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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

For some decades now, there has been a noticeable increase in nationalism in Asia. Nationalism, understood as an exaggerated perception of the importance of one’s own nation, which produces a feeling of superiority over other nations, is generating tensions and conflicts in the entire region. There is a military build-up taking place in the South China Sea and territorial disputes are on the increase.

The impact of nationalism is apparent in almost all Asian countries. The terms of nationalism and patriotism are frequently used as synonyms in this context. Nationalism is by no means only seen in a negative light. It comes as no surprise that the former colonies in particular have a different historic link to this phenomenon than the former colonial states. Whenever they considered the significance of their nation, it was very rarely with the aim of occupying other countries; on the contrary, it often was with the aim of liberating their country from oppression by another power.

There are not only historic explanations for the great significance of nationalism. Another reason is the widespread notion that a strong military is a prerequisite to securing social peace and stability. Political decision-makers rely on support from the armed forces, which for their part appeal to the patriotism and nationalism of the population and frequently cooperate with nationalist political parties and groupings. When a television programme reports on a deployment of the national military, this is often accompanied by patriotic music, soldiers are celebrated as heroes, rousing appeals are made to the population’s patriotism. No commercial media outlet would dare to appeal to the readers’ and viewers’ reason in the conflict about the South China Sea. While many contributions advocate peaceful conflict resolution, they always have the “nationally desirable” outcome in mind.
The most serious tensions in the region arise from the rivalry between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. Surveys indicate that the opinions the Chinese and the Japanese have of each other are as poor as they had last been in war times – despite the fact that China’s economic upsurge has resulted in more intensive economic and trading relations with its neighbour. Peter Hefele, David Merkle and Janina Sturm state in this issue that it is becoming apparent in East Asia “that globalisation and economic interdependency between nations are no guarantee of increased trust and peaceful relations.” In spite of a globalised economy and an increase in cultural influences from abroad, the importance of nationalism has not diminished in Korea either. However, in their article from Seoul, Norbert Eschborn and Janine Läpple point to the phenomena of increasing migration and worldwide media networking. In their opinion, these two developments may well have a moderating effect on nationalism, albeit not in the immediate future.

In Europe, nationalism served as justification for the devastating wars of the 20th century. Konrad Adenauer called it the “blight of Europe”. Subsequently, though, the European unification project has demonstrated how tensions can be reduced and how nationalism can be restrained. However, half a century of economic, political and finally institutional interrelations has not meant that nations have lost their significance. Even in a united Europe there will always be a German, an Italian and a Czech identity, for instance. A similar development is conceivable and desirable for Asia. Greater regional cooperation can help to reduce tensions, boost prosperity and increase the possibilities for citizen participation. That would be to the benefit of all Asian nations.

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THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN EAST ASIA

A THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY?1

Peter Hefele / David Merkle / Janina Sturm

The social, economic and political modernisation of East Asia and its regional and global interlacing have not led to a decline in nationalism in these countries. On the contrary, nationalist sentiments and resentments have been revived over the past few years and are clearly gaining in importance for domestic and foreign policy in these countries. On 2 September of this year, the 68th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War, the historical legacy that has always been a source of tension in the relationship between China and Japan, and to which serious attempts at resolution have never been made, once again became clear. Seldom have polls shown such a negative image of neighbouring countries as they have over the past two years.

What is causing this growing nationalism in East Asia? To what extent does it actually influence domestic and foreign policy? Who are the most significant supporters of nationalism? And what role does nationalism play in the current territorial disputes between the neighbouring countries?

NATIONALISM IN EAST ASIA: CONCEPTS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The development of modern nationalism in East Asia is closely connected with the processes of modernisation that have been taking place there since the 19th century.

1 | This paper examines nationalist trends in the People’s Republic of China and Japan, as well as Taiwan’s unique situation. For the situation in South Korea, we refer to the article which appears in this issue by Norbert Eschborn of the KAS Seoul/South Korea office.
It has evolved from resistance to Western colonial powers and, particularly in China and Korea, to Japan’s imperialist expansion into North-East Asia. The struggle to resist assimilation through foreign cultures, languages and values and ultimately, the pursuit of national independence and autonomy have also contributed to East Asian nationalism.\textsuperscript{2}

The concept of nationalism that originated in Europe denotes an ideology and associated movement that sought to establish and maintain a sovereign nation and the conscious identification and solidarity of all its members with the (often yet to be established) nation.\textsuperscript{3} Furthermore, one can distinguish between inclusive nationalism, which includes all societal groups regardless of their cultural identity, and exclusive nationalism, which regards other nations or minorities as unequal. The latter leads to degradation of other nations or even legitimates a “civilising mission” based on excessive belief in the importance of one’s own nation. Nationalism is often closely tied to national identity, meaning that social ties depend on cultural conformity and, accordingly, “ethnic and political boundaries generally overlap”.\textsuperscript{4}

Nationalism in East Asia exhibits both inclusive and exclusive aspects. Strong identification with one’s own country of origin is often accompanied by a sense of superiority rooted in ethnicity and dissociation from other nations. Due to the high degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity in Japan (and Korea), the momentum of cultural unity plays a decisive role in nationalism there. In China, on the other hand, nationalism came and comes primarily from the Han Chinese majority (91 per cent of the population). However, the communist leadership is attempting to convey a picture of cultural unity, in which all ethnic groups are defined


as "Chinese" (zhōngguórén / 中国人). In doing so, the 57 officially recognised ethnic groups are considered together as one national unit.

China and Japan are able to look back, to some extent, on more than 2,000 years of state and cultural continuity, which represents an important point of reference and a source of their modern national identities. Nevertheless, nationalism in both countries is a relatively “new creation”, which has had to establish itself in the face of older concepts of identity (e.g. dynastic loyalty or ethnic origin) and has found no conclusive territorial definitions as of yet (particularly in China).

Nationalism in East Asia was and still is a “vehicle of modernisation” without necessarily incorporating political and emancipatory values, such as freedom and democracy, which are often associated with this in the West. Notwithstanding this general modernising function which has been in place since the early 19th century, nationalism in China and Japan is based to some extent on very different reasons and historical processes.

China

Chinese nationalism, which emerged in the 19th century, is closely connected to Sun Yat-sen’s (孙逸仙) “Three Principles of the People” (sānmínzhuyì / 三民主義). Sun Yat-sen

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5 | The Chinese term minzu (民族) covers a range of meanings identified by several different words in European languages: country, people, nationality, ethnic group, ethnicity. Thus, for example, the term zhōnghua minzu (中华民族) can be translated to mean two different things: the "Chinese nation" and the "ethnicities (nationalities) of China".

6 | In Europe, it is ideally possible to distinguish between liberal (western European) and ethnic-cultural nationalism. The former also strives for political emancipation in terms of enlightenment. Approximately ten years ago, sinologists were occupied with the discussion as to whether a "liberal" nationalism could also occur with political and emancipatory objectives in the People’s Republic of China. There is no longer any indication of this. Cf. Gunter Schubert, "Nationalismus in China – Der liberale Gegentext zum anti-westlichen Etatismus", Project Discussion Paper No. 18/2001, Discourses On Political Reform And Democratization In East And Southeast Asia In The Light Of New Processes Of Regional, Community building, Duisburg, 2001.
is considered one of the fathers of modern China. In order to prevent the decline of the Chinese people and its culture under the oppression of Western powers feared since the Opium Wars, he developed (based on the ideas of several of his predecessors) a concept of nationhood that stemmed primarily from a Han Chinese nation and that attempted to distinguish itself politically and ethnically from the Manchu-Qing Dynasty. While Sun Yat-sen continued to search for a synthesis of ideas of Western liberalism (democracy / mǐnquánzhuyì / 民權主義) and social welfare (mǐnshēngzhuyì / 民生主義), Chinese nationalism was reinterpreted after the Chinese communists’ victory under Mao Tse-tung. Social and national liberation were ideologically conflated and employed in an “anti-imperialist” manner. During the mass campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s, the concept withdrew in favour of patriotism (aiguozhuyí / 爱国主义). Since the 1980s, a revival of the old nationalist sentiments has been established. This is meant to counter-balance the dwindling significance of communist ideology as a legitimating principle for the ruling party and to overcome social and ethnic frictions in society. The question of reunification with Taiwan illustrate a distinctive feature and a challenge for the nation (see the section on Taiwanese nationalism below).

Japan

Japan was the only country in East Asia to escape direct colonisation by Western powers in the 19th century. However, the forced opening of Japan by the United States of America in 1853 provided the key impetus for a fundamental reform of the Japanese Empire. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 established a modern state and set in motion the modernisation of, in particular, the economy and the army, which allowed Japan’s ascent to the most powerful state in East Asia within three decades.

Since the 1980s, a revival of old nationalist sentiments has been established. This is meant to counter-balance the dwindling significance of communist ideology as a legitimating principle.

The aggressive policy of expansion, initially towards North-East Asia (Korea and Manchuria in the North Eastern part of the Chinese Empire), was motivated by power and economic politics. The ideological foundations were formed from a mix of pride in an ancient, unique culture, which Japan had preserved despite reforms that were predominantly limited to the technological and administrative sectors, and of (modern) nationalism feeding on its feeling of superiority due to its progress. This alleged ethnic and cultural superiority justified the occupation of its neighbouring states in Asia and even attempts to assimilate them. The defeat of the Russian navy in 1904 in the Yellow Sea further strengthened Japan’s self-assurance as it finally succeeded in conquering a great European power.\(^9\)

The concept of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (daitōa kyōeiken / 大東亜共栄圏) developed by the Japanese military and government in the 1930s and 1940s purported to establish a “bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers”.\(^10\) However, this pan-Asian nationalism did not find lasting support among national liberation movements in East and Southeast Asia due to Japan’s military and exploitation strategy. Particularly in China and Korea, the painful experiences of Japanese occupation shaped a form of nationalism that manifested itself in a dissociation from Japan and forged anti-Japanese resentments.

After the Second World War, the forced democratisation of Japan by the U.S. led to a thorough unsettling of Japan’s perception of itself, but not to a systematic overhaul of its own imperialist and nationalist history. The “womb of nationalism remained fertile” in Japan and, since the 1980s, has been able to increase its influence in the political sphere once again. The economic rise of this island empire, tremendous technological achievements and international success of Japanese companies has returned a sense of national identity to the country. However, the


economic stagnation and demographic challenges that have existed since the 1990s have formed a breeding ground for nationalism as a reaction to the economic and political rise of neighbouring powers, especially China, and their own relative decline.  

**SUPPORTERS OF NATIONALISM IN CHINA AND JAPAN**

Nationalism often serves “as a tool for legitimising the government and as a means of strengthening solidarity among the population”. This form of legitimation of authority plays a particular role in authoritarian regimes, as they are not legitimised by democratic elections and alternative sources of legitimation (for example, religion or secular ideology) are less influential. At the moment, nationalist trends are gaining considerable influence in political decision making during political crisis situations, often evolving to become a “political genie in a bottle” with fatal momentum that is difficult to then rein. If effective mechanisms for conflict resolution within states and societies, as well as within intergovernmental relations are lacking, there is significant conflict potential – and this is the current situation in East Asia. The most significant supporters and “channels” of nationalist ideas in Chinese and Japanese politics and society can be found in the political and military spheres, in the media and in societal associations.

**Parties**

In China, the Communist Party of China (CPC) uses nationalist sentiments to preserve the legitimacy of the political system. Along with providing assurance of a lasting increase in prosperity, it views itself as the guarantor of the nation’s territorial identity. So as not to jeopardise its legitimacy as the singular political power during times of weaker economic growth, the CPC always alludes to “elements of an ideational legitimation of the system”, which includes nationalism.

11 | Cf. Buchsteiner, n. 2.
Japan, on the other hand, has been governed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Jiyūminshutō / 自由民主党) almost continuously since the end of the Second World War. The LDP, along with its current president, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the right-wing populist Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai / 日本維新の会), led by the former Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, most strongly represent Japanese nationalism within the landscape of Japanese political parties. High-ranking LDP representatives have repeatedly made headlines with nationalist opinions and policies. During his term of office (2001 to 2006), Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine every year to honour fallen Japanese soldiers from the war. Koizumi purposefully used these visits to garner more votes among the traditional rural population. Even recently re-elected Prime Minister Abe said in the run-up to the last elections that he does not regret visiting the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term of office as Prime Minister. Furthermore, he vowed that if he won the election, he would amend Article 96 of the Constitution to facilitate the reform of the Japanese "peace clause". In the run-up to his visit to the USA in February 2013, Abe caused a stir by expressing views critical of China regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, to which both Japan and China have laid claim. Abe accused the Chinese leadership of having a “deep rooted” desire for territorial disputes with Japan and other neighbouring states, and of specifically using nationalism for domestic political purposes. The most recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by members of the Japanese

16 | Cf. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Japan’s paradoxical shift to the right", Inside Story, 6 Dec 2012, http://inside.org.au/japans-paradoxical-shift-to-the-right (accessed 14 Oct 2013). Article 96 provides strong obstacles to constitutional amendments. Amending this article would be a pre-condition of enabling an amendment of Article 9 of the National Constitution of Japan, which is also currently being discussed. This article stipulates that force may not be used except for cases of national self-defence.
government in remembrance of the 68th anniversary of the Japanese surrender in the Second World War triggered large protests in China and South Korea.

**Military**

*China’s current constitutional structure gives Chinese forces a unique position in the political system, compared to all the other states in North-East Asia (with the exception of North Korea). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is represented in every important political institution, including the National People’s Congress and the Central Committee of the CPC. The party and the army are closely intertwined. The PLA, together with the CPC, views itself as the guarantor of the nation’s stability and unity.*

Over the past few years, high-ranking active generals and foreign and security policy think tanks aligned with the PLA have repeatedly aroused international attention with provocative nationalist opinions.\(^{17}\) Territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas provide an effective sounding board for nationalist agitation. This also presented an effective legitimization for the massive military modernization and armament that has taken place over the past few years.\(^{18}\)

In contrast, the *Japanese Constitution is shaped by a fundamental pacifist character and, as a result, has faced massive criticism by nationalists since its adoption in 1947. According to Article 9, Japan may “possess neither an arms industry nor military forces”.\(^{19}\) Even though Japan now possesses one of the most modern armies in the world, it is officially designated a “self-defence forces”, making

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the debate a symbolic one. Although Article 9 is seen as a symbol of Japan’s peaceful intentions by those on the left of the political spectrum of Japanese politics, those on the right view it as a national disgrace and a symbol of their defeat in the Second World War. However, unlike in China, high-ranking representatives of the armed forces are not present in the public discussion. This role is assumed by representatives of right-wing parties.

Citizens’ initiatives, media, blogs

The growing significance of organisations in civil society in the People’s Republic of China can be primarily explained by changing ways of communication, particularly through internet-based social networks. These new opportunities for social and political participation have also been welcomed by the international community. Unfortunately, these (semi-) public platforms for expression also have a "nationalist ambiguity". Nationalist groups run hundreds of online forums, such as the “Iron and Blood Network” (Tiexuewang / 铁血网) or the “Forum for Military Issues” (Junshi Luntan / 军事论坛). Current international conflicts are broadly discussed from a nationalist perspective, demanding unyielding assertion of its own interests (as with the island conflict) and criticism of the government itself is exercised. In China, the idea also holds that "striking messages can be better sold through a medium of general nationalism than a differentiated, sober analysis of the situation". Additionally, it is often difficult to perceive whether and to what extent government bodies influence these discussions.

In Japan, there are approximately 900 ultra-nationalist citizens’ groups (uyoku dantai / 右翼団体), with a membership totalling some 10,000 members. These groups represent extreme right-wing and nationalist points of view. They are anti-communist, anti-American, they wish to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution, and they glorify Japan’s imperialist past. They often disseminate their views and slogans using minibuses equipped with loudspeakers. In 2006,

former LDP General Secretary Koichi Kato’s house was burned down by one of these groups after he criticised the Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.  

One of the largest groups in the nationalist camp is the Japanese Youth Federation (Nikon Seinensha / 日本青年社). These groups have repeatedly caused conflicts in the past between China, Taiwan and Japan regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For example, these groups constructed lighthouses on the group of islands in 1978, 1988 and 1996 and unsuccessfully requested that the Japanese government officially recognise the structures. Such actions allow these groups to continually fan the flames of conflict.

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21 | Schmidt, n. 19, 50.
“NATIONAL EDUCATION”

Patriotic education plays an important role in general educational curricula in East Asia. In the process, historical depictions of particular neighbouring states and the conflict-prone history of the 19th and 20th centuries are often the cause of cross-national quarrels. What is taught in China and Japan is far from a critical view of history, though its essence finds its way into the official school.24

Japan’s imperialist expansion toward Korea and China, in particular, and the playing down, if not outright denial, of the atrocities committed by Japanese occupying forces is heavily criticised in China (and Korea).25 Thus, some Japanese school books approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology contain passages that play down or deny the Nanjing Massacre of 1937, the testing of biological weapons on Chinese civilians or the forced prostitution of so-called “comfort women”. In fact, the sensitivities of Japan’s neighbouring states should be officially considered in the preparation of school books; coincidentally, however, the LDP government issued a guideline in 2006 declaring love of country to be an important educational objective.26

NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

While Japan, like Korea, is rather ethnically homogeneous, today’s People’s Republic of China’s national territory comprises a huge number of ethnic and linguistic minorities.27 Approximately eight per cent of the population is pitted against the dominant Han Chinese majority, who regarded themselves as the real people of China. Because Chinese

27 | Rosenbluth, Saito and Zinn, n. 14, 8 et sqq.
minorities have largely settled in the western and southern border regions, particularly strong questions of identity and separatism, autonomy and (forced) homogenisation (sinicisation) are raised. In the CPC’s political campaigns, such as the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution”, national idiosyncrasies were violently suppressed and, to a great extent, traditional cultures were destroyed – a traumatic experience that continues to have an effect today.

In fact, since 1982, the 4th paragraph of the Chinese Constitution has required the state to protect the interests of minorities and to prevent ethnic discrimination. In addition, economic and cultural development in minority-inhabited regions should be supported, and the use of their own writing systems and languages should be permitted. However, this stands in opposition to a reality marked by inadequate representation of ethnic minorities in politics, the regime and the military, as well as economic discrimination. Additionally, the massive settlement movement of Han Chinese into the western part of the country since the 1980s has led to an existential threat of perceived expulsion, loss of identity and assimilation. The reaction to this, at least with the politically significant minorities of Tibetans and Uyghurs, has been an “ethno-nationalisation” (Thomas Heberer). The importance of security and material resource policies in the western regions of China, but also the Han Chinese people’s self-image of being a superior nation, has repeatedly led to ethnic disturbances among minorities. Economic and political marginalisation has thus become “ethnised”. On the other hand, the “harmonious” integration of all ethnic groups remains a primary objective of the Communist Party – admittedly without the option of true autonomy within the Chinese federation.

Japan’s nationalist conception of itself as an ethnically homogeneous population is increasingly divergent from its reality of a rapidly changing society. Though progress has

28 | The Chinese central government officially recognises 55 “national minorities” (shaoshu minzu / 少数民族), in doing so, a number of smaller ethnic groups are combined into one despite their cultural and linguistic differences. On closer inspection, even the Han Chinese themselves cannot be regarded as a single ethnic entity.

been made over the past few years in recognising indigenous population groups (the Ainu in northern Japan, for instance), this changed almost nothing with regard to their economic disadvantages. In the future, a latent or even apparent xenophobia is certain to play a considerably more significant role in response to the increasing number of migrant workers coming in from Southeast Asia.

**Fig. 1**

*Island conflicts in the East China Sea*

![Map of the East China Sea showing the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands](image)

**EAST ASIAN NATIONALISM: ISLAND CONFLICTS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA AS AN EXAMPLE**

The current conflict surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea is one example of where a lack of assessment of one’s own historical responsibility, along with nationalism, a relative shift in power, and insufficient methods of conflict resolution can lead.\(^{30}\) Even

without the significant role played by the supposed natural resource deposits in this part of the ocean in the escalation of this conflict, the extent of the confrontations can only be explained against the backdrop of growing nationalism. This nationalism and the question of who this territory belongs to have become the greatest obstacle to Chinese/Japanese reconciliation over the past three years and the source of dangerous regional tensions in East Asia. China has substantiated its territorial claims by arguing that the Islands had already been documented by Chinese cartographers in the 14th century. Japan, on the other hand, has claimed that it had discovered the then-unclaimed islands and took possession of them in 1895. From a Chinese perspective, the territory, along with Taiwan, was surrendered to Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and then should have been returned, along with Taiwan, in the course of the peace negotiations following the Second World War in 1951. Because China officially lodged its claim only in 1971 after returning to the United Nations, Japan is now accusing Beijing of only becoming interested in the islands after energy resources were discovered in the area.

The conflict intensified when Shintaro Ishihara, the right-wing populist Governor of Tokyo at the time, announced in 2012 that he would buy the islands. Then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda purchased the islands from their private Japanese owners and “nationalised” them to prevent further disputes between the two nations. Since then, there have been several outbursts of anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese sentiments in China and Japan, respectively. To some extent, this resulted in violent riots in many Chinese cities, nationalist Chinese boycotts of Japanese products and in August 2012, the sales figures for Japanese vehicles sold

in China plunged rapidly.\textsuperscript{33} However, when the protests threatened to interfere with public order, they were quickly suppressed by the authorities.


Uniqlo, a large Japanese fashion chain, faced a particularly strong backlash of nationalist resentment that saw them facing protests against their Chinese branches. However, when news spread to Japan that the manager of one of the Shanghai branches had put up a poster in the shop window declaring that the islands belonged to China, there were large protests. Japanese customers threatened to boycott Uniqlo.\textsuperscript{34}

**EXCEPTION: NATIONALISM IN TAIWAN**

Since the loss of its UN membership in 1971 and because of the nearly universal enforcement of the One-China policy by Beijing, Taiwan’s isolation at the international level increased. In response to this, the Republic of China sought increased international recognition of its sovereignty on


the island of Taiwan. Nationalism in Taiwan is closely linked with questions of Taiwanese identity and the island’s political future. The range of positions held in Taiwan spans from that of Chinese nationalism, which views Taiwanese culture as just a part of a comprehensive Chinese culture and nation (this position is held by the current governing party, the Kuomintang), to that of explicit Taiwanese nationalism, which views “Chinese-ness” as just one constituent element of the Taiwanese nation and is accompanied by a tendency towards “de-sinicisation”.

Colonial occupation, the oppression of many Taiwanese people under Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石, 1949 to 1987), cohabitation with a multitude of mainland Chinese who had taken refuge in Taiwan with the military and nationalist supporters and ultimately Taiwan’s peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy in the 1990s have all led to a societal cleavage. This is closely tied to the key question of Taiwan’s national and territorial future. The 2000-2008 government, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang / 民進黨), a party whose roots stemmed from the Tangwai ("outside the party") opposition movement, once again intensified Taiwan’s dissociation from the mainland and placed stronger emphasis on their independent identity as “Taiwanese.”

35 | According to the One-China policy, all states that enjoy diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China must acknowledge Taiwan as a part of China and maintain no official diplomatic relations with the government in Taipei. Currently only 23 (mostly) smaller states in Central and South America, Oceania and Africa maintain official relations with Taiwan. In Europe, only the Vatican officially acknowledges Taiwan.


Since the regime change in 2008, cross-strait relations have become much more closely intertwined due to the resumption of (semi-) official contacts, several economic and trade agreements, educational and cultural exchanges and growing tourism numbers. In fact, Taiwan’s question of identity is repeatedly played out in the media landscape through the dualism of both political camps and cleavages between political camps and the media. However, the more than one million Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople on the Chinese mainland) and the growing labour market opportunities for young Taiwanese in China indicate that Taiwan is acting increasingly pragmatically. Polls back this up: In December 2012, approximately 54 per cent of people identified themselves as Taiwanese, but 38.5 per cent identified themselves as “Chinese and Taiwanese”. This suggests that many Taiwanese no longer categorically oppose a Chinese-Taiwanese nation.

The discussion of the question of an independent Taiwanese nation is not only controversial in Taiwan. At the same time, it is of utmost significance for the self-image of the People’s Republic of China and for Chinese-American relations. It is bound up with the geopolitically explosive question as to whether (and how) it could undergo a reunification with the mainland. Beijing’s policy regarding Taiwan remains based upon the strategic aim of Taiwan uniting with the mainland on its own terms. With the Anti-Secession Law of 2006, the leadership in Beijing made it clear that it would confront Taiwan’s official secession militarily if necessary. This stands in opposition to the USA’s position as a “protective power”, in which Taiwan’s incorporation would only be accepted under peaceful circumstances. China, on the other hand, perceives this as interference in its domestic affairs. While the Chinese population naturally

38 | Direct talks between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan take place regularly through both the Association for the Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side.


41 | See also Stefan Fleischauer, Der Traum von der eigenen Nation, Frankfurt am Main, 2008.
Multi-ethnic societies will become the norm in East Asia in the future, and this demands a clear change in attitude to allow for successful social integration.

It is interesting that Taiwan has also intervened in the Chinese-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. As "legitimate representation" of the Republic of China, Taiwan has also staked a historical claim to the group of islands and has demonstrated this interest with patrol boats, which were sighted near the islands in September 2012 after their purchase by Japan.43

CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The increasing significance of nationalist trends in East Asia is negatively affecting the domestic and foreign policy of the nations involved. Domestically, nationalist and racist forces are threatening cultural and social diversity and tolerance of social and ethnic minorities. However, internal and cross-border migration will increase due to demographic imbalances (e.g. ageing). Multi-ethnic societies will become the norm in East Asia in the future, and this demands a clear change in attitude to allow for successful social integration.

In the Europe of the 19th century, commitment to one's own nation was accompanied by the pursuit of freedom, equality and democracy; recent trends toward nationalism in East Asia lack such democratizing potential. On the contrary, it is more likely to be used to suppress emancipatory movements.

In terms of foreign policy, nationalism is thwarting attempts to reach for regional integration extending beyond purely economic interdependencies. In East Asia, it has once

42 | Cf. Bader, n. 12, 36.
again become apparent that globalisation and economic interdependency between nations are no guarantee of increased trust and peaceful relations. Concerns of a relative decline rather fan the flames of nationalist sentiments.

Through its ever-closer global economic links with East Asia, Europe’s prosperity and security would be directly threatened by regional or even domestic conflicts. As the birthplace of modern nationalism, Europe has had to endure the experience of nationalism and racism to the brink of (self-) destruction. However, the successful unification of Europe over the past 60 years has also demonstrated how nationalist mindsets can be overcome. Because of this, Europe and its political sphere are being called upon to communicate the notion of regional integration and a model of a tolerant society in its dialogue with its partners in Asia.
SOUTH KOREA ON A JOURNEY OF SELF-DISCOVERY

FROM “VICTIM NATIONALISM” TO NATION BRANDING

Norbert Eschborn / Janine Läpple

Those familiar with Korea are generally aware of the fact that Korean nationalism can present the greatest obstacle to foreigners seeking to understand what the Koreans are like.¹ There is clearly a specifically Korean type of nationalism, which has prevailed for a considerable time. This becomes apparent, for instance, when one contemplates a scene from the Asian crisis at the close of the 1990s. Like many other Asian countries, South Korea was in great financial turmoil. However, the Republic of Korea was one of a small number of affected countries that overcame this crisis within a very short period of time. One factor that played quite an important role in this context was the cohesion of the population and its willingness to make sacrifices for its country. At the height of the crisis, which had brought about unemployment, poverty and financial hardship, the Korean Housing and Commercial Bank joined forces with a state television station and started up a gold collection campaign.² Numerous Koreans donated their jewellery or other valuables to the state to support their fatherland.³ After the campaign had run for just two days, the donations already amounted to ten tonnes of gold, vastly exceeding the expectations of the campaign initiators.⁴ Although the population itself was suffering from the


4 | Ibid.
impacting the crisis, a sizeable proportion was willing to support the state financially and even to relinquish items of sentimental value.

LOYALTY AND SOLIDARITY

Where does this willingness to put one’s own interests aside and make sacrifices for the nation come from? Patriotism is often described as the key element of nationalism.\(^5\) Seen in this light, nationalism embodies aspects such as feeling a connection with the people that share one’s own nationality, feeling part of a larger construct. Equally important, it also embodies pride about one’s own nation. For these reasons, people with a certain degree of national consciousness are loyal towards their state. The example of the Koreans who gave up their personal possessions for the good of the state illustrates in this context how deep-rooted this loyalty is in the Republic of Korea. One arrives at a similar conclusion with respect to the level of loyalty towards the nation when taking a closer look at Korean values. According to the Korean Culture and Spirit Promotion Project, there are two values of outstanding significance in Korean society: 

\textit{Hyo}\ and \textit{Chung}. In this context, 

\textit{Hyo} embodies respect and gratitude towards one’s parents, while \textit{Chung} represents loyalty towards the fatherland.\(^6\) Together they have been the “two most important moral values that guided the minds and spirits of the Korean people.”\(^7\) Loyalty towards the fatherland thus appears to play a central role in South Korea and to be deeply engrained in society. It may not be sufficient reason for the existence of nationalism, but it forms a fundamental part of this ideology and can thus at least be interpreted as an indication of the existence of a pronounced nationalism.

Apart from this, the success of the gold collection campaign during the Asian crisis also points to the existence of a strong sense of “us” in South Korea. The extent of this feeling of solidarity becomes apparent when one looks at a


\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Chung Hyo Ye, \textit{Tales of filial devotion, loyalty, respect and benevolence from the history and folklore of Korea}, Korean Spirit & Culture Promotion Project, Seoul, 2008, 94.
survey from 2000. At that time, 93 per cent of the Korean respondents answered in the affirmative to the question as to whether they believed their nation was based on a common bloodline. Apart from this extremely high positive response rate, the survey also demonstrates a particular characteristic of Korean nationalism: its ethnic component.

South Korean nationalism is thus also characterised by people defining their nation by a common bloodline, which unites all Koreans and which they believe goes back to their forebear Tangun. Korean mythology tells the following story: "In those days there lived a she-bear and a tigress in the same cave. They prayed to Hwanung [the king who had descended from heaven] to be blessed with incarnation as human beings. The king took pity on them and gave each a bunch of mugwort and twenty pieces of garlic, saying, 'If you eat this holy food and do not see the sunlight for one hundred days, you will become human beings.' The she-bear and the tigress took the food and ate it, and retired into the cave. In twenty-one days the bear, who had faithfully observed the king’s instructions, became a woman. But the tigress, who had disobeyed, remained in her original form. [...] The bear-woman could find no husband, so she prayed under the sandalwood tree to be blessed with a child. Hwanung heard her prayers and married her. She conceived and bore a son who was called Tan’gun Wanggöm, the King of Sandalwood.”

This brief story represents nothing less than Korea’s foundation myth. The large kingdom that Hwanung’s son founded in ancient times was called Gojoseon and is considered the ancestral Korea. The city that he built near the present-day Pyongyang was called Asadal and served as the kingdom’s capital. Today, Tangun is considered Korea’s founding father, and 2333 B.C. marks the origin of the Korean nation in the Koreans’ consciousness. There is, however, some debate among Korean academics as to whether there ever was such a person as Tangun. It was support from the state that helped those advocating this thesis to win every argument and make Tangun a historic

Korea first became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and finally an official Japanese colony in 1910, which it would remain until the end of the Second World War.

Japan’s interest in Korea first became apparent towards the middle of the 19th century. South Korea saw itself confronted by a neighbour to the east that was acting with mounting aggression, and it came increasingly under its influence. This development culminated in Japan annexing Korea. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea first became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and finally an official Japanese colony in 1910, which it would remain until the end of the Second World War. It was the suffering experienced during the colonial period that ultimately also crucially influenced the development of nationalism in Korea. Although some nationalist movements had existed in Korea even before 1900, these tended to take

The fact that this founding myth is still imparted to every schoolchild today indicates that it is not some forgotten ancient story.

THE ROOTS OF KOREAN NATIONALISM

Korea’s history is in large parts that of a great nation. It may not reach back as far as 2333 B.C., the year of the mythical founding of Korea by Tangun, but archaeological finds confirm the existence of city states on the Korean Peninsula from approximately 1100 B.C. It is not, however, merely the length of Korean history that makes it significant but particularly also the sophistication of the country in former times. The historic predecessor states of present-day Korea were great nations, which had a considerable influence on the development of the region of East-Asia. This changed fundamentally when the Korean state was weakened by internal conflict and unrest from the middle of the 19th century onwards. It was at that time that another state to the east gained in strength and began to expand its power: Japan. That country was to be instrumental in determining Korea’s fate for the first 50 years of the 20th century.

The desire to free the country from servitude and to live in a sovereign Korean state spread more and more widely; the idea of nationalism had taken hold in Korea.

Foreign rule by the Japanese was characterised by discrimination, exploitation and oppression in all areas of life. Higher education was reserved to the Japanese, pay was scaled by ethnicity and Korea’s natural resources were exploited ruthlessly. These repressive policies caused increasing protests by the Korean population, and gradually a resistance movement began to form. The desire to free the country from servitude and to live in a sovereign Korean state spread more and more widely; the idea of nationalism had taken hold in Korea. On 1 March 1919, these developments erupted in a mass demonstration, which entered the history books as the “First March Movement”. During the protests, Korean nationalists

declared Korea’s independence, which triggered countrywide uprisings against the Japanese imperialists. The Japanese responded to the protests with extreme harshness. The demonstrations were put down with deadly force, producing devastating bloodshed. According to Korean estimates, some 7,500 Koreans were killed, 15,000 injured and 45,000 arrested. 1 March 1919 thus represents a black day in Korean history; but it is also a milestone in the history of Korean nationalism. It was the first time that the Koreans had joined together to rebel against foreign rule and make their desire to become a sovereign nation known. 1 March 1919 marks the day on which nationalism became the ideology of the Korean people.

Korean nationalism subsequently continued to evolve and became increasingly popular. Korean newspapers spread ideas associated with it, activists abroad set up a government-in-exile, and the call for independence became increasingly louder. The movement finally received a special boost at the end of the 1930s, when Japanese policies towards the Korean colony took a new, more extreme direction. This was a manifestation of the concept of naisen ittai, which translates as “Japan and Korea as one body”. In line with the wording of the new principle, the aim now was total assimilation of the Koreans. Seen from the opposite perspective, it meant the destruction of Korean identity. The Japanese rulers spread propaganda according to which Korea and Japan had common historic roots and the Korean race was merely a subgroup of the Japanese race. The measures taken under the new policy included banning the use of the Korean language in public and the publication of Korean-language newspapers as well as the enforced adoption of Japanese surnames. This comprehensive attempt by the Japanese to completely destroy the Korean nation had the opposite effect in that it strengthened Korean nationalism further.

16 | Cf. Shin, n. 8, 44.
19 | Cf. Tudor, n. 11, 261.
The Koreans sought to do everything in their power to distinguish themselves from the Japanese imperialists and to retain their own identity. To this end, the Korean nationalists picked up on an ancient legend, which was first mentioned in writing in 1280 by the monk Ir’yon:21 the legend of Tangun, who was the son of the god Hwanung and founded the Kingdom of Korea. The myth was spread among the population, and Tangun was henceforth portrayed as the founder of the Korean nation and forefather of all Koreans. This produced the ethnic component of Korean nationalism, which manifests in the principle of minjok. This principle states that the Korean nation is based on a common bloodline, which can be traced back to Tangun.22 Korea is thus said to be a homogenous people that has a unique culture and history, which need to be distinguished from those of the Japanese and Chinese. Dissemination of this view was intended to unite the Korean people and defend its identity against the assimilation attempts of the Japanese.23

Korea’s ethnic nationalism was born, and it became established within a very short period of time. The developments occurring after the end of foreign rule in 1945 would ensure that it was also retained in future. The elation about the end of the colonial era received a sudden damper when it became clear that Korea would not regain its independence immediately. Instead, the Allies took decisions about the country’s future on behalf of the Korean people, which meant a continuation of the heteronomy that Korea had experienced under the Japanese.

The foundations for Korea’s future were laid at the Yalta Conference in 1945, where the USA and the Soviet Union agreed on administering Korea by a joint trusteeship.24 On

22 | Cf. Tudor, n. 11, 261.
8 August 1945, Soviet troops advanced to the 38th parallel as agreed, while the Americans occupied the southern part of the country.\textsuperscript{25} The subsequent increasing deterioration in the relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union also had an impact on Korea's fate. Numerous conferences brought no progress, agreements about all-Korean elections failed. In 1948, elections were held in the U.S.-occupied zone, and Syngman Rhee rose to become the first President of the Republic of Korea.\textsuperscript{26} In the northern part, elections were held one month later, with Kim Il Sung becoming President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.\textsuperscript{27} This put the final seal on the partition of the Korean Peninsula.

\textbf{NATIONALISM AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY}

The Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, the widespread destruction it entailed and the backward state of the South Korean economy created enormous challenges for the country in the 1950s and 1960s. Dictator Park Chung-hee, who came to power in 1961 through a military coup, pursued a highly controversial strategy for overcoming the problems, which involved utilising nationalism as a tool. Syngman Rhee had previously encouraged nationalist and cultural programmes to a certain extent,\textsuperscript{28} but Park Chung-hee set in train an era of systematic use of nationalism for political purposes. He focused particularly strongly on enforcing his strategy of economic development; this required the Korean people to be united and motivated in order to jointly reconstruct the derelict economy. Starting from the basis of ethnic nationalism, the "survival and well-being"\textsuperscript{29} of the Korean race were publicised as the main objectives in this context. Large-scale campaigns were conducted, appealing to the Koreans' "love and loyalty" towards their fatherland.\textsuperscript{30} Each

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Stöver, n. 24, 36 et seq.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 46.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 47.  
\textsuperscript{29} Tudor, n. 11, 264.  
individual had to make a contribution and give something back to the country that had done so much for them. Work was described as a “patriotic duty” and workers were even referred to as “soldiers of industry.”

The subject of “National Ethics Education” became a fixed part of the curriculum, a Day and a Month of Culture were introduced, and “spiritual mobilisation” of the people became an official component of cultural policy. As part of these measures, the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation was established with the intention that it should transfer the state ideology into the minds and daily lives of people using film and literature. The “New Village Movement”, which was created in 1970, played a central role in this policy. Following the Japanese model, this state-controlled movement officially pursued the goal of improving living conditions and infrastructure in Korea’s rural areas. But it equally served to indoctrinate the people – moral education and cultural events constituted integral components of the movement.

By these means, the ideology of nationalism was not merely maintained in Korea subsequent to the colonial era, but virtually burnt into people’s consciousness. Chun Doo-hwan, who succeeded Park Chung-hee and governed until 1988, continued state support for cultural and nationalist programmes, thus ensuring the enduring existence of nationalism.

It is therefore also Korea’s extraordinary history, and in particular the dark last century, that provides an explanation of why nationalism in Korea still has such a strong presence in the early 21st century and how the unique characteristics of Korean nationalism came about. In addition to the original need to disseminate nationalist thinking as a defence against the Japanese assimilation attempts and

The subject of “National Ethics Education” became a fixed part of the curriculum, a Day and a Month of Culture were introduced, and “spiritual mobilisation” of the people became an official component of cultural policy.
the subsequent nationalist indoctrination by Park Chunghee for the purpose of the country’s industrialisation, it is finally also pride about the country’s economic upsurge at the beginning of the 21st century that can be seen as fuelling the extraordinary intensity of the country’s nationalism. After having suffered virtually a century of painful experiences – oppression, foreign rule by major powers such as Japan, the USA and the Soviet Union, and finally poverty after the civil war – the population had finally achieved its long-desired sovereignty at several levels. Foreign rule, dictatorship and poverty had been overcome. The Republic of Korea had become a democratic state with a booming economy. The country had regained its former greatness. The shadows of the past had been dispelled at long last, and people could be proud of their nation once more.

HOW DOES KOREAN NATIONALISM MANIFEST TODAY?

A recent survey gives some clues to explain the enduring strength of Korean nationalism. In 2006, 56.5 per cent of Korean respondents confirmed they agreed with the statement “I am against my children marrying a foreigner”. Over half of the respondents would therefore have denied their children their blessing for marriage to a foreigner – the idea being that the bloodline going back to 2333 B.C. should be preserved. Apart from this example, there are further aspects complementing the picture of present-day Korean nationalism and illustrating its persistence.

Hallyu – the Korean Wave

One of these aspects is embodied by the so-called Korean Wave, referred to as Hallyu in Korea. While the country was exposed to the influences of foreign powers such as Japan and the USA for a long time, a reversal took place towards the end of the 1990s. Korean pop culture expanded across the whole of Asia in the form of the Korean Wave. “Gangnam Style”, the hit by Korean rapper

36 | In Yin Joon, Young Ho Song and Young Joon Bae, “South Koreans Attitudes Towards Foreigners, Minorities and Multiculturalism”, paper presented during a meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1-4 Aug 2008, 335.
Psy, even found its way into the global media and is the most successful example of Korean pop culture to date. In 1997, Korean television series were broadcast in China and Taiwan for the first time, to great success against general expectation. Broadcasts in Hong Kong and Southeast Asian countries followed. During subsequent years, Korean TV series and movies became increasingly popular and spread like wildfire throughout the Asian region. Some years after that, Korean pop music also increased in popularity and began to dominate the Asian charts – the Korean Wave was born.

Parallel to the increasing proliferation of Korean pop culture, general interest in Korea rose as well. Korean food as well as Korean fashion won an ever-increasing following, the demand for Korean language courses soared, and a type of fan tourism emerged involving people visiting the locations where famous Korean movies had been shot. There were and are even some people who go to extremes in their desire to look like their Korean idols, as plastic surgeons report. Korea is “in” in Asia. This fact fills the country’s people with enormous pride. UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon, himself from South Korea, made this comment: “The Korean Wave has brought the country long-overdue respect.” Jeongsuk Joo refers to this phenomenon as “pop nationalism” – the sudden popularity of the country’s culture in the entire Asian region is strengthening nationalist feelings and sustaining pride and national consciousness in South Korea. Hallyu is thus more than just music and television; it is an expression of modern Korean nationalism and of the realisation of being an influential nation.

Korean Spirit and Culture Promotion Project

Besides modern pop culture, efforts are also being made to maintain original, traditional Korean culture. In 2005, a Korean organisation entitled Korean Spirit and Culture Promotion Project...
In 1966, Japan and South Korea resumed official diplomatic relations, but there are a number of unresolved conflicts between the neighbouring countries, which flare up time and again. The Promotion Project was founded to this end. It pursues the aim of not merely maintaining Korean culture, but of disseminating it particularly to other parts of the world. The efforts made in this connection are quite remarkable. The organisation maintains offices in Germany, the USA and the UK and produces free brochures published in several languages, which offer information about Korean history and culture. Large numbers of these brochures are distributed to schools, universities, businesses and embassies as well as high-ranking members of foreign governments. Among other things, their existence underlines the importance that cultural heritage has for the Republic of Korea. An equally significant aspect embodied by the organisation is one that currently occupies a central role in Korea’s nationalism: the need to disseminate one’s own culture and make the world take note of South Korea, which is also apparent among the population.

**NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA**

A further aspect in which present-day Korean nationalism manifests is embodied by the country’s relationship with Japan. This aspect symbolises the darker side of nationalism in Korea, as it fuels the persistent conflicts between the two countries. The bilateral relationship has been strained since the Second World War. In 1966, Japan and South Korea resumed official diplomatic relations, but there are a number of unresolved conflicts between the neighbouring countries, which flare up time and again. This effectively prevents closer cooperation, which would be beneficial to both sides in a number of different areas.

**Dokdo/Takeshima**

The Liancourt Rocks – known in Korea as Dokdo and in Japan as Takeshima Islands – constitute one of the central points of contention between Japan and Korea. The group of islands, with a surface area of just 0.186 square kilometres, was annexed by Japan in 1905, an event that

represented the starting point of Japan’s imperialist ambitions towards Korea. Dokdo is therefore of great symbolic significance for Korea.

Symbol of Korean assertion against Japan: The Dokdo islands, to the left on the screen of a taximeter, to the right as a model in the metro of Seoul. | Source: © Norbert Eschborn.

After the end of the Second World War, territorial matters were settled by the 1952 Peace Treaty of San Francisco. This listed numerous islands that Japan was meant to return to Korea, but Dokdo was not included. Ever since then, both Japan and Korea have insisted on a territorial claim to Dokdo. Japan justifies its claim by stating that Dokdo was not covered in any of the post-war agreements and had not been taken by force. The islands had in fact been terra nullius under international law at the time of annexation, i.e. had never previously been part of any state. The Koreans, on the other hand, state that Dokdo had been part of Korea’s sovereign territory for a long time and that its annexation by Japan was therefore illegal.

In 2002, the publication of Japanese textbooks, in which Dokdo was depicted as being part of Japan, triggered demonstrations in South Korea and resulted in diplomatic tensions.

Dokdo had not been terra nullius in 1905; the Republic of Korea had merely not been in a position to protest against the annexation in the international arena as it had already been under Japanese influence by then. In substantiation of these assertions, the Korean side cites sources which they say prove that Dokdo had already been part of the Kingdom of Silla in 512 A.D. (a predecessor of present-day Korea) and that Korea’s territorial claim to Dokdo therefore goes back some 1,500 years. After the end of the Second World War, South Korea took over administration of the group of islands, but Japan still insisted that Dokdo was part of Japanese national territory. After the conflict had lain dormant for some time, it flared up again towards the end of the 20th century, when Japan unilaterally declared a 200-nautical-mile economic exclusion zone around Dokdo and harassed Korean fishing vessels present in this area. Subsequent provocations from both sides then brought the matter to a head. In 2002, the publication of Japanese textbooks, in which Dokdo was depicted as being part of Japan, triggered demonstrations in South Korea and resulted in diplomatic tensions. In the Republic of Korea, a series of stamps depicting nature motifs from Dokdo was issued in 2004 in spite of Japanese protests.

The following year saw a brief escalation of the conflict, when the Shimane Prefecture, into which Dokdo had been incorporated in 1905, declared 22 February “Take-shima Day”. The timing of this was particularly sensitive. The day of celebration was declared exactly 100 years after the annexation of Dokdo on 22 February 1905 and thus precisely one century on from the start of Korea’s colonisation. This affront triggered furious protests by the Korean population. The conflict has not abated during the

44 | Ibid., 44 and 89.
46 | Cf. Emmers, n. 45, 2.
48 | Cf. Wada Harouki, “Japan’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes in East Asia”, in: Song (ed.), n. 43, 189.
last few years. The most recent events in the dispute over Dokdo included a visit to the islands by the Korean Prime Minister in 2008, which was timed to coincide with large military exercises, the publication of further history books in Japan in 2010, which contained critical statements regarding Dokdo, as well as the first visit to Dokdo by a Korean president, Lee Myeong Bak, in 2012.

“Comfort Women”

“Comfort women” represent a further point of contention between Japan and the Republic of Korea that goes back to the colonial era. This term refers to a group of women, numbering between 50,000 and 200,000 according to different estimates, who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese during the War in the Pacific. They were accommodated in “comfort stations”, which existed in all areas occupied by the Japanese, and their main purpose was to strengthen the motivation of Japanese soldiers and thus enhance the effectiveness of the Japanese army.

South Korean women bore the brunt of this chapter of Japanese colonial rule, as over half of the “comfort women” were from Korea. Some were sold by their parents as minors because of financial hardship, some were abducted by the Japanese and others surrendered voluntarily to the colonial masters lured by empty promises of well-paid jobs in Japanese factories. The Japanese government played a leading role in the planning and administration of the “comfort stations”. To date, there has been no official apology or any payment of damages to individual surviving victims. In order to demonstrate their outrage about this, 234 former “comfort women” started the so-called Wednesday Demonstrations in 1992, which have been held in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul on a weekly basis ever since.

49 | Cf. Myoung-Sook Youn, “Controversies surrounding the question of the Japanese army’s comfort stations and comfort women”, in: Song (ed.), n. 43, 217.
51 | Cf. Youn, n. 49, 223 and 227.
Yasukuni Shrine

For several decades, high-ranking Japanese politicians have been paying regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to commemorate the Japanese war dead, the last instance being a visit by 168 members of the Japanese parliament in April 2013. These visits are regularly followed by diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan. The reason is that the people commemorated at the Yasukuni Shrine include 14 convicted class A war criminals. According to the rating system introduced by the Allies, class A criminals are the main perpetrators, represented by the political leadership. Seven of the 14 war criminals revered at the Yasukuni Shrine were executed in the course of the Tokyo Trials – the equivalent of the Nuremburg Trials. In addition, the Yasukuni Shrine commemorates some 200,000 fallen Koreans who had been forcefully recruited into the Japanese army during the course of the Japanese occupation. Korean families have repeatedly requested that the names of their family members be removed from the list of persons commemorated at the Yasukuni Shrine. They explained that to them the thought of their family

members being commemorated at the shrine for their service to the Japanese fatherland was unbearable. However, the request by the Korean families has remained unheeded to date.

Relations between Japan and South Korea are a highly complex matter. There is already a sizeable body of literature discussing this tense relationship, but the focus in this paper is once again on the aspect of Korean nationalism. The significance this bears in the conflict between the two countries is demonstrated most clearly by the controversy over Dokdo. The islands are hardly more than a few scraggy rocks, yet they have become the object of a lengthy dispute pursued with a great deal of aggression. This is only explicable to those who realise that Dokdo acts as a symbol for Korea’s oppression by Japan. The group of islands embodies all the painful years during which Korea had to suffer under Japan’s rule, and it therefore also underpins Korean nationalism. If Korea were to give way in the dispute over the islands or even just conduct itself more cooperatively, this would mean a renewed triumph of Japan over Korea. The Koreans’ national pride makes it imperative for the Republic of Korea to hold on to Dokdo to demonstrate its regained strength to Japan and to the rest of the world.

CONCLUSION: SELF-CONFIDENCE AND NATION BRANDING

Consequently, nationalism is still very much present in Korea. This circumstance represents another particular feature of Korean nationalism. While nation states around the world are gradually losing some of their individuality to the benefit of unions of states such as the EU, nationalism in South Korea is more topical than in virtually any other developed industrialised nation. Taken together, the described examples paint a multi-faceted picture of what nationalism means in present-day Korea. In addition, they provide insight into an interesting characteristic of Korean nationalism today: the need to spread the country’s culture to the wider world and enhance the country’s international reputation. This need appears to be something of a complex rooted in history. For a long time, Korea was the pawn of foreign powers; even where its own future was
Today, South Korea is the twelfth strongest economy in the world. From being a developing country, the state has risen to become a leading industrialised nation within an extremely short time. Concerned, the populace was denied a voice. The country was one of the poorest in the world and illiteracy was rife. Today, South Korea is the twelfth strongest economy in the world. From being a developing country, the state has risen to become a leading industrialised nation within an extremely short time. Yet South Korea is still somewhat of an “unknown quantity”, as Daniel Tudor put it. Even those who have an interest in Asia frequently ignore the country, focusing instead on its powerful neighbours China and Japan. This, in combination with the historic complex that appears to exist in the Korean mind, provides an explanation for this component of Korean nationalism. Now that the nation has finally regained its former greatness, it wants the rest of the world to take notice and accord it due respect.

The extraordinary change that South Korea has undergone over the last few decades manifests in various ways. One aspect that symbolises Korea’s new self-confidence on the back of this development is the campaign of “Nation Branding”, which the government has been pursuing for several years. Nation Branding is the attempt by a country to improve its international reputation in order to gain political and economic benefits. While South Korea has become one of the economically strongest nations in the world, the country’s international image still appears to be limited to “Gangnam Style”, Samsung and Kimchi. Early attempts to change this were made by former Korean President Kim Dae-jung, who initiated a major image campaign to promote Korea worldwide on the occasion of the 2002 Football World Cup hosted jointly by South Korea and Japan. Under Lee Myeong Bak’s government, Nation Branding came to feature more strongly in government policy. In 2008, the year he took office, he referred to Nation Branding as one of the three core values that

56 | Tudor, n. 11, 9.
57 | Ibid.
59 | Ibid., 101.
were crucial to Korea’s future.\textsuperscript{60} The following year saw the founding of the Presidential Council on Nation Branding. This organisation reports directly to the President and has a budget of 100 billion won (currently approximately 70 million euros).\textsuperscript{61} According to Bak, the goals of this institution include the development of Korea into an internationally respected country.\textsuperscript{62} The current Chairman of the Presidential Council on Nation Branding, Samuel Koo, stressed that his institution was working continuously so the nation could become one of the most important leading countries in the world.\textsuperscript{63} There are already some definite signs of achievements in this direction – which may or may not be due to state campaigns. While the Korean Wave is limited to Asia, Psy’s 2012 “Gangnam Style”, for instance, became an international hit, the number of tourists to Korea has more than doubled since 2007, and Korean companies such as Nexon continue to impress through strong performance.

The Republic of Korea has changed from being on the defensive to taking the offensive. Like the Korean Wave, the Nation Branding campaign thus embodies not just the country’s new self-confidence but also its ability to come to terms with the past. What originated as a defensive type of nationalism to protect the country’s identity has ended in the country of South Korea making progress in putting itself on the map at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

**OUTLOOK: END OF KOREAN NATIONALISM THROUGH GLOBALISATION?**

Nationalism remains an important part of Korean consciousness. South Korea is, however, also undergoing change. Companies such as the Samsung and LG corporations are operating successfully in the global marketplace. While the


\textsuperscript{61} Cf. Schmuck, n. 58, 107.


It has become more attractive particularly to the Chinese and to people from Southeast Asia. South Korea has arrived in the 21st century and finds itself swept along by the wave of globalisation.

The number of foreigners living in South Korea was vanishingly small at 50,000 only two decades ago, the country has been experiencing an enormous influx for some time. It has become more attractive particularly to the Chinese and to people from Southeast Asia. South Korea has arrived in the 21st century and finds itself swept along by the wave of globalisation. These changes will also have an impact on Korean nationalism. Will the increasing opening up of Korea inevitably lead to a weakening of nationalism? Or is nationalism so deeply rooted in Korean society that it will remain impervious to the influences of globalisation? Are nationalism and globalisation reconcilable?

Korea expert Professor Gi Wook Shin does not see any signs of nationalism abating despite the increasing impact of globalisation. Instead, he sees signs of the opposite effect, of an increase in the intensity of nationalism produced by globalisation. He thinks this is due to the fact that South Korea is attempting to shape the impact of globalisation in a way to ensure that it has only positive consequences for the country. Globalisation has also resulted in something of an awakening with respect to the country’s own cultural heritage. This has manifested particularly in increasing state support for Korean culture—a measure that former President Kim Dae-jung included in the official agenda of the globalisation programme of his government. In the Nobel laureate’s view, Korea can only succeed in becoming part of the globalised world if the Korean identity can be preserved. One example that appears to confirm this trend can be found in Korean media legislation. This dictates that at least 80 per cent of the programmes broadcast by state television stations must be Korean productions. So while beneficial effects of globalisation have been gradually permitted on the one hand, policies have been pursued to actively support the preservation of Korean culture on the other.


66 | Ibid.

67 | Authors’ own research.
There are now increasing signs of a development in the opposite direction where Korean nationalism and the Korean government’s response to globalisation are concerned. One example is the reaction provoked by a law from 2000, which granted ethnic Koreans an unlimited right of residence in Korea unless they were immigrants from Russia or China. The purpose had been to restrict immigration to highly educated, English speaking foreigners of Korean descent, who were unlikely to come from those two countries. By 2004, the law had been changed after protests from civil society organisations, and it now applies to all ethnic Koreans living abroad.\(^68\) Other discriminatory laws have fared similarly and some of them have been corrected or rescinded entirely over recent years. This applies in particular to the Korean Nationality Act that came into force in 1948, which had refused Korean citizenship to the children of fathers of non-Korean descent for half a century.\(^69\) This law was finally revised in 1998. Now, children with one ethnic Korean parent are automatically awarded Korean citizenship, whichever parent it is.\(^70\)

Another indication of slowly developing change is evidenced in the results of a 2005 survey by the East Asia Institute on the subject of Korean identity. In answer to the question “What is the most important criterion that makes a person Korean?”, the option “Korean citizenship” was ticked by the greatest number of people overall; while the response “Korean bloodline” was chosen by almost as many people, it only ranked fifth by comparison with the other responses.\(^71\) Of course one cannot ignore how small the differences were between the various options. However, when one considers the large proportion that had chosen the “common bloodline” option in the 2000 survey by Gi Wook Shin, the picture painted by the results from the 2005 survey is significant.


\(^69\) Cf. Hye Kjung Lee, “Gender, Migration and Civil Activism in South Korea”, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 12, 1-2, 143.


\(^71\) Cf. Lee, n. 68, 377.
While the country was still in virtual isolation in 1980 and only 200,000 foreigners lived in South Korea in 2001 according to official numbers, the figure had already risen to 1.4 million by 2011.

Today, nationalism inevitably still plays a very large role in Korean society. By comparison with the past, however, its significance seems to be reducing steadily, albeit very slowly. This trend is likely to accelerate over the next few years due to a number of factors. First, one needs to consider the impact the increasing number of foreigners on Korean soil has, which will probably continue rising over the coming years. While the country was still in virtual isolation in 1980 and only 200,000 foreigners lived in South Korea in 2001 according to official numbers, the figure had already risen to 1.4 million by 2011.72

This corresponds to an increase in the foreign population of 600 per cent in just ten years. This trend looks set to continue, as the Korean economy needs an influx of both high and low-skilled workers to satisfy the needs of the factories of Korean industry. The demographic development in the Republic of Korea will only encourage this trend. As contact between Koreans and foreigners increases, the number of international relationships will rise. While Korean women who entered into relationships with American soldiers after the Second World War were greatly discriminated against, mixed relationships already made up twelve per cent of all new marriages in 2006.73 In the rural areas of Korea, the proportion was as high as 41 per cent.74 Although this high percentage is due to the special phenomenon that Korean farmers cannot easily find Korean women willing to marry them and therefore marry women from Southeast Asian countries, this trend does have consequences. Mixed marriages produce children who are no longer ethnically pure Koreans according to traditional thinking. As this interrupts the Korean bloodline, it will not be possible for the tale of

72 | Cf. Tudor, n. 11, 271.
74 | Ibid.
the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean people to persist. The number of these children is still relatively small, but it will rise with the increasing number of international marriages and produce a community of Koreans of mixed ethnicity. The discrimination they are still experiencing today will decrease, as the community will have reached a considerable size within the foreseeable future. While foreigners still represented a rarity in South Korea a few years ago, they will become a permanent part of the population in the near future.

Another factor blurring the picture is the fact that the intensity of nationalism differs by age group. While nationalism does exist among Korea’s young people, it no longer plays a primary role for them. The younger, media-networked generation has not experienced Korea’s dark times and did not have to suffer Japanese oppression, American foreign rule or gnawing hunger and grinding poverty. Instead, it was born into a globalised world, in which foreigners are gradually becoming a normal part of everyday life. Young people no longer suffer from contact anxiety; they have foreign school friends, who ultimately become friends and partners. In addition, they have opportunities that were denied their forefathers. While South Korea was a country cut off from the outside world until the end of the dictatorship, today’s young people have the opportunity to travel, to gain work experience abroad or to conduct part of their university studies in another country. This gives them a totally different perspective onto the world and onto their own nation.

The fact that nationalism continues to be deeply rooted in Korean society can be explained partly by the influence of the older generation. The levers of power in politics and society are still in the hands of those who think the world is not giving South Korea the recognition it deserves. There are, however, indications that a gradual decline in nationalism has begun, which will probably continue for the foreseeable future. Joining the open global society is not just an opportunity but a necessity for the Republic of Korea. It would mean Korea would also truly become the cosmopolitan country it purports to be in its campaign to enhance its image in the eyes of the world.

75 | Tudor, n. 11, 270.
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2013 AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN CAMBODIA

Denis Schrey / Allan Tran-Sam / Stefanie Hartwig

On 28 July at 7:41 PM the Cambodian Minister of Information Khieu Kannarith announced on Facebook the preliminary election result of the 5th parliamentary election in Cambodia after the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. The Minister’s announcement: “Cambodian People’s Party (CPP): 68 seats, Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP): 55 seats, no change,” came one hour after CNRP, the main opposition party, declared itself the winner of the national election, claiming 63 seats out of 120 for their own party.

The recent confirmation of the preliminary results by the National Election Committee (NEC) – viewed by the opposition, Civil Society Organisations and many voters as not independent – comes at a time where the opposition and the ruling party are struggling to agree on procedures for establishing a joint committee to look into pre-election and vote counting irregularities. The opposition party and the leading NGO election network accuse the National Election Committee as well as the Constitutional Council of being biased and influenced by the ruling party and not independent of fulfilling their role as an arbitrator on election complaints as long as their personal ties to the CPP are that close. Although the actual counting of votes seems to confirm the victory of the ruling party mass irregularities on voter’s registrations, improperly sealed vote tallies as well as vote buying lead to a tampering of election results.

While the opposition continues to reject the announced results, the CPP mixes conciliatory with hard-line statements to respond to the opposition threats of mobilising

1 | On 23 Oct 1991, 19 governments gathered to sign, under UN Mandate, the Paris Peace Agreements which offered a comprehensive political settlement aimed at ending the tragic conflict and continuing bloodshed in Cambodia.
further mass demonstrations in case the CPP does not comply with their political demand for independent election investigation. Despite the current political deadlock, the time of Hun Sen’s CPP dominating the political landscape in Cambodia for three decades seems to be history. The election result indicates a further consolidation of the Cambodian party system. Citizen’s affiliation with former Royalist parties (FUNCINPEC and Nationalist Party) saw a further decline in what was once popular support. With two remaining political forces CPP and CNRP represented in the National Assembly, no party needs to build a coalition or compromise but can focus on their role as ruling and opposition party. In the Cambodian political context this might lead to further polarisation and confrontation in the political discourse. The increased popular support for the opposition signals the desire of citizens to have a strong and constructive challenger of government actions and policies. People’s high expectations for a strong opposition party come at a time when the opposition party has been going through a merging process (Sam Rainsy Party and Human Rights Party joined forces and established in 2012 the Cambodian National Rescue Party) and where effective and sustainable opposition party structures at national and local levels have yet to be developed.

Table 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>allocation of seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Party (former Norodom Rannarith Party)</td>
<td>Seng Sokeng</td>
<td>37,963</td>
<td>2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC Party</td>
<td>Prinzessin Norodom Aron Raksmey</td>
<td>241,866</td>
<td>2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>Sokroth Sokvanpanha Kseyla</td>
<td>34,569</td>
<td>– 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political context in which this year’s general election took place is a reminder that the party system in Cambodia is strongly linked to the country’s history. The political configuration inherited from the 2008 election initially included five political parties. Due to strategic merging, only three remained in the National Assembly at the end of the five-year term: the CPP, the FUNCINPEC, and the CNRP. Each of them has its roots in a specific situation in Cambodia’s modern history.

According to its official stance the CPP is the successor of the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). This political party was founded in 1951 as the result of the dismemberment of the Vietnamese-based Indochina Communist Party into national parties. After the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, KPRP became the only party in a

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<th>Votes</th>
<th>allocation of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)</td>
<td>Chea Sim</td>
<td>3,227,729</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Party for Economic Development</td>
<td>Houset Reamren</td>
<td>19,871</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Alleviation Party</td>
<td>Krovanch Daron</td>
<td>43,312</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP)</td>
<td>Sam Rainsy</td>
<td>2,941,113</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League for Democracy</td>
<td>Krom Veasna</td>
<td>69,667</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,616,110</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE MARKS OF HISTORY IN A MODERNISING POLITICAL GAME**

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3 | The following remarks are partly inspired by interviews with representatives of each political party seating in the Parliament at the time. The interviews took place in September 2012 in Phnom Penh. Interviewees were Yos Phanita (CPP), Chea Se (FUNCINPEC), Ky Wandara (SRP), Long Kimkhorn (HRP), and Pen Sangha (NRP).

4 | During the Vietnam War (1955-1975), Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge Communists formed an alliance to fight the U.S.-backed regimes in their respective countries. The Khmer Rouge •
pro-soviet, one-party authoritarian system, founding its legitimacy on its defeat of the Khmer Rouge regime. In the 1990s the KPRP officially dropped its Marxist-Leninist ideology, orienting itself towards reformist socialism. In defiance of various changes of political systems, what became known as the CPP from 1991 on was able to establish itself as a solid entity in Cambodian political history. The CPP still bears the scars of its history. A strong hierarchy and meticulously organised structures are still main features of the organisation, partly explaining its efficacy. The elites’ socialisation to Vietnamese socialism also explains the CPP’s still solid inroads into the society, as well as its reticent posture with respect to participatory approaches and bottom up democratic mechanisms.\(^5\)

Fig. 1

\textbf{Voter turnout and number of political parties competing in the General elections since 1993 in Cambodia}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{axis}[
    xmin=1993, xmax=2013,
    ymin=0, ymax=100,
    ytick={0,20,40,60,80,100},
    y ticklabels={0,20,40,60,80,100},
    y axis line style = {draw=black},
    x axis line style = {draw=black},
    y tick label style={/pgf/number format/1000 sep=,}
]
\addplot[blue,mark=square,mark options={scale=0.8,fill=black}] table[row sep=crcr] {1993 96.5
1998 54.5
2003 34
2008 11
2013 5.5};
\addlegendentry{Voter turnout}
\addlegendentry{Number of parties in competition}
\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Source: NEC, n. 2. 2013 turnout rate estimated according to preliminary results.

nevertheless quickly grew distrustful of their northern brothers, suspecting them of scheming to establish an Indochina federation under the influence of Vietnam. This situation led to increasing tension, and repeated small and medium-scale military incursions from both sides. By 1978, the political negotiations between the two partners had reached a deadlock. The Vietnamese leaders finally decided to remove the Khmer Rouge regime, invading Cambodia on 25 Dec 1978. Their troops reached Phnom Penh in just two weeks, and were to stay in the country for the following decade, effectively putting an end to the four-year rule of the Khmer Rouge. A pro-Vietnamese government was installed, in a system that remained that of a single-party regime – revolving around the KPRP.
The FUNCINPEC party was officially formed as a political party from abroad in 1981, as a tentative offer to an alternative resistance against the Vietnamese. The FUNCINPEC party was founded by and around the prominent figure of King Sihanouk, the father of the nation who obtained Cambodia’s independence from the French without a drop of blood. The party’s legitimacy derived from Sihanouk’s aura and prestige, and was related to the end of colonialism and Royalty. It was officially formed as a political party from abroad in 1981, as a tentative offer to an alternative resistance to the Vietnamese. The FUNCINPEC’s popularity never ceased decreasing throughout Cambodia’s recent history, going from winning the first democratic election in 1993 to not being able to secure a seat this year in the National Assembly. The party has had difficulties becoming more than “the King’s party” and creating a clear political identity with a distinct programme. Its regular alignment to the CPP, with which it shared power in a coalition from 1993 until this year’s ballot, also made it hard for voters to clearly identify the FUNCINPEC’s line. The retirement of King Sihanouk in 2004 and his death in 2012 weakened the party’s identity even more, along with several dissidences. The most recent of them led to the creation of the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) in 2006.

5 | For more details, see: David Roberts, “From ‘Communism’ to ‘Democracy’ in Cambodia: a Decade of Transition and Beyond”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36, 2003, 245-258.

6 | Only two organisations were able to oppose the pro-Vietnamese government set-up following the 1978 invasion of Cambodia: the Khmer Rouge, which the Vietnamese had just ousted from power but yet remained active, and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The latter, created in 1979 with the support of Thailand, was an attempt to build up a non-communist resistance to the Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia. It demanded immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a democratically elected government.

7 | The Vietnamese armed forces, under increasing pressure from the international community, started their withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. In the same year, the First Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia was held to find a solution regarding the future of the country. This led to the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, signed by the factions of the Cambodian Supreme National Council, Vietnam, and the fifteen countries that participated in the Paris Peace Conference. The Agreement included the establishment of a United Nation Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to monitor Cambodia’s transition towards democracy. A new Cambodian Constitution was adopted in 1993, which legally transformed Cambodia into a modern Constitutional Monarchy with a parliamentary system. The first democratic general election was held in 1993.
on account of a conflict between Prince Norodom and the FUNCINPEC’s secretary general. As a result, the royalist vote in Cambodia became more divided and more confused, as NRP’s platform was hard to differentiate from the FUNCINPEC’s or, to a certain extent, the CPP’s.8

The endeavour did not last and, following the Prince’s retirement from politics in 2012, the party was renamed Nationalist Party. Later on, its merging with FUNCINPEC was decided. The two other parties that secured seats in the National Assembly in the 2008 General election are the SRP and the HRP.9 In 1995, FUNCINPEC dissident and fierce critic of the government Sam Rainsy founded the Khmer Nation Party, later re-named Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). In 2003, Kem Sokha, also a former FUNCINPEC member, set up the NGO Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR) with the objective of creating a public forum to advance human rights. After being temporarily detained for defamation, and supported by a 200,000 strong thumbprint petition, Kem Sokha turned his Centre into the political party HRP in 2007. These two parties SRP and HRP are younger, and rooted in a different period of the history of Cambodia. Contrary to the CPP and FUNCINPEC, they were created in the context of a multi-party system legally established by the constitution of 1993. This impacts directly the two parties’ nature and objectives. Firstly, they lack the strong historical identity the CPP and the FUNCINPEC enjoy. Secondly, they had to compete from the beginning with the already strong and experienced CPP and FUNCINPEC.

In preparation for this year’s ballot, the two parties merged in 2012 under the CNRP’s electoral banner, thereby creating a credible opposition force. This made possible the stunning results it obtained in the 2013 election compared to the opposition parties’ cumulative scores the previous years. Yet the CNRP’s platform remains relatively weak.10

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8 | The NRP and FUNCINPEC both won two seats in the 2008 General election, receiving respectively 5.62 per cent and 5.05 per cent of the votes.
9 | They respectively secured 26 and three seats.
10 | In the interviews conducted in September 2012 by Stefanie Hartwig, none of the interviewees was able to give a clear answer when asked to define their party’s ideology; as exemplified by Long Kimkhorn (HRP) who stated: “We start with social democrat; if one day the party becomes stronger, we move to liberal democrat.”
The party picks out issues that are usually found among traditional NGO-topics, such as rule of law, human rights, land grabbing and labour migration. Furthermore, there are the social problem of labour migration, the poor working conditions and insufficient workers’ rights in the garment industry. These contentious social issues manage to obtain media coverage and to polarise the population, but the party falls short of offering a comprehensive and sufficiently developed political platform.

![Fig. 2 Percentage of vote received by the main parties during General elections since 1993](image)

Source: NEC, n. 2. Data for the 2013 general election are calculated according to the preliminary.

The tendency of personalisation of the party, such as found in the CPP with Hun Sen’s almost thirty-year rule or in the FUNCINPEC around the royal family, is also sometimes unfortunately recurrent.\(^\text{11}\) Owing to its long history, the CPP outplays its opponents in membership numbers and organisational structure at all administrative levels.\(^\text{12}\)

In the past, many scholars have brought forward the structural elements favouring the CPP: a rule of law slowly but surely establishing itself, great control over the media,

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11 | As Ky Wandara (SRP) put it in an interview in September 2012: “[The] person makes [the] party.”
and a lack of legal framework leaving party financing unregulated. These arguments have been regularly used to explain the CPP’s electoral victories and dominance of political life. Although they cannot explain the results of this year’s election. Other elements must be taken into account.

Voters in a polling station: In a study more than half of the respondents expressed they were feeling better off than five years ago. | Source: © Mak Remissa, picture alliance / dpa.

**WELCOMED CONTINUOUS ECONOMIC GROWTH**

Support to the CPP cannot exclusively be attributed to a lack of serious political contenders. Nor can it be assumed that this support rests on the sole historical prestige attached to the party, or on somewhat of a personality cult initiated by Hun Sen. The Prime Minister’s majority can count on a record of improvements widely perceived by the population as successes of the CPP. Above all stands

continuous economic growth, does not go unnoticed by the voters. In a study conducted from 12 January to 2 February 2013, more than half the respondents expressed they were feeling better off compared to five years ago and, for the seventh year in a row, about 80 per cent of the people thought the country was headed in the right direction. Considering the CPP has been in power alone or in a coalition since the first democratic elections of 1993, giving them credit – if only partly – for such improvements seems only fair.

This impressive economic growth can be explained by several factors. Firstly, Cambodia has traveled a long road. The state of war and the Khmer Rouges effectively destroyed almost all infrastructures and institutions in the country. Following their overthrow, Cambodia became, and is still today, an important recipient of foreign aid. This aid has constantly prioritised the health and infrastructure sectors over the years, translating into direct and concrete daily-life improvement for the Cambodians.

The state of war and the Khmer Rouges effectively destroyed almost all infrastructures and institutions in the country. Following their overthrow, Cambodia became, an important recipient of foreign aid.

17 | Ibid.
18 | The above-mentioned survey conducted by the International Republican Institute found that people thought the two issues having the greatest impact on their family lives were health and sanitation (23 per cent), and jobs (17 per cent). That is to say health and the economy.
and at the same time contributing to long-term economic growth (through investment in infrastructure and education for instance). Nevertheless, the net official development assistance and official aid received by the kingdom make up for a smaller part of its gross national income every year, decreasing to 6.5 per cent in 2011 with 792 million U.S. dollars, compared to about eleven per cent ten years before, with 420 million U.S. dollars.

Secondly, as these numbers also demonstrate, foreign aid and assistance, albeit non-negligible, do not constitute the whole of the Cambodian economy. Industry (in particular the garment industry) is thriving in the country, encouraged by labour intensive methods, some of the lowest wages in the region and duty-free access to the European market. All in all, industry is expected to register a ten per cent annual growth rate in 2013, mostly through exports, which accounted for 54 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011. What’s more, these favourable conditions, along with political stability and pro-investors policies by the government have succeeded in creating a climate of trust and business attractiveness: Foreign direct investments showed a skyrocketing 73 per cent annual growth in 2012, with close to 1.6 billion U.S. dollars invested in Cambodia, or approximately seven per cent of its GDP. 23 per cent of these investments are from China, and a majority of the rest from ASEAN countries. The share of investments made from ASEAN countries is growing every year and bound to be more and more important as greater communication and strategic planning by the ASEAN facilitate investments plans. Finally, tourism and real estate make up a significant part of the Cambodian economy as well. Tourism is expected to grow seven per cent in 2013, and could even score better if the trend

21 | For instance the creation from 2005 on of 20 Special Economic Zones in strategic places such as the Thai or Vietnamese borders.
of the first half of the year will be confirmed in the second one,\textsuperscript{22} while real estate is booming thanks to urbanisation.

Thus, the Cambodian economy presents strong assets and shows better results every year. In the long run, the question of aid dependency should nevertheless be addressed. Foreign aid and assistance can provide Cambodia with transitional help towards securing long-term growth. But it will not last forever,\textsuperscript{23} and the objective of long-term growth will not be reached without strong Cambodian commitment to the modernisation of the economy. International aid should be invested wisely to foster broad-based development, while efforts should be made to diversify the economy. Cambodia’s GDP is still comparatively low, and needs to be strengthened. The challenge for the Cambodian economy lies in going beyond the stages of production and transformation of raw materials. The inclusion of skilled workers and research and development activities is crucial for a sustainable economy. The Cambodian economy has already been diversified, slowly but surely. It needs to continue on this path and fully realise its transition.

CPP, THE CUSTODIAN OF SOCIAL PEACE?

A second argument CPP followers regularly bring forward in support of their party is the closely related social stability and social peace it has been able to maintain in the country, going so far as to threaten civil war if the opposition won the election. After the tumultuous and bloody recent history of Cambodia, it is understandable that people want to preserve stability. And as a matter of fact, since 1999, when royalists’ and Hun Sen’s supporters fought in the streets after Hun Sen deposed his co-Premier in a coup, the country has been at peace. This argument is frequently used in the CPP’s propaganda, and it seems to be largely heard.


When discussing social stability in Cambodia, it is nevertheless important not to forget where it comes from and what it is based on. Only through the understanding of the post-Khmer Rouges context, in which the system is rooted, can one comprehend how and why it was accepted and has been able to persist since then. The greatest threat after the Vietnamese “liberation” of the Cambodians in 1979 was social instability. Left only with the ruins of what used to be a society, everything had to be reconstructed. The strategy adopted to address this issue as rapidly as possible was national reconciliation: the majority of former Khmer Rouges Cadres were reintegrated into society, and participated in the national effort of reconstruction. In a society where no institution existed and where a democratic culture was absent, one fast and efficient way to realise this was to rally to the cause those people who had the power to mobilise the necessary resources, providing them with personal incentives and ensuring their loyalty through personal bonds.

Hun Sen was a central actor of this strategy; first as Deputy Prime Minister in the government installed by the Vietnamese after 1979, then as the Prime Minister, he has been maintaining his rule since 1985 through an effective centralisation of power. He has gathered into his hands the strings controlling a complex system of patronage, alliances, and clannish interests. By appointing the right people in the administration and for example the army, he has created a long series of loyalties; these two institutions are now largely known as answering to him and his party. Numerous are the articles detailing the chains of influence that run throughout Cambodia’s elites. A significant proportion of Cambodians are not happy with this state of affairs.

24 | For example, the Cambodian military counted more than 2,000 generals in 2010, compared to less than 500 for all of the American armed forces – the largest military apparatus in the world. See: Khy Sovuthy, "More Military Promotions for Relatives of CPP Top Brass", The Cambodia Daily, 7 Aug 2013, http://cambodiadaily.com/archive/more-military-promotions-for-relatives-of-cpp%E2%80%88top-brass-38540 (accessed 19 Aug 2013).

affairs; and it is likely that this tendency will increase in the future, as more and more deserving graduates flood the market, looking for the good standards of living they have invested so much time and money for. Seeing how good jobs or business opportunities are being given to others based on their personal relationships will instead only create frustration and resentment; two sentiments that hardly lie at the core of social stability.

The CPP’s social order as it is walks on two Achilles’ heels. It is based on a system that may have proved efficient following the fall of the Khmer Rouges, but that might not be the most adequate and democratically satisfying in the current situation. It is not certain how long such a system can last without alienating an increasing proportion of the population. The ten main reasons given by people refusing to endorse the government’s action already all revolve around human rights violations, corruption, and environmental and economic concerns.\footnote{Namely: increasing corruption (24 per cent), illegal immigration (17 per cent), nepotism (17 per cent), damage to environment/forest/fisheries (15 per cent), low crop prices for farmers (15 per cent), land grabbing (14 per cent), poverty (12 per cent), prices of food are too high (not including gas and energy costs) (12 per cent), Gas/energy prices are too high (11 per cent), and not enough jobs (9 per cent). IRI, n. 15.} As the country modernises itself, a ruling method based on patronage and bribery becomes less and less adequate and might be decreasingly tolerated by the people – even if it ensures social stability. The matter of whether the citizenry will still continue to put up with it comes down to how much they will be willing to sacrifice for social stability, and for how long.

\textbf{A GENERAL LACK OF INDEPENDENT INFORMATION}

The CPP also benefits from the fact that Cambodians remain largely rural and unevenly informed. Their preoccupations regard primarily having a piece of land and the essential necessities to live. In 2009, one third of the population was still living on less than 0.60 U.S. dollars a day.\footnote{The World Bank, “Improved Energy Technology for rural Cambodia”, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEAPASTAE/Resources/ASTAE-IMPROVED-ENERGY-TECHNOLOGIES-Cambodia.pdf (accessed 27 Jul 2013).} The World Food Programme found in 2010 that a percentage as high...
as 40 per cent of the children still suffered malnourishment in Cambodia. In this respect, individuals located in rural areas are naturally more vulnerable. Yet, according to the World Bank, a little less than 80 per cent of the population of Cambodia still live in rural areas. In such conditions, people’s attention remains largely focused on the primary means of subsistence. Concerns about political connivance at the national level can seem a distant matter, and pressuring the government on these issues too costly to be obtainable.

Additionally, the penetration of information is questionable inside the Kingdom in general, and even more in its countryside. The primary sources of information in Cambodia remain television (83 per cent) and radio (79 per cent). Most viewed channels turn out to be government-owned or pro-CPP stations. Keeping in mind that only seven per cent of the people polled report using the Internet, where independent analysis and data can be found, the majority of people receive a mostly one-sided, pro-governmental point of view. All evidences seem to indicate that these figures are higher in the rural areas, where one in two people do not even possess a phone, and are largely dependent on the mainstream government-influenced media. A general lack of independent sources of information, coupled with a serious gap between the mostly rural Cambodia and its urban dwellers in terms of income, quality of life, and primary concerns, certainly gave an advantage to the CPP.

29 | The World Bank, n. 20.
30 | IRI, n. 15.
31 | Ibid.
32 | Ibid.
34 | Ibid.
YOUTHS: FRESH TROOPS OR CHALLENGERS?

Representing a growing proportion of the population, youths have different expectations in life than elderly people. This year’s electorate in Cambodia has been the youngest of all, with 3.5 million voters aged between 18 and 30, and half of them voting for the first time. Better educated than their parents’ generation, and having greater familiarity with new technologies and social media, they are more likely to have the tools to question the government’s policies and ask for more details and precise statistics about its actions. As the Internet market grows, it also provides more room for the opposition to express itself. With limited access to mainstream media and a platform particularly attractive to youths (promising education of greater quality, an improved vocational training system, and real professional opportunities for their future), the CNRP is now strongly present on social media websites, which represent a core element of the party’s communication strategy.

Nevertheless, the consequences of this demographic change in this year’s election are not to be overstated. Firstly, no poll or survey can adequately quantify the youths’ support to the opposition party. It is only informed speculation. What’s more, the divisions that prevail within Cambodian society in general are not foreign to its younger components. Difference in the family social background, wealth, and education are also among the factors impacting a young voter’s decisions; a citizen’s age is not enough to determine his political choice. Besides, as of 2013, Cambodians aged 18 to 24 were two and a half times more likely not to have any identification documents than people aged 25 and older. When asked whether they intended to cast a ballot at the general election, they also were the least “very likely to vote” group of all those polled, while making up the majority of the respondents “not likely” or

35 | Ibid.
37 | IRI, n. 15.
“somewhat unlikely” to go to the polls.\textsuperscript{38} The influence of these young voters in the election is therefore difficult to assess and is particularly complex. But youths are none-the less bound to hold weight more and more in Cambodia’s political life, which could turn out to be a decisive advantage for the opposition, as its platform seems to address their main concerns more than the current CPP programme.

**THE LAND-TITLING CAMPAIGN: A DOUBLE-EDGED MEASURE FOR THE GOVERNMENT**

This being said, the CNRP was able to rely on other assets to score in this election than just Internet users. The security of the voter’s land, still often their only source of subsistence, is a cardinal need for a majority of Cambodians. Hoping to take advantage of this, the CPP launched – amid great fanfare – an ambitious land-titling programme in June 2012. Three million land titles are said to have already been distributed, giving many people reasons to support the CPP. Unfortunately for the ruling party, this scheme created a lot of discontentment as well. Many have decried the conditions under which it was conducted, from defrauded residents to international organisations. The World Bank, initially supporting the programme, later froze its funding of new projects in Cambodia over the government’s failure to comply with the organisation’s requirements.\textsuperscript{39} A serious subject of criticism also resides in the number of surprisingly long-term land concessions granted to foreign investors every year, and which often exceed the maximum limit in size of 10,000 ha stipulated in the law. These concessions, which sometimes bear grave human, economical, and environmental costs, are made in the dark and therefore raise many questions, highlighting a lack of explanation as to why such concessions are in the nation’s interest, and a lack of public consultation altogether.

The situation appears even worse as the government’s communication regarding the land-titling campaign itself is nothing short of insufficient and little data and statistics

\textsuperscript{38} | Ibid.
are being released. This points the spotlight solely at human rights NGOs and international organisations. As a result, human rights abuses, corruption, and mishandling of some land title and concession attributions receive large coverage while successes of the campaign are kept out of sight. The absence of transparency in the attribution of titles as well as a general lack of communication, unabashed use of violence, and wide-spread bribery have deceived many people who turned their back on the CPP in this year’s ballot.40

Cambodian People’s Party’s supporters: After the tumultuous and bloody recent history of Cambodia, it is only understandable that people want to preserve stability. | Source: © Mak Remissa, picture alliance / dpa.

CORRUPTION, POPULISM AND THE CNRP

Rampant corruption in Cambodia is still an issue, encouraged by a lack of information and data about the country’s situation and the actions of the government. This might also have strengthened the support that Sam Rainsy, “Mr. Clean”, received on 28 July. In its Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International reports that Cambodia is the most corrupt country in Southeast Asia, far ahead of the second in line.41 And indeed, corruption in Cambodia has a long history. It has been part of the country’s political life at least since its independence. It is

40 | Ibid.
therefore not an attribute to the CPP in particular. Nevertheless, having based his successive campaigns since the time of the Sam Rainsy Party on the eradication of corruption and a state morally beyond reproach, the leader of the opposition probably enticed many disenchanted citizens – although corruption might not necessarily be absent from his party either. Still, Rainsy appeared as the alternative to corruption, as more and more Cambodians consider bribery an unnecessary nuisance. In Southeast Asia, Cambodia offers, after Malaysia, the highest rate of people willing to report such practices (77 per cent), thereby demonstrating it is not accepted as a normal practice. In the last run-up to the elections, interviews of corruption-weary citizens were numerous in the newspapers, arguing they would voice their discontent in that regard by voting for the CNRP this time.

Estimations of the sway these voters held in the outcome of the election should however not be exaggerated. Deploiring the omnipresence of corruption in the country does not necessarily mean joining the opposition: 57 per cent of those polled by Transparency International deemed the government’s action in the fight against corruption “effective”. Such a trend, explains Transparency International, is a common feature in the first years a government launches a campaign against bribery. The Anti-Corruption Unit, presented as a major step in the fight against corruption, was launched in 2010 with great pomp; its efficacy has nevertheless since then proven constrained by government control and serious under-funding.

Finally, another element that might have played in favour of the CNRP during this election is Sam Rainsy’s anti-Vietnamese rhetoric, blaming the Vietnamese in his speeches for about everything from the unemployment rate to Hun Sen’s successive election victories. “All compatriots, if we don’t rescue our nation, in four or five years more Cambodia will be full of Vietnamese”, with declarations such as this Sam Rainsy may have rallied some to his cause. Nevertheless, playing the anti-Vietnamese card also has

42 | Ibid.
43 | Ibid.
its risks and downsides. Namely, antagonising the ethnic-Vietnamese Cambodian voters and the Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia, as well as keeping at bay people who reject populism and racism.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The election result itself and the active youth involvement are indeed encouraging. Both aspects speak in favour of an evolving democratic process and culture in Cambodia. However, they cannot hide systemic weaknesses of the political system and political parties which become apparent when citizens expect results and not mere promises.

The Cambodian People Party when analysing the outcome of the election and its current hierarchical structures will most likely come to the conclusion that it, up to now, did not create a real democratic internal decision making process. It will also have to question its way of influencing voters’ decisions. The election has shown that vote buying might still work in rural areas and in CPP strongholds, yet the rapid urbanisation and growing number of more educated youth voters will challenge and reject such practices in future elections. The next five years will show whether the strong top down management approach of the party will be challenged by the new party generation and those party members who are disappointed by the current structures. A more decentralised decision making would allow for real participation of different groups in
developing policies and shaping the CPP’s position towards much needed substantial institutional reforms, such as the strengthening of the legislative branches (currently being a rubber stamp of government drafted laws), the reform of the internal procedures of the National Assembly to allow opposition parties to properly exercise their mandate as well as the reform of the management structure of the National Election Committee, which is currently controlled by the CPP. Reforms are also needed in the economic field, where competition legislation is still to be implemented, in the media sector, which is still under strong state supervision, and in the field of decentralisation, as current local, political, financial and economic self-governance needs further implementation.

The CNRP and their charismatic leaders Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha will now have to prove they can work together and lead the party’s opposition work. With the return of Sam Rainsy one week before the election, there was strong momentum for the opposition to gain people’s trust in their capability to form a future government. This momentum could be maintained if the party demonstrates over the next years that it can become a credible political opposition force. One of the key challenges will be to broaden the scope of their programmatic work to gain expertise in various important policy areas such as economic policy, foreign relations and regional cooperation as well as energy and environmental policies. The election result mirrors the voter’s expectation that the opposition plays a strong but constructive role in challenging and monitoring the government’s policies in key reform areas.

The election results in 2018 will show which party better responded to the needs and expectations of the voters. Both parties have to work hard to regain (CPP) and keep (CNRP) the trust lost and won in these elections.
ELECTIONS IN 14 MEXICAN STATES

A LOCAL SNAPSHOT AND A FIRST TEST OF THE “PACT FOR MEXICO”

Stefan Jost

In July 2013, 14 Mexican states held elections at various levels, one year after the presidential and congressional elections that returned the PRI to government and the gubernatorial, state congressional and local elections that were held in a number of states. The latest round of elections had been eagerly anticipated as they were expected to have a significant impact on the internal politics and personnel of both the PAN and PRD opposition parties, with potential consequences for the “Pact for Mexico” (signed by the governing and opposition parties) and for the ability of the government to successfully run the country.

Some 30.5 million voters, or around 37 per cent of the Mexican electorate, were called upon to cast their votes in the 14 states\(^1\) in order to elect state congresses, mayors, local councils and one governor. A total of 441 state congressional deputies and 1,339 mayors\(^2\) were to be elected.

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1 | Strictly speaking, it was actually 15 states, as a by-election was required in one district of the state of Sonora.

2 | With respect to the number of mayors to be elected, it should be noted that, of the 570 officials to be elected in the state of Oaxaca, only 153 were to be elected in accordance with traditional electoral law, while, as a result of the high percentage of indigenous peoples in 417 of the local constituencies, the elections would take place in accordance with the customs of these local peoples, rather than in line with standard electoral procedures. The main political parties were not really involved and so the results for these areas have not been included in the statistics.
The focus of attention was the gubernatorial election in Baja California Norte, which had had a PAN governor for the previous 24 years. This election had great symbolic importance for all the parties because it was the first Mexican state the PAN had ever won.

**THE “PACTO POR MEXICO”**

The political setup in Mexico changed in a very interesting and somewhat unexpected way following the presidential and congressional elections of July 2012 and the election of Enrique Peña Nieto as president. During the PAN governments of Presidents Fox and Calderón, Nieto’s PRI had blocked the government’s reform proposals in Congress, especially reforms in the areas of education and finance and plans to reform the energy sector. In the wake of the election results, the new government suddenly found that

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Table 1  
**Type of election by state**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>State Congress</th>
<th>Mayor/Local Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California Norte</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coahuila</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidalgo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the shoe was on the other foot and that it now faced the same challenge as its predecessors in government: it did not have a majority in either congressional chamber and so was reliant upon the votes of the opposition. Just a few days after taking office on 1 December 2012 the new president, Peña Nieto, surprised the Mexican people by concluding a “Pact for Mexico” between the PRI and the two largest opposition parties, the PAN and the PRD. This Pact includes joint policy agreements on more than 90 different issues.

In spite of some heated internal debates that at times spilled over into the public domain, the Pact did appear to be working in the months that followed. Constitutional amendments signalled that initial progress had been made in some key policy areas. At the time of the elections, however, the drafting and adoption of the secondary legislation necessary to implement these constitutional changes has still not been completed. As a result, the key question was whether the elections would amount to a vote of confidence in the Pact itself and whether clear winners and losers would emerge at this early stage in the process.

The position of the main parties in the run-up to the election could not have been more different. On the one side were the PRI, which presented a very united front, while on
the other side were the two main opposition parties, which in many states formed a coalition. In the weeks leading up to the election, PAN was struggling with an internal battle between the *calderonista* faction, i.e. the supporters of former president Felipe Calderón, and the supporters of PAN president Gustavo Madero. This internal dispute was less about issues of ideology and more about personal ambition and power. At times it became so heated that it threatened the future cohesion of the party. The PRD also had its dissenters to the “Pact for Mexico” and had its own sword of Damocles in the form of a threat that the party would be split by the MORENA movement headed by the party’s former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The latter is keen to turn the movement into a separate, more fundamentally left-wing party.

**ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, MUDSLINGING AND THE “RETURN TO VIOLENCE”**

In Mexico, elections – in terms of the whole process of campaigning, voting and vote-counting – continue to unfold against a much more complex backdrop than is suggested by the reports of some international election observers. The Mexicans themselves have no illusions when it comes to elections. Government programmes, such as the “Crusade against hunger” in the PRI-run state of Veracruz, are regularly used for electioneering purposes, while traditional election campaign trickery is still commonplace in Mexico, including manipulating electoral rolls, moving people into specific voting districts, or even into other states, keeping polling stations closed or giving out confusing information about the location of polling stations or about the candidates themselves, buying votes, operating a so-called carousel3 during voting and intimidating candidates and election officers. Sayings such as “won the election, lost the vote count” are not to be dismissed lightly.

3 | Carousel is the name that has been given to the process whereby voters whose votes have been bought are monitored when they leave the polling station to ensure that they actually voted the right way.
The hard-fought election campaign in Baja California Norte (BCN), the importance of this particular election to the PAN and the desire of the PRI to see the Pact remain in place led to rumours that some kind of deal had been done between the two parties to decide the outcome of the election in that state. However, the fact that both parties were so close in the polls and the election campaign continued throughout election day suggests that these rumours were probably unfounded.

Around two weeks before the election, the election campaign in many states took a somewhat dramatic turn. There was a marked increase in the amount of mud-slinging, with accusations of corruption on all sides and the (probably not unfounded) suggestion that regional and local financial resources were being misused to fund the party campaigns. All sorts of Kafkaesque chicaneries were suspected. For example, the public prosecutor's office and the PRI in the state of Aguascalientes accused the PAN of having its campaign financed by a Mafia family. PAN election materials had apparently been found in a house thought to belong to the family. The next day, the PRI held a press conference outside the house. A journalist from the left-leaning daily paper *La Jornada* peered through one of the windows and spotted some election materials – belonging to the PRI. His resulting question led to the abrupt termination of the press conference. A short time later the house was fitted with curtains and officials from the public prosecutor's office took the PRI materials away. It remains unclear what conclusions can be drawn from this episode.

However, even more serious is what has been described as the “return to violence”. The use of violence to influence candidates and voters is nothing new in Mexico, but during these elections it was to become an alarming fact in some states and present on a scale generally considered to be unsurpassed in Mexico’s election history. In Chihuahua, Puebla and Durango three mayoral candidates from the PAN, PRD and PRI were murdered and a PRD party leader in Oaxaca was kidnapped and murdered. An attempt on the life of a female PRI candidate resulted in two of her family members being killed. A PAN campaign caravan was...
attacked and set on fire, while there were also reports of candidates being kidnapped, receiving numerous death threats and members of their families being raped. Organised crime was generally thought to be behind the violence, but so far nothing has been proven.

A few days before the elections, many candidates withdrew their candidacy because they were afraid for their lives. According to PAN president Madero, it was not only PAN candidates who were affected, but also ordinary PAN members and some PAN supporters who were meant to be monitoring the vote count at various polling stations but who either announced that they no longer wanted to do the job or simply failed to turn up.

The PRI majority on the congressional standing committee refused to debate these incidents, so it was also impossible to take forward the opposition’s suggestion that the government should use the military in certain states in order to ensure the safety of the elections. As a result, the PAN and PRD made a public appeal for the army to be deployed in the affected states, and this did indeed happen in certain critical locations.

Election day itself was overshadowed by death threats against PAN candidates in Oaxaca as well as kidnappings, closed polling stations and stolen or burned ballot boxes. The army patrolled certain towns and cities. According to the Ministry of the Interior, election day passed off peacefully and without irregularities.

THE ELECTION RESULTS

In Mexico there seems to be a general rule that the first person to declare themselves the winner, even if they are liberal with their interpretation of the numbers, is the one who determines the outcome. As a result, election night is packed with heated debates about polls and projections. The actual results and the party’s overall share of the votes seem to count for much less in the public’s mind. This would explain why in Baja California Norte, for example, the various parties were already claiming victory before the polling stations had even closed and why the ensuing arguments in the media went on for hours.
The results shown below are not fully comprehensive because the elections were declared to be null and void in certain areas and will have to be held again in 2014, while appeals are pending in the appropriate electoral courts against some of the other election results. It should also be noted that it is not possible to summarise in detail the very complex nature of the many political coalitions that exist in Mexico and, as coalitions are the norm, the results given below are limited to the various leading parties.4

The Gubernatorial Election in Baja California Norte

After a neck-and-neck race in the polls, the vote count in the gubernatorial election developed into something akin to a mystery thriller in the media. The vote count was halted in the early hours of the morning when, according to a statement by the Federal Electoral Institute, there had been “an algorithm error, which did not however affect the overall result”. Preliminary results prior to halting the vote count suggested the PAN could win the gubernatorial election and this was officially confirmed ten days later. The PAN-led four-party coalition “Alianza Unidos por Baja California” and its candidate Francisco “Kiko” Vega received around 25,000 votes, three per cent more than the four-party coalition led by the PRI “Compromiso por Baja California”. The result meant that PAN had won “its” state for the fifth time in succession.

Particularly within PAN itself, the gubernatorial elections were afforded excessive significance. Whereas a victory might be seen as nothing unusual, a defeat could have been the point of no return for the current party leadership. The fact that a broad coalition helped to clinch the victory and that a vote for change would not be unusual after 24 years in power and all the associated attrition seems not to have occurred to either PAN or the general public. As a result, all the other election results on this marathon election day seemed much less significant in the eyes of both the party and the public as a whole. The most important internal

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4 | The following tables are based on the author’s own summary of a wide range of results from official national and regional sources and those quoted in newspapers. Because there are so many different sources, it is not possible to quote them all individually.
result of this election was that, in spite of all the ongoing criticism and internal squabbling, the leadership position of Madero and his supporters has, for the time being at least, been strengthened, whereas the loss of Baja California Norte would have been the end for them.

Results of the state congressional and mayoral elections

A glance at the distribution of seats in the state congresses in 2013 compared to 2010 shows that all three major parties lost seats to a whole number of smaller parties and coalitions in various different states (Table 2). The results of the mayoral elections in the thirteen state capitals are particularly interesting (Table 4).

Table 2
Distribution of seats in the state congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRD</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>-</td>
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Table 3
Distribution of mayoral positions

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<th>PRI 2013</th>
<th>PRI 2013</th>
<th>PRD 2013</th>
<th>Other 2013</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite some striking regional losses such as in Durango, Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Chihuahua, PAN was able to gain good ground in other states such as Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Baja California Norte, Oaxaca and Tlaxcala. It is noteworthy that although PAN experienced losses in smaller municipalities, it made clear gains in the state capitals and larger cities. This is clearly shown by a comparison of population figures in municipalities governed by PAN. At the time of the 2010 elections, the PAN-run municipalities had 9.2 million inhabitants, but this had increased to 12.5 million by the time of the latest vote. This provides

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

**Comparison of the distribution of mayoral positions in the state capitals in 2010 and 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Party 2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN-PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja California</td>
<td>Mexicali</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>Chihuahua</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coahuila de Zaragoza</td>
<td>Saltillo</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durango</td>
<td>Victoria de Durango</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaxaca</td>
<td>Oaxaca de Juárez</td>
<td>PRD-PAN</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puebla</td>
<td>Puebla de Zaragoza</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN-PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintana Roo</td>
<td>Chetumal</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa</td>
<td>Culiacán Rosales</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaulipas</td>
<td>Ciudad Victoria</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tlaxcala</td>
<td>Tlaxcala de Xicohténcatl</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veracruz</td>
<td>Xalapa-Enríquez</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PRI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a considerable stock of political capital in those states that still have to elect their governors.

All in all, PRI and PAN are fairly content with these results. PRI held on to first place, but has to come to terms with the loss of certain state capitals and in particular deal with the accusations of manipulation on the part of PAN and PRD. The aim of presenting a new PRI after the marketing success of the presidential elections has certainly not been achieved with this vote.

On the other hand, PAN can be quite satisfied with the results. After its clear losses in the 2012 presidential election and the disastrous impression made by the party and congressional parties in the weeks and months before the election, it would have surprised no one if it had been punished in these elections. But clearly PAN’s regional and local party structures and above all the majority of voters were largely unaffected by the party’s national quarrels. The aforementioned clear losses in certain states were largely a result of local factors, such as the way the voters refused to accept the coalition between PAN and the leftist PT in Durango.

The result is to some extent a disaster for the PRD. In Veracruz, one of its former bastions, its votes fell from 800,000 in the presidential elections to just 250,000. The party failed to win any seats in the state parliament and also lost out in the mayoral elections. This has added fuel to the fire of internal debates on the identity of the Mexican left and their forms of organisation. It remains to be seen how the PRD will carry on in the “Pact for Mexico” in light of the imminent central reforms and to what extent this will lead to a split within the PRD, at least in terms of the congressional parties, and to a strengthening of the left outside of parliament, particularly in the shape of López Obrador and his MORENA party.

REALITIES AND INTERPRETATIONS

Election results are one thing, but the way they are interpreted by interest-led parties is often something quite different. And here we have no exception. On the one hand,
there is no doubt that these election results are a reaction to the parties’ performance over the last twelve months. But this interpretation only applies in part. In many states and municipalities it seems the national quarrels among the various parties have had little impact on the party base and, above all, the voters.

Overall, it seems the focus remained firmly on local and regional issues and on the candidates themselves. So these elections should not be seen as a vote on the “Pact for Mexico” or on the performance of the individual parties in this Pact. However, the PRD and PAN will be paying closer attention to the question as to whether they should remain in the Pact. Both opposition parties voiced strong criticisms during the latter stages of the election campaign and even on election night. PRD leader Zambrano spoke of the return of the “authoritarian PRI” and its support by organised crime. PAN chair Madero questioned whether it would be possible to return to the “Pact for Mexico” table in light of the PRI’s actions.

We should not attach too much importance to statements made on election night, and indeed, once emotions had cooled down, political rationality soon returned. However, it should be noted that neither the PAN nor the PRD have a unified view of Pact policies, but tend to see them as decisions made by party leaders without the approval of their members, and these differences can be instrumentalised in the context of internal party quarrels. There is also a growing sense of unease among the congressional parties. They tend to feel they are the “lackies” of the Pact’s coordinating committee and are keen to have a greater say in decision-making.

So both Madero and Zambrano will find themselves being judged on their election night statements by opponents within their own parties. A simple “carry on” may be possible among the parties to the Pact, but it will be much more difficult within the individual parties. A first sign of this was the decision by the parties to the Pact to deal with the political reforms put forward mainly by PAN and PRD before the more controversial plans for fiscal reform and
reform to the energy sector. This reorganisation of the Pact’s agenda is an expression of the fear felt by PAN and PRD that once they have agreed to the PRI’s central reform policies they will no longer be able to persuade the PRI to change its negative stance towards political reform.

However, in the first weeks after the elections it has become clear that the “Pact for Mexico” is capable of shouldering the burdens that emerged during the campaign. The upper house has passed legislation on education reform, despite massive protests by the teachers’ unions. In the long-term, these reforms will lead to the break-up of the decades-long fossilisation of this anachronistic form of corporatism.5 The Pact’s resilience is largely thanks to the national political responsibility borne by PAN and PRD. Any other outcome would have resulted in the “Pact for Mexico” and thus Mexico itself being the true loser in these elections.

OUTLOOK

One election is over, but others are looming on the horizon. It is true that the only elections in 2014 will be state and municipal elections in the small states of Nayarit and Coahuila, whose small populations (1.1 and three million inhabitants respectively) mean the results are not of great political significance. However, these elections will not be ignored by the parties, as the Peña Nieto government will be one-third of the way through its term and these PRI-governed states will be able to use this vote to send a clear signal.

2015 will be an even more decisive year. Fifteen states will be holding elections at different levels, predominantly state and municipal elections in five states (Colima, Nuevo León, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Sonora) and gubernatorial elections. These electoral districts are home to some 62 million inhabitants, with about 18 million of these voting in the gubernatorial elections. 2015 will also see

5 | The core element of this reform is ongoing teacher assessment in order to increase teaching quality. These assessments may lead to the dismissal of teachers.
elections for the Chamber of Deputies in Congress. These elections will be critical for the second half of Peña Nieto’s term in office. Since the end of the 1990s, Mexico has had a *gobierno dividido* (divided government). This means that the government does not have its own parliamentary majority in Congress or in either of the two chambers and therefore needs the support of other parties to push through its policies. Under former presidents, this led to a considerable backlog of policies and reforms that is now being tackled by the “Pact for Mexico”. So these mid-term elections are about whether the government will be able to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies and therefore to some extent mitigate the problem of the *gobierno dividido*, or whether the opposition will be able to prevent this. The 2015 elections will consequently be important in setting the course for the main event – the presidential and congressional elections (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) in 2018.

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6 | The two congressional chambers have different legislative periods: Three years for the Chamber of Deputies and six years for the Senate.
Mali Secured?

The Elections Were Successful, But the Problems Persist

Bakary Sambe

The attack on the army base in Menaka by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) on 17 January 2012 marked the beginning of the military crisis in Mali and simultaneously acted as the trigger for a conflict, during the course of which the separatist Tuareg took control in the north of the country. The crisis assumed a new dimension when armed Islamist groups under the banner of Ansar Dine, reinforced by fighters from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), sought to enforce the implementation of sharia and introduce an Islamic form of government in the north of the country, above all in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. This complex crisis lasted for several months until the French army intervened in the so-called Operation Serval with support from African military forces. During this period, the weak rulers in the capital of Bamako made efforts to re-establish administrative institutions which had been severely disrupted by repeated political crises and whose army had suffered humiliation over having been unable to control larger parts of the territory of Mali.

Against this backdrop, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed with the task of strengthening government structures in the course of political development, the ultimate aim of which was organising democratic elections. The objective was to provide the country with legitimate political bodies and enable them to perform tasks such as conducting the inevitable negotiations with the Tuareg groups in the north in order to facilitate the long-term stabilisation of the country. In spite of innumerable logistical and political difficulties, elections were then organised throughout the territory of
Mali (including Kidal). This took place on the basis of an agreement that the transitional government and the MNLA had signed in Ouagadougou in June 2013. Although somewhat weak and imprecise, this agreement facilitated the elections, which won the country unanimous congratulations from the international community.

But do the relatively successful elections mean that Mali has returned to constitutional normality and enduring stability? Prerequisite to this question will be an examination of the initial socio-political situation in Mali. This, in turn, will require investigation into the complex nature of the Ouagadougou Agreement, the focus of which will be specifically on the unresolved political and military status of Kidal.

The new President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, is striving for an effective stabilisation of the country and for national reconciliation in spite of simmering power struggles and opposing interests within Mali and the international community. One cannot appreciate the challenges facing the President today without knowing the circumstances in which the elections took place. A review of the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) will allow a more in-depth analysis of the obstacles and risks involved in organising such elections.

**OVERTHROW OF ATT: IGNORED WARNINGS**

The second term of President Amadou Toumani Touré, who was elected on 12 May 2002 and re-elected on 29 April 2007, would have come to an end in 2012 in line with the provisions of the constitution. At a memorable press conference on 12 June 2011, ATT confirmed that he would not stand a third time in conformance with the constitution, which restricts the number of terms to two. Everything therefore appeared to proceed very favourably; Mali was considered a model democracy and its president was frequently held up as one of Africa’s few democrats in

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1 | While the capital of the northern region was officially cleared of Islamists, in reality it continues to be occupied by Tuareg movements. Although fighters withdrew while the elections were being held, they are still present in the town. The Tuareg groups insist on having a special status, which is to be established by means of new decentralisation legislation.
diplomatic circles and in the international press. Mali rose ever higher in the global ranking of countries honouring human rights, particularly in comparison with other African countries. However, numerous indications within the country should have sent warning signals to the government regarding the severity of the impending storm. But although it lacked a proper political apparatus and in an effort to gain a broad consensus, ATT governed for a long time, taking half-hearted measures and rarely making decisions on crucial political and security issues.

While everything around Amadou Toumani Touré began to disintegrate reform and engage in fighting, he seemed to be most concerned with not offending the sensibilities of the Tuareg. The President did not pay much heed to the security of this country in the Sahel, which at 1,241,238 square kilometres is the second largest state in Western Africa behind Niger. While everything around him began to disintegrate reforms and erupt in fighting, the President seemed to be most concerned with not offending the sensibilities of the Tuareg. Genuine peace with the Tuareg sections of the population was never achieved. However, in an effort to further national unity and territorial integrity, they were never openly fought. In fact, these objectives remained without true substance and were never effectively realised.

There has been a cycle of repeated crises involving the central Mali state and the Tuareg as opposing parties. During the crisis from 1990 to 1995 and during the subsequent one that began in 2006 that abated and then reignited in 2008, third-party countries such as Algeria and Libya attempted to calm the fighting with varying degrees of success. Even then it already became obvious that Mali did not have a clear advantage that would enable it to play an effective role in a crisis situation by which it was most strongly affected and which was being played out on its national territory. In response to these crises, incomplete solutions were produced that left kernels of dissent out of which future conflicts would burgeon.

On 17 January 2012, the Tuareg rebels from the MNLA attacked the Malian army in Menaka. This event marked the beginning of a new rebellion. Furnished with arms and strengthened logistically, the MNLA now demanded the independence of Mali’s three northern regions: first Kidal, then Gao and finally Timbuktu. Due to a lack of equipment,
the Malian army suffered repeated setbacks at the hands of the MNLA. Mali’s collective memory will have the terrible events of Aguelhok seared into it forever, when several dozen young Malian soldiers low on ammunition and equipment were cruelly massacred by the northern rebels. This was a clear sign of the advanced state of disintegration of the Malian armed forces and of an extremely serious security situation.

It was on 24 January that the MNLA attacked the town of Aguelhok on the orders of Colonel Ag Najem, supported by Tuareg soldiers from Libya. Within two months, over 200,000 Malians fled from the fighting, with the majority seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. At the end of January and beginning of February, soldiers’ wives demonstrated against the authorities’ crisis management in Mamako, Kati and Segou. During the night from 10 to 11 March, the MNLA captured the military base of Tessalit, which was of strategic importance because of its landing strip. Following this example, other armed groups, who described themselves as Warriors of Islam, took up the fight on the side of the MNLA: Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). They stated they were in control of the towns of Aguelhok and Tessalit and declared their intention of enforcing sharia law in Mali.

On 21 March 2012, soldiers mutinied in Bamako and Gao. They protested against the way the government was conducting the armed conflict and against the lack of equipment. The same day, the mutineers occupied the presidential palace and the offices of the radio and television station ORTM. President ATT was overthrown. The constitution was suspended and a National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDRE) was set up, headed by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. Under pressure from the Economic Community of West African States and from the international community, the leader of the coup agreed to the implementation of a transition period.
THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN MALI

In response to pressure from the national and international communities and with ECOWAS acting as intermediary, the CNRDRE undertook to restore constitutional order in a solemn declaration made on 1 April. The framework agreement of 6 April 2012 covers the establishment of transitional bodies, amongst other things. The Interim President of the Republic and the Government of National Unity in particular were assigned specific tasks to be fulfilled during the transition period.

The framework agreement of April 2012 includes the restoration of territorial integrity by regaining the north and the organisation of general, transparent and credible elections.

The tasks allotted to the government are derived from the framework agreement of 6 April 2012: first, the restoration of territorial integrity by regaining the north; secondly, the organisation of general, transparent and credible elections. They further include efficient functioning of the institutions throughout the territory; creation of a climate of peace and security in the zone controlled by the government and safeguarding of the transitional institutions; restoration of the fight against extortion and unlawful arrests as an instrument of the rule of law, as well as meticulous and speedy prosecution of all infringements of law by the judicial authorities; fight against corruption, nepotism, exclusion and immunity from prosecution; preparations for the post-war era and the return of the displaced and refugees, and finally the restoration of social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of communities.

In a statement posted on its website on 6 April, the MNLA “irrevocably” declared the independence of Azawad from that day forward. Subsequently, differences of opinion developed between the MNLA and Ansar Dinem, which was allied with AQMI and MOJWA. The jihadists gained the upper hand and henceforth controlled northern Mali. When they attempted to advance into the south of the country in January 2013 by capturing the town of Konna, France intervened militarily at the request of Interim President Dioncounda Traoré. With support from several African countries, predominantly Chad, the French and Malian armies succeeded in stopping the jihadists’ advance and regaining northern Mali, with the exception of the town of Kidal, which continued to be controlled by the MNLA.
On 12 April, Dioncounda Traoré, President of the National Assembly, became Interim President. The transition period was envisaged to last one year. Traoré appointed Cheick Modibo Diarra Prime Minister and instructed him to form a Government of National Unity. However, the crisis had not come to an end and coup leaders continued to interfere in political life. After two Governments of National Unity had been formed, the coup leaders forced Cheick Modibo Diarra to resign on 11 December 2012 and Diango Cissoko was appointed Prime Minister.

President Hollande during a visit to the troops in Bamako in February 2013: After the intervention, France demanded that elections soon be held. | Source: © Emilie Regnier, picture alliance / dpa.

After the French initiative, the international community committed itself to make a considerable financial contribution to the reconstruction of Mali, its army and its administration as well as the basic public services that had been destroyed in the north. In return, the Malian interim government was called upon to organise presidential elections by July 2013 to bring the period of political transition to an end. Despite various difficulties and pressure from France and the international community, the government accepted this demand.
THE ELECTIONS: A LENGTHY OBSTACLE COURSE

France insisted on elections being held by July 2013, as it wanted a military withdrawal to avoid the spectre of a drawn-out war and its impact on public opinion in France. But what Mali’s interim government, ECOWAS and the international community wanted above all was to organise elections quickly. It was important for the country to have a lawfully elected government that could act as a negotiating partner in talks with the international community and the Tuareg movements.

Kidal as the Pivotal Issue of the Peace Process in Mali

The main point of contention, however, remained the “issue of Kidal”, whose status is still not finally determined, even under the Ouagadougou Agreement, the aim of which was to force the parties to sign the deal in order to allow preparations for the presidential elections in July 2013 to proceed. Negotiations between the Malian authorities and the MNLA thus resumed, with the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, acting as intermediary, so that the election schedule could be adhered to. The aspiration was that the rebel groups should return to base and subsequently be disarmed, that the Malian soldiers should return, the Malian administration should be re-established and elections should be held in the entire Malian state territory, including Kidal.

The negotiations began with a three day delay, and the security issues soon gave rise to friction. The most important envoy from the Mali leadership, former minister Tiébilé Dramé, addressed the press on 13 June 2013 with the remark: “We are for peace, but for a peace that defends Mali’s interests.” The government advocated the disarmament of the MNLA immediately upon the arrival of its troops in Kidal. The Tuareg rebels, for their part, demanded that legal proceedings against some of its members be suspended.
Alassane Ouattara, and French President François Hollande that finally persuaded Bamako to accept the Ouagadougou Agreement.

However, the Bamako government was fortunately successful in having some principles included that were crucial for the survival of the Malian state, namely the democratic principle (in renunciation of any religious form of government) as well as, most importantly, the principle of the inviolability of the borders, which are defined in Chapter I of the agreement. The Ouagadougou Agreement envisaged implementation in several phases: an initial phase was to facilitate the organisation of the elections, particularly in Kidal; a second phase envisaged a ceasefire followed by the return of the rebel fighters from the north to their bases with the simultaneous deployment of Malian security forces and administrative officials capable of organising the presidential election. Throughout the negotiations, Traoré had sought to highlight the key issues of security and the sovereign rights of the state of Mali. The Malian President wanted Bamako to have an exclusive monopoly on the army, security and sovereignty. However, the circumstances militated against the fulfilment of this demand, especially as France was not at all in agreement. This demand kept delaying negotiations with the Tuareg groups, which were occupying Kidal; it was not until the Ouagadougou Agreement was signed that a temporary solution was achieved.

Some observers think that France did not act decisively enough vis-à-vis the Tuareg in its efforts to support the Malian government in its desire to effectively secure the integrity of the state. As a result, Bamako had to forego particularly two of its demands: first the immediate disarming of the Tuareg fighters in Kidal and secondly the deletion of the term “Azawad” from the Ouagadougou Agreement. The government had conducted a long and ultimately unsuccessful campaign against this term, which the Tuareg use as the name for the northern region of Mali. In view of these concessions, it is clear that only part of the journey has been completed and that the most important issues have yet to be resolved.
The Course of the Elections: From Uncertainty to a Surprising Outcome

Resolution 2085 of the UN Security Council marked a decisive turning point for the restoration of Mali’s institutions. The Security Council called upon Mali’s leadership to establish a schedule for the democratic transition and the holding of free and transparent elections so that the country would regain an institutional order. In fact, the elections were postponed several times as the recapture of the northern region of Mali had initially been at the top of the agenda.

Once territorial integrity had been restored through the Franco-African military intervention, elections were once again delayed by the MNLA’s refusal to allow them to be held in Kidal Region as well. In addition, the status of the former rebels had to be defined to calm the political climate. A compromise was finally reached in June 2013 with the Ouagadougou Agreement.

The election law was approved on 27 May 2013, which envisaged presidential elections to be held in Mali and in its diplomatic and consular missions in a first round on 28 July 2013 and in a potential second round on 11 August 2013. Events followed one another at an increasingly more rapid pace until 29 June 2013, when the Constitutional Council published the validated list of candidates for the presidential office. Eight out of 36 candidacies had been rejected.

In this difficult political situation, campaigning began on 7 June 2013, which allowed the candidates to introduce themselves to the population. The first round of this election took place in a transparent manner and without any significant incidents. However, organisational deficiencies and logistical problems in some polling stations came close to compromising the voting in the regions and in the Malian diaspora, particularly in France.

The two favourites, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) and Soumaila Cissé, were co-founders of Mali’s largest political party, ADEMA (Alliance for Democracy in Mali). IBK was way ahead in early exit polls. But Cissé denounced the results, citing numerous organisational deficiencies and election fraud. Keïta appealed for calm among his party
supporters and prohibited them from demonstrating in any way until the definitive results were made public. These were announced on 7 August 2013, giving IBK 39.79 per cent of the votes, followed by Soumaïla Cissé with 19.70 per cent, with a turnout of 49.98 per cent, which was higher than any achieved in Mali previously during presidential elections. A second round was thus unavoidable, even though the Minister of Territorial Administration maintained the opposite in a statement that threatened to divide the political class. Campaigning for the second round was to be limited to 48 hours; mobilisation was further curtailed due to the Eid al-Fitr celebrations (end of Ramadan). Consequently, turnout on 11 August was reduced as well, namely to 45.78 per cent.

The majority of the defeated candidates joined the camp of IBK, who went into the second round as the overwhelming favourite. When the initial exit polls confirmed IBK as the victor, the defeated Soumaïla Cissé paid his rival a visit at his home and congratulated him on his victory, much to the Malians’ surprise. The official announcement of the results on 15 August 2013 confirmed the forecasts with a clear victory for IBK (77.6 per cent of the votes against 22.4 for Cissé).

CHALLENGES FACING THE NEW PRESIDENT

With these elections, the country has taken a significant step forward. But the challenges facing the new president are enormous. His main concern, the issue of security, demands first and foremost a reform of the Malian army and regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the drugs trade. In the view of many actors of political life in Mali, the reform of Malian institutions, which had not been capable of guaranteeing the survival of the greatly flawed democratic system, is an absolute necessity. To them, the fight against corruption and nepotism in the administrative apparatus is a prerequisite to reconciliation among the Malian people by means of a “culture of dialogue” pursuant to Article 3 of the Ouagadougou Agreement. One of the greatest challenges facing the newly elected President Keïta will no doubt remain the unsolved status of Kidal.

A second election round was unavoidable, even though the Minister of Territorial Administration maintained the opposite in a statement that threatened to divide the political class.
Besides purely security-related and political issues, Mali’s economy also needs to be revitalised with the aid of international cooperation. Since the beginning of the security crisis in the north, the economy has largely been dysfunctional and the country depends to a large extent on international aid. According to the Senegalese Birama Fall,\(^2\) IBK will not only have to deal with the devastating impact of the coup of March 2012 and the subsequent occupation of the north by terrorist groups, but also with the legacy of the transitional government, which was anything but a model of good governance against all appearances. Added to this are the effects of the preceding decade of ill-fated measures and failures to take action by the government of President ATT, which seriously weakened the authority and credibility of the state. The extent of the challenges facing IBK is great.

The newly elected president must begin by fulfilling the obligations set forth in the Ouagadougou Agreement; at the same time, he must address highly urgent tasks including the essential reconstruction, or even re-creation of the Malian state. First of all, discipline must be restored within the armed forces and the security forces. The Malian population has been suffering for years from the consequences of poor discipline and insubordination, as well as from serious violence perpetrated against the civilian

population by members of the army and security forces. Incidentally, the army did not unanimously welcome the promotion of coup leader Captain Sanogo to the rank of general. Overall, bad practices had proliferated in the army and in the administration, and these even deteriorated after the coup. In various battalions, poor discipline and contempt for hierarchy are pervasive. The extreme politicisation of the troops, particularly of the garrison of Kati and numerous members of highly active police trade unions, have produced a situation where hundreds of uniformed men have declined into anarchy and lawlessness. To be able to reform the army, the gendarmerie and the police efficiently, so they can fulfil their tasks properly, the defence and security forces require adequate resources and personnel.

Secondly, social cohesion and the national unity of the country must be re-established. After the presidential elections, the country remains deeply divided between proponents and opponents of the coup; secular and religious decision-makers; and antagonistic communities. The army itself suffers from a lack of cohesion and is split between those loyal to the rule of law and rebels. The political class is seriously weakened and has lost ground considerably in the estimation of the people due to its vacillating stance and lack of leadership – there is thus no end to the problems in sight. For this reason, it is absolutely crucial for IBK to pursue policies that resonate at a grassroots level and inspire even those at the very top of the state apparatus to generate a dynamic within the Malian population: the desire to live together relying on the sociocultural values that underpin the Malian nation and to develop an outlook for the future.

In addition, it is vital for the Republic of Mali to re-establish state authority and administration in the north. Particularly in the marginalised areas of the north, development programmes produced hardly any results. The relative success of radical Islamists of the north was partly due to the fact that they offered religion as an alternative to a

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3 Kati, 15 kilometres from Bamako, is a garrison town and the headquarters of the hero of the coup of 22 March, Amadou Haya Sanogo.
dysfunctional and corrupt state. Islam was portrayed as a source of morality and justice, which the state had not been able to provide for the people in the north for years. Some observers berated “excessively frequent” references to religious topics and content during the election campaign and even in IBK’s inauguration speech. Noteworthy is that his candidacy and campaign were supported and financed in part by over a hundred Islamic associations, which were organised in the “Sebati” movement. This organisation is close to Imam Diko, the Wahhabi doctrinaire of the High Islamic Council of Mali.

All symbolism and declarations of intent to one side, it is important to take into account the needs of sectors of the population in the north without jeopardising national unity. Decentralisation must be effective, and resources must be deployed in a sensible manner. In the same context, the state must respect the leading figures from the madrasas and offer graduates from Islamic universities career opportunities in order to avoid waves of dissatisfaction and frustration, which Salafist or radical movements may take advantage of. It is a fact that the elites educated in Arab countries represent a potential recruitment pool for jihadists.

It is now incumbent upon the elected President to perform the difficult task of bringing things into balance by stressing the universal applicability of certain principles for citizens and for the behaviour of state representatives at all levels. In the context of Western Africa: Most of the current challenges concern the Malian state as the main party affected and as the central actor, but the ECOWAS must also accept some responsibility and take action, particularly with respect to the porous borders and therefore virtually uncontrollable transnational movements. The war against terrorism and general security issues must be dealt with at a regional level because no state, however powerful, can win the fight for security on its own.

**FINAL REMARKS**

The preparations for the presidential elections in Mali were crucial as a political prerequisite to the resolution of a crisis that began as more of a security issue. The fact that it
involved a dimension of domestic politics correlated with security aspects has made the crisis resolution very difficult – and it is still not completed. In spite of the elections being conducted successfully, they represented only one moment in a process of transition.

Although the international community applauded the unexpected smooth running of the elections, the thorny issue of the Tuareg remains. President IBK, whose task is to reconstruct a destitute country and bring it back from the brink of bankruptcy, is faced with enormous challenges, the most important of which is the restoration of state rule over the entire territory. This challenge became all the clearer when recent clashes between members of the MNLA and the Malian army on Wednesday 11 September 2013 provided a reminder of the fact that religious radicalism could erupt once again if economic development cannot successfully combat youth unemployment and social misery in the foreseeable future, because those provide fertile ground for political violence and terrorism.

This article has been translated from the French.