Civil Society and the War on Terror in East Africa

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Abstract
This article concerns what role civil society actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious groups, media organisations, grass-roots organisations, and advocacy networks play in responding to terrorism and the war on terror. The analysis focuses on two often reinforcing challenges of terrorism and counter-terrorism: the spread of fundamentalist networks and the unilateralist, repressive way in which states pursue counter-terrorism. The paper explores whether global civil society can be the panacea for confronting fundamentalism and if civil society can steer a deliberative process based on multilateralism, human rights, humanitarianism, and dialogue within the international response to terrorism. The evidence from Kenya and Uganda suggests that while civil society actors are attempting to defend human rights, they are circumscribed by a repressive-securitised regime. Furthermore, the existing contestations of the role of international institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the African continent distract civil society actors from advocating for multilateralism and global governance. Lastly, the high levels of poverty and lack of basic services at home means East African civil society can hardly campaign for humanitarianism beyond the borders of its territorial states. Overall, two major dilemmas limit civil society response to the war on terror: On the one hand, civil society is now circumscribed by fear and insecurity perpetuated by terrorism and counter-terrorism; on the other hand, it is sandwiched by a spate of legal and security restrictions that only serve to complicate its work.

1. Introduction
What is the role of global civil society in changing the world? This article

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applies the idea of civil society as ‘an answer to war’ to assess whether it can be a transformative force for changing a world circumscribed by terrorism and counter-terrorism. Kenya and Uganda are used as case studies. The concept of civil society as an answer to war is premised on arguments that civil society is a secular constitutional order, where the rule of law, based on a social contract, replaces force as a method of governance (Kaldor et al., 2006). A counter-argument to this view concerns violent nationalist and fundamentalist networks (see Kaldor, 2003). While groups such as the al-Qaeda, the al-Shabaab or the Mungiki sect in Kenya can in theory be categorised as civil society, they are also acknowledged to use violence rather than dialogue to advance their agendas – in essence they are not ‘a secular constitutional order’. In South Africa, it can be claimed that a nationalistic movement orchestrated the 2015 xenophobia attacks against foreign nationals. In this essay, however, I adopt the definition of civil society as the public arena in which ‘different values, ideas, and political visions are debated, contended and struggled over’ (Howell & Lind, 2010). This arena consists of groups and organisations through which individuals can influence and put pressure on centres of political and economic authority, in particular those through which they negotiate new social contracts or bargains (Kaldor, 2003:146).

This paper concerns what role civil society actors like NGOs, religious groups, media organisations, grass-roots organisations, and advocacy networks play in responding to terrorism and the war on terror. The analysis focuses on two often reinforcing challenges of terrorism and counter-terrorism: the spread of fundamentalist networks and the unilateralist, repressive way in which the war on terror is pursued. Can global civil society be the panacea for confronting fundamentalism? Can civil society steer a deliberative process based on multilateralism, human rights, and humanitarianism within the international response to terrorism?

The evidence from Kenya and Uganda suggests that while civil society actors are attempting to defend human rights, they are circumscribed by a repressive-securitised regime. Furthermore, the existing contestations of the role of international institutions such as the ICC on the African continent distract civil society actors from advocating multilateralism and global governance. Lastly, the high levels of poverty and lack of basic services at home means East African civil society can hardly campaign for humanitarianism beyond the borders of its territorial states.

The remainder of this essay is presented as follows: First I discuss the notion of global civil society as an answer to war, followed by comments on the challenges of the war on terror. I then explain how in theory civil society
is expected to respond to the war on terror. The essay then discusses the war on terror in East Africa, starting with a general background before debating the civil society response.

2. Civil Society as an Answer to War
The idea of civil society as an answer to war is anchored in the argument that civil society is a secular constitutional order, where the rule of law, based on a social contract, replaces force as a method of governance (Kaldor et al., 2006). This social contract, Kaldor argues, is one in which security is provided through human rights and humanitarian law (2003:158). How civil society promotes this order defines its function as an answer to war. In this regard, Kaldor talks of civil society helping to institute and being constituted by a global system of rules underpinned by overlapping inter-governmental, governmental and global authorities (2003:2). It can, therefore, be argued that the success of civil society as an answer to war centres on its ability to promote a system of rules that circumscribe war-making by states, encourage deliberative alternatives to solving conflicts, and emphasise humanitarian responses and human rights. Examples in this regard can draw on the functions of multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and its agencies, the ICC, the African Union (AU), the African Court of Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) as well as statutory and voluntary organisations that act to promote dialogue, defend human rights, and provide humanitarian responses. It can furthermore be argued that such an order, while promoted by civil society, also enabled civil society to respond to violence, particularly in the traditional context of war, or ‘old wars’ as Kaldor (2012) terms them, where the actor in violence was the ‘centralised state’, which had a monopoly of violence, and where wars were fought by armed forces with certain rules to reduce civilian causalities (Kaldor, 2003; 2005; 2012).

2.1 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Dilemmas for Civil Society
The war on terror presents two dilemmas that challenge the foundation of civil society as well as the ability of civil society actors to respond as an antithesis of violence. The first challenge has to do with fundamentalist networks that use terror to cause insecurity and spread fear. Kaldor argues that effective civil society needs an atmosphere free of fear, and suggests that the removal of fear and the absence of violence and coercion in everyday life are important for people to feel able to speak freely and be heard (2003:109). Terrorism, it can be observed, challenges such an
atmosphere through the proliferation of violence and targeting of civilians. As Albrow and Helmut observe about terror groups, ‘they appeal to values that are beyond the nation-state and at the same time exploit the freedoms of movement, association and speech that the democratic state serves to protect. They attack non-military targets and the civilian population. Indeed, they are an even greater challenge to civil society than they are to the state’ (2007:7). Therefore, we can observe that civil society faces a task of not just counterbalancing the ‘war-making state’ but also, and probably most importantly, dealing with fundamentalist networks which exploit the very liberties pursued by civil society to execute their violent agendas.

The second problem has to do with the war on terror and the myriad of counter-terrorism measures states have adopted. Major concerns in this regard include the global unilateralism of the United States which pursues counter-terrorism through an approach of ‘spectacle war’ (see Kaldor, 2003; Howell & Lind, 2010). Kaldor suggests that such an approach only reinforces fear and insecurity and that it also serves to amplify local cleavages and strengthen extremist networks (2003:150, 152). Other scholars eloquently and convincingly stress that the emphasis on military solutions and ‘securitisation of development’ has had far-reaching implications for human rights and the spaces for civil society (Lind & Howell, 2010; Fowler & Sen, 2010). Indeed Howell et al. (2008) suggest a backlash against civil society whereby the growing prominence of security concerns and the concomitant expansion of counter-terrorist measures across the world threaten the spaces for civil society to flourish and act (see also Fowler & Sen, 2010). In particular, it is observed that governments across the world have capitalised on the climate of fear generated by the perception of terrorist threats to introduce a swathe of restrictive counter-terrorist legislation, measures and practices (Howell & Lind, 2009:1279). The methods employed in the war on terror, such as the rendition programmes and targeted killings of suspected terrorists, as the U.S. has done in several parts of the world, or the arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of suspected supporters of terrorism that the Kenyan government – a key U.S. ally in the war on terror – has been accused of, are clear repudiations of international law and a challenge to human rights.

The above challenges, it can be argued, present major dilemmas for global civil society. On the one hand, civil society is now circumscribed by fear and insecurity perpetuated by terrorism and counter-terrorism; on the other hand, it is sandwiched by a spate of legal and security restrictions. Albrow and Helmut (2007) talk of civil society reaching a critical juncture when it comes to responding to terrorism. But how then should civil society
respond to a war that challenges the very foundations of its existence and where the space for its operation is significantly narrowed? Below I comment on how in theory civil society is expected to respond to the war on terror.

3. Civil Society Response of the War On Terror: Theoretical Propositions

Mary Kaldor argues that civil society is needed now more than ever before ‘to help set a new global agenda, to reach out across borders to the excluded groups of the world, especially among the Islamic community, to influence popular opinion and so develop a political alternative to fundamentalism at all levels’ (2003:149). She advocates ‘a global social contract or bargain in which global security is provided through upholding human rights and humanitarian law, and challenges civil society groups who favour such a bargain to construct alliances with like-minded actors to strengthen their position in the bargaining process with political institutions, companies and other civil society groups of a different persuasion’ (2003:158). Civil society can also play a role in promoting the rule of law which is considered to dampen citizens’ opportunities and willingness to engage in political violence (Choi, 2010:940). These propositions suggest that civil society can counteract radicalisation narratives and counterbalance the unilateralist war approach pursued by states. Catherine Barnes, for example, boldly hints on changing the state’s ‘security monopoly’ where she argues for civil society to participate in addressing the structural causes of conflict (2006:8). I argue that while these suggestions offer an appealing idea of how in theory civil society should respond to the war on terror, their realisation can only be context-specific. Civil society response will most likely be affected by existing conditions, including the legal regime, the financial capacity including sources of funding, and prevailing economic conditions in society. This proposition can find validation in studies that have suggested changes in civil society as a result of shifting donor priorities, such as when donors use aid to meet political and defence objectives (see, for example, Howell & Lind, 2010; Fowler & Sen, 2010). How exactly is the situation in East Africa?

3.1 Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in East Africa

On 2 April 2015, the world was shocked by news of an attack on Garissa University in northern Kenya, in which at least 147 people, mostly university students, died and 79 others were injured. This occurred barely seven months after a devastating invasion of Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the
country’s capital, had claimed 67 lives and wounded 200 others.\textsuperscript{4} In both cases, the Al-Shabab, a Somali-based militant fundamentalist group with links to the al-Qaeda,\textsuperscript{5} claimed responsibility.

The Garissa attack and the developments in its aftermath expose the severity of the double-edged problem we face regarding terrorism and the war on terror. This problem is characterised by a fundamentalist network that uses terror to spread fear and insecurity and a centrist state that reacts to this challenge through spectacle war where human rights and humanitarianism are sidestepped, and where fear and insecurity are reproduced. Following the Garissa attack, the Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, in a tone no different from that of former American president George Bush after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, vowed to respond in ‘the severest ways possible’ and branded the al-Shabab ‘an existential threat’.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, the Kenyan government retaliated by bombing two al-Shabab camps in Somalia.\textsuperscript{7} Meanwhile the deputy president, William Ruto, publicly asked the United Nations to close the Dadaab refugee camp on claims that it is a breeding ground for al-Shabab militants. Mr Ruto was also quoted to have drawn parallels between his country and the United States by stating ‘the way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after Garissa.’\textsuperscript{8} Kenya was also reportedly constructing a 700-kilometre wall along its border with Somalia, with the expectation that the al-Shabab would be kept out.\textsuperscript{9} Earlier on, following the Westgate attack, it had been recommended that the Kenyan government ‘declare war against al-Shabaab wherever they are’ (Williams, 2014). In summary, it would seem as if the Kenyan leaders were reading from a similar script as their American counterparts did following 9/11. In this regard, it is not surprising that counter-terrorism in East Africa is referred to by some texts (e.g. Shinn, 2014) as ‘the American war on terror in East Africa and the Horn’.

In neighbouring Uganda, around the period of the Garissa attack, foreign government missions (particularly led by the US embassy\textsuperscript{10}) and local security agencies regularly warned of several attacks planned by the al-Shabab. Security was heightened in public places and a number of suspected terrorists were arrested.\textsuperscript{11} Within the same period the police had launched an attack on and closed several Islamic schools known as madarasas, which they accused of being recruiting grounds for al-Qaeda and the al-Shabab.\textsuperscript{12} Similar sentiments had been expressed by Kenyan authorities much earlier.\textsuperscript{13}

East Africa has been described as an arena of US counter-terrorism operations (Ruteere & Ogada, 2010). International attention on terrorism in East Africa gained momentum following the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 and injured 5,000 (see Lyman et al., 2004). In Uganda’s case, the more serious terrorist attacks in the country occurred in 2010, claiming at least 74 lives of revellers who had gathered at separate places to watch the World Cup finals on 11 July, and the al-Shabab claimed responsibility. There have also been other terrorist branded organisations that operated in Uganda, notably the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (see Rubongoya, 2010). Kenya, in particular, has suffered from several incidents of international terrorism (Ruteere & Ogada, 2010:230). Both Kenya and Uganda are upfront in the war on terror locally and internationally. With regard to their international engagement, the two countries offered themselves as allies to America in the Iraq war (ibid.) and both have had their troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission Force (AMISON) fighting the al-Shabab in Somalia—a factor which has been advanced by the al-Shabab as the reason for its attacks on these countries (The Guardian). Locally, both countries present a myriad of counter-terrorism measures, including pieces of legislation which impose limitations on the human rights and civil society space in several ways (Lind & Howell, 2010; Rubongoya, 2010; Ruteere & Ogada, 2010).

While there are several violent groups operating in East Africa, the al-Shabab and its fundamentalist agenda dominate the terror spectacle. The militant group is based in the Horn of Africa, Somalia to be specific, which has been largely described as a failed state (Menkhaus, 2007). Furthermore, the group uses radicalisation to recruit (see Williams, 2014). In Kenya, for example, government discrimination and high-handed policing tactics are believed to have created perfect breeding grounds for the al-Shabab. Another factor worth noting is the regional characteristics. Lyman observes that ‘the greater Horn of Africa – an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, is home to interlocking conflicts, weak and failing states, pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty. It is chronically susceptible to drought... And it is plagued by HIV/AIDS’ (2004:76). It is argued that such problems are encouraging factors for radicalisation and conflict, and dealing with those issues could fit the content of Kaldor’s proposed ‘new social contract’. But is civil society in East Africa responding to these challenges?

**East African Civil Society and the War on Terror**

*Who constitutes civil society in East Africa?*

The literature points to a myriad of organisations comprising East African
civil society. In Uganda, it includes membership-based and professional associations, advocacy groups, service delivery organisations, cultural and faith-based organisations (FBOs) and media organisations (Rubongoya, 2010). It also includes interest groups: women, youth and persons with disabilities. The situation is not much different from Kenya, except that in Kenya human rights groups seem to be more active than in Uganda (see Ruteere & Ogada, 2010).

In the following section, I assess civil society responses to the war on terror against four expectations, namely: defending human rights, advocating for multilateralism and international law, promoting humanitarianism and support to marginalised groups, and promoting dialogue as an alternative to fundamentalism and violence.

**East African civil society and human rights**

There is evidence that civil society actors have been active in defending the rights of terror suspects as well as those of human rights defenders. In Kenya, for example, the government, following the Garissa attack, published a list of 86 alleged terror supporters; 16 the list included some prominent human rights organisations such as Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURU) and Haki Africa. The international organisation, Human Rights Watch (HRW), came out to challenge the Kenyan government on the publication and insisted that some organisations were being targeted for their important work in listing human rights violations by Kenyan security forces. 17 In another advocacy coalition, international human rights groups from as far away as the United States joined the condemnation of the list. 18 Furthermore, studies have established that civil society actors, particularly in Kenya, have played an active role in defending the rights of suspected terrorists (Ruteere & Ogado, 2010; Lind & Howell, 2010). Kenyan civil society organisations, for example, monitored and documented the fate of terror suspects arrested by the Kenyan government, challenged Kenya’s participation in rendition programmes, and secured the release of some suspects (Ruteere & Ogado, 2010:237). Additionally, human rights groups are also credited with challenging the Kenyan government’s attempt to introduce legislation that would have eroded human rights (Ruteere & Ogado, 2010; Lind & Howell, 2010).

In Uganda, civil society has not been as active as their Kenyan counterparts with regard to human rights issues surrounding the war on terror, although their engagement is still visible. Rubongoya (2010) observes that civil society in Uganda has been weakened by failure to find independent funding and hence is vulnerable to co-optation by external donors as well as being
circumscribed by unfavourable laws and an ambivalent government attitude, particularly towards advocacy organisations. As such, many organisations concentrate on service delivery; it can also be argued that this phenomenon relates to mainstream civil society in Kenya as well (see Lind & Howell, 2010).

A study by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2010) established that civil society organisations (CSOs) in Uganda were reluctant to engage in political topics which they considered sensitive and would, for that matter, put them at loggerheads with politicians. It is perhaps due to the absence of a vibrant human rights-oriented civil society, alongside what has been generally defined as a rubberstamp parliament\textsuperscript{19}, that Uganda’s Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), with its implications for human rights, was passed with minimal debate. Nevertheless, organisations such as the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), Human Rights Network Uganda (HRNU) and Human Rights Network for Journalists (HRNJ) have advocated for a due process in the case of terror suspects. Furthermore, civil society actors have been generally active in advocating for the rights of people arrested under the Terrorism Act: for example, during the closure of the Daily Monitor newspaper in 2002 or the arrest of opposition leader Kiiza Besigye in 2005 and 2012.

**Multilateralism and international law**

When it comes to advocating multilateralism and international law, there has not been much literature on the contribution of East African civil society. Nevertheless, concerning international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the ICC, it can be observed that East African civil society actors are trapped in a debate about the role and legitimacy of these institutions on the African continent. The involvement of these organisations in controversial developments in Africa, for example the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya and the botched prosecution of Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta or the uprising in Libya, has not only generated mixed reactions but also put these agencies at the centre of a raging debate on sovereignty and foreign influence in Africa. No wonder that some African countries, notably South Africa, Burundi and the Gambi, have initiated a process of withdrawal from the ICC.

This state of affairs, unfortunately, obscures a possible reflection by civil society on how organisations like the UN and the ICC can play a positive role in conflicts like the war on terror. In contemporary discourses\textsuperscript{20} these institutions are perceived as extensions of western influence in Africa. Activists from the continent have also begun to subscribe to such narratives,
which were initially fronted by African leaders. On the other hand, indigenous frameworks such as the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD), are also criticised for being dominated by leaders who are less democratic. The fact that these organisations receive much of their funding (for example AMISOM) from western governments only serves to reinforce the scepticism. The LRA, for example, is one of the listed terrorist organisations in East Africa – which operated mainly in Uganda. While the LRA leader Joseph Kony and his top commanders have been indicted by the ICC for war crimes, there is a domestic debate challenging the involvement of the ICC in the LRA case. Such contestations were, for example, expressed when one of the top commanders, Dominic Ogwen, was arrested and handed over to the ICC. This suggests scepticism about the role of international institutions in Africa, which also circumscribes the commitment of civil society actors to advocate for strengthening the so-called global authorities to deal with conflicts like the war on terror.

East African civil society and humanitarianism
In terms of promoting a humanitarian regime, East African civil society actors are always quick to express solidarity and condemn terrorist attacks, including in the Garissa case. Indeed, organisations such as the Red Cross provide humanitarian responses following terrorist attacks. While such reactions are good for compassion and unity, the main challenge has to do with the plight of marginalised groups, particularly the communities of Somali origin and neighbours in conflict-ridden states such as South Sudan, Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia. The exclusion, profiling and exploitation of Somalis is well documented, particularly in Kenya (see Williams, 2014; Ruteere & Ogado, 2010; Aljazeera, 2015; TAMUKANEWS, n.d.). The conflicts in South Sudan and the DRC have driven considerable refugee numbers into Uganda. Besides the challenges of conflicts and other push factors, the refugees also face problems of accessing basic services in the camps. Extreme poverty and pathetic conditions breed frustration and hence susceptibility to radicalisation.

Indeed, there are several civil society actors engaged in service provision and attending to the challenges of refugees; however, they do so basically on the basis of foreign funding. Civil society organisations are also involved in advocating for the rights of marginalised groups, for example in the case of Somali immigrants. However, the high poverty levels in East Africa mean that indigenous citizens, too, are barely managing to survive as evidenced by the fact that several communities, for example in northern
Uganda, still live on handouts from donor agencies. Considering failure by civil society actors to mobilise independent funding (Rubongoya, 2010) they rely on the contribution of external donors who have their own (mainly security-oriented) agendas (see Howell & Lind, 2010).

Kaldor’s suggestion that civil society should create alliances with like-minded actors could be advanced to encourage local civil society to partner with western NGOs in promoting and advocating for a humanitarian regime. The challenge, however, is that international NGOs, as some studies (e.g. Howell & Lind, 2010; Fowler & Sen, 2010) have suggested, are forced to adjust their priorities to meet the political and defence goals of their financing governments. Moreover, an effective humanitarian regime needs to be promoted beyond the state borders yet this remains a challenge in East Africa as civil society is domestically encircled by poverty. A case in point is when suggestions by the Ugandan government to offer scholarships to students from war-stricken South Sudan were met by criticism from sections of civil society that claimed that there were several pressing demands home. In short, civil society faces competition between altruism and self-interest, which makes it difficult to promote humanitarianism.

**Civil society dialogue as an alternative to fundamentalism**

On the final aspect of this analysis, i.e. dialogue as an alternative to fundamentalism, East African civil society first and foremost is active on debates that aim to address the causes of radicalisation. The media plays a particularly important role by providing platforms for debate on issues of marginalisation, inequality and security measures that have the potential to cause radicalisation. Furthermore, religious groups are taking centre stage in the dialogue on peace. At the first ever East African conference of religious leaders held in Kigali in September 2014, a resolution was arrived at to create an East African Community Inter-Religious Council. The declaration from the conference condemned religious justifications of indiscriminate violence and encouraged advancing ‘from religious tolerance to mutual respect.’ Muslim groups are particularly becoming more active in challenging distortions of Islamic teachings by fundamentalist networks. During a dialogue on radicalisation held at Makerere University, the deputy chair of the Uganda Muslim Youth Assembly committed to greater engagement in mosques to challenge radicalisation. The problem, however, is that while this dialogue has prospects of facilitating change domestically, East African civil society is still unable to reach out to the epicentres of radicalisation and conflict, for example, in Somalia. Ideally, an indigenous civil society ought to emerge in these areas but this is challenged by the fact that Somalia
is still not stabilised (see Williams, 2014), and the ongoing conflict – the absence of peace – challenges the very foundation of civil society. In this regard, calls have been made for dialogue with the al-Shabab although the prospects for this are still grim.

4. Conclusion

This essay article demonstrated that while civil society actors in East Africa are attempting to play a role in the war on terror, several limitations circumscribe the prospects of a significant impact. While civil society has the possibility to confront radicalisation, it also faces challenges in its attempts to secure its space, which is currently sandwiched by a spate of human rights restrictions within the counter-terrorism security regime. Furthermore, a possible civil society contribution towards advocating multilateralism and global governance is circumvented by the trap in debates on the role and legitimacy of international institutions in Africa. This is exacerbated by the lingering scepticism towards home-grown frameworks like the AU and IGAD. Moreover, high poverty levels alongside a plethora of domestic challenges inhibit civil society from paying attention to promoting humanitarianism beyond the borders of its territorial states.

The challenge of terrorism in East Africa is mainly twofold – the presence of fundamentalist networks whose strategy is to use terror to spread fear and insecurity, and the centrist states reacting to this challenge through spectacle war while sidestepping human rights and humanitarian concerns, thereby reproducing fear and insecurity. The theoretical propositions suggest that civil society needs to help set a new global agenda, and to reach out across borders to the excluded groups of the world, especially among the Islamic community (Kaldor, 2003). While East African civil society seems to be waking to this call, there is need for more strategic reflections regarding how to overcome the inherent barriers discussed above. How can more civil society actors be mobilised to engage in political advocacy? How can civil society actors transcend sovereignty debates on global institutions and global governance? Studies on these questions could generate ideas for strengthening the contribution of East African civil society as an answer to war. A final challenge comes up in relation to addressing poverty and inequality domestically, which is important both for mitigating cleavages and radicalisation but also for providing civil society actors with a firm base to champion humanitarianism beyond the confines of their states. The increasing recognition of the value of dialogue presents a key opportunity for generating new narratives about terrorism, security and human rights.
Notes
3. The attack and its aftermath dominated local and international media, including dominant channels like CNN, Aljazeera and the BBC as well as major television channels and newspapers in the region. At the time of writing, different sources reported 147 or 148 deaths.
9. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. On the basis of seven years of work experience in politics and democracy, the author participated in a plethora of debates on international institutions in Uganda, including public dialogues, workshops and social media discussions.
21. See, for example, Mungai and Kiranda (2014). The collapse of Uhuru Kenyatta’s case could be a potential death blow to the ICC. Africa LSE blog. Available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/12/16/the-collapse-of-uhuru-kenyattas-case-could-be-a-potential-deathblow-to-the-international-criminal-court/
24. For example, in the case of the Westgate Mall, this was confirmed through conversation with Eve Wemanga (LSE), who worked with the Red Cross at the time of the attack.
25. Author’s notes from a dialogue on radicalisation at Makerere University. For details see http://news.mak.ac.ug/2015/04/multidenominational-composition-uganda-plus-tolerance
26. As already discussed, mainstream civil society actors are engaged in service provision.
27. Debates on marginalisation, exploitation, oppression and security schemes that accelerate radicalisation featured in mainstream media for the period January 2015–April 2015 which were reviewed for purposes of this essay.
30. Author’s notes taken from the dialogue.

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