The months preceding the war in Iraq were not kind to the transatlantic relationship. With Iraq moving to the front burner, the immediate wave of solidarity after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to peter out, as the transatlantic relationship degenerated into a mutual sniping fest. The United States was disappointed about what it saw as only qualified European support for its “war on terror,” and some Americans scoffed at European military weakness. Many Europeans, in turn, were disappointed about what they perceived as a U.S. fixation on military means, and resented the U.S. approach of casually lumping together the war on terror with the issues of weapons of mass destruction or regime change in Iraq.

As it appears that the war is over, both sides of the Atlantic have started looking for ways to mend their relationships, and in doing so carefully avoiding signs of triumphalism or regret. But the political fallout of the war on Iraq will be felt for a long time to come. After all, the crisis has seemingly vindicated those who had long been making the case that transatlantic estrangement is an inescapable fact of life. To those who have been arguing all along that Europe was “fading slowly in the U.S.

rear-view mirror,” the crisis over Iraq was a perfect example of European irrelevance. For those who have long harbored hopes that a more powerful European Union will check U.S. hegemonic ambitions, European opposition to the war on Iraq now serves as the ultimate proof that their vision of an assertive Europe has finally arrived.

Clearly, a return of the transatlantic relationship to the status quo pre-9/11 and pre-Iraq has become inconceivable. Too much has changed to allow for a continuation of business as usual. To remain vibrant, the transatlantic community will have to readjust its approach to partnership. Yet, as this paper will try to demonstrate, some basic “rules of the road” for the future are relatively easy to define. And given the remarkable capacity of the transatlantic community to adapt to changing circumstances, adopting such rules should not be too ambitious a task.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

There is no shortage of explanations as to what has gone wrong in the transatlantic relationship. Some have singled out the Bush Administration’s “unilateralism” as the major reason, suggesting that a “regime change” in Washington might eventually set things right again. The opposite view holds that Europe is governed by a generation of leaders socialized in the Vietnam era, and hence unable or unwilling to cope with a self-confident superpower. Others have reached further, arguing that structural causes, such as the end of the Cold War and European integration, would inevitably pull Europe and America apart. On the wilder shores of international relations theory, the view has taken hold that, as long as the American empire was perceived as benign, other states were willing to “jump on the bandwagon.” Now, however, with U.S. power being perceived as arrogant and narrow-minded, states are “ganging up” on the hegemon.

Each of these interpretations may contain a kernel of truth. For example, it is difficult to imagine that a combination of Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl could have (mis)managed the U.S.-German relationship the way the current leaders have done. And few would take issue with the observation that as European integration and self-assertion progressed, it was bound to lead to more friction with the United States. Yet if one applies “Occam’s razor,” according to which the simplest explanation is most likely the correct one, one can probably explain the current crisis through a less grandiose paradigm: The transatlantic community has not yet fully adjusted to the post-9/11 world.

Two reasons stand out. The first and indeed most fundamental reason is America’s changed condition. Since 9/11, America is “at war,” whereas Europe is not. Europeans neither share the U.S. sense of vulnerability nor the American urgency in dealing with “rogues.” As long as the war on terror remained the major transatlantic project, this gap in perception did not matter much. The images of the collapsing Twin Towers made terrorism enough of a menace even for Europeans to join the United States in this struggle. However, once the Bush Administration shifted its focus towards Iraq, the gap was revealed in full. It became clear that 9/11 has changed the United States more fundamentally than most Europeans had expected. Americans feel under siege. And an administration that was already bent on defining and upholding American interests in a more robust fashion has been emboldened. The fact that many Americans did not share their administration’s views on Iraq was of secondary importance. Of key importance, however, was another fact with which Europeans have yet to come to grips: 9/11 has turned the United States into a “revisionist” power. As President Bush put it, “the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

The result of these developments is a paradox that most Europeans still fail to comprehend: to argue that Iraq has no immediate connection with 9/11 may be factually correct – but it completely misses the point. The attacks on the United States gave the Iraq issue an entirely different context. With the backdrop of 9/11, Iraq transcended its regional context and became a symbol of the potentially dangerous consequences of a policy of neglect. At the risk of oversimplifying the point: Americans felt that anything was better than clinging to the status quo – after all, that status quo had brought 9/11 upon them. By contrast, Europeans feared that the dangers of changing that status quo would far outweigh the dangers of inaction.

The other reason why a new transatlantic consensus has been slow to emerge is Europe’s current condition. Simply put, Europe is still predominantly inward-looking. With the continent largely at peace, and with the European unification project still absorbing most political energies and vision, Europe’s global security outlook remains ad hoc and reactive. As a result, Europe’s collective understanding of new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is not yet fully formed. To many, these threats seem remote – an American obsession rather than a clear and present danger. In addition, there is a deeply held conviction by many Europeans that Europe’s “soft” approach to dealing with problems is not only superior to the “martial” U.S. approach, but also universally applicable. Finally, there is something to be said for Robert Kagan’s thesis that the lack of military capabilities for power projection also limits Europe’s political options, and hence its political ambitions. How else can one explain the schizophrenia of many Europeans, who ritually extol the virtue of the soft approach only to argue seconds later that Europe must do more on defense?

THE WAY AHEAD: SOME DO’S AND DON’T’S FOR THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

In light of this transatlantic drift, the mere assumption that the United States and Europe will remain dependent on each other in managing many problems of “world governance” may not suffice to build a new security consensus. The lessons of the Iraq crisis need to be translated into aforementioned rules of the road that help guide the transatlantic relationship post-9/11, post-Iraq. Indeed, the major elements of such a new consensus are fairly easy to define. Some of these elements may require a greater effort than both sides of the Atlantic are currently able or willing to undertake. But, as it is argued here throughout, the more the transatlantic community absorbs the full implications of the new security environment, the more Europe and America will find that the steps suggested below are both feasible and desirable.

EUROPE

• Europeans will have to recognize that threats to Europe also come from outside of Europe. The statement by German Defense Minister Struck that German security is also being defended at the Hindukush indicates that such a paradigm shift is taking place. However, the full implications of this paradigm shift in terms of military reform – and, above all, military spending – have yet to be absorbed by most European countries. In the same vein, they will have to engage in a more serious transatlantic debate about global security issues, including proliferation threats, which up to now remain abstract for most Europeans. This debate must not be confined to generating a common transatlantic threat perception, but should also embrace a debate on the necessary responses – including military responses. For example, rather than criticizing U.S. proposals regarding pre-emptive options, Europe and the United States should work towards conditioning their use.
• Europeans will have to accept that institutions like the United Nations are not simply about freezing the status quo, but about delivering results. European criticism of U.S. unilateralism will be of little avail as long as Europeans appear unwilling to enforce the very resolutions they themselves have agreed to. Nor will the widely deplored marginalization of the UN be arrested by attributing it with almost mythical qualities as the world’s sole arbiter – or even characterizing it as the world’s “conscience.” Such an elevation of the UN is factually and legally wrong – and will only hasten the gradual withdrawal by the United States from the organization.
• In a similar vein, Europeans will have to accept that NATO is no longer solely about protecting Europe’s political order, but a framework for action whenever (and wherever) transatlantic security interests are being threatened. Over the course of this decade, NATO will have to adopt a truly functional rather than a geographical approach to security. Whether Europe can produce the forces and the “global” mindset to sustain such a role is a question that can only be answered in the longer term. However, even in the short term there are steps that are politically significant and militarily affordable: enhancing NATO’s role in Afghanistan and giving it a role in Iraq. Fears that such a role might perpetuate U.S. dominance of NATO in regions outside of Europe should be outweighed by the benefits: By using the transatlantic institution that still enjoys considerable U.S. trust and support, Europeans could firmly engage an ambivalent United States into long-term nation-building. NATO’s Balkan operations offer an instructive example, because despite ritualistic expressions of discontent with the concept of nation-building, the United States remains involved.
• Despite Europe’s frustration with the United States, it must resist any temptation to construct a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a counterweight to the United States. Although the distinction between “old” and “new” Europe should not be overdrawn, it brings home the fact that a significant majority of European nations are not ready to follow the Franco-German lead in European integration, let alone on matters transatlantic. Reviving old ideas of a “core group” or “avant-garde” in order to rejuvenate ESDP is a dead end. Military integration cannot be a catalyst for political integration. And the military credibility of any such core that includes Germany but excludes the United Kingdom remains highly dubious. Managing transatlantic security relations means managing asymmetry, no matter how much frustration this may entail.

• The United States has to make a consistent case. Arguably, this is the crux of the matter of the current transatlantic disagreement. The Iraq war may have been “the first war about weapons of mass destruction” (Charles Krauthammer), but the United States could not fully convey this point to the wider world. The rationales put forward by the administration after 9/11 appeared inconsistent: from Iraq’s alleged support of terrorism, to its continuing weapons programs, to its obstructionist behavior regarding inspections, the regime’s totalitarian nature, to, finally, the liberalization of Iraq as a prelude to a democratic reordering of a new Middle East. This multitude of arguments undermined rather than strengthened the U.S. case – at home and abroad. Most of all, it served to obscure the most fundamental question: What are the implications of an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction for the security of the Middle East and, thus, for Western economic security – not to mention Israel?
• At the same time, the United States must rein in its public rhetoric. Powerful images like the now infamous “axis of evil” may be necessary to galvanize the attention of a U.S. public that is generally disinterested in foreign policy. Yet what may be good domestic politics can turn out to be bad international public relations. Nothing alienates Europeans more than bellicose rhetoric, generously sprinkled with religious metaphors. Demonizing opponents as rogues while moralizing one’s own objectives may be as American as baseball and apple pie, yet the polls demonstrated that even within the United States itself, large parts of the population remained unconvinced that Iraq posed a “clear and present danger” to the United States. Like their European counterparts, many Americans suspected that the overblown rhetoric emanating from the White House was an attempt to mask an inherently weak case. As a result, the U.S. administration could never fully shed the image that it was trying to hijack the tragedy of 9/11 to sustain a case that would otherwise have floundered.
• The United States has to stay on the multilateral route, no matter how risky it appears to be. The United States may be strong enough militarily to win wars, yet the political and financial costs of reconstruction – the logical corollary of regime change – may well overtax even the world’s only superpower. Moreover, the controversial nature of the strategies required for dealing with new threats (e.g., pre-emption) require more consultation with allies, not less. The same holds true for the goal of advancing changes in international law to make it consistent with the new security environment. Such changes are overdue, but they require international consent. Hence the United States must again come to appreciate multilateralism as a long-term investment. In reviewing the crisis over Iraq since UN Resolution 1441, there are quite a few indications that the lack of cooperation the United States had to suffer in the UN was at least in part a consequence of its previous behavior on other issues. The perceived U.S. unilateralism on the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court may have backfired, as some countries had less reason to be conciliatory. Finally, multilateralism remains a domestic requi rement as well, even in an allegedly unilateral United States. Even if the war itself led to the expected rallying around the flag, the

SIGNS OF AN EMERGING NEW CONSENSUS

The above list may appear so ambitious as to represent nothing more than wishful thinking. But it is not. Indeed, some of the above elements are already beginning to be reflected in current transatlantic policies. Even if Iraq continues to remain divisive, Europe and the United States have already embarked on a process of readjustment that will lead to a new transatlantic consensus on how to respond to the new security environment.

The first sign of readjustment was already on display in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 through the invocation of Article 5 on September 12, 2001. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should trigger NATO’s collective self-defense obligation, the alliance effectively mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.

This broadening of the meaning of collective self-defense was complemented by a second precedent: the deployment of forces from many NATO nations to Afghanistan. This marked the de facto end of NATO’s “out-of-area” debate, which, as the French NATO Ambassador put it cogently, had collapsed with the Twin Towers. The recent agreement to have NATO take over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will solidify the alliance’s out-of-area role, and, hopefully, lock the United States into a nation-building role in Afghanistan. As NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, has argued, the Balkan lessons should leave few doubts as to NATO’s ability to act as a stabilizer in situations that require engagement for the long haul. In this author’s view, even a NATO role in postwar Iraq can no longer be regarded as the proverbial bridge too far, because this debate, which originated in the U.S. strategic community, has meanwhile started to resonate in Europe as well.

Another sign of an emerging transatlantic consensus was the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. Although overshadowed by the Iraq controversy, it turned NATO’s initial post-9/11 reflexes into lasting NATO policy. In addition to inviting seven countries to become members, the alliance agreed to a number of initiatives that reflected the determination to cope with a new security environment. For example, NATO adopted a military concept for the defense against terrorism, which states that NATO forces should be enabled to “deter, disrupt, and defend” wherever required, i.e., without geographical restrictions. A Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism brought NATO’s 27 partner countries into this common struggle. Decisions to enhance the protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction reflected an increasing awareness of responding to this challenge. Finally, the agreement to create a NATO Response Force and to enhance European military capabilities for coalition warfare alongside the United States all pointed in the same direction: Despite disagreements over Iraq, the transatlantic community was making a genuine attempt to recalibrate its central security arrangements in line with the post-9/11 strategic environment.

There are more indications. For example, even if the U.S. decision to take the issue of Iraq to the United Nations produced an unsatisfying outcome, it nevertheless reflected a recognition of the need to forge a broad international consensus on the key tenets of the new security agenda. Other examples include the fact that Europe is today more relaxed on missile defense than it was before, even if differences in perception remain. The United States, on the other hand, has become less ambiguous regarding its support for a defense policy of the European Union. The recent NATO-EU agreement on institutional cooperation is facilitating a stronger role of the EU in the Balkans, thereby making U.S. forces available for other pressing tasks. U.S. efforts to liberalize internal regulations for defense technology transfer to allies are another sign that the need to eliminate sources of frustration in the transatlantic relationship is being recognized. Transatlantic cooperation, although almost eclipsed from public debate, continues to be pivotal in the struggle against terrorism.

When Molière’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme was taught the difference between poetry and prose, he was happily surprised to learn that he had been speaking prose all his life. The same could be said for the current transatlantic debate: Governments may exchange insults across the Atlantic, but such transatlantic poetry will not change the fact that a major process of readjustment is already in full swing. A new transatlantic consensus is already emerging – in prose.

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As the head of the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section in the Political Affairs Division of NATO, Michael Rühle is responsible for drafting speeches and articles for the Secretary General and other high-ranking NATO officials. Previously, Mr. Rühle was a Volkswagen Fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Mr. Rühle has lectured widely on topics of international security in Europe and the United States. He publishes frequently on contemporary security issues, particularly on transatlantic relations and the evolution of NATO, and is the co-author of a major book on strategic defense.

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The views expressed are the author's own and should not be construed to represent the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the American Council on Germany. The author is indebted to James Appathurai and Rad van den Akker for comments and suggestions.