic importance to Israel, and Jewish settlements. Israel retained full control over security and public order. The Palestinian Authority assumed civilian responsibilities, such as economic affairs, healthcare, and education.

 

Palestinian elections

On 21 January 1996, the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories elected their own political representatives for the first time since 1967. With over 88 per cent of the vote coming from 1.013 million voters, self-appointed leader of the Palestinian Authority and PLO Yasser Arafat was elected President of the Palestinian Authority. His opponent, Samiha Khalil – who had rejected the peace process – had no chance from the outset. Despite the call for a boycott from Islamists (Hamas) and exile organisations (PFLP, DFLP), voter turnout was at over 80 per cent. Of the 88 seats in the Palestinian Council, 52 seats went to Fatah members, and a further 15 seats were filled by so-called independents, who were also from Fatah. Fifteen council members can be considered to have been independent, four members were affiliated with the Islamists, and two more seats went to other, smaller parties. The high voter turnout and the strong support for Arafat were seen as a retroactive democratic legitimisation of the course of reconciliation with Israel and as a mandate for the continuation of this reconciliation. The democratic elections in Palestine were unique within the Arab world.

Arafat had made efforts until the last moment to involve the strongest opposition force in the Palestinian territories – that is, Hamas – in the election process. However, negotiations with Hamas leaders in Cairo in December 1995 had proved unsuccessful. Hamas had refused any participation in the elections and had reaffirmed its intention to continue the armed struggle against Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, an agreement was reported to have been reached whereby Hamas would refrain from carrying out attacks on Israeli targets in the autonomous territories until the elections. This policy of balancing between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas was interrupted by the assassination of "engineer" Yahya Ayash on 5 January 1996, which was attributed to the Israeli secret services. Ayash – who had been responsible for countless Israeli deaths through terrorist attacks – was declared a martyr, and Hamas vowed vengeance for his death.

 

Hamas bombings

At the end of February and in early March 1996, four bombs in total exploded in Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv within nine days, carried out by suicide bombers. The bombings resulted in 59 deaths and over 200 injuries. The apparently uncontrollable Hamas terror brigades – who named themselves after one of their "martyrs”, referring to themselves as the Issedin al-Qassam Brigades – had sent out their suicide bombers to kill indiscriminately. Among the victims were children, Romanian guest workers, and three Palestinians. Israel was in shock. Despite the Purim holiday, which is traditionally the happiest time in the Jewish calendar, there was deep mourning across the country.

The bombings dramatically shifted the political balance in Israel. Prime Minister Peres – whose victory in the early elections on 29 May 1996 had seemed assured – suddenly saw his popularity decline. The fact that there was no security for the citizens of Israel even two years after the Oslo peace agreement weighed heavily against Peres, the architect of the agreement. The people and the opposition demanded tough countermeasures. In a late-night cabinet meeting, Peres responded to the need for firm leadership: He ordered the closure of the Gaza Strip, the autonomous cities, and all 465 villages in the West Bank. He decided to set up a highly specialised anti-terror unit and ordered extensive searches and arrests in the Palestinian territories. Strike teams from the Israeli security forces raided Islamic institutions and arrested hundreds of Hamas sympathisers. The homes of the families of terrorists were sealed off and blown up. Armed soldiers were posted at bus stops on the main bus routes across the country, and 3,400 volunteers guarded the Jewish settlements behind the Green Line. However, the prime minister did not take the final step of invading the Israeli army into Zone A, which was under Palestinian administration. This would have meant the final end of the peace process.

Even after the first wave of terrorist attacks, Prime Minister Peres still enjoyed a 15 per cent lead in the polls over opposition leader Netanyahu. However, the second wave of bombings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on 3 and 4 March 1996 destroyed confidence in peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians and thus also Peres' political vision of a borderless "New Middle East”. The fact that Yasser Arafat had done nothing decisive in the week between the two waves of attacks to stop Hamas from carrying out its murderous acts played into the hands of the opposition Likud's arguments, with the party claiming that the entire Oslo peace process had been a mistake. Peres' lead in voter preferences had vanished overnight. The support of the international community at the anti-terror conference in Sharm el-Sheikh (12 March 1996), the solidarity visit of US President Bill Clinton to Israel shortly afterwards, and the rapid actions of Arafat's security forces against Hamas (in mid-March 1996) were not enough to reverse the decline in the Israeli leader’s popularity.

 

The concept of separation between Israelis and Palestinians

Prime Minister Peres pushed forward the concept of separation between Israelis and Palestinians. This concept had been prepared under his predecessor, Rabin, as a response to the first bombings in April 1994. Peres and his Labour Party aimed to address the two main concerns of Israelis in their election campaign: namely the demand for security and the desire for peace. Labour promised physical separation from Palestinians while maintaining cooperation with Arafat. While the overcrowded Gaza Strip had already been surrounded by a security fence, a border between Israel and the West Bank was now to be established. Along the 350-kilometre-long Green Line, eighteen border crossings were to control the movement of people and goods. A fence was to be erected over a stretch of 29 kilometres, part of which had already been in place near the Palestinian city of Qalqilya and the Israeli town of Kfar Saba. The rest was to be separated by a two-kilometre-wide buffer zone that was to be monitored by 500 border soldiers with jeeps and helicopters. A special electronic surveillance system – similar to the one on Germany's current eastern border – was to detect illegal border crossers.

In light of the upcoming elections on 29 May 1996, Prime Minister Peres had succumbed to the public demand for strong leadership. Paradoxically, this led to a reversal of roles between the two rival candidates for the office of Prime Minister in the election campaign. While Netanyahu tirelessly emphasised his commitment to peace, Peres tried to present himself as "Mr. Security”. The closure of the Palestinian territories was not lifted until after the elections. The scheduled Israeli withdrawal from Hebron – which had been set for 28 March 1996 as per the Oslo Accords – was also postponed. First, Arafat had to fulfil his part of the Oslo agreements: namely the cancellation of all articles in the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel as well as the arrest and handover of the Hamas terrorists sought by Israel, foremost among these acts being the capture of the organiser of the recent bombings, Mohammed Deif. In order to prevent the peace process from coming to a complete standstill, formal talks on the final status of the Palestinian territories – as stipulated in Oslo II – began on 4 May 1996. Peres had already declared in early April that if re-elected, he would submit any agreement negotiated with the Palestinians to a referendum for approval by the Israeli people. He also intended to put a similarly sensitive issue – that is, the return of the Golan Heights in exchange for a comprehensive peace agreement with Syria – to a public vote.

 

War with Hezbollah in Lebanon

At the end of March 1996, the situation in northern Israel near the Lebanese border had worsened yet again. For weeks, the pro-Iranian Shiite militia Hezbollah had increased its attacks on Israeli soldiers and members of the Israel-allied South Lebanon Army (SLA) in the security zone in southern Lebanon. When Israeli retaliatory strikes likely killed Lebanese civilians, Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Just two months earlier, Israel would have only responded by shelling Hezbollah positions outside the security zone. This time, however, Prime Minister and Defence Minister Peres authorised a large-scale military retaliation under the codename Grapes of Wrath: Israeli attack helicopters advanced as far as Beirut, where they destroyed a Hezbollah headquarters. Heavy artillery shelled southern Lebanon, and the Israeli Air Force launched attacks on Shiite positions in villages north of the security zone. The SLA – allied with Israel – had previously warned the population in these areas via their radio station – Voice of the South – to evacuate their homes. Hezbollah militias responded with more Katyusha attacks on villages and cities in northern Israel. The escalating fighting triggered a refugee wave of over 400,000 people fleeing from southern Lebanon northwards. On 18 April 1996, Israeli troops shelled a UN-run compound in Qana, where nearly 500 refugees from nearby villages had taken shelter. Around 100 people were killed. The Israeli bombing was aimed at a Hezbollah position about 300 metres from the UN compound, from which Katyusha rockets had been fired into Israel. Hiding behind civilian structures in order to avoid retaliation was a known Hezbollah strategy. The bloodbath in Qana marked a turning point in the Israeli offensive. Rather than continuing with a military solution, political negotiations were now sought. After intensive mediation by the US, a ceasefire between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria was agreed upon on 26 April 1996. The agreement had five points. To begin, Hezbollah would no longer fire Katyusha rockets or other weapons at Israel. Moreover, Israel and the allied SLA committed to "not targeting civilian sites, neither residential areas, nor industrial plants or power stations”. These facilities, however, could not be used as launching pads for attacks against Israel. This agreement did not restrict "the right of either side to self-defence".

Until the announcement of a ceasefire, the Israeli army had not been able to stop the Katyusha attacks on northern Israeli cities. The reached agreements were essentially the same as those that had been verbally discussed before the operation. Therefore, the Lebanon operation was seen by the Israeli public as a failure that had brought only horrific suffering to the Lebanese population. In terms of foreign policy, the operation was seen as a catastrophe. Given the scale of the Israeli military action in Lebanon, Peres was criticised for having chosen a demonstrative overreaction to the rocket attacks for electoral reasons. It is certain that this decision led to more political damage than benefits.

 

The Israeli elections of 1996

For the first time in Israel's history, on 29 May 1996, the Prime Minister was directly elected by the people. Previously, the formation of the government and the office of Prime Minister had been entrusted to a representative of the Knesset faction who had had the best prospects of forming a majority coalition in the Knesset. This system gave disproportionate influence to smaller factions, which demanded far-reaching concessions in exchange for their support. With the direct election of the Prime Minister, this influence of the smaller parties was intended to be reduced. On election day, Israeli voters were thus required to cast two votes: one for the Prime Minister and one for the Knesset.

 

The electoral system

Israel's electoral law provides for direct, equal, secret, general, nationwide, and proportional elections. The voting age for active participation is 18, whereas for passive participation, it is 21. Voting is not compulsory. There is no division of the country into electoral districts. Knesset elections are party-list elections and are not personality-based. The 120 parliamentary seats are allocated to the party lists according to proportional representation. There is a threshold of 1.5 per cent. Before each election, the parties present their programmes and candidate lists. Parties that are already represented in the Knesset are automatically eligible for re-election. New parties must submit at least 2,500 signatures from eligible voters, register officially as a party, and pay a deposit, which is refunded if the party receives at least 1.5 per cent of the vote (equivalent to one seat in the Knesset). Each party is provided with campaign funds based on the number of representatives it has in the Knesset. New parties entering the Knesset for the first time receive similar funding retroactively.

 

The political parties

The political party spectrum in Israel is characterised by great diversity as a result of the existing proportional electoral system and the low (1.5 per cent) electoral threshold. This low barrier allows even small political groups to enter the Knesset. Party splits and mergers as well as the creation of new parties are frequent occurrences. The common categorisation of political currents into "left" and "right" parties – as is typical in Western countries – is only partially applicable in Israel.

In total, 20 political parties and groups stood for election in 1996, seven of which had no chance of surpassing the 1.5 per cent threshold from the outset.

When examining the party structure in Israel prior to the elections on 29 May 1996, four main political formations can be identified:

  • the social-democratic Labour Party and the left-wing Meretz bloc,
  • the national-conservative Likud bloc and smaller right-wing nationalist parties,
  • the religious parties, and
  • the Arab parties.

Additionally, there were two new parties – the Third Way and the Russian immigrant party Israel Ba'Aliya – positioned in the centre of the political spectrum.

 

The Labour Party

The Labour Party was founded in 1968 through the merger of Mapai (“Workers' Party of the Land of Israel”), Achdut Ha’avoda (“Unity of Labour”), and Rafi (“List of Workers of Israel”). The westward-oriented social-democratic Mapai had been the dominant party of the Labour bloc since its founding in 1930. Its programme was Zionist, non-religious, and moderately socialist from the start. Among the founders of the party was David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of modern Israel. Most of the country’s leading politicians (also before the establishment of the state) had come from Mapai, and from 1948 to 1977, all Israeli prime ministers were from the party.

The social structure of the Labour Party’s membership and voter base was highly heterogeneous. Traditionally, it was seen as the party of the educated and wealthier population, mostly of European/Western origin (Ashkenazim).

After the 1992 Knesset elections, the Labour Party was once again in power. However, it was unable to form a majority in the Knesset. The government – led by Prime Minister Rabin and consisting of the Labour Party and the left-wing Meretz alliance – was a minority government and could only implement the peace process with the support of the Arab members of The Knesset. In protest against the potential return of the Golan Heights, Knesset members Kahalani and Süßmann split from the Labour Party and founded a new party called the Third Way. After Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, Shimon Peres took over as Prime Minister and party leader.

The Labour Party played a leading role in negotiating agreements with the Palestinians. Peres sought a clear mandate for continuing his "land for peace" policy through a victory in the elections. The Labour Party aimed for a quick and comprehensive peace agreement with Syria and was willing to return the Golan Heights, though the decision was to be made by a public referendum.

 

Meretz

Meretz was formed in 1992 as a left-liberal electoral alliance of three parties: Mapam, Shinui, and Ratz. The left-socialist Mapam had already entered into an electoral alliance with the Labour Party in 1969 under the name Maarach (Hebrew: “alliance”). Mapam was closely connected with part of the kibbutz movement and the Histadrut trade union. In the 1950s and 1960s, Mapam had a strongly pro-Soviet stance. The party advocated for dialogue with the Palestinians and in 1996 held a moderately anti-capitalist position. In 1984, Mapam had left its alliance with the Labour Party. The Meretz coalition had achieved 9.5 per cent of the vote in the 1992 elections and became part of the governing coalition with the Labour Party.

 

Likud

Likud emerged from a loose alliance of nationalist forces, including national-liberal groups. The nucleus of the Likud bloc of 1996 was the Herut (Hebrew: “freedom”) Party, which was founded in 1948 and formulated a nationalist party programme. Menachem Begin led the party from its founding in 1925 (as the Zionist Party) until 1982. Herut positioned itself over many years as the only effective opposition party. In 1965, Herut formed the Gahal bloc (Gush Herut-Liberal) together with the Liberal Party. Until 1967, this alliance remained in opposition. From 1967 to 1969, Gahal was represented in the so-called National Unity Cabinet by two ministers without portfolio (Begin – Herut, and Joseph Saphir – Liberal). In 1973, Likud (Hebrew: “union”) was formed by combining Gahal with three smaller right-wing parties. In the 1977 elections, the Likud bloc became the largest faction and took over the government for the first time, with Menachem Begin becoming Prime Minister. After Begin’s resignation, Yitzhak Shamir took over the leadership of the party and the office of Prime Minister in September 1983. Likud then split into three factions under Shamir (Mainstream), Ariel Sharon (Hawk), and David Levi (Sephardim).

After the 1984 Knesset elections, Likud formed a grand coalition with the Labour Party, which was led by Shimon Peres from 1984 to 1986 and by Yitzhak Shamir from 1986 to 1988. The grand coalition continued after the 1988 elections under Shamir’s leadership until it broke up in spring 1990 due to numerous disagreements. Shamir then relied on right-wing and religious parties to support his government. Due to significant differences, particularly over settlement policy and the Madrid peace talks, representatives of the right-wing nationalist party Techijah left the coalition. After the snap elections in 1992, Likud returned to opposition.

The crushing election defeat led to a generational shift in Likud leadership. Yitzhak Shamir was replaced by then–42-year-old Benjamin Netanyahu as party leader. Netanyahu succeeded in overcoming the division within Likud. He pushed back the influence of David Levi in the party, thereby leading to Levi’s departure from Likud in June 1995, at which point Levi founded a new party called Gesher.

In March 1996, Likud reached an electoral alliance with Gesher and Zomet that allowed Netanyahu to eliminate rivals for the position of Prime Minister and to improve his chances as the only challenger to incumbent Peres. The leaders of Zomet and Gesher – Eitan and Levi – had previously announced their intention to run for Prime Minister themselves. The election alliance was also intended as a demonstration of unity within the centre-right camp.

Likud was critical of the peace process. The principle of negotiations with the PLO was initially met with strong opposition but was eventually accepted after the Oslo I and II agreements. Likud's position in the peace process can be summarised in the following key points:

  • Agreement that a compromise had to be reached with the Palestinians. The fact that the Camp David agreement with Egypt in 1977 was achieved by a Likud government is often emphasised.
  • Rejection of a sovereign Palestinian state.
  • Rejection of the resettlement of Jewish settlers from the occupied territories (i.e. the West Bank).
  • Peace negotiations with Syria without returning the Golan Heights.
  • Ensuring law and order via the Israeli army in Zones B and C of the autonomous areas, with options for Israeli security forces to intervene in Zone A.

 

Religious parties

The camp of religious parties in Israel was highly fragmented in 1996. The most important religious party for many years had been the National Religious Party (NRP), which had traditionally represented the religious wing of the Zionist movement. Its programme included the religiously justified claim to the land of "Eretz Israel”. The party also demanded legislation and education based on Jewish religious principles. For several decades, the NRP had been a steadfast coalition partner of the Labour Party. Later, the party increasingly emphasised its "national" aspect. By 1996, it was considered a major representative of the settler movement. In the 1992 elections, the NRP received 4.9 per cent of the vote, which equated to six seats in the Knesset.

The electoral alliance United Torah Judaism was formed in 1992 by the two ultra-Orthodox parties Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah. It received 3.2 per cent of the vote in 1992, gaining four seats in the Knesset. The alliance was considered anti-Zionist, meaning it rejected the secular nature of the state. Its programme generally advocated for the implementation of religious positions in Israel’s political, economic, and social life.

The Shas Party emerged after a split from Agudat Israel. Its voter base consisted mainly of Moroccan-Orthodox and Iraqi-Orthodox Jews. Shas fought for religious positions and in 1996 had six members (i.e. 4.9 per cent of the vote) in the Knesset, aiming to address the social disadvantages faced by Oriental Jews.

 

Arab parties

Two so-called Arab parties were represented in the Knesset in 1996 – the communist party Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party. In March 1996, the Islamic Movement also decided to participate in the elections. It entered into an electoral alliance with the Arab Democratic Party (United Arab List). Another contender – the Arab Movement for Change, led by Arafat adviser Ahmed Tibi – voluntarily withdrew from the race shortly before the elections due to low voter preferences.

A joint Arab list was not formed. Due to its non-Zionist character and its support for a binational state, the communist party Hadash was an attractive alternative to Zionist parties for many Arab citizens of Israel. Hadash’s stronghold was in northern Galilee and Nazareth, where most of Israel’s Arab citizens lived. In the 1992 elections, Hadash received 2.4 per cent of the vote (i.e. 3 seats).

The Arab Democratic Party was founded in 1988 by Abed el-Wahab Darausche after his split from the Labour Party. It was represented in the Knesset in 1996 by two members (i.e. 1.6 per cent of the vote).

 

Party of immigrants

A new force in the political landscape was the Russian immigrant party Israel Ba'Aliya, founded by former Soviet dissident Nathan Sharansky. It was established in June 1995 to represent the interests of the over 600,000 Russian immigrants in Israel.

 

Nationalists and extremists

Radical nationalist parties included Kach, Techijah, and Moledet. Among them, only the Moledet Party participated in the elections. The Moledet (Hebrew: “homeland”) party was founded in 1988 by former General Rehavam Ze’evi after his departure from the Labour Party. The party was represented by three seats in the Knesset in 1996. Moledet advocated for the expulsion (“relocation") of Palestinians from the occupied territories.

 

The election campaign

It is critical to note that for a long time, it seemed as though there was no real election campaign at all. Indeed, after the 1996 primary battles – which determined the party lists – the campaign was remarkably quiet. This might seem surprising given that these elections were expected to determine the future course of Israel. Many observers even called it the most important election since the founding of the state. However, on the streets, everything was calm. The tone had shifted after the assassination of Rabin. Sensational actions were viewed negatively by the population rather than as incentive for mobilisation.

The focus of the campaign took place on television. Every evening, video clips were aired during prime time. Opposition leader "Bibi" Netanyahu emphasised the security needs of Israelis, reminding voters of the Islamist attacks at the end of February and in early March. Netanyahu portrayed himself as someone who sought peace, but as his campaign slogan went, "Peace with Security". This combination of peace and security was repeatedly highlighted and used in various forms throughout the campaign. At the start of the campaign, Netanyahu accused Peres of wanting to divide Jerusalem. The video clips repeatedly showed Peres alongside Arafat, with the Israeli public watching every evening as Arafat called for the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Regarding the religious population, Netanyahu demanded the preservation of Jewish values. The Labour Party and Peres remained largely on the defensive, only showing images of Rabin's assassination in Labour Party video clips on the eve of the elections.

Netanyahu and Peres only faced each other once in a televised debate. In that encounter, Peres presented himself as a statesman, a father of the nation, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, but he appeared pale and disengaged. For weeks, Peres had avoided contact with Netanyahu, not wanting to elevate his opponent’s position in the campaign. During the debate, Netanyahu triumphed, with his youthful and dynamic style appealing more strongly to viewers. According to post-election analyses, Netanyahu was able to win over many younger voters.

 

The election results

On 29 May 1996, 3,933,250 voters were called to decide for the first time in the history of the State of Israel in a separate vote on both the new Prime Minister and the composition of the Knesset. With a voter turnout of 79.3 per cent, 1,501,023 voters (i.e. 50.4 per cent) chose Benjamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister. Incumbent Shimon Peres received 1,471,566 votes (i.e. 49.5 per cent).

The margin that secured Netanyahu’s victory was extremely narrow, consisting of only about 30,000 votes out of 3.9 million eligible voters. However, among Jewish voters, the gap between Peres and his challenger was not as small as the final figures suggest. If the votes of the Arab Israelis are excluded – that is, about 18 per cent of the population, with only 5.2 per cent of these individuals voting for Netanyahu – it becomes clear that a significant majority of Jews voted against Peres, with an official breakdown of 55.5 per cent versus 44.4 per cent.

Two factors were crucial to Netanyahu’s razor-thin victory: the removal of 17,000 invalid votes cast by Arab Israelis that Peres could not account for on the on hand and the call by leading rabbis to their religious followers to vote for Netanyahu on the other hand. According to tradition, religious groups had thus far avoided openly endorsing a secular candidate.

 

 

Results of the 14th Knesset elections of 1996

Party Seats Percentage 1992 Election Results
Labour Party 34 26,8% 44

Likud-Gescher-Zomet

32 25,1% 40
Shas 10 8,5% 6
National Religious Party 9 7,8% 6
Meretz 9 7,4% 12
Israel Ba'Aliya 7 5,7% 0
Hadash 5 4,2% 3
United Torah Judaism 4 3,2% 4
United Arab List 4 3,1% 0
Third Way 4 2,9% 2
Moledet 2 2,3% 3

 

The election results reveal a significant decline in the number of votes for the two major parties of the Labour Party and Likud, which was accompanied by a notable increase in the number of seats for religious parties. Compared with in 1992, the Labour Party had lost ten seats, and Likud had lost eight. The four religious and right-wing small parties had gained seven seats and now had a total of 25 representatives in the Knesset (up from 18 previously). New representatives included the Russian immigrant party Israel Ba'Aliya, which had won seven seats, and the Third Way, which had won four seats.

The drastic loss in votes was particularly painful for Likud, especially considering that according to the coalition agreement, almost one-third of Likud's seats had been allocated to the alliance partners of Gescher and Zomet. This means that many prominent Likud politicians had been unable to qualify for a seat in the Knesset. A partial compensation was to be made through a rule that allowed Likud members who had been appointed to ministerial positions to relinquish their seats so that other candidates from the Likud list could take over the vacated Knesset positions.

For the Labour Party, the loss of ten seats and the shift to the opposition was a major setback. Shortly after the election results had been announced, mutual accusations arose within the party leadership about who had been responsible for the devastating defeat. Although Peres rejected calls to resign as party leader, potential successors had already emerged. Former Foreign Minister and Chief of Staff Ehud Barak was the first to officially announce his candidacy for the upcoming Labour primaries.

The left-wing Meretz alliance was also a clear loser because it was to be represented by only nine members (down from 12) in the 14th Knesset.

The religious parties achieved an unexpectedly high vote share. Shas increased its representation in the Knesset from six to ten seats, while the European ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism remained at four seats and the National Religious Party gained six seats, thereby increasing its representation from six seats to nine.

The Arab parties also saw an increase in votes, which can be attributed to the high voter turnout among the Arab population (i.e. 77 per cent compared with 69 per cent in 1992). The voting behaviour of Israeli Arabs can be statistically described as follows:

  • Hadash received 36.8 per cent of the Arab vote.
  • The United Arab List received 25.5 per cent of the Arab vote.
  • The Labour Party received 16.6 per cent of the Arab vote.
  • Meretz received ten per cent of the Arab vote.

A previously unknown force – the Russian immigrant party Israel Ba'Aliya, led by former dissident Nathan Sharansky – emerged with seven seats. Its primary goal was to better integrate the more than 600,000 immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

Finally, the Third Way was to be represented in the Knesset for the first time. This breakaway faction from the Labour Party – led by Golan resident and former General Avigdor Kahalani – advocated for one primary goal: to never relinquish the Golan Heights.

After the elections, it was up to designated Prime Minister Netanyahu to form a government coalition. Negotiations began with the parties of the right-wing bloc, including the religious parties, the Third Way, and the Russian Jews. The direct election made Netanyahu more independent from the Knesset. Parties were now only able to negotiate with him over the formation of the government. Although the Knesset had to approve Netanyahu’s cabinet, it was to have little binding influence on his policies as long as his cabinet held a majority in the Knesset. According to law, the new Prime Minister had 45 days to present his cabinet and a government programme. If negotiations with the smaller parties – particularly the religious ones – were to fail due to maximalist demands, Netanyahu would still have been able to rely on a large coalition with the Labour Party, which was excluded by either side.

What Israeli politics would look like in the future was difficult to predict in 1996. What is clear – and confirmed by all polls – was that a majority of the Israeli population wanted peace with the Arabs. For the Jews of Israel, peace primarily meant a life without fear and terror. Peres – respected as a statesman and seen by many as someone with the ability to foresee long-term future developments – was unable to simultaneously take on Rabin’s role. The Jewish population no longer trusted him to provide the security they so desperately needed. They had voted against Peres, thereby bringing Netanyahu to power.

There were also many tactical errors: In terms of the future balance of power in his party and government, Peres had failed to present the highly regarded then–Foreign Minister and former Chief of Staff Ehud Barak as an equal partner to the electorate. Many Israelis believed he could have taken on the role of “Mr. Security”, which Rabin was so admired for by the public. Instead, Peres declared during the Lebanon war that he could envision himself taking on the role of Defence Minister in the next government. The Labour Party’s election campaign organisation was characterised by personal disputes and rivalry among the leadership. For months, they had neglected to address the concerns of the Russian Jewish immigrants. Despite the remarkable integration of over 600,000 Jewish immigrants in recent years, they felt neglected and abandoned by the government. This explains why a party specifically created for their concerns had gained such strong support. The Arab Israelis were not only outraged by Kfar Kana and the ongoing closure of the occupied territories, but also disappointed that the government had never granted them any significant political influence despite their support in the Knesset. By refusing to vote for Peres, they wanted to send him a message. However, they did not foresee that this would be the end of Peres’ career.

Many had underestimated the Likud party leader. Indeed, the Israeli press had dismissed Netanyahu as a lightweight. Only later did people recognise that his assumption of Likud leadership after just one legislative term, his political and financial consolidation of the party after its collapse in 1992 due to internal conflicts and financial mismanagement, and his elimination of all rivals – both within his party and across the entire right-wing spectrum – were organisational and political masterstrokes.

What policy the designated Prime Minister would go on to pursue was unclear at the time. In his first public speech after the elections, Netanyahu tried to address the concerns of the international community about the continuation of the peace process: “The government we form will work to strengthen peace with the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the Palestinians, and we will try to establish coexistence with the other Arab states”. However, exactly how Netanyahu planned to reconcile this with Likud’s four demands – that is, “No to a Palestinian state, No to the division of Jerusalem, No to concessions on the Golan, and Yes to expanding settlements” – remained to be seen. Nevertheless, one thing was already clear: Netanyahu intended to fully exercise the powers granted to him by the constitution, and he aimed to lead Israel in the style of an American president.

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Contact Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Dr. Gerhard Wahlers
Deputy Secretary General and Head of the Division European and International Cooperation
Gerhard.Wahlers@kas.de +49 30 26996-3260 +49 30 26996-3567
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Dr. Sören Soika

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Editor-in-Chief International Reports (Ai)
soeren.soika@kas.de +49 30 26996 3388

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