EU and NATO

Strategic Partnership or Alliance for a Purpose?

When NATO was established in 1949, there had been peace in Europe for exactly four years. However, the confrontation between the USA and the USSR peaked with the Berlin Wall and the Korean War. Suddenly, it was not only the former adversaries France and Germany who sought allies, but the USA as well. What is today often overlooked is that without the Europeans, the USA would not have been able to counter the USSR. The strategic points that the USA used in the Cold War made it clear that it depended on and needed to protect the Europeans. The USA surely did not pick countries such as Denmark or Portugal for their military muscle, but because both countries owned strategically important islands, such as Greenland and the Azores. They were significant strongholds for airplanes and ships on their Atlantic route. Even the subdued Germany - at least its western part - suddenly appeared as an equal partner (1955) as it was a border point with the Warsaw Pact. Europeans who after the war made efforts to create a military alliance (e.g. the Brussels Treaty efforts by Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) primarily against Germany, failed to set up anything effective against the threat “from the East”. Even when France declared that it was finally prepared to accept (West) Germany as a partner, all attempts crumbled due to the old European squabble of little states. The most ambitious plan of 1952 to establish a European army failed in 1954 because the French National Assembly rejected it. The European Defence Community, from this vantage point, was too revolutionary for the political leaders of the time. Compared to the economic and political integration of Europe, the military one was very much neglected. EU countries in NATO give much more money for defence than the USA, but their combined tactical capacities for assault are lesser than those of the USA. For more than 30 years the USA and West Europeans have lived in a kind of symbiosis. Following the fall of the USSR - which, in fact, wanted to
became a member of NATO in 1954 - this symbiosis was disrupted. The continents started drifting apart not only because of the debate about the purpose of NATO when you are surrounded by friends, but also because of the new American interests.

In the Kosovo conflict, Europeans had yet another chance to see what their weaknesses were. The strategic satellite reconnaissance was in the hands of the Americans and they charged the Europeans for every photograph or film. The then German Minister of Defence, Scharping, told the journalists that in spite of paying, they did not always get what they wanted. Since 2000, EU countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, started sending their own reconnaissance satellites in outer space, but again separately. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) established for the first time the responsibility of the EU for all issues of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy, and it drafted the security political outlook. Since Europe had no military means of its own, the Maastricht Treaty envisaged that the EU should impose on the West Europe Union (WEU) to plan and conduct the military operations that the EU decides on. Until that time, the WEU, as the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic Alliance, played no substantial role. In fact, the WEU existed only on paper, while only NATO had soldiers and command structures. The awareness for closer connection slowly emerged as late as 2002. In addition to the Rapid Reaction Force, which seemed as a drop of water in the desert, large projects started their development, such as the European Airlift Command, a combination of the aircraft transport capacities of the EU countries.

During the third Iraq war, the USA again felt the twinge that it needed the Europeans. Military bases, hospitals, even soldiers were welcome. Even though the war, as Donald Rumsfeld said, divided Europe into Old and New Europe, from today's point of view, this situation took Europeans a step forward. In order to be able to respond effectively to modern threats and conflicts in the world, even the last super power, USA, needs allies. No country today is able to tackle problems independently - globalisation has touched upon security interests long ago. Even today, when the missile programme (again) divides Europeans and is the possible cause for an American-Russian conflict, it is possible that the fight for raw materials will make NATO, Russia and the EU work together.
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Our Road to the Alliance
Macedonia Deserves to Be in NATO

Antonio Milososki

It gives me particular pleasure to have the opportunity to promote the views of the Republic of Macedonia and the efforts undertaken on our part for integration into NATO in the context of receiving an invitation for membership at the following Summit for Enlargement of the Alliance to be held in Bucharest next year. It gives me even greater pleasure that this article is going to be published in the Political Thought, a publication of the esteemed Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which in these past years has provided an immense contribution to the promotion of the Euro-Atlantic values and the civil society in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as of the Macedonian foreign policy priorities.

Our country set NATO integration as a strategic goal immediately following its independence. Fourteen years ago, the Macedonian Assembly adopted the first decision for the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO. Two years later, we joined the Partnership for Peace programme, and in 1996 we started the dialogue with the Alliance about the NATO enlargement study, when the first Macedonian military liaison officers were deployed in the NATO General Headquarters in Brussels and the NATO Headquarters in Mons.

The following year, the Republic of Macedonia also became a member of NATO’s process for planning and analysis - PARP, thus intensifying our cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic partners. In 1999, we started implementing the Membership Action Plan (MAP); we have so far completed 8 MAP cycles, and the ninth is going to be even more intensive, considering that it will last from September this year to February next year.

The integration of the Republic of Macedonia into NATO, with a clearly expressed consensus of all political factors in the country and with broad support of its citizens, is one of the strategic goals and fundamental determinations, as well as a priority in the Government programme. In most public opinion surveys in Macedonia, the percentage of persons in favour of the integration of the Republic of Macedonia into NATO is always in the area of 90%. Therefore, the Republic of Macedonia mobilises all its capacities and potentials, so that in the foreseeable future it may become an equal partner in the Euro-Atlantic structures and a regarded member of the family of modern democracies. The president of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia has taken charge of all
activities in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration with a view to focusing the available national capacities more efficiently in implementing the required standards and criteria.

The Republic of Macedonia has already completed the eighth cycle of implementation of the Action Plan for membership of NATO, and it continues to adopt the standards related to the membership in the Alliance. What is especially important for us are the continuous intensive activities of close and transparent cooperation with all members of the Alliance and with the countries aspiring for membership, as well as with NATO, with all of whom we continue to develop dynamic communication and cooperation within our preparations for membership in the Alliance.

The participation of Macedonian military forces in international military missions strongly testifies to the Macedonian dedication to preserving the values of western democracies, including the global fight against terrorism, the most serious security challenge for the modern world. In addition to our military participation as part of the international anti-terrorist coalition in Iraq, in 2006, the Republic of Macedonia substantially increased its presence in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan - where we also consider civilian engagement - and it has dispatched its forces to the ALTEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, on 7 June this year we officially marked taking over the functions of the NATO Headquarters in Skopje to support NATO led operations with our Host Nation Support Coordination Center. This year we have also successfully coordinated the partner activities within the Adriatic Charter with the purpose of contributing jointly to the security in the region and for each of the partners to utilise their respective capacities to the maximum. Redesigning and reforming Macedonian defence is at a final stage of creating a small, mobile, professional and well-equipped army, prepared to respond to contemporary security challenges. We are currently developing a new National Security Strategy, involving experts from a number of ministries and government agencies.

The Government of the Republic of Macedonia remains faithful to its determination for the completion of the Framework Agreement, which has had a positive impact on promoting inter-ethnic relations in the country. Substantial results have been achieved in the political dialogue, enabling the return of the opposition DUI to the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia. (A list of laws has been established that will require a Badinter majority, as well as the legal changes in the operation of the Committee for Relations among Communities in the Assembly). The Government has recently adopted the Strategy for the equitable representation of communities, and the adoption of an action plan for its implementation is planned for this summer. As far as decentralisation is concerned, in July this year we will see the start of the second stage of this process - fiscal decentralisation - allowing municipa-
ilities greater financial income for exercising their competencies in education, healthcare, sports, social welfare and culture.

Moreover, the Government has undertaken serious and determined steps toward reforms and there are already marked results in fighting corruption and reforming the judiciary. A number of channels for international human, migrants, narcotic and firearms trafficking have been discovered, and the actions against cases of corruption in government institutions have been enhanced. A number of laws have been adopted or amended in the area of the judiciary, contributing to accelerating certain civil procedures. We have strengthened the position of the state antitrust authority, and we are preparing all the bylaws planned for the start of the enforcement of the Law on Police in this area.

Substantial reforms in the judiciary are underway, contributing to enhancing the efficiency of the judiciary, as well as depoliticising it completely. The Academy for Magistrates is expected to start working soon, and the changes in the Public Prosecution are also in their final stage.

We shall confirm our centuries-old tradition of religious tolerance by adopting the new Law on Religious Communities, incorporating the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the OSCE.

The economic measures of the Government are focused on affording the most flexible investing environment for foreign investors by reducing administrative procedures, cutting the time for company registration, and tax benefits. The “Invest in Macedonia” Project has given rise to interest from relevant foreign investors in the possibilities offered by our country. In addition to maintaining macroeconomic stability, we strive to reduce unemployment and promote the business environment and the living standard of the citizens.

The countries of the Adriatic Group received encouraging signals from the Riga Summit. We are going to take advantage of this unique opportunity to show our allies that we deserve their trust in our capacities to stabilise the Balkans and integrate it into the successful European democracies. This opportunity was confirmed by the recent adoption of the NATO FREEDOM CONSOLIDATION ACT of 2007 by the American Congress to admit Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, the Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and to allocate financial military assistance to implement this process. In the context of maintaining good neighbourly relations, I would like to stress our constructive position in resolving the status of Kosovo by supporting the plan of the peace mediator Marti Ahtisaari and by the clearly defined position that it is better to have status than to have status quo. We make maximum efforts for accelerating the Euro-Atlantic integration of all countries from the Western Balkans. We actively help the newly admitted countries in the Partnership for Peace programme which are beginning
their reforms in defence to achieve the other standards and criteria of the Alliance.

The membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the Alliance will contribute to the strengthening of its stability and geostrategic position in the region, as well as to the strengthening of the trust of foreign investors in its potentials for quality investment and multiplying capital. For the Republic of Macedonia, membership in NATO is complementary with EU membership and it is a major step forward towards the European integration of the country and the full liberalisation of the visa regime for Macedonian citizens. This will allow us to devote more attention to resources for carrying out larger and more vital projects to make avail of our geo-strategic position (e.g. the AMBO oil pipeline, road and railroad connection within Corridor 8 etc.).

There is no alternative to NATO membership and it is the only true solution for attaining permanent stability and prosperity in the region with a positive impact on the overall situation in Europe. In this respect, the Republic of Macedonia is active in enhancing the partnership within the EAPS and the PfP, viewing it as highly important for the role of NATO in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and as a contribution to enhancing NATO capacities to deal with current and future global and regional security challenges in the new millennium.

I am convinced that the Republic of Macedonia is going to demonstrate the ability to fullfil the commitments and take advantage of the privileges deriving from the membership of the Alliance.
Reforms in the Judiciary in the Republic of Macedonia: A Requirement for NATO Membership

Mihajlo Manevski

The implementation of the reforms in the judiciary in order to ensure an independent and efficient judicial system, coupled with undertaking a successful fight against organized crime and corruption are, at present, a key challenge for the Ministry of Justice and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The reforms of the judiciary and prosecuting organized crime and corruption are immensely significant due to two equally important goals - ensuring the rule of law and granting of rights and freedoms to the citizens, as well as a successful integration of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO and the EU.

My long years of experience and work within the judicial institutions provide me with a broad overview of the systemic deficiencies and allow me to critically approach existing problems while contemplating and executing their solutions. Guided by the clear commitment of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to ensure an effective and independent judicial system which will guarantee the rights and freedoms of the citizens and provide them with a better access to justice, my associates and I have undertaken numerous reform activities within the Ministry of Justice which strengthen the position of the judiciary, ensure greater balance of the overall system of governance and improve the present state of play in this field.

The reforms of the judiciary are directed towards the adoption of new legislature, amendments and addenda to existing laws in order to improve the function of the judicial system as a whole, in parallel to monitoring of the implementation of laws with the aim of discerning the defects which will need further alteration.

The Ministry of Justice, according to the competences provided by the law and in cooperation with various domestic and foreign experts, along with expert and financial assistance provided by the representatives of the international community and the embassies, has drafted a number of laws and has undertaken activities directed towards the approximation of domestic to EU legislature which, at the same time, positively affects the social climate in the country for the citizens of Macedonia, as well as in relation to the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the country.
Reforms in the Judicial System

Within the framework of the reforms in the judiciary, over twenty laws have been adopted and amended which allow for the completion of the judicial frame within which provisions aligned with international conventions and EU norms are incorporated in order to codify the European legislative system in the Republic of Macedonia such as: the Law on the Judicial Council, the Law on Courts, the Law on the Academy for Training of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the Law on Administrative Disputes, the Law on Enforcement, the Law on Misdemeanor, the Law on Mediation, the Law on the Bar, the Law on the Notaries, the Law on Juvenile Justice, the Law on Private International Law, the Law on the State Ombudsman and other laws. After the adoption of the reform laws, implementation and monitoring of implementation have been undertaken.

The implementation of the Law on the Judicial Council introduces a new practice in the appointment and dismissal of judges which allows for the redefinition of competence in order to guarantee greater independence and impartiality in the judicial system; it also takes into account the equitable representation of the representatives of the non-majority communities in accordance with the provisions for competency and professionalism. The Judicial Council was elected by the judges through secret elections which were conducted in October 2006: eight judges were elected and the President and Vice President of the Judicial Council were appointed at the constitutive session which was held on 19 December 2006. The Judicial Council is functioning with the present composition along with the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice and it recently decided on the number of judges in the courts which will be five hundred forty three (543). The remaining five members which the Parliament elects on the proposal of the President of the country (two) and those proposed by a Parliamentary Commission (three) are to be elected in the nearest future in order to allow for an undisrupted and more effective functioning of the Council.

The adoption of the Law on Courts stems from the obligation for reforms in the judiciary of the Republic of Macedonia stipulated in the Strategy for reforms in the judicial system, the amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia in relation to the judiciary adopted in 2005 and the strategic goal of the Republic of Macedonia for membership in the EU and NATO, as well as for the purpose of the implementation of effective and continuous reforms in the judiciary based on European standards. The Law on Courts which entered into force on 1 January 2007 allows for the constitution of two new courts, an Appellate Court in Gostivar and an Administrative Court which will start to work towards the first half of 2007. The premises have been selected and the infrastructural adaptation and reconstruction of the premises is in the
process. The public announcement for employment of judges in the Administrative Court (nineteen in total) and the procedure for the appointment of judges should be completed soon. In accordance with the provisions of the Law, a separate civil and criminal court have been founded through the relocation of judges from Courts of First Instance Skopje I and Skopje II. Moreover, five specialized departments have been formed in the Courts of First Instance with extended competences for dealing with cases of organized crime and corruption.

The implementation of the Law on the Academy for Training of Judges and Public Prosecutors is a step forward towards ensuring an expert judiciary which will allow for improved efficiency and professionalism of the overall judicial system. The Director and the Executive Director have been appointed by the Executive Board, the Statute and the other bylaws have been adopted, as well as the Programme and the Rulebook for taking the entry exam, the Programme for continuous training and the preparatory Programme for the representatives of the non majority communities in the Republic of Macedonia the first training sessions for judges and public prosecutors have been carried out on the topic of public international law and EU law, foreign language and computer courses are organized, and preparations for implementing further training planned for the second half of the year are underway.

The Law on Enforcement has been implemented, fifty one (51) enforcement officers and assistant enforcement officers have been appointed, the unified template for the report of the enforcement officers has been prepared along with the enforcement officers tariff as one of the priority obligations stemming from the European Partnership in the direction of making the process of enforcement of judicial verdicts in civil cases speedier. The Law on Mediation has also been implemented, which introduces the concept of an alternative manner of dispute settlement which will improve the efficiency of the judiciary and will allow for a more economic and speedier access of citizens to justice.

The Law on Misdemeanours allows for the formation of misdemeanour institutions by the state administrative bodies which will authorize the initiation of the misdemeanour procedure and pronounce sanctions. However, the typically administrative misdemeanours exempt from the judicial competence in order to decrease the number of unresolved misdemeanour cases in the courts.

In accordance with the requirements for the alignment of domestic to EU legislature, the Law on Amendments and addenda to the Law on the Bar which is in line with the Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 February 1998 and the Directive 77/249/EEC of the European Parliament has been also adopted. These Directives deal with the attorney profession in member states which are not the country where the qualification has been obtained and with attorney services by foreign attorneys and bar
associations. The implementation of the provisions allows for the incorporation of these Directives into the Law and alignment with EU legislature. A new *Law on Notaries* has been adopted, which incorporates the new standards and institutes in line with EU legislature. Concomitantly, an obligation of the notaries for registering cases of corruption is included into the law.

At present, a new *Law on the State Ombudsman* is in preparation after the adoption of the Proposal for the adoption of the Law on the State Ombudsman as an independent body which will protect the property rights and interests of the Republic of Macedonia. Additionally, the *Law on Judicial Service* which regulates the performance of the judicial service and the position of judicial administration and the *Law on Salaries of Judges* whose provisions implement international standards on the status and position of judges in the direction of strengthening of their independence and effective, qualitative and timely resolution of cases are also being prepared. In the course of 2007, the practice of existing laws will be monitored and an *Analysis on the implementation of laws in the judiciary* will be prepared.

The Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the other judicial institutions and the State Institute for Statistics, will work on the introduction of a *unitary and unified statistical system* for keeping record of the court cases compatible with the preparation of the analysis of the effectiveness of the judiciary in all its areas. In addition, in order to improve the efficiency and transparency in the judicial system, to ensure a more successful communication amongst the judicial institutions and with the aim of effective tackling of the immense backlog of cases, the *IT Center of the Ministry of Justice* is now functional, on the basic of a project implemented with the financial assistance of the European Commission through the European Agency for Reconstruction where 12 new IT personnel have been employed. The IT Center was officially opened during the working visit and the appraisal mission of the Director General of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission Mr. Michael Leigh to the Republic of Macedonia on 23 March 2007.

**Fight Against Organized Crime and Corruption**

The Government of the Republic of Macedonia is fully committed to the enforcement of “zero tolerance” for *corruption policy* in order to improve the existing legal framework compatible with EU standards and international anti-corruption instruments. The prosecution bodies are institutionally strengthened with the aim of more successful and effective undertaking of procedures against sophisticated acts of corruption. Significant importance is given to prevention and transparency, as well as to raising the level of public awareness in this area. In order to ensure an effective battle for the repression and prevention of corruption in the Republic of Macedonia, sustainable
and substantial measures and activities have been undertaken in terms of legislation.

Several international conventions have been ratified within this field. The procedure for the ratification of the UN Convention for fight against corruption is underway. The legal framework for anticorruption policy is composed of numerous new laws such as the Law on the Prevention of Corruption from 2006 aligned with EU measures. The amendments to the Law on Criminal Procedure and the new criminal acts in the Criminal Code envisage the ensuring of a more successful criminal and legal suppression of corruption cases. The Law on Communication is expected to significantly improve the disclosing of cases of high level corruption and facilitate evidence gathering.

A procedure for the adoption of a new Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering has been initiated along with the procedure for a new Law on Public Prosecution and the Law on Council of Public Prosecutors. The Law on Public Prosecution redefines the position and enhances the competencies of the public prosecutor for the purpose of effective discovery of criminal acts and undertaking criminal procedures, while the Law on the Council of Public Prosecutors ensures greater independence and impartiality in the appointment of public prosecutors. These two legal texts were submitted to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe for expert opinions where I participated at the 69th Plenary Session for an exchange of views regarding these draft laws. The comments and the remarks received on the draft laws have been incorporated and the laws are aligned with the Recommendations of the Council of Europe on the public prosecution office. The Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interests has also been adopted.

We closely monitor the process of the financing of political parties, and the financing of election campaigns in particular. With the amendments to the Electoral Code, new provisions have been included regarding the sources of funding for financing election campaigns and the prevention of political corruption; the right to vote of the diaspora is also guaranteed.

The Ministry of Justice has prepared a Strategy for reforms in the criminal justice system in order to strengthen the criminal justice framework, as well as to strengthen the capacities of the competent institutions responsible for sanctioning the perpetrators of criminal acts with the aim of ensuring effective protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens. The amendments to the Criminal Code foresee wider measures for the criminal responsibility for acts of organized crime (human trafficking, child pornography and other acts). Concomitantly, the amendments to the Law on Criminal Procedure are aimed in the direction of improving the protection of witnesses; they also include preparations for the transfer of the investigation in the competence of the public prosecutor.
Apart from the legislative measures embarked upon, a number of concrete activities for the prevention and repression of acts of organized crime and corruption have been undertaken.

The trial against persons involved in a serious corruption scheme worth several million euros, including a former Deputy Minister, the Director of the Cadastre, several notaries, lawyers and a former judge has finished. A first degree verdict has been brought and the 22 persons have been found guilty and are sentenced to a prison sentence of fifty one (51) years in total. Other verdicts include several important cases of criminal acts of bribery and abuse of official position among customs administration, law enforcement agents and other former officials, as well as cases related with the urban mafia. The procedure for other cases against former officials and directors of public institutions are ongoing.

Criminal charges have been brought against judges and public prosecutors for incompetent and unconscientious work and involvement in criminal corrupt acts, including one President of a Court of First Instance who has been sentenced with a verdict. At the same time, one judge has been dismissed by the Judicial Council of the Republic of Macedonia. An investigation is currently being carried out against more than forty (40) persons for bribery among customs administration and law enforcement agents at the border crossings.

**Other Activities Related to the Euro-Atlantic Aspirations**

Apart from the present workload, activities and measures continuously undertaken in the direction of the completion of reforms in the judiciary and the implementation of a successful fight against crime and corruption, the Ministry of Justice prepares other projects which are of undisputed relevance for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations; these activities are also prerequisites for the following strategic objectives:

- The *Law on Cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the ex-Yugoslavia* which incorporates the comments received in the opinions of the Hague Tribunal and the OSCE at the request of the Ministry of Justice has been adopted. Concomitantly, all the necessary measures and reforms are carried out for the return of the four Hague cases to the Republic of Macedonia. However, we put our emphasis on the preparation of the institutions competent to receive the cases and not on the timing. Therefore, a new court room has been fully equipped and is fully functional with the most modern audio and video equipment in the Court of First Instance Skopje I which allows for the hearing of witnesses with hidden
identity and change of voice, the prison rooms in the Skopje Penitentiary have been equipped in accordance with the standards of the Tribunal and the judges and public prosecutors have been trained to implement the international criminal norms and rules of the Tribunal in Sarajevo and at the Tribunal in the Hague.

- We have prepared a Law on the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups which incorporates international standards and norms, while taking into account the specificities of the Macedonian religious milieu and the traditional multi-confessional heritage of the country. The draft Law which has been prepared in cooperation with the representatives of the religious communities in the Republic of Macedonia was submitted to the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR for opinions. The general impression of the Venice Commission is that “In general, the draft law meets many of the highest international requirements in protecting the freedom of religion or beliefs and in providing a positive framework for its exercise and practice.” The comments were incorporated in the latest version of the law which will enter the adoption procedure.

- The procedure for adoption of other relevant laws which are in the parliamentary procedure, such as the Law on Juvenile Justice, which incorporates international standards on juvenile justice and which codifies juvenile legislation and the Law on Private International Law which includes international and European standards for the recognition and execution of foreign court verdicts.

Realistic and Not a Declarative Political Commitment!

The Ministry of Justice and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia are strongly committed towards the implementation of reforms in the judicial system and the realisation of an effective and efficient anti-corruption policy and repression of organized crime. The activities which have been carried out in the past period stipulate the realistic and not declarative political commitments for results which will simultaneously contribute to a better and safer life of the citizens and the fulfillment of the criteria necessary for the integration in NATO and the EU.

The course of reforms is set and we remain on the already outlined roadmap for the realisation of the set objectives. We should not have illusions that the current processes and the fight against organized crime and corruption are simple and easily solvable questions. On the contrary, the achievement of measurable results which will translate into realistic gains for the citizens of the

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Republic of Macedonia and on the basis of which our meeting of the criteria necessary for NATO and EU membership will be judged presupposes continuous work, honest self-assessment of completed activities, constant commitment to the improving of available capacities and generating the entire social capital in the direction of the realization of the strategic goals of the Republic of Macedonia – membership in NATO and the EU.
Why Should Macedonia Become a Member of the Alliance?

Nano Ruzin

With the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, the Alliance entered a new phase of its enlargement. Previously, the expansion was led by geostrategic motives. With its first round of enlargement after the end of the Cold War, NATO transformed itself into a mechanism for promoting values of stability, liberty and democracy. This newly enhanced mandate of NATO culminated with the intervention in Kosovo, when the Alliance transformed itself from a defensive to offensive organization. During this crisis, in 1999, NATO adopted the updated Strategic Concept by which it became committed “to building a larger and stronger Euro-Atlantic community.” Therefore, the Euro-Atlantic zone has expanded into a space where the human rights and the fundamental freedoms are entirely respected, the borders are completely open for the peoples, ideas and trade, the military conflicts are impossible (The Washington Declaration, NAC Washington, D.C., April 21/24, 1999). Just as the first criticism around the possible transformation of the Alliance from a military organization into a new sterile League of the United Nations started coming, the terrorist attacks on USA on 11 September 2001 happened. The Alliance faced new obligations and challenges, especially in the battle against the asymmetric terrorist danger.

It is within the frames of the aforementioned dimensions that we can find the answer to the emblematic question: “Why should Macedonia become a NATO member?” What are the advantages of NATO membership? Will the Alliance membership open new perspectives for the Republic of Macedonia?

1. NATO’s Process of Enlargement

NATO’s process of enlargement is based upon the Founding Act of the Washington Treaty. The process practically started in the 1950s when Turkey and Greece obtained their membership; it continued during the 1960s when Germany joined the Alliance and through the 1980s with the accession of Spain, until today, with the effectuation of the two post-Cold War rounds of enlargement. It is likely that the Alliance’s Open Door Policy stipulated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty of 4 April 1949 will remain open to new members.

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, new
possibilities for inviting new democracies in the Alliance were opened. At the Summit of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels in 1994 it was confirmed that the Alliance was open to accept new members from the former Soviet camp. The question “why and how in the Alliance” is discussed in the Study on the NATO Enlargement published in 1995.

As it is stated by Sean Key in “NATO’s Next Enlargement: An Overview” (Growing Pains ed. by Tomas Valasek and Theresa Hitchen, 2002, Center for Defence Information, p. 10) “... the enlargement of the Alliance in 1999 was effectuated by strong geostrategic motives...” Burdened by the ongoing question on the east border of Germany, the allies insisted on finding a certain balance through strengthening and enlarging the European institutions. In the meantime, the diminishing of Russia’s power which could have led to a destabilization of a wider range, imposed the necessity of integration of Russia, thus preventing any kind of strategic adventurism of the former super power. In such context, the possible accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to the Alliance reflected the moral and political dimensions of the enlargement of the Alliance rather than its strategic and military motives. Consequently, NATO became more interested in the institutional than the military enlargement. This means absence of troops, nuclear weapons and infrastructure located on the territory of the new members of the Alliance. However, is this enough for the credibility of the new members in terms of security? Can such NATO enlargement be experienced as a false promise? In accordance with the Washington Treaty, the Alliance is committed to strengthening and guaranteeing the security of the new member when admitted. Accordingly, it is more than certain that the new members of the Alliance would enjoy the same status as any other member.

2. The Big Bang Enlargement After the Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001

The date of the terrorist attacks on the USA targets, 11 September 2001, has been assigned a symbolic meaning in the universal history of the modern world as an epitome of epic discontinuity in the history. The Americans called this date “dividing” so as to stress that in the future, history will be perceived as before and after this date. Putting this rhetoric aside, the fact is that the terrorist attacks on the USA have speeded up the world’s history. According to the American historian Paul Kennedy, “on 11 September 2001, the USA have completely entered the 21st century”. Soon even the Bush Administration, instead of using Huntington’s terminology on the “clash of civilizations” adopts the phrase “fight against terrorism”.

The international community on its part reacted very explicitly and decisively to this new type of asymmetric war. On 12 September, the UN Security Council condemned the attacks on
USA through the Resolution 1368, qualifying terrorism as a “threat to the peace and the security in the world.” On the same day, the North Atlantic Council of NATO for the first time in its existence activated Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, according to which the attack on the USA was regarded as an attack on all the members of the Alliance, which meant an individual and collective use of force of NATO members.

At the same time, this was also the first variable of terrorist attacks. The second variable could be understood from the statement that “the danger from international terrorism becomes a primary and strategic assignment of the strongest state in the world - USA.” Finally, the third variable was that a terrorist attack was not understood as an attack launched by other states -actors from the outside, but as a result of the activity of organized international terrorist groups within the state itself. (Pierre Conesa, “Al Qaida une secte millenariste, Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris, January 2002).

The period of the terrorist attacks coincided with the period of the preparations and the fulfillment of the Annual National Membership Action Plan by the nine aspirants of the Vilnius Group to join the Alliance. Introduced in 1999 during the Jubilee Summit in Washington and based on the experiences gained from the first enlargement round, MAP developed into a special mechanism for preparing every aspiring country to join NATO.

The global position of the Bush Administration since June 2001 during the visit to Europe was that “none of the European countries can be prevented from its aspirations to NATO for historic or geographic reasons.” (The New York Times, 16/17 June 2001). At that time it was still uncertain which of the nine aspirants, joined by Croatia, will be invited for accession. The Scandinavian countries lobbied for the invitation of at least one Baltic state. Italy supported Slovenia and Romania, whereas the United Kingdom’s diplomacy appealed for a strict minimum, fearing that the massive accession would change the physiognomy of the Alliance. (William Hopkinson “Elargissement - Une nouvelle OTAN”, Paris, IES, UEO, Cah. de Chaillot 49, Oct. 2001). According to the former Minister of Defense of Germany Volker Rhue, “Germany supported the candidatures of Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and possibly Romania”, but according to the MD of Greece Apostolos Athanassios, advantage was given to Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In July 2001, five options were open: the minimalist, which meant accession only for Slovenia and possibly Slovakia, the middle option which justified an invitation to Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria, the moderately strengthened option (Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) with a possibility for one Baltic state and finally, the total option or the ‘big bang’ which meant invitation to all the aspirants but the least prepared (Albania, Macedonia, Croatia). This option was especially viable after the
events on 11 September, when the solidarity of USA with all the pro-Atlantic countries was being strengthened. Moreover, the repetitive misunderstandings with Russia would be avoided, especially those with Russia’s great distrust to the Alliance’s expansion towards its west borders.

Prior to the Summit in Prague, despite the announcements of the former USA National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski, nobody could have anticipated the ‘big bang’ accession to NATO. The only thing the American Administration made clear about the enlargement of the Alliance was that “USA will reject any idea of a veto from the outside” (The New York Times 16/17 June 2001). The second significant message of the American Administration was the statement that, “part of the aspiring candidates for the Alliance were more interested in how they would benefit from their future membership in NATO (having the role to safeguard the territorial integrity which was a past function of the Alliance) than in their benefit to the global and regional security”.

At the Summit in Prague 2002 there was a ‘big bang’ accession to NATO considering the fact that there were ten aspirants and seven invitations for accession sent to the members of the Vilnius Group.

3. The Future Enlargement of NATO: Macedonia’s Benefit

The preceding American recommendation is a sort of an acquie of the system of values for reasoning in the Alliance that has to be taken into consideration by all those who give official statements in the Republic of Macedonia about our membership in the Alliance. At this point it is not beneficial to evaluate the future enlargement of the Alliance and the membership of the Republic of Macedonia solely by the benefits that the future membership might bring. Actually, it was not by chance that on the eve of the Summit in Prague, the US NATO Ambassador at that time, Nicholas Burns, asked the same three questions to the leaders of the ten state members of the Vilnius Group: “Why do you want to become members of the Alliance? How will your country contribute to the strengthening of the regional and the global stability? How will you apply and defend the NATO’s principles?”

Although the individual answers of the leaders of the ten aspirant states at that time are unknown, it is evident that the question, “Why do you want to join the Alliance?” is the first and, if not the most significant, then the most provocative to every potential aspirant or future member.

The answers to this question can be multi-layered and multiple, but it is more than clear that all the European new democracies, without exception, have ranked the accession to the Alliance as one of the issues of superior strategic interest for the state. Really now, why should Macedonia become a member to the Alliance? Definitely not because it is fashionable or some sort of luxury but mostly because of its strategic
interest. This interest is not expressed solely in the obligations that NATO imposes on the domestic political government to undertake intensification of the reforms in various domains from the political and security to the legal, economic and defense issues, but also in the wider context of the whole transformation of the Macedonian multi-ethnic society. Undoubtedly, the way to EU leads also through the Alliance, as was the case with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. Reforms dictated by the Alliance provided a good basis for a wider scope of the EU reforms, although part of these reforms, especially in the sphere of defense and politics, are in accordance with the EU standards.

The membership in the Alliance Club represents a great privilege for every country, and especially for the small ones, like the Republic of Macedonia. Indeed, Island, with 260,000 citizens, but much larger, and Luxemburg, with 540,000 citizens and smaller, as well as Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia, with a similar number of citizens and of a similar size, are NATO members. It would be a great privilege for the Republic of Macedonia to become a member of NATO, the most powerful political and military organization in the world and, according to George Bush, “the unique space for dialogue and exchange of opinions on the key safety issues”.

Macedonia will have an opportunity to participate in the making of the most important decisions on managing the world’s security, it will participate with its own forces in the management of crises, it will play a significant security role with some thirty members of the Alliance. It goes without saying that as a member of the Alliance, the Republic of Macedonia will be guaranteed permanent security and stability. The accession of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO will mark a definite end to all the conspiracy theories against it, the adventurous ambitions of the extremists, the skepticism of the pessimists. Consequently, the gradual integration of the Republic of Macedonia into the Euro-Atlantic processes will follow, our diplomats, ministers and leaders will sit in the same room and discuss with the most powerful leaders of today, and our security forces will protect the regional and global peace shoulder to shoulder with their military allies from the other armies.

Macedonia, as a member of the Alliance, will also obtain a greater financial credibility for foreign investments, better welfare for its citizens and better perspectives for EU membership.

Macedonia will finally find its adequate place in the international community as a member of the European and the Euro-Atlantic family.
Transforming Society:
Croatia’s Road to NATO

Davor Bozinovic

One of the most quoted phrases in NATO enlargement policy says that membership in the Alliance is not only about the armed forces; it is also about society as a whole. Seven years after Croatia embarked on a journey towards membership in NATO, it can confirm how much sense this phrase makes. Only by being a strong and reliable state in its own right can a country be a strong and reliable ally. In this short article, I will describe how Croatia transformed itself politically and militarily, and I will make a case for Croatia as a member of NATO.

How About Individual Defence?

After the Declaration of Independence in 1991, Croatia fought a four-year war to preserve its statehood and territory. The armed forces were built from scratch, military expertise was scarce, weapons were few and Croatia was not part of any defence alliance. The only possible option at that time was to organise a defence of our own. Croatia eventually prevailed, but the cost was immense – the loss of human lives, destroyed economy and weak institutions strained the social fabric and hampered development. Evoking that part of history has modern implications: does Croatia want to stand alone in the face of peril again? No. Croatia wants to deter any aggression before it is forced to fight. Also, it wants to be better prepared to stand on its own ground. Finally, Croatia wants to join forces with other states in order to defend its freedom and common values.

Sharing Values

Being a member of the Alliance is about sharing the same values. Ultimately, it is about the society and what citizens believe to be valuable in their everyday life – access to education and health care, political and human rights, freedom of the press and market economy. The Alliance was forged to defend those values and Croatia wanted to be a part of it. But there was a long way to travel.

The War for Independence has left its mark. Just as the economy needed healing, the Croatian society needed something to hold on to. Euro-Atlantic integration was recognised as the way forward. The affiliation with the Euro-Atlantic community carried certain political responsibilities and obligations. When Croatia took the responsibility to
reform, NATO took the responsibility to provide advice in that process and guide Croatia to membership status within the framework of the Membership Action Plan (2002). The goals and priorities were set, with NATO providing estimates and expertise on reform related to defence from the sphere of politics, economy, defence, military, security, finance and legislature.

On the political side, the issues which dominated the exchange with NATO were the return of refugees, reform of the judiciary and the cooperation with the ICTY. Progress has been made on all three issues: there is now full cooperation with the ICTY; the return of refugees is near completion, and reform of the judiciary is under way.

Transforming the Military and the Defence Sector

Defence and military reform are, by definition, areas in which NATO has more expertise. This coincided with military transformation as one of Croatia’s social priorities in the late 90s. Why social? Well, it is worth mentioning that the Croatian Armed Forces were 180,000 men and women strong in 1995. The estimate was that a force of 16,000 soldiers should be sufficient for a NATO member country. Therefore, Croatia had to think of ways to take care of 164,000 people and their families. It might have been a military issue, but the problem was civilian in nature. And downsizing forces was just the beginning.

In 2002, becoming more involved with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, Croatian Parliament passed two important documents – National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. Also, the Parliament passed five laws related to defence, setting the conditions for legal compatibility with NATO and transparency of defence policy.

Croatia entered the first cycle of the Membership Action Plan with a surplus of military personnel, large reserve forces, territorial structure of defence, dispersed command structure, obsolete weapons and equipment, with no development or procurement plans, and a lack of strategic vision. Since then, Croatia has adopted two strategic documents which identify the situation in the defence sector, point out to desirable reforms and map the new vision of the Armed Forces – the Strategic Defence Review and the Long-Term Development Plan. Also, it has implemented necessary reforms essential to laying proper foundations for the long-term development of the armed forces, particularly through downsizing the Armed Forces and the abolishment of the territorial concept of defence.

NATO has paid full attention to defence reforms through a special mechanism for advice entitled Planning and Review Process. Over the years, the tasks have become more complex and more demanding, related to the capabilities which Allies have set before themselves as well. Today, a consensus
exists on the future model of defence and the structure of the armed forces, and the process of defence review is considered to be almost completed.

**Croatia as a Partner**

Joining the Partnership for Peace programme in the year 2000 was an expression of the idea that Croatia belongs to the Euro-Atlantic community. This also marked the first formal participation in Western security structures and raised the expectations for full membership in NATO. Since then, Croatia has made significant progress in all of the five above-mentioned sectors: politics, economy, defence, military, security, finance and legislature.

Through the mechanisms of partnership, Croatia has been preparing itself to work with NATO and to work within NATO. Necessary arrangements have been made to facilitate communication and cooperation. Today, Croatia has a sizeable Mission to NATO as well as NATO departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Almost 200 soldiers participate in ISAF (Afghanistan), the most significant NATO mission to date.

Being a member of the Alliance means being able to work together, support the others and take joint actions. Within the framework of the Membership Action Plan, Croatia is cooperating with Albania and Macedonia, tied together with the mentoring of the United States. The members of the Adriatic Three (a colloquial name for this group) value this cooperation as a training for the future membership in NATO. One of the achievements of A3 cooperation is their joint three-nation medical team deployed in Afghanistan. This model of “training for the Alliance” could serve as an example for future aspirant countries.

**Acting as a Member of the Alliance**

Probably the best example of how much Croatia has achieved in the last fifteen years refers to its participation in the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, Croatia was consuming security. In Afghanistan, it became a security provider.

The evolution of Croatian engagement in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the effect of NATO mentoring and the reforms which were undertaken. Providing security for reconstruction and development efforts, Croatia has steadily increased the number of troops deployed since it started participating in the operation ISAF in February 2003. The first contingent was a military police platoon, fifty men strong, deployed in Kabul. Less than two years later, civilian elements were sent to Afghanistan as well - one diplomat and two police officers to serve in a *Provincial Reconstruction Team*. In addition, four medical personnel were sent to a joint Albanian, Croatian and Macedonian medical unit. Later on, an additional force protection unit and mobile obser-
vation teams were added to the Croatian contingent.

Recognising the importance of Afghan-owned efforts and the need for capacity building, Croatia is also contributing to the priority task of mentoring and training the Afghan National Army. In the second half of 2006, Croatian Operation Mentoring and Liaison Teams were deployed with their ANA units to support critical efforts of ISAF in the south of the country. In addition to training, the Government of Croatia has decided to donate weapons and ammunition to help equip the Afghan National Army.

The number of almost 200 men and women deployed in three regional commands in Afghanistan makes Croatia the second largest Partner contributor to the ISAF operation. In 2008, this number will increase to 300 soldiers deployed, as already decided by the Croatian Parliament.

**Regional Outreach**

Afghanistan is important as a symbol of Croatia’s transition from a security consumer to a security provider. Also, participation in ISAF puts Croatia in the context of global security and responsible burden-sharing. However, real security for states like Croatia will always be regional in nature.

Projecting security to the region, Croatia is bilaterally engaged with Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, providing expertise and advice on defence reforms. In the framework of NATO, Croatia is a co-lead nation in a trust fund for Bosnia & Herzegovina, helping to downsize their armed forces, in the same manner Croatia made the social transition in the post-war period.

Projecting security is not only about defence and the military. It is about economy and politics as well. By becoming a member of CEFTA in 2002, the Republic of Croatia confirmed its readiness to contribute to the enhancement of economic relations between the member countries and political stability in the area of South Eastern Europe. During the chairmanship, Croatia initiated the modernisation and enlargement of CEFTA agreement to include Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania and other countries of the region.

In the past 12 months, Croatia chaired SEECP (South-East European Co-operation Process). During that challenging time, foundations for a new regional architecture were laid with the transition of the Stability Pact to the Regional Cooperation Council, reaffirming regional ownership of cooperation in Southeast Europe.

In 2007, Croatia took over the chairmanship of SEEGROUP for the second time. SEEGROUP was established as part of the NATO South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). Its task is to support regional practical co-operation in the area of security and defence, as well as to improve harmonisation and coordination among the regional countries. Before Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina joined Partnership for Peace, SEEGROUP was their only institutionalised interface for
communication with NATO member states on a regular basis. Croatia welcomes the increasing interest of Allies for the work of SEEGROUP and will support its further enlargement.

**Free in Europe and Safe in NATO**

This article started with a description of Croatia in war and ended with a description of Croatia contributing to and promoting regional and global security. The road was long and winding, but the results are here. It would be unjust to attribute this transformation to anyone else than to the citizens of Croatia who have carried the burden of reforms. However, it would be equally unjust not to acknowledge the role of organisations such as NATO in that process, because transforming defence meant transforming the very core of society.

In the early 1990s, Croatia was dreaming to be free in Europe and safe in NATO. Today, with both feet on the ground, it can rightfully claim its place in the Euro-Atlantic community.
The Strategic Security and Defence Interests of EU and NATO

Ulrich Kleppmann

1In the past, the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU never bore much significance as there was a clear division of roles. The USA, with its atomic superiority, guaranteed the protection of Europe, while Europe guaranteed Americans greater freedom in decision making.

European Failures

The first attempt at a collective organisation of security, the European Defence Community (EDC), failed in 1954 before the French National Assembly. It was supposed to have an institutional structure separate from the European Coal and Steel Community, with a common European army. Preparations had gone so far that details such as the appearance of the uniform and the ranks were discussed.

After the EDC, there was the Fouchet Plan, advocating a European political union. The initiator of this proposal was the French president De Gaulle, who planned the integration of the existing European Community into a superimposed political union. The states again recognised the necessity to separate political and economic integration. France could not accept that: the European political Union failed.

European political cooperation was achieved much later with the Luxembourg Reports (1969). On the grounds of previous experiences, a decision was made that the development of European political cooperation should advance along with the economy-oriented Community.

Belated Awareness and Development

In the early 1990s, many people in Europe and North America considered that the time had come to balance the relationship between the European allies and the USA. The European allies needed and wanted to take greater responsibility for the common security and defence in order to alleviate the burden on the USA and to strengthen

1 image: www.zanato.com
the alliance in general. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) established for the first time the responsibility of the EU for all issues of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy. The EU was to be able in future to charge the West Europe Union (WEU) with planning and conducting military operations. Until that time, the WEU, as the “European pillar” of the North Atlantic Alliance, played no substantial role. In addition, the WEU was firmly integrated in the EU as its ten members were also members of the EU. The purpose of such integration was to network the political accomplishment of the goals with the application of military means. With the Petersburg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, combat engagements in crisis management, including peace-making measures) the EU was to face the problems on its own doorstep, as well as become a global player.

Another essential problem was to be resolved. The EU, i.e., the WEU, had no military infrastructure as no parallel structure was constructed in the past fifty years. The armies of the EU member countries were integrated in NATO. On the grounds of the decisions made at the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin, preparations were made to allow the WEU access to NATO military means and capacities for WEU-led operations. This happened once agreement was reached that the WEU would carry out independent actions only when NATO would not be able to or would not wish to act. With the access of the WEU to NATO military means and capacities, the WEU was to be enabled to be in a position to carry out operations independently without having to create new (double) military means and capacities, existing within NATO.

With the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Petersburg Tasks of the WEU became part of the EU Treaty. At the EU Summit in Cologne (June 1999), a decision was made whereby the EU was given at its disposal the necessary means and capacities to carry out the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). This was welcomed by NATO and it was declared that NATO would undertake the required preparations in order to facilitate EU’s access to the collective means and capacities of the Alliance for operations where the Alliance was not militarily engaged as a whole. With the Marseilles Decision of November 2000, the WEU abolished its operative activity. One month later, the European Council in Nice and the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in Brussels both confirmed their support for achieving the goal of a strategic partnership between the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU in the area of conflict prevention and crisis resolution.

As international institutions, the EU and NATO have common strategic security and defence interests - common members and common borders.

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2 The background was the knowledge that Europeans should be in a position to act independently if there are crisis developments, in particular, in the European area - e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the Europeans - with the exception of the British - did not follow and support the Americans in the Second Gulf War.

3 The Petersburg tasks were established in 1992 on the European Council Summit.
make for common interests\(^4\). In order to be able to coordinate their common security and defence interests, on 13 December 2002, NATO and the EU agreed on a strategic partnership with the Common Declaration for a European Security and Defence Policy.

The key points of this strategic partnership are the following:

- NATO stays responsible for the collective defence of all members part of the North Atlantic Alliance.
- The EU, to date, has not undertaken the responsibility for the collective defence of its members, however, this is not excluded for the future.
- Both NATO and the EU may carry out military operations for conflict prevention or crisis resolution, and they reserve this prerogative. NATO and the EU have agreed that the EU will decide to undertake military operations only in the event when NATO as a whole will not act.
- In the event of an EU led operation, the EU will have access to the military means and capacities of NATO.
- Regular consultation between NATO and the EU on all security and defence issues.
- The purpose of the strategic partnership is the further development of the EU in the area of foreign affairs, security and defence by strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance, and thereby the Alliance as a whole.

On 17 March 2003, NATO and the EU signed an agreement giving substance to the support of NATO to the European Security and Defence Policy. This agreement approved the EU’s secure access to NATO’s planning capacities. (Planning EU led operations by the NATO General Headquarters).

The EU undertook its first responsibility in mid March 2003 following the Berlin-plus\(^5\) agreements with the Concordia mission to Macedonia. After the completion of the NATO-led operations in Bosnia (SFOR), in the beginning of December 2004, the EU continued the management of the Althea operation with the support of NATO means and capacities - currently it is the EUFOR military peace-keeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with approximately 7,500 soldiers).

**EU and NATO:**

**Strong (Only) Together**

“No double structures” is the slogan of the European Security and Defence policy. What NATO already has in terms of planning institutions and capacities, the EU need not recreate. Therefore, these two organisations have close cooperation.

The European Union has already proved its capability of acting in four missions\(^6\). What started ten years ago

\(^4\) 19 EU members are NATO members, and ten of them are members of the West European Union (WEU), the European pillar in NATO.

\(^5\) On 17th March 2003, NATO and the EU adopted the so-called Berlin-plus agreements. They are the basis for military action on the part of the EU in the event of non-action by NATO. This arranges the relationship between these two organisations and it prevents the unnecessary overlapping of resources.

\(^6\) Althea in B&H, Concordia and Proxima in MK, EU Mission to Congo.
as a first step of military and political cooperation, has since continuously developed and proved a big success in practice.

NATO, too, can be pleased when they are replaced by the EU in certain missions, such as the one in Congo. Congo was of essential interest to Europeans as most European development and assistance funds were invested there. There may be a division of responsibilities in future, too. NATO and the EU were and still are interdependent.
Macedonia on Its Way to NATO

Metodi Hadzi-Janev

The tectonic changes that transpired with the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism have shaken the Balkans to a large extent. In a grim environment caused by “demons of the past”, the decision to continue outside the former federation was a serious security issue for Macedonia. The ideas tinted with the nostalgia of the former system for non-alliance soon grew into an idea for neutrality that was to make Macedonia the Switzerland of the Balkans. Faced with reality, such ideas became history, and the entire political elite turned to membership with the Euro-Atlantic structures, NATO and the EU. The aspirations for membership of the Alliance imposed the need to meet NATO standards. At the same time, the dynamics of security events greatly influenced the redefinition of NATO’s priorities and role in the Alliance itself. Therefore, the impressions that most post-communist countries had, that the criteria for NATO membership mean solely reforms in defence, were quickly changed. After tackling the challenges of the 2001 conflict, the Republic of Macedonia started striding towards NATO. There were marked results in all areas in the reforms to approximate NATO standards. Nevertheless, it is a common opinion that Macedonia has achieved the best reform results in defence, and according to some analyses, the transformation in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia and the implementation of NATO standards and procedures is even ahead of some of the newly admitted NATO members. The recognition and success of Macedonian soldiers supporting operations in Afghanistan, or those part of the NATO countries in the Coalition of Will in Iraq, are a worthy example in this view.

NATO and Enlargement

At first, the fall of the Eastern block caused a vacuum that raised the issue of the need for the further operation of the Alliance. The qualms about the further existence of NATO were soon resolved by recognising the need that NATO should become an organisation contributing to strengthening and keeping world peace and security and democratic values. This implicitly dictated the need for NATO enlargement with new members.

Still, this awareness did not mean that NATO itself had had such experience. After the Madrid Summit in 1997,
when the three aspiring countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) were invited to join the Alliance, NATO faced serious challenges. The greatest difficulties that enlargement stumbled upon were adapting the new procedures in the organisation and the operation of the new members, not only with respect to the standards they did not have, but also for taking on the new security challenges. Following such an experience, it became clear that additional measures must be undertaken to facilitate future members’ attainment of the required standards. At the next summit, in Washington in 1999, when the aspirants became full-fledged members, the Membership Action Plan was declared. Envisaged as a practical manifestation of the open doors policy, the MAP became a facility for measuring the progress of countries aspiring to full-fledged membership. The 2002 Prague Summit, the 2004 Istanbul Summit and the most recent one in Tallinn, where the heads of states and governments redefined the open doors criteria and policy, were additional checkpoints for the MAP.

The MAP rests on four pillars:

- annual national programmes (covering political, economic, defence, security and legal aspects of the efforts and preparations for membership);
- feedback facilities (intended to control, evaluate and assess progress by parallel application of techniques for political and expert advice);
- the Clearinghouse process (intended to coordinate the assistance coming from NATO and individual member countries) and
- enhancing defence planning (which includes an analysis of achieved agreed targets, especially in the military preparations of membership aspirants).

If we carefully look at the core of the MAP process and, especially, following the redefinition of criteria and priorities in the alliance, it becomes clear that the Action Plan is no longer an issue for the ministers of defence and foreign affairs only, but one for the other structures of the candidate country as well. Therefore, a plan was developed establishing inter-ministerial cooperation with aspirant countries at the national level.

The Progress of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO

The MAP process is not recent for the Republic of Macedonia. To date, we have had seven annual national programmes. The progress in the quality of annual national programmes is more than evident. While it is possible to comment that initially there was a lack of clearly set objectives, set deadlines for achieving them and an adequate budget construction, from 2006 on, such remarks are no longer valid. This is to a certain degree due to the improved coordination among state administration authorities involved in its implementation.
Adhering to the Action Plan guidelines, the annual national programmes are divided into several chapters.

Chapter One focuses on political and economic reform. In this context, Macedonia is finalising the legal implementation of the Framework Agreement. Although, to an extent, this process was blocked by DUI’s leaving Parliament, it seems that the dialogue that the Government has managed to kick-start gives hope for taking things towards the desired objective. Completing the laws required to enable the unhindered legal application of the Framework Agreement is yet another step in taking reforms in this area in a good direction. The equitable representation of ethnic minorities in the public administration, primarily the Albanian and Turkish ethnicities, are another measure demonstrating the resolve to succeed. In defence (e.g. the Army of the Republic of Macedonia), required percentages have been fully met, and even exceeded in certain categories. In special units, too, there has been tangible progress, commending the creativity of the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters in developing a programme to stimulate ethnic minorities to enlist in the army and in particular, the special units.

The takeover of the state border by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the reforms in the police - partially under the supervision of PROXIMA - were another step taking Macedonia closer to NATO.

The enhancement of the capacity of the State Election Commission and the implementation of the comments ODIHR made in the last local elections were fully tested and encouraged in the last parliamentary elections in 2006, when the best elections to date were organised.

With its active policy of good neighbourly relations and the establishment of real cooperation with its neighbours, the Republic of Macedonia became a leader in this field, which is a key element of the newest set of NATO membership standards. Even though the issue of the name of the country is a sore spot in building relations with our southern neighbour, NATO’s approach and policy concerning this issue have made it clear that it will not influence Macedonia’s membership in NATO.

The analyses and surveys related to the public opinion on membership in NATO are overwhelmingly pro-NATO, since NATO membership is expected to improve the economic situation in the country. Even though certain structures have raised doubts about the citizens’ awareness of NATO expectations, we must underline the fact that such expectations are both logical and realistic. Considering events in the region (full-fledged membership of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU), as well as the security guarantee that Macedonia will obtain by entering NATO, the large number of companies looking to invest in cheap labour regions will surely find their business interest in the country. The good infrastructure in the country, confirmed by the drastic rise in the value of stocks on the Macedonian stock market (which is
merely a result of retrieving the true valuation of companies, which they had prior to the abysmal privatisation), is a lure to complete the picture of public expectation. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia has followed suit with the reforms it has undertaken to create a favourable business climate for foreign investment. We will thus start reducing the high unemployment rate, which is one of the economic remarks that has been made by the Alliance and is on the agenda of the new NATO enlargement policy.

Completing the reform of the judiciary - which is now accelerated - is still a chief challenge for Macedonia, as well as continuing the fight against corruption. The State Commission for Preventing Corruption and the Directorate for Preventing Money Laundering have been given a key role. There has also been a step forward in regulating crisis situations, which was monitored by the NATO Headquarters in Macedonia. A Law on Crisis Management has been enacted, giving rise to bylaws for joint and strictly defined action of the army and the police on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. According to the Guidelines signed by the ministers of defence and internal affairs, a joint exercise of the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs has been scheduled for the middle of this year.

Regarding the reforms that the Republic of Macedonia has been undertaking with a view to NATO membership, we may conclude that there has been manifest progress in all areas. Nevertheless, defence reforms are our prized asset. It is something about which the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters of the Army can boast of that they have gone even further than the most recent NATO members.

**Defence Reforms: Our Prized Asset**

In conformity with the guidelines outlined in Chapter Two of the Action Plan, the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia have prepared a Strategic Defence Overview, stipulating strict deadlines for meeting projected commitments. It also includes the complete transformation of the Army, now at its final stage (all regular units have gone through transformation and promotion). Far from a simple process, this has resulted in staff cuts and termination of certain formation units, aiming to build a small, mobile and expeditious army. In western armies there is a trend of lowering the retirement age for military staff. In addition to this measure, in order to successfully adapt the staff to the novelties, we have undertaken the Fan Programme, intended to adapt military staff more easily and simply to professions in civil areas.

The SDO was also the source of the White Paper, wherein the Ministry of Defence presents the future plans and steps publicly and transparently. However, this document is important for the
practical implementation of the SDO. The reduction in staff through the Fan Programme, for example, is nothing more than carrying out plans. The operationalisation of set targets to standardise micromanagement in defence according to NATO procedures has been concluded with the standardisation in macromanagement. In this context, we have announced increased participation in NATO led operations, which is also underway. In Afghanistan, in addition to the infantry unit within the German forces, we have dispatched an infantry company under British command. At the same time, we have missions in Iraq and Bosnia, where, in addition to medical staff, we have combat units as well. The special units, for instance, still carry out high-risk operations in the nations building system in Iraq, and their results are confirmed by the recognitions that Macedonian soldiers have been given. This is further evidence, and possibly the firmest one, that Macedonia is ready to take high risks, the kind that NATO membership imposes. The most recent relaxation of national restrictions, which have created a public vacuum, are the result of such determination.

This bears further importance, as at the latest NATO summit one of the major remarks of the US President was the need for more aggressive and more decisive steps to be undertaken in tackling modern threats. Considering the new role that NATO has assumed, as well as the danger of modern terrorism and its modes of operation, it is more than clear that a reactive approach to fighting terrorism would benefit only terrorism itself. Instead, a proactive approach with a high degree of professionalism and observance of attained values in the area of human rights is something that NATO should strive for if it is to endure in fighting the new threats. In other words, the only purpose served by national restrictions is the passive participation in NATO’s efforts. Bearing this in mind, as well as the missions that Macedonian soldiers are involved in, the conclusion that in certain areas defence is on a par with the most elite NATO armed forces is tenable. This is confirmed not only by recognitions, but also by the statements made by the former and new US Secretaries of Defence, who receive such information from their commanders on the field. One may seek no better argument for compatibility than work on the field.

In addition to this area, the defence progress towards NATO, influenced by other areas as well, is also evident in the resources issue. Let us recall that NATO’s resources concerns were due to the need for NATO to make sure that by obtaining membership the aspirant country would be capable of undertaking the commitments immediately following its entry. The allocations of 2.3%-2.6% of the GDP for the defence are in the top bracket as compared to some applicant countries, and even some member countries. Furthermore, their allocation of approximately 50% for salaries, 30% for maintenance and
operations, and 20% for renewal is in compliance with the standards required by NATO. This process is a result of the changes put in motion by the Law on Defence and the Law on Military Service in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia. These modern laws have, among other things, made a step forward in decentralising staff management. This alone takes care of one of the major remarks about the underlined politicising of the administration and the executive authorities. The Minister of Defence, for instance, is authorised to appoint officers only with the colonel rank, while all lower ranked officers are appointed by the Chief of the General Staff or by the appropriate senior officers. Generals, including the Chief of the General Staff, are appointed by the president of the country.

The Law on Classified Information and the establishment of the Directorate for Security of Classified Information as an independent agency of the state administration have ironed out the problem of Macedonia’s standardisation in, perhaps, one of the most sensitive areas for any coalition or partnership - information exchange. In this context, the number of persons with NATO security certificates has been increased, indirectly indicating that the trust in the executive branches of defence has increased. The Directorate makes numerous efforts to enhance INFOSEK, related to the process of security accreditation of national networks, accrediting NATO classified information.

Finally, the reforms in defence clearly testify to the firm determination regarding the entry into NATO and the legal regulations. Realistically speaking, there is no constitutional or legal obstacle to membership in NATO. What is more, the provision of the Law on Defence (which will enter into force with the membership of NATO) stipulating that decisions for dispatching peace missions shall be adopted by the Government, rather than the Parliament, is a most clear signal of our resolve to join NATO.

What we must focus on is completing reforms. In other words, we should aim at enabling independent operation, i.e., full logistic independence. This would demonstrate maturity and minimise the possibilities for manoeuvring and remarks for possible failures. This must not, however, be read as a sense of being unwanted since, at the end of the day, the readiness for membership depends on us and our will for changes.

Irrespective of everything, we must conclude that there are still challenges that, though at the stage of resolution, must be resolved by the end of the year. The reforms in personnel management (retirement for some of the older staff), perhaps the most painful of them all, are pending and everyone is expectant. It remains to be seen by the end of the year whether they will be crucial to a full completion of the defence reforms. The fact that the reforms will continue following entry into NATO is a result of the experience of past enlargements - an indirect guarantee for hope.
Furthermore, we will learn better by doing rather than by just watching. Although it may not be something to boast about, doing homework under foreign control is our strength. Without meaning to sound philosophical, sometimes that works, too. Finally, what we must conclude is that Macedonia deserves a realistic chance for entry into NATO.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO

The developments in the years immediately following the conclusion of World War II, instead of leading to the strengthening of peace and the start of economic reconstruction of torn down Europe, brought about more intensive antagonism of political, ideological, and economic differences between the Western European countries and the USA, on one hand, and the former Soviet Union, on the other. The initiative and the developments that led to the establishment of NATO were primarily motivated by the political and security interests of the Western European countries to form a political and security alliance in order to prevent the spreading of the danger of Communism, and the possible aggression by the former Soviet Union and the countries under its influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The events in Europe in the second half of the 1940s have substantially accelerated the process of political and security integration of the Western European countries. In March 1948, five Western European Countries - Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom - signed the Brussels Treaty, confirming their determination to develop a common defence system and enhance their relations in a way that would allow them to tackle the ideological, political and military threats to their security.

Part of the Brussels Treaty was the first step in the process that led to the creation of the North Atlantic alliance. What followed were negotiations with the USA and Canada for establishing a single North Atlantic alliance, based on security guarantees and mutual assistance between Europe and North America. These negotiations were finalised by signing the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - NATO - producing a common security system based on the partnership of the member countries. In addition to the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, the Washington Treaty was also signed by: the USA, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal, as the 12 founding members of NATO. The North Atlantic alliance was established upon a multilateral international treaty among several countries, and it is the constitutional act of the Organisation, the treaty that is the legal basis for the alliance, as well as a treaty concluded in accordance with the UN Charter. In
terms of structure, the Treaty has 14 articles stipulating the goals of the Alliance, and the mechanisms for achieving those goals. The Washington Treaty has been concluded voluntarily, following a public debate, and as a result of a parliamentary procedure in each and every of these countries. The Treaty respects their individual rights, as well as their individual duties pursuant to the UN Charter. It obliges each member country to share the risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits of the collective security; it also requires them not to enter into any other international treaty that could be in conflict with this Treaty. According to the Treaty, NATO is an intergovernmental organisation where member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence.

The primary objective of NATO is to defend the freedom and security of all its member countries with political and military means, pursuant to the Washington Treaty and the principles of the UN Charter. Since its beginning, NATO has been working on establishing a just and permanent order for peace in Europe, based on the common democratic values: human rights and the rule of law. NATO protects the shared values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and peaceful conflict resolution, and it promotes these values in the North Atlantic area. The fundamental principle of NATO is the common effort for mutual cooperation among member countries, based on the mutual connection of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within NATO ensure that no member country is forced to rely on its own national efforts in handling security challenges. Without depriving member countries of their right and duties to take their sovereign duties in the field of defence, NATO allows them to achieve their primary national security objectives through collective efforts. The rationale of equal security of NATO members, regardless of the differences in their conditions or their national ability, contributes to the stability in the North Atlantic area. NATO creates conditions supporting enhanced cooperation among the member countries, as well as among NATO members and other countries. The means with which NATO conducts its security policy involve the maintenance of sufficient military ability for preventing wars and for effective defence, as well as for a general capacity to deal with crises affecting the security of NATO member countries, and for actively promoting a dialogue with other countries and cooperation within European security. In order to accomplish its purpose, NATO enables member countries to consult each other on issues they choose to pose and debate on, on political and military issues affecting their security. NATO is an organisation of free states united in their determination to protect their security by common borders and stable relations with other countries. NATO is determined to protect its member countries from aggression or threat of aggression, pursuant to Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, stipulating that the military attack on any member country shall be considered an attack on all the member countries.

NATO has developed a structure enabling and ensuring the accomplishment of its goal. The structures created within NATO enable member countries to coordinate their policies in order to meet fundamental tasks. They ensure continuous consultation and cooperation at the political, economic and other levels, as well as formulation of common plans for common defence, consultation on security issues of common interest and undertaking joint action as a response, establishment of infrastructure and basic installations in institutions necessary for military structures to act, and agreements for joint programmes for training and exercise. The support for these activities is provided and afforded by complex civilian and military structures and facilities, including administrative, budget and planning HQs, as well as agencies established by the NATO member countries in order to coordinate the work in specialised areas; for instance, the communications required to help in political consultation, the command and control of military forces, as well as the logistic support required for maintaining the military forces.

The main NATO institutions for policy and decision making are: the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). NATO comprises civilian organisation and structures, and military organisation and structures. The civilian organisation and structures comprise: the permanent representatives and national delegations, the Secretary General, the International Headquarters, the personal cabinet, the cabinet of the Secretary General, the Executive Secretariat, the Information and Press Office, the NATO Security Office, the Sector for Political Affairs, the Sector for Defence Planning and Operations, the Sector for Defence Support, the headquarters in the NATO HQ for consultation, command and control, the Sector for investing in security, logistics and planning non-military emergencies, the Sector for issues in science and the environment, the Administrative Office, the Office of the Financial Controller, the Office of the Chairman of the High Board for Resources, the Office of the Chairman of the budget committees, the International Board of Auditors, the NATO organisations for manufacturing and logistics, and a number of other groups and committees within the structure of NATO. There are a number of other programmes, organisations, agencies and bodies as an integral part of the NATO structure, performing specialised operations in separate specific areas.

The military organisations and structures comprise: the Military Committee, Strategic Commanders, the International Military HQ, representatives of partner countries. The multinational military structures provide joint planning, training, exercises and
operations under the command of the NATO strategic commanders. The military command is in a transformation and reorganisation process, aiming to make NATO a global entity against the challenges and threats of the new millennium, to improve its military effectiveness in order to contribute efficiently to the protection of the peace, security and territorial integrity of the member countries, to be able to provide support for NATO operations, to transform it into a more flexible, sustainable, agile and trustworthy organisation.

The NATO structure includes the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), the Interallied Confederation Reserve Officers (CIOR), the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (CIOMR).

The NATO HQ is in Brussels, Belgium. The NATO emblem is a circle with a compass in the middle. The circle symbolises unity and cooperation, while the compass suggests the common path to peace that NATO member countries have taken. The emblem was accepted as the symbol of NATO by the North Atlantic Council in October 1953. The official languages are English and French. NATO is an international and intergovernmental organisation where decisions are made jointly by the member countries with consensus. Like any other international organisation, NATO, too, in order to be able to function, has a defined financing system. According to a determined formula, the member countries allocate financial means to the budget (there is a civilian and a military budget), funds used as expenses to finance the operation of NATO.

The end of the Cold War and the changed security environment in Europe saw NATO commence the process of internal and external transformation, including further enlargement, partnership relations and cooperation with other countries, rearranging military structures to adapt them and enable them to handle various threats and crisis situations in future, and to preserve peace in the North Atlantic area. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, as the sole security structure in Europe, was able to play an important role in ensuring and guaranteeing the peace and stable development of the democratic transformation of the former communist countries in Europe.

This has led to the creation of new institutions when in December 1991, immediately following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established as a consultation forum bringing together NATO member countries and countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In May 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was formed as a follow-up of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, as a forum for regular consultation, dialogue and cooperation among the NATO member countries and the partner countries. One of NATO's big initiatives
was the Partnership for Peace (PfP), initiated at the Brussels Summit in January 1994. The Partnership for Peace is a programme for bilateral cooperation between a given partner country and NATO. The purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to strengthen the stability and security in the whole of Europe. The invitation to take part in the Partnership for Peace was sent out to all member countries in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, i.e., later of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as to the countries taking part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), i.e., later the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which wanted to contribute to the programme. The activities to be carried out by the members of the Partnership for Peace in their cooperation with NATO are defined in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace. There is a procedure for acceding countries in the Partnership for Peace, there are defined areas of cooperation, and an entire structure of activities within the Partnership for Peace. The number of member countries in the Partnership for Peace changes, and today it involves: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Finland, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

One of the most important features of NATO since its formation has been the enlargement process, a process particularly current today, in the context of its overall process of transformation. NATO’s first enlargement happened in 1952 with the accession of Greece and Turkey, the second enlargement was the membership of Germany in 1955 (in 1990, with the unification of Germany, the former Democratic Republic of Germany was included in the security protection of NATO as a constituent part of unified Germany), the third enlargement was the accession of Spain in 1982, the fourth with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, and the fifth with Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004. The NATO enlargement process is not over; in the following years NATO plans to invite other countries to enlarge the membership of the organisation with new member countries. Therefore, a country wishing to become a member of NATO must meet certain political, economic and military criteria, all in order to ensure that this country would contribute to the security system of NATO, as well as use its benefits. For this reason, there is the Membership Action Plan (MAP), designed to help aspiring countries by advice, assistance and practical support in their preparations for NATO membership.

The process of transformation represented by opening up NATO and the established partnership and cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) of NATO and Russia, and the
NATO and Ukraine Commission (NUC); by developing the Mediterranean dialogue through the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) with a number of countries in the region in order to improve the security and stability in the Mediterranean, which is directly related to security in Europe; by developing and strengthening the cooperation and partnership with the countries in Southeast Europe and developing the Istanbul initiative for cooperation. NATO is dedicated to the activities for strengthening and developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), to the cooperation with the West European Union (WEU) and to strengthening the relations, cooperation and strategic partnership with the European Union.

In its operation, the organisation is dedicated to conducting policies and undertaking activities regarding the control of armament and the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the control of conventional armament and disarmament, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, as the nature of threats changes, peace-keeping methods must change accordingly. NATO adjusts its defence capacities to modern threats by adapting existing forces and developing new ones, a many-sided approach to tackling terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other security threats.

NATO has played an important role in resolving the military crisis in former Yugoslavia, i.e., in the peace processes and the stabilisation of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the IFOR (December 1995 - December 1996) and SFOR (December 1996 - December 2004) missions; in Kosovo, through political activities and the military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from March to June 1999, as well as through the current KFOR mission set up in June 1999. In Macedonia, it was present through the following missions: Essential Harvest (August - September 2001), Amber Fox (September 2001 - December 2002) and the Allied Harmony (December 2002 - March 2003).

Faced with new threats, the main activities of NATO for the future are undertaking and taking part in new military operations and missions, and taking part in the global fight against terrorism even outside the North Atlantic area. The Organisation carries out this determination through its participation and leadership in the ISAF operation (International Stabilisation Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, aiming to recover stability and peace in the country. In August 2003, NATO took over the command and control of the ISAF mission - it is the first mission in the history of NATO to go beyond the North Atlantic area.

In August 2004, in response to the request by the Interim Government of Iraq, NATO established a Training Implementation Mission in Iraq to help Iraq in building government capacities to respond to the security needs of the Iraqi people. NATO does this by training, equipment and non-military technical assistance.

At the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002, the Organisation started a process of modernisation, designed to ensure that NATO is able to face effectively the threats and challenges of the 21st century. This process of strengthening continues after the NATO summits in Istanbul in 2004 and in Riga in 2006.
Stateless War:
A New Challenge for NATO

“In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting nonstate opponents... Almost everywhere, the state is losing.”

William Lind

The end of the Cold War led a number of researchers on both sides of the Atlantic to anticipate the end of NATO, arguing that without a common threat, the Alliance becomes obsolete. Some American NATO-skeptics have stated that membership in the Alliance has become an unnecessary burden for the States and that any international organization impedes the US in promoting its national interests abroad. Some Eurocentrics, on the other side, have called for greater self-sufficiency of the European Union, mainly in terms of defense and security, if it is to become an independent equal partner to the US in international politics; some even advocate an exit from the Alliance, fearing to become an instrument of American foreign policy.

However, this is not the first internal crisis NATO has faced and managed to live through. As Ryan Hendrickson shows, the Alliance has already passed through several serious and numerous minor crises since its conception and has overcome them all, proving that “NATO’s ability to successfully address transatlantic discord suggests a pattern of dispute resolution and effective adaptation.” Still, each crisis stretched NATO between the poles of unilateralism and united alliance, and by each adaptation, the organisation had to be redefined to some degree, distancing its mission and structure from the original concept of security-provider for the primary member-states.

In 1991, in response to its post-Cold War “identity crisis,” NATO markedly populated its security agenda with

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4 Hendrickson names three major pre-Cold War crises: 1956 Suez Canal crisis, the 1966 France withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military commands, de Gaulle’s demand to remove NATO headquarters and military installations from their territory, and the 1986 US bombing of Libya. Also, the allies had disagreements over European defence spending levels, the Vietnam War, Germany’s Ostpolitik foreign policy, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the American military invasions of Grenada and Panama, the deployment of American missiles in Europe, etc. Post-Cold War crises include Afghanistan 2001, Turkey 2003, and Iraq 2003. (Ryan C. Hendrickson. “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death” US Army War College: Parameters, vol 37, issue 1 (spring 2007): 103).

5 “Thus, it is a stretch to be nostalgic about NATO’s ‘commonly’ shared vision during the Cold War. NATO’s history is replete with profound transatlantic differences and internal debates, which the allies overcame...” (Hendrickson 2007).

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democratization, humanitarian actions and peacekeeping. It began addressing conflict prevention and crisis management issues; it extended its diplomatic outreach and military partnerships to Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance was active in Bosnia and in Kosovo. The 9/11 presented the most striking, although, some would say, not the deepest, of the recent crises. It prompted the US to soon initiate an overhaul of NATO’s raison d’être, its mission, structure and strategy. “Fighting terror” was promoted as the new common ground for more countries than the Alliance had ever included. The notion of security changed, as the major NATO players felt the spillover effects of violence from distant conflicts, poverty and political turmoil.

In the past decade, NATO has redefined security within a broad notion that interconnects political, economic and defence components. The growing significance of terrorism and stateless wars have prompted Heads of Member-States to endorse the Comprehensive Political Guidance in 2006, which “recognises that for the foreseeable future, the principal threats to the Alliance are international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction... as well as instability caused by failed or failing states; regional crises; misuse of new technologies...” Clearly, intercepting such threats must extend both on the territories of the Member-States and the remote areas of crisis and conflict. The shift of interest away from the Allies’ territories is symptomatic of the current endeavor to restructure NATO according to present and future challenges. The Alliance is now involved in six “remote” missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, Bosnia, Iraq and Sudan. Is this sufficient? How successful can it be in respect to the type of violence at place in the target countries?

**Stateless Wars**

“... we live in an interdependent world, where we cannot maintain security merely through the protection of borders; where states no longer control what happens within their borders; and where old-fashioned war between states has become anachronistic. Today states ... function in a world shaped less by military power than by complex political processes involving international institutions, multinational corporations, citizens’ groups and, indeed, fundamentalists and terrorists—in short, global politics.”

Mary Kaldor

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6 Russia and China, for their own reasons and in their own way, willingly joined the call for global “war on terror.” In a different context, it should be noted that non-NATO members, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and India, support NATO-led international engagements and have contributed to peacekeeping operations in crisis areas.


9 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; the Kosovo Force (KFOR); Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean; NATO Headquarters – Sarajevo; the NATO Training Mission in Iraq and support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.

The terrorist attacks on the main Member-States' territories may be merely the peak of the iceberg that endangers the security of the Allies. A relatively new phenomenon, a particular type of warfare, emerged under the familiar outlines of local civil wars of exhausting length and non-dramatic number of casualties in the remote areas of the world.

According to recent studies,\(^\text{11}\) the end of the Cold War is simultaneous to a change in global tendencies of warfare: interstate conflicts have dropped in number, while intrastate and regional conflicts have taken up an upward trajectory. “More important, however, the nature of wars has changed,” claims Kaldor\(^\text{12}\). Scholars address this phenomenon within a theoretical framework of the so-called “new,” “post-modern” or “Fourth Generation” wars.” The classical notion of “international conflict” refers to interstate wars. However, these “new” wars are international without states for significant players. The super- and sub-state levels where these wars function, as well as the increasing role of non-state actors, suggest the name of “stateless wars,” a term I shall propose and justify in this article.

Briefly, the patterns and character of these wars include: continuous low-intensity conflicts spread over shifting territory regardless to state boundaries; duration over decades, with irregular upsurges and temporary ceasefires which follow social exhaustion rather than victory or defeat; sustenance by illicit war economy; international linkages; and, general irrelevance of state institutions, multilateral and international organizations in their suppression. Sample cases include Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, some Caucasus conflicts, etc., with the most recent case of Iraq showing traits of increasing statelessness of warfare.

The growing involvement of NATO on territories other than those of its member-states prompts us to examine the patterns of emergence, maintenance and quelling of this new type of warfare. We shall see how the nature of stateless wars renders them resilient to uprooting by force, although military action may be a necessary component in their prevention and pacification. It is worthwhile noting that terrorism prospers on the same roots as stateless wars, and the most effective prevention strategy in the “war on terror,” or rather “peace, prosperity and politics,” may show identical to stateless war prevention.

**Violent Entrepreneurs International**

The term “new wars” may be misleading, as there is not much difference how wars were fought in the history of pre-state warfare compared to contemporary conflicts. Their roots, unsurprisingly, lie in poverty, inequality,
and political dissatisfaction. Massive availability of cheap or for-free combatants with nothing to lose and everything to gain (livelihood, social position, power, voice) from war makes continuous conflict desirable. The relative novelty of stateless wars is, primarily and ultimately, what the fight is for. Unlike classical wars, whose aims could be legitimate (such as territorial control, state-making, violent promotion of ideologies, protection of indigenous human rights), the aim of the new warfare, however, is profit.

A growing body of scholarly texts observe that some side-effects of the recently intensified global connectivity influence the structure of contemporary warfare, its actors and agendas: economic benefit takes precedence over the “old war” goals. The main distinctive feature of stateless wars is the symbiosis of violence and profit. Conventional “old” wars are distinguishable by a prevalent (although non-exclusive) feature of “governmental” and “not-(mainly)-for-profit” violence. They also presuppose the existence of states and typically seek to establish a new state or to consolidate existent state power. The old-war limits, in terms of time, scope and enemy, are defined by geopolitical aims, territory and borders. Although old-war goals may still be publicly promoted by new-war parties, stateless-war leaders utilize such paroles in order to mobilize recruits and obtain international support, while fulfilling a different agenda, the pursuit of economic gain. Stateless wars are juxtaposed to the classical concepts of warfare NATO and, in general, every state army is structured to respond to.

The means of stateless wars are, most often, fear and expulsion of civilians, aiming more at harm than at killing (mutilation, rape, intimidation, destruction of food and water sources, destruction of cultural monuments, among the rest), with preferred guerrilla-style warfare, unusual combinations of archaic and hi-tech weapons (e.g. a suicide bomber with a satellite phone), while direct confrontation with armed forces is avoided when possible. From paramilitary groups, organized crime, professional mercenaries, to unemployed citizens, corrupted state servants, police and army in disintegration – those who can profit more on war than on peace abound.

Kaldor observes that the profiteering feature of the contemporary violence stems from the changes in global economy of the 1980s and 1990s, when the opening up of previously resource-constrained local economies to global competition brings unequal players in a game of equal rules. The unintended results of often awkwardly implemented and more than

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13 Also “Clausewitzian wars,” or “wars of classical modernity.”
14 “Whereas in old-fashioned wars, people were mobilized to participate in the war effort, in the new wars, mobilizing people is the aim of the war effort...” (Kaldor 2001: 15)
15 This is dissimilar to the wars of classical modernity, whose aim (not means) were massive casualties of the enemy forces, achieved in direct confrontation, and the target is a clearly demarcated army.
16 “Some see the new wars as a reversion to primitivism. But primitive wars were highly ritualistic and limited by social constraints. The new wars are rational, applying rational thinking to the aims of war and rejecting normative constraints.” (Kaldor 1996)
17 Ibid.
often opportunistically manipulated liberalization programs, structural adjustment, and transition policies, are unemployment, inequality, informal economy and black markets. Mafia-style enterprises, urban gang operations and guerrilla movements grow alike in means and ends, linking the suburbs of the Western capitals with Eastern Europe and the Third World by the common trait of profit-oriented violence.

The Diminished State

From another perspective, Daalder links the emergence of stateless wars to the shift away from strong states: “one important consequence of globalization is the diffusion of power away from states. Non-state entities, ranging from businesses to transnational citizens organisations, from crime cartels to terrorist groups, are often more nimble than states and frequently succeed in frustrating their policies. The changing policy agenda and rise of these non-state actors mean that even the most powerful state is losing its ability to control what goes on in the world.” Non-state actors can be local and/or international; they can function within formal and/or informal organizations, with licit and/or illicit activities – the most successful ones usually practice both sides of these, still, artificially constructed state-centric dichotomies.

Examining the emergence and sustenance of war economies, Jeroen de Zeeuw and Georg Frerks explain how “[l]improved communication technology, fast capital movements and increased deregulation in Western economies have created the necessary preconditions for coalitions between local warlords, private business, intermediary agents and emerging private security companies to capitalise upon the lack of states control on resource extraction.” This, in Berdal’s more cautious view, may have enabled the development and sustenance of a vested economic interest in continued conflict.

In previously strong but now withdrawn states, as well as in weak or failed states, violence, among the rest, is de-monopolized and privatized; the security zone is populated by private actors - often security companies, paramilitary or local warlords. William Reno suggests that modern warfare might be better understood as “an instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode of accumulation.” Let us take a look of the new service on the free market: violence, and its bright side, security.

Violence as Commodity

An observable phenomenon nowadays is that terrorist, resistance or

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19 Also, the possibility of instantaneous trading and global communication, the deregulation of industries, the partial removal of policy barriers, cross-border financial transactions and mergers, offshore activities, expanded networks of subcontractors and front companies
20 Quoted in Berdal (2003).
liberation movements increasingly change their activities to secure profit on the internationalized money flows,\(^{21}\) while corporations increasingly may profit on local armed movements.\(^{22}\) The ability to deliver or withhold violence, i.e., to provide security, together with the related skills and services, is commodified into a value-free service and offered to the highest bidder on the market, regardless to the motives of the hiring agent and its hireling. As motives have no bearing on the market price of the service, it is economically rational to hire violence/security providers of any orientation. In brief, when the cardinal value of a war agent’s agenda becomes profit on the global market (when territory, state, ideology, justice, freedom, development, society, lifestyle, or any other non-profit good drops down on the list of preferences), such an actor becomes representative to the stateless wars.

The influence of global economic changes has affected not only the agenda of the war-related actors, but also the way business and war are run. International corporations resemble guerilla structures, and guerillas resemble businessmen. Corporations and new wars appear to have learnt from each other the most efficient model of operations: high decentralization and outsourcing, loose networks of highly autonomous units within mixed relations of (sometimes simultaneous) confrontation, competition and cooperation, shifting alliances formed ad hoc, aligned toward a common gain-maximizing goal and broken for the lack of it, light-step approach (without heavy investments, binding territory or property), high mobility, flexibility and indiscernability from the surrounding. Organisationally, corporations and new-war structures are polycentric, rarely vertically structured hierarchies; they diversify their products and services, some licit and some illicit; they rather rent or are rented, than buy or are bought; they operate through networks, indiscriminately and equally comprising state offices, firms, local gangs, mercenaries, experts, criminals and so on. How to fight such a new Leviathan?

**Responses**

The old-war tactical and strategic frame is likely to fail when required to quell a new type of war, because the war is fought on different levels. William Lind points out that old-war generals and the new-war actors measure defeat and success in incomparable terms: the former measure them in terms of territory, comparative attrition rates, firepower and technology, while the latter measure them in economic benefits, moral victory, civilian support and mass-psychological effects.\(^{23}\) Lind also notes that “no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a nonstate enemy,”\(^{24}\) which is much due

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\(^{21}\) E.g. local warlords provide security for international actors in Afghanistan in exchange for political or economic gain; non-state commanders secure oil companies and oil fields in Africa etc.

\(^{22}\) E.g. Western security companies in Iraq: private military advisory firms, companies profiting on arms transport, logistics or communication services, etc.

\(^{23}\) Lind 2004: 15.

to the aforementioned structural and organizational traits of stateless wars.

As stateless wars feed on weak states, poverty, inequality and political dissatisfaction, the solution in the long run would obviously have to address these conditions for breeding violence. What is believed to be the best prevention strategy is economic development, social justice and political representation (democracy). NATO’s new international commitment, as stated at the Riga Summit, acknowledges the idea that merely military action may fail short of the desired result of providing lasting security for its members. However, there are different ways of responding to regional instability and stateless wars. One issue is how to act (hard and/or soft power), and the second is who acts (international, all-alliance, multilateral, bi- or unilateral action). The response agenda of diplomacy, peacekeeping, nation-building, economic aid and democratization assistance moves more in line with the European “globalist” foreign policy relying on international cooperation. The EU policy is dissimilar although not mutually exclusive with the occasional US preference for regime change by force and its tendency toward somewhat unilateral interventionism.  

The relative efficacy of these diverging lines of practice can be measured by the economic and democratic developments in the new and future members of NATO and the EU. Colonel Moisan and Moroney examine how successfully NATO has modelled the EU’s Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood programs to incorporate its members and partners within the newly defined security agenda. “Unfortunately,” they conclude, “these programs have met with mixed reviews. Tellingly, partners have remarked that they see no measurable improvement in participation, prospects for integration, and especially additional capabilities.”

The vague link between NATO and democracy may be an additional factor in its lower scores in democracy promotion. Helene Sjursen, in her top-cited article “On the Identity of NATO,” lists the following reasons for caution: first, NATO is not an organization based on the rule of law, and it cannot become one without cosmopolitan law to which the Alliance can refer for justification. Second, NATO relies on a decision-making process without procedures for adjudication by third parties, a tribunal or a court, to resolve internal disputes; third, although the present decision-making process renders indirect legitimacy sufficient, it “renders the conception of NATO as a liberal democratic security community problematic. It gives an illusion of democratic legitimacy to an organization that has neither a democratic mandate nor a democratic structure of decision-making such as majority voting.”

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26 Bush’s recent parole that “the mission defines the coalition” opens wide the door for non-allied functioning of the Alliance.

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Comparing the success of NATO’s democracy promotion in Eastern Europe to that of the European Union, Barany\textsuperscript{29} concludes that NATO’s “less impressive” influence is due to three sets of reasons: first, the neighbourhood factor; second, the stricter EU membership criteria and a compelling set of sanctions and rewards; three, the EU all-encompassing engagement in institutional policies (from human rights legislation to health standards and agricultural policy).

The neighbourhood argument aside, the relatively better success of the Union, at present, to foster lasting economic and democratic reforms, suggests further restructuring of NATO in the direction of modelling the EU neighbourhood toolkit, its adjustment and application globally. On the other hand, it appears that the Union as well, in lack of common defence but with clear interest in international engagement, can model NATO – what has functioned in the relatively peaceful European neighbourhood may not function farther. As Kaldor concludes, “Tolerant politics cannot survive in conditions of violence—this is the point of the new wars...”\textsuperscript{30} She delineates two ways of response to the contemporary patterns of global(izing) conflict\textsuperscript{31}: defensive (to dismiss the new wars as “anarchy” or “primitivism,” overlooking their organized and highly modernized structure, as well as their global spread) and offensive - to establish peace, rebuild states and, I would add, to sanction direct and indirect war-profiters both in the developed and in the target countries.

**Conclusion**

Stateless wars, which share their roots with terrorism, are likely to become the prevalent feature of the conflicts of the future. They are one of the key challenges NATO will have to accommodate and, hence, remodel itself accordingly. The Alliance is increasingly involved in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where new wars take sway and the insufficiency of the classical understanding of war shows in practice. It is likely that in future NATO’s outstanding military capacities will make its engagement even more desirable as a peacekeeping and stabilization force. Will it meet the new challenge of stateless wars? The EU “soft power,” with strict conditional support to democratic and economic reforms as security components, combined with NATO’s “hard” military capacity to provide environment where such reforms can be initiated and maintained, is potentially a successful model for preventing and quelling stateless wars.

To still think in the way of classical wars, strategy and tactics, to require better success with more budget for more sophisticated military technology, cannot win stateless wars. Instead, what is needed is a new way of thinking,

\textsuperscript{30} Kaldor 2001: 17.
\textsuperscript{31} Kaldor 1996.
in the direction of lasting remedies which will help stabilize economies and foster functional political and social systems – and the military may often be necessary to enable the delivery of such remedy. Permanent global insecurity, futile old-style peacekeeping missions, misused aid, licit economy devoured by black markets, state-building programmes sabotaged by recurrent violence, the waste of human lives and potential, may be the price of not acknowledging the challenge of stateless wars.

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From Koizumi to Abe: Strengthening Japan’s Post-Cold War Security Activism

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has gradually re-emerged as an international security actor. The evolution of the country’s national security policy was particularly significant during the five and a half-year term of the former Prime-Minister Junichiro Koizumi, with the most important development being the expansion of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) role in international context. Originally created in the early Cold War years for territorial defence, the SDF are now actively engaged in various international missions, ranging from the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (UN PKO) to fight against international terrorism and the campaign in Iraq. Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who assumed office in September, is determined to pursue a more assertive foreign and security policy by revising the post-war Constitution and expanding the SDF overseas missions. With a view to increasing Japan’s presence in the international security arena, Abe has embarked on deepening ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in addition to focusing on the maintenance of the Japan-US alliance.

Abe’s security activism represents a continuing trend after the Cold War for the transformation of Japanese national security policy. While his policies reflect the ambition of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to raise Japan’s recognition as an international security actor, they may not coincide with the Japanese people’s anti-militarist, and rather modest, expectations for the country’s security role.

The Cold War Constraints

Japanese national security and defence policy was constrained by two factors during the Cold War period: domestically, by anti-militarism and fear of re-militarisation, and internationally, by bipolarity and the need for US protection from the Communist threat. Japan’s anti-militarism was institutionalised in the 1947 Constitution and manifested through Article 9. Known as the ‘peace clause’, Article 9 renounces the use of military force as an instrument of statecraft and declares commitment to non-possession of war potential.1 The Japanese government has interpreted Article 9 as permitting the maintenance of the SDF exclusively for

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self-defence purposes, but prohibiting the engagement in collective self-defence. Permeated by anti-militarism ever since the disastrous experience of the Second World War, the Japanese public has favoured the government’s approach to the ‘peace clause’ and the overall limitation of the country’s security role. The emergence of bipolarity constrained further Japan’s national security policy. In 1951, Japan signed the US-Japan Security Treaty, which was subsequently revised in 1960. Under the provisions of the 1960 treaty, the US committed itself to the defence of Japan, while Japan became obliged to provide bases and host-nation support for the US forces. Strongly supported by the ruling LDP, the US-Japan alliance served a purpose to deter the Communist, particularly Soviet, threat and maintain Japan’s security.

As a result of the Cold War constraints, successive LDP administrations pursued a so-called ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy, which limited the SDF role to Japan’s territorial defence and excluded participation in overseas security missions. This approach to security also ensured a ‘low profile’ for the military through the low status of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) in security decision-making. As the JDA was the administrative body responsible for the SDF, it was not given a full-fledged ministerial status out of fear for possible revival of Japan’s militarism.

**Changes After 1989**

The end of the East-West military confrontation and the emergence of new security threats pushed for a redefinition of Japan’s national security policy. Tokyo’s failure to dispatch the SDF to provide non-combat support for the US-led multi-national forces in the 1990-1 Persian Gulf War, followed by its inability to cope with the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis stimulated a domestic debate on the need for Japan’s expanded security presence. Added to this was the public’s increased awareness of the North Korean nuclear threat, particularly in the aftermath of the 1998 missile launch by the North. The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the rise of China further contributed to the alteration of Japan’s regional threat perceptions. The changing international security environment throughout the 1990s also had a significant impact on the US-Japan alliance, as it became clear that the alliance had to be adapted to the new security parameters.

In the domestic political arena, the 1990/1991 Gulf Crisis, together with the end of the bipolar divide, brought an end to the one-party dominance of the LDP, which the party had enjoyed since its formation in 1955. The 1990s also saw the fall of the largest opposition party, the socialists, and formation of new political parties. Although the LDP has regained its dominant position, since the late 1990s on it has formed only

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coalition governments, notably with the moderate conservative *Komei* Party. The leader of the opposition, on the other hand, has become the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has gradually adopted a close position to that of the LDP on national security and defence.

As a result of both international and domestic changes, the security climate in Japan after 1989 came to be characterised by a greater willingness for a strengthened partnership with the US and for an expansion of the SDF missions beyond Japan’s territorial borders. Reflecting the need for more international engagements, in 1992 the Japanese Diet passed legislation to permit the SDF participation in UN PKO and international humanitarian relief missions. Subsequently, Japanese national security doctrine was revised and the US-Japan alliance reinforced. In this way, the SDF role was expanded from traditionally providing for Japan’s territorial defence to include rear-area support for the US forces in regional contingencies. In 1998, Japan announced its decision to participate in a joint research with the US on a ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme, which reflected the growing concern about the North Korean nuclear threat.

*Koizumi the ‘Reformer’: Japan and the ‘War on Terror’*

By the end of the 1990s, a momentum had emerged for developing Japan’s new post-Cold War security activism. This was achieved under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi who assumed office in April 2001 and announced a ‘reformist’ policy agenda. Reviewing Japan’s national security policy and deepening the US-Japan alliance became priorities for his administration in the security area. To be sure, they were not unrelated to each other.

The 11 September terrorist attacks on the US became the first opportunity for Koizumi to enhance Tokyo’s security ties with Washington and thereby expand Japan’s international security presence. A special anti-terrorist law was swiftly enacted in October 2001 and the SDF were subsequently dispatched to the Indian Ocean to provide non-combat logistical support for the US-led multi-national forces fighting in Afghanistan. Being a strong advocate of Japan’s participation in the fight against international terrorism, Koizumi was also one of the first supporters of George W. Bush’s policy towards Iraq. In July 2003, despite the strong domestic opposition to the war, the LDP-led coalition government succeeded in passing special legislation, which permitted the SDF participation in humanitarian and reconstruction missions in Iraq. The subsequent dispatch of the defence forces to Iraq marked their first overseas mission since 1945 to a country with ongoing hostilities. While this indicated a search for more pro-activity in Japan’s security policy after the Cold War, the traditional domestic anti-militarism has retained its constraining impact on the LDP ambitions. Indeed,
the SDF role has remained limited to humanitarian, non-combat and logistical activities. Furthermore, both special laws were underpinned by relevant UN resolutions: 1368 for eradication of terrorism and 1483 for the Iraqi reconstruction. It is, therefore, clear that the Koizumi government both took account of the Japanese public’s continuing opposition to the SDF use of military force in overseas operations and accorded a particular importance to the UN legitimacy. The latter has been viewed by the Japanese people as crucial for the SDF international security missions since the defence forces’ role has expanded after 1989.

The reasons for Koizumi’s pro-activity after the 11 September terrorist attacks can partly be found in Japan’s failure to support the US ally during the 1990/1991 Gulf War, as well as to participate in the international community’s efforts for peace and stability. Having undermined both the credibility of the US-Japan alliance and Japan’s international position, the Gulf War experience remained as a negative reminder from the past. Indeed, supporting the US ally in the ‘war on terror’ was for Tokyo a way to ensure Washington’s continuing commitment to Japan’s defence under the Security Treaty and thereby maintain the bilateral alliance. However, the SDF dispatches were also an opportunity for the LDP to embark on realising long-standing security ambitions and strengthen Japan’s international security presence.

Towards International Security Activism

Japan’s involvement in the ‘war on terror’ has both added a global dimension to the SDF role and strengthened the US-Japan alliance. In 2004, the Koizumi administration issued the ‘National Defence Programme Guideline’ (NDPG), which reflected the Japanese public’s growing concern about new security threats, notably North Korea, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. While adhering to the Cold War principle of ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy, the document indicated ‘improving the international security environment’ as the second top priority in Japan’s national security policy after providing for its own defence from aggression. 4 The SDF will now deal with various threats and contingencies, and actively contribute to international peace cooperation activities. Subsequently, the NDPG opened the door to finalisation of US-Japan agreements for closer military integration, with plans for a strengthened bilateral co-operation, particularly in BMD and international peace activities. 5

For Koizumi and his LDP, a strengthened US-Japan alliance became a means to expand Japan’s international security contributions. In 2003, Koizumi suggested that Japan should enact

permanent legislation for overseas SDF missions, including those not under the UN umbrella. While this would obviate the need to enact special laws for particular purposes, such as those for anti-terrorism and the Iraqi reconstruction, such legislation would permit more support for the US global security initiatives. Indeed, the LDP’s 2006 draft proposal for the law stated that the government would dispatch the SDF abroad based on its own judgement, even in the absence of a UN resolution or a request by other international organisations.

Abe and Breaking Away from ‘the Post-War Regime’

Constitutional Revision

Prime Minister Abe, often described as a more ‘hawkish’ prime-minister than Koizumi, has been determined to pursue an assertive foreign and security policy. Abe has continued strengthening Japan’s international security activism and has followed his predecessor’s steps.

Constitutional revision, which has been sought by the LDP since the party’s formation in 1955, gained salience during the term of Koizumi. Together with Abe, who was Chief Cabinet Secretary in his third Cabinet, Koizumi was one of the leading proponents of the SDF participation in collective self-defence arrangements in support of the US forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that the revision of the Constitution, particularly Article 9, occupies a priority place on Abe’s policy agenda. The Prime Minister has often emphasised that, in order to expand Japan’s contribution to international security, the Constitution had to be adapted to the new era. In his policy speech to the Diet on 26 January, Abe stressed his determination to create a ‘beautiful country, Japan’ and underlined the need to review ‘the post-war regime’. According to the Prime Minister, Constitutional amendment was the first and major step towards realising this ‘new vision’ for Japan. The revision is no easy task, however, as it requires the approval by a two-third of the Diet members, which is to be followed by a simple majority vote in a national referendum.

Based on the strength of the ruling coalition, the LDP and the Komei Party, the Japanese Diet enacted in May legislation for holding a national referendum needed to amend the Constitution. This does not mean, however, that the LDP’s ‘long-cherished’ goal will soon be realised, as it lacks domestic consensus. Views differ, in particular with regard to Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defence, which the country possesses under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but is prohibited from exercising according to the government’s interpretation of Article 9. The DPJ remains cautious to allow this right, although the party is not completely against it. The Komei Party opposes both the amendment of

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6 The Japan Times on-line, 16 July 2003.
7 Daily Yomiuri on-line, 2 September 2006.

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Article 9 and participation in collective self-defence. The Japanese public, for its part, has come to support legitimisation of the SDF, not least because of an increased awareness of new security threats, and a greater willingness to have Japan contribute to international peace and security. Nevertheless, the traditional domestic anti-militarism remains largely intact, as the majority of people want to preserve Article 9 and the prohibition on collective self-defence.

**Strengthening Ties with NATO and More SDF Missions**

In search for expanding Japan’s international security presence, Abe has embarked on deepening ties with NATO in addition to pursuing the LDP’s traditional US-centred security policy. Having become the first Japanese Prime Minister to deliver a speech at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Abe announced on 12 January his diplomatic slogan of ‘pro-active diplomacy’. He called for deepening the Japan-NATO collaboration with regard to global peace and stability, particularly through various peace co-operation activities.\(^9\) Abe also stressed that Japan would continue to support anti-terrorist, reconstruction and humanitarian activities in Afghanistan, where the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force has been operating. In the context of Japan’s envisaged ‘new’ role in world affairs and echoing Koizumi’s earlier proposal, Abe declared that his administration would seek to establish permanent legislation authorising the SDF overseas missions. The Prime-Minister underlined that, ‘Japanese will no longer shy away from carrying out overseas activities involving the SDF, if it is for the sake of international peace and stability.’\(^10\)

Given the Japanese public’s opposition to the expansion of the SDF missions, particularly not under the UN umbrella, Abe may have made a rather ambitious promise to the NATO leaders. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s statement reflected Abe’s primary goal to assign Japan a ‘new’ role in world affairs. This determination is likely to have been strengthened by the successful passage of defence legislation in December to elevate the JDA to the Ministry of Defence and expand the ‘primary duties’ of the SDF. The SDF core duties, previously defined as national defence and disaster relief missions in Japan, now also include UN PKO, international disaster relief activities, rear-area support for the US forces in regional contingencies, and missions based on the anti-terrorist and Iraqi special laws. Given that the defence legislation was supported not only by the ruling coalition, but also by the leader of the opposition, i.e., the DPJ, Abe’s determination to break away from ‘the post-war regime’ may well be a reflection of the current political reality in Japan. The question, however, is whether the

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10 Ibid.
Japanese people are ready to accept this ‘new’ Japan.

**Japan’s New Security Activism: An Accepted ‘Return’?**

Since the early 1990s, Japan has embarked on strengthening its international security presence, particularly by expanding the SDF overseas missions. The emergence of new security threats, and the international demand for Japan’s contribution to global peace and stability have played a primary role for a redefinition of Japan’s national security policy. The process has been facilitated by the changed domestic political situation in Japan, which came to be characterised by a greater consensus between the LDP and the leading opposition party regarding the need for Japan’s more pro-active security policy. Added to this has been the public’s increased awareness of new security challenges and, in turn, willingness to see the SDF in the international security arena.

Japan’s move towards international security activism was accelerated during the term of Koizumi and Prime Minister Abe has followed the path of his predecessor. Abe’s determination to revise the ‘war-renouncing’ Constitution in order to clear the way for more SDF overseas missions, not least in support of the US ally, has been a reflection of the LDP’s long-time security ambitions. The plans for expansion of co-operation with NATO and for a permanent law for SDF overseas dispatches further indicate the direction of Japan’s future security policy.

The LDP’s push for a security activism, including a strengthened alliance with Washington, naturally raises the question how Japan’s post-Cold War ‘return’ will develop, particularly, given Japan’s militarist past. While the LDP has rather ambitious goals, they seem largely separated from the strong anti-militarist sentiments that continue to dominate the public mood in Japan. The majority of people want to preserve Article 9, and oppose collective self-defence and the SDF use of force overseas. Indeed, domestic support for UN PKO and humanitarian activities has generally increased after 1989. However, the public’s acceptance of what Japan’s security role should be seems a far cry from Abe’s ‘new vision’ for Japan and his administration’s idea for a ‘pro-active diplomacy’. The post-Cold War expansion of the SDF missions may well have reached the limit accepted by the people. Accordingly, if Abe wants to succeed in breaking away from ‘the post-war regime’, he should narrow the gap between the LDP’s aspirations and domestic expectations for the country’s security role. Only then can Japan move forward towards becoming a recognised international security actor.

**Key words:** Koizumi, Abe, Japan’s international security activism, SDF, anti-militarism
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: the Right Man on the Right Spot

Ilina Mangova

The North Atlantic Alliance was established in 1949 for the purpose of safeguarding the security of the territories of the two countries in North America and the twelve countries in Western Europe. Today, with the ISAF peace operation in Afghanistan, the training mission in Iraq, the KFOR mission in Kosovo, the logistic support for the African Union mission in Darfur, the assistance following the tsunami in Indonesia, the hurricane Katrina in the USA, and the earthquake in Pakistan, NATO exceeds its borders. The end of World War II caused a change in the established world order where Russia was the archenemy. NATO has successfully opposed the allegations of its expendability, and it has adapted to the new environment. Today’s NATO is a friend of Russia, it includes the former members of the Warsaw Pact, and it acts beyond the territory of its member countries. However, the enemy did not disappear. It has merely changed its face. Albeit certain that there will be no war or attack by another country against any of the member countries, none of the members are any longer certain when the next terrorist attack on their territory is going to happen. The new enemies are terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and they have neither a single fatherland, nor a single leader. Global changes have necessitated the transformation of the largest military alliance in order to adapt it to the challenges of the 21st century. Operative capabilities have been enhanced, response task forces have been established, procedures are being changed to make task forces better applicable and more useful, in particular when there is little or no support by the host country. The declaration of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty is enforced even after the big enlargement in 2004 - NATO is open for the future membership of the Western Balkan countries, as well as for cooperation with Russia as a partner, the Ukraine, Georgia, and the countries from Central Asia and the Caucasus.

On the other hand, in the past eight years, the views of the allies have not been fully aligned. The USA went into Afghanistan alone, and even refused the participation of NATO, until later, when it perceived the need for assistance. France and Germany opposed the strike on Iraq, but the greater part of the allies are present there today through the multinational division and the NATO training mission.

Aligning the requests for assistance, the needs to manage crises before they
become dangerous, the American and the interests of Old Europe, have all in the last ten odd years been making the work of the NATO Secretary General as difficult as ever. With three NATO Secretaries General, the Netherlands appears to be fertile soil for successful balance-keepers in Euro-Atlantic relations.

The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is described as a man with both feet firmly on the ground; he controls himself and never panics, keeps his cool even when discussing serious issues, takes his coffee together with the staff, previously at the ministry, and now in NATO. As early as in the training for young diplomats, he was the subject of much admiration among his colleagues due to his powerful command of facts and his diplomatic potential that set him apart as a frontrunner among his peers. The opportunity to help people has been his driving force throughout his diplomatic and political career.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commenced his diplomatic career in 1975 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, from where he was seconded to the Dutch embassy to Ghana. It was a time when he did not come across much diplomacy, but he fell for the African continent. Following the Ghana mission, he worked in the Dutch mission in NATO in Brussels on issues of defence planning. In 1980, he became the personal secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and remained on that post during the term of four consecutive ministers. As a personal secretary, he had access to and insight into the high foreign policy and it was then that he was inspired to make an earnest entry on the political stage. Having gained the trust and respect of his superior ministers of foreign affairs, he had their support in becoming a member of parliament as a member of the Christian Democratic Alliance. His first political adventure was, in fact, a few years previously in the small and progressive leftist Democrats 66, which he soon abandoned for obvious differences in military and political views. Both in the party and as an MP, he devoted himself to issues of foreign policy and development. In the course of his sixteen years in parliament, he established his authority through vehement debates with the opposition, remembered by the public for summoning a parliamentary session during the summer break in order to react to the escalating war in Yugoslavia, and the grim position of the Bosnian Muslims. At that time, he was member of both the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe and the West European Union, and later of the North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly. However, following nine years in parliament, there came times of inauspicious fortune. In 1993, many expected Scheffer to become minister of foreign affairs, but he was not appointed to that office. There was further frustration when he failed to become president of the Christian Democratic Alliance. Later he became the leader of the party, but the bad karma stayed on. The CDA lost the
elections and the party went into opposition, a very uncomfortable situation for the new leader. Leadership, even though much coveted, was a strenuous experience for Scheffer. He did not handle social and economic issues very well, he failed to attract the masses to the Christian and democratic ideas, as well as to manage the turmoil inside the party. In 2001, he suffered the toughest blow yet when the executive committee of the party voted against him, and he was compelled to step down from the top of the Christian Democratic Alliance. Nevertheless, Scheffer remained loyal to the party, and with the change on the political stage of the Netherlands and the return of the Christian Democratic Alliance to power, the new Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, asked him to be the minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands. More a diplomat than a politician, his greatest ambition came to fruition, and he finally returned to his original calling - diplomacy. Diplomacy got him back into shape, and he provided. During his term as minister, he created the perfect balance between the USA and Europe regarding the war in Iraq, where the Netherlands gave political support to the USA and the UK, without providing military assistance, thus managing to avoid confrontations with Germany and France. Many believe that it is this positioning of the Netherlands that pinpointed Scheffer as the perfect choice for a future NATO Secretary General. Still, his appointment as NATO Secretary General caught him off guard after only a year and a half in office as a minister. In the appointment calculations, he won ahead of Portuguese Antonio Vitorino, Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, who was not supported by the USA. Unlike him, Scheffer, a proven “atlantist”, had both the open support of the USA and the favour of the French, whom he won over as an acknowledged Francophile.

Scheffer succeeded Lord George Robertson, whose legacy was the initiated process of transformation of NATO, the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the good relations with Russia, and the stable Balkans. Inherited as top of the agenda, the mission in Afghanistan, with Scheffer in charge, was extended, primarily territorially, but he also focused the international community and the United Nations on tackling the large number of drug fields in the country. The growing production of narcotics in Afghanistan influenced the reduction of their price on European markets. Soon after Scheffer came into office, he faced the lack of means to carry out the mission, and an inability to respond to the requests of the Afghan government. What followed was his harsh criticism of the member countries for shirking their duties, and a demand to make good their declared political efforts.

Scheffer is an advocate for greater military independence of Europe, a view he took on board as early as in his youth, and elaborated in his university thesis on the American military presence in Europe. In the latter half of the 20th century, Europe was largely consu-
med by the improvement of other areas of social life, to the detriment of developing military structures. On the other hand, in 2001, the USA was hit by a terrorist attack of inestimable proportions. In America, the awareness of the danger of terrorism was fixed on top of the agenda, whereas the same failed to happen in Europe. Scheffer refers to this as a perception gap, and he keeps underlining the need to overcome it. Such abridgement requires a continuous dialogue not only between the elites, but, above all, among the peoples of Europe and America, to be initiated by the Europeans. Overcoming this gap in perception, according to Scheffer, will also contribute to overcoming the differences in the transatlantic relations.

The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is America’s favourite, a Francophile and, above all, a politician with European values. The ability to balance these features make him a successful leader of the North Atlantic alliance. This is corroborated by the decision of the North Atlantic Council of 10 January 2007 to extend his term in order to allow him to prepare for and chair the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Alliance.

Macedonia saw Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Security Forum in Ohrid on the 28 and 29 June this year. During his term in office to date, he has clearly stated his support for our membership of NATO, always stressing that it is our duty to carry on with the reforms that must be completed; the invitation will depend on results achieved, standards met and our ability to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic security and stability. With a 90% support of the citizens for the country’s membership in NATO, Macedonia expects this to happen with Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the helm.
Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era


Ronald D. Asmus was one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of Communism. Opening NATO’s Door was written while he was a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2000 to 2002. Prior to this, he worked in the Clinton Administration, serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe from 1997 to 2000. During this time he was a key advisor to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and was one of the architects of NATO enlargement. Thus Asmus gives the reader an ‘insider’s’ insight into how NATO transformed itself into the alliance that it is today.

In his study, Asmus tackles some interesting issues such as the following: how and why did NATO, a Cold War military alliance created in 1949 to counter Stalin’s Soviet Union, become the cornerstone of a new security order for post-Cold War Europe? Why did the United States not retreat from Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall but, instead, launched the greatest expansion of the American commitment to the old continent in decades? In the early 1990s, the very idea of inviting new members into NATO, yet at the same time remaining on good terms with Russia, seemed inconceivable. So, how was it achieved? Asmus’ basic answer is that the process was well managed.
It should be noted that Asmus observes that, “Had it been up to NATO alone, enlargement might very well have stopped at the Eastern German border.” There was simply no impetus in the West to move beyond what had been achieved in 1990 and what already appeared like a miracle in its own right: German unification in NATO. Soon, however, things started to change.

Asmus documents how the Clinton Administration sought to develop a rationale for a new NATO that would bind the U.S. and Europe together as closely in the post-Cold War era as they had been during the fight against Communism. For the Clinton Administration, NATO enlargement became the centrepiece of a broader agenda to modernise the US-European strategic partnership for the future. This strategy reflected an American commitment to the spread of democracy and Western values, the importance attached to modernising Washington’s key alliances for an increasingly globalised world, and the fact that the Clinton Administration looked to Europe as America’s natural partner in addressing the challenges of the future.

Opening NATO’s Door also focuses on NATO’s relationship with Russia. There were many difficulties in getting the Russian leadership to accept the fact that a US-dominated military alliance was moving towards its country’s borders. The challenge was to convince Russia that NATO enlargement was not a “monster” as the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin called it, and that instead of resisting the inevitable, Russia should grasp the opportunity to re-define its relationship with the West. Asmus recounts in great detail the numerous meetings in which the Russians appeared simultaneously determined and undecided, cunning and honest, cool-headed and neurotic. In the end, however, the Russians gave in and settled for “damage limitation”, to employ the term that former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov used in his memoirs, by signing the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.

For the European reader, however, one observation remains striking: the virtual absence of the European Allies in the NATO enlargement process; the whole process was US-driven. As Asmus shows, even the German government remained in two minds as to the benefits of no longer being on the frontline and the drawbacks of alienating Russia. Considering the benign outcome of the process, this may not necessarily have been a bad thing. It is interesting to note that more than half a century after the Second World War, the Europeans quietly came to terms with the idea that the United States should re-order their continent for them - and do so through the expansion of a military alliance.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the book was written under an executive order signed by the United States Secretary of State granting the author access to the US Department of State’s archives. While such permission might not seem out of the ordinary to most researchers, one must have in mind that
the order gave Asmus access to classified documents which are currently unavailable to the general public. Such “privileged access”, as Asmus observes, raises a number of dilemmas for both the author and the reader. On the one hand colleagues and readers alike will not have immediate access to the same sources; however, not to have cited the unclassified material would have diminished the credibility of the work in question. Nevertheless, privileged access to information is not a new issue to academia and despite the fact that at this point in time some sources in the book cannot be crosschecked, one does assume the veracity of the author’s citations.

In general, Asmus’ book provides a thorough and insightful account of the most significant phase in NATO’s history since its formation. It is an important study that should be read by any serious scholar of NATO and transatlantic relations.
For centuries Europe has been an idea, holding out hope of peace and understanding. That hope has been fulfilled. European unification has made peace and prosperity possible. It has brought about a sense of community and overcome differences. Each Member State has helped to unite Europe and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Thanks to the yearning for freedom of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe the unnatural division of Europe is now consigned to the past. European integration shows that we have learnt the painful lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict. Today we live together as was never possible before.

We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better.

I.

In the European Union, we are turning our common ideals into reality: for us, the individual is paramount. His dignity is inviolable. His rights are inalienable. Women and men enjoy equal rights.

We are striving for peace and freedom, for democracy and the rule of law, for mutual respect and shared responsibility, for prosperity and security, for tolerance and participation, for justice and solidarity.

We have a unique way of living and working together in the European Union. This is expressed through the democratic interaction of the Member States and the European institutions. The European Union is founded on equal rights and mutually supportive cooperation. This enables us to strike a fair balance between Member States’ interests.

We preserve in the European Union the identities and diverse traditions of its Member States. We are enriched by open borders and a lively variety of languages, cultures and regions. There are many goals which we cannot achieve on our own, but only in concert. Tasks are shared between the European Union, the Member States and their regions and local authorities.
II.

We are facing major challenges which do not stop at national borders. The European Union is our response to these challenges. Only together can we continue to preserve our ideal of European society in future for the good of all European Union citizens. This European model combines economic success and social responsibility. The common market and the euro make us strong. We can thus shape the increasing interdependence of the global economy and ever-growing competition on international markets according to our values. Europe’s wealth lies in the knowledge and ability of its people; that is the key to growth, employment and social cohesion.

We will fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration together. We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them. Racism and xenophobia must never again be given any rein.

We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight.

We intend jointly to lead the way in energy policy and climate protection and make our contribution to averting the global threat of climate change.

III.

The European Union will continue to thrive both on openness and on the will of its Member States to consolidate the Union’s internal development. The European Union will continue to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond its borders.

With European unification a dream of earlier generations has become a reality. Our history reminds us that we must protect this for the good of future generations. For that reason we must always renew the political shape of Europe in keeping with the times. That is why today, 50 years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome, we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009.

For we know, Europe is our common future.
About the Authors

**Elena Atanassova-Cornelis** received her doctoral degree in Japanese Studies from the Catholic University of Leuven (K.U.Leuven) in Belgium. She has specialised in contemporary Japanese foreign and security policy.

Ambassador **Davor Bozinovic**, Head of the Mission of the Republic of Croatia to NATO.

**Saso Dodevski** (1973). MA in International Politics obtained from the Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law in 2004. PhD candidate at the same faculty since 2006; the Konrad Adenauer Foundation alumnus.

**Metodi Hadzi-Janev** (1976) is an officer in the Macedonian Army. He graduated from the Military Academy in Skopje and earned his MA in International Law and Politics from the Faculty of Law in Skopje. In 2003 he led the first Macedonian mission in Iraq, an experience which he reflected on from the point of view of international law in his recently published book *Freedom for Iraq*.

**Ulrich Kleppmann** (1968), B.S. (econ.), official representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the Republic of Macedonia.

**Mihajlo Manevski** (1937), Minister of Justice since 2006. He graduated from the Faculty of Law in Skopje in 1960. He worked for more than 28 years in the Public Prosecution Office of the Republic of Macedonia. In his career he has worked as Deputy Public Prosecutor in the Regional Public Prosecutor Office in Skopje, Deputy Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia and President of the Regional Court in Skopje. From 1986 - 1991, Mr. Manevski was a member of the Executive Council of the Republic of Macedonia and Minister of Judicature and Administration, and then, from 1994 to 2000, as state advisor in the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. In 2002, he was elected member of the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, and in 2005 was elected President of the State Commission.
Ilina Mangova (1981) has graduated from the Political Science Department at the Skopje Faculty of Law. She works as Programme Assistant at the International Republican Institute in Macedonia.

Antonio Milososki (1976), Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2006. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the VMRO-DPMNE political party. He graduated from the Faculty of Law in Skopje in 1999, and received his MA degree in Germany in 2002, where he is currently a PhD candidate in political sciences. From 1999 - 2000 he was Chief of Cabinet of Dosta Dimovska Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, and from May 2000 - September 2001, spokesman of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. From 1997-1998 Milososki was vice-president of the Youth Union of the VMRO-DPMNE political party.

Ana Pejcinova obtained her PhD in 2002 at the Charles University of Prague, at the Department of General & Comparative Literature, Philosophical Faculty. From 2004-2005 she worked as a United Nations electoral officer for the Afghan and Iraqi elections. In 2006, she obtained an additional MA in Political Science from the Central European University in Budapest. She has published a number of literary and scholarly works in English and in Macedonian, available at her homepage: www.anapejcinova.org.

Nano Ruzin is Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO.

David Vitkov is a researcher in the IDSCS. He recibed his education in Australia and Austria, and his main interests are human rights and minority issues.