CONTENTS

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS / ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS / xvi

PREFACE / xviii

PART ONE  INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 / 03
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OVERVIEW
Hari Singh

PART TWO  COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: METAPHOR OR THEORY?

CHAPTER 2 / 15
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY, THE POST COLD WAR
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE
Kanishka Jayasuriya

PART THREE  THE STATE: SECURITY PROVIDER OR USURPER

CHAPTER 3 / 37
HUMAN SECURITY: A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE?
Brendan Howe
CHAPTER 4 / 60
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY
N. Ganesan

CHAPTER 5 / 82
CIVIL SOCIETY IN A RE-CONCEPTUALIZED
SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Meredith L. Weiss

PART FOUR GREY AREA PHENOMENON

CHAPTER 6 / 105
THREATS FROM RELIGIOUS-BASED TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Bilveer Singh

CHAPTER 7 / 141
MARITIME TERRORISM: A THREAT TO WORLD TRADE?
Peter Roell

CHAPTER 8 / 149
CHINA AND MARITIME COOPERATION: PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN
Gaye Christoffersen

PART FIVE BIOSPHERE AND RESOURCES

CHAPTER 9 / 187
SECURITY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND DISASTER VULNERABILITIES IN ASIA
Francisco A. Magno

CHAPTER 10 / 205
WATER, SECURITY, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF TIPAIMUKH DAM
Ishtiaq Hossain
PART SIX GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POWER STRUCTURES

CHAPTER 11 / 245
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AMIDST THE SINO-JAPANESE STRATEGIC RIVALRY
Renato Cruz De Castro

CHAPTER 12 / 275
JAPAN-AUSTRALIA SECURITY RELATIONS: BUILDING A REAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?
Thomas S. Wilkins

CHAPTER 13 / 298
ALLIANCE AND ENVIRONMENT SECURITY: COMPARING NATO AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
Tashika Odagiri

CHAPTER 14 / 316
NATO’S ROLE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Klaus Olshausen

PART SEVEN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES

CHAPTER 15 / 335
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
Javed Maswood

CHAPTER 16 / 350
ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A SECURITY THREAT
M Ramesh

CHAPTER 17 / 372
OECD AND UN ON HUMAN SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE WORLD
Eun Mee Kim, Jae Eun Lee, Jin Kyung Kim, and Su Youn Jang
PART EIGHT  GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER 18 / 407
PACIFIC ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Ramses Amer  

CHAPTER 19 / 447
EU RELATIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN AND NORTH KOREA:
SCOPE AND LIMITS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AN EU ROLE AND ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAN SECURITY
Axel Berkofsky  

CHAPTER 20 / 486
EUROPE’S SECURITY POLICY: A LONG-TERM AND COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE
Ralph Thiele  

CHAPTER 21 / 513
HOW MUCH OF A “MULTILATERAL UTILITY?”
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY REGIONLISM TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Jürgen Rüland
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

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By the twenty-first century, scholarly consensus had emerged that the concept of security can no longer be restricted to military matters but that it had to be conceived of in broader multidimensional terms. This train of thought has since generated innumerable conferences and voluminous studies on the subject of comprehensive security, especially in the context of theory building and regional case studies. This volume of proceedings is an integral part of this scholarly enterprise and is based on an international conference jointly organized by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), and Keio University in Tokyo, 30 November - 1 December 2009.

While the relationship between KAS and APISA has evolved and been gradually strengthened by scholarly collaboration since 2003, the partnership with Keio University, which graciously offered to host the conference, is recent with the potential to grow. In this regard, special thanks are due to Professor Toshiro Tanaka, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies, and Professor Yoshihide Soeya, Director of the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies, for
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Colin Dürkop
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Hari Singh
Asian Political and International Studies Association
The end of the Cold War was a blessing for mankind as it terminated the threat of instantaneous extinction in a nuclear world war. The German, and then East European, revolution which ended the Cold War also led to the liberation of the people and under communism in Eastern Europe and to the opportunity to transform their countries into liberal democracies. This momentous change in turn initiated a new era of global development which lifted, in the course of twenty years, hundreds of millions of people out of abject poverty. In Europe it also meant the beginning of a new era of integration and joint development, as attested to by the enlargement of the EU, and of Nato. More important, it also meant for Europe the beginning of an era where war on this continent has become ever harder to imagine.

While the end of the Cold War to Europe thus brought a “peace dividend”, that is not the case elsewhere in the world. In Africa the Great Lake region is torn by civil wars, in the Middle East the threat of new wars looms, failed states constitute a threat to their citizens and to regional and global stability.
For East Asia these twenty years brought a second economic boom. What had occurred earlier in Japan and the four ‘little tigers’ was now experienced by China: unprecedented economic growth. However, East Asia suffers from two predicaments: Its security is precarious, and it is confronted with the same new global threats as the rest of mankind. There are a number of regions where political stability is fragile. At the same time, climate change, scarcity of resources such as water or arable land, migration, terrorism, health risks and environmental hazards are challenges that affect Asia more than before precisely because of the economic boom it enjoys.

How East Asia solves these problems it is confronted with, will affect Europeans as well the people on other continents. But there is ample reason for optimisms: If Europe, torn apart by armed conflicts over centuries and after two world wars, has been able to achieve peace, security and stability, the same task should be so much easier for East Asia in a time of increasing affluence, and of increasing awareness of the new global concerns.

Dr. Volker Stanzel
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Japan.
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OVERVIEW

Hari Singh
Re-interrogating Security

As the world entered the twenty-first century, the functional role of the state in the political organization of human activity was already becoming problematic. Largely inefficient and suffering from both the centrifugal forces of fragmentation and disintegration on the one hand and centripetal pulls towards supra nationalism, regionalism and world government systems on the other, it is remarkable that the nation-state continues to persevere. Nevertheless, its centrality in the system of states has diminished significantly as it is forced to compete with non-state actors that include, among others, international organizations, international regimes, multinationals, transnational networks and individuals in determining the global agenda.

This trend in world politics has had very important ramifications for the idea of security which had hitherto been conceived mainly in military-security terms. The preeminence of the state in an international system that was “anarchic” in nature given the absence of a central regulatory authority made it more
suspicious of the intentions of others, as a result of which military preparedness and alliances were considered key elements in tempering state-based threats to a nation’s territorial integrity, survival of its people, societal values and economic well-being. Yet, as the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Twin Tower and the Pentagon in 2001 in the United States strikingly illustrated, threats to a state and its society are no longer state bound. These events in particular reinforced the rethink on the concept of security in international politics.

Suffice it to say that in the contemporary international system, the concept of security has assumed multi-dimensionality. While the military attribute remains important, a more holistic understanding of security needs to incorporate, first, the human condition. Survival, dignity, freedom, rights and access to basic needs like food, water and shelter are generally considered as universal givens but whose transgressions within and without a state may have important implications for the security of the state and international society at large. Given that the organization of human activity is political in nature and is a task undertaken by a state, it is important, secondly, to analyze the role of the state in the context of the security problematique. With regard to its population, it is pertinent to ask: is state the provider or subverter of security? State-sponsored terror against citizens is common place in many authoritarian regimes as is institutionalized discrimination, purposive marginalization and state plunder of resources among more open societies. Thirdly, the state itself is a conglomerate of sub-national agents with sectional interests. This departs from the traditional view of the state being a unitary actor. In this sense, security may have little to do with the state itself but is more a product of the tradeoffs between the disparate social, political and economic interest groups within the state. In particular, it is important to distinguish between regime security and state security and the conditions under
which this distinction becomes blurred.

Politics itself is group phenomenon. The interests of groups do not necessarily coincide and sometimes are at variance with the interests of the state itself which in turn may have a deleterious effect on the sanctity of human life, values and institutions. In this connection, it behooves to incorporate within the security structure the role of institutional and associational groups like political parties, military establishment, ethnic, religious and separatist movements, as well as non-associational and anomic groups like the NGOs, social movements and spontaneous riots. To be sure, the competition among groups is framed in terms of resource allocation – both tangible and intangible, wealth and status being respective examples. The allocation of resources itself is dependent upon the economic-based substructure of politics. Hence it is imperative that the security discourse pays adequate attention to the role of growth and development – variables that are not necessarily synonymous – and the implications that arise especially with respect to inequalities, indebtedness and injustices.

To recapitulate, the interests of sub-national actors comprising individuals or groups may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the state which, however, needs to accommodate these interests for the sake of political stability. But marginalized interests, especially those mediated along ascriptive criteria such as race and religion, and shared belief systems built on alternative world futures often strike a harmonious chord among other individuals and groups in other states. This highlights the fourth aspect of the security calculus that warrants more attention: the transnational dimension. If anything, the advances in information technology and the interconnectedness captured by the globalization rubric have made more salient the threats posed by non-traditional threats to the security of states and societies.
Finally, states have woken up to the fact that the political organization of human life does not take place in a vacuum; the international system itself disputes the notion of a vacuum but it is only an abstraction that allows for another abstract entity – the state – to legitimately survive and interact on sovereign footing. In the contemporary world, states and citizens are increasingly bothered by the ecosystem that sustains human life. This would include the climate and the earth’s natural resources which, through attrition, depletion and pollution, impact adversely on the basic needs of citizens including the availability of food and water, shelter and health.

The discourse on comprehensive security would be incomplete without taking into consideration the fact that states have a responsibility in managing the threats or the underlying issues that give rise to these threats. In this regard, the analysis adopts the assumption that states are rational actors, able to manage the security problematique and step back from the brink of disaster. Sometimes, states cannot resolve the security issues on their own, perhaps due to the intransigence of the ruling regime or it lacking political will. This will require the combined pressure of the international community to achieve desired outcomes especially if it relates to issues like genocide, apartheid or civil war. Often, states are unable to act on their own due to limited resources and are obliged to cooperate with others in addressing mutual concerns like oil spills, global warming and nuclear proliferation. Thus, the importance of global and regional collaboration in responding to the issue of security which may take the form of international organizations and regimes, joint task forces, confidence building measures, peacekeeping and so forth.
Comprehensive Security in the Asia Pacific Region

This project examines comprehensive security in the context of the Asia-Pacific region. The choice of Asia-Pacific is dictated in part by manageability of the project as a more universal approach based on the issue-areas delineated above would involve voluminous studies. A region-based approach provides for greater depth of analysis including the assessment of the elements of continuity and change, and the Asia-Pacific itself abounds in diversity which caters for interesting cross-country and cross-cultural comparisons.

Contrary to popular wisdom, the Asia-Pacific is a relatively recent regional conception. The East, South-East and South Asian regional constructions had become worn out by the demise of the Cold War, the rise of India and China as regional giants with a growing ability to project power beyond their borders, overlapping interests among Southeast and East Asian states in the South China Sea, and America post-Cold War region-building enterprise in the Pacific to counter the rise of Europe contributed to the evolution of a regional identity. Power projection, balancing, preservation of alliances and military modernization are factors that serve as a grim reminder that the use of force by states is still relevant in the contemporary context. Reinforcing this aspect is the issue of nuclear proliferation. It is instructive to note that three of the officially recognized nuclear powers that emerged in the post-war world are from the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear status by itself confers upon states immense prestige although nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific should not be a valid measurement of the importance of the region in world politics. The rise of the Asia-Pacific region was essentially premised upon economic growth underlined by double-digit
growth of the South and East Asian economies and later in India, fueling expectations of the twenty first century being the “Pacific Century”. Economic growth in the Asia-Pacific meant greater integration into the world capitalist economy and hence susceptibility to its vicissitudes and contradiction, as reflected by the deleterious effects on the Asia-Pacific economies wrought by the Asian Financial Crisis. If anything, the crisis not only questioned the neo-liberal agenda imposed by the developed West, but also unwittingly revealed the double-edged nature of international regimes: for instance, the International Monetary Fund’s initial prescriptions for economic recovery proved far more damaging than the crisis itself.

The impressive economic growth in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the Southeast and East Asian states, was explained by governments as being the result of the “strong state” model – euphemism for authoritarian rule. Centralization of authority in the executive, the accompanying paralysis of countervailing bases of power and repression of legitimate dissent had an inimical effect on human rights not to mention that development itself was questionable in terms of sustainability. It took the Asian Financial Crisis to finally lay to rest the myth of the “Asian economic miracle” and its strong state counterpart.

The progression toward more democratic political systems in the Asia-Pacific had its own share of weaknesses that impinged negatively on security. Whereas centrifugal forces within a state were reined in by force under the strong state model, the post-authoritarian system unencumbered the disintegrative forces structured along ethnic and ideological lines and the combination tended to spill across borders as witnessed by the separatist movements, thus highlighting their transnational dimensions and not to mention the exacerbation of inter-state tensions; and it is not uncommon for these movements becoming linked with
terrorism and money laundering as in the case of the Jemaah Islamiyah, drug trafficking as exemplified by Shan United Army, and crime and piracy as evidenced by the Abu Sayaff in southern Mindanao.

A state drawn asunder by competing interest groups against the backdrop of an absent national consensus is certainly a warning sign of its transition towards a failed state condition underwritten, among others, by the failure of its political institutions to provide the basic function of safeguarding the physical safety of its population amidst spiraling crime let alone the provision of social safety nets, rapid economic decline accompanied by massive inflation, pervasive corruption and poverty, and the emergence of autonomous power centres with the state – Pakistan, Myanmar and Timor Leste being examples. Needless to say that the security implications are not exclusive to the failed state but transcend borders in terms of refugee outflows that place neighbouring economies and health systems under severe stress, the ruling regime’s embrace of drug barons and money launderers, organized crime and human trafficking, and external state involvement ranging from military intervention, sanctions, and subversion, to war among nations as illustrated by the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Pol Pot’s Cambodia.

Even if the state exhibits a national consensus and political processes appear institutionalized, the security problematique is never far removed from the surface in many of the states in the Asia-Pacific. Most political regimes suffer from a legitimacy deficit on account of the growing irrelevance of the communist parties, skewed electoral rules in democratic systems, and from corruption and cronyism. Politics is dominated by the elite classes that are often synonymous with traditional political family dynasties as in the case of most Asian societies. Wealth is mainly concentrated among these coteries, and
unsustainable and uneven development has further accentuated the income inequalities among populations, fermenting in the process revolutionary undercurrents in Asian societies in the form of “people’s power” as seen in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in recent times. In this regard, social forces become important agents in the restructuring of political institutions in a state with conflict often serving as the midwife of change.

In retrospect, the issue of security in the Asia-Pacific has been dealt with in terms of the interactive processes between and within states and societies premised on rational and non-rational behavior. At this juncture, it is also important to weave in the ecological dimension that sustains human life. The availability of water, food and clean air is critical to human life, and impediments to these through voluntaristic actions constitute grave threats to human survival. However, man does not always have control over his environment and may become its victim. For instance, areas under sea-level such as the Maldives may disappear as ocean waters rise as a result of global warming. The immense human and economic costs were apparent in the disaster unleashed by the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. Had preventive health measures not be taken, the SARS and Avian Bird Flu epidemics would have had graver implications for human life and inter-state harmony.

Conference Structure

The format of the international conference presented below is based on the foregoing analytical backdrop. The proposed sessions are not mutually exclusive divisions of comprehensive security as each may have implications on the other. Although the proposed structure is not unalterable for reasons pertaining to
adaptation and refinement, it will nevertheless serve as the spinal column upon which comprehensive security clusters can be fleshed out. Paper writers were encouraged to approach their areas of research from a comparative perspective that also takes into account the international, regional, transnational, state and human dimensions. Among the contributors are policymakers who were encouraged to combine personal experiences and policy prescriptions in their discussions.

I: Introduction
Session 1: Comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific: Conference rationale and key questions

II: Comprehensive Security: Metaphor in Search of Theoretical Sophistication?
Session 2: Theoretical issues and approaches

III: The Human Condition in the Asia-Pacific
Session 3: Theoretical evolution; historical record; current debates

IV: The State as Provider/Usurper of Security
Session 4: Role of institutional and associational groups (political parties, bureaucracy, military; ethnic, religious and separatist groups)
Session 5: Role of non-associational and anomic groups (civil society, NGOs, social movements, internet bloggers, people’s power)
Session 6: Politics of development and underdevelopment (poverty, hunger, education, indebtedness, inequalities, (un)sustainability, exploitation, class divisions)
Session 7: Nature of the state (authoritarian, democratic, political regimes); nature of governance

**V: Transnational Sources of National and Regional Insecurity**
Session 8: “Grey-area phenomenon” (terrorism, piracy, human and drug trafficking, crime, money laundering
Session 9: Economic globalization (speculators, networks), disease (SARS, Bird Flu),

**VI: Environmental and Energy Security**
Session 10: Ecological degradation (dam building, depleting forest reserves, haze), climate change (global warming, flooding, drought), food insufficiency, mineral extraction, depletion and pollution

**VII: Traditional Security Issues**
Session 11: Power structures in global and regional systems, arms and arms races, alliances, nuclear proliferation, bilateral disputes
Session 12: Systemic economic inequalities, integration into the global capitalist system, role of global economic regimes, free trade and protectionism

**VIII: International Cooperation as Enhancing Security**
Session 13: Role of global and regional institutions (international organizations, international regimes, bilateral arrangements, confidence building measures, zones of peace, sub-regional economic zones)

**IX: Concluding Assessment**
Session 14: Comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific (synthesis; future plans)
PART TWO

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: METAPHOR OR THEORY?

CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY, THE POST COLD WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE
Kanishka Jayasuriya
Introduction

My task in this paper is to discuss comprehensive security and I will endeavour to do that in terms of the evolution of the idea of comprehensive security in relation to the changes within the “Westphalian state”. In so doing I want to locate the notion of comprehensive security in terms of the new security dilemma of the global polity. The central feature of the new security dilemma is the rescaling of security from its location at the national level. Security is now an inherently global issue that confronts actors at various scales of governance. In turn, this rescaling of security has significant implications for the process of state transformation. The last section of this essay examines how the constitution of security itself is part and parcel of the process of state formation. In making this point, the essay deviates from abstract and essentialist definitions of security to understand how conceptions of security are tied to particular historical and social transformation. In other words, I want to urge the need for us to become more reflexive about the notion of security and its wider implication for the process of state transformation.
First, let us explore the notion of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security is a concept that broadens the definition of security to encompass not just traditional national security concerns but also human and environmental security concerns. The central facet of this notion of comprehensive security is that it attempts – though with some ambiguity – to broaden the concept of security from areas of military security to other non-traditional forms of security. The concept itself began to take shape in the 1990s but it has a much earlier provenance in the deliberations of the Palme Report.

The Palme Commission – chaired by the late Social democratic Prime Minster of Sweden – outlined a notion of common security that bears some similarity to later conceptions of comprehensive security. The Commission introduced the notion of common security that was rooted in the idea that notions of security in the nuclear age necessarily had to confront new ways of escaping security dilemmas through common security. The Commission argued that

> In the absence of a world authority with the right and power to police international relations, states have to protect themselves. Unless they show mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned.’ Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982: 132).

As this statement makes clear, the notion of common security was rooted in the Cold War politics of nuclear disarmament and multilateral search for common security and significantly it was it was bounded and constituted by notions of Westphalian statehood.
Nevertheless as Rothschild (1995) points out, there were two important ideas of security which later became central to ideas of comprehensive security. First, there was an understanding that military security was not enough by itself and security had to include a conception of security as a condition that allows nations to pursue their conception of a valuable life. Second, associated with this notion of the common security is a strong emphasis on the ideas and institutions that reflected a strong version of multilateralism. In essence, the Palme Commission was a product of its time reflecting what Simpson (2004) has illuminatingly called, the “charter liberalism”. In terms of our argument the shift from the Palme Commission’s notion of common security to the ideas and practices of comprehensive security in the post-Cold War period reflects the denationalisation of the governance of security and the decline of charter liberalism and inclusive citizenship within the international society.

Post-Cold War, Risk and the Denationalisation of Security

The notion of “inclusionary citizenship” in this context draws on Simpson’s (2001) notion of “charter liberalism” in his exposition of the post-war legal order, particularly, a pluralist understanding of international order1). He argues:

I want to call this charter liberalism because the principles underlying this approach find their highest expression in the text of the US Charter. The point of this approach to treat all states equally to allow them each the same rights afforded to individuals in a liberal society (i.e., domestic

1) This argument is elaborated further in Simpson (2004).
jurisdiction, equality, non intervention) and to, if not celebrate, at least tolerate the diversity produced by these norms (Simpson 2001: 541).

It was, above all, a model of international citizenship that incorporated the formal political equality of states, progressively broadened the membership of the international society, and placed emphasis on the role of legal procedures and deliberation in resolving international conflicts. Just as labour had been constitutionalised within the domestic political system in the post-war era, a similar dynamic found expression in the growing representation and assertiveness of the post-colonial world in mechanisms of global governance. In this respect, the Palme Report represents a development within this charter society rather than against it.

The charter liberalism of inclusive international society fits into a larger picture of the emergence of national territoriosity as a way of organising political space, and more importantly, as a way of delineating “Westphalian” boundaries by demarcating the external and internal as well as ‘Weberian boundaries between public and private authority within the state. Echoing Rokkan’s more political sociological analysis, Ruggie has cogently argued that the demarcation of these boundaries is bound with the development of territoriosity as a mode of organising political rule, and that the

chief characteristic of the modern system of territorial rule is the consolidation of all parcelized and personalized authority into one public realm. This consolidation entailed two fundamental spatial demarcations: between public and private realms and between internal and external realms (Ruggie 1993: 64).

The thrust of his argument is that territorial organisation of states and the
management of this system – be it through nineteenth century balance of power systems or institutionalised systems in the twentieth century – is a distinctly modern project. In turn this modernist – though this liberal dimension is not explicit in Ruggie’s account – a project that was as much focused on the constitution of rule as legitimate both internally within the state and externally in its relationship with the other states. In this way the traditional security dilemma – where security of one state increases the insecurity of the entire system – underpins the process of “national” state formation.

However, the increasing complexity of the global financial system has reduced – though not entirely extinguished – the role of territoriality in global political governance. In an influential work Sassen (2003) has highlighted the importance of the denationalisation of public governance by which she means the process through which authority and political rule increasingly spills out of national territorial containers. In her terms, denationalisation occurs when

re-scaling dynamics cut across institutional size and across the institutional encasements of territory produced by the formation of national states. This does not mean that the old hierarchies disappear, but rather that rescalings emerge alongside the old ones, and that the former can often trump the latter (Sassen 2003: 6).

The implication of this argument is two fold: first, the national does not disappear but is now enmeshed within new scales of governance; second, the rescaling takes place within the spaces of the national state so that state spaces of security governance are transformed\(^2\). This argument has been applied to a

\(^2\) On the idea of state space see Brenner 2004, Jayasuriya 2009 but see also Poulantzas (1978).
variety of governance domains particularly in the area of finance and trade. The central insight of this article is that one of the hallmarks of the territorialisation of national security has been the national scaling of the institutions and practices of security. Indeed this national production has been crucial to the very formation of citizenship.

The thrust of this argument then is that the process of globalisation, market reform, and growing complexity leads to not only the simple zero sum transfer of power, but also a reconstitution of the scales on which the production of security takes place. It is within this structural context that we find shifting scales and notions of security and the potential challenge posed by such shifts for the implicit methodological nationalism of Westphalian notions of security. This scalar shift in security is reflected in the discursive and material constitution of security, through new institutions and practices of non-traditional security. The nub of our argument is that security is denationalised, and this in turn has led to changes in the notion of statehood.

To frame this discussion let us look at the old hoary concept of the security dilemma. This is the paradox: in a world of states the ongoing search for security in one country is at the cost of generating system-wide insecurity, thereby resulting in more insecurity for the state over the long run. The Palme Commission message on common security was an attempt to respond to this security dilemma in the new context of nuclear weapons. But the basic problematique of the security dilemma remained much the same. Yet, it is the very nature of the security dilemma that has been transformed by our complex and interdependent world.

Cerny (2000) has argued that new sources of uncertainly have altered the very
context of the security dilemma by altering the political logic of security within
the state and outside in the international system. He argues that mutations in the
traditional security dilemma occur along two dimension: first, the nature of
security as an indivisible “public good” provided through the state or an alliance
or hegemony all of which are now much more “divisible”, and therefore capable
of being provided through other non state actors and institutions; second, the
nature of the state system itself leads to a much more independent action by
actors and institutions within the scale of the national state. In other word there is
now – Cerny argues – the possibility of defection by actors below the level of the
nation state providing a completely different range of security dilemma.

At the root of the new security dilemma is the idea of shifting national scales of
security production. The dominant methodological nationalist reading of security
makes it difficult to understand the growing links, alliances, and governance, of
security outside the national territorial boundaries. Hence, in order to analyse this
denationalisation of the institutions of security as a rescaling of the political
authority and rule, we need to recognise that it is exactly the historically
contingent production of this national space of security itself that demands
explanation.

All in all these changes have led to the emergence of a new security dilemma.
This dilemma now encompasses new actors both below and above the state as is
evident in the development of a new illegal economy – translational crime,
drugs, and crime – provide major challenges for the governance of the
Westphalian state even within Western Europe and North America. The response
to these new security challenges cannot be framed within existing transnational
governances structures. A striking example of such a new security dilemma is
the conflict between the federal Mexican state and drug cartels that has also
The fundamental problem posed by the new security dilemmas is whether this is likely to significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional state-based and state-systemic approaches in the stabilization of international politics. Where it is not primarily states that defect from interstate balances of power, but rather a range of transnational and sub national actors and structures, then interstate alliances and other traditional means of re-equilibrating the balance will be insufficient to control those defections (Cerny 2000: 645).

In sum then, the new security dilemma can be understood in terms of transformations in the scope and form denationalisation of security in the following dimensions:

- The nature and form of security as a public good is not merely confined to the national territorial boundaries of the state. The key point here is that the production of security is rescaled so that it is no longer confined to the national scale; new spaces of security are being produced that is no longer within boundaries of the state system.
- There are new actors involved in the production security and insecurity. Security is no longer a good that is provided by the public sector; it now involves a range of private and public actors (see Avant 2005).
- As a result of changes in the nature and form of security and its production new issues – often called non traditional – are emerging. These issues – environment, health, etc., – cross the boundaries of national states.
- The shift to the network state has created new forms of political organisation that potentially compete with state to produce security or insecurity.
The implications of this new security dilemma for the responses to security are that:

- It focuses on new arenas through which security is produced and these require new institutional arrangements and organisation. These new arenas of security also require the rescaling of security activities vertically – both downwards and upwards from the national state, and horizontally – incorporating many new actors and institutions. In this context –, there is a greater emphasis on strategic partnerships with state and non state actors in dealing with security challenges.

- New actors take on security functions which may in turn challenge traditional notion of security. For example, the increasing involvement of private security companies in the provision of security in Iraq and elsewhere may result in the regulation of these private actors (Liss 2009). Traditional multilateral mechanisms are not adequate to deal with the proliferation of the security challenges.

- The agenda of security now includes a range of non traditional security issues such as health and the environment and these non traditional security issues take place in new spaces of security. Dealing with these new security spaces require us to move beyond traditional intergovernmental institutional arrangements.

- The importance of networks in the production of insecurity means that security responses must equally be within these network arrangements.

**Risk and the Logic of Security**

One of the major ways by which this rescaling of security takes place is through
a new logic of risk management. The new spaces of security – be it health, crime, or the environment – is shaped by notions of risk (Spence 2005). These communities of risk often cross national boundaries. Hence the framing of infectious disease as a mode of risk management constitutes a risk community that is defined in terms of a particular group, community or spaces that poses particular risks for the international community. These communities, of course, do not match the traditional national spaces of security production.

A distinctive aspect of this risk management is the way ideas and representations of risk are mobilised to give shape and form to new spaces of governance. Beck’s (1999) work highlights the way in which issues such as terrorism, migration, or even infectious diseases, create a new “risk society”. In the case of central Asia, del Rosario (2009) draws on Beck to highlight the importance of the representation of risk in confronting the difficult challenges of water governance in Central Asia. She builds on Beck’s insight that the process of economic modernisation and industrialisation leads to the emergence of new, catastrophic, and incalculable risks. But unlike the risks of industrial society, these cannot be socialised; they need to be managed and regulated through self and collective reflexive governance.

It is, however, the crucial role of risk as a particular form of political governance that distinguishes Beck’s work, and other sociological perspectives. Governing through risks involves a set of boundary-crossings over the traditional “Weberian” public and private boundaries as well as the familiar “Westphalian” national and international boundaries. Therefore to the extent that this new risk society leads to the spatial and temporal transformation of risk (Clapton 2009), it requires a global as well as a regional response to security spaces hitherto firmly within the national jurisdiction. As Clapton (2009) argues:
Contemporary security risks such as terrorism are imprecisely defined and difficult to locate in terms of time and space. This de-bounding of risk is one of the central elements of Beck’s notion of world risk society and is also crucial to understanding contemporary constitutional transition within international society. Confronted with de-bounded, ill-defined global risks, Western states have focused on identifying and reshaping so-called “zones of risk” – states which demonstrate internal characteristics that provide an environment conducive to the origination of risk (Clapton 2009: 20).

It is in this context that, I wish to draw attention to the way in which risk management becomes the primary rationale for new modes of security spaces within national states. The particular logic of security as risk management is to shift the spatial and temporal boundaries of security from the national level which has remained the dominant scale of security production. This is not simply confined to security issues, and Nesadurai (2009) points out that recent financial governance programs have turned to surveillance in order to manage the growing risks of financial turmoil. But the management of these spaces requires new policy and political institutions within the state that operate beyond national spaces.

It is these kinds of risks that have been at the forefront of the current global financial crisis. Hameiri examines how recent Australian interventions in the Southwest Pacific have been driven by a desire to manage the myriad of security risks posed by what is represented as state failure in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood (see also Hameiri 2008). He argues:

As is apparent, the emphasis within the Plan is on the management and containment of transnational risks of various kinds within the geographical borders of member countries through the establishing of “regional” -/involving regional institutions-/forms of country -level, and in some cases subnational, regulation (Hameiri 2009: 54).
It is these governance projects of risk management which, as Clapton (2009) argues, are driven by liberal imperatives but which often involve illiberal and coercive means. Clapton asserts that these new notions of security as risk management are consistent with a hierarchical logic of international relations. Indeed if the Palme Report identified comprehensive security in terms of the “formal” sovereign equality of national states, the post-cold war notions of comprehensive security can be identified within a complex hierarchies — note the plural here — of the international system.

The broader point here is that production security as a risk management process needs to be conceptualised not so much as an externally driven process through the increasing flows of trade and capital, but rather as an internal process that fundamentally transforms the national spaces over which economic governance is conducted. Indeed, Hameiri (2009) and Rosser (2009) point to the way in which “state building” in East Timor and Solomon Islands has become a regulatory project of state transformation. This is a crucial dimension of the argument because it implies that adopting a regulatory lens from which to view regional governance allows us to locate it within the context of political projects of transforming the security spaces in individual countries. From this risk management perspective, the process of state transformation is the key to the rescaling of security institutions and practices.

State Transformation and the New Security Dilemma

The new security dilemma is not simply a question of states confronting a range of new security challenges and issues, but is more properly seen as a transformation of the state itself. The new security dilemma as we have argued
rescales the “national” dimensions of security institutions, but it does this by fundamentally transforming institutions and the spaces through which these new spaces operate. Especially important in this respect is the role played by private actors in the governance of security. On this basis, the new security dilemma transforms the public and private boundaries of the Westphalian state. It is not whether it is private or public per se that is important, but the relationship between private and public actors in new security spaces that challenge the “public” and “private”, and “national” and “global”, binaries of the Weberian and Westphalian notions of statehood. Simply put, it is these new formations of public and private — such as through operations of private military companies — that are now increasingly central to emerging forms of governance. Consequently the focus of much of the mainstream international relations literature on forms of methodological nationalism obscures the more important dimension of security governance in the movement of political authority from public institutions to various forms of privatised regional governance, working in the shadow of tangled hierarchies of state and supranational institutions.

In a similar manner, new forms of risk management often involve public actors taking on new international responsibilities. Hameiri (2009) draws attention to the way in which the Australian intervention in the Southwest Pacific has created new spaces of governance within Australian state institutions. The Australian Federal Police (AFP), through the creation of innovative governance mechanisms, has played a significant role in Nauru and Solomon Islands that far transcends its original domestic law enforcement mandate, as well as transformed its relations with other Australian state agencies. Similarly Rosser (2009) argues that the ADB’s approach to fragile states is a political project underpinned by particular social and political interests, and ideologically organised by a concern with managing the security risks supposedly posed to
developed countries by such states. The thrust of this argument is that the new role of the ADB, through mechanisms of risk management in failed states, involves shaping internal arrangements within these countries.

What are the implications of the new security dilemma for traditional diplomacy? In answering this question it is useful to consider diplomatic activity as an “autonomous social field” with its own particular type structural relationships. In this context, what gave diplomatic activity its autonomy was a form of privileged monopoly over a set of highly specialised diplomatic practices and routines. No doubt, the manner in which the symbolic capital was enshrined in these diplomatic practices and routines has been continually challenged and contested by various groups. For one obvious example, consider the transition between diplomacy as essentially an aristocratic activity in the 19th century to the growing professionalisation of foreign policy bureaucracies of the 20th century. However, what is unique in the emergence of the regulatory state and its implied fragmentation of sovereignty is the fact that the monopoly of traditional national centres with regard to the instruments and activities of security and diplomacy is contested. Along with the increasing fragmentation of diplomatic activity, is a loss of control over the symbolic capital that gave this privileged monopoly of diplomatic routines and practices.

Central to the loss of this symbolic capital is the breaking of the traditional ‘Westphalian’ frame of national security. The movement of sovereignty towards new actors and arenas — civil society, sub national actors, global networks, and independent agencies — has disrupted the state monopoly over internal sovereignty so distinctive of the “Westphalian” model. It is this fragmentation that lies at the heart of the emerging regulatory state and has important ramifications for the nature and organisation of diplomatic activity. However, the
most significant ramifications of these developments may lie in the loss of “taken-for-granted” and practical consciousness of sovereignty – Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of “habitus” – that underpins the symbolic field of the traditional domain of diplomatic activity. The next step in this research agenda is to explore how the fragmentation of the state is leading to the creation of new and multiple arenas of diplomatic fields, each with its own distinctive structures and symbolic fields. This must focus much more clearly on the conditions and circumstances under which non state actors or quasi public agents engage in diplomacy. At the same time, we also need to focus on the way these actors form transnational networks that do not necessarily coincide with traditional models of the “Westphalian” state. Identifying these networks will be an important task for future research. We also need to be cognisant of the fact that these new centres of diplomatic activity carry with them new types and sources of political power that force us to confront the most important question of all: who benefits?

Conclusion

Consequently new organisational forms of power have important implications for our understating of traditional diplomacy. Our usual image of diplomacy — and of course this is central to the “Westphalian frame” — is one of a set of practices constituted within the interstices of public power. Hence, the notion that this public power, which to some extent is diffused within various private organisations, runs contrary to our understanding of by “whom” and “where” and “how” security institutions function. New forms of global governance denationalises the ideas and practices of security creating new international actors and partnerships operating outside of and alongside national security languages and institutions.
In this context, it is useful to explore the ramifications of the rise of “private diplomacy” in several developing countries. To give some examples:

- The rapid increase in civil wars and associated violence has led to an increasing involvement of a range of private actors who facilitate, mediate, and even monitor, peace agreements between states and warring parties. The European based International Crisis Group\(^3\) has been a particularly influential diplomatic actor in a number of crisis areas.

- It is the case that in countries such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, non-governmental humanitarian organisations are in the forefront in the delivery and implementation of a range of welfare programs as part of delivering security. This securitisation of aid leads to the blurring of the boundary between domestic, private, and public actors, there seems to be parallel trend in the global sphere. International civil society is no longer independent of domestic and global public power; it is increasingly involved in the exercise of that public power.

The strength of new security dilemma framework outlined in this paper lies is locating the logic of this dilemma in terms of the broader process of state transformation. In so doing it transforms the political spaces of the state. The new security challenges create new spaces within the state that exist in conflict and tension with more traditional “Westphalian” forms of statehood and security. I am not suggesting here that the new security dilemma displaces or supplants more traditional security dilemmas. Rather these twin security dilemmas bring with them different security practices and institutions that may be in conflict. Indeed in

\(^3\) See their web site <http://www.crisisweb.org/> for a comprehensive overview of their activities.
the Asia Pacific, the accommodation between the “new” and traditional security regimes within the state is likely to be an important dimension of the emerging forms of statehood. What is clear is that unlike the in heyday of the territorial state, security dilemmas will contribute both to the consolidation and fragmentation of the national state. In this sense the denationalisation of security has substantial implication for our understanding of statehood. The conceptual framework provided in this paper is an innovative research agenda for the study of security and state transformation that moves beyond the methodological nationalism that constrains much of the international relations and security.

References


PART THREE

THE STATE: SECURITY PROVIDER OR USURPER

CHAPTER 3
HUMAN SECURITY: A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE?
Brendan Howe

CHAPTER 4
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY
N. Ganesan

CHAPTER 5
CIVIL SOCIETY IN A RE-CONCEPTUALIZED SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Meredith L. Weiss
Introduction

This paper challenges the traditional belief that diplomats should ignore the internal affairs of states in order to preserve international stability, and posits the argument that the lack of internal justice may actually increase international disorder. Japan’s comprehensive security approach to international affairs has long acknowledged that economic instability and environmental threats have fed military instability and therefore needed to be addressed in tandem with or even prior to traditional security considerations. However, human security and human development considerations have until recently been omitted even from comprehensive security discourse. This paper addresses the relationships between traditional, non-traditional/new, comprehensive, and human security studies and expands the discussion on narrow and broad approaches to human security. It also clarifies the conceptual and practical relationship between global governance, security, and development. Finally it considers the question that if there are indeed times when the international community (whether the United Nations, regional international organizations, and/or other states) has a
responsibly to protect citizens from the actions of their own governments in order to secure freedom from fear; is there also a responsibility to provide in order to secure freedom from want when states contribute massively negative impacts to the human security of their citizens through deliberate actions, inaction, incompetence, obstruction, or neglect?

**Human Security and State Security**

Security itself is an essentially contested concept. Definitions ranging from the traditional state-centric one of a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur; through the systemic implying both coercive means to check an aggressor and all manner of persuasion, bolstered by the prospect of mutually shared benefits, to transform hostility into cooperation; to the consideration of insecurity or vulnerabilities – both internal and external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures. The contradiction between state and systemic security is exposed by the concept of relative certainty of victory if one goes to war in the former and the collective security principle and rationale of relative certainty of defeat of an aggressor in the latter.

Over the last half a century international conflict analysis and security studies have become institutionalized and recognized by the academic mainstream.

In general the fields relate to the investigation of the causes of and the reduction in frequency and effect of major wars. Conflict is seen as inevitable, but cooperation (however limited) is always a possibility. Indeed, conflict need not always be seen as negative – it is one of the paths to maturity in both individuals and societies, it is often necessary for social change. It is the worst manifestation
of conflict, major interstate wars, that preoccupies the thinking of traditional security theorists and practitioners. The major concerns have revolved around the concepts of military capabilities (both offensive and defensive), the distribution and balance of power in the international system in terms of polarity and concentration in the hands of the dominant states, and policy prescription in terms of the strategic implications of these considerations, including offensive (power projection), defensive, and deterrent spending.

However, new thinking on security has gradually come to the fore in the field, with input from both academics and from practitioners in international organizations such as the United Nations, and states (in particular Japan, Canada, and Norway). Critical and post-modern perspectives have tended to conceive of security as emancipation or the freedom to carry out what would freely choose to do. The constructivists of the Copenhagen School introduced the concept of securitization, examining how certain issues are transformed into a matter of national security by those acting on behalf of a state. In the early 1980s Japan adopted a “comprehensive security” (sogo anzen hosho) policy under the direction of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki.1) Comprehensive security not only looked beyond the traditional security elements of individual self defense by focusing on regional and global security arrangements, but also stressed the need to take into account other aspects vital to national stability such as food, energy, environment, communication, and social security (Akaha 1991; Radtke and Feddema 2000). It was an explicitly inclusive approach that emphasized multilateralism, and the concept as such can be traced to Japanese thinking on

1) Following the recommendations of a group commissioned by his predecessor Masayoshi Ohira from the National Institute for the Advancement of Research commissioned to study change in the international environment and Japan’s response.
security as far back as the fifties.

Non-traditional security agendas are now in vogue in other parts of the world and are often termed “new security challenges”. The characteristics of such challenges include some or all of the following: a focus on non-military rather than military threats; transnational rather than national threats, and multilateral or collective rather than self-help security solutions (Waever 1995; Acharya 2002). It may be that as other countries adopt elements of new or comprehensive security agendas (and there is evidence of Western commentators looking to what lessons can be learned from Japan in this area) Japan’s security policy will be seen as increasingly “normal” (Rix 1987; Olsen 2004). But Japan has also been instrumental in pushing forward the next step in the evolution of security conceptualization. Japan has provided many of the policy initiatives and much of the impetus for the development of the human security discourse, and is the largest contributor to the human security related practices and intuitions of the UN.

Human security is an emerging multi-disciplinary paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities at the level of individual human beings. It incorporates methodologies and analysis from a number of research fields including strategic and security studies, development studies, human rights, international relations, and the study of international organizations. It exists at the point where these disciplines converge on the concept of protection. The Commission on Human Security established under the chairmanship Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, Nobel Economics Prize Laureate, in its final report Human Security Now, defines human security in the following way:
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. (CHS 2003: 4)

UN agencies and personnel have also been heavily involved in the development of the paradigm. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s made the first explicit reference to human security from the organization’s perspective in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. In this report, the concept was used in relation to preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery. The report drew attention to the broad scope of challenges in post-conflict settings and highlighted the need to address root causes of conflict through a common international moral perception and a wide network of actors under “an integrated approach to human security”, but essentially took a narrow approach to the definition, focusing on physical threats to the lives and wellbeing. In 1994, the UNDP’s *Human Development Report* stressed the need for a broader interpretation of human security, defining it as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” and further characterized human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994: 23). At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 then General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Anan took up the call of freedom from fear, and freedom from want, and placed these concepts center stage for the global governance mission.

Yet the two concepts are at the basis of a schism within the academic and
practitioner community when it comes to the analysis of threats to human security and policy prescription. Proponents of a “narrow” concept of human security (a freedom from fear emphasis which underpins both the UN Responsibility to Protect approach and the Human Security Report Project’s *Human Security Report*) focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Proponents of the “broad” freedom from want concept of human security such as that articulated in the UNDP’s 1994 *Human Development Report* and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report *Human Security Now* argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.

However, all proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals, and on a distinction between human security and national security. While national security focuses on the defense of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from *any* form of threat to their wellbeing or even their very existence. Although relatively new, the term is now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threats to individual human wellbeing associated with interstate war, civil war, genocide, ethnic cleansing, the displacement of populations, natural disasters and pandemics. Some of the broadest interpretations include aspects of security related to food, health, the environment, communities, politics, and human rights. Importantly, human insecurity can in itself become a source of insecurity for states. Desperate conditions among the disaffected youth of refugee camps or inner cities can produce fertile breeding grounds for religious extremism or terrorism. Mass cross-border migration patterns, whether in terms
of refugees or economic migrants, and whether legal or illegal can nevertheless contribute to an increase in inter-ethnic tensions in the new host country, and also, potentially an increase in crime whether petty or organized transnational. A non-traditional security issue has the potential to become a traditional security threat, and issues of human security can morph into ones of pressing concern for the survival of states themselves or the peace and security of a region or even the globe. Thus it may be in the enlightened self-interest of states and statesmen as well as the international community, however broadly defined, to pay attention to non-traditional and human security concerns.

Hence Mick Keelty, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner, has warned that climate change is the greatest security issue facing Australia's future as it would force an exodus of refugees to seek illegal residence in Australia. He singled out China, where he said there may be a significant loss of farming land, pointing out that “For China to feed its predicted 2030 population, it needs to increase its food production by about 50 per cent above today's levels … How does it achieve this if its available land is dramatically shrinking and millions of people are on the move because of land and water?” Keelty further warned that a mass displacement of people in the Asia-Pacific region would only create more social unrest, for “Existing cultural tensions may be exacerbated as a large number of people undertake a forced migration” (Lauder 2007). Table 1 places the human security approaches in the wider theoretical and practical discourse on security studies.
Table 1: Approaches to International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Main Actors</th>
<th>Threats From</th>
<th>Main Targets</th>
<th>Issues</th>
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<td>Traditional</td>
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<td>Defense, Deterrence, Balance of Power</td>
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<td>Human Security/Responsibility to Protect</td>
<td>IGOs, States, NGOs</td>
<td>States and Non-State Actors</td>
<td>Individuals and Communities</td>
<td>Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), Peacekeeping</td>
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**Human Security and Development**

The closest relationship with other disciplines in both theory and practice is that found between human security as the protection of persons, and human development as the provision of basic human needs. Human security and human development are both people-centered. They challenge the orthodox approach to security and development - i.e. state security and liberal economic growth respectively. Both emphasize people are to be seen as the ultimate ends but never as means, and treat humans as agents who should be empowered to participate in the process of their own need-satisfaction. Both perspectives are multidimensional, and address people’s dignity as well as their material and physical concerns. Both impose duties on the wider global community. Human security and development can be seen as mutually reinforcing. Hence in his
January 2009 speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace, World Bank President Robert Zoellick pointed out the need for a stronger link between security, governance and development. A peaceful environment frees individuals and governments to move from a focus on mere survival to a position where they can consider improvement of their situations. Likewise, as a society develops it is able to afford more doctors, hospitals, welfare networks, internal security operations, schools, and de-mining operations.

Conversely, as former UN Secretary-General Annan observed in his Report, *In Larger Freedom*: “we will not enjoy security without development, development without security, and neither without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.” Conflict retards development and underdevelopment can lead to conflict. According to Ghia, as of 2003, of the forty-nine least developed countries (LDCs), twenty-one have experienced grave episodes of violence and instability in the past three decades (2006). Indeed, the prevalence of warfare around the globe has resulted in post-conflict development “become[ing] the norm rather than the exception” (Junne and Verkoren 2005: 318). The negative reinforcement of insecurity and underdevelopment can continue long after the official cessation of hostilities. Post-bellum threats to both life and wellbeing include the breakdown of law and order, the spread of disease as a result of refugee camp overcrowding, poor nutrition, infrastructure collapse, scarcity of medical supplies (although ironically often a proliferation of illicit drugs), and continued criminal attacks on civilian populations, unemployment, displacement, homelessness, disrupted economic activity, and stagflation. In addition to these complexities, in many post-conflict environments the most immediate threat to both human security and human development is the legacy of ERW, whether rockets, grenades, mortars, landmines, or cluster munitions and their sub-munitions.
Land mines, unexploded munitions (UXM), unexploded ordnances (UXO) such as bombs, shells, and grenades which have been employed but failed to detonate, and other ERW are widely encountered in the aftermath of international and internal conflicts, wreaking havoc for decades after hostilities have ceased (Watson 2004: 4). They hinder the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their communities, damage infrastructure essential for economic development, increase rebuilding costs, prevent the use of assets vital to sustainable livelihoods such as water sources, irrigation channels, and are fatal impediments to land use. They prevent land use for agriculture, grazing, housing or resettlement, and commerce (Geneva 2007). In addition, they deter public and private investment and economic development through increased uncertainty, costs and delays resulting from their suspected presence (ibid.). They harm otherwise productive members of society, and maim or kill children trying to salvage them for scrap metal (Rees 2008). According to the UNDP, as many as 78 nations are affected by landmines and about 85 by explosive remnants of war (UNDP Mine Action 2009).

Cluster munitions in particular, both due to their inaccuracy and frequent malfunctioning, have been indiscriminate both at their time of use and long after conflicts have ended. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a network of more than 1,400 NGOs, reported deaths and injuries from landmines and UXOs in 65 countries in 2002 and the first half of 2003 (International Campaign). Aware of the destructive legacy that these munitions often pose for post-conflict civilian populations, international efforts to limit the use of cluster munitions has been growing. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) adopted in May of that year in Dublin has been signed by over 100 states (although only about 25 percent of these have so far ratified). In addition a bill has been introduced in the Congress of perennial holdout, the United States
(Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2009), which seeks to place specified restrictions on the use of cluster munitions and directs the President, within 90 days after the use of such munitions, to submit to the congressional defense appropriations and foreign relations committees a plan for cleaning up any such munitions or sub-munitions which fail to explode and continue to pose a hazard to civilians. Table 2 reflects the relationship between security and development under the rubric of governance.

**Table 2: Theoretical and Practical Elements of Global Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Global Governance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Reconcile Conflicting Interests/Protect Interests Against Others</strong></th>
<th><strong>Generate Collective Good/Facilitate Cooperation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional State-Centric Security</td>
<td>Non-Traditional Security/New Challenges</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense, Deterrence, Arms-Racing, Balance of Power, Security Dilemma, Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Natural Disasters, Disease, Global Warming, Pollution, Terrorism, Transnational Crime, Resources</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect, Freedom from Fear, Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recipient Focused, Human-centric, Participatory, New Donors and Actors, Partnerships, Non-Hierarchical, NGOs, HDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State-centric Development, IGOs (UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank, etc), Foreign Direct Investment, Free Trade, Traditional ODA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Responsibility to Protect

In terms of human rights, human security and development are considered aspects of international entitlement rights – what states and the wider international community should provide for the citizens of the world as each individual has certain rights and entitlements by virtue of being a human being. In other words the key questions concern what are our basic entitlements and what are the duties imposed on others? This constitutes a different emphasis from a focus on the sort of political rights (freedom of speech, assembly, to stand for office, etc) which are often championed by external agencies attempting to provide impetus for reform in a fragile state. As such they may be considered less politically charged than a liberal “crusade” to change the systems of governance of target states. Nevertheless, the question arises what are the duties imposed on the international community when the leaders of a community fail in their responsibility to protect the human security of their citizens? A reinterpretation of the concept of state rights as privileges granted to them in trust by their citizens has allowed the international community to consider the violation of the norm of non-intervention and states’ legal rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the UN seemed to support this normative shift:

states exist to protect citizens and not vice versa, and they can no longer use sovereignty as a shield to hide behind….The charter is written in the name of “We the peoples”. It’s a document that is humane and centred on individuals….The fact that we cannot protect everyone does not mean we cannot help where we can (2000).

International politics has often been viewed as a realm beyond the scope of
ethical analysis. Either a different morality is seen to hold sway between societies than within them, or it is erroneous and even dangerous, to talk of morality with regard to the governance of inter-societal actions. Likewise, the way we act towards our fellow citizens, co-religious, those of a shared ethnicity or other form of common identity often differs widely from the way we treat barbarians, infidels or Untermenschen. Either the “other” is not entitled in normative terms to equal consideration, or it is impractical to extend such considerations beyond the boundaries of our own communities. However, the supposed value-neutral conditions pertaining to international interaction no longer hold up to scrutiny.

During the Cold War considerations of national interest dominated the decision-making of all the major powers. Regimes that would now be considered totally unacceptable to liberal democracies (including military dictatorships in Chile, Argentina and Indonesia and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq) were supported by the United States and her democratic allies. However, the end of the Cold War, combined with the increased media penetration and dissemination capabilities, appear to have rendered amoral foreign policy untenable, at least in Western liberal democracies. Therefore, the governing dictates of that time may be seen as no longer suitable for the regulation of international politics, national interest as no longer a sufficient normative guide for action, and even that the normative value attached to the sovereign state itself can be questioned.

The Nuremberg trials first established a limit to state sovereignty – states could no longer do as they wished with their citizens, and the UN Charter Preamble reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights without discrimination. This is also reflected in the wording of Articles 1(3), 55 and 56. 1948 saw the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the General Assembly, and
this was followed in 1966 by the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights. Finally, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been ratified by 120 countries and, according to the International Court of Justice, holds to generally accepted values which oblige all states, even those which have few links with the international community, to “punish and prevent genocide”. Not only does the convention state that the authors and instigators of a genocide must be brought to trial, but also that “there is nothing to prevent a state which is party to the Convention, even if it is not directly affected itself, from calling for sanctions against violations committed in another signatory country”.

The process of normative shifting from an emphasis on state rights and prerogatives to that of an emphasis on their duties to their citizens and the rights of these citizens against states has gathered speed since the end of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty… has passed. … It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world” (1996). No state was anymore immune to the demands and rights of its internal and external constituencies, and the UN, as the embodiment of the international community would not tolerate the hindrance of its “great objectives” of peace and security, justice and human rights and “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” (Boutros-Ghali 1996).

According to Martha Finnemore, in “surveying the global pattern of military intervention since the end of the Cold War, two features stand out. First, most of it is multilateral … Second, in many cases the geostrategic or economic interests of the intervening states in the target state are negligible” (1998: 181). In
particular Finnemore notes the extraordinary costs of the missions to Cambodia (UNTAC) and Somalia (UNOSOM II) as mitigating against material interests of intervening states presenting the determining factor whether or not to intervene (1998: 181). National interest dominated when the international community decided not to intervene during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified general “peace-keeping fatigue” as causing unwillingness to contribute troops and fund UN operations (1996). However, the UN and Member States were ultimately compelled to take some form of action by pressure from international and domestic public opinion fuelled by information from NGOs and the media. In addition, what prevented other members of the Security Council from admitting that genocide was taking place was awareness that if such were proven, then international law would compel them to intervene, regardless of costs and the dictates of individual national interest.

Guilt at the failure to act over Rwanda increased international normative pressure for action in the next case of “practices that shock the conscience of humankind”; Kosovo. Kosovo was to be the first explicitly humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War world. The eagerness to get involved in Kosovo contrasts most vividly with reluctance over Rwanda and Bosnia, as does the relative absence of considerations of material national interest compared with the Gulf. Not surprisingly therefore realists such as Henry Kissinger and Colin Gray repeatedly and convincingly argued against the intervention saying that no vital U.S. military or political interests were at stake, and that “moral outrage is not a sound base for policy”, but they nevertheless conceded that “periodically it is so insistent that prudent policy-makers must bow to its demands” (Owens 2005).

In response to this international normative shift, at the High-Level Plenary Meeting for the 2005 World Summit (14-16 September) the world’s leaders
agreed on a “responsibility to protect” which included a “clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. This declaration included a specific endorsement of humanitarian intervention by expressing willingness ‘to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it”. The Responsibility to Protect even includes a section (6.28 – 6.40) on what can be done “When the Security Council Fails to Act”, and proceeds to classify and characterize various sorts of deployment of armed force showing scant regard for the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention (Sunga 2006: 77). However, non-violent challenges and the inactions or incompetence of states may actually pose a greater threat to human security, especially in terms of a freedom from want, than that of violent actions in terms of freedom from fear. The next section considers the necessity of a responsibility to provide concept of duty.

A Responsibility to Provide

While states clearly have a duty not to harm their citizens, and the international community has duty to come to the aid of victims of internal as well as external aggression, little has been said about the duty states owe to their citizens in terms of providing for their basic human needs, or that imposed on the international community when states fail to act. Freedom from want is becoming more important in both absolute and relative terms than freedom from fear. As previously mentioned, hunger, disease and natural disasters between them kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. But also war-related deaths have been declining, and the international community is both more likely
to be informed of internal acts of aggression, and more likely to act against them than in previous decades. Nevertheless the most assertive champions of human security are beginning to risk provoking controversy with provocative statements on the need for “aid invasions” when states contribute massively negative impacts to the human security of their citizens through deliberate actions, incompetence, obstruction, or neglect (Evans 2008).

In 2008 controversies over national and international responses to May’s devastating cyclone in Burma/Myanmar and Chinese rule in Tibet (with violent demonstrations in Tibet itself, in the surrounding region and, as a result of the Olympic torch relay, across the globe), as well as severe civil unrest in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, gave an immediacy and urgency to the debate on the clash between state prerogatives, human rights, and the duties of the international community in particular with reference to the Asian region. The year 2009 has seen an ongoing focus on transnational human security issues in the region, with criticism of Chinese repatriation of North Korean refugees and Thai repatriation of ethnic Hmong from Laos. Many victims of the cyclone in Myanmar and also the earthquake which devastated parts of China’s Sichuan province in the same month, still find themselves victimized a second time by the insufficient responses of regimes that seem unable or unwilling to provide for them.

Even if in some cases it may be politically, militarily, or geographically impossible or undesirable to launch an aid invasion, or a militarized humanitarian intervention, nevertheless, it is beneficial to conceptualize human security as both a responsibility to protect and a responsibility to provide, as often fear and want, or insecurity and underdevelopment are inextricably entwined. In the Burmese monk-led uprising of September 2007, two of the
chants that rallied the crowds against the ruling military junta were “freedom from fear” and “freedom from hunger”. Clearly Burma’s rulers have good reason to be feared, and they cracked down on these demonstrations as firmly as they did those of 1988 when 3,000 people were killed. However, perhaps even more shocking was the neglect and incompetence demonstrated by the government in the face of the massive suffering caused by cyclone Nargis in 2008.

Meanwhile Laos provides a compelling case-study of the complexity of the relationship between human security and development. It is the most bombed country in history (Kingshill 1991; Cave, Lawson & Sherriff 2006), with heavy Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination, and remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a depressingly low life expectancy of just 56.29 years (CIA World Factbook), and a ranking of 133 out of 182 countries on the 2009 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (Online). Although in recent years Lao PDR has begun to develop, as categorized by the UN it remains very much a LDC. While in some ways, as would be hoped, this development does seem to be having a positive effect in terms of increasing education and decreasing mother and child mortality, it is also having a negative effect for some of the most vulnerable people in the country in terms of an increase in traffic accidents, human trafficking, migration, AIDS, and a dangerous demand for scrap metal. Thus in some ways Lao PDR faces the classic post-conflict state double-jeopardy of insecurity and under-development, whereby underdevelopment undermines human security and insecurity threatens development; but in other, perhaps surprising ways, human security in Lao is also threatened by the forces of development.

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2) As the Lao PDR has no life registry all population and mortality data are only estimates based on surveys and census (Lao PDR HDR, 2006).
A purely development focused approach is unlikely to do much for human security in the country, whereas focusing exclusively on the protection of the population is unlikely to do much to fulfill their human needs. Narrow definitions of human security tend to focus on the physical threats to individuals, and prescribe a responsibility to protect individuals from the threats they face. Many examinations to development and ODA take a macro approach focusing on statistical data and measurements of aggregate wellbeing and improvement while missing the impact of underdevelopment and development on the most vulnerable sections of society. In Lao PDR the government and the international community can only substantially improve the lives of the most vulnerable by focusing simultaneously on a responsibility to protect them from immediate threats and a responsibility to provide for their wellbeing.

Focusing solely on a freedom from fear definition of human security is insufficient to address the problems faced by the citizens and government of Lao PDR as there are many developmental challenges which constitute threats to lives and wellbeing. Indeed, infant mortality dwarfs the threat to human security posed by all other contributing factors. However, focusing solely on development issues is also insufficient as not only does insecurity hinder development, but also development can boost existing or generate new threats to human security. Protection and education alone are insufficient to reduce the threat from explosive remnants of war. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the people of Laos are well aware of the dangers, but nevertheless choose to put themselves at risk in the interest of taking advantage of the booming demand for scrap metal. Rather what is needed is either the provision of alternative sources of wellbeing generation, or measures to reduce the risk associated with collecting scrap metal.
Conclusion

Traditional state-centric conceptions of international security are insufficient to encompass the diverse threats to the lives and livelihoods of the citizens of the world. Security needs to be considered in a wider theoretical framework and practical context. Given that states themselves are the sources of many of the threats to the human security of their citizens, or are at least an aggravating factor, the onus is on the international community to help those who cannot help themselves. According to the responsibility to protect doctrine, when there are threats of violence to a substantial number of civilian lives, the international community has a duty to intervene in their defense, even if this violates political sovereignty considerations. Some would extend (controversially) this interventionary principle to “aid invasions”. However, even if we do not wish to go so far, there is a need to combine the broader freedom from want perspective with considerations of freedom from fear, not only because want kills more than the violence which causes fear, but also because of the integrated nature of the sets of issues. As mentioned above, non-traditional and human security issues can morph into threats to states, insecurity can pose a threat to development and vice versa. Thus states and the international community have a responsibility to provide for as well as protect the most vulnerable, but also a rational self-interest in doing so.

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Comprehensive security refers to the maintenance and enhancement of the security of the aggregate population of a country. It constitutes an attempt to shelter the state and its citizens who reside within it from the vagaries of natural and artificial impediments to the maintenance of an acceptable standard of living. The discourse is therefore framed around the notion of an inclusive and democratic state. In states where civil-military relations have not been constituted within a democratic framework, the national discourse privileges regime interests over citizen interests. Additionally, there is a general tendency to conflate state security with regime security. Consequently, authoritarian states have a concept of comprehensive security that is skewed away from the traditional understanding of it. This paper analyzes the gravitation between authoritarianism and democracy in four Southeast Asian countries – Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand - through an examination of their civil-military relations. These four countries have been chosen on account of their authoritarian past. Nonetheless, whereas a movement in favor of democracy provides the proper frame of reference for the adoption of comprehensive security, such a situation does not automatically obtain. The progress towards the
achievement of such security is naturally contingent on state priorities and capacity. This is an important caveat since developing countries often lack the resources and political will to achieve comprehensive security.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad introduction to the evolution of the concept of security and civil-military relations. The second section examines recent developments in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand with a view to gauging movement towards and away from democratic norms. As mentioned at the outset, authoritarian governments typically embrace a regime-centered understanding of security. The third section concludes the paper and identifies likely future political trajectories in these four states.

The Historical Evolution of Comprehensive Security and Civil-Military Relations

In international relations literature, the earliest use of the term security invariably meant state security. Within such a traditional conception territoriality and sovereignty acquired significant importance since these were the critical determinants of a state. The term comprehensive security came into vogue in the 1970s and 1980s as a way of describing how to best secure the national interests of a country. However, whereas the referent for the discourse remained the same – the state – the new concept sought to be much more inclusive with regard to the actual inhabitants of a state. In other words, although the state remained as the point of reference for security, the focus shifted to the inhabitants of the state as the beneficiaries of such security. Previously, following from the realist tradition, the referent unit, the state, was held as the abstract and sacrosanct
object of protection. This change was in order to integrate the core neorealist concept of mutual help that extended into the intrastate level as realism underwent theoretical refinement and challenges. Subsequently, by the end of the 1980s, the concept of human security would come to replace state security as the primary referent shifted from the state to individuals and groups. The movement in the unit of analysis is important in that primacy became accorded to individuals and groups that inhabited a state rather than some vague and abstract notion of the state. After all, if a government came into power on the basis of a social contract, why should those elected into public office not further the natural rights of their citizens?

The shift in the referent unit was naturally aided and abetted by developments in international relations that witnessed the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union as previously constituted. Communism that was viewed as the anti-thesis of democracy and capitalism had lost the historic ideological conflict that began in the mid-nineteenth century. Conversely, the Cold War had nourished realism and its competitive conception of state interests identified as the pursuit of power. In the main, five areas are typically identified as the constitutive core of comprehensive security. Broadly conceptualized, these are military, political, economic, societal and environmental security. Sometimes specific issues or sub-categories are utilized to demonstrate their importance within the larger categories. Food and energy security are two such issues that have become more salient.

To the extent that comprehensive security privileges the citizens of a state and is typically framed within the democratic discourse, it has an important bearing on civil-military relations. Democracy assumes a certain structuration of civil-military relations. In the main, it is assumed that the military is subjected to
civilian supremacy. In other words, the military and its functions are controlled and determined by civilians. This fundamental proviso is to control the military that typically provides the core of coercive state capacity. If the state can claim a legitimate monopoly to the use of force, then the use of such force must in turn be legitimate. For such legitimacy to obtain, it must act within the interests of the state broadly writ rather than its own corporate interests. It is for this reason that the military is typically entrusted with external rather than internal security, the latter function often falling to a police force. Even when the military is mobilized in order to assist with disaster management or reconstruction, there are strict limits to the terms of engagement. Certain constitutional provisions must be invoked in order to deploy the military for internal security and reconstruction. This procedural norm is to prevent incumbent governments from utilizing the coercive capacity of the military to sustain regime interests or to provide the military with the opportunity for political involvement. Conversely, authoritarian regimes seek to entrench themselves within the political process and often seek to monopolize political discourse while weakening competing sources of power and influence. Such attempts may come in the form of restructuring the polity to provide the military with an institutional presence in politics and impeding similar access to other socio-political groups. Over time, military authoritarian regimes seek a movement away from competition in the political arena and the plural interests that characterize democratic societies. It is also to be noted that civic culture and public space that emanate from plural interest articulation and aggregation are prohibited in authoritarian states. Such organizations and transactional norms in turn undergird human security at the societal level and provide what Robert Putnam calls social capital. Similarly, communitarianism that aspires to raise the welfare of groups derives from the civic republican tradition that is fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism. The literature in political science therefore clearly privileges democracy over authoritarianism and in this regard the existence of
authoritarian states is deleterious to comprehensive and human security in turn. Having established this evolution and linkage in the literature the paper will address the developmental status of the four selected countries in Southeast Asia. Exogenous factors that impinge on the process of the delivery of comprehensive security will also be addressed where applicable.

**Appraising Civil-Military Relations and Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia**

The military coup against the Thaksin government in September 2006 significantly reversed the otherwise generally positive trajectory of movement away from authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. The evidence up until then appeared to overwhelmingly support Huntington’s thesis that there was indeed a third wave of democratization in Southeast Asia. The demonstration effect was positively provided by developments in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Burma/Myanmar appeared to be the only state where the military junta in power following the collapse of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government in 1988 appeared intent on retaining its military authoritarian government, especially after annulling the outcome of the 1990 general election that favored the National League for Democracy (NLD). In order to better appreciate the nature of domestic political developments the countries identified will be dealt with individually.

**Domestic Developments in Indonesia**

Of all the countries in Southeast Asia Indonesia has witnessed the most
remarkable transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state. Although the regime under Suharto’s New Order government was variously categorized as corporatist and patrimonial, it bore many of the hallmarks of an authoritarian regime. President Suharto, who headed the government formally from July 1967 was a professional soldier and his power base was located within the military. In the 1970s he actively sought to entrench the military in the upper echelons of government and marginalize his challengers. He then emasculated the political opposition into two major parties and formed a new party that represented military interests. Subsequently, the party, Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) served as his vehicle for power and elections that would see him return unopposed until his downfall in 1998.

The nature of Suharto’s relationship with the military waxed and waned in the course of his tenure in office. The military was eager to reappropriate its role as an independent centre of power by the late 1980s. This action was to deflect Suharto’s own attempts to create a presidency that was independently powerful and sovereign. However, following his realization of the military’s attempts to regain its pride of place in domestic politics, he ushered in an era of openness (keterbukaan) in domestic politics to empower other constituencies in order to stave off pressures from the military. A similar tactic had been employed by his predecessor, Sukarno, in the 1960s when he sought to balance the competing pressures from the nationalists, religious groups and communists by coining the acronym NASAKOM. Among other measures, Suharto significantly empowered the Islamic constituency and allowed the mushrooming of socio-political organizations. Unfortunately for Suharto, these forces, rather than staving off pressures from the military, eventually hastened his downfall. In all fairness however, it must be noted that the Asian Financial Crisis had a disproportionate impact on the fate of the Suharto government. The structural
reforms mandated by international donor agencies that included the lifting of subsidies on essential commodities led in turn to food riots in Jakarta that triggered the regime’s collapse.

The collapse of the Suharto government led his deputy Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie to head an interim government for little over a year before elections were called. Subsequently, Abdurrahman Wahid became President for a period of two years before his impeachment for corruption. Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced him for the next two years before elections were called again in 2004. The 2004 election proved to be the turning point in Indonesian politics. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who won the elections culled together a fairly strong government with support from GOLKAR and a number of smaller Islamic political parties. His image as a clean politician who was responsible for weeding out corruption in government earned him widespread popularity. As a result, he has just been reelected for a second term of office in 2009. The other major contending parties smeared their reputation through alignments with politicians associated with the Suharto regime. SBY is therefore much stronger now and is able to lead the country with a much stronger and more stable coalition government in place.

Other than developments at the elite level, the salience of a number of issues suggest that Indonesia has indeed moved away from authoritarianism and is gravitating towards the entrenchment of democratic norms. Structural aspects of such change include the abolishment of reserved seats in parliament for the military, a norm under the previous Suharto administration. Political parties are firmly in place and have generally abided by the rules of free and fair political contestation. The government generally obtains a high level of political legitimacy and politically related violence has significantly subsided. Internal
security functions that were previously performed by the military have been turned over to a police force and to deal with sudden demands, the country has even created a police mobile brigade (Brimob). At the administrative level, the political executive is working towards implementing a policy of decentralization although there is a shortage of trained bureaucrats for the task. The SBY government has also announced a policy to further eradicate corruption and develop the country’s infrastructure. The country is generally regarded stable and poised for further political and socio-economic development. In fact, for the short time that the country has taken to transform itself from an authoritarian state to a democratic one, the country holds out both a demonstration effect as well as promise to other countries in the region and beyond.

Domestic Developments in Burma/Myanmar

Myanmar has undergone perhaps some of the most dramatic political developments in the last two decades in Southeast Asia. When the BSPP government collapsed in 1988, there was little by way of political precedent to replace the military authoritarian regime that was established by Ne Win following a coup against the democratically established government in 1962. There were also disagreements within the ranks of the military on the proper course of action. The demonstration effect of the global collapse of communist and socialist regimes inspired a student-led demonstration against the military junta in power. However, this uprising was easily suppressed by the junta through resort to violence. Shortly afterwards however, the junta signaled its willingness to implement national elections in order to acquire renewed political legitimacy in replacement of that of the BSPP government. The election that was held in 1990 yielded an unexpected outcome for the junta. The newly assembled
National League for Democracy (NLD), symbolically led by its charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, scored a significant victory in the election. The junta that was unwilling to relinquish political power quickly annulled the outcome of the election and detained many members of the political opposition.

The annulment of the election results and repeated detentions of senior members of the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi as well as reports of torture and use of civilians as porters in warfare brought punitive sanctions from the international community. These sanctions were led primarily by the United States and the European Union. The sanctions regime has been expanded over time to include trade and investment embargoes as well as an embargo on travel for senior members of the military junta in power, their immediate families and those associated with the regime. Some of the pressures brought to bear by the impact of these sanctions have been blunted in the regional arena through Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN since 1997. In any event, the brunt of the sanctions has been borne by wage labourers like those in the textile industry rather than the military elite. Countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have continued to engage Myanmar in trade and investments albeit it must be added that the chorus of opposition against political developments in the country have also continued to mount in the regional arena. Myanmar’s other two close neighbors, India and China have also helped blunt the impact of sanctions. China in particular has been heavily involved in the development of infrastructure, oil and gas exploration, hydroelectric power projects and port and cold storage facilities. Myanmar figures prominently in China’s interest in gaining access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean as well as the development of a road and transport network linking Kunming in Yunnan province to the port of Sittwe in Arakan state. India, that maintains a strategic naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been alarmed by these developments and sought to balance China by
engaging Myanmar much more recently. Similarly, Thailand, with a long border and dense transactions with Myanmar has also helped deflect the impact of international sanctions. Nonetheless, it might be noted that Myanmar’s relations with China, India and Thailand are complicated by cultural and historical considerations as well as the military junta’s firm determination to retain its independence and latitude in foreign policy output. Consequently, although all three countries help Myanmar in deflecting the impact of international sanctions, it remains firm in its resolve not to lose its sovereign right to foreign and domestic policy output.

The internal political situation in Myanmar is complicated by a number of factors that are unique to the country. Important among such factors are ethnic insurgent armies and protracted civil war in the country. Early attempts to arrive at some form of accommodation with the insurgent armies involved ceasefire arrangements with the largest of the groups. It began with the Wan and Kokang ethnic armies that had previously been the sword arm of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). Subsequently, similar ceasefires were arranged with a total of 17 such ethnic armies. Under the terms of agreement, such armies are allowed to retain their arms and control a contiguous piece of territory and administer it. The government recognized their control of these areas and agreed to inform them of ahead of time should the need arise for it to enter the areas. Notwithstanding these arrangements, fighting continues to obtain in the Chin state neighboring Bangladesh and parts of the Shan and Karen states with elements of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S). Additionally and importantly, it is unclear how these armies and ceasefires will evolve in relation to plans to hold a national election in 2010. The junta’s preferred plan is to induct these soldiers as part of a border guard force but the armies appear reluctant to lose control of the territories and resources contained within them.
The election that has been announced for 2010 has been long in coming. It followed many years of what was labeled the “roadmap to democracy”. Among other things, important aspects of this roadmap included the convening on a National Convention to include all the territories and ethnic groups. It also included a hastily rushed through National Referendum in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, much to the chagrin of the political opposition and the international community. In the midst of all these preparations, the trial and extended detention of Aung San Suu Kyi for breaching the terms of her house arrest, has complicated matters for the political opposition. Suu Kyi continues to remain an icon of both the democracy movement and the political opposition. She commands widespread respect within the country and is capable of coalescing the disjointed opposition into a serious campaign against the junta. The military is all too aware of this potential and is clearly anxious to avoid the stunning defeat that it was subjected to in 1990.

While the lead up to and outcome of the 2010 election remains unclear, there are a number of parallel developments occurring that should be factored into any analysis of the current situation. The first of these is that the military junta is keen to appropriate some form of political legitimacy both domestically and internationally following the collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 and the annulment of the 1990 election results. The new results will effectively remove the 1990 election outcome from the political landscape and it will cease to be a frame of reference for any sort of political settlement. The new constitution will reserve a fixed proportion of seats in the legislature for the military, not unlike the situation in Indonesia under the Suharto administration. The political executive is to be a person conversant with military and strategic affairs. Although it is widely thought that the election will provide an exit strategy for Than Shwe to be the next President and simultaneously retire from the military, it
is really unclear how the other cards will fall. There is a flurry of activity within
the political opposition both inside and outside the country to take advantage of
this seeming window of opportunity and contest in the election. There appears to
be the growing realization that the 2010 national election may well be a
significant conjuncture in domestic politics with path dependent considerations
for the future.

To draw the Myanmar case to a close, it is clear that domestic political
developments in the past two decades have clearly privileged the military junta
in power. The serious challenges to the military’s control of domestic politics in
the form of the ethnic insurgent armies and the political opposition as constituted
in the NLD have clearly been deflected. Conversely, the military has
significantly strengthened itself, both in absolute as well as relational terms.
Trade and investments from the immediately adjacent countries have also
blunted the impact of the external sanctions regime. In the meantime, Western
countries led by the United States are signaling a new willingness to engage the
Myanmar military government. Consequently, on balance, it is quite clear that
civil-military relations have been calibrated in the military’s favor after the
collapse of the BSPP government in 1988. Much will clearly depend on the
process and outcome of the 2010 national election and on how the political
opposition and other sectors of civil society are able to impress themselves on the
national scene. In this regard, although the 2010 election will be an important
path dependent conjuncture, it will be difficult to predict what the future
trajectory of domestic politics will be in Myanmar. One thing remains certain
though – the military is likely to be primus inter pares for some time to come
with all the attendant implications.
Domestic Developments in the Philippines

The Philippine case is unique to the extent that although the country has successfully emerged from a military authoritarian regime for more than two decades now, meaningful changes have not obtained in the realm of socio-economic development. In fact the cynic might add that the same is true of political developments – the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship has simply led to the reinstatement of the power of preexisting elite. In this regard, although democracy obtains at the procedural level in the Philippines, it appears to have little impact on the appropriation and distribution of power and resources. Additionally, the existence of a populist political culture has in effect been a detriment to the institutionalization of democracy.

There were a number of factors and forces that led to the overthrow of the Marcos government in 1986 that epitomized a military authoritarian government through the imposition of martial law from as early as 1972. Central to the success of the overthrow was dissension within the ranks of the military. Marcos’ Defence Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile defected and joined a rebel group led by Gregorio Honasan who in turn commanded the loyalty of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). The decision by the Catholic Church to support the rebel group and prevent an assault by Marcos loyalists led in turn to civilian and clerical support for the coup. The decision by the United States to intervene and airlift Marcos to safety and exile in Hawaii subsequently sealed the fate of the military government. Fortunately, political violence had been avoided and the country began its slow return to democratic norms. Important structural changes entered into the constitution to prevent a return to Marcos-styled politics was the insertion of a six-year term limit on the office of the President. The first person to win the term was Cory Aquino – wife of the assassinated politician Benigno
Aquino. Notwithstanding her democratic credentials, there were a total of six coup attempts during her term in office and the 1989 December attempt almost succeeded were it not for U.S. intervention in preventing rebel aircraft from strafing Malacanang Palace. In this regard, RAM continued to challenge the government even after the Marcos government had collapsed. Fortunately, over time, this threat was defused through a policy of clemency and absorption of RAM leaders in the Senate. Additionally, senior military commanders linked to coup attempts and political adventurism have been detained and their threats deflected over time.

The person who was most able to administer the country effectively after Marcos was actually retired army commander Fidel Ramos. Coup attempts became a thing of the past under his presidency. He was able to bring political calm and development to the country. Importantly, he also managed to bring the Islamic insurgency in Mindanao to a close by negotiating a truce with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. The terms of the truce involved the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with Nur Misuari, MNLF leader, as Governor of the region for a term of five years. Unfortunately though, the truce unraveled when Nur Misuari’s term expired and other factions and groups in the Islamic insurgency have taken up arms. The policy of the Gloria Arroyo government that was conciliatory at the outset subsequently became bogged down over land and legal rights. The general consensus at this point is that the current government has neither the political will nor the interest in settlement of the issue. Important elite and Catholic interest also appear to be impediments to the achievement of a lasting settlement.

The election of Joseph (Erap) Estrada revealed the populist side of Philippine politics. His impeachment for corruption and widespread public demonstrations
led in turn to Gloria Arroyo replacing him just after two years. Later on in 2004, she would go on to win her own term of another six years. All of these developments raise a number of important questions about the tone and texture of Philippine democracy. The first of these is the establishment of political protest as a legitimate way of replacing an elected government. Even if Marcos was overthrown in such a manner, it is important to realize that the demonstration was a prelude and precursor to democratic elections afterwards. In the case of Gloria Arroyo’s ascension to power in 2000, it was simply a swearing-in ceremony by the Chief Justice on a podium in the middle of the demonstration. Secondly, since Gloria Arroyo stood for her own term of office afterwards, she has been in power for a total of 10 years. This extended term of office is clearly in violation of the spirit of the new constitution and its term limit on power.

There are a number of other important extraneous conditions that has affected the quality of Philippine democracy even as Arroyo’s term of office is due to expire next year. The first of these is the fact that power and influence continues to be exercised by a relatively small elite that is unprepared to give up this monopoly any time soon. This elite, that also controls the economy, has successfully legislated its own interests and evolved protectionist policies that further its own corporate interests. The emasculated economy in turn provides little opportunity for a large and independent middle class to anchor democracy. Instead large numbers of locals regularly leave the country to search for employment abroad. This practice is so pervasive that the country is a major provider of domestic, medical and skilled labour to many parts of Asia and the Middle East. Consequently, it is arguable that the Philippines, despite being a democracy with civilian supremacy, has a political economy that is fundamentally feudal and captured by elite interests. The situation also appears as if it is unlikely to change
in the near future. Consequently, comprehensive security obtains to the extent that state revenues and political will permits and large parts of the population is left to fend for themselves.

**Domestic Developments in Thailand**

Thailand’s political developments have been the most counter-intuitive in the recent past. Following the failed attempts by the military to stage a coup in 1991 and 1992, it was generally thought that the country was well on its way to democracy. Although the Democrat Party that formed the Chuan Leekpai-led government in 1993 was subsequently replaced by more old-styled politicians with dubious credentials, the Democrats were able to return to power in 1997. In this regard, the governments led by Banharn Silpa-Archa in 1995 and that led by Chaovarit Yongchaiyudh in 1996 collapsed under the pressures of the Asian financial crisis. However, the weak economy and capital flight presented enormous challenges to the Democrat-led six-party minority coalition development with all the additional attendant interparty dynamics in 1997.

Despite many developments in its disfavor, the Chuan government was able to put together a number of reforms to further democratize the country. These included a new constitution, a number of administrative courts to mediate electoral and constitutional disputes, and a National Counter Corruption Commission. All these developments and the robust involvement of the urban middle class in Bangkok to thwart the country from returning to military authoritarianism appeared to work in entrenching democratic norms. However, the Asian Financial Crisis had significantly undermined the domestic elite, including the King’s Crown Property Bureau. This weakness provided an
opportunity for a newcomer to make significant gains in national politics in 2001. Thaksin Shinawatra who had earlier registered the Thai Rak Thai (TRT - Thais Love Thais) Party in 1998 capitalized on the anti-international populist sentiments in the country. Importantly, his monopolies in the telecommunications industry had allowed him to accumulate andfield resources that were totally disproportionate to those of his competitors.

When he formed the first government in 2001, Thaksin did not have a simple majority of seats and had to include smaller parties like Seritham and the New Aspiration Party led by Cha ovalit. However, in order to fortify the TRT’s position, Thaksin had these parties dissolved and merged within the larger identity of the TRT. He was also able with his enormous resources to woo members of the traditional elite, including elements within the military. And finally, with his populist policies, he was able to retain a large electoral support base in the north of the country where he hailed from and the poor and rural northeast of the country. Such policies included a three year moratorium on farm debt, hospital services pegged at 30 Baht per visit and million Baht loans to villages to promote cottage industries. These policies clearly endeared him to the rural poor where he still retains a large and powerful following.

Notwithstanding his electoral and policy successes, there were also a number of charges leveled against him at the popular and elite levels. His personalized style of ruling was often regarded authoritarian and his war against drugs that involved the extra-judicial killings of more than 2,000 persons attracted widespread criticism. He was also accused of skewing public policies in order to enrich himself and stood accused of what came to be called policy corruption. Finally, for all his wealth and power, he was unable to avoid the factionalism that characterized Thai politics. As a result of personality-based loyalties, his own
party suffered from such factionalism with four dominant factions that often threatened the unity of the party.

When he was reelected for a second term into office in 2005, Thaksin’s position was clearly unassailable. His party had a commanding lead with 377 seats in the 500-seat legislature and with the opposition holding less than 25 percent of the total seats, even a motion of censure was difficult to initiate without some TRT support. His stunning success in turn attracted much criticism from the traditional elite that had been marginalized by Thaksin. This unhappiness found its vent in a social movement – the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD – Yellow Shirts) that was led by one time media mogul and business partner Sondhi Limthongkul. Over time, this movement expanded to include members of the urban middle classes, public sector and Thaksin’s mentor and leader of the Santi Asoke sect of Buddhism, Chamlong Srimuang. Claiming to work in support of the monarchy and against authoritarianism, the PAD caused chaos in Bangkok through public demonstrations and the occupation of important facilities. Eventually, the King “whispered” into Thaksin’s ears for him to step down and cool the temperature. Over time, however, he slowly eased himself back into power on the basis of a 2006 referendum that he regarded to be in his favor.

By now things were coming to a head and eventually, when he was out of the country and attending a United Nations conference in New York in September 2006, the military staged a coup against his government and over time a military interim caretaker government was announced. The unfolding political drama did not end there. The courts that were tasked by the King to mediate the political impasse eventually disbanded TRT for electoral fraud and banned some 111 senior members of the party from holding office for a five year term. TRT
supporters and members then quickly moved to register a new political party, the People Power Party (PPP) that then won the polls in 2008. However, the PAD again began its public demonstrations and forced the resignation of two incumbent Prime Ministers who led the PPP government – Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat – Thaksin’s brother-in-law. The courts again intervened and alleging electoral fraud, disbanded the PPP as well. Thaksin’s followers and supporters then began their own social movement – the National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD- Red Shirts). A number of new political parties were spawned following the dissolution of the PPP essentially with Thaksin supporters. The current minority government led by the Democrat Party was only able to form a government when a major Thaksin faction leader, Newin Chidchob, broke ranks to support the Abhisit Vejjajiva government. It is for this reason that the Abhisit government is often viewed as lacking in political legitimacy.

In the meantime, Thaksin continues his battles through proxies from afar and sometimes near, as was the case when he recently visited Cambodia and caused a diplomatic row between Thailand and Cambodia. The Thai government has sought Thaksin’s extradition for a two-year jail term for corruption delivered in absentia. Both the Red and Yellow Shirts continue with their social movements and protests and Thaksin skillfully manages to keep his constituency alive and nourished. The military that led the coup is believed to be supported by the Privy Council that advises the King. Many see the President of the Privy Council, Prem Tinsulanond’s, hands in the maneuvers of the military and the monarchy. The decorated ex-military commander and Prime Minister from 1980 to 1988 is known for his linkages with the monarchy and the Council itself is in any event tasked with advising the King. Hence, it is often thought that traditional centers of power in domestic politics are staging a behind the
scenes attempt to return to power and influence. The King who is technically above politics in his role as constitutional monarch rarely displays his preferences in public except to broker disputes that threaten the political and social fabric of the country. At the present time however, at 81 years of age, he is frail and has been hospitalized for some months now. Consequently, the country is truly at a political crossroad and there is a very real danger that violence may obtain before the impasse is broken.

As for the democratic scorecard, it is clear that Thailand has regressed significantly from its attempts at democratic consolidation. In this regard, the Asian Financial Crisis had a significant and deleterious impact on Indonesia and Thailand. Whereas the former emerged from the crisis much more democratic, the latter lapsed in the direction of authoritarianism. A democratically elected government of sorts is currently functioning in Thailand but remains unstable and subjected to the vagaries of mass social movements from below and elite pressures from above. Given the high stakes at which the political endgame is being played, many watchers expect another coup in the event that the current government is unable to cope or loses its existing support. Another coup is also possible if political violence breaks out or there is an attempt by those allied with Thaksin in the military and the police to seize power. A power vacuum ensuing from untoward developments involving the King also has potential to rearrange the chess board. Hence, there are a truly large number of factors and forces that work against political accommodation and cohesion in Thailand at the present time. It is hoped that the negative developments of the recent years will make way over time for a gradual return to normalcy and democratic governance.
Conclusion

The development of civil-military relations in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand has certainly been complicated. Whereas there was some initial euphoria in the 1990s that the region was gradually moving away from authoritarianism and towards democracy, at least some of that euphoria has now abated. Among the four countries examined, Indonesia has surprised most observers with its rapid and sustained transition towards democratic governance. The recent reelection of SBY for a second term suggests that there is overwhelming support for his policies and that he will continue to undertake democratic consolidation, particularly in the area of administrative decentralization and in the fight against corruption. The Philippines, while it has shed its military authoritarian past, remains undeveloped politically on account of its elite monopoly on power and the economy. Extra-constitutional populist politics also stand in the way of democratic consolidation.

Myanmar and Thailand present the two cases where democratic governance has been compromised. In the case of Myanmar that has had a military authoritarian regime in place since 1962, it is likely that the transition will take time to evolve. The country’s closed nature, the junta’s sensitivity to sovereignty and the country’s ability to ward off punitive external sanctions on the basis of its relations with its immediate neighbors has allowed the junta to retain its power. It is hoped that the 2010 national election and the recent engagement of the country by the United States will gradually lead to a measure of democratic governance. As for Thailand, the country is in the midst of a long and drawn out political crisis. The crisis will have to be resolved at some point simply on account of the high cost exacted by the current situation and the higher stakes that are being waged. All that can be hoped is that the situation will not deteriorate into political
violence before some modicum of democratic norms is established.

Comprehensive security, as mentioned at the outset, privileges the aggregate population of a state rather than some vague and abstract notion of national security as argued by writers who subscribed to an archrealist notion of power politics premised on competitive rather than collaborative norms. For such security to obtain, it is imperative that civil-military relations be properly calibrated to favor citizen interests. History has amply demonstrated that authoritarian regimes tend to favor regime security over comprehensive or human security. Additionally, regime security is then conveniently conflated with state security. This nebulous linkage then allows for regime interests to be promoted in the name of state interests. Similarly, perceived threats to the regime can be conveniently dealt with in the name of national security. Consequently, democratic regimes that reflect the plural interests of its citizenry are far better able to deliver comprehensive security rather than the narrowly defined regime specific interests of authoritarian ones. It is in this regard that a discourse on civil-military relations is central to the notion of comprehensive security.
The October 2009 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Cha-Am, Thailand saw the much-vaunted launch of a new ASEAN-wide Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the product of years of delicate negotiation and compromise among member states, finally propounded in the ASEAN Charter signed by member states in 2007. Neoliberal and constructivist aspirations seemed realized: three decades of economic and political cooperation had apparently succeeded in forging ever-deeper cooperation and reshaping shared norms. Yet things did not go quite as planned; the interests of those states most threatened by these civil societal critics trumped happy regionalism, leaving the AICHR toothless and stalled. The language of the Charter itself is closely hedged: ASEAN will promote human rights “with due regard” for member states’ rights; state sovereignty and non-interference remain core principles; and decision-making will still be based on deliberation and consensus (McCarthy 2009: 169).

And as an especially palpable manifestation of how flat the effort fell: long-simmering plans to institutionalize interaction between ASEAN leaders and
representatives of ASEAN civil society organizations (CSOs)1) collapsed when half the member states’ governments rejected their civil society representatives on arrival, triggering a walkout by disillusioned human rights activists. Even before the recent summit, activists were less than satisfied with the new human rights body specifically: the commission could promote human rights in a general sense, but without powers of investigation or sanction. Furthermore, the body lacks independence as well as transparency in the selection of commissioners, since foreign ministries choose or approve each state’s NGO delegation (McCarthy 2009: 169-70; Nation [Bangkok], Oct. 12, 2009; IPS/Irawaddy, Oct. 19, 2009; NYT, Oct. 23, 2009).

The place of CSOs in ASEAN neatly encapsulates a normative divide within ASEAN, between those states that accept a more open, consultative process and those steadfast in illiberalism at the domestic level and non-interference in same from the regional level. Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos raised objections to a plan, introduced by Thailand and supported especially by Indonesia and the Philippines, to institutionalize ASEAN–CSO consultations; the less democratic member states have proposed instead downgrading the meetings to be less formal or optional. (Vietnam was initially supportive; Brunei and Singapore are wary. Past summits have included either submitted reports from CSOs or brief face-to-face meetings.) Preferences regarding the AICHR fall along the same lines. The split in states’ relative support for bringing civil society into the fold and human rights onto the regional agenda starkly represented variations in levels of internal democracy and development of autonomous CSOs within those states - and the

1) 58 CSOs are currently accredited as “ASEAN-affiliated CSOs,” per a set of formal guidelines (available on the ASEAN Secretariat’s website: http://www.aseansec.org/18362.htm). Most are regionally- rather than nationally-oriented. See the full list at: http://www.aseansec.org/6070.pdf
members of ASEAN run the gamut politically. In this round, at least, realism – the priority of narrow state self-interests – seemed the bottom line.

The pace and scope of economic globalization in the post-Cold War years has raised new questions not just about sovereignty, alliances, heightened interdependence, and implications for security, but also about the possibility and place of civil society, whether at the domestic, regional, or global level. With political and economic dimensions both varied and dynamic, the Asia-Pacific region offers an ideal environment in which to explore civil society and social activism as part of a reconfigured security environment, and to think theoretically about how such activism aligns or interacts with identities, interests, and paradigms of regional relations. I focus here specifically on Southeast Asia, in part since ASEAN offers a clear institutional architecture for some degree of global governance and regional identity-building, but also since this set of states shares important features in terms of economic and political trajectories, facilitating comparison. ASEAN itself has been actively negotiating the precise terms of that architecture, working a build “a superstructure alongside the infrastructure” to lend the organization both greater authority and sharper form.2) Moreover, the very nature of “security” remains in flux in the region (Lizee 2000), though I adopt for now an understanding of “comprehensive security” in a human, rather than state or military, sense, per the parameters of the current project.

Participation of CSOs is new neither at the domestic nor at the regional level3) in

3) From early days, regional chambers of commerce and academic think tanks (some participants in which were also ASEAN officials) played significant roles in charting ASEAN policies, perspectives, and directions (Chandra 2009: 5-6).
the ASEAN region, though the density and scope of associational life has expanded over the forty-three years since ASEAN’s founding. Civil society has developed in many states of the region in large part given its centrality to welfare service provision, services inherent to an expanded vision of security. That dimension carries less salience at the regional level, yet may serve as a benchmark for the sturdiness of regional identities and allegiances. At the same time, just as the conflicts in which the region is embroiled tend to be transnational to at least some extent, so do civil societal responses. Recent years have seen an increase in transnational organizing around matters that constitute new or unconventional security threats, from infectious diseases to refugee flows. Lastly – and most contentiously – globalizing processes and threats increase the mandate activists from one state feel to intervene in other states, whether to the extent of supporting counterparts across borders or of wielding a boomerang-type effect to influence those other states. This chapter will contribute to our understanding of how civil society and social movements are part of a re-conceptualized security environment by exploring contemporary interactions between civil societal and state forces, in both home states and neighboring target ones. Such an examination will allow us to broach larger questions of the sequencing of democratization and associational development, of whether we can indeed speak of an emergent regional or global civil society, and of how “security” is most usefully understood.

Global (or Regional) Civil Society: Myth or Reality?

Civil society may be defined, per Hegel, as the sphere between state and family, or between formal political institutions and apolitical kinship and social networks (even when the latter may, at times, serve as the basis for broader engagement).
Gramsci refined these parameters as the space outside state, family, and also market – an arena of culture, discourse, and ideology; a revival of the concept in the 1970s and ‘80s then adopted a less territorially- and rule-bound vision, focusing on space for civic engagement (Kaldor 2003: 584-6). While individuals may function as civil societal actors, our focus here is at the associational level, on civil societal organizations (CSOs) such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), sociopolitically-engaged religious associations, formally-constituted issue-based coalitions, trade unions, and the like. Most such groups organize on the state or local level, though a small subset locate themselves at the regional or international level.

It remains the state, though, in most prevailing conceptions, that primarily grants or rescinds the space available for civil societal engagement: civil societies are very much the product of local norms, institutional forms, and political opportunity structures, though civil society’s activation may in turn shift these parameters. The lack of a transnational state in a formal sense presents the clearest bar to development of a transnational civil society, though such formally-constituted bodies as the European Union and, to a lesser extent, ASEAN, may present sufficiently state-like structures to support a civil society, or a global civil society may be described in more normatively- than institutionally-bounded terms. Indeed, an optimistic assessment suggests “the growing interconnectedness of states, the emergence of a system of global governance, and the explosion of the movements, groups, networks and organizations that engage in a global or transnational public debate, have called into question the primacy of states”; the latter “continue to be the juridical repository of sovereignty, although sovereignty will be much more conditional than before – increasingly dependent on both domestic consent and international respect” (Kaldor 2003: 583).
Proponents of internationalization (Tarrow 2006: 25) note the availability of these new potentials for mobilization not just across borders, but in truly international space, yet also the difficulties of transcending the state-ordered realm. While a strong transnational thesis argues that the national state may be losing its capacity to constrain and structure collective action, even as activists and their organizations find new sources and sympathetic norms to facilitate mobilization across borders (Tarrow 1998: 181-2), a more flexible approach still offers leverage. Transnational activism need not extend across a broad swathe of countries, but includes issues, actors, targets, or strategies that span at least one border, however formally or informally, and involves discursive soft power – for instance in the form of “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) – at least as much as more elusive hard power.

The space of transnational civil society, in which such activism takes place, interacts with both domestic and interstate political and economic structures, neither fully autonomous of state power or immune to domestic political opportunity structures, nor confined to these (Piper and Uhlin 2004). Within this realm are transnational activists, whom Tarrow defines as “individuals and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts” (Tarrow 2006: 29). Such processes and actors are at the heart of the push for protected space for cross-border civil societal engagement within ASEAN, but also of several of the most pivotal of civil societal initiatives in the region today. As such, this emergent space and its denizens pose new allies and adversaries alike for states confronting both new and old security challenges. Perhaps most importantly, this array of forces challenges the normative premises of ASEAN, albeit generally in sync with the association’s more politically liberal members. Their increasing involvement, supranational identity, and claim for
legitimate voice has led CSOs in the region to argue for a “human security” approach – one in which these same CSOs can then assert themselves not just at a superficial level, but in helping to combat a panoply of potentially destabilizing, nontraditional threats.

Welfare Service Provision: Transnational Civil Society to the Rescue?

The dimension probably most important for legitimating and ensuring that states protect an autonomous space for civil society at the domestic level is that of welfare provision: CSOs provide services states cannot afford to provide, prefer not to provide, or lack the access or ability to provide. These roles gained all the more recognition in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, when not only did affected states face pressures for democratization and accountability, but few could afford to maintain social service provision. CSOs thus came to the fore not just as democracy advocates, but as increasingly active in poverty alleviation, health care services, and more (Lizee 2000; Tan 2005: 57).

Welfare provision is far less significant a force for legitimation of civil society at the international level, since supranational institutions generally bear less direct responsibility for these services, even if conceptualized as part of “human security.”

4) Paris offers a trenchant critique of the concept of human security”: though not just “hot air,” the supposed new paradigm is only vaguely defined, and its chief backers prefer that it stay that way, the more readily to cement a loose coalition of states hoping to shift focus and resources from traditional security issues to more developmental concerns (Paris 2001: 88).
it aims to keep informed and involved, in order that the latter can “help promote
the development of a people-centered ASEAN Community,”5) most are
professional or occupational networks. Still, such welfarist campaigns as disaster
response drives have seen some recognition of regional affinity and even
identity. Boosting such efforts since the late 1990s have been the launch of ever
more nationally-constituted, but regionally (or even globally) identified groups –
a process of scale shift, as local activists recalibrate their targets (Tarrow 2006:
121). The Malaysian Medial Relief Society (MERCY Malaysia), for instance,
established in 1999, has sent medical relief missions to Indonesia’s Maluku and
Sumatra, Cambodia, and elsewhere (including to such places as Kosovo, India,
and Afghanistan, though its primary focus is regional), as well as to struggling
communities within Malaysia (Weiss 2004: 133-4). Recognizing such capacities,
and reflecting specifically on region-wide responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami, then ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong promised to enlist all
stakeholders, including CSOs, in future ASEAN disaster relief efforts.6)

Yet the ability of CSOs to intervene even in a true crisis remains constrained:
even wounded states may clutch at their sovereignty or simply be too
disorganized to facilitate international intervention. Cyclone Nargis, which
wracked Myanmar in 2008 offers such an example. The state was both
incapacitated in terms of infrastructure and preoccupied with a political agenda,
leaving it unable to respond at all effectively (Pavin 2009). At the same time,

5) ASEAN Secretariat, “Guidelines On ASEAN’s Relations with Civil Society Organisations” (6 April
organizations in question at the ASEAN summit are a different group of more than seventy SE Asia-
based organizations.
6) Ong Keng Yong, “Leadership in Asia After Tsunami,” Remarks delivered at the Asian Leadership
while ASEAN stepped expeditiously to the plate – both official and civil societal actors, together with UN agencies and international NGOs – their engagement suffered delays, as it required the junta’s consent (Haacke 2008: 371). Even so, ASEAN’s intervention helped convince the junta to grant open access to affected areas (McCarthy 2009: 167), while its own humanitarian efforts helped to expedite those of international NGOs working then in Myanmar (Chandra 2009: 9). Moreover, as Tan notes, “NGOs are now viewed as possessing certain capacities that can facilitate peace and reconciliation at the grassroots level in societies torn by civil war and ethnic strife”; they are thus increasingly playing roles in peacekeeping and other conflict management missions, potentially even in historically-chary Southeast Asia (Tan 2005: 52).

**Regional Threats and Responses**

As such ad hoc disaster response drives hint, what seems most to legitimate civil societal engagement at the regional level, from a state perspective, is really a permutation on welfarist engagement: the role of partly- or fully-autonomous organizations in responding to inherently transnational challenges such as disease and migration. More broadly, it is these sorts of threats – environmental and economic problems, drugs, terrorism, transboundary crime, and so forth – that rationalists suggest have spurred a more consultative style within ASEAN, to allow a more effective collective response (Katsumata 2004: 239). These longer-term, endemic threats cannot be tackled by any one state, nor does any state have the same access to affected populations and (sometimes illicit) networks as nonstate actors for some of the most intractable of these challenges. At the same time, liberalization and the growth of civil society within ASEAN member states has fed CSO campaigns around social justice, poverty,
environmental degradation, and more, with some of those CSOs taking a regional stance (Tan 2005: 56). Regional efforts to combat such endemic but elusive concerns as HIV (which by the nature of its vectors, demands a different approach than other public health threats do) and flows of refugees and human trafficking perhaps best illustrate these dynamics. These more systematic campaigns represent a different sort of engagement than short-term civil societal participation in emergency response drives. The networks formed around transboundary threats serve a clear functional purpose, but in doing so, impinge on state agendas and test state legitimacy by invoking and addressing issues states might rather sidestep.

A series of severe, and severely contagious, illnesses has made clear the extent to which public health is a security issue. The ravages of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in 2003, for instance, “awakened countries to a clear and present danger, making affected nations aware of how vulnerable their security could be,” even though health security had not previously factored into prevailing regional definitions of comprehensive security (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 475-6). The spread of HIV has been an especial spur to collective action among marginalized communities in Southeast Asia (Weiss 2006), but also to new forms of transnational collaboration. Still, as Lindquist notes, “place” matters, as the topography of transnational advocacy networks is not evenly flat: dominant channels and nodes for agenda-setting and resources remain national ones. Activists in far-flung corners of Indonesia, for instance, look to Jakarta rather than to closer-by counterparts based in other countries for funds and other resources (Lindquist 2004: 119-20). And yet CSOs may be better able to confront the geographic unboundedness of disease in ways states are less able to do. The Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility (CARAM) network, for instance, integrates attention to public health with issues of labor migration and
refugee flows, homing in both on specific national contexts via member organizations and on cross-border dynamics as warranted (Weiss 2004: 133).

**Activists Across Borders: Civil Societal Allies and Influence**

Yet the most distinctive and potentially disruptive form of civil societal engagement on the regional level is in a rights-oriented advocacy mode. It is this mode which most clearly propounds a progressive “alternative regionalism” rooted in the efforts of left-leaning social movements, and more “people-centered” (rooted in popular participation in decision-making) than “people-oriented” (oriented toward the people’s concerns and interests, as understood by elites) (Chandra 2009: 2-3, 10). Such engagement not only attempts to intervene directly to right perceived abuses, but directly challenges state-defined conceptualizations of sovereignty and security in favor of a “human security” approach. The latter approach has more traction now than previously, given political transitions in several states, yet still represents a real divergence from ASEAN’s usual, more conventional posture (Tan 2005: 56).

If states wish to participate in regional or international forums, they may be constrained in their ability to shield themselves from organizations or claims deemed legitimate in partner states – resulting in at least some degree of convergence to the mean as some states accommodate and others press. At the same time, especially within the famously genteel ASEAN, norms of noninterference have trumped aspirations toward human rights aims at the Track I level: diplomacy has straitjacketed states, in a way CSOs evade. New international norms of human rights and democracy are making inroads to
change that balance, but unevenly across the region (Katsumata 2004: 252). Epitomizing this form of more normative engagement are ASEAN-level civil societal campaigns around East Timor, especially through the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET, established 1994) in conjunction with the global East Timor Action Network (ETAN), and Myanmar, coordinated through the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN, established 1996). While aspiring to concrete, regime-changing objectives, these campaigns may be understood also through a constructivist lens: they seek to inculcate norms of adherence to minimal human rights standards among ASEAN members and to offer new ways to understand and pursue “security.”

But to understand this level better, we return to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), discussed earlier. The germ of the AICHR was a 1993 commitment among ASEAN foreign ministers to establish such a body, yet concerns over its capacity and reach complicated its development. Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter ratified at the 2007 ASEAN summit in Singapore finally provided for the establishment of a human rights mechanism—and even then, that particular article caused particular difficulties. Former ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong explains both the delay and the continued emphasis on non-interference: “We needed to assure different countries that nobody is going to tell them how to run their country.”7) Still, the language of the Charter diverges clearly from precedent, including the still-upheld norm of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs, by listing among ASEAN’s objectives, “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and

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fundamental freedoms” and committing to establish “a human rights body” (Jones 2008: 737).

Since well before the latest rounds of sociopolitical upheavals, ASEAN-based CSOs have collaborated in a series of meetings around human rights and more broadly, alternative visions and platforms for ASEAN. Indeed, this particular sort of networking dates as least to 1993, when regional CSOs held a parallel meeting in Bangkok while their states met to strategize for the Vienna UN World Conference on Human Rights. The states’ declaration in 1993 (as at other times) stressed cultural relativism, rejected confrontation and conditionality as modes of persuasion, and stressed economic, social, and cultural rights equally with civil and political ones. The Bangkok NGO declaration, on the other hand, took a stronger—though not absolute—universalist stance, also stressing the group rights (especially of minority and indigenous groups) and the right of self-determination (McCarthy 2009: 160-1). Since then, CSOs across the region have launched both issue-based campaigns and more ensuring networks around shared human rights concerns,8) including the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), inaugurated in 2000 as a sort of civil societal summit (Chandra 2009: 6; Tan 2005: 57). The Malaysian government itself fostered an ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) to parallel the Kuala Lumpur Summit in 2005; the ACSC developed a formal statement to present to the assembled state leaders (Chandra 2009: 6). These efforts stepped up the following year, with the launch of the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacies (SAPA) network, which organized ACSCs again for subsequent ASEAN Summits and serves as a

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8) Acharya offers a list of regionally-oriented Southeast Asian CSOs, most of them with a rights-based focus (Acharya 2003: 385).
platform for exchange of resources and information (Chandra 2009: 7-8), then in 2007 with an effort to draft an ASEAN People’s Charter as counterpart to the new ASEAN Charter. The People’s version was to focus more on such issues as human rights, social and economic justice, and sustainable development.9) These same activists have now reversed the lens – what Tarrow would term internalization (Tarrow 2006: 80) – by using the launch of the AICHR to leverage demands for establishment of state-level commissions, which only Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines now have.10)

While ASEAN as a whole seems sincere in its aspirations to convene some sort of ASEAN Social Forum to institutionalize input from and engagement with (at least government-backed) CSOs (Chandra 2009: 8-9), the actual substance of the AICHR suggests how shallow these aspirations may actually be. The “official” position is for an AICHR with only the shallowest of capacities: the body is to focus on “promotion of human rights issues,” but sticking to areas of general consensus within the region.11) Even then, explains Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Establishing AICHR and making it work are totally two different things.”12) Though the AICHR may help to cultivate new norms, he explains, the commission’s terms of reference neither mandate compliance with human rights standards or sanctions for non-compliance, nor provide for human rights experts to serve as commissioners. To the frustration of critics in and outside the region, “the primary role of the human rights body, at this stage, will be limited to advocacy, capacity-building and drawing up conventions and declarations on

specific areas of human rights.” However limited, though, this latest move by ASEAN represents pressure for change substantially from civil society, of a piece with CSOs’ engagement around Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN (McCarthy 2009). Yet significant movement toward giving a human rights mechanism teeth – and using these teeth to gnaw at the junta – would require more of a normative shift than ASEAN as a whole has yet experienced.

**Synthesis and Implications**

The decade plus since the Asian financial crisis and the political changes it wrought have arguably seen a stepped-up role not just for ASEAN as an institution – captured most clearly with the codification, finally, of the ASEAN Charter two years ago – but also for CSOs within and surrounding that institutional framework. Two trends have coincided: institutional development at the supranational level and a shift toward more participatory, accountable modes of governance in each of several member states. The latter process of state-level democratization, which the Philippines kicked off in 1986, “has called into question the ASEAN model of elite-centric regional socialization. … The civil society in the region demands greater openness in Southeast Asian regionalism” (Acharya 2003: 376). Interactions between civil societal and state forces have thus grown more extensive and more intensive alike, both in home states and in neighboring target ones, sometimes in ways clearly anodyne, and other times in ways more threatening to state agendas and interests. The space this emergent transnational space provides for interference – if not directly by states, then by

13) Ibid.
their CSOs – disrupts the usual sequencing of democratization and associational development: CSOs relevant to one state may form in a partner state, while activists in less-democratic states find ready allies and examples within the region.

To some extent, then, we can speak of an emergent regional civil society, in a way we cannot speak of a global civil society. Inasmuch as activists respond to changes in political opportunity structures at a transnational rather than just domestic level (Tarrow 2006: 3), they occupy a space granted by regional rather than state-level political institutions. In addition, more of its members now than in earlier years of ASEAN are inclined toward flexibility on matters of sovereignty and norms of non-interference, and toward not just accepting CSOs, but working productively with them – a pattern Acharya terms “participatory regionalism” (Acharya 2003: 382). At the same time, even as some states have democratized, ASEAN has admitted new non-democracies, which together may disrupt or dismantle this still-developing space if they feel too threatened by the emergent regional civil society. The downgrading of the consultative process promised at the last ASEAN summit appears to be a step in that direction. Pressure from civil society, far more than from agents of ASEAN member states themselves, has forced some among the latter to recognize new threats to human security (through those CSOs’ intervention in new domains and through a broader discursive thrust), yet doing so threatens the security of state leaders themselves, by undercutting their legitimacy or validating a voluntary sector previously suppressed or constrained (for instance, Lizee 2000; McCarthy 2009).

Realist calculations of state interest may thus compromise the intensification of an organization initially inspired by the liberal imperative of collective security. Indeed, Jones notes that a 2004 Indonesian proposal, backed by the Philippines
and Thailand, to develop ASEAN as “a security community that would promote human rights, democracy and transparent communication between members” could ultimately capsize ASEAN, as this agenda contradicts both the preferences of most member states and more “traditional understandings of either power or diplomacy” (Jones 2008: 743). Despite recent gestures toward participatory openness, then, ASEAN remains “a state-driven process rooted in consciousness of relative power,” with a pragmatic guiding objective of regional order – ASEAN was established as, and remains, an intergovernmental association rather than a supranational regime (Jones 2008: 744).

Because ASEAN rules allow states to check intrusions on their sovereignty, though, the centrality of civil society must be seen in context. The role of civil society should temper our understanding of the functions and relative primacy of states in the international system, but only to a limited extent. Regionally-oriented CSOs offer both extra-local resources – seen, for instance, in short-term disaster relief missions – and challengers beyond any one state’s complete reach. CSOs enjoy a wider ambit than state actors compelled to respect diplomatic imperatives, yet may have limited concrete resources or options beyond communications networks, discursive and information-based strategies, and other tools of soft power. States retain coercive power as well as diplomatic levers and hence, the upper hand. At the same time, the crystallization of a regional civil society helps give legitimacy and substance to a more substantively supranational regional order, at a time when that order is moving away from an “old regionalist,” narrow security frame to a more mutable and complex form of “new regionalism” (Buszynski 1997-8: 555-6). While the power of individual states to curb its growth repudiates the independent agency of that order, state-level agency is arguably more deeply compromised by the engagement of nonstate, border-crossing organizations and networks.
Yet even a vibrant regional civil society need not be internally democratic or leveling in its effects. Rather, the imbalance in resources, normative groundings, and availability of entrepreneurial leaders in civil society is likely to reinforce the pecking order in ASEAN or in other regional groupings. Considered in terms of civil society’s capacity, strength, and legitimacy, states may be ranked differently than if ordered in terms of economic might or other metrics. Those states with the most actively engaged, regionally-alert CSOs have more tools to offer in a welfarist sense, but also pose the greatest threat of intruding in hard-to-control ways on their neighbors’ sovereignty (even as CSOs offer a check on their home governments, as well). From a neorealist perspective, then, the most politically liberal states gain disproportionate sway from the institutionalization of a regional civil society; the most restrictive, in contrast, find their own autonomy – and hence, security – all the more curbed. Understood in this way, the recent debacle over the CSO consultation in Cha-Am makes sense, but also seems unlikely to stem the broader tide of extra-institutional engagement across ever-eroding borders.

References


PART FOUR

GREY AREA PHENOMENON

CHAPTER 6
THREATS FROM RELIGIOUS-BASED TERRORISM
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Bilveer Singh

CHAPTER 7
MARITIME TERRORISM: A THREAT TO WORLD TRADE?
Peter Roell

CHAPTER 8
CHINA AND MARITIME COOPERATION:
PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN
Gaye Christoffersen
Introduction

No state in Southeast Asia has been able to escape the influence of religion in politics. The influence of religion on national politics in Southeast Asia has varied, with some states such as Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar and to some extent, the Philippines, explicitly embracing the dominant religion as part of the political system. Others such as Indonesia and Singapore, though openly secular, have acknowledged the importance of religion in national politics and tried to coexist while maintaining a delicate balance with their national creed of secularism. While religions have served as unifying mechanisms in various anti-colonial movements in Southeast Asia, since the end of the Cold War and particularly in the context of intense globalization and general rise of religious consciousness and assertiveness, religious extremism has been on the rise, with radical Islam being targeted in this regard. The manifold terrorist attacks by Islamist radicals in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, have led to religious-based terrorism and extremism being singled out for study, with jihadi-oriented projects being perceived as serious threats to
regional security. This paper examines the role of religion as a political ideology. More importantly, it analyses the rise of religious-based terrorism in Southeast Asia, looking at the causal factors, its course, policies aimed at neutralizing the threat and the intended and unintended consequences.

Framework: Religion, Politics and Ideology

What is clearly discernible is that the existence of religious pluralism in Southeast Asia and its easy utility as a tool for political mobilization, different religions have tended to be politicized to achieve specific political objectives and agendas. While there is a tendency, in the current period to focus on political Islam, both Christianity and Buddhism have availed themselves for the purpose. This is important as there has been a rise in importance of political religions, vying not just with existing civil religions but also other ideologies, with the object of replacing and even eradicating them. While civil religions tend to unify socially and act as a conservative force, the process of religious politicization can have a major transformational effect, as is evident in parts of Southeast Asia, be it Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia and parts of Philippines and Thailand, or Christianity in the Philippines and parts of Indonesia, and finally, Buddhism in Thailand, Myanmar and parts of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Historically, in Southeast Asia, religion had served as a unifying mechanism in anti-colonial projects, with state nationalism often couched in certain religious outlooks, especially in Indonesia, Myanmar and even in Vietnam. Following this, through the 1950s and 1960s, religion often acted as a bulwark against the spread of Western democracy and inroads against communism and socialism. Religion was also mobilized to stall what was often regarded as decadent and
immoral practices of the West. However, it was the end of the Cold War that brought the importance of religion to the forefront, especially as a political ideology. This was partly to check the imposition of Western liberal democracy and the attendant economic and social system as well as to carve out a niche in preserving what was regarded as local political practices that needed to be preserved in the face of onslaught of the West as far as democracy and human rights were concerned. At the same time, in the context of globalization and rising religious assertiveness of almost all religions worldwide, Southeast Asia was witness to increasing assertiveness of radical Islam, which in turn, brought the Islamist, especially jihadi ideology to the forefront in the post-911 era. The manifold terrorist attacks by Islamist radicals in various parts of Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, merely confirmed the phenomenon as a dangerous one with religion as a political ideology being increasingly viewed in pejorative terms. How accurate is this assessment and what religion means as a political ideology in Southeast Asia will be examined further in this paper.

Is religion a political ideology? This remains contested and hence, the answer is - yes and no! Strictly speaking, an ideology can be seen as a coherent body of thought containing ideas and beliefs to interpret, interact and coexist with socio-political and economic realities that a found in a particular locality, primarily the state. Originally defined by Antoine Destutt Tracy to mean the “science of ideas”, over time, ideology has come to be seen in both positive and negative senses. Negatively viewed, it implies a political strategy or tactic to realize one’s hidden objectives in politics, usually associated with the capture of power and influence. Essentially, pejoratively, ideologies are tools to distort realities, are unreasonable and tend to be dogmatic (Williams, 1977: 55) The Marxists viewed ideology as a tool for subjugation of the masses, with the majority suffering
disproportionately at the expense of those who propound the ideology. This view argued that ideology was a tool by the ruling class to subordinate groups under them, mainly at ensuring that the latter did not challenges the ruling elites. The Marxists also viewed ideology as something that was strategically deployed to safeguard the existing unjust power structure and system, and where the ruling elites continued to exploit the masses (Ibid). In a more generic and neutral sense, an ideology can be defined as a coherent set of ideas that is accompanied with political objectives and a roadmap on how to achieve them (Hawkes, 2003). An ideology can be to sustain or effect change in a political system.

Today, there are wide-ranging political ideologies adopted by political parties and groups explaining how a society should be organized and more important, the blueprint to follow to achieve order and development. In this sense, political ideologies contain both the goals (how a particular society should be organized) and probably more important, the method (what the society should do to achieve its goals). In this connection, ideologies on how to organize state and societies range on a broad spectrum, from the extreme left, centre to the extreme right.

In contrast, religion (though difficult to define to the satisfaction of all, and hence, remains contested) refers to a coherent system of thoughts that have clearly defined narratives, symbols, practices and beliefs, giving meaning to a person with reference to higher supernatural power (the God or a Diety) in order to seek truth and ultimate salvation. There are a number of gateways in looking at the religion-politics nexus Williams, 1966: 368-373). The social-structural approach examines the manner religious cleavages impacts upon politics, leading George Marsden to conclude that together with ethnicity, “religion has been the best predictor of political behaviour throughout most of the history of the United States” (Marsden, 1990). This is mainly due to the role of religion as
an identity marker in politics. The organizational approach has also been used to study the extent of support religious organizations provide to various social movements in their quest for change and reform (Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983). The culturalist approach is another useful way to examine the religion-politics nexus. This assumes that religions form strongly entrenched values which conditions one’s political attitudes and that these values are likely to create like-minded “opinion publics” that can be mobilized to conserve or rid particular politics groups in power (Hart, 1996: 87-100). Finally, there is the approach of interpretive anthropology, most strongly associated with Clifford Geertz. This approach analyzes the link between the “sacred cosmos” and political order, with religion the key shaping force as it helps to “establish a clear sense of ‘what is’ as well as ‘what ought to be’, and in a smoothly operating culture, aligns the two in both social world and the ‘cosmos’” (Geertz, 1983: 121-146).

What the above discussion makes clear is that both religion and ideology are very powerful political and social resources that can be mobilized by a state to achieve specific short to long term goals. When religion is viewed as a political ideology, it refers to the specific purpose of religion to achieve goals in the political arena. Religion is no longer something metaphysical to achieve social cohesion and reconcile the individual with the Cosmos. Instead, it is the surfacing of “political religion” with the goal of influencing national ideology and where the goals are very clearly political, which can range from influencing the adoption of specific religious aspects by the government, or to the more extreme, organizing the state along religious lines, culminating in the emergence of a theocratic state.

However, what makes the religion-politics nexus contestable is the fact that it can be interpreted in so many ways, with the benefits and outcomes being
distributed unjustly. As Antonio Gramsci (1971) noted, there can be both ruling and challenging ideologies, and politics is essentially the contest between the two forces for hegemony. As such, ideology can be best approached as a coherent system of thoughts and ideas that benefit a particular group or class of people and where these ideas are projected as being universally valid (Williams and Demerath III, 1991: 417-431). Politically, religion has the capacity to both reinforce and challenge existing power relationships. In the light of this, the functions of religion in politics and relating to this, the role of ideology in religion is largely discursive, providing moral authority, an oppositional identity and finally, a justification for quiescence (Billings, 1990: 1-31).

Religion, therefore, can be very ideological. Groups and coalitions of religiously-based activists can utilize specifically religio-moral arguments, citing verses from the holy texts, to press their claims for political action. Religious symbols can be mobilized to force issues on the public agenda in order to alter the existing status quo. Using religious doctrines and theology to dissect and analyze current socio-political and economic problems in a society is one major way religion can be utilized as an ideology to promote a cause of action, usually to undermine and remove the existing power elites and structure. Not only that, religious doctrines and tenets are also put forward to prescribe solutions to existing malaises in society as well as to justify the group’s action, even if need be, through violence (Williams and Demerath III, 1991: 417-431).

In summary, religion can be a very potent force in politics. It can legitimate the existing power structure and wielders. It can also be used to distract discontent by focusing on other worldly concerns. Religious organizations have also provided organizational and moral support to social movements, as various liberation theology groups in South America and the Philippines, and parts of
Indonesia such as presently in Papua and formerly in East Timor. Religion can also offer a concept of justice to mobilize the masses into action for change or safeguard of a regime. It is also due to the character and role of religion in a political setting that a society is described as either secular or theological. Equally important, as far as the religion-political nexus is concerned, it can be both a conservative or progressive force, either legitimizing the existing political structure and forces or supporting protests and resistance to bring it down. As such, there is every reason to conclude that as far as politics is concerned, religion is a powerful resource.

What is Religious-Based Terrorism?

While the concept of terrorism remains contested, in its simplest form, terrorism refers to the calculated use of violence to achieve political goals, and this can be used by both state and non-state actors. Developing from this, religious-based terrorism refers to acts of violence that are perpetrated, premised, justified and rationalized on the basis of a particular religion. Most religions do sanction the use of violence under certain circumstances, best evident in the history of the Crusades. In the present context, the focus has been on Islamist terrorism, with various conservative Islamic schools, mostly associated with the Hanbali School of jurisprudence and its various branches and divisions, upon which violence has been justified in the name of Islam (Singh 2007: 10-24). While much violence has been undertaken in the name of religion, in reality, religion is often used, misused and abused in conflicts that often have serious political, economic and social-cultural motivations and causes. And often, violence in the name of religion is usually perpetrated by those who have little or no knowledge of the tenets of the religion in which they have joined in the battle. As was argued by
Wesley Ariarajah (2001), more often than not, “it is religious identity and fervor that play the important role than the motivations provided by the faith itself”.

**Religious-Based Terrorism in Southeast Asia**

Southeast Asia is a highly heterogeneous region, with sharp fault lines in race, religion and language. The region hosts almost all the major religions of the world, with the majority of its people being either Islamic, Buddhists or Christians. All religions in the region are politically significant, having played or functioned to affect socio-political events at one time or another. Islam had been politically influential in Indonesia and Malaysia in supporting the various anti-colonial struggles and since then, the definition of the state’s character. Christianity was extremely important in organizing anti-American movements in the Philippines. It also played a critical role in the East Timorese struggle against Indonesia and this continues to be important in the Papuan struggle against Indonesia today. Buddhism played an important role in safeguarding the Thai monarchy as well as supporting anti-colonial struggles in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma. However, as the dominant discourse in Southeast Asia, as far as religion as a political ideology is concerned since the last two decades has been associated with Islam, this paper will focus on it, with cross-references made to Southeast Asia as a whole whenever possible.

More specifically, religion as a political ideology in Islam is closely intertwined with what is known as the process of *Salafication*. This refers to the efforts by adherents, minority they may be, to jump-start Islamic revival in the region, especially in countries with significant Muslims’ presence. This has witnessed the rise of the purist *Wahhabi-Salafi* version of Islam gaining ground in
Southeast Asia, evident from the propensity of Muslims to join aggressive extremist organizations, especially in Indonesia, the largest Muslim state in the world and one that has experienced much religious-oriented violence since 2000. In analysing the phenomenon, one of the most striking characteristics of the post-Suharto Indonesia was the emergence of Islam as a pivotal political player (Schwartz, 1999). Having been politically marginalized by the state for many years, first under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and later, under Suharto’s New Order, Islam has increasingly politically asserted itself following the lifting of political restraints in the aftermath of Suharto’s downfall in May 1998 (Fealy, 2001). More dramatically, a number of radical Islamic groups appeared and publicly promoted their Islamic political agenda (Azra, 2002; Hassan, 2002: 353-375).

While some argue that the emergence of Islamic radical groups in the aftermath of Suharto’s downfall was partly engineered by some elements of the New Order regime and military to destabilize the country (Hefner, 2001), it is widely accepted that radical Islamic organizations have a long history in Indonesia (van Bruinessen, 2002: 117-154). The earliest of such movement in the modern era was that of the “Padri” in West Sumatra. From 1780s, pilgrims returning from the Middle East set about “reforming” local Islamic practices and applying Islamic law more strictly in the region. Islam was also a powerful element in other conflicts of the colonial period, including the Java War of 1825-30, although its expression was more heterodox than severely orthodox as was the case in the Padri War. The Darul Islam rebellion from the late 1940s to the early 1960s was also to promote a radical Islamic agenda. Thus, the assumption in some terrorism texts that Islamic radicalism is a new phenomenon in Indonesia is historically flawed (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005). The aspirations and attempts to build, peacefully or violently, a more formal Islamic state has been a major part
of the country’s political discourse and practice since its independence. Violence perpetrated by Muslim radicals is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, as evident in the attempt to actualise the Jakarta Charter in 1945, and many have argued that Suharto regime’s repression of political Islam contributed to the radicalization of Muslim dissents (Mujani and Liddle, 2004: 109-123; Jones, 2001).

During the first two decades of the New Order, political Islam became a principal target of the state’s exclusionary politics as well as the focus of ideological and political distrust. At least until the late of 1980s, political Islam was effectively marginalized through an extensive public indoctrination campaign to stigmatise Islam as a political ideology dangerous to the unity and prosperity of the state. Political Islam was also undermined institutionally and ideologically with all Muslim political parties forced to merge into a single party and strictly controlled by the government. Also, all Islamic mass organizations had to accept the official state ideology, Pancasila, as the only legitimate ideology (asas tunggal) (Fealy 2001). Despite, or for some, because of Suharto’s repression, since 1980s there has been a steady rise in Muslim consciousness and ritual formalism, especially among the urban middle classes and student population. University campuses had become fertile grounds for an Islamic awakening, with students being recruited into a diverse range of disciplined organizational cells. Some of these cells have taken their inspiration from fundamentalist thought and organizational models of radical Islamic movements in the Middle East (van Bruinessen, 2002).

The resurgence of political Islam, however, can be seen more profoundly after the fall of Suharto. The collapse of the New Order paved the way for an open contestation for public sphere among different elements of Indonesian society.
Also, the newly liberated society suddenly found a free space to express themselves and their interests, with many groups not wanting actors with specific ideological leanings to dominate the dynamics of changes taking place during the transition process at that time. The emergence of the new liberated civil society entailed a particular openness that permitted all kinds of ideas to surface that affected the lives of Indonesians and this also included ideas associated with political Islam and the role Islam was to play in Indonesia after being repressed from nearly half a century (Schwartz, 1999). As a result, political Islam emerged as major player in Indonesian politics. More dramatically, a number of radical Islamic groups appeared and publicly promoted ideological, symbolical and formal Islamic political goals (Azra 2002). It is not difficult to see the development of political Islam during the post-Suharto period in the light of legalism and formalism. The intellectual transformation which occurred between the 1970s and 1990s seems to have lost its significance when ideological, symbolic and formal Islam gave the impression of dominating the new discourse on Indonesia’s political Islam. The use of Islam as a party basis and the call for the implementation of shari’ah were clear indicators of the rising tide of political Islamism.

In contemporary times, and especially after September 11, 2001, there is a tendency to see terrorism as largely a function of the spread of a global ideology. In this respect, Western views of both Middle Eastern and Indonesian Islam have become hardened and the interactions dramatically reduced. More than any other region of the Islamic world, the Middle East is now seen as the crucible of nihilistic jihadism. Indonesian Islam is still regarded as predominantly tolerant and pluralistic, but the emergence in recent years of local paramilitary jihadist and terrorist groups has led to concern over perceived radicalisation and the eroding of the country’s essentially “moderate” Islamic character. One reason
commonly advanced by Western observers for this “extremist” minority trend in Indonesia is the growing influence of Middle Eastern Islam. Globalisation and the increasing penetration of mass communication have contributed to this process, as also has generous Middle Eastern sponsorship of radical outreach programs. Thus, the more Indonesian Islam is seen as having Middle Eastern qualities, the greater spectre of threat it poses through the injection of radical ideology into Indonesian Islam. Some have viewed this as the rising “purification” of Indonesian Islam from “Sufi” and Javanese influence (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005).

The reality, however, is far more complex than these stereotypes suggest. There is a wide range of Islamist thinking and behaviour in the Middle East, from the innovative and the pragmatic, to virulent jihadist-salafism. To characterise all of Middle Eastern Islamism as dangerously radical is to miss a large part of the Islamic political mosaic. Islamism has never been uniquely Middle Eastern, and today, it is even less so, underlined by neo-fundamentalism’s growing detachment from the region. Indonesian Islam, while mainly moderate, has also had a long history of violent minority radicalism which owed little to external influences, whether from the Middle East or elsewhere.

Similarly, the relationship between Middle Eastern and Indonesian Muslims is far more variegated than is commonly assumed by many contemporary Western commentators. As the birthplace of Islam, the Middle East has been a powerful force in shaping the faith in Southeast Asia. Most of the major streams of thinking and practice in the Middle East have found their way to Southeast Asia. Rarely, however, have these processes entailed direct transfer and unmediated application by Muslims in countries like Indonesia. More commonly, though not always, there has been an ongoing process of selection, modification and
adjustments of various practices, combining them with pre-existing Islamic and non-Islamic features (Ibid: 49).

Many factors have contributed to the rise of Islamist militancy and radical ideology being increasingly injected into the thought and practice of Indonesian Islam, and probably elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Contemporary Indonesian radicalism is a complex mix of local and international factors as well as religious, political and economic elements. Most radical Muslims have powerful political, social and economic grievances, and these provide the main motif force for their radical religiosity. Politically, there is a sense of disillusionment with national politics and political process. Most radical Muslims believe that Islam has been marginalised and oppressed in Indonesia, and that antagonistic domestic and international forces are determined to deny Islam its rightful place at the centre of national life. Muslims are portrayed as having failed to achieve most of their stated objectives. The refusal of religious minorities and “less devout” Muslims to allow constitutional recognition of the authority of shari’a for the Islamic community (the Jakarta Charter) has been a constant source of grievance, with many radical writers asserting that Muslim were forced to make far greater sacrifice in the name of national unity than were other groups. They also point to the inability of Islamic parties to win a majority at any of the country’s nine general elections as further evidence of failure. The state was also seen as fostering Christianisation and discriminating against devout Muslims in the bureaucracy and the military.

From the economic standpoint, there is disillusionment with economic programmes of various states, especially the exploitation of the poor by the rich. The existence of unfair distribution of economic goods in spite of countries being well endowed has also provided ready recruits for the extremist cause (Singh
Radicals also resent the economic sidelining of Muslims and referred repeatedly to the fact that Muslims add a disproportionately small share of the nation’s wealth and had less opportunity for career and economic advancement (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005). It is the failure of “nationalist projects” to deliver political, economic, and social goods that has led to counteractions, namely, the adoption of the “Islamic mode” of political, economic, and social development (including the use of terrorism and violence), to remedy what is perceived as national, regional and global injustice (Singh, 2007).

Added to these domestic considerations is the whole array of international factors. Many Muslims are disillusioned with the international system, mainly dominated by the West, particularly the United States that is often portrayed to be practicing double standards. Though viewed as a democracy and supporting human rights, the United States’ pro-Israel policies and sanction of Israeli repression of the Palestinians and Arabs, as well as its own largely anti-Islamic policies – evident in its almost non-action when Muslims were being butchered in Bosnia – have riled many into launching a jihad against the United States, Israel and their supporters. Also, international (Western) support for repression of Muslims by various secular governments is also a source of anger and motivation. The lack of objection by the West to repressive policies of Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, and Suharto’s Indonesia against their Islamic militants has led to the burgeoning of Islamic militancy and extremism in these countries (Ibid.).

The rise of radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia also shows that various currents of Islamism and neo-fundamentalism have had an impact in Indonesia. Most often these ideas have been imported by Indonesian Islamists looking for new modes of thinking about the relationship between Islam, politics and society or indeed new models for activism. Various mechanisms have served as vectors
for these ideas, from Indonesian students who travelled to the Middle East to the *jihadists* who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s to the proliferating sources of Islamists information available through the internet and satellite television.

Saudi support – financial and otherwise – has been critical to the emergence of *salafi* currents within the Indonesian Muslim community. Most *salafists* seem essentially concerned with questions of morality and religiosity – albeit of an intolerant form – limiting their activities to preaching and education. Nonetheless, some *salafi* groups do cross into acts of vigilantism and sectarian violence. Saudi propagation has also served as a vector – if possibly unintentionally – for the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indonesian Islamists seem, however, to have been selective in their appropriation of Muslim Brotherhood ideas. The gradualist approach of Hassan al-Banna has been utilized more than the revolutionary thinking of Sayyid Qutb and his radical heirs. In this respect, there are parallels between *Partai Keadilan Sejatera*’s (PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party) pragmatic adaptation of its ideology and the shift occurring among some Islamists in the Middle East (notably *Hizb al-Wasat*); although in Indonesia, the existence of a democratic politics means this process is more likely to realize its full, moderating potential. Nonetheless, some of the darker sides of the PKS also seem to have been influenced by anti-Western conspiracy theories subscribed to by some of its members.

Three organizations, in particular, have received significant Saudi support, both government and non-government: *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah* Indonesia (DDII; Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), *Jamiat Islam wal-Irsyad* (The Islamic Association for Enlightenment, usually known as simply *al-Irsyad*); and the *Persatuan Islam* (Persis; Islamic Association). DDII was established in 1967 by
leaders of the banned *Masyumi* Islamic Party. Its focus has been propagation rather than practical political activity. DDII’s chairman, Mohammad Natsir, was widely respected by Middle Eastern *Wahhabi* and *salafist* circles, and he became the most important conduit for Saudi funds flowing into Indonesia during the 1970s and 1980s. *Al-Irsyad*, founded in 1913, is primarily devoted to Islamic education and propagation, and Persis was established in 1924 as a modernist Muslim organization. Both *al-Irsyad* and Persis have Islamic schools that have featured prominently in the education of Indonesian Islamists.

Together with *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (the Indonesian Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences or LIPIA), a branch of *Al-Imam* Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, DDII was critical for the growth of *salafism* in the 1970s and early 1980s. DDII, as the main disburser of Saudi money in Indonesia during these decades, provided scholarships for young Indonesian Muslims to study at Middle Eastern institutions, including several of the leading centres of *salafist* education such as *al-Iman* University in Riyadh. However, Saudi support did not orient DDII specifically toward *Wahhabism* or *salafism*. DDII also played a key role in popularizing Muslim Brotherhood’s thought, translating a number of seminal Muslim Brotherhood texts in the late 1970s and 1980s, the most popular of which was Sayyid Qutb’s “*Signpost*”.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution had also a galvanizing effect on many younger Indonesians, who viewed it as proof that Muslims could overthrow powerful and repressive Western-backed regimes, and replace them with Islamic political and economic system. The most important development was the internationalisation of *jihad* from the late 1970s, culminating in the anti-Soviet *Mujahidin*-led war in Afghanistan during 1980s. This was critical to the rise of extremism and terrorism in Southeast Asia. More than 500 Indonesian – and possibly as many
as 1000 – went through foreign *mujahidin* training camps from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s. Their reasons for attending these camps were complex. Some responded to the active recruitment efforts of Islamic organizations, notably the Saudi-based Muslim World League. For others, like the many Arab Islamists who travelled to Afghanistan, more practical motives also seem to have been at play; in particular, the opportunity Afghanistan provided for gaining military training that could be used in their home countries. It was there that they gained skills as soldiers in arduous battlefield conditions, learned terrorist-related skills such as bomb making and running clandestine operations, and were indoctrinated with pan-Islam virulently anti-Western ideologies (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005).

Indonesian *mujahidins* had a varied exposure to their Arab counterparts. On arrival in Pakistan, many went through Abdullah Azzam’s *Maktab al-Khidmat*, before going on to the training camp of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan commander who had the closest links to Saudi Arabia and Osama bin Laden. A small number of Indonesian *mujahidins* trained at the camps of other Afghan leaders such as Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Jamil ur-Rahman. The experience of Indonesian volunteers greatly intensified their sense of global Islamic solidarity. Importantly, they were able to establish relations with Muslim radicals from across the Islamic world. These contacts would later prove invaluable in gaining financial assistance, access to technical know-how and connection into global terrorist network. The practical effect of the ‘*mujahidin-sation*’ of Indonesian radical groups has been a great increase in their capacity to wreak havoc and destruction –critical elements in terror campaign. Money, explosives, technical expertise and covert operational methods were available to experienced and resourceful Afghanistan veterans and their associates (Ibid.).
In addition to the *mujahidin* factor, increasing numbers of Southeast Asia Muslims have received their education in the Middle East, where they were exposed to more puritanical and radical expressions of the faiths from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Palestine. In terms of human movement, students have been perhaps the most important contemporary conduits of Islamist ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia. They went to the Middle East, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in large numbers to study with prestigious Islamic scholars and immerse themselves in an “authentic” Islamic culture. In recent years, the number of Indonesians in the Middle East has risen dramatically, due not only to the increase in Indonesian government scholarships but also additional financial assistance from Middle Eastern governments and private donors. While these students did not typically study Islamist ideas and thoughts, the time spent in the Middle East has provided opportunities to interact with Islamist groups and exposed students to their radical ideas. In Egypt, for instance, Indonesian students often circulated in Muslim Brotherhood circles, thereby radicalizing them (Ibid.).

Another conduit for Islamist ideas has been education and *da’wa* supported by government and non-government organizations and individuals from the Middle East. Saudi- sponsored educational and *da’wa* activities in Indonesia expanded dramatically in the 1980s, probably as part of Saudi Arabia’s broader ideological conflict at that time with Iranian Islamism. It would be wrong, however, to view Saudi activism in Indonesia as reflective of a coherent strategy or aim. Saudi religious propagation and educational activities often seemed to manifest different motives and sometimes competing interests. Saudi sponsorship has undoubtedly been provided to those groups whose religious inclinations are closest to Wahhabism, notably Indonesian *salafi* groups. The key institution of Saudi-sponsored Islamic education in Indonesia is LIPIA even though Sidney
Jones has characterized LIPIA as essentially a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated institution (Jones, 2001).

Globalisation, particularly as it relates to the transmission of information, has also a significant effect. Cyber technology and satellite television stations such as *al-Jazeerah* and *al-Arabiya* have greatly increased the speed and volume of information flows to radical groups in Southeast Asia from other parts of the Islamic world (Fealy and Bubalo, 2005). In the pre-globalized world, it was at least possible to believe the myth that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way of life. In Islamic discourse this means ‘one religion one culture’ paradigm. Globalization has shattered this myth. The communication links are now worldwide, rapid and increasingly dense. People, customs, societies and civilizations previously more or less isolated from one another are in regular and almost unavoidable contact. This has two consequences for the Muslim communities. First, it allows others to experience the reality of different Islamic cultures. This experience can demonstrate not only what is common to the Muslim *ummah* but also what is “different”. Second, the experience of this difference can be unsettling if it is viewed as a deviation from “the Islamic way” (Hassan, 2002).

While the first consequence makes one conscious of the social and cultural diversity of the Muslim *ummah*, the second consequence produces a reaction of rejection of this cultural and social hybridity, and a desire to replace it with the authentic “Islamic way”. The struggle between “hybridity” and “authenticity” perhaps constitutes the most important challenge of globalization for the Muslim *ummah* and is one of the underlying causes of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist movements. Islamic fundamentalism refers to a strategy by which Islamic “purists” attempt to reassert their construction of religious identity.
and social order as the exclusive basis for a recreated political and social order. They feel this identity is at risk and being eroded by cultural and religious hybridity. They try to fortify their interpretation of religious ways through selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices form a sacred past (Ibid.).

Religious fundamentalism is thus a problem produced by the encounter between modernity and religious community in all its diversity and cultural hybridity. In the context of Indonesia, Azra has observed that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is predicated on the perception that indigenous Islam is syncretic and hybrid, and needs to be purified and transformed into “authentic” Islam through the application of the radicals’ interpretation. This is the root of the radical Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. Azra has also suggested that the Islamic radicalism and most of the radical Islamic organizations such as FPI, MMI and other similar groups are led by Indonesians of Arabic descent who reject the indigenous Indonesian Islam in favour of their “salaﬁ” ‘authentic’ Islam which is closer to the Arabian Islam (Azra, 2002).

In Indonesia, various schools of Islamic thought have competed for followers and public attention, but most have not called for an Islamic state. The more radical groups, which had their roots in anti-Dutch guerrilla activities, effectively were kept in check by strong leadership from President Sukarno (1950-1965) and especially Suharto (1967-1998). Moderate Islamic groups formed the main legal opposition to the Suharto regime which ended in May 1998. However, since Suharto’s fall, religious consciousness has been on the rise among Indonesian Muslims, giving greater political space for radical groups and their violent fringe to operate, at times openly. Since the fall of Suharto, a few radical Muslim groups have acquired a disproportionate influence. All in all, there are many groups that have been classified as Islamist radicals, with a number of
them alleged to be involved in terrorist activities. See Table 1 below.

### Table 1: Key Radical Movements in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Darul Islam [old and new wings]</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islammiyah Indonesia</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Laskar Jihad</td>
<td>Moderately important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Laskar Jundullah</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Majilis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
<td>Moderate important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus Sarjana</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam</td>
<td>Relatively minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jamaah Ikhwan al Muslimin Indonesia</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hizo al-Tharir Indonesia</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Barisan Pemuda Ka'ba</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pam Swakarsa</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pendekar Banten</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Gerakan Pemuda Islam</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Front Hizbullah Bulan Bintang</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jamaah Negara Islam Indonesia</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mujahidin KOMPAK</td>
<td>Moderately significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Abu Bakar Battalion</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Republic Persatuan Islam Indonesia</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Medical Emergency Relief Charity</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Laskar Mujahidin</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this regard, the most potent religious-based terrorist group to emerge in Indonesia in the post-Cold War period was the *Al Jemaah Al Islamiyyah*, formally created in 1993, under the leadership of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir, during their sojourn in exile in Malaysia and involvement in jihadi-oriented activities in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1990. The October 2002 Bali bombing was their most important signature of violence and AJAI members involved in the carnage justified it on grounds of taking revenge against the enemies of Islam, on the need to physically oppose Islam’s enemies, on the need to create an Islamic state based on Sharia, to revenge against the persecution by Indonesian Police and Military as well as to demonstrate their opposition to places that host activities that are against Islamic way of life and principles. More important, thirteen reasons were forwarded to justify the violence: to challenge anti-Islamic crusaders, as a duty of good Muslims to revenge against policies of those who have harmed Afghans during the month of *Ramadhan*, due to Australia’s intervention in East Timor, revenge against crusaders’ agents for hurting Muslims the world over, as a revenge against Christians for undertaking ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Ambon and elsewhere in the Malukus, to revenge the sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia, as part of a global jihad to fight against Christians and Jews for the anti-Islamic policies, as a substantive signal to assist Muslims anywhere in the world, to undertake the order of Allah in defending weak and helpless Muslims, as a revenge against Christians and Jews, especially American occupation of the Holy Land (Saudi Arabia), to exact a high price on the US for its worldwide terrorist activities against Muslims and to demonstrate and prove to Allah that Muslims will not stand still and will react when they and their interests are being harmed by infidels and the enemies of Islam (Sunarko, 2006: 49-51).

Like in Indonesia, there have been almost parallel developments in Thailand and the Philippines, with the southern parts of the two countries embroiled in a
protracted low-level insurgency for many decades. In Thailand, the conflict has been projected as a conflict between Buddhism and Islam while in the Philippines it is seen as a clash between the Christian and Islam civilisations. Table 2 identifies the key groups involved in the Southern Thailand conflict.

Table 2: Key Radical Movements in Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Present Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Separatists</td>
<td>GAMPAR</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Unite Southern Thailand with Malaysia</td>
<td>Very Small</td>
<td>Elite-based and mainly political</td>
<td>Disbanded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>BNPP</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Independent Pattani State</td>
<td>Small but still effective</td>
<td>Political and military</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>PULO</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Weakened by splits but still effective</td>
<td>Mainly political</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>New PULO</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Strong Movement</td>
<td>Essentially a military force</td>
<td>Highly Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihadists</td>
<td>Mujahidin Pattani Movement</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mainly political</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>GMIP</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Small but Strong Movement</td>
<td>Political and military</td>
<td>Very Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>BERSATU</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Ibid</td>
<td>Quite Strong</td>
<td>Mainly political</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As for the Philippines, there are also a number of significant groups that have been accorded the status of being Islamist extremists and even alleged to be involved in terrorist activities. See Table 3.
Table 3: Radical Groups in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
<td>Tremendous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
<td>Relatively strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front – Misuari Breakaway group</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Balik Islam Movement</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Raja Solaiman Movement</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Counter-Measures and Consequences

Traditionally, governments in Southeast Asia have tried to manage the threat from the religious-based extremists, mainly through the use of force. This was clearly evident in the approach of the Indonesian Government to address the Darul Islam and GAM threats as well as Bangkok and Manila’s approach to terminate the threat posed by PULO, MNLF, MILF and ASG respectively. By the late 1990s, Manila also tried to reach out to the MNLF, especially Nur Misuari, through a power-sharing arrangement, by providing limited autonomy to a number of provinces in the south, even though this agreement eventually collapsed by early 2000.

Following the 911 attacks and the launch of the ‘global war on terror’, Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, likewise, launched a regional version of the ‘war on terror’, even though this was more comprehensively undertaken compared, say, to the approach of the United
States, which relied mainly on the use of force. Through a series of region-wide as well as extra-region agreements, the Southeast Asian states, through ASEAN, committed themselves to eradicate what was referred to as the terrorist threat, often alleged to be aligned with the *Al Qaeda*. Here, the main target was the *Al Jammah Al Islammiyah*, which by 2000, had launched a number of deadly attacks in the region, especially Indonesia. This saw a plethora of agreements, communiqués, press releases and declarations on the need to actively eradicate the threat (Singh, 2007: 181-182).

Among others, this would include the following: Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, Singapore, 11 October 2001; Joint Communique of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 20-21 May 2002; Press Release, “ASEAN Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attacks in Bali, Indonesia”, Statement by the 39th Chair, ASEAN Standing Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 2 October 2005; ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 5 November 2001; and ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007. ASEAN has also signed similar agreements with third parties on the issue. Among others, this would include: Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, Phnom Penh, Thailand, 4 November 2002; Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, 14 ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 27 January 2003; and ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, 8 October 2003, Bali, Indonesia.

In general, counter-measures against religious-based (and even non-religious-based) terrorism have seen action being undertaken at the national, regional and
international levels. Nationally, this has involved arrests of terrorists, with nearly 500 members of AJAI alone believed to be in detention, including the killing of leading figures such as Dr Azahari, Nordin Top and Dulmatin. States have also passed tough laws to curb the menace, including detentions without trials, attempts to solve alleged problems and grievances, demonstration of strong political resolve as well as attempts to delegitimise extremist interpretation of Islam by supporting and empowering the moderate Islamic mainstream. Regionally, this has witnessed increasing cooperation to neutralize the terrorists as evident in the capture of Fathur Rahman, Mas Selamat and even Hambali. There is also increasing intelligence sharing, stronger border checks and security and attempts to monitor financial flows. At the global level, ASEAN countries have been supportive of efforts by the United Nations to neutralize the menace, saw increasing cooperation in political, legal, economic and security areas, attempts to remove global reference points such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the Iraqi conflict, the conflicts in Kashmir, Chechnya, as well as the need to manage the security situation in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Consequences of the Rise of Religious-based Terrorism and Counter-Measures in Southeast Asia

When one scans the security landscape of Southeast Asia, amidst the plethora of conflicts and disputes, be they inter- or intra-state, religious-based terrorism has chalked up as a serious security issue in a number of countries, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines with Malaysia and Singapore as potential targets. Following 911, especially with the successful October 2002 Bali attacks, followed by subsequent attacks in Jakarta and elsewhere, Southeast
Asia was profiled as the “second front” in the global war on terror. While this might be an over-exaggeration, yet there was a degree of truth as many jihadists saw the region as an important arena in the global struggle against the West and more important, as part of the effort to create an “Islamic Khilafah”. It also led to negative publicity for the region, especially the various ‘red alerts’ of potential attacks that deterred tourists and investors from entering the region. Regionally, there was a clear attempt to isolate, marginalize and neutralize the religious extremists through a host of measures, often pitting the governments against Islamists, with Muslim-dominated countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia treading cautiously so that they are not perceived as being part of the “war against Islam” but more aimed at neutralizing ‘criminal elements’ that were endangering society and marring the good name of Islam. Nationally, while Islamist extremism and terrorism were intensely securitized with all-encompassing measures to eradicate the threat, at the same time, efforts were in place to enhance inter-racial and inter-religious harmony, especially in multi-religious societies such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, with the management of religious extremism being managed in such a way that it was not viewed as a religious discourse but rather a criminal one.

Religion as a Political Ideology in Southeast Asia – Can the Process be Managed and Reversed?

Many observers tend to portray contemporary world politics in terms of civilizational conflict, an approach which has been popularized by Samuel Huntington. Years before the tragic 911 event, Huntington predicted that the next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations arguing that ideological cleavages were now being replaced by the fault lines of
civilizations, reinforced by a revival of religion and culture as the identities that distinguish friend from foe. These cleavages, in his view, are ultimately reducible to that between “the West and the Rest”, and the threat to the West was primarily from a putative alliance of Islamic and Confucian civilizations. Echoing Huntington’s theory, Fukuyama suggested the attacks were an assault against modernity and pointed out Islam as the one major world culture that arguably does have some very basic problems with modernity rejection not just to Western policies but the most basic principle of modernity itself, that of religious tolerance”. In this sense, he explicitly rejected the view that politics had anything to do with what happened and stressed instead the “civilizational” gulf by suggesting that the present conflict was between modernity and what he called “Islamo-facism”.

Huntington and Fukuyama are not definitely the only supporters of clash of civilizations theory. The theory gained a central and hegemonic position in world politics after it was endorsed by political forces in the United States. While President George W. Bush insisted that his administration was not launching a war against Islam, even though his various governmental policies and discourses of ‘global war on terror’ are basically premised on the clash of civilizations. Since the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration consistently claimed that it was engaged in a battle between “good” and “evil”, and invited the world to choose either to join the forces of good, the upholders of civilization and civility, or conversely, be counted among evildoers, the dwellers in the darkness of barbarity. The Bush administration, therefore, “was perpetuating an old and well-established colonial habit: dividing the world into the civilized and uncivilized, and declaring that the white man’s burden was to civilize the world, by force if necessary”.

132  COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Much has been said about the fallacies of a clash of civilization theory. It is too simplistic to account for the complex dynamics of the Muslim world. Failing to perceive civilization as an amalgam of social forces and ideas that are continually changing and developing in response to challenges both from within and from without, the theory fails to acknowledge that the Muslim world has, in recent years, seen rising voices of moderation, religious tolerance, democratic social movements, and human rights. These developments show that there was no inherent clash between Islam and the West. As Bikhu Parekh rightly argues, “some strands within Islam fit nicely with some strands within the West, and on some readings of them, Islamic and Western civilizations share much in common”. Islam, in other words, is not a homogeneous entity with an unchanging essence. There are in fact “many Islams just as there are many Wests” (Parekh, 2002).

What is more important to note, however, is that the struggle for reform and democracy has been a major component of contemporary Islamic resurgence. As argued by Hefner, while some Muslims called for a totalizing transformation of the social order based on an ideal of pristine unity identified with the first generation of Muslim believers, there is a remarkable effort underway in many countries to give Muslim politics a civic, pluralist, and even democratic face, marked primarily by “the resistance to etatist and essentializing interpretation of politics and calling for a pluralistic organization of state and society”. As has been well-documented by Esposito, the call for greater liberalization, democratization and the creation of institutions of civil society has become a common and widespread historical transformation in the Muslim world. The claims of the clash of civilizations, with its essentialist tendency, however, reduce this complex social and historical dynamics into “essentialized and artificially coherent categories and thus only serves to obfuscate the real dynamics of the
struggle between interpretative communities over who gets to speak for Islam and how”.

In this regard, the events of September 11 and other acts of Islamic extremism are better seen as caused not by cultural or religious differences or by American attempts to introduce democracy and human rights into the region, but rather by a myriad of historical and contemporary factors. Moreover, other causes of the attack cannot be divorced from the broader context of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, including U.S. support for Israel and for the region’s pro-Western but corrupt regimes—not to mention U.S. involvement in a number of historical conflicts in the region. As rightly pointed out by An-Na’im, far from clashes of civilizations the conflicts between Islamic groups and the United States stemmed not from value or civilizational confrontation, but from the failure of these governments, whose leadership relies exclusively on U.S. support, to bring about political, social, and economic development. In this sense, the fallacy of the thesis is clear in that the attacks were motivated by specific political, security and human rights grievances against the foreign policy of the United States, rather than by an irrational, generalized Islamic hostility to so-called “Western civilization” as such. In this light, September 11 attacks and its aftermath is more about “the difference of power” between the two sides of the conflict and their allies, regardless of cultural/religious affiliation, than “the power of difference” between what so-called Islamic and Western civilizations.

What is rejected is the assertion that violence, radicalism, terrorism or fundamentalism is intrinsically Islamic, but not the possibility of Islam, as any other religious traditions, being used as justification of these acts. At the same time, however, the possibility of Islam being interpreted within an exclusivist, supremacist lens should be understood in its intimate relationship with certain
socio-political contexts. In this sense, Islamic fundamentalism is not the only form of fundamentalism and its existence is better seen as a response or reaction to other forms of fundamentalism. In relation to this, it is not hard to see that the US-led promotion and campaign of “freedom”, “democracy” and “free market”, which assumes their principles to be a self-evident and universal truth or norm and hence dismisses alternative worldviews or ideologies as abnormal, deviant, irrational, and “fundamentalist” threat, is another form of fundamentalism.

It is in this light that the collision at the Twin Towers is better seen, as Esack argues, as “the clash of two religious fundamentalisms: a reckless, incorrigible, fundamentalist, and all-pervasive religion of the Market on the one hand, and a fierce, angry, and vicious fundamentalist driven by pathological, deluded – but nevertheless religious – individuals on the other” (Ibid.). According to Esack, both are fundamentalism in the sense that, like all forms of fundamentalism, “they are obsessed with a single truth as understood by it, demonizing of all others who refuse to get behind its ‘truth’” (Ibid.).

In this context, instead of promoting a clash of civilizations and deploying a unilateral, militaristic approach in combating terrorism, more attention and energy should be devoted in addressing the ethical and justice issues posed by the global polarization of wealth, income, and power and with them the huge asymmetries of life chances by connecting the project of economic globalization to manifest principles of social justice. At the same time, the need for a deeper understanding between Islam and the West and the call for a closer “dialogue between civilizations” should be situated in the global effort of creating a more just world order embracing a world of unusual cultural differences and unprecedented global inequalities. On this, Samir Amin has reminded us that “there is no possibility of a united front against terrorism. Only the development
of a unified front against international and social injustice can serve to make such desperate acts of victims of the system useless on their part and no longer possible” (Amin, 2001: 6).

References


Introduction

In this short paper, I would like to present three observations:

1. Maritime terrorism is a reality, not fiction.
2. “Choke Points” and mega harbors are the focus of terrorists.
3. In order to fight maritime terrorism and piracy, cooperation between governments and private sector is crucial.

It is difficult to define *maritime terrorism*, particularly because the United Nations have so far not been able to find a binding definition for “terrorism”. The U.S. Department of Defence defines terrorism as “unlawful use or threatened use or force of violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives”.

If we look at the attacks by pirates at the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean, it is obvious that monetary motivations were behind the incidents. Acts of hijacking and blackmailing cannot be defined as maritime terrorism, but as *organised crime*. 
Let me now make my first observation:

**Observation 1: Maritime Terrorism is a Reality, and not a Fiction**

In order to better analyse maritime terrorist threats, it is not enough to examine the capabilities and motives of terrorist groups, but also to examine the maritime industry, shipping practices, the vulnerability of trade shipping as well as countermeasures by the authorities and other institutions which are entrusted with the security of the shipping routes. Let me give some examples of planned or executed maritime terrorist attacks:

**January 2000**
Al-Qaida members carried out an unsuccessful attack in Aden against the USS Sullivans. But the boat, overloaded with explosives, sank before it could reach the target.

**October 2000**
Successful Al-Qaida attack against the U.S. destroyer USS Cole in Yemen. 17 U.S. sailors were killed, 39 wounded.

**June 2002**
Members of Al-Qaida, who had planned attacks against British and US ships in the Strait of Gibraltar, were arrested by Morocco’s secret service.

**October 2002**
A terror group from Yemen, having connections with Al-Qaida, attacked the French oil tanker Limburg off the harbour of Ash Shahir. One crew member was killed, others wounded. 90 000 tons of oil polluted in the Gulf of Aden. As a result the monthly container transshipment in Yemen declined from 43,000 to 3,000 containers. 3,000 dockers lost their jobs and the national economy shrunk by 1 percent GDP.

February 2004
Bomb attack by the Abu Sayyaf group against a passenger ferry in the Philippines. Over 100 people were killed.

August 2005
Israel’s security service Shin Bet warned four Israeli cruise liners – on their passage to Turkey – about a possible terror attack and redirected the ships to Cyprus.

July 2009
Egypt’s security authorities prevented an attack against the Suez Canal and the adjacent oil pipeline. According to sources in Cairo the terror group consisted of 24 Egyptians and one Palestinian.

According to Western intelligence services, some Islamist terror groups have declared that it is their aim to interrupt Western supply lines. As the second most senior leader of Al-Qaida, Aiman Al-Sawahri, stated: “We must stop the West plundering the oil of Muslims.”

Often, people claim that terrorist groups could probably form alliances with
organised crime groups and pirates. But there is no proof for such a claim. Islamic terrorist groups isolate themselves extremely and are suspicious of outsiders, especially when they do not share the same ideology. It is worthwhile to note that during the last 15 years only 2 percent of all terrorist attacks could be assigned to maritime terrorism. Although maritime terrorist attacks cannot be excluded in the future and should not be played down, special operational capabilities are required which the terrorists probably do not have yet at their disposal. However, it could be that the pirates in Somalia are contributing to terrorist organisations by paying some form of protection money.

In this context we should not forget the plans of Al-Qaida chief planner for maritime terrorism, Abd Al Rahman Al Nashiri – also called the Prince of the Sea – who was arrested in November 2002 in the United Arab Emirates. Nashiri had developed a strategy which included the following four elements:

- Ramming or blowing up medium-sized ships in the vicinity of other ships or in harbours;
- Attacking super tankers from the air with small planes, packed with explosives;
- Underwater attacks against ships using divers;
- Attacks against cruise liners and taking hostages.

**Observation 2: “Choke Points” and Mega Harbours are Targets of Terrorists**

Terrorists will ask themselves at which locations they can decisively hit the infrastructure of the industrialized world because up to now the maritime terrorist
attacks have not threatened world trade seriously. They will direct their attention
to the so-called “choke points” and mega harbours, as 75 percent of the
international ocean traffic with approximately 50,000 ships is processed in
approximately 2,800 harbours.

As many of the biggest harbours in the world are located in East and Southeast
Asia and most of the trade is directed via sea routes in this region, terrorists will
pay special attention to this region in their target planning. These may include the
following harbours: Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Pusan, Shanghai, Kaohsiung,
Hong Kong and Singapore. Of course, the mega harbours in the United States
and in Europe may be the targets of terrorists as well.

The strategically important Straits of Malacca is one of the critical choke points.
It connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific. It is the
most important trade route between the Far East, the Gulf States and Europe.
90,000 ships per year pass the Straits of Malacca. One third of the world trade,
80 percent of oil imports for East Asia and two third of the worldwide liquid gas
transports go via this route.

A terror attack, for example the sinking of a tanker in the Straits of Malacca,
would block the straits. Ships would have to make a detour of 1,000 km via the
Indonesian Straits of Sunda and Flores. The ships would have to be at sea for 2
extra days, which would result in 8 billion US dollars additional costs per year.
Freight and insurance rates would increase and the market price for all
transported goods would also increase in a short period of time with negative
economic effects on the region and world trade.

Blown up container ships could block harbours for weeks – quite apart from an
attack in one of the 20 mega harbours with a so-called “dirty bomb”. A closure of the Singapore harbour for example, would cost more than USD 200 billion per year. Also the terrorist attack of a fully loaded gas tanker in one of the mega harbours would have a devastating effect on the world trade and provide terrorists with an event comparable to September 11.

But terrorist attacks can also be expected at other choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz, Bab al Mandat, the Suez Canal, Bosporus, Straits of Gibraltar or the Panama Canal. We in Europe should also not forget the English Channel.

In conclusion: Yes, world trade is potentially threatened by maritime terrorism.

**Observation 3: Fighting Potential Maritime Terrorism and Piracy Cooperation between State Institutions and the Private Sector is Crucial**

Efficient cooperation between states could improve the maritime security situation. This can also be seen in the more intensive and successful cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over the last few years.

Pirate attacks in Indonesia have been reduced from 121 cases in 2003 to 43 in 2007, and to 2 in the first half year of 2009. In the Straits of Malacca we also could observe a positive development. In 2004, 38 attacks were recorded, in 2007 only 7, and only 2 in the first half year of 2009.

The situation off the Horn of Africa is very different. In the first 9 months of 2009, 114 ships were boarded, 34 hijacked, 88 came under fire. 661 persons
were taken hostage.

Also helpful is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), initiated by the United States in 2002. The aim of this program is to identify – out of the 230 million containers which are transported by sea every year – those containers with weapons of mass destruction or dangerous nuclear substances which could be used by terrorists for their attacks. Containers, designated for the United States, are checked at the harbour of departure. At present, US officials are working in more than 46 harbours.

However, U.S. plans to examine all U.S.-bound containers are unrealistic and moreover, impossible. Timely intelligence is here the name of the game.

In cooperation with state organisations and the industry, technical means are also used to protect against potential terror attacks. For example, the scanning of huge containers, the use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) which proved to be very effective when pirates tried to attack the cruise liner *Seabourne Spirit* on November 5, 2005. Furthermore, anti-boarding systems, such as 9 000-volt-protective-fences for merchant ships make the boarding for pirates or terrorists more difficult. Also unmanned “inventus systems” are used. Equipped with cameras, they are capable of searching huge parts of the oceans and transmit this data to a ship or to a ground station.

I also would like to draw your attention to a new trend. Due to the intensive attacks against ships, the loss of sea freight, the increase of insurance rates and the resulting losses of USD 16 billion annually, states are intensifying their cooperation with private security companies, which are specialised in maritime security. In this field, British and US companies are playing a leading role.
Given the configuration of modern naval warships, designed to counter the threat of other modern navies, it becomes clear that such ships are unsuitable to counter terrorists or counter piracy operations. We can either resort to the private sector, which could protect cargo vessels by deploying guards on board, or governments need to build and deploy suitable naval vessels designed to counter this new threat.

If we understand security policy in a more comprehensive way, which means that the political, economic, social, ecological and military dimensions must be considered together and must be brought together, then maritime terrorism can only be fought successfully in cooperation between state institutions and the private sector.

Let me finish with a motto that has guided NATO for many years and has provided peace, freedom and security to all of us: “Vigilance is the price of freedom.”
China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) has just celebrated its first anniversary of deployment to the Gulf of Aden, its first overseas mission. This paper will assess this first year and attempt to determine the degree of Chinese learning regarding a maritime cooperative security strategy to counter piracy. China’s maritime strategies are evolving incrementally towards greater convergence with American and Japanese approaches to maritime order driven by an interactive process of Chinese domestic debates with rapidly changing facts on the ground, praxis, especially when encountering crises that require Chinese adaptation.

The author has previously written on Japanese maritime strategies and the formation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) as a counter-piracy maritime regime that China was slowly socialized within and eventually joined (Christoffersen, 2007; 2009). The focus of this paper is primarily on China’s maritime strategies and how Beijing has responded to U.S. and Japanese initiatives.
As we witness deeper engagement by China with international institutions and responding to transnational threats, questions remain: does Beijing play by the rules, is it solving global problems and strengthening the international system as a responsible stakeholder, and is Beijing willing to take on a proactive leadership role?

The focus of this paper is on China’s adaptation to international maritime cooperation as a process of learning from the bottom-up through operational coordination. The process of learning may lay the groundwork for a trilateral or multilateral maritime arrangement. It is argued that the institutional design of a potential East Asian maritime regime should be viewed as a dependent variable that is the result of this learning, rather than an independent variable that structures maritime cooperation (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 15).

**Comprehensive Security in Maritime Issues**

The Chinese have used comprehensive security, cooperative security and common security interchangeably, although in the case of Somalian piracy they are analytically distinct. A comprehensive security approach to the problem of Somalian piracy would address the root causes of piracy – poverty, lack of economic development, and threats to environmental security by commercial overfishing that has forced Somalian fishermen into piracy. The United Nations (UN) has taken this kind of comprehensive security approach to Somalia, as have many developing countries concerned that the Somalia model of dispatching warships on counter-piracy missions might eventually be applied to them. China’s official policy on Somalian piracy closely parallels the UN’s position, and reflects an emphasis on comprehensive security instead of the use of warships.
Nevertheless, the Chinese deployment to the Gulf of Aden is taken to be a major opportunity for China’s participation in cooperative security. Cooperative security is generally defined as a multilateral security arrangement that is inclusive and creates habits of dialogue and cooperation. It is often associated with nontraditional security issues and transnational threats to security. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created on the basis of cooperative security. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is a non-governmental, Track II dialogue for security issues in the Asia-Pacific that provides support for the ARF.

Li Wei (2008), Director of the Anti-terrorism Research Center, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), claimed the Somalia deployment was a huge breakthrough because it represented a shift in China’s perception of security from traditional security to non-traditional security (China Daily, 26 December 2008). Chinese scholars had been writing about cooperative security and non-traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific for several years but it was now being put into practice by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N).

China’s interest in comprehensive security dates back to the 1970s when Japan’s government adopted a concept of “comprehensive security” which influenced Chinese scholars at that time. These scholars introduced the concept in publications beginning in the early 1980s, eventually reaching government policymakers. With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the concept of “comprehensive security” became more widely used by Chinese government officials (Chu, 2004). Chinese approaches to comprehensive security and cooperative security were reflected in the “New Security Concept” presented by China to ARF in March 1997. However, it was not until the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 that officials realized the importance of economic security and
included it as part of comprehensive security. Since 1997, Chinese official thinking on security has broadened, incorporating energy security among several non-traditional security concerns which have been given a greater priority than before.

The Chinese adoption of the comprehensive security concept reflects an interactive pattern of scholarly discourse and empirical experience that leads to acceptance of new norms by policymakers. Government ministries can in turn call on scholars to further elaborate on a concept. For example, the “New Security Concept” was promoted by the Asia Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which asked Chinese scholars to articulate a normative basis for Chinese multilateral diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry needed this rationale to contend with critics of multilateralism in the PLA, the government and academia (Shirk, 2008: 128).

It was the Foreign Ministry’s empirical experience of multilateralism with Southeast Asia in the ARF and CSCAP that generated further scholarly discourse on cooperative security. The Concept would lead to the 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Chinese analysts point out that Beijing accepted international maritime relations as governed by international law (UNCLOS) in 2004, and reluctantly adapted to the regionalization of maritime security issues in the South China Sea as inevitable. China-ASEAN relations have steadily improved on the basis of cooperative security in nontraditional security issues (Zou, 2006). The first Chinese book on cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific was written by Professor Su Hao (Su2003).

Intellectual debates in China have provided a window into Chinese thinking on
policy issues over the last three decades. Analysts have identified seven different channels for intellectuals to influence Chinese policymaking (Zhao, 2005). Chinese debates are ongoing over the utility of comprehensive security vs. traditional security concerns. There are Chinese Realists and Chinese Neo-liberal Institutionalists who disagree on much and debate much.

However, Chinese naval strategy for geographic areas beyond Southeast Asia evolved separately from the New Security Concept. Outside observers noted that China’s New Security Concept with ASEAN did not extend to cooperative security with the US which had several initiatives for security cooperation in Asia and continued to hope for Chinese participation without success. The U.S. wanted practical military-to-military exercises, while Chinese wanted dialogue on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) (Thayer, 2000). In fact, Chinese discussion of Asian multilateralism was often a mechanism for displacing the U.S. bilateral military alliances.

In 2001, Xia Liping had suggested principles for establishment of an East Asian multilateral security mechanism, guided by theories of common and cooperative security, in a dialogue that would be formed around ARF and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) (Xia, 2001). In contrast, American scholars stressed maritime operationalizing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, operationalizing cooperative security concepts, rather than dialogue. Unfortunately, the ill-fated Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) was what Americans had in mind (Weeks, 2004: 24). China remained skeptical of maritime security cooperation with the U.S. throughout the 1990s up to the present.

From 1949 to 1980s, the primary Chinese naval strategic concept was “coastal defense.” From 1982, under the direction of Admiral Liu Huaqing, naval
strategic concepts shifted towards “offshore defense” sometimes defined as defense of China’s 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and including the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea, waters around Taiwan and Okinawa. Strategic thinking outpaced naval capabilities as the PLA-N didn’t have the resources to implement the strategy of offshore defense.

Most recently Chinese naval strategists and scholars advocate “distance sea defense” or “far seas operations” which is not geographically bounded but rather defined by China’s maritime national interests which have been expanding. This strategy required the PLA-N have a global reach, as it moved beyond concern with Taiwan. The PLA-N also did not have the resources to implement this strategy and will not have them until 2020. Delinking naval strategy from territorial interests opened possibilities for maritime cooperative security with the U.S.

Chinese strategists have debated what role military operations other than war (MOOTW) could play in nontraditional security threats such as piracy, and concluded that these operations can increase China’s soft power as a responsible stake holder maintaining the global maritime order. It was another empirical experience, China’s lack of a role in the coordinated Indonesian tsunami relief in 2004, that resolved the debate in favor of MOOTW (Holmes and Yoshihara, 2009: 4-5).

The origins of the “far seas” concept of expanded national interest beyond territorial waters is based in the set of new missions given to the PLA by Hu Jintao in 2004, called Historic Missions of the PLA in the New Period of the New Century. These missions included countering terrorism and other non-traditional security threats, defending Chinese sea-borne trade and oil imports, and were in
response to Hu’s December 2003 speech on China’s “Malacca Dilemma” (Hartnett, 2009). In April 2005, Hu Jintao further articulated a vision of a “Harmonious World” which included international “institutional harmony” and regional institution-building, and would eventually be adapted to maritime relations.

In April 2009, the PLA-N celebrated its 60th anniversary with a naval review in the Yellow Sea, off Qingdao port, joined by navies of 14 other nations. A symposium was held, called “Harmonious Seas,” in which Admiral Wu Shengli gave a keynote speech on maintaining peace and stability. President Hu Jintao conveyed to American and other foreign naval commanders China’s interest in increased international maritime security cooperation. Hu claimed international maritime cooperation would build “harmonious oceans and seas.” The inclusion of so many foreign navies at the event was meant to indicate that the PLA-N is becoming more open and would be increasingly willing to cooperate in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere Shanghai Daily, 24 April 2009).

Nan Li (2009) finds multiple factors driving the PLA-N shift to a “far seas” naval strategy - domestic nationalism, dreams of a blue-water navy and anxiety over the security of the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) China depended on. A maritime strategy delinked from territorial waters, the “distance sea defense,” allowed for incorporation of non-traditional security threats by non-state actors, such as terrorism and piracy.

Robert Ross (2009) argues that China’s first long-distance naval deployment to the Gulf of Aden was part of a maritime strategy to build up naval forces into a blue-water navy that he calls “naval nationalism,” a “prestige strategy” that governments pursue to bolster their domestic legitimacy. Ross considers naval
nationalism to be a suboptimal maritime strategy not driven by rational security considerations or cost-benefit analyses.

Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein (2009) suggest that if China’s naval strategy were to shift to SLOC defense with a blue-water navy, beyond counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it would be preceded by domestic debates. If there were to be such a shift, there would be a sequence of events: first debates, then speeches, then published doctrines, followed by procurement, and then deployment. These debates are currently still ongoing.

With a focus on non-traditional security issues, a cooperative security approach was a possibility but Chinese naval strategists did not dwell on maritime cooperation. In deploying to the Gulf of Aden, China’s original intention was to protect Chinese interests in the SLOCs by guarding only Chinese ships. However, SLOC security is an international public good that would require Chinese naval strategists to adapt to emerging conditions on the ground.

**China-Japan Maritime Relations**

Much of the credit for increasing Chinese acceptance of norms of maritime cooperative security is due to Japan’s influence and the formation of ReCAAP, originally based on an APT framework but later expanded. Chinese thinking on Japanese maritime strategies slowly evolved. Prior to 2005, Chinese writing on maritime security focused on defending China’s maritime rights in relation to Japan, in a confrontational maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific (Xu, 1990). But by 2005-06, Chinese writing on Japan’s maritime strategy recognized that Japan had an emerging new concept of sea power. A
major work on maritime cooperation, *Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation*, had several chapters on maritime security cooperation (CICIR 2005). Assessing Japan’s international maritime security strategy, it concluded that Japan pursued traditional security objectives with the U.S. such as in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), while also pursuing nontraditional security strategies in cooperation with China, South Korea, and ASEAN to fight piracy (Ibid: 320-326). The volume claimed that international maritime cooperation was needed for SLOC security, especially the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and to the Middle East. Oil dependence on the Middle East has been a major driver of Chinese concern over the SLOCs.

Chinese analysts argued that China’s response to Japan’s changing maritime strategy should be to re-examine its own maritime strategy, be more vigorous in presenting to the world its own maritime rights, and actively promote maritime cooperation in East Asia, including cooperation with Japan, applying the lessons learned from the long history of Sino-Japanese cooperation on land and adapting these lessons to maritime cooperation (Zhang, 2005).

A Japanese analyst in 2006 suggested a Japan-U.S.-China trilateral maritime cooperation framework, using the three nations’ coast guards to protect the SLOCs, creating an international public good of SLOC security, especially in the Malacca Strait. Obstacles to realization of trilateral cooperation included very different maritime strategies and mutual distrust (Nakahata).

By 2006, Chinese writing was more positive on Japan’s strategy to build a multilateral maritime security cooperation mechanism. Applying China’s New Security Concept to maritime issues, and continuing to advocate common security and comprehensive security, Chinese argued China should participate in Japan’s
initiative against piracy (ReCAAP) in order to maintain maritime regional order (Yingchun, 2006). China, in fact, did join ReCAAP. Chinese writing took greater note of the influence of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on East Asian countries and their maritime territorial disputes and their development of national maritime legislation. There was Chinese suspicion, however, that Japan was using the piracy issue to build its naval capacity as it moved towards becoming a “normal” country (Zhu, 2006).

Global Maritime Partnerships: U.S.-China Cooperation

For the United States, Admiral Mike Mullen is credited with promoting a new norm in June 2006, a new maritime strategy that shifted from the old Cold War maritime strategy that focused on sea control to a new strategy that would need maritime partners to protect trade routes, counter terrorists and interdict WMD, who would “watch over the seas together” a vision of maritime comprehensive security. Initially this partnership was called the “thousand-ship navy” but later was called the Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) as presented in “A Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power.” The emphasis was on cooperative security approaches to maritime security with both allied naval powers and in partnerships with non-allies such as China. India, which had opposed PSI, as had Malaysia and Indonesia, was skeptical that GMP might be just a reincarnation of PSI. U.S. military allies Japan and South Korea were positive but non-allied countries were wary and uncertain what membership would entail.

One forum for Chinese learning and socialization took place in Track II CSCAP, especially the Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific Meeting on the Roles of Maritime Security Forces, which discussed, at its December 2006 meeting, contemporary concepts of maritime security and the ways to implement the concepts in actual cooperation. The meeting reviewed the U.S. idea of Global Maritime Partnerships, and Japanese participants mentioned creating a Council for Comprehensive Maritime Policy. Chinese participants mentioned that the PLA-N was expanding into nontraditional security areas of terrorism, piracy, and smuggling (CSCAP, 2006). The second meeting, in April 2008 in Seoul, discussed a seamless approach to SLOC security in the East Asia-Indian Ocean-Middle East regions.

Track I ARF meetings benefited from CSCAP work. In June 2003, ARF had issued the *ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security* committing ARF member countries to multilateral maritime cooperation to combat piracy. The ARF has in fact held a series of workshops on maritime cooperative security from November 1998 to March 2009. But because these are Track I, there is less learning or socialization occurring than in the Track II CSCAP workshops where there is effort made to develop a shared understanding of key concepts.

China cautiously approached GMP with less negativity compared to the Chinese response to PSI and RMSI. In 2007 the Chinese Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wu Shengli, visited Washington and met with Admiral Mullen. Mullen proposed that China join the GMP. Wu could not give him a definitive response at that time. According to Yang Yi, China needed to study the initiative, “It is imperative for China to undertake a full-scale, in-depth study of what the GMP program entails and what it will mean for the Chinese military.” (Yang Yi, 2007)

Yang Yi argued that China would first do a comprehensive study of what it would mean to participate in GMP, including a cost-benefit analysis, to determine all the
ramifications, how it would synchronize with Chinese strategies and national interests. On the benefit side, it would enable China to be a responsible power contributing to regional order and the provision of international public goods. GMP could be the opening wedge for improving U.S.-China military cooperation if it, according to Yang, observed several principles: activities must be under UN auspices and international law, respect for territorial integrity of other countries, avoidance of the use of force, confined to nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, religious extremists and national separatists, and there should be efforts at CBMs to increase mutual understanding. Yang warned that China would not participate in maritime interceptions without authorization by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Yang further stated that U.S. and Japanese strategic intent was not transparent which made it very difficult for China to engage in maritime cooperation with them (Ibid: 38).

A Chinese analyst based in Singapore, Mingjiang Li (2009), argued that Beijing was willing to join concrete programs with limited objectives, such as the Somalia deployment, but it would avoid what he called “Grand Schemes” of the U.S. – i.e. PSI, RMSI, GMP – which had broader strategic implications that Beijing did not trust and had not thought through yet.

The initial Chinese reaction was skeptical, claiming that GMP was a continuing effort to contain China although it was disguised as a new U.S. initiative (Erickson, 2007: 43-45). However, Su Hao (2008) assessed the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” as a U.S. Navy effort to maintain U.S. leadership while integrating China into the maritime order.” Wang Baofu (2008: 62-67) argued the new US maritime strategy perpetuated the thinking of Alfred Thayer Mahan, thus stressing continuity with the past century and doubted that the U.S. had given up its “maritime hegemonic mentality.” Mahan, a late 19th
century American naval strategist, had stressed control of seaborne commerce and engaging in strategic denial of the SLOCs to the opponent. Nevertheless, Wang conceded that there had been some transformation in U.S. thinking. The new Chinese Defense White Paper 2008 came out in January 2009 with greater emphasis on missions countering non-traditional security threats and had a very small section on international cooperation and expanding the PLA-N’s operational range to distant waters.

The GMP goal of creating an international public good of SLOC security was put into practice in countering Somali piracy. The U.S. response to Somalia was to establish a new command, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), announced January 8, 2009. Previous to that, the CTF-150 was formed in 2002, consisting of allied forces, as a counterterrorism patrol unit. In contrast, CTF-151 was created for maritime cooperation with non-allies and “Eastern navies” – China’s PLA-N and Japan’s MSDF which would not or could not engage in collective security and lacked authority to use weapons in counterterrorism – and other non-allied countries if they supported the U.S. goal of deterring, disrupting and arresting Somalian pirates (Navy Times, 8 January 2009). CTF-151 is an example of the U.S. Navy’s operationalizing the GMP concept.

CTF-151 was created for nations that would participate in antipiracy patrols at the operational level but wanted to avoid counterterrorism activities that might be PSI or RMSI in disguise. The Turkish navy took command of CTF-151 in May 2009 for a few months and then command rotated back to the U.S. South Korea announced that it also would work with CTF-151. Tokyo and Seoul agreed to cooperate closely in Somalia including escorting each other’s ships but would not conduct joint escort missions because of restrictions on Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) (Japan Times, 2009).
China in the Gulf of Aden

China’s deployment of three ships, DDG-171 Haikou and DDG-169 Wuhan, missile-armed destroyers, and Weishanhu, a supply ship, to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, arriving January 6, 2009, was a major turning point - China’s first operational deployment outside of Asia. Chinese purposes were to defend Chinese merchant shipping but also to demonstrate how China was a responsible stakeholder maintaining the security of the SLOCs. People’s Daily (7 January 2009) claimed that this was a significant test of the Chinese navy in its first escort mission far from China but it expected many more “firsts” for the PLA-N in the near future. It was in fact the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, rather than the Ministry of Defense, that was the major driver behind the PLA-N mission to Somalia (Goldstein, 2009: 5).

Beijing was very cautious to ensure a positive international reaction, probing beforehand international opinion on its deployment, announcing at the UN that it was considering deployment, and using a Chinese media campaign to justify it under international law. The Chinese media claimed there was a debate among naval strategists and international relations experts on China’s Somalia mission (China Daily, 12 December, 2008).

The Liberation Army Daily, prior to deployment, ran an article claiming the boundaries of China’s national interests extended far beyond Chinese coastal and territorial waters to include wherever Chinese freighters sailed, i.e., the global SLOCs (Lam, 2009: 4). The deployment marked a major step towards the PLA-N becoming a blue-water navy. A section of the Liberation Army Daily online (26 December 2008) titled “Chinese Navy Fights Pirates,” is devoted to news articles of PLA-N accomplishments in the Gulf of Aden and off the
Somalia coast. In an interview with the commander of the naval escort taskforce, Rear Admiral Du Jingchen claimed it was a solemn duty and sacred mission of the Chinese navy to protect territorial waters and “maritime strategic passages”. A Chinese law professor claimed the PLA-N Somalia mission would be “a milestone for the Chinese Navy since the fleet will embody the country’s sovereignty (Xinhua, 17 December 2008).”

Peter Dutton (20090 has noted that China has generally avoided cooperative maritime security arrangements with the U.S. and other countries. Yet he argued there were several areas of U.S.-China agreement in the Gulf of Aden: ungoverned maritime space required coordinated action by the two nations, as did capacity building of coastal states. To cooperate, there would need to be much better communication between U.S. and Chinese naval forces. They could achieve coordinated actions, even while disagreeing over interpretations of UNCLOS, and work towards a common goal of SLOC security.

The U.S. encouraged Beijing’s deployment of the PLA-N to Somalia and wasted no time during China’s Somali operation to ask Beijing if it would join the GMP but got no immediate response. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, also welcomed the engagement of China and applauded China’s Somalia deployment, stating “I do not exclude, at a certain stage, that when the UN would create a sort of roof under which these whole anti-piracy operations take place, NATO and China will meet under that roof.” (People’s Daily, 20 January 2009).

Ye Hailin (2009b) hinted at debates over whether China should build a blue-water navy, what China’s maritime strategy should be, what its maritime interests were, and what were the threats to its maritime security, as China’s identity
shifted from a land-based power to a maritime nation. Ye delineated China’s maritime interests according to each ocean. In the East China Sea and South China Sea, China was focused on resource exploitation with numerous territorial disputes and driven by popular nationalism. In the Indian Ocean, China’s maritime interests were solely SLOC security without nationalist impulses. It was in the Indian Ocean that China could achieve a “harmonious ocean” through regional and international cooperation.

Ye Hailin recognized that Beijing was responsible for regional suspicions because it had never published an official Maritime Strategy, only a few pages on international cooperation in China’s Defense White Paper. Ye felt that in this vacuum, unofficial Chinese writings are misconstrued as authoritative. An example of this is Ni Lexiong’s essay “Sea Power and China’s Development,” a strident nationalist treatise on expanding China’s blue-water navy (Liberation Daily, 17 April, 2005). Ye argued that China has a limited, conservative maritime strategy except for security of the SLOCs where there is a shift to greater activism. He claimed Beijing was weighing three options regarding the Somalia deployment: 1. Seek a temporary logistics base since the PLA-N ships were not designed for long-term, long-distance deployment; 2. Declare the mission accomplished and go home, leaving other nations to guard the SLOCs; 3. Create a long-term cooperative arrangement with regional partners and set up a logistics base in the Indian Ocean. Ye felt all three approaches were needed and Pakistan would be the ideal logistics base. Ye, speaking in March 2009, also mentioned that China might initiate or join an international joint naval fleet but it didn’t sound like it would include the U.S. which he referred to as a “thalassocracy,” a maritime hegemon (Ye, 2009a).

In May 2009, Chinese media claimed Chinese maritime experts were calling for
an overhaul of China’s maritime strategy due to disputes in the South China Sea. Malaysia and Vietnam had just jointly filed their territorial claims in the South China Sea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf according to Article 76, paragraph 8, of the UNCLOS. A U.S. ship, the Impeccable, had just had a run-in with Chinese ships.

Despite Beijing’s cautious approach to deployment to Somalia, Southeast Asia was attentive to Chinese comments including those of Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander of the PLA-N, who was quoted as saying “It’s the first time for us to organize a naval force on an international humanitarian mission and the first time for our navy to protect important shipping lanes far from our shores,” and also “It’s the first time we go abroad to protect our strategic interests armed with military force (Bangkok Post, 26 December 2008).” Southeast Asia was concerned about precedents set in the Somalia operation that might be applied to the Malacca Strait and the rest of Southeast Asia. Beijing has reassured Southeast Asia that it believes MALSINDO can secure order in the Malacca Strait.

Malaysians worried that the lessons of Somalian antipiracy operations, as a vigilante exercise, would be extended to Southeast Asia, and argued instead that the lessons from Southeast Asia should be applied to the Somalia operation by enhancing local capacity – political stability, economic development and training indigenous militaries in counter-piracy measures (Valencia and Khalid, 2009). Southeast Asians thought the lesson from the Malacca Strait was to “go local” (Ho, 2009). Indonesia had objected to the first draft of UNSC 1816 because the U.S. had implied that the Somalian intervention by outside maritime powers would be applied elsewhere, including the Malacca Strait. Indonesia insisted that the Somalian intervention was not a precedent for interventions in other pirate-infested waters and must be conducted in a manner consistent with UNCLOS.
Both Malaysia and Indonesia were wary of RMSI re-emerging in a different form (Valencia and Khalid, 2009).

Under the auspices of the UN with U.S. encouragement, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) met in New York in January 2009. The U.S. expected to create an international public good of maritime security initially off the Somalia coast but with possibilities for a much larger mandate. CGPCS issued a statement calling for establishing a regional counter-piracy coordination center in the vicinity of Somalia, emulating ReCAAP’s center in Singapore.

CGSCP adopted a plan of action and created four working groups: Working Group 1 in charge of establishing the regional coordination center. Working Group 2 tasked with judicial issues of piracy with support from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Working Group 3 tasked with strengthening shipping capacity and self-awareness with support from the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Working Group 4 would take charge of public information on counter-piracy efforts. The U.S. only chaired Working Group 3, with the U.K., Denmark and Egypt chairing the other groups.

The third meeting of the CGSCP, in May 2009, commended participating nations for their operational coordination achieved through the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings held periodically in Bahrain in which China, Japan, and numerous other countries participated. The SHADE mechanism is considered to have a successful open and inclusive structure that allows for military coordination with varying degrees of autonomy. China took the initiative to suggest that CGSCP establish areas of responsibility for escort operations. This suggestion was assigned to Working Group 1, in charge of operational coordination.
By May 2009, even Malaysia was offering to serve in the CGSCP. Malaysia had independently sent escort ships to the Gulf of Aden for the previous year. The Foreign Minister claimed that Malaysia could contribute to CSGCP based on its experience in MALSINDO, but also cautioned that the two situations may differ substantially (Malaysian Insider, 18 May 2009). In May 2009, Malaysia held the “Kuala Lumpur International Conference on Piracy and Crimes at Sea” that was attended by all CGSCP countries. The purpose of the meeting was to develop shared understandings on best practices for CGSCP countries. The meeting issued a resolution calling for “coordinated efforts” by naval forces, emphasizing the basic principle already found in MALSINDO, that the littoral states had primary responsibility for combating piracy while the non-littoral states should be limited to capacity building. Malaysia cautioned that the Gulf of Aden CGSCP should learn the lessons from the mechanism created by the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2009). The meeting did not accept a proposal from a group of major trading nations calling for more of a “joint response” in a UN-led “international maritime force.” Malaysia emphasized the root causes of piracy, poverty, and lack of economic development, should be addressed and the use of warships should be deemphasized.

The way in which CGSCP was formed seemed to bring together the lessons learned in East Asia: drawing on ReCAAP success and RMSI failure, and to operationalize the concept of the “Thousand-ship Navy” without calling it as such. CGSCP was based on networks rather than military alliances, organized around principles of cooperative security, under the auspices of the UN, adhering to UNCLOS, with the U.S. “leading from behind.” The CGSCP will report periodically to UNSC.
The PLA-N Somalia deployment received much Chinese media attention. An article in *China Daily* (23 December 2008) claimed it demonstrated China’s intention to create a harmonious international community and take on overseas missions that maintained world peace and security, but the article recognized that how China could smoothly coordinate and cooperate with other navies continued to be a major problem. Nevertheless, participating in regional and global maritime cooperation was a good way to demonstrate a peaceful image for China.

When Beijing first announced its Somalia deployment, a Defense Ministry spokesperson claimed “China is ready to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in performing humanitarian rescue tasks.”(*China Radio International*, 23 December 2008). The exact nature of China's cooperation with other navies, including the U.S. and Japan, is a moving target, a work in progress, that many have struggled to define. One American analyst optimistically predicted that a successful Somalia anti-piracy operation would lead to the elusive and long-stalled goal of East Asian maritime security cooperation between the U.S., Japan and China, and creation of a regional maritime security regime (*Japan Times*, 14 January 2009). Other Americans were more cautious, finding numerous difficulties such as Chinese reluctance to coordinate with other nations’ navies which demonstrated that integrating the Chinese navy into multilateral cooperation was an ongoing challenge with a long way to go (Saunders, 2009).

Still another American analyst felt that it was noteworthy that China’s participation demonstrated a new outward orientation for the PLA-N; this was the PLA-N’s first experience with relying on foreign sources for logistics support, and the first time the PLA-N had operated in an environment of
international naval forces. Cooperation with the US Navy was inevitable as the U.S. and Chinese navies coordinated search patterns, communicating via VHF radio, and exchanged information on suspected pirates (Cole, 2009). Nevertheless, some felt it was clear that the PLA-N, by operating in the vicinity of CTF-151, was participating in a GMP with the U.S. envisioned by the “thousand-ship navy” concept but had not publicly acknowledged that (McVadon, 2009). Some felt it would lead to U.S.-China-Japan trilateral or multilateral cooperation, urging the U.S. to "find a way to formally affiliate itself with the PLA-N destroyers while on-station” (Erikson and Mikolay, 2009).

China's relationship with CTF-151 is hard to define. China operates independently, originally intending only to escort its own national flag vessels, operating in a parallel fashion rather than integrated with CTF-151. However, there is continuous dialogue at the tactical level, an "ad hoc tactical collaboration" in the Gulf of Aden (Weitz, 2009) CTF-151 has the necessary characteristics that would lead Beijing to participate: (1) authorized by a UNSC Resolution, (2) the Somalian government requested international assistance, (3) UNCLOS allows for anti-piracy operations. Chinese activities are said to be independent but coordinated with the US which permits cooperation even while retaining differences over interpretations of international maritime law. By contrast, Beijing would not join CTF-150, a coalition of the willing, because nations involved accept U.S. interpretation of international maritime law, and CTF-150 is under the chain of command of the U.S. admiral commanding the 5th Fleet (Dutton, 2009).

Vice Admiral William Gortney, in testimony to Congress, reported that American and Chinese naval officers were communicating via unclassified emails in their Yahoo accounts (Marks, 2009). The official U.S. Navy response
to China’s deployment to Somalia was very positive and encouraging. Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated it could lead to a renewal of U.S.-China military exchanges which had been stopped by Beijing in October 2008 after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. During U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s visit to Beijing, it was agreed that the Strategic Economic Dialogue would be expanded to include security issues.

The U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks between defense ministries did resume in Beijing on February 27, 2009, led by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, David Sedney, and the Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Defense Ministry, Maj. Gen. Qian Lihua. Beyond the Taiwan issue, the U.S. and China also discussed coordinating their antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Sedney praised the PLA-N’s contribution in the Gulf of Aden, stating, "The work they've done has been highly professional, it's been highly effective, and it's been very well coordinated with the United States and the other navies that are working there: (Associated Press, 28 February 2009). Retired Rear Admiral Yang Yi commented that the U.S. and China, as major responsible powers, should strengthen cooperation to counter both traditional and non-traditional security threats (China Daily, 7 February 2009). Sedney, in his briefing to the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission on 4 March 2009, said he had observed Chinese military leaders “grappling with the issue of how does China work together with the United States, and others, to address common problems.”

A Center for Naval Analysis conference on China’s anti-piracy activities, held in March 2009, noted that the U.S. and Chinese navies in the Gulf of Aden were sharing information through unprecedented daily communications at the tactical
and operational level. China’s participation represented a globalizing expansion of Chinese national security interests beyond geographic boundaries, and a willingness to be a responsible stakeholder in the maritime domain. This kind of cooperation could occur even while formal military-to-military relations were strained due to arms sales to Taiwan (Kaufman, 2009). Although Beijing avoided joining CTF-151, China’s PLA-N destroyers in the Gulf of Aden would eventually escort non-Chinese ships including Japanese, Taiwanese, and ships of the UN World Food Program.

For the U.S., CTF-151 is the first real test of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the GMP concept. Rather than being a top-down initiative as RMSI was, the anti-piracy operations have been unfolding in an ad hoc fashion, a bottom-up initiative that is a work in progress. American analysts felt that as long as all the participating navies agreed to a common set of rules based on UNCLOS, it was workable (Kraska and Wilson, 2009). A Chinese military expert, Peng Guangqian, suggested a roughly similar set of rules for U.S.-China military cooperation off the coast of Somalia, that U.S.-China cooperation should be conducted within UNCLOS but he also added “equal consultation” and “mutual respect” to the set of rules (China Daily, 22 December 2008).

Despite U.S.-China differences in interpretation of UNCLOS, American analysis finds areas of U.S.-China agreement as both sides believe: they should work together to manage the ungoverned maritime domain, they should strengthen the maritime governance capacity of coastal states, and they should communicate better at all levels (Dutton, 2009). American expectations remain modest that China would join a GMP even though at the tactical level the PLA-N is learning maritime cooperation with the U.S. Navy.
In September 2009, the fourth meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia met at the UN in New York, for the purpose of furthering institutionalization of international cooperation off Somalia (U.S. Department of State, 2009). A further purpose was to extend the lessons of Somalia to other transnational maritime, nontraditional security threats (Shapiro, 2009).

On October 14, 2009, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell called for greater interaction and dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. He claimed that with the PLA-N deployment to Somalia, with the two militaries operating in increasing proximity and having increasing interactions, but without procedures and mechanisms to coordinate, they needed to develop “rules of the road for how we cooperate in the future” in order to avoid crises. Beijing didn’t appear to concur. General Xu Caihou, vice chairman to the People’s Liberation Army Central Military Commission, visited Washington at the end of October 2009. The results of his visit appeared in the U.S.-China Joint statement that would be issued November 2009 during President Obama’s Beijing visit.

The U.S.-China joint statement stated:

...The two sides will actively implement various exchange and cooperation programs agreed between the two militaries, including by increasing the level and frequency of exchanges. The goal of these efforts is to improve their capabilities for practical cooperation and foster greater understanding of each other’s intentions and of the international security environment (White House, 2009).

There was no specific mention of the Gulf of Aden but a general statement on Building Strategic Trust:
The United States and China have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability and prosperity. The two countries should further strengthen coordination and cooperation, work together to tackle challenges, and promote world peace, security and prosperity.

This statement was bilateral but a bilateral relationship situated in the Asia-Pacific. China welcomed the U.S. as an Asia-Pacific nation, and the two countries stressed their common security interests in the Asia-Pacific. President Obama’s speech in Tokyo stressed U.S. interest in Asian multilateralism, “cultivating spheres of cooperation—not competing spheres of influence” in the Asia-Pacific. Obama stressed engaging with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asian Summit.

**Chinese Crisis in the Gulf of Aden**

In October 2009, a small crisis in the Gulf of Aden presented the Chinese government with a dilemma. The Somalia deployment had been played up in the media, celebrating “naval nationalism,” in a way that made the PLA-N appear to manage its long-distance deployment with ease although, in fact, it was struggling to sustain a long-distance maritime presence.

The crisis was the hijacking of a Chinese ship, the *De Xin Hai*, on 19 October 2009 by Somali pirates. The Chinese by themselves could not mount a rescue and were facing a long stand-off that would be a definite loss of face and loss of legitimacy domestically. Chinese media, under the influence of “naval nationalism” called for the PLA-N to quickly respond but the PLA-N ships were
far from the *De Xin Hai*. The crisis presented an empirical lesson on the importance of maritime cooperation.

After a few days, Major General Qian Lihua, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office, Chinese Ministry of Defense, announced that a successful rescue would be possible if all the nations involved in the anti-piracy operations off of Somali worked in concert. Qian stated that China would organize a meeting of all nations operating off Somalia in order to clarify areas of responsibility and arrange better coordination (*Reuters*, 22 October 2009).

The extent of U.S.-China cooperation began to unfold on CCTV which first mentioned that the PLA-N was guarding non-Chinese ships. On October 28, CCTV revealed to its audience that the U.S. and China were cooperating off the coast of Somalia. On 2 November 2009, CCTV’s Dialogue discussed General Xu Caihou’s visit to Washington DC and statements on increasingly positive US-China military relations. The show’s host, Yang Rui, asked, amidst serious chronic differences on the legal status of China’s EEZ and U.S. military sales to Taiwan, how the Chinese should look at the increasingly important non-combative nature of Chinese-U.S. military relations in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He also stressed that "the two navies have cooperated in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia (Yang Rui, 2009). *People’s Daily* (1 November 2009) reported that General Xu and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates had achieved a consensus over cooperation in seven issue areas. This included several non-traditional security areas: humanitarian rescue, disaster relief, the war on terrorism, officer exchange and training, and joint maritime search and rescue exercises.

On 2 November 2009, U.S.-China operational-level, tactical cooperation
evolved to something akin to sharing strategies. PLA-N Admiral Wang Zhiguo, the commander of TF-529, invited the U.S. commander of CTF-151, Scott Sanders, and four other coalition members of CTF-151, as guests aboard his ship. Commander Sanders, mentioning that China is a reliable partner, stated:

As a partner in maritime security, we have worked with China on a tactical level in order to prevent piracy and maritime criminal activity off the coast of Somalia. Having the opportunity to sit down and share views on counter-piracy with Adm. Wang was an invaluable experience. The cooperation between our nations continues to pay big dividends. Face to face visits at the tactical level are a tremendous opportunity to share lessons learned and coordinate future counter-piracy efforts (U.S. Central Command, 2009).

This kind of meeting did not mean China would join CTF-151 or that there was a fully functioning U.S.-China Maritime Partnership. Nevertheless, the tactical working relationship became better coordinated.

On November 5, 2009 the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that China would host an international conference to better coordinate anti-piracy naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden, and that it would, in fact, begin the following day. The purpose was to coordinate escort missions of Russia, Japan, the EU and NATO to assign them responsibility for different geographic areas in the Gulf of Aden, rather than each nation only escorting its own ships, and also to consider the possibility of having joint patrols. Greater coordination would require a sharing of intelligence codes which was too sensitive a political/military issue.

The Ministry of Defense noted that “China always takes a positive and open attitude toward international cooperation on shipping escorts and is willing to
cooperate under related UN resolutions” (China Daily, 6 November 2009). The China Daily claimed there was skepticism as to whether China’s idea would be accepted by other naval powers because the “major powers have already established their codes of practice at sea, it’s hard for China to restructure the existing naval presence and lead the coordination.”

The Commander of the EU naval forces said other nations were pleased with this “unprecedented” Chinese cooperation, and would be happy to talk with Chinese, but weren’t sure what further coordination was needed since existing cooperation, among the nations that were cooperating, was extensive. The Chinese noted that the hijacking of the De Xin Hai indicated that a higher level of international cooperation was needed since the navies were not under a centralized command structure.

At the meeting, Chinese proposed that China take a more active role in SHADE meetings, and that in fact China should be allowed to lead or co-chair a future monthly SHADE meeting. SHADE coordinates NATO, EU and CTF-151 naval forces. SHADE meetings share information and coordinate areas of responsibility. Previously, EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) and the Combined Maritime Forces had co-chaired the meeting, i.e., the EU and the U.S. China asked that it take the lead role of the anti-piracy forces in the Gulf of Aden, a surprising request given its independent stance in the Gulf of Aden and its very cautious initial approach (Reuters, 10 November 2009). The U.S. and EU agreed, hoping Chinese cooperation on anti-piracy would spill over into other areas of security cooperation. China will have an opportunity to co-chair the meetings starting in 2010.

In December 2009, after a visit by Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to Japan, Japan and China agreed to their first joint naval training exercises. Maritime
cooperation would begin with joint search and rescue exercises with expectations that maritime cooperation would expand along humanitarian missions.

On December 28, 2009, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that the hijacked Chinese ship, the *De Xin Hai*, had been rescued by “relevant departments and enterprises” and that it was now under the protection of Chinese warships (Foreign Ministry, PRC), Chinese media did not clarify who had rescued the ship. One of the captured pirates told the international media that a ransom of $4 million had been paid (*VOA News*, 28 December 2009). The *Shanghai Daily*, however, did claim that the ship was rescued by the Chinese navy. This ended the crisis of the hijacked ship.

The Chinese Ministry of Defense, summing up the year 2009 that distinguished it from previous years, claimed four achievements: improved military diplomacy, increased joint military exercises, multilateral military activities, and expansion of military cooperation such as off the Somali coast (*China Military Online*, 20 November 2009). All these achievements were related to maritime cooperative security.

**Conclusion**

China’s deployment of PLA-N to the Gulf of Aden is unprecedented on many levels. Cooperation between the U.S., Chinese, Japanese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Aden is unprecedented. These navies were trained to go to war with each other rather than cooperate. There are better prospects for cooperative maritime security among Coast Guards, as demonstrated by the US and Chinese Coast Guards, and by the functioning of ReCAAP.
This case study of the PLA-N in the Gulf of Aden indicates that the empirical experience of maritime security cooperation was necessary for the PLA-N to absorb and accept the logic of cooperative security arrangements. Chinese scholarly debate alone, without empirical experience, would not have led the PLA-N to embrace the logic of the New Security Concept applied to the Gulf of Aden.

It is often, in fact, the empirical experience of a crisis that acts as a driver requiring Chinese rethinking of previous policies. The Gulf of Aden mini-crisis fits the pattern of previous crises - the financial crisis of 1997 and the 2004 coordinated tsunami relief that China was not part of - that had an impact on Chinese acceptance of the logic of cooperative security. One empirical indicator of Chinese acceptance was China contributing to rule formation and volunteering for a leadership role within the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. An additional indication was Chinese realization that the PLA-N could not by itself rescue the hijacked Chinese ship which led to requests for greater cooperation.

The Somali antipiracy operation illustrates how the U.S., Japan and China, and other nations, working loosely together can create an international public good of SLOC security, based on the premise of cooperative security, i.e., military cooperation among a mix of allies and non-allies. At the operational-level something akin to cooperation has emerged among the navies operating in close proximity in the Gulf of Aden.

This paper has looked at maritime cooperative security off the coast of Somalia but recognizes that the genuine long-term solution to the Somalian piracy problem would be a comprehensive security approach that addressed the causes
of Somali piracy. Nevertheless, within discussion of comprehensive security in Somalia, given the rampant lawlessness there for so many decades, there is also room for consideration of MOOTW within a cooperative security approach.

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PART FIVE

BIOSPHERE AND RESOURCES

CHAPTER 9
SECURITY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND DISASTER VULNERABILITIES IN ASIA
Francisco A. Magno

CHAPTER 10
WATER, SECURITY, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF TIPAIMUKH DAM
Ishtiaq Hössain
Introduction

Asia led all regions in most number of natural disasters in 2004 accounting for 38 percent of the total. Over the last 30 years, 50 percent of the death toll from disasters came from Asian countries. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned of the rise in extreme climatic events such as floods, droughts and coastal flooding induced by global warming. Huge numbers of people will be affected in the mega-deltas of Asia. The threats to security are tremendous in the densely-populated and low-lying communities where adaptive capacity is low and are already reeling from the devastating effects of tropical storms and local coastal subsidence.

This paper will build on the argument of Barnett (2003), Barnett and Adger (2007), and Raleigh and Urdal (2007) that climate change is a security problem. Amid the disasters spawned by climate change, a comprehensive environmental security approach should be adopted by states to defend the lives of their citizens. Regional cooperation in information and communications technology,
capacity building, and emergency assistance is needed to address climate-induced disaster vulnerabilities that form part of the new security context in Asia.

In a large way the destruction fostered by natural disasters comes from ecologically harmful practices and from the location of people and infrastructures in dangerous places. Many ecosystems have been severely battered and their levels of resilience against natural disturbances have gone down. This provides the staging ground for the eruption of unnatural disasters that have greatly intensified due to human actions. The ecological safety net is torn apart with the degradation of forests, rechanneling of rivers, filling in wetlands, and destabilizing the climate (Abramovitz 2001).

Environmental security was conceived to highlight the limitations of militarized practices of security, the porous boundaries of sovereignty shaped by environmental change, and to elevate environmental problems from the level of low politics to high politics. In this way states would commit as much energy and resources to address environmental problems as they do to other security problems. The term security captures the exigencies of danger much better than concepts like sustainability, vulnerability or adaptation. It likewise presents a framework in which danger can be reformulated in the context of broadened risks to welfare and sovereignty especially in the case of small island states. Security can also function as a unifying concept that ties together local, national and global levels of environmental change and response. It also provides links mitigation and adaptation as both are essential to security from climate risks (Barnett 2003).
Climate Change

Much of the international attention on the climate issue is focused on stabilizing, if not reducing, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, even if the international community were to succeed in stabilizing or reducing GHG emission, climate change adaptation strategies have to be also implemented at national and local levels because the climate is going to change in the next few decades due to past GHG emissions. These changes will have far-reaching implications for existing disaster risks and vulnerabilities confronted by societies.

Some studies, such as the fourth and latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), show that the impacts of climate change are already manifesting in some regions. Climate-induced diseases and heat stress in Asia has already increased with rising temperatures and rainfall variability. Climate trends, which have direct implications for the nature of disasters in the region, have been also observed in the region including increased frequency of occurrence of more intense rainfall events causing severe floods, landslides, debris and mudflows; increasing frequency and intensity of droughts in many parts of Asia attributed largely to temperature increases particularly during the summer and normally drier months and during El Niño events; and increased frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones originating in the Pacific over the last few decades. The damage caused by intense cyclones has risen significantly in some countries in Asia, including China, Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, and Cambodia (Cruz et al. 2007).

Improving the capacity of communities and local governments to deal with current disaster risk will also improve their capacity to deal with the expected impacts of climate change if such measures take a dynamic approach and are
amenable to further adjustments to take into account further changes in risks and vulnerabilities. There is an increasing consensus that the expected adverse impacts of climate change could be addressed through current disaster risk reduction efforts at the local level. Translating this consensus into actual programs and actions by local governments and communities is hampered by challenges and constraints related to the nature of the climate change issue itself and by the lack of local governance capacity to take into account risk and vulnerabilities in the distant future into existing efforts.

This paper will situate the climate issue within the broader development context. It will examine the linkages between disaster risk management and climate adaptation. It will also discuss the challenges and constraints in linking disaster risk management and climate adaptation at the local level.

**Climate in Development**

Since climate does not operate in a vacuum but interacts with a host of socio-economic and political factors, it is important to situate the issue of linking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation in a broader and more holistic development framework. The intimate link between climate and development demonstrates that it would be more beneficial to integrate climate change adaptation within a broader development agenda at the local level, such as agricultural planning or water resource management rather than pursuing it as a stand-alone initiative.

Acemuglo et al. (2000) note that the climate theory of development has a long history; it goes back at least to Montesquieu who suggested that low income and
despotism are more likely in warmer climates. However there is a long gap in the social science research record on climate and society relationship because the dominant approach of viewing this relationship was discredited throughout most of the 20th century largely due to its determinist and racist overtones (Rayner 2000).

In order to demonstrate the important role of climatic change in transforming societies, Fagan (2004) cites events such as the great droughts in southwestern Asia that prompted experiments in cultivating wild grasses, the drying of the Sahara that brought cattle people to the Nile Valley with their distinct ideas of leadership, and the ripple effects of the Medieval Warm Period that had very different impacts in Europe and the Americas. However, despite these compelling examples he notes that archeologists shun from discussing this issue because the discourse was coached in terms of environmental determinism – the argument that climate change was the primary cause of major developments –which was frowned upon in the academe for generations.

But interest in climate and society relationship was resurrected in the 1970s in the light of increasing evidence of anthropogenic footprints in the climate system (Rayner 2000). But unlike the determinist tone of earlier discussions, the contemporary discourse acknowledges that climate is not the only factor that explains development. In addition, the discussion has also become more nuanced; it acknowledges that the extent to which climate contributes to development or underdevelopment is mediated by institutions and policies.

In a study comparing the 30 highest income countries in the world with the 42 highly indebted and poor countries (HIPC), Sachs observes that around 93 percent of the combined population of the 30 rich countries lies in the world’s
temperate and snow zones. With very few exceptions, the HIPC by contrast include 39 tropical or desert societies. As a result of different ecological locations, rich and poor countries face different health conditions and must overcome different agronomic limitations. These differences, Sachs notes, are often the fundamental causes of persisting poverty (Sachs 1999).

The gap between the life expectancies of people living in temperate and tropical climate zones is very huge. Individuals in temperate climate zones almost everywhere have a life expectancy of 70 years or more but in the tropics life expectancy is generally much shorter, with an average of just 51 years in the 42 HIPC. This is because populations in tropical zones are susceptible to diseases, such as malaria, hookworm, sleeping sickness, and schistosomiasis, whose transmission generally depends on warm climate (Sachs 1999).

Sachs also notes that the differences of agricultural productivity between rich and poor countries has to do not only with social organization but also with the fragility of most tropical soils at high temperature combined with heavy rainfall. In other places such as the vast savannahs of Africa, agricultural productivity is limited because of the highly variable water supplies (Ibid.).

A report by Columbia University’s International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) on climate variability and the hunger target of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG), observes that the hazards and uncertainty associated with climate variability contribute significantly to poverty and food insecurity as they have adverse impacts not only on agricultural productivity but also on the availability of labor, on the accessibility of farm-to-market roads, and even on trade of agricultural commodities (Hansen et al. 2004).
Climate fluctuations, if accompanied by the spread of malaria and other diseases, not only put at risk the productivity of rainfed areas but may also decrease the availability of labor and the capacity of households to generate non-agricultural sources of income to buy food. Extreme climate events such as floods and tropical cyclones can also damage farm-to-market roads (Hansen et al. 2004). The effect of climate can go a long way from local production to international trade as exemplified by the livestock ban that Saudi Arabia imposed on the Greater Horn of Africa due to the apprehension that the livestock coming from the Greater Horn was affected by the rainfall-related outbreaks of a mosquito-borne virus that hit east Africa. In Ethiopia alone, approximately three million pastoralists were severely affected by this import ban (Orlove and Tosteson 1999: 22).

Climate is a source of both benefits and hazards. Civilization itself was partly made possible by the techniques that societies have developed over time to adapt to and capitalize on the seasonal and inter-annual variations of rainfall and other climatic variables (UNDP and IRI 2007). However, evidence also shows that that climate variability could serve as a stumbling bloc for development. Unmitigated climatic hazards have been proven to wipe out decades of development. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that climate alone could not make or break development. Certainly there are important qualifications that have to be made as climate play out within a broader socio-economic and political context. Davis quoted Rolando Garcia’s assertion in Nature Pleads Guilty that “climatic facts are not facts in themselves; they assume importance only in relation to the restructuring of the environment within different systems of production” (Garcia 1981, quoted in Davis 2001: 19).
Davis (2001: 19) defines drought as the recurrent duel between natural rainfall variability and agriculture’s hydraulic defenses. He argues that drought is never simply a natural disaster; it always has a human made dimension, which is manifested through landscape degradation, the neglect of traditional irrigation systems and demobilization of communal labor, and underinvestment in water storage.

In the extremely poor and semi-arid state of Ceara in Northeast Brazil, the recurring multi-year droughts which cause water scarcity and low agricultural productivity are often associated with El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events. During drought years, the decreased water level in reservoirs can and have threatened the livelihood of some groups. In Peru, the El Niño in 1972-73, coupled with an inadequate regulatory fishing environment, was a major factor that caused the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy fisheries sector. After a decade, another El Niño event contributed to at least US$13 billion of damage and 1500 deaths in Peru. And when El Niño occurred again in 1997-98, thousands were affected, crops yields fell, and infrastructures collapsed (Orlove, Broad, and Petty 2004).

It is tempting to ascribe the damages to climate but a closer look will reveal that it is not the root cause of the social problems confronting the Peruvian fishery sector and the state of Ceara. There are structural problems which exacerbate and make people more vulnerable to the damaging impacts of climate variability and extreme climate events. In both societies, inequality and poverty are deep-seated problems. Over one and a half million individuals in Ceara’s hinterland live below the poverty line. Low productivity in agriculture is caused not only to periodic severe droughts but also to skewed land distribution, low level of education, high levels of poverty, and limited physical and social infrastructure.
(Taddei, Broad, and Pfaff 2003). In Peru, the labor market offered very limited opportunities due to the economic downturn and a generally weak economy. This problem severely limited the fishers’ ability to react to climate information because opportunities to switch to other occupations or find a secondary employment were not readily available.

**Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation**

IPCC defines adaptation as the adjustment in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment due to effects of climate change. It includes all measures aimed at reducing the negative impacts resulting from climate change as well as the identification of new opportunities and benefits associated to new climates (Sperling and Szekely 2005).

Adaptation includes a whole range of strategies ranging from technological (e.g. sea defenses), behavioral (e.g. altered food and recreational choices), managerial (e.g. altered farm practices) to policy measures (e.g. planning regulations, incentives). Adaptation can be anticipatory, where systems adjust before the initial impacts take place, or it can be reactive, where change is introduced in response to the onset of impacts (IISD, IUCN, and SEI 2003).

On the other hand, disaster risk management is defined by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) as “the systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational skills and capacities to implement policies, strategies and coping capacities of the society and communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental
and technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and non-structural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) adverse effects of hazards” (http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm).

The projection that climate change will aggravate or alter the frequency and severity of climatic hazards (most notably cyclones, floods, and droughts) provides one of the most compelling argument for linking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Impacts of long term climate change will likely manifest (or have already manifested in some regions, as some studies would argue) in patterns of climate variability through (i) the alteration of the average climatic conditions; (ii) likely increased frequency and intensity of extreme climate events; (iii) combination of (i) and (ii) and; (iv) climate surprises or the emergence of historically unprecedented and sudden climate change-induced patterns. (Subbiah 2007, personal communication)

There has been an increasing recognition by international agencies that adaptation measures can benefit from the practical and relatively long experience of societies in disaster risk management (see for example Sperling and Szekely 2005). Since the projected impacts of climate change would likely resemble climate variability patterns already experienced by societies on a seasonal to inter-annual basis, the pattern of disaster risks can be anticipated and the experiences of present systems in dealing with these disaster risks could be drawn upon in designing climate change adaptation strategies. In addition, societal experiences in dealing with extreme climate events may provide guidance in dealing with uncertainties associated with climate “surprises”.

While uncertainties associated with physical climate modeling and socio-
economic projections are being addressed by the scientific community, local
governments and communities are encouraged to implement so-called “no
regrets” set of disaster reduction activities that also support climate change
adaptation. These activities include the following (UNISDR 2004:304):

- early warning systems, seasonal climate forecasts and outlooks;
- insurance and related financial means;
- building codes, designs and standards (construction on stilts, redesign
  of oil rigs);
- promotion of renewable energy sources as mitigation and vulnerability
  reduction options;
- land-use planning including relocation incentives;
- flood-resistant agricultural practices;
- water management including regional water-sharing agreements,
  drainage facilities, flood prevention;
- environmental management (beach nourishment, mangrove belts,
  wetland and watershed protection, forest and agricultural land
  management);
- coastal zone management; and
- disaster management precepts, upstream vulnerability reduction,
  information, awareness, networking, reducing uncertainty for
decision-making.

In practical terms, linking disaster risk management and climate change
adaptation within a local governance framework means that existing
vulnerability to current climate variability and extremes is taken as the starting
point. However, the governance framework should also recognize that it is no
longer enough to rely on past experience and historical information. Since it is
currently not possible to fully anticipate how the climate is going to change, adaptation should include changes in institutions and governance conditions. The framework has to be dynamic and flexible in order to take into account further changes in risks and vulnerabilities.

But making ongoing local disaster risk management address longer-term risks associated with climate change is easier said than done. This undertaking poses many challenges and requires a conscious effort to adjust local governance frameworks in order to accommodate uncertainties about the exact nature and severity of climate-related hazards in the future. The next section discusses the challenges and constraints faced by local governments in linking disaster risk management and climate change adaptation.

**Challenges and Constraints in Linking Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation**

Adaptation takes place at all levels, from national and regional levels to adaptations made by local communities and individuals. There is an increasing call for supporting local adaptation strategies because of the realization that they are the most appropriate given the very specific local manifestations of climate change impacts (IISD, IUCN, and SEI 2003). Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are encouraged to build upon coping strategies at the grassroots level in preparing its respective National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), a process that – the UNFCCC Secretariat notes - enables LDCs to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change. The UNFCC notes that the NAPA “takes into account existing coping strategies at the grassroots level, and builds upon that to...
identify priority activities, rather than focusing on scenario-based modeling to assess future vulnerability and long-term policy at the state level. In the NAPA process, prominence is given to community-level input as an important source of information, recognizing that grassroots communities are the main stakeholders” (http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php).

The call for locally-defined measures to protect communities from climatic hazards is not new in Asia. In the last 20 years, community-based disaster preparedness has been promoted all over Asia by regional (e.g. Asian Disaster Preparedness Center) and national (e.g. Center for Disaster Preparedness in the Philippines) organizations. Most community-based programs have focused not only on disaster response measures but also on disaster preparedness and mitigation, such as on the establishment of disaster preparedness community-based hazard warning systems, such as the Community-Based Flood Early Warning Systems (CBFEWS), which is pioneered by the Philippine Philippines Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), the meteorological agency, in flood-prone communities in the Philippines (see for example Nilo et al. 2006) or the externally-supported but locally-based capacity building programs for managing climate risks, such as the Climate Field Schools in Indonesia (Subbiah et al. 2006) and the Philippines.

The UNDP/IRI report (2007) recognizes that in most cases, community-based preparedness works fairly well as people know what types of risks they face from years of experience. However, the report argues that “these local efforts now need to take a longer-term focus that accounts for new uncertainties posed by climate change, which could bring unexpected new risk to communities” (p.16). In order to do this, local governments and communities have to overcome several challenges and constraints.
One of the most difficult challenges is the mismatch between the temporal (long term) and spatial scale (global) of climate problem and the short to medium term horizon of policymaking. It is difficult to convince policymakers to do something about potential risks at a distant future given competing present day development demands that they have to address. The UNDP/IRI report (2007) argues that “while information on short- and long-term risks and risk factors is becoming increasingly available, not enough has been done at the local level and very little at the policy and planning level as an integral part of national and sectoral policy” (p.16). It is difficult to see local governments and communities assign a high priority to climate change adaptation in the policymaking agenda unless there is a strong constituency demanding for it or it there is a strong push, as well as technical and financial support, from external agencies.

Second, while most countries have adopted climate change adaptation policy frameworks, they are too general and do not readily lend themselves to adoption at the local level. Translating them into specific and measurable targets remains a formidable challenge. Starting May 2007, the Netherlands Government, through ETC International, is implementing a project with regional and national institutions to develop methodologies for setting climate change adaptation targets akin to the UN Millennium Development Goals and to explore their applicability. In Asia, country studies are being conducted in Mongolia and Bangladesh in order to explore the applicability of using climate change adaptation targets as a means to mainstream climate change adaptation into development planning.

Finally, efforts to address climate change impacts through local disaster risk management framework are hampered by the lack of local capacity to downscale and calibrate outputs from global climate models and translate them into
variables that are most relevant to their ongoing local disaster risk management efforts. This limits the means of local governments and communities to design technologies as well as institutional and governance arrangements to address the risks and vulnerabilities caused by a changing climate.

**Conclusion**

Even if GHG emissions will be reduced or stabilized, adaptation is still necessary to address compounded and emerging disaster risks caused by warming due to past GHG emissions. Adaptation requires technologies, financial resources, and adjustments in policy and governance arrangements. Current disaster risk management framework presents opportunities to mainstream adaptation. It is argued that by strengthening capacity of societies to manage current climate variability and extremes, their capacity to manage the expected impacts of climate change are also strengthened.

Because of the site-specific nature of climate risk and vulnerabilities, there is a preference for local adaptation strategies. However local governments and communities have to overcome challenges and constraints in fully meeting the demands of designing and implementing sound local adaptation strategies. Some of the key challenges are the mismatch between the temporal and spatial scale of climate problems and the relatively short horizon of policymaking; broad climate change adaptation policy frameworks that do not readily lend themselves to adoption at the local level; and lack of local capacity to downscale and calibrate outputs from global climate models and translate them into variables that are most relevant to their ongoing local disaster risk management efforts.
References


Introduction

In 2009, media, political parties, and civil society groups in Bangladesh and Manipur State in India have been intensely debating the issue of the construction of Tipaimukh dam in Manipur state in India. Officially known as the Tipaimukh Multipurpose Hydroelectric Project, the dam is to be constructed over Barak River, 500 meters downstream where the Barak and Tuivai Rivers meet in Manipur state. Bangladesh gets 7-8 percent of its total water requirements from Barak River. It is, therefore, natural that serious concerns about the possible adverse effects of the construction of the dam would be present in any public discourse in Bangladesh about the dam. Civil society and ethnic groups in Manipur have also criticised the construction of the dam. Water resource experts in Bangladesh believe that the country would face a monumental environmental crisis once the dam is commissioned. These experts are of the opinion that the construction of the dam on Barak River would seriously limit water available in Surma and Kushyara Rivers in Bangladesh. They also point out that these two rivers and their distributaries support agriculture, irrigation, navigation, drinking
water supply, fisheries, wildlife in Sylhet Division and in peripheral areas of Dhaka Division and industries like fertilizer, electricity and gas. Concerns expressed in Bangladesh about the Tipaimukh dam needs to be understood within the context of the country’s bitter experience of serious water shortage and other impacts after the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage in 1975 over the Ganges River in India. In the past, this issue had seriously undermined the relations between India and Bangladesh. However, in 1996 both countries signed a treaty on the Ganges River (Crow 1981; Hossain 1981; Hossain 1998). Despite the agreement, the continuous environmental effects of the controlled river are devastating in the greater part of Western Bangladesh, and reportedly, water supply is not available according to the agreement in most part of the year. The construction of Tipaimukh dam is most likely to have severe negative environmental impacts on North-eastern parts of the country and has the potential to seriously undermine not only the country’s relations with India but also the efforts of Bangladesh government to find solutions to the country’s national security problems within the framework of a comprehensive security framework.

This paper adopts a revised version of Muthiah Alagappa’s model for considering national security questions (Alagappa 1998: 16). It is argued in this paper that the construction of Tipaimukh dam and its impact on the country is best explained as part of the country’s non-traditional security threats. The “fragile” nature of Bangladesh State not only enhances the non-traditional security threats of the country but also complicates the efforts of the country to deal with those threats.1)

1) Bangladesh (it shares this position with Yemen) is ranked 18th on the Failed States Index published by Foreign Policy journal. However, it needs to be mentioned that Bangladesh is categorized as “in danger” of failing. It fared badly on the following criteria: demographic pressure, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, and economic decline, delegitimaization of the State, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention. For details see “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy (July-August 2009): 80-93.
Robert Zoellick defines a fragile state as the one possessing the following characteristics: ineffective government, existence of poverty and presence of conflict (Zoellick 2008-2009). In this sense, Bangladesh, a country of more than 140 million people, can be considered a fragile state. Since the creation of the country in 1971 successive governments in Bangladesh have been unable to carry out some of the core functions of the State, e.g. providing enough pure water, electricity, sewerage, employment, health care, and security to the majority of its population. In spite of the positive impact of micro-finance on the alleviation of poverty in Bangladesh, half of the country’s population still lives in poverty. This state of affairs threatens the social stability of the country. Conflict in the country may not be as endemic as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia but Bangladesh suffers from prevalent political and social conflicts. In addition to the characteristics of a fragile state laid down by Zoellick, Bangladesh also suffers from a “sovereignty gap” (Ghani and Lockhart 2008) – an ever-widening gap between the State’s capacity to govern by law and its capacity to provide for the needs of the people in practice. Worse still, Bangladesh also runs a higher risk of conflict because of low and stagnant incomes, high unemployment and ineffective governance. In short, Bangladesh is in the midst of a number environmental, economic and political crises and the construction of the Tipaimukh dam in India could bring about such devastating environmental impacts in the country that it, together with those just mentioned, could potentially undermine the long-term national stability thereby threatening its national security (Barthwal-Datta 2009). The construction of the dam has led to a public debate in Bangladesh increasing the “sovereignty gap”. Also, the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam, just like the construction of the Farakka Barrage in the past, has appeared as a divisive issue between Bangladesh and India.
This paper, first of all, deals with the changing concept of security. Then the article considers the notion of security within Bangladesh context. The paper also explains the impact of the construction of Tipaimukh Dam on Bangladesh. It also assesses the impact of the construction of the dam on relations between Bangladesh and India. Finally, in the conclusion, some recommendations are made about resolving the Tipaimukh Dam dispute between India and Bangladesh over the issue.

The Changing Concept of Security in International Relations

The term “national security” was first reportedly used by James Forrestal, President Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Navy and later, President Truman’s Secretary of Defence, in testimony before the US Senate in the mid-1940s. The initial stage of development of national security studies was dominated, and its agenda set by American scholars, who espoused political realism. Its agenda reflected chiefly Washington’s concerns for protecting its territorial integrity, and sovereignty from military attacks from the Soviet Union. Based on this tradition, most of the early studies reflected these concerns and concentrated on how to defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from external attacks. This became known as the traditional school in national security studies.

As the following discussion shows, national security studies, however, gradually began to attract academics concerned not only with the security issues of the United States but also those of other countries including the Third World. These works questioned the wisdom of applying the traditional school’s model to analyse the security problems of most of the Third World countries. The result
has been the development of an enriched subject of study, which came to be known as the revisionist school of national security.

The traditionalist group of scholars believes that the study of national security concerns only the study of the threat, use and control of military force. They highlight the importance of protection of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against any external military threat. The revisionists, however, view the issues of national security beyond merely military terms. They point out that the accelerated globalization of the world economy, revolutionary advances in communications and transport, secessionist pressures, and environmental, health, and demographic trends are all viewed as undermining the state’s “traditional” capabilities and authority as never before (Rosso 1995: 179). Therefore, their national security needs are required to be looked at very differently from those under the traditional approach. Why do the revisionists emphasize such non-traditional factors of national security?

The foremost reason for this is the fact that “national security” was previously unabashedly state-centric in its orientations. Since state-centric, the traditional notion emphasized the protection of core values of the state from external military aggression.2) The traditionalists argue in favour of the primacy of military security as a goal of nation states (Buzan 1991: 5). Since power is the essence of security and since the military might is of the highest priority for

2) At least one author forcibly argues that states do not have a history of having effective control over its territory, economy, politics, and the environment. Therefore, he challenges the notion that the emphasis on the non-traditional factors of national security is a new development. However, he could not show that the policymakers took these into consideration. In other words, he agreed that traditionally the policymakers considered national security issues from the military point of view. For details see Rosso Jr. 1995: 175-208.
achieving security, military and power is linked. The traditionalists believe that
the international political system is anarchic, and that military security and
survival should, therefore, supersede goals such as environmental sustainability.
Security studies are therefore defined as the study of threat, use, and control of
military force. Therefore, traditionalists favour discriminating against non-
military issues in matters of security. Based on realist worldview, the
traditionalist argument holds that nation-state is the ultimate unit of analysis,
defending itself in an anarchic, self-help system.

A growing number of intellectuals challenged this orthodoxy and suggested that
security could not be contained within the narrow confines of any one state. In
particular, they pointed out that the traditional emphasis on the external military
security dimension was problematic for analyzing national security issues of
most of the Third World states. In the late 1950s, John Herz successfully
demonstrated the problems of applying Western standards to analyse non-
Western states (Herz 1959: 1976). He stressed that with their artificially
established borders, (as in Africa) that ignored ethnic and tribal claims and their
lack of administrative control and cohesion, it was unrealistic to attempt to create
these newly independent entities in the image of a Western ideal. Later, Barry
Buzan, Edward E. Azar and Mohammed Ayoob convincingly demonstrated that

3) Morgenthau argues that elements such geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity are important
for determining the power of a nation because they contribute to military preparedness. See
Morgenthau, 1948: 121.

4) While Stephen Walt (1991: 212) argues that military power is not the only danger that states face, he
argues that "statecraft" - which includes diplomacy and crisis management - is also part of security
studies, Kenneth Waltz (1979: 104 & 113) argues that because of state of war, and thus the occurrence
of violence, is inherent to the state of nature, states must stand ready to use force to defend themselves.
Mearsheimer (1992: 217) argues that military competition between states sometimes leads to war, has
been the defining feature of international politics.
one needs to look beyond state-centric notion of national security (Azar and Moon 1981; Ayoob 1986; Buzan 1991).

In the 1960s and 1970s the “new professional” officers of many Latin American armies also became aware of the importance of one of the important non-traditional elements of national security of a state – its economic dimension. They argued that national security was the end result of a total process of development. These officers took over power from civilian political leaders arguing that the former were failing to bring about rapid socio-economic development and thus, were endangering the security of the state (Maniruzzaman 1989: 15).

Brian Job identifies three key lines of argument in different writings on national security studies. First, these point out the problem of the weak nature of states of the Third World. Many states are in need of social, economic, and political cohesions. They also lack the capacities to provide basic services like health, and education to their people. Their studies, therefore, strongly argue that, among others, chronic internal political and economic instability in many states in the Third World seriously undermine their national security. Consequently, Job points out that the security dilemma for the typical Third World states arises in meeting internal rather than external threats, and for the typical Third World citizens, it could well involve seeking protection from their own state institutions (Job 1992: 12).

Second, Job emphasizes what he describes as the paradox of state territorial borders. Most of these borders are products of these states’ colonial past. The colonial powers had drawn the boundaries, not in the interest of the colonized people but for those of their own. Consequently, these borders, especially those
in Africa, were arbitrarily drawn, dividing tribes, ethnic groups, and sometimes-even nations. Therefore, in their post-colonial days, many Third World states were faced with problems like irredentism and secessionist movements. The Biafran crisis (1967-70), an attempt by the Christian-dominated Northern Nigeria to secede from the rest of Nigeria, is a case in point. This attempt by the Northerners of Nigeria would have succeeded, had it not been for poor international support for the secessionists and support for the federal Nigerian government, in particular, the British and Russian military assistance to the Federal Nigerian government.

In order to minimise the threat of break-up of these states, and increase the chances of inter-state conflicts, sometimes, those states, like those in Africa, undertook not to change the continent’s boundaries drawn by the colonial powers. Even then, Africa is not immune to inter-state border conflicts. The crises during the 1990s in Rwanda, the Sudan, Somalia, the Congo, are good examples of some post-colonial, African societies suffering from their colonial legacies.

Job’s assertion that most of these post-colonial states had many of their security concerns thrust onto them by their former colonial masters is probably true. But his (Job 1992: 12) assertion, (by way of quoting Migdal) that during the Cold War, not a single Third World state disappeared from the map, does not seem to be well-supported by empirical evidence. For example, on 9 August 1965, the peaceful separation of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation happened. This separation came about in the aftermath of a bitter political crisis between the then Singapore Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, and the Malaysian Federal Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The classic case of break-up of a Third World country as a result of internal economic, political and ethnic diversities is that of Pakistan in 1971. Perhaps, this is the only successful case of secession by an
armed struggle by the majority population, (Bengalis constituted 56% of Pakistan) of a state from its parent country in the twentieth century.

Third is the recognition of the impact of the Cold War security order in the Third World. Job identifies different viewpoints among the authors, concerning the nature and duration of the effect that superpower management had on the Third World. For Barry Buzan, regional security complexes and the indigenous conflict patterns within them were overlaid by the global designs and competition of the East and West core security complexes. The result was rather curious: sometimes it would lead to enhancement/provocation and sometimes to inhibition/insulation of some conflicts. Buzan provides the Angolan civil war as one example of the enhancement of a conflict as a result of the involvement by the U.S., South Africa, and Cuba. The Afghan crisis, which began with the Soviet invasion of that country in 1980, took a turn for the worse with the involvement of regional and extra-regional states. The result was a bitter civil war for more than twenty years. The Americans are trying to contain the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Barry Buzan’s work was followed by a growing body of empirical, descriptive work, much of it concentrating on apparent manifestations of Third World security problems. Notable among them were Buzan and Rizvi, and Ayoob, which highlighted regional conflicts and their management; the militarization of Third World, superpower interests and involvement in the Third World, and the use of ethnic and religious movements challenging the established state order.

The majority of these works point out that while some countries probably do indeed have external dimensions to their security concerns, the majority of these states like India, Pakistan, the former Soviet Union, the states emerging following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the former Republic of
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Indonesia, Cambodia etc. suffer from threats emanating from within their territories. It is to be noted that most of these states suffer from chronic political, economic, ethnic, environmental problems.

India, for example, has long been suffering from secessionist movements in its different parts. The well-documented “Khalistan” movement in the Punjab or the “Nagaland” movements in northeast India are cases in point. The armed insurgency in Kashmir since 1989 also threatens the ‘unity’ of India. The economic imbalance between West and East Pakistan, and Pakistan’s inability to develop a viable political system was partially responsible for its break-up in 1971. The failure of that country’s politico-military elite to develop an effective political system made it extremely difficult to adequately respond to the Bengalis’ demand for autonomy. Islamabad refused to accept the results of elections held in 1970, which gave the majority of the seats of the National Assembly to the Awami League (AL). On 25th March 1971, Islamabad’s politico-military elite launched a military campaign (known as Operation Searchlight) to sniff out the political aspirations of the Bengalis. Facing almost complete annihilation the Bengalis of East Pakistan found no other alternative but to resist the Pakistanis by launching an armed struggle and establish Bangladesh.

The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, not because of any external aggression, but partially due to the political and economic mess created by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The communist state of the Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart as the ethnic “solidarity”, so brutally artificially created by the long rule of President Josef Tito, broke apart. Rwanda and Somalia became victims of ethnic strife, which were accentuated by mass internal migration brought about by prolonged periods of drought and other natural calamities. Afghanistan
(1996-2001) under the Taliban, present yet another interesting example. Led by Mullah Umar, and under the Taliban rule, Afghanistan was more or less taken over by the Saudi dissident Usama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda group. Muslims, who became well-known as the *Mujahedeens* from the Arab countries, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia also joined them. Thus, the Afghan indigenous national leadership in Kabul was effectively taken over by key foreign figures like Usama bin Laden. They set up training camps, and coordinated their worldwide campaign against the Americans. So, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., Afghanistan became the target of the American military campaign, which, not only included a sustained air campaign but also the landing of American, British, and American special forces. Despite the early boasts of the Taliban, it failed to protect Afghanistan from the external military attack launched by the coalition forces, led by the U.S. By the end of December 2001, the Taliban leadership was replaced with a government led by Mr. Hamid Karzai. The coalition military forces of the US, Britain, and the NATO are still fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The emphasis on non-traditional security issues should not give the impression that the significance of the military as an issue in national security should now be abandoned. In fact, many national security issues, such as the protection of core national values from external military aggression, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional political and military stability, are relatively consistent with the past national security concerns and practices. Non-traditional challenges, however, command increased attention. Concerns such as internal political, and economic stability, environmental degradation, trans-state criminal organizations, terrorism, and migration of people deserve much more close attention.
Admittedly, the non-traditional threats to national security are diverse, but they do have some features in common. First, they are not state-centred. They are sub-national or trans-state in character. Second, these challenges have no geographic focus. Third, these challenges cannot be managed by traditional defence policies alone. Finally, these new challenges suggest that individuals as well as states are endangered.

Lester Brown, President of the WorldWatch Institute, was among the first few scholars to link non-military phenomena to a prevailing notion of security (Brown, 1977). His paper *Redefining National Security* published in 1977 sparked off a lively debate on the subject. Brown had a long list of new security threats: climatic change, soil erosion, food shortages, and deforestation. In 1983 Richard Ullman attempted to take up Brown’s advocacy by adding such non-military phenomena as epidemics, floods, droughts, and earthquakes to the Brown list published in 1977 (Ullman 1983: 123-129).

In 1992, it was confidently thought that the cornerstones of the post-World War II international system had been rearranged or altogether removed with the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the reuniting of Germany (Job 1992: 12). Unfortunately, as the September terrorist attacks on the US; the chiefly American military assault on Afghanistan; the economic crisis and ethnic strife in Indonesia; the Bosnian crisis; the Kosovo crisis; the Macedonian crisis etc., have shown, even after a decade of the end of the Cold War, the full implications of these changes on any revised order for the rest of the world, in particular, for the countries of the Third World, and their security dilemmas still remain puzzling and less apparent. However, one thing was for sure, in the post-Cold War era, as more and more states started to suffer from increased number of ethnic clashes, go through
economic crisis, more and more authors forayed into discussion on various elements of the non-traditional security. As these issues clearly showed that the security scene was no longer dominated by the nuclear standoff between the US and the Soviet Union, therefore, it was undoubtedly considered a good time to continue the debate led by the revisionists.

Jessica Matthew, Vice-President of World Resources Institute, set the tone of the discussion in 1989 by publishing an updated version of Ullman’s “Redefining Security” (Matthews 1989: 162-177). Matthew’s piece, which served as a model for a number of similarly themed essays, established a far-ranging agenda of security concerns that expanded on earlier warnings that mankind is rapidly altering the basic physiology of the planet (Rosso 1995). In the ensuing years, in addition to the analyses of the changing security environment by such well-established authors as Zbigniew Brezezinski (1992: 31-49), Stanley Hoffmann (1990: 115-122), Henry Kissinger (1989: 1-20), James Schlesinger (1991-1992: 3-24), and Theodore Sorenson (1990:1), there now appeared the works of a younger and diverse group of new security analysts, including Peter Gleick (1991), Michael Klare (1992), Ronnie Lipshutz (1992), and Joseph Romm, among many others, who challenged the traditional orthodoxies and mind set. While acknowledging the salience of non-military aspects of security, some of these studies, as stressed before in this chapter, insisted that the danger of war was still important.

As a way to bring these non-traditional security issues to the people some popular news weeklies, such as Time, entered the scene. In early 1992 Time sponsored a conference on security in Singapore. Eight security experts from Southeast Asia gathered there to discuss the national security issues affecting their countries in the post-Cold War era. They ranked domestic political
instability as their number one security concern for the Southeast Asian countries (Walsh 1992: 10-17). They also identified economics as the “central struggle” of the East and Southeast Asian states in the post-Cold War era. Despite the very high likelihood of the old feuds – such as a war between North and South Korea, an armed takeover of Taiwan by China, a free-for-all over South China Sea’s potentially oil-flush Spratly Islands – off East and Southeast Asia being played out, it is significant that the experts gathered in Singapore singled out trade – an important economic factor – as one very significant part of the security scene in East and Southeast Asia (ibid.: 12).

A separate panel discussion on security in South Asia was organized by *Time* in New Delhi (Desmond 1992: 18-21). There, fifteen security experts drawn from India, Pakistan, and the U.S. met to analyse the regional security issues. Like their Southeast Asian counterparts, the security experts assembled in New Delhi also expressed their profound anxieties for internal threats facing the South Asian countries. For example, Mr. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, an associate editor of *The Times of India*, argued that the single biggest threat to India and Pakistan was internal rebellion (ibid.: 18). His comments rang some truth.

In India nearly half a million members of the various security forces including the Indian Army have been deployed in Kashmir since 1989 to crush an armed insurgency, some of whom having links in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Also, the Indian Army had been deployed in the Punjab and Assam to suppress well-armed guerrilla separatist groups. Pakistan faces fewer organized movements but the province of Sind has at times been almost ungovernable because of ethnic conflicts involving the *Muhajirs* and the locals. The provinces of Sind and Punjab are also suffering from Shiite-Sunni conflict. Policy-makers in Islamabad have always voiced their concerns about the presence of more than
2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These refugees have been blamed, among others, for drug and trafficking and gunrunning, accentuating the local inter-ethnic feuds in Sind. The prospect of return to Pakistan of thousands of Pakistani Taliban soldiers, after the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, was a prospect much dreaded by the policy-makers in Islamabad. These former Taliban soldiers who were later joined by Central Asians now threaten the very existence of Pakistan. They have made it very difficult for Islamabad to convince the international community that it was doing its best to curb terrorism.

Since the end of the Cold War, in addition to the economic aspects of national security debate, environmental issues have also received special attention. This is, however, not to suggest that the environmental aspects of national security developed only after the end of the Cold War. Simon Dalby (1992: 25) rightly noted that the resource dimensions of security were clearly put forward in the U.S. in the 1970s in response to the 1973 oil crisis (Schultz 1973; Krasner 1978; Lipschultz 1989).

In late 1970s Dennis Pirages (1978) wrote about eco-politics as the new agenda for international relations. As pointed out earlier in this paper, Lester Brown attempted to redefine national security to include environmental themes. In the late 1980s, well before the holding of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, the articulation of security language with environmental themes had heightened attention, at least in the U.S., to the environmental dimension of global politics (Dalby 1992: 26). For example, in 1989 Jessica Tuchman Matthew argued that the concept of security needed to be extended to encompass resource availability questions as well as more broadly understood environmental issues.
Since then a number of works have been published linking environmental issues to national security (Helman 1990; Fairclough 1991; Renner 1989; Brown 1989; Myers 1989). Themes covered by these are varied. Some have highlighted the impacts of military actions on the environment, the dangers of environmental change as a potential cause of conflict. Others have argued that food issues and water conflicts might undermine the safety of populations and governments in the future. The assumption in all these works is that global environmental changes challenge both states and populations in new ways. National security threats are not only military, or economic, but now are related to environmental change.

Environmental security represents a significant departure from traditional approach to national security because it addresses two distinct issues (Porter 1995: 218). First, environmental security approach tries to identify the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts. Second, environmental security assesses the impact of global environment on the well being of societies and economies. Therefore, one could argue, “more broadly, environmental security is concerned with any threat to the well-being of societies and their populations … [And] that [it] can be influenced by public policies.” (Porter 1995: 218). Ecological issues are therefore likely to gain pre-eminence on the political agenda as opposed to military matters.

**National Security in the Bangladesh Context**

A Bangladeshi political commentator once expressed his dissatisfaction with what he considered to be the “kindergarten” level of the “emerging” discussion in Bangladesh on its national security issues (Hafiz 1999: 2). Perhaps it was too harsh a comment on the state of academic discourse in Bangladesh on that
state’s national security issues. However, it cannot be denied that in the past, very little attention was paid by the academic community in Bangladesh and abroad to issues affecting the national security of Bangladesh. But this overall state of affairs on the discussion on national security issues of Bangladesh should not suggest that this subject matter was entirely overlooked by the academic community. Since the independence of the country in 1971, they have been writing, either directly or indirectly, on various aspects of national security of Bangladesh. For example, as early as in 1972, Professor Trevor Ling, a British author, dealt with the political and economic viability – two important elements of national security – of the newly independent country (Ling 1972: 221-230). Later in 1979, Christopher Bateman, a Canadian, dealt with the same theme and analysed some of the factors affecting Bangladesh’s national security within the context of the country’s nation building process (Bateman 1979: 780-788).

Many works have been published on various aspects of foreign policy of Bangladesh, and very few of them, if any, either directly or indirectly, deals with issues concerning the country’s national security. It is no exaggeration to suggest that most of the works on Bangladesh foreign policy almost exclusively deal with the country’s relations with the rest of the world (Bateman 1979: 780-788; Shelly 1981; Abbas 1984; Ahamed 1984). It was not until the late eighties and nineties that some attempts were made to explore the national security issues of the country.5) The Bangladeshi national institution that has played a leading role

in opening up public discussion on security studies of the country is the military
of the country. For example, since 1998, The Defence Services Staff and
Command College (DSSC), located in Dhaka, have been organizing series of
seminars on the national security of Bangladesh. Though primarily aimed at the
officers of the Bangladesh military, these seminars, nevertheless, provided an
excellent forum for the seminar speakers and participants; drawn from home and
abroad, to engage in free, frank and systematic discussion on various aspects,
previously considered “off-limits” to the public, on the national security of
Bangladesh. It remains a matter of speculation as to why the country’s armed
forces had decided in 1998-99, to open up discussions on the national security
issues of the country. The following may be advanced as Bangladesh military’s
primary reasons for conducting those seminars:

- To learn lessons from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
  Yugoslavia;
- To make itself relevant to deal with similar situations if they should
  arise in Bangladesh;
- To make the Bangladesh armed forces relevant to an ever changing
  situation where the internal dimensions of national security issues
  were becoming increasingly important;
- To tap the expertise of the Bangladesh academic community - at home
  and abroad - in dealing with the national security issues of
  Bangladesh;
- To open up discussion on national security issues within the country
  under the direction of the country’s military; and,
- To make itself relevant to a rapidly democratizing political system of
  the country, which began in 1991, with the election of a civilian
  government replacing a military dominated system of government,
which was in place since 1975.

As stated earlier, this paper adopts a revised version of Muthiah Alagappa’s model for considering national security questions (Alagappa 1998: 16). Unlike Alagappa, who makes a strong case for considering the security of the people rather than the state as the referent, this study takes into consideration both the state and the people as the referent for analysing national security of Bangladesh. In other words, this study emphasizes that for the sake of the security of Bangladesh, both the state and the people need to be secured. There are mainly two reasons for taking such a position. First, the nature of state is weak in Bangladesh. In a formal sense, the state appears strong but in reality, the state is riddled with inefficiency, nepotism, corruption, and widespread violence, a political culture dominated by political goons, an ineffective parliament, and a judiciary, which though formally separated from the executive, is yet to develop as an independent institution. All these have clearly hindered the ability of the state to function properly and provide efficient service to the people. Therefore, the state needs to be secured. Second, the security of the people of Bangladesh needs also to be assured. Bangladesh has a history of its state structures being used by the government to come down hard on its critics and opposition political parties. The notorious Special Power Act (1974) has been used by successive governments in Dhaka to harass and jail critics of the government.

Iftekharuzzaman describes the Bangladeshi approach to security in the following manner: “Bangladesh’s national security issues are addressed from a classic realist perspective. The emphasis is on national strength and self-reliance – and hence on the building of strong and vibrant national economy and polity. This approach is complemented by a well-integrated military establishment capable of defending national independence and territorial integrity until international
support can be mobilised” (Iftekharuzzaman 1998: 331). This statement points toward the dominance of the realist school of thought in security considerations of Bangladesh. But by including the economic and political factors in security consideration, Iftekharuzzaman also admits the importance of non-traditional elements of the country’s security considerations. This argument is further strengthened when Iftekharuzzaman calls for adoption of diplomacy in gaining international support against the external enemy.

Talukdar Maniruzzaman, a noted political scientist of Bangladesh, also views the country’s national security from a traditional approach. He views the threat to the country from its external environment. He is more direct than any other Bangladeshi author to identify who the external enemy is for his country. Talukdar identifies what he describes as the “expansionist designs” of the Indian leadership as the main threat to Bangladesh (Maniruzzaman 2001: 94). Although by this he implicitly tries to distinguish between the Indian state and its leadership, in his discussion Talukdar does not really make any distinction between the two. Like Iftekharuzzaman, Talukdar also underscores the weakness of the military to safeguard the security of the country from external attacks. Though he does not state it clearly, Professor Talukdar also seems to be aware of the need to look into the non-traditional elements of security when one looks at his suggestions for dealing with the security of Bangladesh.

Keenly aware of the military weakness of the country, Professor Talukdar recommends two methods to secure Bangladesh’s national security. The first method suggested by him is what he describes as the total defence. By this, he

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6) The concept of total defence is applied in Singapore. It has five dimensions: military, social, political, economic and psychological.
recommends providing military training to every able-bodied man and woman of the country – a citizens’ army *a la* Israel and Singapore. This method certainly does not fall within the purview of the traditional way for dealing with the security of a state. Among others, the traditional way calls for the creation and maintenance of a standing army armed with modern weapons systems. Unlike the non-traditional method for dealing with the security, a conventional way calls for the creation of a deterrent against an external enemy. Therefore, the emphasis is on the development of weapons including nuclear and not on the creation of a citizens’ army. The second method suggested by Professor Talukdar for Bangladesh to improve its security is to enter into an alliance with any other external nuclear power. This is an example of the use of diplomacy, which, in the absence of any possibility of development of nuclear weapons by Bangladesh, should be considered as Bangladesh’s deterrent against any external enemy. These suggestions are certainly not from a traditional perspective to security. Given this context the traditional approach to consider Bangladesh’s national security issues can be questioned. As a Third World country, it is important for us to consider the non-traditional elements of national security of Bangladesh.

As pointed out previously, in addition to considering national security in military terms (the traditional approach), there is a strong need to consider the non-traditional (the revisionist school) elements of security of a state. For example, Barry Buzan noted that for weaker states the referent object for national security is harder to define, and the primarily external orientation of the concept gives way to an increasingly domestic agenda of threats (Buzan, 1989, p. 18). A question may be raised whether such emphasis on domestic (non-traditional) sources of threats to national security of a weak, developing country like Bangladesh is logical. There is no doubt that firm answers to this
question leads to awkward dilemmas either way. On the one hand, if domestic threats are accepted as a national security problem, then the government is provided with a powerful tool to legitimize the use of force against its domestic political opposition. Given this context, a series of questions may be raised: is it really correct to see the opposition to unpopular dictators like Somoza, Marcos, Duvalier, Ayoob, and Ershad as part of the national security problems of Nicaragua, the Philippines, Haiti, Pakistan and Bangladesh? In cases such as these, the use of a narrower concept of state security might help to avoid the ambiguities raised by the broader social and political content of national security. On the other hand, if domestic threats emanating from, among others, social, political, economic, and environment are not considered as part of the national security problem, serious difficulties arise. Such an approach can explain the disintegration of Pakistan (1971), the Soviet Union (1991), and Yugoslavia (1992). Further, the anarchy in Somalia, and the Sudan, the never-ending civil wars in Afghanistan, the separatist movements led by the Muslim militants in Kashmir, the independence movement in the Basque region of Spain, and the secessionist attempt by the Muslims of Chechnya are but a few examples that vividly show the importance of considering the domestic threats to national security. A weak government burdened with inefficiency, corruption, inexperience and lacking political vision would have great difficulty in meeting those challenges to national security. Therefore, Barry Buzan has no hesitation in including the congenital weakness of a government as a major source of threat to national security of a state. He maintains that the congenital weakness of the government brings into question the integrity, and even the existence, of the state, and therefore has to be regarded as a national security issue.
Environmental Impacts of Construction of Tipaimukh Dam on Bangladesh

Before we undertake an analysis of the impact of the construction Tipaimukh Dam on Bangladesh, the river systems of the country need to be explained. Numbering about 700, the rivers of Bangladesh are considered the life of the people. These rivers generally flow south to the Bay of Bengal. These rivers serve as the main source of water for agriculture and serve as the principal arteries for transportation. These rivers also provide with fish, which is an important source of protein for the people of Bangladesh.

The river systems of the country consist of five major networks. First is the Jamuna-Brahmmaputra system. It is nearly 292 kilometres long and extends from northern Bangladesh to its confluence with the Padma (as the Ganges is known in Bangladesh). Originating as the Yarlung Zangbao Jiang in China’s Tibet, Jamuna flows through the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, where it is known as the Brahmaputra (“Son of Brahma). It becomes known as the Jamuna when it meets Teesta River in Bangladesh.

The Padma-Ganges is the second river network. It is divided into two sections: a 258 kilometre segment known as the Ganges. It extends from the western border with India to its confluence with the Jamuna about 72 kilometres west of Dhaka. The other segment, about 126 kilometres in length, and known as the Padma runs from the Ganges-Jamuna confluence to where it joins the Meghan River in Chandpur. The Padma-Ganges is the central part of a deltaic river system with literally hundreds of rivers flowing through generally east and west into the Padma.
The third river network system is the Surma-Meghna system, which passes through the north-eastern border with India to Chandpur where it joins the Padma. Nearly 670 kilometres in length, the Surma-Meghna, by itself is the longest river in Bangladesh. It is formed by the union of six lesser rivers. The fourth river network is the one when the Padma and Meghna join together and flows 145 kilometres to the Bay of Bengal. These four river networks flowing through Bangladesh drains an area of nearly 1.5 million square kilometres.

A firth river system is the Karnaphuli. It is not connected to the other four river networks and flows through the Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts. It cuts across the hills and then empties itself into the Bay of Bengal. The main rivers of this region are the Feni, Karnaphuli, Sangu, and Matamuhuri. The port of Chittagong is located on the banks of the Karnaphuli River. The Karnaphuli Dam and Bangladesh’s only hydroelectric project is located here.

The Tipaimukh Multipurpose Hydroelectric Project is to be constructed over Barak River in Manipur, India, (see Map 1) with a firm generation capacity of nearly 402 MW. The main objective of the construction of project is to generate 1500 MW hydropower and flood control on an area of 2039 sq. km. of Manipur State. The North Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO) was created to undertake the project with the Manipur Government at 5% equity till it was replaced recently by National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC).
The proposed construction of the Tipaimukh dam has drawn criticism from environmentalists from both India and Bangladesh. In Manipur, where the dam is to be built, the environmental concerns are based on two aspects. First, concerns have been expressed about the displacement of people from the affected areas, loss of biodiversity, loss of economic activities of indigenous peoples, social impacts. The second concern is the absence of holistic impact assessment and limitations of developmental and environmental regulations, weak enforcement mechanisms, and lack of people oriented accountability norms and thirdly, unclear benefits of the project to the people of Manipur and nuances based on traumatic experiences from similar projects in Manipur such as NHPC’s 105 MW Loktak Multipurpose Hydroelectric Project (NHPC) which remains irresponsible and unaccountable for its devastation of Loktak wetlands ecosystem, submergence of vast tract of agricultural land, loss of species and failure to rehabilitate several thousands of affected peoples of Manipur even after nearly three decades of project commissioning in 1984. The NHPC further insisted on reaping more profits by filing Loktak project as Clean Development
Mechanisms project for carbon credits under Kyoto Protocols of the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change.

A large number of Zeliangrong and Hmar tribes will be displaced permanently and deprived of livelihood. Official figures states 1,461 Hmar families will be directly displaced due to the project. The dam will submerge 311 sq. km covering 90 villages with 1,310 families, including 27,242 hectares of forest and cultivable land and posing serious threat to the rich biodiversity, flora and fauna of the region. Social impact due to demographic changes due to migration of workers from outside Manipur has not been addressed. The site selected for Tipaimukh project is one of the most active in the entire world, recording at least two major earthquakes of 8+ in the Richter scale during the past 50 years. The dam is envisaged for construction in one of the most geologically unstable area and the dam axis falls on a ‘fault line’ potentially epicenters for major earthquakes.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Manipur and the NEEPCO was signed on 9 January 2003 even as the affected peoples both in the upstream and downstream of Barak River called for a wide consultation on Tipaimukh Dam based on provision of project information. Against peoples' wishes, the Minister of Power of India, Mr. Sushil Kumar Shinde laid the foundation stone for Tipaimukh Dam on 15 December 2006. Of late, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) of the Government of India accorded environmental clearance on 24 October 2008, despite peoples' objection to Tipaimukh Dam during the projects’ five public hearings held during 2004-2008. The environmental clearance of MOEF is despite the fact that the downstream impact assessment of the project in Assam and Bangladesh is still pending. Notwithstanding serious lack of information, Detailed Project
Report (DPR) and Environmental Impact assessment and management plans of the dam, the Government of India floated international tenders inviting bids for construction of the project. Largely, the Government of India relies on militarization of dam site area and suppression of voices for fair decision making process and sustainable development to pursue construction of the dam.

All over the world, the ever-increasing demand for fresh water has propelled the construction of dams and barrages on international rivers, and it is reported that 60% of the world's largest rivers have been interrupted by the artificial structures. Many of them were built in agreement with riparian countries, and about 200 treaties are now in force for the management of common water resources. But Tipaimukh dam is not one of them. According to a study carried out by UNESCO, fresh water is getting scarce. The study reveals that the average supply of water is expected to fall by one-third within 20 years. Nearly 7 billion people could face water shortages by 2020, and global warming may cause severe water shortages in 50 countries. South Asia is one of the regions to be adversely affected, partly because of melting of the Himalayan glaciers due to global warming.

Bangladeshi water resource specialists point out that the construction of Tipaimukh dam would lead to drought and environmental degradation in Bangladesh. It would cause the Surma and Kushiara Rivers to run dry during November-May, which would eventually hamper agriculture, irrigation and navigation. It is also likely to lead to a shortage of supply of drinking water by decreasing ground water levels.

According to water resources experts, any interference in the normal flow of water in the Barak River would have an adverse effect on the Surma River in
Bangladesh which, in turn, feeds the Meghna River that flows through Bangladesh. The construction of Tipaimukh dam would hamper the cultivation of early variety of *boro* rice in the north-eastern part of Bangladesh. There is also a projection that arable land will decrease and production of crops will fall, leading to an increase in poverty. According to an estimate made by Bangladesh and Indian water resources experts, approximately 7 to 8 percent of the total water of Bangladesh is obtained from the Barak River. Millions of people are dependent on hundreds of water bodies fed by the Barak in the Sylhet region in Bangladesh for fishing and agricultural activities.

A dam-break is a catastrophic failure of a dam which results in the sudden draining of the reservoir and a severe flood wave that causes destruction and in many cases death downstream. If the Tipaimukh Dam were to break, impounding billions of cubic meters of water, it would cause catastrophic floods because of its colossal structure. According to Dr. Soibam Ibotombi, a lecturer of Earth Sciences at Manipur University, the north-eastern part of India is one of the highest earthquake-prone areas in the world due to its tectonic setting as well as collision plate convergence. Analysis has revealed that hundreds of earthquakes have taken place in this region in the last 100-200 years. A study on the trends of earthquakes reveals that earthquakes mostly take place in regions which have experienced earthquakes in the past. The Tipaimukh Dam site has been chosen at the highest risk seismically hazardous zone.

According to these water resources experts in Bangladesh if the Tipaimukh dam is constructed, 16 districts of greater Sylhet will be affected. The immense natural disaster that will take place would be irreplaceable. Even though the Indian government is of the opinion that once the dam is completed, electricity will be generated and Bangladesh will benefit by importing the much needed
electricity. However, it does not make sense to subject certain areas of the country to all kinds of environmental impacts and import electricity from a dam that is the cause of all those.

**Issue of Tipaimukh Dam in Bangladesh-India Relations**

If history is any lesson, the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam is likely to lead to influx of environmental refugees into India, and aggravate relations between Bangladesh and India. For long, India has been complaining about the influx of Bangladeshis into the neighbouring Indian state of Assam. The Indians complain that these Bangladeshis compete with the locals for jobs, and are used as “vote banks” by certain political parties in Assam. In order to stop the influx of Bangladeshis, the Indian authorities have built a fence along Assam-Bangladesh border. A study carried out by Ashok Swain demonstrates that the construction of Farakka Barrage has affected agricultural and industrial production, disrupted domestic water supply, fishing and navigation, and changed the hydraulic character of the Ganges River and ecology of Ganges Delta in the down-stream areas. He argues that these trans-border human-inflicted environmental changes have resulted in the loss of the sources of living of a large population in the south-western part of Bangladesh and have necessitated their migration in pursuit of their survival. The absence of other alternatives in their own country has left no other option for these Bangladeshis but to migrate to different parts of India. The large-scale migration, from the late 1970s, of these Muslim migrants into Hindu-dominated India has culminated in a number of native-migrant conflicts in the receiving society. The Indian state of Assam, which received a large proportion of these migrants, was the first to experience conflict. Conflicts
between natives and migrants now have spread to other parts of India and have become a major issue for politically rising Hindu organisations. Ashok Swain’s study determines that environmental destruction not only creates resource security conflicts, it can also force the people to migrate, thus leading to native-migrant conflicts in receiving society (Swain 1996: 189-204).

Past experience of efforts between Bangladesh and India to resolve water disputes, such as the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of 1996 and the setting up Teesta Commission of 1997, indicates the possibility of two countries converging towards establishing dialogue between the two countries over the Tipaimukh dam. Intervention by the United States envoy to Bangladesh favouring a dialogue to settle the row further reinforces this possibility. In fact, diplomatic engagement between India and Bangladesh over proposed the Tipaimukh Dam has already started, the latest being the two Prime Ministers meeting at NAM summit in Egypt earlier this year. But as in the past negotiations over sharing of common rivers between the two countries have demonstrated, there are important divergent of views over Tipaimukh. India has shown reluctance in sharing data with Bangladesh over the construction of the dam.

Most Bangladeshis view the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam as a national problem. Therefore, they wish the political parties be united on this national problem. However, the two main political parties in Bangladesh the ruling Awami League (AL) and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) are bitterly divided over the Tipaimukh issue. The BNP charges the AL leaders for “abandoning” Bangladesh’s national interests. The AL leaders, on their part accuse the BNP of neglecting the issue while the party was in power. It should be pointed out that the current government in Dhaka has been in power for a few
months whereas the Tipaimukh Dam project is a decade long one. During the BNP regime (2001-2006) the then water minister had met with his Indian counterpart a few times over the issue. But the outcomes of these meetings are not known.

Indeed, Bangladesh Prime Minister called for political unity with the opposition BNP to so that the government can “bargain better with India” over Tipaimukh Dam issue. However, the statement of Mr. Razzak, Bangladesh’s former Minister of Water Resources and the current Chairman of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Water Resources, that Tipaimukh Dam “will not harm Bangladesh” was premature given the fact that there has not been any comprehensive and multilateral impact assessment. The statement seriously negated and undermined the rationale and objectives of Bangladesh Parliamentary delegation’s visit to Tipaimukh dam site in July 2009.

In January 2010, expectations ran high in Bangladesh over Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to New Delhi, India. There was hope that her visit to India would not only make progress towards an understanding on Tipaimukh Dam controversy but also discuss issues related to water-sharing of 54 rivers that run into Bangladesh from India. However, that was not to be. Both countries signed three agreements on terrorism and organised crime, and transfer of convicted prisoners. They also signed two Memorandums of Understanding on cooperation in the power sector and cultural exchange. On Tipaimukh Dam, however, there was no agreement and Bangladesh only got an “assurance” that India would not take any step that would hurt Dhaka’s interest. This was not satisfying at all. India also did not provide any information regarding the Tipaimukh Dam to Bangladesh. These failures very easily reinforce the notion that as a fragile state, Bangladesh is powerless to protect its basic interests.
relating to the construction of Tipaimukh Dam. However, it needs to be mentioned that India offered to provide machinery necessary to Bangladesh to dredge some of the rivers in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to New Delhi in January 2010 did not bring about any agreements on Tipaimukh Dam controversy, and the disagreements over this dam are most likely to cast negative shadow on relations between Bangladesh and India.

Conclusion

The resolution of Tipaimukh dam seriously needs a multilateral, inclusive and human rights based approach to development and sensitivity to the concerns and established rights of all affected peoples.7) Bangladesh government’s decision to send an all-party parliamentary committee to visit Tipaimukh dam site at the end of July 2009 to review the dam’s impact was considered a right step if the visit had formed the basis for an inclusive process to conduct detailed impact assessment of the dam in upstream and downstream of the Barak River based on recommendations of World Commission on Dams, 2000 and other applicable international law on transboundary waters, such as the UN Convention on the Law of Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997. The visit was expected to be a good grounding for a multilateral approach in addressing Tipaimukh Dam issues. However, the visit was marred by controversy even before it left for India. The BNP members of the delegation refused to go as long as the government did not agree to their request of being accompanied by their own water resources experts.

7) For an interesting view about the mechanisms to resolve the water disputes between India and Bangladesh, see Faisal 2002: 309-327.
Bangladesh and the indigenous peoples of India’s North East need to be fully sensitive to the multitude of mega dam projects planned by India in transboundary waters and tributaries and should strategize for a multi-dimensional and multi-party approach in the use and management of transboundary waters with due respect of rights of people in lower riparian areas and indigenous peoples dependent on such waters.

References


WATER, SECURITY, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF TIPAIMUKH DAM 241
PART SIX

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POWER STRUCTURES

CHAPTER 11
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AMIDST THE SINO-JAPANESE STRATEGIC RIVALRY
Renato Cruz De Castro

CHAPTER 12
JAPAN-AUSTRALIA SECURITY RELATIONS: BUILDING A REAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?
Thomas S. Wilkins

CHAPTER 13
ALLIANCE AND ENVIRONMENT SECURITY: COMPARING NATO AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
Tashika Odagiri

CHAPTER 14
NATO’S ROLE IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Klaus Olshausen

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
The traditional perspective on international security encompasses a state’s insecurities, brought about by its vulnerability to other states’ capabilities to do harm especially through the deliberate use of force (Terriff et al. 1999: 39). Other forms of state power (e.g. economic statecraft, intelligence, political warfare, etc.) are deemed important only as far as they contribute to the capacity to inflict physical harm to the government and population. The assessment of a state’s power fundamentally begins with military capability which has the greatest potential to inflict harm on other states through war. Thus, the study of war has been the central focus of both International Relations and Security Studies and is widely accepted as an inevitable feature of inter-state relations. Historically, war has been so prominent in terms of state policy and so costly in the loss of human lives and destruction of properties (Hough 2004: 22).

Empirical studies of war occurrences have shown that the frequency and intensities of conflicts in the 19th and 20th centuries have been influenced by inter-state rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 2000). Interstate rivalry refers to a competitive relationship between two state actors over an issue that is of the
highest salience to them (Vasquez 1993: 75). Rivalry between two political collectivities (generally states) is characterized by sustained and mutually contingent hostile interactions (Ibid: 76). Currently, there are an estimated 28 dyadic rivalries (e.g. Greece-Turkey, Syria-Israel, Thailand-Cambodia, India-Pakistan, North-South Korea, etc.) that began in the 19th century and continue into the 21st century international system (Wayman 2000: 219-34). The one that has the greatest potential to trigger a major regional conflict is the Sino-Japanese rivalry. This is because, like other historic rivalries like Poland-Russia, France-Germany, and Germany-Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Japanese dispute has some of the conflict processes that have generated wars in the past and possibly, even in the near future (Colaresi et al 2007: 107).

Sino-Japanese geo-strategic rivalry in the early 21st century is a result of two developments: the systemic changes occurring in East Asia, and the limited opportunity for sustained and institutionalized security cooperation among the major powers in the region. With its growing political and economic clout, China’s increasing interests and capabilities are slowly eroding the status of the region’s two major status quo powers – the U.S. and Japan. China creatively and incrementally seeks to replace the U.S. as the dominant hegemonic power in East Asia as it slowly transforms itself from a reluctant status quo power into revisionist one. The U.S. and Japan, in turn, are determined to thwart this Chinese ambition and ensure American leadership in East Asia as well as the linchpin of this hegemonic status – the American-Japanese security relations. China’s slow and circumspect modernization of its armed forces, along with its growing economic resources and expanding diplomatic clout, has circumscribed (to a certain degree) American and more significantly, Japanese influence in East Asia. In the long-run, it might even displace the U.S. as key guarantor of regional security. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s did not
unleash the necessary political forces for the institutionalization of cooperative security among the major powers in East Asia. These aforesaid developments, in turn, have accentuated the more than the century-old (beginning in 1894) Sino-Japanese rivalry.

This paper addresses this central question: Focusing on the renewed Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry, how important are the traditional security issues of power structure and transitional dynamics in early 21st century East Asia? What triggers this present strategic rivalry? How is this strategic rivalry reflected in the two major powers’ policy toward Southeast Asia? How is this rivalry waged in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)? And finally, how are the Southeast Asian countries responding to this great power rivalry in East Asia?

**Traditional Security Issues in Early 21st Century East Asia**

As a value in international relations, security is one of the most basic goals of any state in the fluid and complex 21st century international system. States seek for their citizens’ irrefutable and apparent guarantee of safety and well-being, economic assurance and possibly, sociability and regularity of a life lived freely without fear or deprivation. All governments consider security as a universal goal, and a solemn pledge between the people and their political leaders, to whom their comprehensive security is the first duty, the overriding goal of domestic and international policy-making (Burke 2007: 1). In other words, states are searching for the holy grail of comprehensive security that relieves the anxieties of everyday life, the enormous spatial, cultural, social, economic and strategic complexities, and the vagaries of international security governance. In the early
21st century, comprehensive security remains one of the modern states’ most elusive aspirations.

Pursuing this aspiration in the contemporary state system, however, has become more difficult as the term security can now be defined in various ways. These definitions range from the restrictive description based on strategic or military defense (security from war and conquest) to the more broader and inclusive concepts of security that consider a wider range of threats against human lives and individual welfare. The latter category now includes political security (security from extreme political oppression and persecution), economic security (cultural survival and minority rights), and environmental security (security from environmental degradation and disasters) (Kirchner, 2007: 5). Hence, the present predicament in the study and pursuit of security in the post-Cold War era is the absence of consensus on what constitutes security. During the Cold War, the high-politics issues of war and peace, arms build-up, nuclear deterrence and crisis management, summit diplomacy, conventional warfare, state-orchestrated insurgency and political subversion, and alliance formation and alliance were the primary concerns of security analysts and scholars, defense officials, and key political decision-makers. By contrast, the low-politics issues of the environment, climate change, the management of scarce natural resources and the management of global population were rarely considered as credible threats to national security. What mattered then were the survival of the states, the art of their statecraft, their comprehensive power, their conflicts, and given the implications of international anarchy, their insecurities (Terriff et al 1999: 38).

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, shattered the conceptual divide between high-and low-politics issues. Many security analysts and policymakers now believe that non-traditional and low-politics issues should be
placed at the top of national security agendas (Baylis et al 2002: 310). With the threat of global nuclear holocaust receding in the background, marginalized low-politics issues have emerged from the shadow of superpower rivalry and have appeared on the international political/strategic agenda. These diverse, non-traditional, and low-politics security challenges include environmental degradation, climate change, economic crises, the existence and operations of transnational crimes, terrorist networks, and global migration. However, these threats share common features (Terriff et al 1999: 115-116): (a) they are not state-centered security challenges; (b) they have no particular geographic locus; and (c) they cannot be managed or addressed by military means since they pose danger to individuals rather than the states.

The expansion of the security agenda, however, is controversial or contentious. Although security connotes the freedom from threats to the core values of human collectivities, there is a major disagreement on whether the main referent point of security should be the state or society or the individual (Baylis 2008: 229). The thorny issue, however, is whether security should be broadened from the traditional concerns of international anarchy and politico-military conflicts among states to include the non-traditional security issues of economics, crime, terrorism and migration (Terriff et al 1999: 20-22). A common view is that these non-traditional security challenges do not directly threaten the existence of states and are largely outside the control of states’ policies and capabilities. Thus, they can only be addressed more effectively by a community of states cooperating with one another on a functional basis. Arguably, it is more constructive to regard these non-traditional security issues as engineering, public health, or functional problems instead of addressing them using either statecraft or by the strategic approach (Baylis et al 2008: 325-326).
This article maintains the continued relevance of traditional security issues despite broadening the concept of security (McSweeney 1999: 45-67). Expanding the coverage of security will make the term encompassing; dilute the states’ primary task of statecraft, and military and political mobilization, and stifle their focus and ability to confront the most tangible and immediate threat to their existence – inter-state conflicts, political or military interventions by other states, and possibly even conquest (Hough 2007: 7). Moreover, with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, and the unraveling of the global balance of power imposed by the two superpowers, once repressed regional forces such as state-rivalries, economic competition, conventional arms build-up, and low-intensity conflicts have resurfaced.

This is especially true in the case of East Asia where largely intact Westphalian-states are still trapped by the logic of international anarchy (Kirchner 2007: 11). These states remain fixated with the issues of territorial integrity and are relatively unencumbered by norms against the use of military force to resolve their lingering territorial or political disputes among each other. Territoriality is the key characteristic of the Westphalian states and functions as the “hard shell” protecting state and societies from the perceived hostile and potentially dangerous external environment (Ibid: 282). This situation is exacerbated by an East Asian regional security structure that is maintained through a delicate balancing of three major powers – the U.S., Japan, and China. Since early 1990s, these three major powers have pursued their own respective security interests within a thin veneer of a cooperative security framework. The meteoric emergence of China as an economic and a political power in the early 21st century, however, has shaped the discourse on regional security. It has also transformed the regional economy from an imminent Japanese hegemony into a dynamic multilateral competition among Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei.
(Overholt 2008: 127). Furthermore, China’s growing political and military power complicates U.S. predominance in the region, including its ability to fulfill its commitments to allies (like Japan), and others, including Taiwan, and to ensure a balance of power that favors stability or the status quo (Bergstein 2008: 226). Hence, an ascendant China challenges the current distribution of power in East Asia, and, becomes a potential threat to the U.S. and its key Asian ally – Japan (Yahuda 2004: 343).

The Dragon and the Rising Sun in the Early 21st Century

A major development in contemporary East Asia is China’s emergence as a regional economic power. In less than three decades, China transformed its command and slow-growing autarkic economy into a dynamic market-driven one that has become the world’s most formidable exporting juggernaut. The country is now a global economic player responsible for the rapid recovery of East Asian economies after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and an influential major power in the region. Using its booming economy, China metes out trade and other commercial opportunities to draw ASEAN member-countries into its growing political orbit. Through unprecedented foreign policy moves, China projects the image of a newly ascendant power that dispenses economic largesse to East Asian countries. Simultaneously, regional trade flourishes because of the huge Chinese market for industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer exports. Thus, a dynamic economic link has been forged between China’s import growth and increasing exports to its neighboring states. China’s economy is expected to be double the size of the German economy by 2010 and to surpass the Japanese economy, the second largest economy in the world, by
In recent years, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has outperformed other East Asian economic “miracles.” The Chinese economy grew, on the average, by about 10 percent a year during the last 15 years (Keiel 2006: 68).

China advocates a comprehensive national security strategy in which military security is only a component. In fact, it relies on diplomatic and economic means to address its international security concerns, rather than on less relevant military means. By emphasizing non-traditional security concerns, China infuses a sense of shared growth and security community into its overall relations with neighboring states. It also fosters a model of interstate cooperation that enhances collective security for the participating states while not threatening any outside party. The focus on non-traditional security challenges makes the highly militarized/realist American approach to security outdated, and promotes Southeast Asian cooperation in addressing non-military threats at the expense of U.S. influence in the region.

Despite its growing economy and increasing political clout in East Asia, China’s main diplomatic gambit since the mid-1990s is not to openly challenge America’s strategic dominance predicated upon the latter’s well-established system of alliances and forward-deployed forces. Its stratagem involves debunking the basis (the so-called China threat) of these alliances and their obsolete Cold War mental mode. Beijing’s offer of a new regional order and direction became apparent when it began implementing its “New Security Concept (NSC)” in 1998. Premised on cooperative and coordinated security, the NSC proposes neither a pattern of diplomatic-defense relationship with countries that are neither allies nor adversaries of China. According to Beijing, the new concept is well-suited to the new post-Cold War environment characterized by
peace and development but threatened by non-traditional (non-state) security challenges, e.g., transnational crimes, international terrorism, etc. The NSC subtly conveys the idea that American security alliances are from a previous era and are indicative of a Cold War/realpolitik mentality.

The establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005 is the culmination of China’s efforts to advance its NSC in the region. Malaysia initiated the formation of the EAS, but with China’s support and encouragement. The opportune timing of the summit bodes well for China’s ascendency as a major power in East Asia. Although by virtue of its Pacific coast and vast economic and strategic interests, the U.S. has always regarded itself as part of East Asia, the EAS paradoxically excludes Washington. The EAS endeavors to develop an East Asian response to the dramatic challenges of the post-Cold War era. Significantly, it aspires to shape regional developments in ways that will best maintain economic dynamics, maximizes regional security, and preserve peace and stability among the summit members sans the ultimate arbiter and guarantor of security in the region – the U.S. Moreover, the summit intends to be the confidence-building forum for East Asian states, and a venue for substantive regional cooperation in resolving security issues without any outside powers (except perhaps Australia). The EAS embodies the NSC’s goals of smoothing China’s relations with its immediate neighbors and evolving a regional security environment without the U.S. Thus, the EAS is an “emblem of a quiet consolidation of Chinese influence in the region” at the expense of the U.S. (Cohen 2005: 2).

China’s growing political and economic clout in East Asia is happening at the time that Japan’s capacity to assert itself as a regional power was spluttering. Tokyo’s strength and greatest claim to regional influence and leadership – its
economy – became its most debilitating problem after the crash of its real estate and stock markets in 1993. The burst of the economic bubble was marked by the rapid decline in the prices of real estate and other financial assets in the Japanese economy. This caused the collapse of the Japanese banking sector as Japanese banks kept bad loans extended in the 1980s that had been backed by inflated real estate prices. These economic woes triggered a decade-long recession in Japan. With a stagnant economy, Japan could not maintain, much more expand, its regional interests and clout as its overseas investments and official development assistances to its East Asian neighbors suffered a dramatic decline.

While Japan was hamstrung by an underperforming economy, a somewhat discredited and paralyzed bureaucracy, and an unstable political system, China effectively modernized its economy and rapidly integrated itself into a regional system where it established a very influential role. As the Japanese economy went into a deep recession, China’s economy experienced a dramatic expansion. Furthermore, the unprecedented economic integration of Hong Kong, China and Taiwan fueled speculations of a possible Greater China Economic Area and consequently, Chinese economic domination of East Asia (Scott 2007: 109).

These developments coincided with numerous strategic/diplomatic incidents that precipitated the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the undermining of the domestic political foundations in Japan for a cooperative relationship with China. Among these incidents (Mochizuki 2004: 109): the Chinese military modernization that could threaten Japan; the escalation of Chinese maritime research activities in the waters claimed by Tokyo as part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ); the increase in Chinese naval activities in the East China Sea; dispatch of Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels in 2000 that circumnavigated Japan; and Tokyo’s decision to participate in the plan of the
Bush Administration to establish a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) System in Northeast Asia that elicited vehement Chinese opposition and indignation (Katzenstein 2008: 110). In turn, Japanese defense officials publicly voiced their growing concerns about the increasing presence and activities of Chinese warships, within and outside, Japanese territorial waters as well as the possibility that China may use force against Taiwan (Fukui 2007: 225). These incidents consequently transformed China-Japan ties into one of the most highly volatile bilateral relations in East Asia.¹)

The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations at the onset of the 21st century coincided with the general improvement in U.S.-Japan security relations. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China’s political ascendancy in the region, and the global war on terror have made the alliance a clear, feasible, and vibrant security option for both Washington and Tokyo. On the one hand, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. prompted Washington to adjust its bilateral alliances in East Asia to meet the security challenges of the new millennium. The tragic event, on the other hand, ushered a Japanese political environment that could liberally discuss security issues affecting the country. The rise to the office of Prime Minister of Junichiro Koizumi, a popular and pro-American politician, resulted in the radical restructuring of the U.S-Japan alliance. Immediately after 9/11, Tokyo promised that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) would play a prominent role in America’s war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in particular and global terrorism in general (Heginbotham and Samuels 2002: 113-118).

In 2002, Washington and Tokyo held a series of dialogue to reassess U.S.-Japan

¹) For an interesting and comprehensive discussion of current incidents that have further generated tensions between China and Japan see Samuels 2007: 136-143
alliance in the light of the changing security environment of the 21st century. Officially called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the talks recognized that the nature of the security threats has dramatically been changed (Tatsumi 2006: 1). Consequently, the structure and pace of U.S.-Japan security cooperation were altered and accelerated respectively. Tokyo agreed to be a part of the ballistic missile defense system by 2007. It procured the Joint Strike Fighter and Joint Direct Attack Munitions, which make the two countries’ militaries more interoperable and interdependent (Rap 2004: 100). Tokyo is also developing capabilities to enable the SDF to interface with the U.S. armed forces in any major overseas operations away from the Japanese homeland. These are indicators that Japan would eventually assume the geo-strategic role of the “new South Korea” - a leverage point of the U.S. against China (Auer and Lim 2004: 282). And for historical, political, and military reasons, China is a central challenge for Japan and Asia-Pacific regional security, and in the long run is probably more important than Korea (Katzenstein 2008: 109).

With China’s pervasive influence in East Asia, the U.S. initiated the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in May 2005 with two of its closest allies in East Asia – Japan and Australia. The TSD was formed to generate extensive and coordinated Australian and Japanese efforts to the U.S. global strategy (Tow 2008: 4). Its activities include joint discussions on China’s military transparency, Iranian nuclear issues, postwar reconstruction in Iraq involving Australian and Japanese forces, and possible security roles for Japan in maritime patrols and peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan. This trilateral politico/military initiative is aimed to derail South Korea’s rapprochement with China so as to minimize intra-alliance disagreement in Northeast Asia, strengthen the U.S. leverage in the Korean peninsula, and temper China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific (Odgaard 2007: 82). Beijing considers the TSD as the beginning of the
transformation of bilateral U.S. alliances in East Asia into a more formal multilateral alliance structure targeting exclusively the ascendency of China (Zhu 2008: 43). Then in 2007, Tokyo announced its value-based foreign policy aimed to create an “arc of freedom and democracy across the democracies in the Asia-Pacific” that conveniently excluded China (Katzenstein 2008: 24). For its part, Beijing has been very critical of Tokyo’s efforts to strengthen its alliance with Washington, the restructuring of Japan’s national security institutions, and plans to revise the 1946 constitution (Ibid). It has also launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to counter-balance the most threatening characteristics of the TSD (Zhu 2008: 7). On the not-so-hidden and simmering tensions in 21st century Sino-Japanese relations, Christopher Hughes (2004: 167) comments:

From the late-1990s onward, Japanese policy-makers have been forced to perform a highly precarious balancing act between strengthening alliance ties with the United States while attempting not to alienate China. The consequence of this Japanese “hedging” strategy toward China has been that, even though it is generally acknowledged among most policymakers that China is the greatest military threat to Japan; it is not openly identified as a threat to avoid unnecessary tensions. Instead, while Japan continues to strengthen its individual and bilateral military options in the event that China should emerge as a potential foe, it persists in identifying North Korea as the principal and most convenient source of threat and legitimization for upgrading of its military power.

The tension in Sino-Japanese relations subsided after the exchange of visits of the two countries’ heads of states from 2006 to 2007. Nevertheless, there is simply no guarantee that the two countries’ political relations will not become more competitive and not erupt to a full-blown geo-strategic rivalry. There exist latent and volatile issues that may suddenly rock the two countries’ relationship
in the near future. These issues include the following (Mederios 2009: 114): the
deep-seated and natural enmity between Chinese and Japanese societies;2) the
non-resolution of China and Japan’s complex territorial disputes; the sense of
competition in the light of their uneven economic development (Chinese
economy thrives, while the Japanese economy stagnates); and the intrinsic
political dynamics during a change of leadership in either or both of these
countries that can fuel the deterioration of their bilateral relations.

Southeast Asia: An Arena of Sino-Japan Rivalry?

The ASEAN member-states figure prominently in Chinese and Japanese efforts
to engage East Asia and Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis. The Southeast
Asian countries are generally small powers that do not have the economic
weight, military capabilities and politico/diplomatic clout comparable to any
other middle powers in Asia like South Korea and Taiwan. Yet, they are
considered fair game for both Tokyo and Beijing given these small powers’
central role in multilateral security activities in the region. The ten ASEAN
member-states occupying the driver’s seat in the ARF are the swing states in the
East Asian security equation (Macintyre 2004: 127). Their sudden alignment to
any one of the big powers in East Asia – Beijing, Tokyo and Washington –
would have a considerable diplomatic implication for the balance of power and

2) Studies by the Japan’s Cabinet Office and the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences revealed the
existence of nationalist sentiments in both Japanese and Chinese societies that are directed against each
other's nations. These nationalist sentiments tend to reinforce each other. They may also get out of control
and may trigger mass protests that could affect the two countries’ diplomatic relations. These nationalist
sentiments on both sides of Sea of Japan intensified during the Japan and China’s diplomatic row during
the Yasukuni Shrine visits and Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Island stand-off. See Zheng 2008: 35-36.
influence in the region. From Tokyo’s and Beijing’s perspectives, the ASEAN constitutes most of the rest of East Asia (Ibid). Neither of them wants to see the ten ASEAN member-states being drawn closer to the economic or diplomatic sphere of influence or one of the other. Engaging these small powers in a multilateral security forum helps minimize this risk. The Southeast Asian countries, in turn, are aware of the ulterior motives behind Tokyo’s and Beijing’s active participations in the ARF, and know how to use them for their own diplomatic and political motives.

Of the two major powers, Japan initially assumed an activist role in the ARF in the early 1990s. Then Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama first raised the idea of an East Asian security dialogue process in July 1991 when he called for a regional security forum that could create a sense of mutual reassurance to all concerned states (Leifer 1996: 22). This proposal was significant because it was Japan’s tentative step to assume a security role in East Asia without establishing a conventional regional security capability and revising its island defense plans. When Japan presented this security initiative, China was not originally included. Underlying this move was Tokyo’s intention to organize a new framework of security relations that would perpetuate U.S. engagement in East Asia at a time when the Cold War was winding down (Ibid: 24). Moreover, Japan’s proposal was formulated in a manner that it would not infringe on its special security relationship with the U.S. and would preclude any Japanese forward security role in East Asia (Ibid). In effect, Japan’s early experiment with multilateralism was a means to supplement and even boost its bilateral security cooperation with the U.S. (Hughes 2004: 123).

When the ASEAN member-states and its dialogue partners decided in July 1993 to form the ARF, Japan immediately indicated its willingness to be a part of this
regional security forum. However, Tokyo’s participation was contingent on two conditions (Drifte 2003: 125): (a) that the ARF would only play a supplementary role to existing security arrangements; and (b) that the forum should perform the function of providing reassurance, and not of confidence-building. Japan also stressed the need to hold concrete discussions on “Mutual Reassurance Measures” in three areas: information sharing, personal exchanges, and cooperation toward the promotion of global activities (Sudo 2002: 90).

When the ARF was formally constituted in Bangkok in July 1994, Japan’s participation was premised on the supplementary function (to the U.S.-Japan security alliance) of this institutionalized regional security dialogue and its role as a reassurance rather than a confidence-building instrument (Drifte 2003: 123).

The February 1995 Philippine-China dispute over the Mischief Reef provided Tokyo the opportunity to play an important role in the ARF. Manila requested Tokyo to mediate in its dispute with Beijing after the Philippine Navy discovered Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef, located 130 miles off the westernmost Philippine island of Palawan. Tokyo cooperated with ASEAN in fostering a three-stage development for the ARF, namely (Sudo 2002: 90): (a) the promotion of confidence-building; (b) developing preventive diplomacy; and (c) elaborating approaches to conflict-resolutions and management. Tokyo also urged the ARF to play an active role in resolving the territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea.

Japan’s positive response to the Philippines and the other ASEAN member-states’ request for it to play a mediating role during the Mischief Reef incident reflects its interest in and approach to the ARF process – encouraging the development or maturation of the process, especially its role in the pacific settlement of disputes (DiFilippo 2002: 190). From Tokyo’s perspective, a
stronger and more institutionalized ARF is seen as a legitimate regional entity providing yet another effective layer to international security (ibid: 90). However, Tokyo found the ARF debilitated in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy, and pointed out the necessity of enhancing its multilateral engagement to constrain an increasingly assertive and muscular China (Macintyre 2004: 90). Consequently, Tokyo staunchly supported the strengthening and the institutionalization of the ARF process until the late 1990s.

Japan’s participation in the ARF is analogous to a two-wheeled cart – the first wheel is its bilateral security relations with the U.S.; the second wheel is its involvement in a multilateral security forum that promotes confidence-building measures through dialogues, and promises to resolve concrete security contentions among states. Nevertheless, the failure of the 2000 ARF meeting to adopt a mechanism for preventive diplomacy and a code of conduct in the South China Sea impressed upon Tokyo that the forum’s knack to resolve these pestering security issues, is not forthcoming (Sudo 2002: 92-93). Thus, in the meantime, it has to content itself with dancing the music to the ASEAN’s tune – a loose, informal, and an ad hoc multilateral security forum operating on the basis of unanimity and consensus-building.

China, on the other hand, initially viewed the ARF process with suspicion. Beijing assumed that the forum would legitimize Tokyo as a military power in East Asia, and become the platform for the internationalization of existing bilateral disputes in the region (Haacke 2003: 116). China’s wary attitude stemmed from its concern that its involvement in a multilateral regional institution would curtail its freedom of action at home and abroad (Yahuda 2004: 226). Eventually, however, the Chinese key decision-makers realized that the ARF process is not dominated by Japan or the U.S. Rather, it policy framework
is managed by a group of small powers that adheres to unanimity in the decision-making process, and operates on the principle of non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs. This non-infringement of the member-states’ sovereignty is precisely the very rule that weakens the ARF’s ability to address with thorny security issues and inter-state conflicts.

It didn’t take very long for Beijing to realize that the ARF could not operate as a structure of constraint on regional foreign policy, as shown by its inability to play a pivotal role during the Mischief Reef incident in February 1995, and the March 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis between the U.S. and China. Still, the ARF has become a venue to demonstrate its non-threatening and cooperative face, thus complementing its bilateral ties and other links with the ASEAN member-states. With its growing diplomatic relations with these small powers within and outside the ARF, China is assured that contentious issues in which it is embroiled such as Taiwan, Tibet and other territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas are excluded from any multilateral scrutiny (Weatherbee 2005: 148). Consequently, the Chinese foreign ministry acknowledged that multilateralism could defuse the negativity of the phrase “China threat” in Southeast Asia, consolidate its diplomatic relations with friendly states, and strengthen its regional presence and influence alongside with those of the Americans and Japanese (Yahuda 2004: 300). On China’s taking advantage of the ASEAN Way of decision-making in the ARF, Jurgen Haacke (2003: 117) notes:

In effect, the consensus rule has also accorded Beijing a veto power that she has not been reluctant to use. ASEAN-sponsored multilateralism in security affairs has…offered China a chance to question the United States’ leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region, to attempt to play ASEAN off against the U.S. and to argue against Japan assuming a more prominent regional political-military role.
By the late 1990s, China’s engagement with the ASEAN and ARF processes drew Beijing into the midst of a multilateral regional security regime more than what its political leadership was initially willing to accept. Within a span of three years, the Chinese went from being hostile to adopting confidence-building measures, and proposing their own (Drifte 2003: 125). China’s participation in the ARF process is evident in the following (Liu 2005: 42-44): (a) its active support for the ASEAN states’ leading role in the ARF by pushing proposals for regional security dialogue and cooperation; (b) adherence to the existing modalities of the ASEAN Way with confidence-building at the core and premised on the principles of unanimity in decision-making and the general absence of institutions; (c) advocacy of its new concept of security based on dialogues and cooperative security; and (d) delaying the ARF process from moving to the direction of preventive diplomacy while tolerating the discussion and formulation of the definition, concept and principles of preventive diplomacy.

Despite this activist role, Beijing is not keen on adopting preventive diplomacy for the forum, and thinks that it is more productive to focus on confidence building measures to improve the climate of relations among the member-states (Haacke 2003: 120). It has also prevented the ARF chair and other parties from engaging in preventive diplomacy autonomously. China sees to it that ARF discussions are limited to exploring the overlap between confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. It has also supported some ASEAN member-states that want to proceed more slowly with preventive diplomacy instead of following what Japan and some Western states would like to do. China, along with some ASEAN member-states, makes sure that the ARF concentrate on confidence-building measures and those new practices on the preventive diplomacy front take some time to develop (ibid: 123). Thus,
assessing the role of the ARF in East Asian security, Michael Yahuda (2004: 231) laments:

The ARF could not be expected to be the venue for determining the outcomes of conflicts where competing great power interests are deeply embedded, as in the case of Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir. The challenge for the ARF, however, is to move beyond stage one of confidence-building to stage two of prevented diplomacy. The concept has been defined operationally, but the barriers against implementing them are formidable given the profound differences of interests and security perceptions within the regions that include most of the world's great powers.

This defect has hamstrung the ARF from playing a significant role in key security challenges facing the region such as the violence that marked East Timor’s secession from Indonesia in the late 1990s, and North Korea’s nuclear arms ambition. In 1997, China described its support to the ARF as a new approach to regional security, an approach different from Cold War mentality, an approach that seeks to strengthen peace through a dialogue and cooperation. China insisted that its new security concept, unlike the American bilateral security alliances, is well suited to the post-Cold War environment characterized by peace and development. Using the ARF as a venue to articulate its views to the Southeast Asian states, Beijing pressed the point that American alliances were remnants of a previous era and indicative of a Cold War mentality (Ibid: 300) China’s efforts to advance its new security concept were part of its diplomatic gambit to use the ARF process to voice its concern over the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the late 1990s. Summing up Chinese participation in the ARF process, Russel Ong (2002: 173) notes that Beijing prefers: a) a step-by-step, incremental approach to ensure that its security interests will not be compromised in any way; and b) selective dialogues on
regional security in which solutions to disputes and issues will be to its advantage.

Consequently, China’s preference for the ARF’s loose and ad-hoc approach focused on confidence-building rather than on preventive diplomacy has clashed with Japan’s agenda for an institutionalized and mature regional security forum geared for preventive diplomacy. China has criticized such a move as copycat version of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Central Europe (OSCE) that is a form of mechanized dialogue that overlooks ASEAN’s status as the driving force in the ARF process (Liu 2005: 47). Generally, China is wary of any process of institution-building in the ARF, attempts to reform the ASEAN Way of consensus-building and unanimity, and humanitarian intervention in the internal affairs of member states (ibid: 47-48). Recently, Japan and Western non-ASEAN members of the forum have initiated practical preventive diplomacy measures that potentially accord great importance to an expanded ARF chair, and challenge the norms of the ASEAN way (Haacke 2003: 221). However, China has rejected the move and stressed the continued relevance of the ASEAN diplomatic and security culture on the ARF. Consequently, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. have become increasingly frustrated with the slow-moving ASEAN approach adopted by the ARF (Collins 2003: 177).

The aforementioned countries have noticeably reduced their attention to the forum because of its inability to impact regional security (Simon 2008: 280). Sheldon Simon (2007a: 22) noted that after nearly more than a decade of existence, the “ARF’s consensus rule, adopted from ASEAN, has proven a serious obstacle to managing tensions that arise from the divergent strategic interests of ARF members.” He also observed that the ARF “cannot discuss intra-state conflicts because of China’s objections” and that an assessment of the
ARF’s accomplishments in preventive diplomacy through 2001 reveals “that they are peacetime or pre-crisis measures, only marginally applicable to ongoing conflicts in which crisis-time response may be needed.” (Simon 2007b: 124). These views on the ARF echo Leifer who figured out earlier in the mid-1990s “that the “ARF is an imperfect diplomatic instrument for achieving regional security goals in that it seeks to address the problem of power which arises from the anarchic nature of the international society without provision for either collective defense or conventional collective security.” (Leifer 1996: 53-54)

Consequently, Japan and other ASEAN members augment the ARF’s multilateral process and limitation as a security forum with their formal or informal defense ties with the extra-regional powers. The Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore maintain vibrant security relations with the U.S. whose military presence in the region holds China at bay. With its main agenda in the ARF frustrated by China’s support to the ASEAN Way, Japan has no choice but to hedge on its bilateral security relations with the U.S. and experiment with various forms of “quasi-multilateral security arrangements.” Examples of such arrangement includes former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s doctrine for a Japan-ASEAN broader and deeper partnership that involved a top-level forum between top leaders of Japan and some ASEAN member states and the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia (Sudo 2002: 39-41). For Tokyo (and a number of ASEAN member-states), “the ARF will be just one component in the national strategies of Asian states. It will supplement rather than supplant national capabilities and alliances.” (Alagappa 1998: 637) The ARF simply boosts but can never replace existing security arrangements. In effect, the forum can never be a really useful tool in security management in East Asia. Given that Japan and even the ASEAN member-states still pursue policies that promote traditional balance of power relationships (alliances and arms build-up), the idea that the
ARF will be at the forefront of genuine regional confidence-building and conflict management is a pie in the sky. Assessing Japan’s hedging and balancing act between its participation in the ARF and cultivation of close security ties with the U.S., Christopher Hughes (2004: 124) warns:

…Japan’s prioritization of the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance over regional multilateralism has meant that, in certain circumstances, frameworks such as the ARF—at best, merely supplemental to the alliance—can be denied even these supplemental functions. The ARF is a cooperative security dialogue body that works on the principle that none of the participants identify each other as adversary. However, efforts by Japan and the U.S. to strengthen their alliance, and the well-understood fact that, despite Japanese hedging and obfuscation tactics, China is the object of this strengthened alliance, contravene the principle...As a result, the potential function of the ARF is weakened all around. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the U.S.-Japan alliance, rather than serving as a basis for the development of regional multilateralism, may actually serve as a ceiling to it.

Balancing between the Dragon and the Rising Sun

The changing nature of great power relations reechoes the undermining of the balance of power that the ARF has tried to manage since the 1990s. The relatively cooperative relations among the three great powers (the U.S., China, and Japan) that have sustained the momentum and constructive course of the ARF are eroded by mistrust and suspicious, in effect, altering the regional status quo. The central issue in the ARF’s existence and viability is supporting the balance or distribution of power that allows the multilateral venture to proceed in circumstances of some predictability (Leifer 1996: 57-58). Loosening the grip on
this supporting balance can weaken or break up the ARF. In its complexity, the forum already finds it difficult to create this balance much more to manage it. As Leifer (1996: 59) observed in the mid-1990s, “It is more realistic to regard the forum as a modest contribution to a viable balance or distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific by other than traditional means.”

The ARF will be a useful and viable security forum if it can address the changing security needs of its most powerful members. Currently, Japan and China are engaged in a minuet of suspicion and low-intensity competition that may eventually turn into a rivalry. In the short-term, the ASEAN states can shape the ARF agenda, but they cannot completely control it. A Sino-Japanese geo-strategic rivalry might force the ASEAN states to choose either one of these two great East Asian powers. Fortunately, this has not yet happened. Despite their low-intensity bilateral competition within and outside the ARF, both Tokyo and Beijing still see the advantage of multilateralism. In fact, the ARF is useful to these two major powers for two reasons: (1) it provides a broader and more stable infrastructure for ensuring transparencies in security matters – a key requirement for regional security management; and (2) it gives Tokyo and Beijing a larger stake in the construction of a predictable regional security environment, an opportunity that also enhances their overall political standing to the small powers of Southeast Asia.

Auspiciously, China and Japan consider the ASEAN as the legitimate leader in a regional security forum. Neither power can take charge in formulating and managing the regional security agenda because of their mutual distrust and animosity. Moreover the ASEAN stays neutral because of its extensive system of dialogue partners, and its ability to engage all the major powers in various forms of economic and security cooperation.
This situation nevertheless triggers tremendous challenges for the small powers of Southeast Asia. The first challenge for them is to recognize the need to gravitate towards the center and discuss issues generally ignored during the ARF intercessional meetings and dialogues. These issues include the current relations of the great powers, their evolving geo-strategic rivalry, changing security needs, and the general balance of power in East Asia. Hopefully, the coalition of small powers, along with some middle powers, can prevent a polarization within the forum. The second challenge is for these small powers to act as a bridge or sometimes a buffer between China and Japan. Their geo-political positions will be put to a crucial test especially when bridging the gulf that separates these two great powers. In a transition period characterized by changes in the distribution of power relations, the ASEAN states can exercise a certain clout that is not proportionate to their actual resources and capabilities. Given their current status in the ARF, they appear non-partisan and believable to the two contending parties. Likewise, through the ARF, these small states can help remodel the regional order and concentrate on conflict management with the two great powers in their midst (Odgaard 2007: 57).

Conclusion

Despite the broadening of security issues at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, East Asian states are still focused and concerned with traditional security challenges. This mindset is rooted in two regional characteristics: (1) the existence of Westphalian states that are still conscious of their territoriality and relatively unrestrained by norms of the non-use of force in settling international disputes; and (2) the absence of an institution that can foster and ensure cooperative security among the major powers in region. The salience of
traditional security challenges in East Asia is best epitomized by the current Sino-Japanese rivalry.

This present rivalry has been triggered by China’s economic and political emergence in the early 21st century, while Japan has been experiencing an economic decline since the early 1990s. This situation is exacerbated by Tokyo’s efforts to reinvigorate its alliance with Washington after 9/11 and to play a more active role in international security affairs to support its ally in the war on terror. This strategic rivalry is also reflected in China’s and Japan’s policies toward the Southeast Asian states and in their respective behavior in the ARF.

Paradoxically, this enmity has caused a high level of insecurity to both powers, while creating a political space for ASEAN member-states to manage their affairs relatively free from the intervention of the big powers. Currently, this group of medium and small powers acts as a buffer or a bridge between Japan and China. This role endows these states with a certain degree of influence that is not proportionate to their actual capabilities. Interestingly, a peculiar situation is generated in which the two major powers’ insecurities foster the lesser powers’ overall security. It only proves the age old aphorism that under certain circumstances, “those weak powers are not necessarily powerless even in the world of the strong.”

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Introduction

Japan’s security policy has been subject to a series of rapid evolutions over the past decade or so. Major developments on this score, such as the Peace Cooperation Law (1992), Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) deployment overseas (e.g. Indian Ocean [2001], Iraq [2003]), the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD [2006]), and the creation of Defence Ministry (2007), have demonstrated a more proactive international security policy on the part of Japan. This in itself is a reflection of what Pempel (2009: 1) calls Tokyo’s revived “omnidirectional diplomacy”. This more determined foreign policy stance is under-girded by a stronger nationalistic domestic consensus among the Japanese (including a weakening of Article IX) and a sustained development of Japan’s military capabilities, especially in the realm of naval power projection. These exceptional developments have fuelled a lively “Japan rising” debate (Pyle 2007) with some commentators questioning whether this drive toward “normalisation” represents a “Heisei re-militarisation” (Tanter 2009; Hughes 2009).
Another significant aspect is a rapid shift in Japan’s alliance, or rather, “alignment” policy. This shift is manifold and can be expressed in three overlapping circles or layers of alignment strategy. Firstly, Japan has sought to revitalize and restructure its traditional bilateral alliance relationship with the United States, through a number of measures designed to increase allied coordination, procurement, and interoperability, with this reconfigured arrangement lately dubbed the “Alliance of the New Century” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). Second, Japan has had an active voice in the development of regional security architecture, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Lastly, recognising in Yul Sohn (2009: 5)’s words that “a traditional military alliance is necessary but insufficient to deal with Japan’s new strategic dilemmas”, Tokyo has sought to expand and diversify its portfolio of potential allies beyond its bilateral dependence on Washington. In Walton (2008: 74)’s estimation, “Japan was asserting a new sense of security independence beyond its traditional ties with the United States”. To this purpose it has moved decisively to initiate a number of “strategic partnerships” with states in the Asia-Pacific. These include Indonesia (2006), Vietnam (2009) and the Philippines (2009), with the as yet under-developed Japan-India strategic partnership (2007), potentially the jewel on the crown. However, the most prolific and successful by far at this stage is the Japan-Australia strategic partnership (JASP).

This paper will look at the substance and prospects for the Japan-Australia strategic partnership through the application of a conceptual framework devised from Business/Organisational Theories literature, designed to capture the nature and dynamics of this increasingly prevalent form of security alignment, and one that functions as a major tool of Tokyo’s security policy. The paper argues that Tokyo-Canberra cooperation is resolute and multi-faceted and potentially holds
substantial benefits for both strategic partners. The JASP does however face a number of challenges, both internal and external, as the framework will reveal.

**On “Alliance” versus “Alignment”**

An important distinction between the concepts of “alliance” and “alignment” must be made before the analysis proceeds further. In a strict conceptual sense the two are not identical phenomena, nor synonyms. Both are forms of state-to-state (security) cooperation, however alliances, according to Snyder (1994: 4) “are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.” While Walt and David define “alignment” as “a relationship between two or more states that involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future” (cited in Miller & Toritsyn 2005: 333). An alliance therefore is simply one type, or a subset, of the larger covering concept of alignment. Ward (1982: 7) indicates the benefits of prioritising the broader phenomenon:

> Alignment is not signified by formal treaties, but is delineated by a variety of behavioural actions. It is a more extensive concept than alliance since it does not focus solely upon the military dimension of international politics. Degrees of alignments in political, economic, military, and cultural spheres present a multifaceted sculpture of national and supranational postures.

For definitional and conceptual reasons then the label of “alignment” is to be preferred to describe different variations of allied security cooperation: coalition, non-aggression pact, security community, including alliance itself.
This distinction is rendered all the more salient and pressing now that the orthodox military alliance paradigm that dominated the Cold War (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) is fading from empirical consciousness. Rather, in a fluid and uncertain contemporary security environment these conventional alliances are diminishing and no new ones on this pattern are likely to appear, leading Menon (2007) to forecast the “end of alliances”. Instead, Tertrais (2004: 135) contends:

the ever more complex nature of the strategic environment and the diversity of security arrangements devised by contemporary nations test the very notion of “alliance”, causing one to wonder if it even remains a useful strategic concept.

Now Parag Khanna (2008: 324) emphatically asserts, we live “in a world of alignments, not alliances.” Among other contenders – the “coalition of the willing” and the “security community” – the archetype of “strategic partnership” appears to becoming ever more prominent to describe and structure new allied security relationships. As Tertrais (2004: 136) argues:

A broader definition of alliances would include those that do not imply a security guarantee. In today’s parlance, they are often called strategic partnerships and include the recognition of common security interests as well as provisions for strong military cooperation to various degrees.

This is reflected not just in the plethora of new strategic partnerships created by Japan, but in a wide variety of other cases, such as U.S.-India, Israel-Turkey, and NATO-EU, to name but a small sample, with perhaps the Sino-Russian strategic partnership the most functional and well known among these (Anderson 1997; Wilson 2004). It is to the features of strategic partnership archetype we now turn. First, the framework defines the basic characteristics of a strategic partnership,
thus answering the question “what is a strategic partnership?” Then it considers how strategic partnerships can be analysed and assessed, before applying this framework to the Japan-Australia case study.

Analytical Framework: Strategic Partnership as A New Form of Security Alignment

Defining Strategic Partnerships:

I define a strategic partnership as “structured collaboration between states (or other ‘actors’) to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges more effectively than could be achieved in isolation.” (Wilkins 2008: 358-383) To expand upon this with reference to Organisational Studies literature, which examines the phenomenon in the business world, one can identify the following general characteristics of strategic partnership in the security sphere (Silver 1993; Bergquist et al. 1995; Mytelka 1991; Alter and Hage 1993; Steward 1999).

First, it will be built around a general (security) purpose known as a “system principle”, rather than one specific task, such as deterring or combating a hostile state, as in a conventional military alliance. Second, strategic partnerships, unlike alliances, are primarily “goal-driven” rather than “threat-driven” alignments. Following from this, no enemy state is identified by the partnership as a “threat”, though the partnership may be concerned with joint security “issue-areas”, such as proliferation or terrorism, for example. Third, strategic partnerships tend to be informal in nature and entail low commitment costs, rather than being enshrined in a formal alliance treaty that binds the participants to rigid courses of action,
such as a mutual defence pact. This permits partners to retain a greater degree of autonomy and flexibility, thus alleviating the “entrapment” dynamic common to orthodox alliances (Snyder 1997). This, however, in no way precludes issue-specific bilateral/multilateral declarations and other confidence building measures (CBMs). A good example of this is the way that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, established 1996, nests within the multilateral framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Fourthly, perhaps due to the term’s inception in the business world, economic exchange appears foremost among their “functional areas” of cooperation and acts as one of the key drivers behind the partnership, alongside security concerns. It is the security dimension however that distinguishes strategic partnerships from Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Strategic partnerships are therefore security alignments well-fitted to challenging non-traditional security threats, not provoking great power rivalry, whilst retaining an ability to “hedge” against it (Weitsman 2003).

The essence of strategic partnership arrangements is neatly summarised by Goldstein, when he writes that:

> the essential elements are a commitment to promoting stable relationships and extensive economic intercourse, muting disagreements about domestic politics in the interest of working together on matters of shared concern in international diplomacy, and routinizing the frequent exchange of official visits, especially those by representatives of each country’s military and regular summit meetings between top government leaders. (Goldstein 2003:75)

**Explaining Strategic Partnerships:**

This second part of the framework tracks the association between strategic
partners across a “collaboration continuum” - from its formation, through its implementation, to its evaluation. Through this process it is possible to expose the different spheres in which the partners interact, and ascertain its durability and prospects for growth.

(i) The formation of strategic partnerships can be reduced to three main factors: environmental uncertainty, strategic fit, and system principle. First, actors in a competitive (“anarchic”) international environment are confronted by uncertainty and act to reduce this by searching for partners to share risks (Mytelka 1997). Joining forces for this purpose is an effort to mitigate the uncertainties of a potentially hostile international system. Second, suitable partners are identified and assessed in relation to their “strategic fit”; that is, their degree of mutual interests, perhaps shared values/ideology, and the resources and other benefits they might contribute to a partnership (Berquist 1995: 69-70; Austin xii; Wilkins 2007: 251-278). Thirdly, once suitable partners have been selected, the parties concerned will promulgate their joint purpose into an overarching framework for cooperation and collaboration known as a “system principle” (“a reason for being”) (Roberts 2004: 24). The system principle embodies the joint organisational identity and emblematises its goals. However, it should be noted that individual partners are perfectly capable of deviating from these official goals, through their pursuit of covert (or ‘unofficial’) national objectives. The political leadership, often supported by business and military interests, typically plays a key role in initiating and presiding over the formation process (Austin 2000: 53).

(ii) The next phase, implementation, concerns the building and maintenance of the partnership and involves differing degrees of formalisation and institutionalisation in each instance (Bergquist 1995: 87). First, any strategic
partnership incorporating national polities and their immense state apparatus will be a “meta-organisation” of tremendous complexity. This complexity will rise exponentially as the number of partners grows and thus necessitate further institutionalisation in order to govern it effectively. Second, a form of organisational structure will emerge by mutual effort and consensus that serves to operationalise the partnership as an organisational entity. This structure defines the respective roles and responsibilities of the partners, and the joint rules and policies to be observed. It establishes, on a vertical hierarchy, the various bureaucratic components of the partner states to be interconnected - executive, ministerial, financial, military, and public - for example. A typical strategic partnership can be characterised by its (officially) non-hierarchical, collaboration-based culture, and a nominally equal distribution of authority between the participants (Bergquist 1995: 19). Thirdly, the scope of the partnership’s operations will be horizontally demarcated across designated “functional areas” of cooperation – diplomatic/security, defence/military, economic, societal and cultural, for example. It is likely that the partnership will be built around a core of economic interaction, given the origin of strategic partnering in the business world. Depending on the degree of cooperation present on these two axes we can determine how tightly the partners are ‘coupled’. It should be stressed however that though the state partners pool their identity in a joint agreement, they do not merge or subsume their individual national sovereignty (as in the EU, for example).

(iii) Evaluation is the last phase of partnering and remains an ongoing process until the strategic partnership itself disbands. This phase provides metrics by which the organisation’s efficiency, success, and future prospects may be gauged. These factors determine if the organisation will decline and disintegrate, or whether it will build its capacity and perhaps expand its membership. First, the
partnership can be measured against its efficacy in achieving its stated goals, those embodied in its system principle. If it is failing to attain these it must be restructured or disbanded; an “exit stage” has been reached. The partnership can be expected to endure as long as it achieves the its shared goals and still serves as a useful vehicle for attaining the individual goals of its member states. Second, the durability of the partnership will be reflected in its adherence to the common interests and values of its members. The more closely these align the more durable the relationship (Wilkins 2007). Moreover, the very existence of the partnership may shape the values and interests (even the goals) of the participant states by generating new interests or socialising them into new values or norms over time (as in security communities). Third, positive mutual perceptions by the constituent states are important. These stem from current and past behaviour, ideology, and cultural affinities or clashes. The creation of a climate of trust between partners through their demonstrated commitment to the organisation is integral to its successful performance and continued survival (Kegley and Raymond 1990).

Case Study: Japan-Australia Strategic Partnership

Defining

Prima facie it would appear that the Japan-Australia strategic partnership accords closely to the basic definition above. There are channels for structured collaboration defined in the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) and its attendant Action Plan for Implementation (both 2007, to be examined further below), especially in the sphere of economic collaboration and an increasing level of cooperation in other security issues such as counter-terrorism,
intelligence sharing and plans for joint military training. As Walton (2008: 78) identifies: “In essence the JDSC has established a clear framework for security links and how they might possibly continue to develop.”

To elaborate: first, the JASP may be said to revolve around a general system principle involving natural collaboration by like-minded democracies – articulated as an “arc or freedom and prosperity”. It is broadly based on a commitment to a set of shared values. Second, they are not allied against any specific state, though both share some concerns with the rise of China. The primary drivers behind the JASP are to increase mutual trade benefits and coordinate regional security interests. This is evidenced in common positions on issues such as nuclear North Korea, and the admission of Japan to the United Nations. Thirdly, the JASP is relatively informal and un-institutionalised. Though Canberra had proposed a more formal security treaty, Tokyo preferred to sign a joint security declaration; a more informal and less binding document. This means that the costs of commitment to the JASP are low for both parties. There is no provision for mutual defence assistance. As Walton notes

> It is not a treaty or an old-style defence pact. There is no provision, for example for mutual defence or other aspects of traditional military style treaties. The purpose of the declaration is to deal with common security interests such as border security, counter-terrorism, peace cooperation, exchange of information and personnel on joint exercise and coordinated activities. (Ibid.)

Like other strategic partnerships, the JASP is evident in other forums for security cooperation, particularly the TSD mini-lateral, but also the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), APEC, and other regional organisations. Until recently, “consultation was mainly conducted at the multilateral level using existing
regional architecture” (Ibid: 75). Now the level of interaction on the Tokyo-Canberra axis, of the TSD, has thickened (see PP Diagram).

Fourthly, the JASP was historically predicated on a strong economic platform, as originally conceived in the Nippon-Australia Relations Agreement (NARA) Treaty (1976). As Japan matured as a liberal democracy and Western ally, this has facilitated the deeper security cooperation initiated in recent years. As Goldstein noted above, the JASP is reinforced by a high level of Japanese-Australian interaction including Prime Ministerial visits, defence exchanges and cultural activities.

**Explaining**

Having established that the JASP conform to the basic parameters of our strategic partnership definition, I will now proceed to examine its properties and prospects more closely across the “collaboration continuum” of formation, implementation and evaluation.

(i) The *formation* of the Japan-Australia strategic partnership was a long time in the making. Having fought each other as fierce opponents during the Greater East Asia/Pacific War, though Australia was cajoled by the United States into subscribing to the 1951 peace treaty, it was not until the 1970s that Tokyo and Canberra initiated tangible bilateral relations (NARA Treaty 1976) (Drysdale 2006). During the comparatively stable Cold War strategic environment linkages between the two countries were largely limited to the economic sphere. It was the collapse of the bipolar system and the seismic shock of the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, coupled with unmistakable shifts in global power dynamics, brought about by the rise of China, that tore down such certainties.
Faced with an unpredictable and potentially hostile international and regional environment, and responding to such gaiatsu (“external pressure”), Japan conducted a serious re-evaluation of its foreign and security policy. Tokyo began to reconsider its relationship with its traditional ally, the United States, but also to search for new partners that shared the same interests, values and security concerns. Australia, (along with India), were quickly identified as good “strategic fits” with Japanese objectives.

In 2006 Prime Minster Abe specifically pointed to Australia (and India) as key players in his vision for an “Alliance of Democracies and Security architecture for the Asia Pacific region” (Okamoto 2007). Australia shared with Japan a number of core characteristics and values: a mature liberal democratic system, a market economy predicated on free trade, a commitment to democracies and human rights. Moreover, there was a close synergy of strategic interests based upon the criticality of protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs), combating international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and maintaining regional stability throughout South East Asia and the South Pacific. Also, both countries had well developed economic linkages evincing distinct complementarities, with Australia a vital source of raw materials and energy for Japan, and Japan a crucial supplier of electronics, manufactures and investment for Australia. Lastly, the two countries shared the same great and powerfully ally, the United States. There could have been no better “strategic fit”.

This being the case, once the political will was in place, and with Australia an enthusiastic party to agreement, a “system principle” began to form at the core of joint Japan-Australia relations. The developing relationship went through a number of semantic evolutions, beginning as a “partnership” (1995), then a
“creative partnership” (2002), followed by a “strategic partnership” (2007) to “comprehensive strategic partnership” (2008) to its latest descriptor “comprehensive strategic, security and economic partnership” (2009). Quite simply, according to the JDSC “the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based upon democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). This statement emblematises the JASP’s general objectives and raison d’etre, as the JSDC and its affiliated documents/statements serve to reify the organisation’s identity.

Finally, as the model predicts, leadership played a “highly visible” (Walton 2007: 76) role in the formation stage of the JASP. During the formation phase PM Howard and his counterparts met frequently. Walton (2008: 82) points out how “Howard was credited with providing political leadership and strong bureaucratic support within Australia for a series of meaningful government sponsored conferences and declarations that have given the bilateral relationship impetus”. His counterparts for the main period of the formation phase, Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe were well known for their pro-Australian and American tendencies. “Abe saw Australia as a logical partner and set out to establish a new partnership based on alignment with the United States, the desire to secure vital Australian resources and to develop a quadrilateral arrangement with Australia, India and the United States to block and contain China.” (Ibid) The close collaboration and personal synergies between the Japanese and Australian leaderships were crucial in providing the impetus for the JASP’s formation.

(ii) As the model forecasts, the next phase, that of implementation, follows. Six months after the JDSC, an Action Plan for Implementation was drawn up (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007b). On this basis a form of institutional
structure to the strategic partnership began to emerge to operationalise the JASP. This framework institutional structure can be categorised into vertical and horizontal linkages, through which the two states are “coupled”. Walton (2007: 77) points to the importance of “maintaining strong and effective channels of communication at the highest levels to ensure the maintenance of good relations.”

The vertical hierarchy of the JASP contains both Track I and Track II elements. First, at the top of the hierarchy are ‘heads-of-government-level visits’ (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995). These may be in a bilateral capacity, within the context of the TSD, or other multilateral fora, each serving as an opportunity for an exchange of views and a continued validation of the JASP. Second, are Ministerial linkages, with the implementation plan specifying strategic dialogue between Foreign and Defence Minsters on an annual basis (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007a). Third, the Memorandum on Defence Exchange facilitates military-to-military level contacts, providing for personnel exchanges and joint exercises. This builds upon the military attachés system put in place 1996, and the MoU on Combating International Terrorism (2003). Fourth, in terms of civil cooperation, agreements are in place for law enforcement collaboration, including intelligence sharing and a Customs Cooperation Meeting. Fifth, the manifold economic linkages between the two countries are being streamed towards an FTA. Finally, in order to build grassroots support for the JASP, public linkages have been crucial, with events such as a the 2006 Year of Exchange, for example, the aim of which was to “promote friendship, deeper mutual understanding and cooperation between Australia and Japan, especially at the grass roots level”.1) The earlier Joint Declaration on Australia-Japan

Partnership highlighted how “People to people links, fostered over decades through business, education, tourism and cultural contacts have made a profound contribution to the relationship” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995).

On the horizontal axis, a spectrum of “functional areas” for cooperation can be identified. Firstly, one of the core purposes of the JASP is diplomatic and security cooperation, broadly defined. Joint diplomatic support is evident in the JASP, with for example, Canberra affirming its support for Japan’s entry onto the permanent UN Security Council, or the joint commitment to prevent WMD proliferation through upholding of the NPT and active participation in the PSI. “New security challenges” such as transnational crime, border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, piracy, energy security, pandemics and humanitarian relief are all specified in the JDSC. There is broad consensus on the future shape of the region’s security architecture with emphasis on APEC (both countries were founders), and the EAS; a mechanism for regional integration. Also, the two partners are committed to realising their cooperation on regional security issues by efforts to promote peace and prosperity amongst the Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

Secondly, in the defence or military sector, there are strong linkages. In this respect both partners have a moderate degree of military interoperability based upon their alliance with the United States. The JSDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) conduct regular multilateral military exercises, such as KAKADU (2008), though bilateral exercises have yet to occur.2) Both militaries have gained valuable bilateral operational experience as a result of the joint

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deployment in Iraq (2005-2006), plus their joint participation in Tsunami relief
Thirdly, as the model predicts, economic cooperation forms a major platform of
the JASP. Walton (2008: 75) argues that “commercial/economic links have
been (and still remain) at the very core of the bilateral relationship”. Japan is the
second most important trading partner for Australia, and a feasibility study for a
FTA is currently underway to increase bilateral exchanges to unprecedented
levels. Finally societal/cultural cooperation is a key element in the functional
areas of cooperation between Japan and Australia. Dedicated Japan-Australia
conferences (now on its Fifth evolution, 2008), organisations such as the
Australia-Japan Foundation, and other Track II initiatives play a significant role
in broadening the JASP.3)

(iii) Evaluation of the JASP is an incomplete and ongoing process. Judged
against the broad goals embedded in the partnerships’ system principle, as
outlined in the JDSC, and elaborated in the subsequent Action Plan, some
limited success has been attained. Certainly both partners have affirmed their
commitment to further capacity building as enunciated in the 2008 Joint
Statement on “Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership”,
though the momentum behind the JASP naturally appears to have slowed due to
Japan’s recent political bouleversement.4)

In terms of diplomatic and security goals, Japan and Australia have worked
closely and harmoniously upon maintaining their alliance relationships with the

4) Joint Statement by PM Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and PM Kevin Rudd of Australia on “Comprehensive
paci/australia/joint0806.html
United States, including their participation in Afghanistan/Indian Ocean missions. Indeed, the military-alliance relationship with Washington is a major influence upon bilateralism, as Ball observes, “US strategic policies and defence decisions will determine the directions, pace and dimensions of Australia-Japan security relations.” (2006: 180) Indeed the TSD is becoming the central framework for trilateral cooperation, and is prioritised accordingly in bilateral statements.5)

Coordination in through the Foreign and Defence Minster’s annual meetings – the “2+2” dialogue - has proceeded smoothly. At the military-military level, both countries view the other’s expansion of military capabilities favourably, though projects such as joint JSDF-ADF bilateral exercises on Australian soil have yet to materialise. Provision is in place for unit-to-unit exchanges and several reciprocal port visits have ensued by naval and air units. In the economic sphere Japan and Australia are jointly committed to cooperating to overcome the global financial crisis, and work together in the G20 to this effect. In terms of purely bilateral economic interchange the JASP looks healthy. Tokyo and Canberra are agreed upon the desirability of a FTA (estimated to benefit +$39bn for Australia and +$27bn for Japan over a 20 year period), as their commercial relations continue to expand. For example, Chevron Australia recently inked a major natural gas supply deal with Tokyo (and Seoul). The parties also affirm their desire to stimulate the service and financial sectors of bilateral trade.

Lastly, cooperation in a new functional area – that of environmental security – is

developing rapidly. Both partners have affirmed their commitment to cooperate on climate change, cutting greenhouse emissions and supporting the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate.6) To this effect Japan and Australia are working together on the Callide Oxy-Fuel project – a prototype greenhouse gas capture mechanism for coal-fired power stations.7) Furthermore, the partners are committed to strengthening their scientific and technological linkages “to take a fresh look at existing science and technology cooperation with a view to identifying new areas of mutual interest.”8)

In terms of “covert” goals, the increasing security and military cooperation between Japan and Australia, within the context of the TSD alliance, will act as a serviceable deterrent, if not “containment” of rising China, as each of these powers “hedges” against the future (Weitsman 2003). On this score Japan likely welcomes the expansion of Australian military, particularly naval, power, twinned with reference to rising China, articulated in the 2009 defence white paper.9) Japan acting in the role as Australian strategic partner, with the JASP functioning as a constructive “middle power” alignment in the Asia-Pacific also creates more positive perceptions of Japan in the region, than if Tokyo acts as “great power” ally to the United States. In addition, joint efforts to cooperate in the PICs are a subtle way of countering a perceived attempt by Beijing to increase its influence in this region.

6) http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx
Mutual perceptions between the two countries appear to be very positive, if not always that deeply embedded. A variety of dedicated Track II initiatives involving increased exchanges of parliamentarians and Diet members, alongside business and tourist connections continue to maintain amicable relations.\textsuperscript{10} Prime Minister Howard was probably correct when he stipulated that “Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan”\textsuperscript{11} One noteworthy bone of contention between the two countries however is the persistence of the “whaling issue”, where Japan continues to uphold, or flout, depending upon one’s viewpoint, international whaling conventions.

According to the Australian Ambassador to Japan, “Prime Minster Aso recently described the Australia-Japan relationship as reaching the most productive time in history… It’s the increasing scope and depth of our strategic relationship that really bears out Prime Minster Aso’s judgement.”\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, this evaluation has provided much evidence of “deepening” (military, security, economic, areas) and “widening” (environmental, science and technology, areas).\textsuperscript{13} Will the JASP become a fully fledged alliance? This is unlikely at this time since “domestic difficulties [in Japan] make the concept of an alliance politically untenable.” (Walton 2007: 85) However, as mentioned in the introduction, this may not be an altogether negative signal. Few new military-alliance formations have been created in the post-Cold war period. Instead this paper has argued strategic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} ‘Fifth Australia-Japan Conference: Co-Chairs’ Statement’, 19 November 2008, DFAT.
\item \textsuperscript{11} http://www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2006/061114_anzccj.html
\item \textsuperscript{12} “The Strategic Partnership between Australia and Japan – implications for the Global outlook for the 21st century” Speech by Mr Murray McLean, Australian Ambassador to Japan. Australian Government in Japan.
\end{itemize}
partnerships and coalitions are now the preferred tools of alignment policy. As Tertrais (2004: 148) asks “Are not bilateral strategic partnerships between some Western-orientated states stronger and more solid than some more formal military alliances?”

Conclusions

The JASP cleaves so closely to the attributes and predictions of the strategic partnership alignment model illustrated in the analytical framework above as to stand as an exemplar of the phenomenon. It adheres to a non-treaty form of alignment, operating bilaterally and multilaterally, with close areas of joint cooperation in the security, and particularly, economic fields, whilst eschewing a provocative mutual defence pact. Though some questions are raised due to the dramatic shift in Japanese domestic politics, this may represent a temporary slowing of the impetus to deepen and broaden the JASP, rather than its abrogation.

References

JAPAN-AUSTRALIA SECURITY RELATIONS: BUILDING A REAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP? 295


Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed the puzzling behavior of states, which has not necessarily been congruent with the conventional understanding of military alliances in the field of international relations. Some of these anomalies, in light of existing alliance theories, are the variety of issues and agendas that present day “military” alliances seek to handle; environmental problems are typical of such cases. Global environmental protection, among other nonmilitary issues such as democracy and economic cooperation, has been discussed in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹ For example, the Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, Tetsuro Hukuyama, and the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Kurt M. Campbell, reportedly agreed on October 23, 2009 that both states should stress on climate

¹ In contrast to democracy and economic cooperation (the importance of which was mentioned in the original treaties that established these alliances) references to the environment have been found only in recent documents.
change as “a pillar to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” 2) In the 2000s, environmental issues were repeatedly taken up at ministerial meetings like the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2). Even at summit meetings, the management of environmental challenges such as climate change was mentioned as a way to strengthen the alliance. In Europe, the effects of climate change on strategic conditions in the region are considered as an important agenda for discussion in the ongoing revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept in 2009 and 2010.3)

The formation of interstate alliances, however, is conventionally considered as a measure to meet military threats and manage military risks with military means.4) Two questions arise: First, why do allies attempt to address environmental issues such as global warming through the existing institutional frameworks of military alliances? Second, how are these two functions of alliances – namely, the traditional function of securing the military interests of the individual parties, and the new function of protecting the global or regional environment, beyond national borders – related to each other?

In order to uncover some of the clues to the answers, the first part of this paper examines the theoretical literature in international relations, including alliance theory and securitization theories. This paper will then develop an analytical framework to analyze the relationship between alliances and environmental security. The second part of this paper provides a comparative illustration of the

4) See, for example, the definition by Snyder (1997: 4): “Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”
roles of NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance in managing environmental degradation in their respective regions. The implications of this argument, in considering the effect on the stability of interstate order, will be mentioned briefly at the end of the paper.5)

Theoretical Framework

Alliance and Threat Perception

According to the typical definition, by (neo)realist scholars, of the term “alliance” in international relations, states generally form alliances in order to aggregate their own capabilities of meeting threats from more powerful states when they estimate a physical difference in military capabilities (Waltz 1979). In contrast to the traditional understanding of military threats, Walt (1987) emphasized the effects of the subjective perceptions of states in calculating the gaps between their own material power resources and those of other states, and in anticipating the consequences to national security.

Walt defines alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (Walt 1987: 1). This definition of alliance is logically broad enough to include various functions for

5) In accordance with the categorization proposed by Liska (1968: 24), alliance functions can be divided into three levels: interallied control, aggregation of power, and international governance. The latter two functions can be combined as the external functions of an alliance (Odagiri 2009a). This paper concentrates on these functions, while considerations of interallied management may operate in dealing with the environment. Odagiri (2009b) provides an introductory account on how environmental functions of alliance influence its military functions on each level.
managing the various types of threats. Allies may attempt to deal with nonmilitary challenges, such as those originating from environmental degradation, with existing alliance arrangements once they perceive these challenges as threats to their own national survival.6)

Despite the potential to extend this logic to the analysis of nonmilitary alliance functions, such as those pertaining to environmental security, Walt’s theory of alliance formation remains strictly loyal to the realist lines of argument. His concept of threat and security is assumed to apply only in military terms.7) In other words, Walt argues only for balancing behavior against military threats using military means; this theory hence fails to conclude that alliances may work differently when using nonmilitary instruments.8)

**Securitization in Environmental Issues**

Alliances are security arrangements.9) When these nonmilitary issues such as those related to the environment are regarded as threats to the national security of allies, these allies logically have the option to capitalize on existing alliance frameworks to counter these nonmilitary threats and to broadly improve their security

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6) This paper refers to the environment as a physical phenomenon, not as a norm or an ideology that states or alliances should pursue. In this sense, environmental and military issues are common in affecting the physical existence of states. Environmental challenges in this paper, however, exclude natural disasters such as earthquakes, eruptions of volcanoes, and tidal waves, and only include those changes of the natural environment that result from intentional or unintentional human activities. Hough (2008) distinguished “environmental threat” from “natural threat.”


8) Even (neo)liberalist arguments are similar to those of Walt, in this respect. Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander (1996), for example, expect a “security management institution” to handle uncertain risks in military terms, though not in accordance with balancing logic.

9) Security specialists hold a heated debate on whether alliances should include informal alignments of states without formal treaties. This point is not under discussion in this paper, however.
conditions. How and why, in that case, do states, at times, see phenomena such as environmental degradation as potential threats to their own national survival?

Although international relations scholars have been discussing “environmental security” for over thirty years, the argument about the “securitization” processes developed by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) is a recent manifestation. Relying on the constructivist perspective, Buzan and his colleagues focus on international, transnational, and domestic political processes in which the relevant actors perceive military or other issues related to security subjectively and/or intersubjectively at their respective levels, resulting in these actors taking urgent measures by following extraordinary political procedures. In other words, the military, environment, and other issues are conceptualized as subcategories of “security.” Therefore, the social processes of changing threat perception and of labeling these issues as “security” need to be investigated.

**Typology of Environmental Securitization**

According to the securitization theory, environmental challenges can be considered national security problems if they are perceived as factors that affect the physical bases of states: their land and their population. The relationship between the environment, military, and security, however, is not always straightforward; it can be varied. Based on the different ways of connecting the environment with military affairs, the patterns of securitization can be categorized into two types: militarized or comprehensive.

One theoretically possible method of securitizing the environment is to define certain environmental changes as relevant to national security as long as armed conflict with other states is anticipated as a result of environmental degradation.
This pattern can be called the militarized type of securitization because environmental threats are clearly associated with military threats.

In the other type, environmental changes are regarded as relevant to national security whether or not armed conflict with other states is expected. Environmental degradation is perceived as a problem that may negatively affect the physical survival of a state. Since environmental degradation is one category among various types of security issues, this type of securitization is called the comprehensive type.

In brief, these two types provide different perspectives of securitization of the environment; while the militarized type regards the environment as one of the factors that affects military security in the traditional sense, the comprehensive type places both the environment and the military under one enlarged conception of security.

**Alliance and Environmental Security**

The securitization theory asserts that nonmilitary issues can be reframed as security issues depending on the social context and the changing perceptions of threat. According to this logic, the functions of an alliance depend not only on the distribution of power among states (in a strictly material sense) but also on the actors’ ideas of what constitutes threats and how to ameliorate the unfavorable conditions that surround these threats. How, then, do alliances react to threats from changes in the natural environment and how do they confirm their environmental security?

States have various means of addressing environmental challenges, of which the use of armed force is just one. Except in cases in which environmental
degradation directly causes armed conflict, armaments often prove to be useless when states attempt to handle environmental issues. Rather, states usually employ nonmilitary means in managing environmental issues. There is no denying, however, that the uniqueness of an alliance as an interstate institution comes from its role in providing military instruments. Allies, therefore, cannot fail to count on the use of physical force as an ultimate option, at least to some extent, when trying to solve problems originating in environmental degradation.

Following the different patterns of securitization in environmental issues, allies employ military means differently when they address environmental challenges; they either use the militarized approach or the comprehensive one. In the militarized type, the armed forces are the principal means of addressing the environmental issues, so that armed conflict with non-allied states due to environmental degradation can be prevented. In the latter case, allies prefer to resolve environmental issues by nonmilitary means since the link between environmental degradation and military insecurity has not been clearly recognized.

In sum, environmental challenges are approached differently by different alliances, depending on their pattern of securitization. While the militarized type features situations in which allies take military measures to prevent environmental degradation from causing armed conflict, the comprehensive type features the tendency of allies to improve the environment by employing nonmilitary means and by limiting the use of physical power.

**Case Studies**

The cases of NATO and of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War will be
comparatively analyzed in this section. NATO’s approach to environmental issues demonstrates the typical characteristics of the militarized model of securitization while the U.S.-Japan alliance provides one of the closest examples of the comprehensive model.

The NATO Case

By announcing its New Strategic Concept in November 1991 and April 1999, NATO defined as its post-Cold War role the maintenance of stability in Europe and the North Atlantic region and the focus on conflict prevention and crisis management. Various security challenges or risks, including the environment, were mentioned in the documents. A “comprehensive” or “broad” approach, which would require political as well as military means, was considered necessary to meet these new risks. What was unclear at this stage, however, were the specifics of environmental challenges, the mechanism by which they would produce instabilities in the region, and the ways of managing these environmental challenges.

The presidents and prime ministers of the allied states gathered in April, 2009 and discussed the new kind of global-scale challenges that they were facing, such as energy security, climate change, threats from terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They declared that all these may “have a negative impact on Allied and international security.” By strengthening

cooperation with other international organizations and by combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively, they would improve their “ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges.”\textsuperscript{11} NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in his address at Lloyd’s of London in October, 2009, stressed the “potentially huge security implications” that climate change may have and insisted that they “should start simply by bringing the security aspects of climate change to the table for discussion.” Following his own remarks that “the response cannot be exclusively military” and that “military aspects are really only one tool,” Mr. Rasmussen pointed out the need “to address the root cause” by working out “arrangements to share resources” and by facilitating measures such as preventive diplomacy, partnership with developing states, and “team efforts” between civilians and the military.\textsuperscript{12} NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General John Craddock, also proposed “a comprehensive policy” at the Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North in Reykjavik, Iceland, in January, 2009.\textsuperscript{13}

In brief, in the 1990s, NATO defined environmental challenges as potential factors that could threaten allied security. Also, in the recent process of revising NATO’s Strategic Concept, NATO officials have been referring in public to climate change and other specific environmental problems and have been proposing a comprehensive approach to meeting these challenges. This seems to justify the conclusion that NATO’s approach to environmental issues is of the comprehensive type, at least to some extent. Yet, the remarks of NATO officials with regard to how environmental degradation threatens allied security and what

\textsuperscript{11} “Declaration on Alliance Security,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, April 4, 2009.
\textsuperscript{12} Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Lloyds of London, October 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{13} Speech by General John Craddock at the Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North, January 29, 2009.
prescriptions are useful to meet these environmental challenges reveal a different, dominant tendency.

First, most discussions over environmental security in NATO are concerned with potential armed conflict with non-allied states due to environmental changes. Mr. Rasmussen, in his speech in October, 2009, enumerated phenomena such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, drought, and decrease in food production; he was worried about these phenomena inviting armed conflict by driving population movement and damaging their financial bases. It was the Darfur incident that had exemplified this logic; according to the secretary general, “climate change in Sudan has been a major contributor to this tragedy,” even when other factors such as political, religious, and ethnic ones have been taken into account. He also mentioned the “clear effect” of rising sea levels on the ability of NATO’s armed forces, citing the case of Diego Garcia, a British territory in the Indian Ocean and “an important logistical hub.”

The potential implications of climate change for geopolitical conditions in the Arctic region have been stressed most forcefully in this light. Admitting that the retreating ice “is not necessarily a threat” but “an opportunity,” Mr. Rasmussen indicated that “increased shipping means a greater need for search and rescue” and leads to competition for resources. The fact that the Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North was held tells of the high interest of NATO officials in this matter. General Craddock stressed “the need to think strategically when planning for security in the High North,” and warned that “many environmental and geopolitical developments in the Arctic have the potential to create conflict.”

Second, the expected measures to meet environmental challenges are “a unique
asset” of NATO, in Mr. Rasmussen’s words. These measures include military bases and facilities, armaments, and organizational arrangements. He estimated, in his address in January, 2009, that NATO’s “traditional security structures will have an important role to play.” Mr. Rasmussen also insisted that “the security implications of climate change need to be better integrated into national security and defence strategies”. The specific actions mentioned in his speech included the networking of intelligence agencies, preparation for natural and humanitarian disasters, military training, and capacity building with partnership countries, prudent planning, and improvement of the fuel efficiency of military vehicles. General Craddock, in his turn at the Reykjavik seminar, stated that “NATO could contribute greatly to facilitating cooperation in areas such as the development and security of shipping routes, energy security, surveillance and monitoring, search and rescue, resource exploration and mining, and crisis response, among others” as components of “a comprehensive policy that prevents strategic competition” in the High North.

In sum, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has shown a tendency to associate environmental challenges – in particular, climate change – with strategic conditions in the Arctic or the Atlantic Ocean, and to make good use of existing military assets such as armed forces and intelligence networks. In addition, NATO proposed to utilize the NATO-Russia Council, an institutional arrangement for confidence-building in the military field, as an arena for discussing environmental security. Judging from its inclination to recognize environmental degradation in terms of armed conflict and to emphasize the roles of organizational assets peculiar to alliances like military forces and facilities, NATO can be regarded as a classic example of the militarized type of securitization.
The U.S.-Japan Case

The U.S.-Japan alliance has also begun to perceive environmental challenges such as climate change as security issues and has tried to include these issues on its agendas. Yet, the difference in the securitization patterns of these alliances should not be dismissed; the U.S.-Japan case exemplifies the comprehensive model of securitization.

“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security” in April, 1996, like the New Strategic Concept of NATO in Europe in the 1990s, made it clear that the alliance assumed a role in stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War. Environmental degradation, however, was not mentioned in the declaration as a risk factor that may destabilize regional order.14)

The statements of the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) repeatedly referred to environmental challenges in the 2000s although its concern was limited to the prevention of environmental pollution originating in military bases. At the meeting in September, 2000, the U.S.-Japan alliance launched “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles,” which confirmed the need to reinforce cooperation in the field of environmental protection. The governments of the U.S. and Japan, which “recognize the increasing importance of protecting the environment,” affirmed their commitment, as a common goal, to investigating environmental problems in and around U.S. base facilities in

Japan and to making concerted efforts to protect the surrounding environment.\textsuperscript{15)}

In “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century,” which was issued at the summit meeting in June, 2006, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush pledged to work together on various global challenges including natural disaster response. They announced their intention to cope, within the framework of alliance, with environmental challenges, stating that they had “agreed to work on the interrelated challenges of energy security, clean development, reducing pollution, and climate change.”\textsuperscript{16)} This phrase, however, was enumerated along with other military and economic issues, and there was no account of the relationship between the military and the environment. In addition, measures to meet environmental challenges and the use of military means were not specified at all.

The successive summit meetings of the two allies demonstrated a similar tendency as they touched on environmental challenges in the context of alliance matters. “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperation to Tackle Global Trade, Energy, and Environmental Challenges,” published by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Bush in April, 2007, offered the logic that treating environmental issues could strengthen the security relations of the allies; “the two leaders continued to build on the strong alliance between the United States and Japan,

\textsuperscript{15) “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles,” announced at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, September 11, 2000. The joint statements at the 2+2 meetings in December, 2002 and February, 2005 referred to the environment in the same manner. The logic of these statements and that of the environmental security argument, however, contradict each other; while the former is concerned with preventing alliance behavior that affects the environment, the latter believes that environmental degradation may threaten the security of allies.}

\textsuperscript{16) “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century,” issued by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush, June 29, 2006.}
agreeing to work closely together to tackle critical global trade, energy, and environmental challenges.” It also proposed close cooperation in “an integrated approach to economic growth, energy security, and climate change.”17) At the summit meeting in July, 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and President Bush reaffirmed the view that the alliance had observed rapid deepening in various areas such as security, economy, and human exchange.” They agreed that in order to further deepen the alliance, it was important to facilitate closer cooperation in areas such as climate change.18) In February 2009, Prime Minister Taro Aso and President Barack H. Obama reaffirmed that the alliance was the foundation on which they would manage global challenges such as climate change and energy security, in concert.19)

In sum, the recent summits and ministerial meetings, in contrast with those in the 1990s, have shown an inclination to frame environmental issues within the alliance, offering the logic that the successful management of environmental challenges such as climate change may contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The role of the military, however, remains ambiguous. This can be interpreted as a sign that the U.S.-Japan alliance is likely to define the environment as a subfield of security and is likely to manage environmental issues with nonmilitary instruments, without anticipating specific armed conflict. In this sense, the U.S-Japan alliance is an illustrative example of the comprehensive type of securitization.

19) Outline of the summit meeting of Prime Minister Taro Aso and President Barack H. Obama, February 24, 2009.
Conclusion

This paper investigated two types of securitization in the environmental sector and the associated behavior patterns of alliances by studying the cases of NATO and the U.S. Japan alliance after the Cold War.

Theoretical examination indicates that the alliances attempt to improve environmental conditions because they recognize that their security may be affected by environmental challenges. In as early as the 1990s, NATO’s documents on its Strategic Concept pointed to the environment as one of the factors that might threaten its allies’ security and the stability of Europe. The U.S.-Japan alliance has also begun to follow this trend in recent years, acknowledging that the management of the environment can be a way of strengthening the alliance.

There are two types of environmental securitization, according to the relationship between the environment and the military. While NATO has recognized the possibility of armed conflict arising from environmental degradation and has begun to capitalize on its military assets, the U.S.-Japan alliance has shown its inclination to define the environment as equivalent to the military under the concept of security and it has avoided clear references to an exercise of military means. In brief, the case of NATO demonstrates an example of the militarized type and the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance shows an example of the comprehensive type.

There remains one question: if alliances try to manage the environment, what effect will their behavior have on international order? In other words, do alliances work as international environmental regimes and do they contribute to the stability of the international system? The implications of this paper’s
arguments need to be briefly considered.

An alliance consists of member states from a subset of states in the international system. By definition, an alliance cannot represent all the states in the world. This signifies that alliances, in principle, are arrangements formed and maintained by allies in order to secure their own national interests and not those of the entire international system. While the behavior of allies at times contributes, intentionally or unintentionally, to stability at the systemic level, it is likely to be interpreted by non-allied states as efforts to increase the national interests of the allies at the expense of other states. This logic holds true even when allies deal with environmental issues.20)

Nevertheless, the behavior of allies with regard to environmental issues may cause different degrees of concern on the part of non-allies, depending on the securitization pattern. In the case of the militarized type, military threats are clearly anticipated. Alliances take measures to improve the environment because allies recognize the negative effects on their strategic conditions. The non-allied states, in turn, may perceive these measures as potential threats to their military security. In brief, alliance behavior in environmental issues follows a similar logic to that in military issues. A competitive view may develop between allies and non-allies regarding environmental problems.

In the case of the comprehensive type, environmental challenges are not directly associated with military considerations, at least in the subjective calculations of allies. Allies take certain measures in order to meet environmental challenges

20) NATO seems to care about Russian concerns and seek to mitigate them. The proposal of an environmental partnership to Russia may be one of those efforts.
and not in order to improve military conditions. Non-allied states, however, may become concerned about disadvantages they face as a result of the behavior of the allies with regard to the environment. Even if serious military implications are not expected, the behavior of allies, after all, is driven by their own interests. Moreover, it is always possible that non-allies may misconstrue the comprehensive type behavior of allies as that of the militarized type due to the simple fact that the alliances hold ultimate, military options.

In sum, it is not obvious whether the international system will benefit from the management of the environment by alliances. Despite the important differences in the behavioral patterns associated with the two types of securitizations, misconceptions over military implications may arise in both cases, and relations between allies and non-allies may thus be aggravated. The attempts of allies to improve their environmental security may lead to their military insecurity.21)

References


21) The seriousness of this dilemma may depend on such factors as discrepancies in the military sector between allies and non-allies and/or shared threat perception in the environmental sector. The management of environmental challenges by alliances may be seen as a provision of international public goods, and cooperation between both parties may be facilitated (Odagiri 2009b). Further research with regard to the perceptions of non-allies such as China and Russia is necessary in order to specify these conditions.


Preliminary Remarks

As the first decade of the twenty first century comes to a close, the international system is confronted by opportunities, risks and threats that will invariably affect system stability in the coming years. For this reason, states and international organizations have no choice but to redefine their primary objectives. This reality is also evident in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance with its Treaty Organization (NATO) as it enters its seventh decade.

Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to briefly revisit NATO inception. NATO was established with the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949. By this treaty, twelve member states were wedded in an alliance whose aims were to protect their freedom, heritage and civilization as well as to strengthen the internal stability, prosperity and welfare.

1) Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.
It was with this broad political purpose that member states decided to combine their individual efforts to preserve peace and security on the basis of collective defence. The elimination of conflicts among the members was both a goal and a source of impetus for greater economic cooperation among them.

At a time when the concept of comprehensive security is becoming increasingly prevalent, it seems quite remarkable that the founding fathers of NATO had several decades ago recognized the magnitude of the social and economic reconstruction in Europe, and had committed themselves to common efforts.

This is not the place to trace the whole history of NATO. It is, however, worth mentioning that throughout the turbulent Cold War period of 1949-1989, the dynamics of NATO were very much underpinned by the controversial debates regarding security and defence issues. Perhaps it was this readiness to consult and debate in an open and frank manner which made NATO an attractive choice for additional nations also after the end of the Cold War.

The Alliance at Sixty

Two different views emerged months before and after the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009. On the one hand there are those who see NATO as an indispensable entity in a period of uncertainty whose framework (with the U.S. as world power) allows for crisis intervention and command and control of multi-national forces. They also see NATO as a valuable means of retaining the U.S. interests and presence in the strategic European theatre.

On the other hand there are those who expect NATO to fade away. In their view,
the alliance has lost its *raison d’être* since the demise of the Cold War. It could at best function as a reassurance asset for collective defence, since the new era requires a much more diversified set of instruments and a consensual decision for robust military intervention would become more difficult.

After the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit and in the middle of the work on the New Strategic Concept, one can identify amongst the member nations three groups of different strength.

The first group comprises those who see NATO - like the European Union (EU) - as a global player. That involves the will, readiness and the capability to confront transnational threats, crisis or conflict breeding developments preventively and timely in case vital interests of NATO members are at stake. The second group comprises those who identify a direct concern for their national security - not the least reinforced by the Russian war against Georgia in August 2008. They recognize a visible strengthening of the defence capability and defence readiness in the spirit of indivisible and equal security as vital for NATO cohesion. This background is imperative before they will agree to explore cooperative options with Russia. The third group are allies who consider the commitment for collective defence as a lynchpin of NATO, but they do not see a strong need for additional contingency plans or measures for the defence in Central-Eastern Europe beyond the integrated air defence. They argue with the limited resources and a less critical assessment of Russian intentions and capabilities. Beyond that, they are rather cautious in their appraisal as to whether, when and where NATO should engage in crisis prevention, resolution and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

If this presents a valid picture, it becomes obvious that the member states face an
urgent task to find a meaningful consensus for the New Strategic Concept and future crisis response measures.

**NATO’s Current Challenges**

In years to come, NATO will have to decide and act in dynamic situations that are at the same time volatile, uncertain, highly complex and ambiguous. For acting successfully in this context, the awareness of the diversity amongst the allies and their partners is equally essential as will be a clear analysis of the very different kinds of opposing elements, be it states, non-state actors or a mix of both.

In his work *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz offers helpful insights and principles for any continuous assessment of those complex, complicated and dynamic situations as well as the decision making processes. The political purpose, the goals for different means and the availability of assets and capabilities themselves have to be reflected upon, clarified, decided on and then put into action with determination and resolve.

His notion that wars, conflicts and crises are moulded by primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, the play of chance and probability and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, remains helpful to orient our reflection and action in the twenty first century. His well spelled out characteristics and requirements for personalities (“military genius”) that tackle dynamic, complex problems; and, of course, some specifics and basic requirements for armed forces that Clausewitz studied extensively still hold truth today.
The essential political purpose of the Alliance for the foreseeable future will remain to create, build and maintain a Europe that is united, free and at peace. And following the letter and the spirit of the Washington Treaty, the elements of stability, prosperity, security and effective protection of all members will remain the overarching political goals.

Thus, based on the potential international developments in the coming years, especially in relation to detailed assessments of chances, risks, threats and dangers, NATO will define its contribution to accomplish a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.

Stability and security will remain an important objective that can be pursued through a range of means. Under those auspices and geopolitically reaching beyond NATO territory, the alliance will decide what kind of responsibility and active contribution it is ready to take on in the area of crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in the existing conflicts or in potential crisis regions. In those deliberations, the vital interests will have to become the main theme to decide when and where action is advisable, necessary or even imperative - in standing up for our values, our civilization and our culture.

Two political notions from the conceptual work after the September 11 terrorist attacks will fuel and frame the current debate as well. The first is that the lengthy and controversial debate over “out of area” engagements was overcome with the agreed formula: “as and where required”. Secondly, for the work on a concept for the defence against transnational terrorism the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established an essential guiding principle: “that it is preferable to deter terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their consequences”.

320 COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
However, the three groups mentioned above prove that both notions have not yet led to a consensus on an operationalized, manageable concept for concrete situations. If NATO wants to limit or mitigate ever more difficult and cumbersome discussions on each individual situation, it has to work for an agreeable position in the New Strategic Concept. An extended definition of deterrence including the required steps to make it work will be necessary. Even more urgent will be progress for a concept regarding intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance for both police and military action.

Thus, I strongly encourage the members of NATO to work with the well established “two side medal” as a key orientation for the twenty-first century:

1. Cooperation & dialogue and
2. Collective defense and crisis response operations

This comprehensive guidance in an unsecure world requires within the Alliance to:

- strengthen solidarity,
- consult early and broadly and cooperate intensively,
- decide in common and act with resolve, determination and steadfastness.

**Cooperation with Others**

The dynamic, complex, complicated and very unpredictable situations in broad security terms have already made it a common place that NATO cannot and will not act in an isolated manner. Any New Strategic Concept that wants to accomplish the political purpose will require a multitude of non-military and
military measures, assets and capabilities. Most are delivered by states or international organizations but also by nongovernmental organizations tasked by those actors or independently.

Since I do not expect that consensus will be reached that nations make their non-military means available through NATO, it becomes obvious that - with 21 nations being members of NATO and the EU - the often declared complementarity has to be put to work now.

A Western Compact for Comprehensive Security: EU-U.S./North America-NATO

Today, a “Western compact for comprehensive security” requires a close coordination and cooperation between the EU, NATO, and North America (particularly the U.S. but also Canada). Although this is needed, it is not an end in itself. EU, NATO and the U.S. can build a security formation that is not uniform but one that understands that combining their different strengths and main efforts in the widely broadened field of security can create synergies for effects but also economy of efforts.

Based on the documents on NATO-EU cooperation from March 2003, and especially the EU-U.S. summit declarations of 2006, there exist many opportunities to start with:

- Evaluation of the strategy documents regarding political purpose and objectives to identify commonalities and differences; the goal remains a “Long-term Vision” for the “Western Compact on Security”;
Effort to commonly describe, analyse and assess the risks, threats and dangers that are to be faced, including close connectivity regarding early warning mechanisms;

Describe and assess different courses of action to tackle them and identify how each organization or nation/state can contribute most efficiently and effectively;

Development of military and civil capabilities and capacities through scenario-driven planning processes, if not in one single process, than with greater transparency amongst the organizations;

Early consultation to assess potential crisis situations and develop coordinated actions;

Develop compatible, interoperable military and civil command structures at the strategic and operational level;

Identify functional and regional areas (i.e. defence against transnational terrorism, internet security, piracy or the Balkans, Afghanistan etc.) where closer coordination and cooperation is advisable and necessary today.

Unfortunately, the unresolved Cyprus issue hampers, even prevents, visible progress. Thus, all EU member states as well as NATO are urged to actively work for a resolution rather than leaving it only to the U.N. and the parties on the ground.

U.N., OSCE, AU

Of course, consultation and specific cooperation with the U.N. in general as well as the OSCE and other regional organizations, like the African Union (AU) in particular have to be enhanced and strengthened in concrete crisis situations or
functional areas. The declaration between NATO and the U.N. which needed more than two years consideration at the U.N. can only be a starting point. The rather limited support of the AU in crisis response missions or training activities for peace support operations shows the reserve and restraint that still exists. In this area, a closer cooperation between EU and NATO could create added value for all.

**Relationship with Russia**

Based on a strong internal strategic consensus, a self-confident NATO can build and shape a reasonable relationship with Russia where Russian interests are considered but cannot - especially due to internal NATO disunity - play a dominant role.

Until August 2008, war seemed to be no option for a Great Power to enforce its own interests. The return of the use of force as a means of achieving objectives on the part of Russia as well as the direct and indirect consequences in the South Caucasus and beyond will most likely have repercussions on the future NATO-Russia relationship.

The resumption of the NATO-Russia Council meeting can hardly mean that Russian actions directed against the security in Europe are to be put up with as “fait accompli” and followed by a “business as usual” approach. Russia, as a strategic partner, cannot and must not be understood in a way that it can, step by step, force back strong principles and important interests of the West by the policy of “divide et impera”. This would endanger the security fabric of Europe as a whole. The focus cannot just be what suits Russia but what ensures the
independence and enables the free development of those states that gained their freedom in 1991. None of these states poses a risk or danger to Russia and, for that matter, neither does NATO. Russia’s cooperation in important issues, whether Iran, North Korea, terrorism or non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is appreciated and required, but it is not something to be suffered at all costs.

**Partner on a Global Scale**

The debate whether NATO could or should become a global player has led to the common understanding that in a world of increasingly globalized issues of security, it would be well advised to build partnerships beyond its peripheries.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, NCC back in 1991), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD, since 1995) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI, started at the Istanbul summit 2004) are all based on the conviction to build relations, coordination and cooperation in order to forge coalitions for the “non-cooperative situations” of tomorrow. Along these auspices, it would be desirable for NATO to work for regional and functional cooperation with Japan, a strong ally of the U.S., also key strategic actor in on the European scene.

In addition, closer political and military contacts with China, as a growing economic and political player on a global scale, should be on the work plan of NATO. Similar points hold true for India. This is all the more urgent as NATO is heavily engaged for over six years in Afghanistan, i.e. in the heart of Central Asia.

There are several other countries in Latin America, Asia and Australia seeking contact with NATO. Many of these contribute to NATO-led crisis response
missions in the Balkans or in Afghanistan. This is proof of the attractive force of an Alliance that owns a structure that can lead armed forces of many nations in a united effort to reach a common objective and thus, contribute to the mandated political purpose. The spectrum of the potential engagements in very different crisis response operations extends from peace support and stability operations to high intensity conflicts. The means and capabilities of those partners can help spread the burden of operations on more shoulders - an effect that cannot be disregarded at times of limited resources everywhere.

An alliance that has gained added strength through a newly built consensus on its raison d’être would be well advised not to turn down the contribution of those partners but rather look for ways to increase the consultation, training and employment opportunities with them. That serves not only an improved understanding and necessary interoperability but is building the coalitions of tomorrow, today.

All these regional and functional fields of cooperation and dialogue underline once again how urgently consultation, coordination and cooperation of NATO with the EU and North America require practical progress. The comprehensive approach in crisis management does not begin only after a UN Security Council Resolution has been agreed upon or on a NATO decision mandating a specific mission has been taken.

**NATO’s Level of Ambition**

The reflections on cooperation with the EU and other institutions and states form an essential element in framing and deciding a realistic level of ambition of
NATO that fits her political purpose. Of course, a solid and detailed analysis and assessment of risks, dangers and threats is another critical parameter in this process. Besides well-known threats, it has become increasingly obvious that climate change carries important security risks. The competition regarding available energy resources may not be limited to economic measures only. This clearly underlines that limiting our own security precautions against asymmetric threats and actions is not valid enough to prepare for “possible futures”. In such a complex and dynamic framework, the defence ministers will have to reassess and review the level of ambition they stated in June 2006.

Non-military requirements will become an important ingredient in the capability planning process. This is indispensable notwithstanding the notion, that their deployment and employment in crisis regions will not be accomplished through NATO due to its missing consensus. Thus, NATO will have to further reflect and widen its “comprehensive approach”. A new version or at least a critical adaptation of the “Comprehensive Political Guidance” will become necessary. The Ministerial Guidance, the Basic Document of the Defence Planning Committee, will then have to be reconsidered, too.

Structures, Procedures, and Capabilities

Besides a strong consensus of the overall political purpose and the objectives in concrete situations, a mighty and pro-active NATO needs, first, the political will to decide and the resolve to see it through; and secondly, the required means, assets and capabilities, efficient and effective multinational structure and well established and trained procedures from the strategic to the tactical level of command.
Since the 1990s, NATO has identified a number of critical capability gaps. But all the initiatives, like the 1999 “Defence Capability Initiative” (DCI) and the 2002 “Prague Capability Commitment” (PCC) have not resulted in closing those gaps in the structures of the European allies. Budget constraints and insufficient cooperation in research and development and armament acquisition processes are two important obstacles. Strategic air and sea transport, compatible capabilities for command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and improved tactical and theatre missile defence are just a few areas where both in NATO and the EU the gaps remain essentially the same.

A look at the NATO Command Structure (NCS) does not present a satisfying picture either. Since the 1990s, each reform of the NCS was overtaken by the next before it had been properly implemented. This gave reason for the impression that many nations called for reform because they could neither assign the adequate number and quality of personnel nor provide sufficient funding for modern and effective equipment. The distance from an effective and efficient structure grew and grows even further apart since all states want to find an element of the remaining headquarters or elements on their territory and those who own them don’t want to give one up easily. The return of France to the NCS with about 400-500 personnel will not dramatically change these existing difficulties.

In addition, the 2006 level of ambition stated the readiness for 5-6 “smaller operations”. This requires multinational division and brigade headquarters as part of the NATO Force Structure (NFS), manned and equipped by respective nations. Since the available personnel for multinational structures is a finite number in all nations, there will again be repercussions on the NCS. The nations will have to come to grip with the Gordian knot of mutually exclusive
requirements, if they are not to permanently administer the shortage and will finally put the lives of employed soldiers at risk through suboptimal command structures.

An alliance of 28 nations represents a great diversity, also in “military cultures” This impacts in many ways on planning and employment procedures. Despite decades of standardization efforts and the many activities to bring doctrines and procedures in line with each other, it remains a permanent challenge in today’s complex missions to build and ensure as best as possible the integrated leadership of the national armed forces and services in an indispensable multinational framework.

**Concluding Remarks**

Under the circumstances described and in view of its political purpose, the political North-Atlantic Alliance cannot restrict itself to the territory of the member states in a traditional sense. Like the EU, NATO has to become a global player without playing a part everywhere.

However, its political purpose would be best served if it is able to utilise cooperation and dialogue effectively, especially in forging tomorrows coalitions today, and by its ability to maintain and improves adequate military and non-military capabilities for crisis response operations and collective defence.

In any case, NATO has to foster internal consensus as critical basis for her political clout through determination and steadfastness under critical circumstances.
Since in present day conflicts and crises, interests, passions and interaction are not limited to two opposing states or nations but are extended to a greater number and variety of critical actors, be it governments, international organisations or non state actors (friendly or opposing), NATO will have to reflect and decide in an unambiguous manner what its particular and peculiar contribution to a crisis management action will be before a consensual decision is taken.

From a Western point of view, crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction can most likely be tackled with a perspective of success, if NATO and the EU as well as the EU and the U.S. can decide on a concerted approach. Presently, in relation to most security policy challenges within the alliance as well as within the EU, “strategic unity” does not yet exist. Critical efforts are required to build a consensus on issues like enlargement/open door of both NATO and EU, strategic missile defense in and for Europe, a constructive relationship with Russia and a sound regional concept for Afghanistan not to mention the wider strategic concerns related to the Middle East or Africa.

All said and done, a lot of efforts have to be taken. The alliance should - like the EU - have the resolve to become “more capable, more coherent and more active”. In addition it should master the upcoming challenges with determination, in close cooperation and indivisible solidarity.

Finally, NATO and the EU will have to overcome small and large disputes on broader security issues. Only if this is achievable and a reasonable EU-U.S. cooperation particularly on security issues develops, the West can reach, maintain and possibly strengthen its geostrategic and geopolitical role in shaping
the future world order based on greater stability and peace. This will create a basis from which to reach out intensively to our Asian partners whom we need and who need us.
PART SEVEN

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES

CHAPTER 15
COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
Javed Maswood

CHAPTER 16
ECONOMIC CRISIS AS A SECURITY THREAT
M Ramesh

CHAPTER 17
OECD AND UN ON HUMAN SECURITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE WORLD
Eun Mee Kim, Jae Eun Lee, Jin Kyung Kim, and Su Youn Jang
The late Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme is credited with developing the concept of “comprehensive security” but it was perhaps first introduced into political practice by the Japanese government in the late 1970s. This paper on economic security deals with one aspect of comprehensive economic security. As noted by Yukiko Miyagi (2008: 9), comprehensive security, including for instance economic, environmental, energy and resource security, broadens the traditional understanding of security as physical security. Traditionally, security studies have focused on military issues and security threats interpreted essentially as existential threats. For traditionalists, comprehensive security was an anathema because economic or resource threats are rarely, if ever, existential threats to the survival of a referent object, usually the state (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). Traditionalists eventually accepted a wider view of security but “only inasmuch as it could be linked to concerns about the threat or actual use of force between political actors.” (Ibid, p.3)

But unlike the traditionalist and those who accepted a wider definition of security but only if it could be related to force and military security, the Japanese
approach was to dissociate the military dimension of security from the other components of comprehensive security. Thus, if the traditionalists understood security in terms of threats to a state, comprehensive security is better understood as ensuring the needs of citizens from external threats in a way that also strengthens regime security and stability. Indeed, comprehensive security included an aversion to threat designation and its corollary, omni-directional diplomacy, also proposed by Ohira, meant that Japanese foreign policy was geared to improving diplomatic tied with all countries with a view to reducing existential security threats.

In advocating comprehensive security, the Japanese government tried to convey the message that even if its national defense budget was small by international standards, it was still contributing to overall western security by focusing on the stabilizing global energy and resource regimes, etc. The overall attraction of this new concept was that it achieved a number of different goals and objectives. For instance, comprehensive security was:

1. Clever deflection of western pressure for Japan to substantially increase its military spending and contribute more to alliance security in a way commensurate to its economic capacity. Japan continued to be accused of taking a “free ride” on western security efforts but now the Japanese government had a useful tool to resist pressure to increase military spending.

2. Clever domestic politics that allowed for a more reasoned debates on matters of national security. Chapman, Drifte and Gow (1982: 232) point out that it provided a vehicle for domestic consensus on security and for the “emergence of a cooler and more rational response to the issue of defense than at any time in the post-war era.” It also meant that security
debates were no longer framed in purely military terms.

3. Clever legitimating of East Asian development states that were focused on economic growth and prosperity. The notion of economic security, as a subset of comprehensive security was perfectly compatible with the nature of developmental states in East Asia. However, following the demise of developmental states, economic security passed into the new narrative of globalization and market liberalization.

4. Clever attempt at ensuring regime security. When the notion of comprehensive security was espoused by Prime Minister Ohira in the late 1970s, the long established hold on political power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was seemingly unraveling as a result of political and financial scandals. In the 1980 general elections, LDP was heading for defeat and was only returned to power when Ohira died in the middle of the election campaign, prompting a surge of sympathy votes. Indeed the LDP was returned to power in a way that significantly added to its electoral strength in the national Parliament.

In subsequent years, comprehensive security dominated discussions of security in Japan and it presented a view to the rest of the world that even though Japan’s defense budget was small by international standards, it was still contributing to comprehensive western security by focusing, for instance, on the economic dimension of security.

The narrative of comprehensive security has served Japanese interests well and in the post-Cold War period, as the threat of major global military conflict, has receded so has the concept of comprehensive security acquired greater significance. The idea that the state has a function in ensuring economic security – a key component of comprehensive security – has greater resonance in the
context of a succession of economic crises in both developed and developing
countries. In the aftermath of the contemporary global financial crisis, it may
appear that globalization has severe negative consequences and that it increases
economic insecurity rather than economic security, but I will argue in this paper,
that crises notwithstanding, there is unlikely to be a weakening of the consensus
around liberal market principles.

Whereas traditional security focused on the physical survivability of individuals
and the role of state in extending a protective security umbrella, economic
security referred to the state’s role in ensuring secure livelihood for its citizens
through policies designed to generate sound economic growth. The success of
economic security policies can therefore enhance regime legitimacy and security.
For Japan, economic security and success of its industries are intricately linked to
secure energy and resource supplies and, not surprisingly, the government
consciously focused on stable and improved relations with Third World countries
in general and the oil producing countries in particular. The oil producing Middle
Eastern countries had already used their resource strength to disrupt western
economies and Japan sought to reassure its critics that despite relatively small
defense spending, Japan was contributing, through other means, to enhance
western and its own security, rather than taking a free ride on the West.
Consequently, the Japanese government emphasized both its foreign aid program
and pacific and “omni-directional” diplomacy as its unique contributions to
comprehensive global security. Comprehensive economic security can be
likened to geonomics, which combined “both macro-level economic power
management and micro-level implications for individual states caught in the
shifting power game” (Hsiung, Undated: 5).

On a regional and global scale, Japan’s contribution to comprehensive economic
security might be understood as efforts to deal with potential or actual sources of economic and political instability. Threat management was not only centered around foreign aid and diplomatic initiatives to stabilize international economic relations and to prevent disruptions to economic growth, but also became manifest in attempts to create a robust economic architecture to forestall future threats, such as the proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 to prevent future financial crises.

Importantly for Japan, comprehensive security not only deflected western concerns over Japan’s presumed “free” or “cheap” ride on western security guarantees but also passed the “goodness of fit” test with respect to developmental states in Asia. Comprehensive economic security allowed these developmental states to rationalize their existence in terms of a broader social context of national security, because through functional state intervention in the market they were presumably engaged in enhancing the economic security of their citizens. This was an important defense against the neoclassical critique, even as the latter extended its global dominance in the aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis of 1982.

However, in the late 1980s, the Japanese developmental state veered off track with speculative economic expansion that showed a clear disconnect with existing economic realities, leading to a spike in asset prices (share markets and real estate). High growth in the 1960s had earned Japan the label of a “miracle economy” and in the late 1980s, Japan was being celebrated as a potential No. 1, a potential that it was ultimately unable to fulfill. After the Japanese economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, Japanese companies and financial institutions helped reproduce the economic bubble on a regional scale with a flood of foreign investment. There was also large speculative capital flow, for instance through
off-shore banking facilities in Thailand. When the speculative flow of capital was suddenly reversed in 1997, it led to downward pressure on exchange rates that then triggered the financial crisis.

The flight of capital and plunging exchange rates turned the financial crisis into a real economic crisis and later into a political crisis as well. Many of the crisis countries submitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality and the process of structural adjustment rendered obsolete the dual strategy of comprehensive security and developmental states. These final few countries that had held out since the onset of the Latin American debt crisis were finally forced to accept the discipline of a global economy. Globalization and the neoclassical economic paradigm did not allow for the possibility of developmental states or of states standing as guarantors of economic security, as part of the umbrella concept of comprehensive security. In its place, economic globalization was heralded as ensuring ideal environmental conditions for states to achieve development, industrialization and growth by trading and participating in the global economy. This spelled the end of developmental states but the notion of economic security was incorporated into the new economic model. The assumption was that states will have access to international markets to pursue a trade-led growth strategy. Developing countries in Asia and elsewhere were dragged into participating in the global economy with promises of economic development and security, even though the global economy as it was structured denied many developing countries access to foreign markets for their primary exports through either high average tariffs or escalating tariff scales.

Evidence of success for neoclassical growth strategies, encapsulated in the Washington Consensus, was the high growth rate achieved by developing countries. Reports commissioned by the World Bank and the IMF regularly
confirmed the advantages of economic globalization for developing countries. That these results were skewed because aggregate statistical data included the two large economies of China and India, seemed not to matter, nor the fact that many African countries and smaller economies found the transition to neoclassical market principles difficult and detrimental to their fledgling industries. But paradigm hegemony had been achieved and an ahistorical theoretical model could not be made sensitive to situational needs. Alongside critics of globalization in developing countries, there are as well critics in developed countries who express concerns about:

1. The hollowing-out effect on domestic industries manufacturing is relocated to cheaper production platforms, and
2. The race to the bottom, a reversal of hard fought social and economic gains triggered by competition from low-cost exporter, like China.

Crises can be excellent turning points and while the global economy has suffered a series of setback in recent years, it is difficult to foresee a breakdown of liberal market principles. This is because many of the crises have been relatively short-lived and countries have managed to exit from a regional or global crisis relatively quickly, if painfully. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a significant setback for several countries but recovery was faster than expected.

Following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, leaders of the leading economies came together to form a Group of Twenty, a G20 (separate from the G20 grouping of developing countries that was formed in 2003 to pressure developed countries into making concessions in the Doha Round of global trade negotiations) to find and implement collective solutions to the crisis. At their first summit in London in April 2009, the G20 leaders committed themselves to
“refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new restrictions, or implementing WTO inconsistent measures to stimulate exports”, until the end of 2010. This was a general promise to avoid “beggar thy neighbor” policies. The OECD also emphasized the importance of a continued commitment to openness. Director of OECD Trade and Agriculture, Ken Ash, said that countries that had liberalized various sectors the most had performed the best in economic terms. He argued that protectionism was the wrong thing to do. Because when governments resort to trade closure “they impose costs on households, they impose costs on businesses, they choke off markets and they get the exact opposite effect of what they want. What they want they will get, if they open markets further.” Similarly, Director General of the WTO Pascal Lamy said, “one of the important lessons of the Great Depression, which we must not forget, is that ‘protectionism’ and economic isolationism do not work. They are policies of the past, which should have no place in our future.” However, on the other hand, large trade surpluses in China, about 9 per cent of its GDP, and elsewhere have become a lightening rod for critics who advocate protectionism.

Promises notwithstanding, advanced industrial countries (G8 member states) have resorted to increased protectionism and export subsidies that have been detrimental to developing countries. Global Trade Alert, a non-profit organization set up in 2008 to monitor G20 commitments, concluded in its 2009 report that the:

… protectionist juggernaut has not lost any of its momentum. In each quarter of 2009 approximately 70 state initiatives have been implemented that contain measures which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. Worldwide, since November 2008 the GTA team has found that of the 280 state initiatives that have actually been
implemented, a total of 192 of them have tilted the playing field towards domestic commercial interests at the expense of foreigners or have discriminated between foreigners. Another 48 state initiatives have been implemented that are suspicious and are likely to discriminate against at least some foreign commercial interests. (Evenett 2009: 2)

The following table prepared from data produced by Global Trade Alert documents the series of protectionist measures adopted by G8 member countries and which belie their commitment to maintain trade openness.

**TABLE 1**

**G8 PROTECTIONIST MEASURES SINCE 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total Measures Applied by G8 Countries</th>
<th>Percentage Share From All Measures</th>
<th>Countries Harmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bail Out/State Aid</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32 per cent</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 per cent</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Defense</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14 per cent</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Procurement/Buy National Policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 per cent</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Tariff Barrier</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5 per cent</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5 per cent</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Subsidy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4 per cent</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 per cent</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Taxes or Restrictions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 per cent</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import Ban</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 per cent</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Global Trade Alert, 2009*

In all fairness, it should be noted that it is not simply the advanced G8 countries that are in breach of their G20 commitments. Among developing country
members of the G20, India introduced a 30 per cent safeguard duty on Chinese exports of aluminum and extended import bans on Chinese dairy products. Likewise, Argentina slowed down the process of issuing import licenses and Ecuador too imposed safeguards duties on Colombian exports. Such resort to protectionism has not gone unchallenged with China threatening retaliation against India and Ecuador being forced, by the Andean Community, to gradually withdraw its safeguard duties.

As to be expected, trade – the driver of growth and provider of economic security – has fallen since the onset of the crisis. In the U.S., for example, average monthly trade in the first half of 2008 was about $300 billion (imports at around $170 billion and exports at $110 billion) but a year later monthly trade levels had fallen to US$200 billion (imports at around $120 billion and exports at $80 billion). The fall in imports is significantly larger and no doubt has had detrimental impact on developing countries that rely on the US markets for their exports. According to the WTO, total trade levels in 2009 are expected to drop by 10 per cent over the previous year, and include a fall of about 14 per cent in exports from developed countries and a smaller decline of 7 per cent in exports from developing countries. This decline in trade has negative consequences for developing countries but much of the fall may be attributed more to the slowdown in global economic activity than to any drastic increase of protectionism. Part of the reason is that, as observed by Pascal Lamy (2009), our “production processes are so globalized that a country’s import tariff could well penalize imports from one of its own global companies.”

Whatever the reasons, the fall in trade reminds us of the vulnerability of states in the global system. Countries that embraced globalization in the expectation that trade opportunities will lead to growth and development now confront a situation
where globalization, instead of being a linear pathway to economic security has, instead, become a complex source of both economic growth and of economic insecurity and crisis. And, developing countries in particular, having been dragged into participation in the global economy have no real capacity to shield themselves from external shocks.

However, while the contemporary financial crisis has exposed the vulnerabilities in the global economy, this too is unlikely to trigger a reversal of economic globalization, even though there has been some return to protectionism and trade barriers. A prolonged economic downturn may undermine the legitimacy of economic orthodoxy but there is enough evidence to suggest a modest recovery in 2010. Moreover, while there is seemingly little that states can do to shield themselves from externally generated crises, we cannot completely dismiss agency. States do have choices which determine, in turn, whether they do well or poorly in crises. In the contemporary global financial crisis, Dubai appears to be particularly hard hit but it is incredible also that policymakers ignored the lessons of the 1997 Asian crisis and chose instead to hastily emulate Thailand in a grand design to become a regional financial and tourism hub. Unlike Dubai, Brazil fared better in the financial crisis and due in part to decisions by the government of Brazil to control capital flows, much like Malaysia in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 crisis. Malaysia was criticized for its action, as was Brazil for defying the globalization of capital but what worked for Brazil was the requirement that global banks wanting to operate in Brazil should establish an independent subsidiary with its own capital base, rather than through a foreign branch operation. The practical consequence of this was that Brazilian regulators were able to monitor these subsidiaries as local banks, and control for capital flight that might trigger a domestic crisis. On the other hand, operating through a branch in London, Lehman Brothers was able to remove billions of dollars in...
assets just before its collapse and which the British authorities have been unable to retrieve.

A capital flight of that scale in developing countries would have had serious consequences but, luckily, there is now greater support for appropriate regulatory interventions to prevent capital flight when a crisis becomes imminent or in the early days of a crisis. Even in this age of globalization there is ample scope for state-based regulatory measures. Indeed, it has been suggested that one reason why China has fared better is because of the large state sector that contributes 43 per cent of fixed asset investments and 60 per cent of total banking assets, giving it considerable capacity to influence the drivers of the Chinese economy to adopt heavily growth-oriented policies.

At the same time, despite some creeping protectionism, it is remarkable that the financial crisis has not resulted in a significant repeal of trade openness or a sharp spike in trade protectionism. Even if globalization can compromise the economic security of countries through the conflagration effect of financial and economic crises, solutions are unlikely to be found in economic strategies of the past, with reliance either on insular policies or in state intervention in markets. We may never do away with crises but so far the international community has managed to avoid prolonged crises. The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a significant setback to several East Asian economies but recovery for most economies was rapid and quick. Similarly the current financial crisis appears already to have moved beyond the bottom of the cycle. In its *East Asia and Pacific Update* issued in November 2009, the World Bank noted that economic growth rate for East Asian countries will slow to 6.7 per cent for 2009, down from 8 per cent in 2008. Again, such aggregate data are misleading and the World Bank pointed the dismal outlook for East Asia if China is excluded from
such aggregate growth states. The Update noted that in 2009 East Asia will grow at a pace slower than in South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, and only modestly faster than for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Still, for selected East Asian countries, trade growth shows evidence of a rebound and this will filter through to growth forecasts for the coming year. Malaysia, a developing country that relies on exports for GDP growth has seen a significant recovery in exports in recent months although total trade levels have yet to reach pre-crisis levels.

**TABLE 2**

Malaysian Export Growth (Month-on-Month basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>4.5 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>5.1 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8.4 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite some encouraging evidence, recovery has been patchy and remains, also fragile. A sudden shock could easily reverse the positive trends but barring a long and sustained economic downturn, there is not likely to be a significant erosion of legitimacy for the neoclassical economic model or for engaging with the global economy. Globalization will always contain within itself the seeds of rapid conflagration but globalization can not be wound back because of the spread of global production networks, nor is it realistic for countries to completely break with globalization to pursue insular strategies. The recurrence of crises notwithstanding, it is clear that duration of crises is relatively short and the setbacks, when they do occur are no reason, except perhaps for some of the least developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, to disengage from the benefits that accrue from globalization.
Finally, let me add that crises, despite their immediate negative consequences, also provide opportunities to countries to continue to innovate and reposition themselves in the global economy. There is a functional aspect to all crises in that they identify existing weaknesses and allow for remedial action in order to ensure sustainable growth into the future.

**Conclusion**

Globalization has been beneficial but it has also brought about an environment of pervasive instability. Kurt Radtke (2000: 40) plays on the “mutually assured destruction” of the Cold War period to suggest that we have now entered a period of MAI or “mutually assured instability”. Globalization has accelerated the pace with which destabilizing market forces are spread through the system and while globalization has undoubtedly been beneficial to most countries, they have had to contend with periodic instability and crises. At the same time, states because of their participation in the global economy, have fewer policy tools at their disposal to safeguard national economic stability. Thus, while economic security as a subset of comprehensive security implied that the state had a particular responsibility to safeguard national economic prosperity, globalization has made it difficult to shield from instability generated elsewhere within the global system. Nonetheless, the path of self-reliant autarky also is a non-option because of the benefits that accrue from participating in the global economy. In that context, the best that states can do is engage in responsible risk management strategies, which means learning from the mistakes of Thailand and Dubai, and learning the lessons of Malaysia and Brazil.
References


The economists’ oblivion towards the blow to their understanding of the world dealt by economic crisis is paralleled only by the security specialists’ perception of their subject area. While security scholars debate whether the state or the individual is the primary locus of their inquiry, a pervasive threat to both looms large. The lack of appreciation of the threat posed by economic crisis continues despite the strides made in recognizing that units other than the sanctity of the state matter. Yet the literature still does not sufficiently appreciate the congenital links between the wellbeing of states and individuals. Global economic crises have brought into sharp relief the inextricable links between the two in that they threaten both states and individuals. Security studies need to broaden their understanding and take into account the multi-layered and multi-dimensional nature of the insecurity posed by economic crisis.

In the security literature, economic crisis is usually lumped under “economic security” which has traditionally been defined as maintaining or promoting national economic interests. This is a misleadingly state-centric conception. Economic crises may well threaten national interest, but one of their main effects
is the comprehensive and widespread havoc they cause for households and societies they afflict.

The concept of human security defined as “freedom from want” is also ill-conceived in that it focuses on individuals and, as such, overlooks the multidimensional adverse effects of economic crisis on the society and the state. Economic crisis are not just about poverty at the household level: they erode social fabric, undermine regimes, erode public health care, and pollute the environment. Global economic crisis pose a comprehensive threat to all levels and aspects of society.

The expanded understanding of security is consistent with contemporary thinking in the discipline which acknowledges two contradictory developments. On the one hand, there has been a move towards recognizing the global sources of instabilities that aggravate the insecurities faced by states, societies and individuals. On the other hand, there is a growing recognition of the individuals’ need for a protection against conditions that undermine their wellbeing. The threats posed by economic crisis are at the same time both global and local in their source as well as effects.

Global economic crisis are not odd isolated events but an integral part of the contemporary global political-economic architecture. Over the last five decades outside war-torn countries, economic crises have undermined people’s security more severely and more frequently than military, political, terrorist, and environmental crises.

The threat of economic crisis is older, more imminent, frequent and expensive to deal with. The origin of economic crises as a comprehensive threat to security
started before the end of Cold War, the supposed shift away from military to broader conceptions of security. The real turning point was the collapse of Bretton Woods arrangements which inaugurated monetary liberalization and the ensuing relaxation of cross-border investment rules. The establishment of international production chains and the proliferation of internet technology reinforced the emerging order. The end of the Cold War was more important for the military complex and the academics studying them rather than people, whose everyday lives are more affected by economic conditions than military conditions.

Southeast Asia has been struck by three economic crises in the last two decades: 1986-87, 1997-98, 2008-09. While there are significant differences among the three crises in terms of causes, geographic spread, and chronology, they all have had grave economic and social consequences. The lessons of these crises offer an excellent opportunity for assessing their effects on the security and wellbeing of states and their constitutive societies.

In this paper we will examine the economic crisis and its social effects in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It will argue that the lack of social protection system in the region when the crisis erupted in 1997 put the population at risk of a social catastrophe due to lack of an adequate social protection system. The catastrophe was averted only after governments hurriedly expanded their social protection with substantial help from international organization. The current crisis is yet again confirming the need for social protection mechanisms, as governments are in the process of devising a response. It is unfortunate that not all governments in the region used the lessons of the 1997/98 to establish a comprehensive social protection system to face the current and future crises. With the frequency and intensity of crises increasing,
governments need to establish a social protection system that automatically springs into action in the event of widespread decline in income, regardless of the cause. The essence of such a system will be similar to the measures societies have in place to protect themselves against fire, natural disasters, and bank failures.

Fluctuating Economic Conditions in Asia

There are vast differences in the income levels of the five countries covered here. Singapore is one of the richest countries in the world, with per capita income exceeding ten times that of Indonesia and the Philippines, the two low income countries in the group. Malaysia is an upper middle income country while Thailand is a mid middle income country.

1. GDP Per Capita, purchasing-power-parity

IMF, World Economic Outlook,
The current economic crisis is characterized by growth patterns somewhat different from a decade ago. During the previous crisis, Indonesia and Thailand were worst affected while the Philippines and Singapore were only slightly affected. In 1998, GDP shrunk by 13 percent in Indonesia, 10.5 percent in Thailand, 7.4 percent in Malaysia, followed by negligible decline in Singapore and the Philippines. In terms of severity, the decline in Indonesia and Thailand has few contemporary parallels. The latest economic forecast issued by the IMF in April 2009 is a significant downgrade from the one issued at the end of January which itself was a major downgrade from one issued only two months earlier. In a reverse image of the preceding crisis, Singapore is expected to be most severely affected while Indonesia has the best performing economy.

2. Economic Growth

https://sdb.s.org/sdbs/index.jsp;
Unlike the 1997/98 crisis which had multiple domestic and international causes, the current crisis in Asia is rooted largely in shrinking global economy and the related decline in exports and investment. The more a country depends on exports, the more adversely it is affected by the current crisis. In early 2009, exports dipped by as much as 41 percent in these countries. The exception is Thailand, where exports declined by a more modest 28 percent but the decline in growth was severe due to political turmoil in the country. In the case of Indonesia and Philippines, however, the decline in exports has not been accompanied by a similar decline in growth rate due to their relatively smaller dependence on exports. The current situation is very different from the earlier crisis when exports actually grew in 1998 in all countries except Indonesia without which they would have been in even worse situation.

3. Exports, annual % growth

![Graph showing exports growth]

Source: https://sdsb.adb.org/sdsb/index.jsp

The affects of declining growth rate are aggravated if accompanied by rising prices. The effects of the 1997/98 crisis were aggravated by increase in consumer
prices in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was particularly affected, where it increased by 77 percent in 1998, followed by Philippines where it increased by 10 percent. Prices have not increased by the same margin during the current crisis, though it is substantial. The substantial increase in consumer prices in 2008 – of as much as 12 percent in Indonesia and the Philippines and of 6-7 percent in Malaysia and Singapore – was the result of historically high petroleum and food prices that year. Both petroleum and food prices have fallen substantially this year and so inflationary pressures are likely to be low during the rest of the current crisis.

4. Inflation Rate


Source: https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp
The current economic crisis follows in the heels of energy and food crisis. Price of fossil fuels – oil, natural gas, coal – and electricity rose steeply in 2006-2008, imposing tremendous stress on governments and households’ budgets. Inflation adjusted price of a barrel of crude oil on NYMEX more than doubled to $60 between 2003 and 2005 and then climbed above $140 in July 2008. But they began to decline as signs of economic slowdown erupted and within a few months was trading below $50. Oil prices have a disproportionate impact on the economy because it is an intermediate product to a range of agricultural, industrial, and infrastructure industries: the effects of significant price fluctuations in oil prices are typically felt throughout the economy. The recent decline in prices is undoubtedly helpful but its beneficial effects are offset by the prevailing financial crisis.

5. Petroleum and Food Prices, 2005 = 100

http://indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=food-price-index&months=180

Food is the largest expenditure item for the poor and, as such, food prices have disproportionate effect on their living standards. In Indonesia, food prices rose by 81 percent in 1998 and 25 percent in the following year, thus severely affecting
the already suffering poor population. The increase was far less steep in other
countries, where food prices went up by less than 10 percent in 1998. These are
devastating increases in societies suffering from declining employment and
income. The current crisis was preceded by massive increase in global food
prices. Between 2004 and 2008, price of wheat, maize and especially rice
increased steeply, but have declined by as much as 40 percent in recent months.
Nevertheless, they remain high relative to longer-term trends and are subject to
severe fluctuations.

The recent decline in petroleum and food prices is one of the bright spots in the
current economic horizon. In the middle of 2008, when both prices had reached
historic highs, there were fears that the high price of the two essential
commodities would push millions into poverty. Unfortunately, the decline in
food and oil prices in late 2008 was associated with, and indeed triggered by,
slowing economy.

Decline in economic growth is, expectedly, accompanied by increase in
unemployment. Southeast Asian countries, except for the Philippines, have had
low or negligible unemployment rate which rose during the crisis. In 1998,
unemployment rose by 17 percent over the preceding year in Indonesia and
Philippines, 31 percent in Malaysia, and 189 percent in Thailand. The decline in
Thailand was particularly dramatic, which had nearly full employment in 1997.
Little is known about the current unemployment situation in Asia, though with
declining growth rate, it would be reasonable to expect significant rise in
unemployment. However, Singapore, which is by far the most severely affected
by the current crisis, has a substantial (amounting to as much as a quarter of the
total) foreign labour force and so has some cushion against massive rise in
unemployment.
What is not captured in the unemployment data is under-employment. It is believed that due to the absence of unemployment benefits, in difficult economic times many laid off workers in the affected countries simply reduce the hours they work or shift to the informal sector on a part-time basis. This is believed to be particularly true in countries with large agricultural sectors, such as Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, underemployment rose from 37 percent of labour force in 1996 to approximately one-half in 1998, whereas in Thailand it rose from 1.7 percent in 1998 to 3.6 percent in 1999 (http://www.jri.co.jp/english/thinktank/research/aer/2000/AERe200003unemploy.html).

The economic slowdown during the 1990s crisis was accompanied by increase in poverty, with the $1/day poverty headcount index increasing from 15.1 to 15.9 in developing East Asia between 1996 and 1999 (Atine 2003). However, the most significant impact is discernible in $2/day poverty headcount index: by this
measure, poverty increased from 50.9 to 51.2 in developing East Asia and from 43.6 to 52.8 in Southeast Asia over the 1996-1999 period. This confirms that there were a lot of people in the adversely affected countries living just above the poverty line who were pushed under it by the crisis. It is estimated that between 1997 and 1998 poverty rate increased from 11.3 to 18.2 percent in Indonesia, from 8 to 10 percent in Malaysia, and from 10 to 13 percent in Thailand (http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if022h5.pdf). Even after the recovery from the 1990s crisis, there were a lot of vulnerable people in the region, as the table below shows.

7. Poverty Headcount Ratio (PPP) 2003 (Percentage of Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$1 a day</th>
<th>$2 a day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://sdfs.adb.org/

It is still early to estimate the effects of the current crisis on the poor. In the recent forecast issued in February 2009, the World Bank estimated that as many as 53 million additional people could be trapped in poverty due to the economic crisis (World Bank, News & Broadcast  February 12, 2009). It further predicted that 200,000 - 400,000 more babies could die each year between now and 2015 if the
crisis persists. In Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines are particularly vulnerable to increased poverty. Singapore does not publish poverty data and so it is impossible to estimate the poverty situation in the island state during the previous or the current crisis.

There was a sharp deterioration in stock and property market indices in the late 2008 and early 2009 which led to seriously pessimistic consumer sentiments. Foreign investors fled the region quite early into the crisis which nearly halved, compared to the 2007 peak, the inflow of foreign equity, loan, and bond into the region (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/12/miniane.htm).

8. Stock Index Performance as of 21 April 2009, % Annual Average Change

The decline in asset prices and consumer confidence has undermined business confidence, as shown in the following graph, which will further aggravate economic woes.
Weak business confidence is self-fulfilling: if businesses don’t feel confident, they withhold investments, which adversely affects production and income. Current economic conditions are unlikely to improve until businesses feel more optimistic about the near future.

Decline in economic activity in 1998 was accompanied by shrinking government revenues, as total public revenues as a percentage of GDP declined in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and, especially, Thailand (and probably also Singapore, though comparable data is not available). However, public expenditures declined only in Thailand, while it increased in others, leading to budget deficits of varying magnitude.
In Indonesia and Malaysia, where public expenditures’ share of GDP remained stable or increased slightly despite declining revenues, budget deficit increased precipitously during the crisis years. The rise in budget deficit was particularly large in the case of Malaysia.
Increasing unemployment and declining income due to economic slowdown are typically associated with increased poverty and higher spending on social protection. However, this did not occur in the crisis-struck countries in Asia: in 1998, social policy expenditures as percentage of GDP remained largely unchanged, increasing slightly in Malaysia and Thailand and declining slightly in Indonesia. In Indonesia, there was a noticeable increase in 1999, more than a year after the onset of crisis, before falling again in the subsequent years. Only in Malaysia was there a substantial increase between 1997 and 2003, when it began to decline. In other countries, social policy expenditures’ share of GDP has consistently declined since 2000, reflecting improvement in economic conditions.
There are substantial differences across Southeast Asian countries not only in terms of the financial resources they devote to social policies but, more significantly, how they are apportioned. The only common feature is the largest proportion that is typically devoted to education, which is unsurprising given the region’s youthful demographics. In Indonesia, social welfare has typically been the second largest expenditure item, but in the crisis years it was community amenities (much of it related to public works projects with income generation purpose) that attracted the largest proportion. The small share devoted to health in Indonesia is noticeable. In contrast, in Malaysia, health attracts the second largest share, while housing receives a very small proportion. The Philippines is a small spender on social policy overall and much of it is devoted to education and social welfare. Singapore is remarkable not only for the small sum it spends on social policy when its income level is taken into account, but for the large share it devotes to housing and the small share to social welfare. Similar to Malaysia, Thailand is remarkable for the
large share it devotes to healthcare and the small share to housing.

12. Public Expenditures on Social Policy, % of GDP


When the crisis started, all efforts were concentrated on the economic dimensions. Micro level surveys in Indonesia and Thailand carried out in early 2008 pointed to the social havoc the crisis was causing: children were being pulled out of schools, nutrition level was declining, health care access was shrinking, and so on. The findings, albeit patchy and cursory, painted a very grim picture of the emerging social reality, galvanizing governmental and non-governmental organizations, both domestic and international, into action. By mid-1998, social protection programs had been established or expanded, with much of funding from international organizations and Japan, in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The social indicators stabilized and eventually improved as the programs began to have their intended effects.

**Conclusion**

The current economic crisis is posing difficult challenges for governments and households in Asia. As a result of economic slowdown, jobs have been lost and household income has declined, resulting in diminished public revenues at the same time as the need for greater public spending has increased. In a last ditch effort to shore up their economy, governments around the world are pumping in trillions of dollars through looser fiscal and monetary policies.

Governments have good reason, both economic and social, to take bold action in the face of the unprecedented economic crisis. The experiences of 1997-1998 should serve as reminder of how rapidly poverty can rise under recessionary conditions. And when poverty rises and public finance is tight, there is higher likelihood of increased infant mortality, child malnutrition, and school dropout rate (Mendoza 2009).
There are sound economic reasons for providing social protection to those adversely affected. Poor families consume less, thus aggravating economic downturn. Social protection serves vital macroeconomic functions by acting as stabilisers that are automatically activated when income and demand are falling.

Economic crises also have broad psychological impacts with long-term deleterious consequences. Evidence shows a strong association between the 1997 economic crisis and suicide rate, which increased sharply in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Thailand, the countries most severely affected by the crisis (Chang et al 2009). There was no increase in Singapore and Taiwan – it is notable that these were also the countries that remained relatively unscathed by the crisis.

Economic crisis does not only cause economic and psychological hardships, it also causes political unrest, as governments in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand found out at their own expense in 1997-1998. The economy-first strategy works only as long as economic growth is forthcoming and its benefits reach most people. When economic growth stops, governments that stake their claim to office on the basis of their economic record – as is the case in many countries in Asia – have little to fall back upon to legitimise their rule. Social safety nets by protecting against the adverse impact of economic downturn cushion the despair and anguish that lead people to turn against their government. Expansion of social programs to strengthen the government’s position has been used from Bismarck in the nineteenth century to Thaksin Shinawatra in recent years.

The most immediate reason for providing social protection is that such measures strengthen poor households’ capacity to cope with the crisis. As Mendoza (2009) puts it: “For a variety of reasons, the poor are often the least equipped to weather
the impact of aggregate shocks on their income – they have few assets which they could sell or use as a buffer, limited or no access to formal credit and insurance markets to help smooth income shocks over time, and often lack the education and marketable skills which are necessary for successful migration to other areas with economic opportunities.” Their margin for financial survival is so small that even a small increase in expenditures or decline in income wreaks havoc on their lives. A sudden need for a family member’s medical treatment, for instance, is often catastrophic for poor households’ finances.

Without social protection, the poor often cope with financial crisis in ways that cause long-term damage to themselves and their communities. To sustain themselves financially, the poor may send their children to work, undermining the children’s long-term future. Younger children are especially vulnerable to long-term hardships during economic recessions. Saving resources for family by skimping on children’s food or education expenses, and rationing of food for mothers and young children leaves long-term deleterious effects because mal- and under-nutrition for children and pregnant mothers adversely affects children learning skills and increased risk of disease in later life.

To deal with the current and future crises, what governments need to establish is a general social protection system ready to offer assistance in the event of widespread decline in income, regardless of the cause, scope, and depth of the crisis. So instead of launching new social protection programs each time there is a financial, energy, or food crisis, there should be affordable programs in place before the crisis erupts. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, social protection is affordable to all countries, even the poorest. According to ILO’s projections for a sample of twelve low income countries in Africa and Asia, governments can establish social protection programs offering universal
basic old age and disability benefits at the cost of between 0.6 and 1.5 percent of annual GDP (ILO Social Security Department, 2008). For perspective, note that the fuel subsidy in Indonesia at its height cost the government nearly 4 percent of the GDP. In comparison, Bolsa Familia program in Brazil reached 11 million households and cost the government only 0.5 percent of GDP in 2006. Policymakers need to rise above their predilections and hesitations and establish a social protection system that will offer their population a modicum of protection from systemic shocks endemic to globalization.

References


Introduction

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have highlighted the importance of security in the context of poverty reduction in the world. In particular, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008* (UN 2008) addresses the issue of “conflict” as an important cause that has led to recent increases in poverty by displacing people from their homes along with rising food prices. The way in which conflict affects poverty is through the displacement of people from their homes and livelihoods as refugees and into poverty. “More than 42 million people are displaced by conflict and persecution, both within and outside the borders of their own countries” (UN 2008: 7). Not only is there a direct causal relationship between insecurity and poverty, but the solution for poverty must also encompass means to address security problems.

Leading this global discourse on the relationship between poverty and security are the UN and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Compared to the traditional notion of security, which tended to focus
on the national-level discussions about security, the new notions of security tended to be human-centered and encompassed a broader range of issues. Hence the terms “human security” and “comprehensive security” were developed. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s 1994 Human Development Report provides a clear definition of human security, while the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD provides policy guidelines for the donors of official development assistance (ODA). The latter can be seen as policy guidelines to help realize and implement the abstract goals outlined in the UN documents of the 1994 report, and later in the MDGs.

From the development side of the picture, it has been an important dialogue with security specialists to understand how security should be understood within the broad goals of attaining the MDGs when internal and international conflicts have displaced people and have pushed them into poverty and often extreme poverty. This paper is an exercise to understand how the concept of human security has been understood in the development field, and, how in particular it has affected the policies (implementation guidelines) in development assistance. The latter has becoming increasingly important since many areas in or post-conflict situations are also the most poverty-stricken and thus, have been major recipients of ODA. We are trying to understand how human security has been understood in the context of attainment of development in conflict, and post-conflict situations, and how this conceptualization led to concrete implementation guidelines for donors of ODA.

Thus, this paper is an effort to understand how the concept of human security has evolved, and how international organizations – in particular, the OECD/DAC – have realized the concept of human security into specific guidelines for donors of ODA. We also examine a few cases in which human security has been enforced
as a primary objective of their aid activities. This paper’s goal is threefold: (1) to provide a critical discussion about how the concept of human security has developed; (2) to discuss the OECD/DAC guidelines that pertain to human security and poverty reduction; and (3) to examine UNDP, Canada and Japan as cases in which human security was explicitly professed as a key component of their aid activities. We have examined OECD/DAC guidelines for ODA, UNDP documents, and public reports published by the respective governments.

**Global Discourse on Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Human Security**

*Emergence of the Concept of Human Security*

The concept of security was originally developed to deal with conflict between states. It is defined as the protection of “the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal, or military instruments at the state or international level” (King and Murray 2001). This so-called “traditional” notion of security is related more to states than to people, and is often used interchangeably with national security, which is defined as the promotion of “rights ascribed to nations rather than to individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole, and which subordinates other interests to those of the nation” (Wolfers 1952). The UN defines the concept of national security as the safeguarding of territorial integrity and national independence from any external threat, showing much resemblance to the traditional definition of security (Daes 1990).

The concept of human security has been rooted in the ideals of UN, which was
founded on the principle that it would always give equal weight to all territories and people. In 1945, the U.S. Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius Jr., reported to his government the conclusions from the San Francisco meeting that led to the establishment of the UN:

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace … No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs (UNDP 1994).

Stettinius suggested that there were two major components of human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want, which he argued that both should be given equal weight (UNDP 1994). However, the concept of “security” evolved to focus more towards the freedom from fear, rather than freedom from want.

Over the last few decades, however, the need to redefine security has risen. As intra-state conflicts and conflicts involving non-state actors have sharply increased since the end of the Cold War, the international community struggled to respond effectively. The complexity of the many perils threatening people’s daily lives tended to involve transnational dimensions and moved beyond national security, which focused solely on the threat of external military aggressions. Such threats ranged from poverty, unemployment, drugs, terrorism, environmental degradation and social disintegration (UNDP 1994: 11). In response to these recent threats, the concepts of security and poverty have changed. The former began to address security threats that are not at the national level; and the latter began to look seriously at how security directly affects poverty.
The changing understanding of security was also driven by many developing countries that were sensitive to any threats to their already fragile national identity after their recent independence (UNDP 1994: 22). In some cases, protection of national identity came at the expense of ignoring the concerns of citizens who sought security in their daily lives. For these common citizens, security meant “protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards” (UNDP 1994: 22) – the very things that would grant their daily survival. The international community began to see security threats not only between, but also within states, and focus on people in addition to states. This posed a challenge to the existing concept of security, which was exclusively concerned with territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It is in this context that the term “human security” was born to shed light on the significance of security at the level of individuals.

While the first explicit reference to human security by a UN official was by the former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace in 1992, it is more commonly traced to the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994). This report is now considered as the seminal text that stresses the need for human security, broadly defining it as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.” Here, human security means “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression,” as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful

1) According to World Report on Violence and Health, only 7 out of 110 conflicts recorded between 1989 and 2000 were between states, and the rest were civil wars (WHO 2002: 218).
2) In this report, he used the concept of human security in relation to “preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery” and addressed the need for a wide network of actors under “an integrated approach to human security” (Ghali 1992).
disruptions in the patterns of daily life – where in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP 1994). Human security includes seven components, is preventive, and is people-centered (UNDP 1994: 22-23).

More recently, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed the 2000 Millennium Summit, stating that the concept of human security was much broader than just “the absence of violent conflict,” and embraced human rights, good governance, access to education and health care. He argued that freedom of the future generations were another necessary and interrelated building block for human security (2000).

In response to this call to redefine security, the UN created the Commission on Human Security (CHS) as an independent commission under the chairmanship of Sadako Ogata4) and Amartya Sen5) in 2000 (UNTFHS 2009). CHS published its final report entitled *Human Security Now* in 2003, aiming to mobilize support and provide a concrete framework for the institutionalization of the concept of human security. CHS adopted an even broader definition of human security compared to the 1994 UNDP report, and argued that it should entail security “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” (2003: 4). This report referred to “political, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give

3) Seven components of human security are: (1) economic security which requires an assured basic income; (2) food security which means all people have both physical and economic access to basic food; (3) health security which means freedom from diseases and infection; (4) environmental security such as freedom from dangers of environmental pollution; (5) personal security which is physical safety; (6) community security which ensures survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups; and (7) political security which means protection of basic human rights and freedoms (UNDP 1994: 24-33).


people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity,” and suggested a list of ten “starting points” to address human security, while UNDP suggested seven components of human security as mentioned above (CHS 2003: 133).6) The CHS’s notion of security has expanded to include human dignity, means for financing human security in post-conflict situations, and linking the issues of human security to fair trade, minimum living standards, access to education, and respect for diversity. Thus, this new notion of human security is comprehensive to the point that it could involve a massive undertaking to realize, and would be much broader in its scope than even the UN MDGs.

Individual governments have also contributed to the development of the concept of human security. As will be examined more fully in the section on cases, the Canadian government defines human security as “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives” (Takasu 2000). The Japanese government defines human security as the “preservation and protection of the life and dignity of individual human beings,” which “can be ensured only when the individual is confident of a life free of fear and free of want” (Ibid.).

In the academic literature, there have not been many new revisions on the UNDP’s concept of human security from 1994. For example, Thomas (1999) argues that human security is “a condition of existence in which basic material

6) The UN’s CHS outlined ten starting points on human security as follows: “(1) protecting people in violent conflict; (2) protecting people from the proliferation of arms; (3) supporting the human security of people on the move; (4) establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations; (5) encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor; (6) providing minimum living standards everywhere; (7) according high priority to universal access to basic health care; (8) developing an efficient and equitable system for patent rights; (9) empowering all people with universal basic education, through much stronger global and national efforts; and (10) clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individual to have diverse identities and affiliations” (CHS 2003: 133).
needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community.” Bajpai (2000) argues that “human security relates to the protection of the individual’s personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence,” and in order to manage human security, it is important to promote “human development and good governance” and to “use sanctions of force.” Maclean (1998) also provides yet another interpretation, stating that “human security shifts our focus from traditional territorial security to that of the person” and that it “involves the security of the individuals in their personal surroundings, their community, and in their environment.”

Thus, we can conclude that the most widely used definition of human security is still rooted in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, and revised and expanded in the Commission on Human Security (2003). The definition includes the following: it concerns security threats at the levels of the individual and the community along with the state; entails a broadened understanding of threats including economic, environmental, personal, and political threats; and is context-specific and prevention-oriented.

**Critical Perspectives on Human Security**

Although the UN has worked hard to develop a common definition of human security, there are still some critics. There is concern that there is yet to be a global consensus about what human security means, especially at the implementation stage. Bosold and Werthes (2005: 86) argued that governments have used the meaning of human security quite differently. For example, Canada and Norway adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of human security –i.e., physical threat resulting from violent conflict (Bosold and Werthes 2005: 86). On the other hand, UNDP and Japan adopted a broader definition of human security.
that encompassed different development policies leading to sustainable human
development (Bosold and Werthes 2005: 86). Due to such different definitions
and usage by governments and international organizations, some have criticized
it as being a “normatively attractive but analytically weak concept” (Neuman

Others have criticized the concept of human security for not clearly stating
who/what should be responsible for ensuring human security, and that there is no
systematic way of analyzing inter-sectorality, or the reality that interventions in
one sphere have externalities (Tadjbakhsh 2005). The criticisms on human
security tend to focus on problems associated with implementation.

Although the concept of human security has its critics, it is difficult to deny the
pervasive presence that it has already taken globally (Lam 2006). First,
proponents of human security have provided their own definition of human
security in implementing programs. Some focus on the issue of physical violence
against individuals, while others adopt broader and flexible definition of threat
adopted by the UNDP. Second, a number of states and NGOs have found the
concept attractive and sought to institutionalize it in practice. Governments of
Canada and Norway founded the Human Security Network, aiming to promote
human security and identify concrete areas for collective action in human
security (HSU 2009). Their definition of human security is “freedom from
pervasive threats,” such as physical violence in violent conflicts, and the
protection of “people’s rights, their safety or their lives.” Japan established the
United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security with the UN Secretariat to
finance UN human security projects and in order to increase the operational
impact of human security projects (UNTFHS 2009). The UNTFHS funds
projects related to key thematic areas in human security, including “post-conflict
peace building, persistence and chronic poverty, disaster risk reduction, human trafficking and food security” (UNTFHS 2009).

Recently, there has been a growing movement to develop a common conceptualization of human security and to set guidelines for applying the concept into practice. The OECD outlined a revised definition of human security in 2001, which is based on an agreement with other international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The revised definition of human security refers to “an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being” (OECD 2001: 38). This broader understanding of human security is consistent with the conceptualization of the UNDP (1994) and widely used by the providers of aid activities (OECD 2001: 38).

**OECD/DAC’s Approach on Human Security and Poverty Reduction**

**OECD/DAC’s Perspective on Human Security**

OECD/DAC shares the UN’s view that human security is a vital precondition for development (UNDP 1994; OECD 1997). This concept embraces the mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, efficient security systems, and broadly shared social and economic development which is supported by political structures capable of resolving conflicts through peaceful
means (Hussein et al. 2004). OECD/DAC develops comprehensive policy guidelines and principles for donors’ intervention and development assistance in conflict-affected areas through the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC), which it established as a special Task Force in 1995. It then published the first policy guideline in 1997 on “Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century,” which provided comprehensive guides to human security in development cooperation (OECD 1997). OECD/DAC’s most recent definition of security in the DAC guidelines is as follows (2001):

“Security” is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing.

Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme and widely used by development actors (OECD 2001: 38).

While the initial policy guidelines involves the design and implementation of development cooperation activity for conflict prevention in post-conflict

7) CPDC network is comprised of bilateral donors of OECD/DAC, the European Commission, UNDP, the IMF and the World Bank.
recovery, a series of policy guidelines have increasingly broadened its scope and raised new issues supplementing the first guideline (OECD 2001a). OECD/DAC has also developed policy manuals and training modules designed to promote human security and poverty reduction. The manuals and training modules aim to translate/realize effectively what was an abstract concept into implementable programs. OECD/DAC has led the discussion on human security by making necessary connections to broader issues of development and aid effectiveness, and by trying to harmonize policies regarding human security with existing aid policies.

We examined all the OECD/DAC guidelines that pertain to conflict and fragility in an effort to critically analyze donors’ framework for human security as prescribed by the OECD. These guidelines include 13 DAC guidelines and reference series, reports, publications, and manuals on conflict and terrorism prevention, state building in fragile situations, Whole-of-Government approach to fragile states, and delivery of public service in fragile situations (OECD 2008a; 2008b; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2006; 2005a; 2005b; 2003; 2001a; 2001b; 1997).

OECD/DAC’s perspective on human security consists of two dimensions: (1) “conflict” and (2) “fragility” (see Figure 1 below). The dimension of “conflict” mainly involves donors’ response in conflict and conflict-affected situations. Based on the recognition of the complex conflict situations requiring sensitive interventions, OECD/DAC provides policy guidance on immediate and flexible responses to conflict areas depending on different phases and characteristics of conflicts (OECD 2009).

OECD/DAC highlights the point that short-term humanitarian aid in conflict situations should be integrated to the goals of long-term stability and
development (OECD 1997; 2003). Given the recent emerging global consensus on the importance of long-term engagement for peace building that extends beyond the short-term post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, OECD/DAC has increasingly directed aid to conflict prevention and long-term recovery development prospects. OECD/DAC praises the shift and comprehensive responses of some donors to conflicts, and their long-term support for social reconstruction and stability (OECD 2003).

**Figure 1**

**OECD/DAC Perspective on Human Security**

To achieve long-term goals, donors must support the establishment of accountable and effective governance, which supports the delivery of security and justice. Figure 1 presents the OECD/DAC’s understanding of human security. First, it recognizes the significance of “governance” in providing for human security. Second, human security involves conflict and fragility, which the former is realized as peace-keeping efforts in conflict- and post-conflict areas, while the latter is realized as the provision of state-building in the context of governance in conflict-prone and fragile areas. Third, sub-goals of peace-
keeping and state-building include intervention in conflict and post-conflict recovery in the former, and prevention of terrorism and state-building in the latter. Finally, since governance is emphasized by OECD/DAC, it provides more detailed guidelines for governance including justice and security system reform, democratization and provision of basic social services.

On the other hand, the dimension of “fragility” of OECD/DAC involves aid responses to conflict-prone fragile situations, not limited to post-conflict or physical conflict situations. In the dimension of fragility, the priority goal of international intervention and development assistance needs to be social stability and state and governance building as vital condition for sustainable growth (OECD 2003). While governance issues are central to OECD/DAC’s overall perspective on human security, long-term governance building is emphasized in the context of fragility (Hussein et al. 2004).

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the U.S. shed new light on fragile situations and its association with underdevelopment and security threats, both at the regional and global levels (OECD 2006). The engagement of traditional donor countries – mainly the U.S. – in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated that traditional short-term military responses are not sufficient solutions for state- and peace-building. The latter are seen increasingly as the necessary foundations for human security. OECD/DAC suggests a more strategic approach to fragile situations based on a comprehensive understanding of the origin of, and factors

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8) OECD/DAC adopts the definition of governance along with the World Bank. Here, governance refers to “use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development (OECD 1995). It identifies the rule of law, public sector management, and control of corruption and reduction of excessive military expenditure as three important dimensions of governance for development cooperation (OECD 1995).
contributing to, the fragility in a given area (OECD 2006).

OECD/DAC defines fragility as “the lack of capacity and willingness of a government to perform key state functions for the benefit of all” (OECD 2008). Fragile states suffer from failed governance, which may be caused by domestic sociopolitical dynamics or by external factors including natural disasters and regional conflicts. As with conflict-affected areas, a flexible approach is needed in fragile situations, since fragility can lead to a plethora of possible results, including further conflict, state collapse, loss of territorial control, extreme political stability, and repression or denial of resources to the subgroups of the population (OECD 2005b).

From the perspective of the OECD/DAC, fragile situations are not limited to physical conflict, but to all cases in which governments or non-state institutions cannot protect their people and attain social and economic development. Security is considered as a basic human need, as well as a means to improve the livelihood of individuals and a vital precondition for the development of a society. Thus, OECD/DAC highlights the delivery of basic social services such as health care and primary education as a top priority in development assistance in fragile states. Such prioritization is based on the belief that meeting basic needs and rights in the short-term will then contribute to the long-term effect of building a state and its legitimacy (OECD 2008a; OECD 2008b). Thus, as is the case in conflict-affected areas, OECD/DAC emphasizes the necessary balance of pursuing short-term humanitarian programs with long-term sustainable governance in assisting fragile states (OECD 2008b). In order to formulate a long-term goal of development in fragile situations, donors are advised to maintain long-term and multi-dimensional views across diverse policy domains of development, security and diplomacy (OECD 2007c). In addition, policy
coherence and coordination efforts among donors are strongly required for more efficient and effective responses to broad, long-term dimensions of development assistance (OECD 2008b; 2006).

While OECD/DAC sets state building as the top priority in supporting fragile states, it also focuses on the provision of social basic services to satisfy the basic needs of people (OECD 2005b). The OECD/DAC’s understanding of fragile situations involves attention both to “freedom from needs” extending to “freedom from want,” and reflects its transition to individual-centered from state-centered approach to human security.

**OECD/DAC’s Policy Guidelines on ODA for Human Security**

a. Whole of Government Approach for Policy Coherence
OECD/DAC has recognized the importance of donor country policy coordination as a necessary condition for development cooperation efforts aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable growth (OECD 2008c). OECD/DAC suggests that policy coherence is vital in order to avoid adverse effects that may ensue from numerous donors pursuing incoherent policies, but more importantly, there is potential for synergy among the donors across different policy areas. OECD/DAC has reviewed how the donor nation’s diverse policies in the areas of trade, migration, and agriculture can affect the development prospects of developing countries. Thus, OECD/DAC suggests that a cohesive and integrated approach to aid by donors is required for efficient use of resources in the recipient nations of ODA.

Given the complexity of conflict-ridden and fragile situations, the development assistance required is far from simple. To achieve human security requires both
the attainment of short-term and long-term security and development. Thus, OECD/DAC urges a harmonized approach among donors, and full integration of short-term responses with long-term development objectives (OECD 2006; 2003; 2001a). It suggests that constructive relationships between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation entities be built to ensure that short-term goals are linked to long-term development objectives. Shared information and analysis, and joint strategy formulation among donors are recommended for the harmonized approach (OECD 2001a).

In order to enhance policy coherence within an individual donor country, OECD/DAC recommends the “Whole-of-Government” approach (WGA), which involves coordination across the ministries or departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs, development aid, and humanitarian assistance (OECD 2006). WGA includes both the formal and informal networks across different agencies within a government, utilized to coordinate the design and implementation of aid interventions. As fragile states face challenges in a wide range of domains, such as the provision of public goods like security and social services, the existence of a legitimate political institution, and failures of economic management, diverse actors need to engage in developing strategies, and implementing policies and programs.

OECD/DAC assesses the progress of member countries in their establishment of policy and institutions, through a pre-determined framework outlined as “good practices” (OECD 2006). Based on the experiences of member countries, OECD/DAC highlights that political commitment and leadership from the top is essential to lead the WGA process and agreement of different actors. The policy guidance on mechanisms and instruments to employ the WGA includes joint analysis of fragile states, integrated information management system among the
related Ministries/departments, and incentive structure for collaboration.

b. Strategic and Flexible Approach to Origins and Phases of Conflict and Fragility

OECD/DAC guidelines stress the importance of taking a strategic and flexible stance in providing aid for conflict and fragile regions, paying attention to the phases and particular characteristics of conflict (OECD 1997; 2007c). Aid strategy and policy need to be formulated based on a comprehensive understanding of the conflict and fragile situation. In fragile states where the situation is often in flux, donors should be well aware of the history of conflict, distinctive characteristics of fragility, aid needs, and current aid flows.

In order to design a comprehensive and strategic aid policy for insecure areas, OECD/DAC suggests that donors carry out a peace and conflict impact assessment along with the more conventional risk and vulnerability impact assessment. By analyzing the components and potential impacts of development cooperation in conflict-ridden or conflict-prone areas, donors can minimize unpredictable adverse impacts on such fragile environments (OECD 2001a). OECD/DAC suggests that the peace and conflict impact analysis should become as common as the cost-benefit analysis in order to promote policy coherence (OECD 2001a).

Analysis of Case Studies

OECD/DAC has provided policy guidelines on ODA for human security to promote harmonized and effective aid activities of donors. We have selected a few cases, in which human security has been professed as a key goal of their ODA, to
understand how human security is defined, and what specific policies and programs were developed to enhance human security in the context of ODA. Three selected cases are the UNDP, Japan and Canada. They represent differences in the definition of human security as well as divergent programs. Analysis of these cases will allow us to see how human security is realized in real programs.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

UNDP defines human security in two parts: (1) security against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression; and (2) security against abrupt disruptions in daily life including joblessness, conflict, and more (UNDP 1994). According to UNDP, hunger, disease, repression and unexpected disruption are the causes of a loss of security and an increase in fragility.

In 2001, the UNDP Executive Board strongly advocated for crisis prevention and disaster mitigation as essential for attaining sustainable human development. Thus, UNDP created the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) to serve as the center of the new human security agenda (UNDP 2009b). BCPR offers technical expertise including financial resources; protects women who are usually primary victims during crisis; fosters partnerships with civil society organizations, national governments, bilateral partners, regional and international organizations, and other UN agencies or departments to design and implement crisis and recovery programs; and builds capacity to prevent and recover from conflict (UNDP 2009b).

As seen in the Figure 2 below, UNDP implements its development programs under five goals: Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction, Crisis Prevention & Recovery, Environment & Energy, and HIV/AIDS (UNDP 2009a). Human
Security belongs to Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which has ten sub-categories: Armed Violence, Conflict Prevention, Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration, Early Recovery, Economic Recovery, Gender Equality, Natural Disaster, Rule of Law, Small Arms & Mine Action, and State-building (Ryan 2009). As you can see from these categories, UNDP encourages conflict-sensitive development, which links security and development approaches (UNDP 2008). UNDP helps countries in crisis due to violent conflicts or natural disasters, through state capacity building, policy development, and establishment of rule of law, social and economic recovery, and gender equality.

**Figure 2:**

**UNDP Development Goals**

Source: UNDP website <http://www.undp.org/cpr/>
According to the UNDP Strategic Plan of 2008-2011, UNDP has identified crisis prevention and recovery as a priority area, and has highlighted three goals: enhancing conflict and disaster prevention and management capabilities, promoting governance in post-crisis countries, and rebuilding the basis for post-conflict development (UNDP 2007).

UNDP is one of the largest donors providing technical assistance to strengthen governance in conflict areas (UNDP 2005). UNDP, as a leading international organization, has been able to intervene and send assistance teams to, and implement development programs, in conflict areas such as Myanmar and Palestine (UNDP 2008). UNDP strengthens national rule of law in conflict or post-conflict situations; supports capacity of local justice and security institutions; and develops national policies and programs on conflict prevention. UNDP programs mainly reflect economic security, environmental security, personal security and political security, while food security, health security and community security are not actively dealt with by UNDP.

In spite of the UNDP’s proclaimed concerns for human security, there are not many country reports or evaluation papers regarding crisis prevention and recovery, in which UNDP was a main actor. Therefore, we selected the cases of Ghana, Darfur, and Gaza, which were presented in the UNDP crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) newsletters.

In Ghana, UNDP helped establish a national peace council and district peace advisory councils to advise the government and its people about conflict management in 2006, prior to the 2008 elections (UNDP 2009d). UNDP established dialogue forums between the peace councils and the greater Ghanaian society to build national capacity for conflict prevention and
management. According to the UNDP annual report (2009), UNDP assessed that this program helped appease tensions during the elections. In addition, UNDP supported the judicial system to respond to disputes immediately and effectively. To strengthen public trust and promote human rights, UNDP also trained journalists and police (UNDP 2009d).

In the Darfur region of western Sudan, UNDP implemented programs with the International Rescue Committee, which is an international NGO for humanitarian aid and post-conflict development based in the United States, to strengthen and institutionalize the rule of law. UNDP supported capacity development of Darfur’s lawyers as well as justice and security institutions. In particular, the program emphasized women’s access to justice and participation (UNDP 2009b). Seven Justice and Confidence Centres (JCC) have been established in Darfur to raise the awareness of human rights and protect civilians, especially that of women (UNDP 2006).

As the Darfur’s case shows, UNDP emphasizes gender equality and women’s empowerment in conflict areas, which has become one of the most distinguished features in crisis prevention and recovery programs. UNDP regards gender equality as a core goal of human development; therefore, UNDP integrates gender issues in conflict prevention and resolution processes to promote women’s empowerment and gender equality. UNDP recommends putting women at the forefront of crisis prevention and recovery (UNDP 2008). UNDP supports the rule of law and provides legal aid to protect women, promoting women’s participation (UNDP 2008).

In the Gaza Strip, UNDP implemented early recovery programs entitled, Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP 2009c). UNDP
recognizes that economic recovery is a key element to establish the foundations for post-conflict sustainable development. Thus, UNDP distributed food packages to over 30,000 Palestinians, and offered assistance to victims to create self-sustaining environment with employment opportunities (UNDP 2008). UNDP also implemented projects to compensate for the agricultural and farm property which has been affected by conflict. This is to compensate the main income generating source in Palestine.

UNDP takes the following main approaches to conflict prevention: integrate conflict prevention into development programs that promote participation, dispute resolution, and gender equality; build national processes and institutions to manage conflict; and build consensus through dialogue (UNDP 2009a). UNDP has paid attention to the interrelationship between governance and conflict prevention; human rights and conflict prevention; and development and security.

On the other hand, basic human needs and social development are not widely dealt with in UNDP programs. And although UNDP recognizes the relationship between poverty and conflict, most of their programs are limited to economic recovery in post-conflict situations and less so on longer term poverty reduction. Regarding harmonization and coordination, UNDP supports partnerships with other UN agencies and departments, NGOS and civil societies in developing programs, policies, and systems. However, there is little mention of harmonization and coordination among donors or with partners.

**Canada**

The Canadian government has promoted a narrower definition of human security
as freedom from fear, and has been critical of a broader definition adopted by UNDP since the latter emphasized threats associated with underdevelopment and ignored “human insecurity resulting from violent conflict” (DFAIT 2000). In the Canadian view, human security is “security of the people,” and its goal is to “ensure that people can live in freedom from fear” (DFAIT 2000). This conceptualization is regarded as a “crisis prevention or conflict-management tool” and is mainly associated with the freedom from fear perspective (Bosold and Werthes 2005). The Canadian foreign policy as a whole adopts this relatively narrow definition of human security.

Canada’s diplomatic approach to human security is also distinct in that it adopts a “bottom-up approach to diplomacy” in comparison to the more conventional “top-down, undemocratic approach” (Matthew et al. 2004). The Ottawa Treaty, which is the most important treaty in Canada’s human security policy, brings to light a bottom-up approach to neglected disarmament issue that has threatened human security. The Ottawa Treaty deals with small arms trade and trafficking. In the process of concluding the treaty, the Canadian government worked very closely with civil society in banning the landmines. It was able to lead other nations to support the victims of landmines. This integral involvement of various civil society actors in developing the treaty sent a very clear message: (1) it developed a highly successful Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines; and (2) it also demonstrated by example, the concept of human security as a freedom from physical violence at the human level.

In addition to the Ottawa treaty, the Canadian government’s sharp criticism of the UN’s failure in Rwanda in 1994 shows its strong commitment to human security. The then foreign minister of Canada, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy said that, human security “is going to have to be reconciled with the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states” and the concept of national sovereignty “cannot be absolute” (Hubert and Bonser 2001). This stance led Canada to create the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and its final report, entitled, “The Responsibility to Protect” dealt with questions of when to intervene, under whose authority, and how (ICISS 2001). Humanitarian intervention is a key in the Canadian conception of human security.

**Japan**

A different understanding of human security has developed in Japan compared to Canada. Japan advocated the UNDP’s approach to human security, in which a broader definition was adopted - i.e., freedom from fear and freedom from want. The latter includes issues associated with underdevelopment and emphasizes basic human needs such as hunger, disease, repression, and sudden and hurtful disruptions. Thus, their goals are to ensure survival and dignity of individuals as human beings (Takasu 2000). Former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo introduced human security as “the key, which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats” and emphasized this perception of security in terms of people, in contrast to the traditional, state-centric approach (Obuchi 1998). This became the foundation for Japan’s policy agenda for ODA, which is an integral part of its foreign policy. Japan has prioritized its aid activities according to its ODA Charter, and has provided assistance to developing countries in the following sectors: education; health care and welfare; water and sanitation; agriculture; and human and social development (see Figure 3 for details).
Conclusion

Security or lack thereof has become such an important issue in understanding how poverty is created, and to attain social and economic development. We examined how key international organizations—i.e., the UN and OECD—have led this global discourse linking the concepts of security with development. Long a concern for academics, the practitioners have embraced these disparate concepts, and tried to link them in a practical and implementable ways. In particular, since extreme poverty is also found in most severely hit conflict-areas, it has been very important to understand how development assistance must not only be provided, but provided in a sensible and effective manner. Thus, we examined how OECD/DAC translated these lofty goals of linking security to development in the context of donor guidelines for development assistance.

The UN, and in particular, UNDP, has led the discussion on human security which encompasses a broad range of security concerns moving away from the traditional state-centric notion of security. By shifting the level of policy-focus and implementation from the state to individuals and communities, the UNDP’s
1994 report sheds light on how security problems must be dealt with to support the humans in the process. It adopts a broader definition of security than that of the traditional conceptualization. While OECD’s conceptualization is basically in line with the UNDP’s definition of human security, it tends to emphasize the “governance” dimension of development cooperation. Since it recognizes insecurity and fragility as a fundamental cause of governance and state failure, OECD/DAC highlights the importance of donors’ contribution to governance improvement to strengthen its linkages with poverty reduction and sustainable development. Even though it also suggests development assistance in conflict-affected areas in order to redress human rights violations and gender inequality for sustainable peace building in the area, OECD/DAC focuses more on institutional governance issues and provides specific policy guidelines and manuals on such issues including basic social service provision and security system reform. There are critics who argue that UNDP’s definition is a bit too broad and lacks focus, and others who are critical of OECD/ DAC’s guidelines on human security as lacking its “human” element with greater emphasis placed on governance at the institutional level.

Without a common shared definition of human security, governments and international organizations have used different conceptualizations of human security: either a narrower definition used by Canada or a broader definition adopted by the UNDP or Japan. They each have their advantages and weaknesses. Further empirical research is needed in this area to ascertain which conceptualizations and programs provide stronger results for delivering human security. Although the impact assessment may also be colored by the definition we use, it will be nonetheless very important to conduct further study to see how the programs affected human security - using both the narrower or broader definitions of human security -, and more importantly, how they have affected.
poverty reduction as an ultimate goal of human security.

Reference


PART EIGHT

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER 18
PACIFIC ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Ramses Amer

CHAPTER 19
EU RELATIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN AND NORTH KOREA:
SCOPE AND LIMITS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR AN EU ROLE AND ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAN SECURITY
Axel Berkofsky

CHAPTER 20
EUROPE’S SECURITY POLICY:
A LONG-TERM AND COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE
Ralph Thiele

CHAPTER 21
HOW MUCH OF A “MULTILATERAL UTILITY?”
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
REGIONALISM TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Jürgen Rüland

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Purpose and Structure

The paper investigates the interaction between Pacific Asia and the United Nations (UN). This is done through the examination of two dimensions for the purpose of the paper. The first dimension is some key norms of the UN Charter – such as the prohibition of the threat or use of force in inter-state relations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states – and their importance in China’s foreign policy and in the principles governing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The other dimension is the contribution of the UN operations in Cambodia and East Timor to the development of UN peacekeeping. Although few such operations have been carried out in Pacific Asia the two selected cases have both been of considerable importance in the development of UN peacekeeping.

The paper is structured in the following way. First, the key norms of the Charter relating the prohibition of the threat or use of force in inter-state relations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states are identified and the
debate that they have generated presented. Second, the importance of these key norms in China’s foreign policy and in the principles governing ASEAN is outlined. Third, the contribution of the UN’ operations in Cambodia and East Timor to the development of UN peacekeeping is addressed. Fourth, based on the examination of these two main dimensions of the interaction between Pacific Asia and the UN, a broader concluding analysis is carried out.

**Key Norms of the UN Charter**

The two key clauses in the UN Charter that will be examined in the context of study are Article 2(4) relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force, and Article 2(7) relating to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states. It is essential to look at what is literally stated in two clauses.

**Article 2(4) reads as follows:**

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article 2(7) reads as follows:**

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Article 2(4)¹

The scholarly debate among international lawyers pertaining to the provisions of Article 2(4) of the Charter displays considerable controversy as to how these provisions should be interpreted. This controversy can partly be ascribed to the wording of Article 2(4). The wording of Article 2(4), and for that matter the whole Charter, was based on considerations and decisions among the original member-states of the United Nations. It is the result of a series of compromises reached by these states after having reconciled each other’s views. Consequently, the text is in some instances “ambiguous” and “unclear”.²

In the context of Article 2(4) the term “force” has caused debate among scholars. A restrictive interpretation argues that “force” refers to the threat or use of “armed force” against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. An extensive interpretation argues that “force” refers to any “action” or to any threat of “action” initiated against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.

The restrictive interpretation prohibits the threat or the use of “armed force” but does not, in principle, prohibit an economic embargo directed at another state. Scholars adhering to such a restrictive interpretation usually point to the fact that

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2) References to the discussions about Article 2(4) can be found in: Asrat (1991: 38-40, 199-200); Bowett (1955-56: 131); Brownlie (1962: 223-33). The continued relevance of the study of the legal regulations of the use of force in international law can be seen from recent studies such as Brownlie (2001: 21-37); Gazzini (2005); O’Conell (2007).
other forms of intervention in the internal affairs of a state than by “armed force” are addressed by the provisions of Article 2(7) and the principle of non-interference. The extensive interpretation implies that the threat or the use of ‘force’ in whatever form in inter-state relations is prohibited, i.e. “any” kind of interference which is not acceptable to the government of the target state.

Another point of disagreement is how the wording “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”, in Article 2(4), should be interpreted. A restrictive interpretation argues that only the threat or use of force that directly affects the territorial integrity or the political independence of a state is encompassed by the prohibition. An extensive interpretation centres on the argument that not only the threat or the use of force affecting the territorial integrity or the political independence of a state but also any action against the political authority of a state is encompassed by the prohibition.

The interpretation of the wording “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”, in Article 2(4), has a bearing on the kind of inter-state behaviour that would fall under the phenomenon known as “use of force”. Nevertheless, despite the divergent interpretations of Article 2(4) there is a consensus that this Article provides a general prohibition of the threat or use of armed force in inter-state relations.

The scholarly interpretations of the provisions of Article 2(4) have their weaknesses from the point of view of restricting the use of “force” in inter-state relations.3)

3) In this context the listed weaknesses are only seen from the perspective of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and they do not take into consideration whether customary international law or General Assembly Resolutions address these weaknesses.
A restrictive interpretation of the term “force” would not prohibit economic and political activities that could undermine the political stability in a state or create hardship for its population. Furthermore, it would not prohibit foreign interference in a state as long as such interference does not involve direct engagement of troops in the affected state.

A restrictive interpretation of the wording “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” would imply that foreign interventions short of armed attacks would not be prohibited, notwithstanding their effects on the political structure of the target state.

To conclude it is important to note that there are two exceptions to the prohibition of the threat or use of force. First, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations as stated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.4) Second, enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Article 2(7)

In the case of Article 2(7) the interpretation of the wording has not led to the same debate as in the case of Article 2(4). It is generally acknowledge that Article 2(7) should be interpreted as stipulating that non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is not permitted. This is even reflected in the debate relating to Article 2(4) as exemplified above. The relationship between the principle of non-interference and the application of enforcement measures under

Chapter VII is explicit in the wording of Article 2(7).

The debate in which Article 2(7) and the principle of non-interference has become an integral part of is the one relating to “non-intervention” versus “humanitarian”, “pro democratic”, and “pro self-determination” interventions. In fact the principle on non-interference plays a central role in the “non-intervention” line of argumentation. While proponents of “humanitarian”, “pro democratic” and “pro self-determination” interventions tend to minimise its importance and even the relevance of the principle of non-interference.

In the post-Cold War era pro democratic interventions, pro self-determination interventions and in particular humanitarian interventions have gained renewed “popularity” and are at times almost looked upon as a remedy for all evils in the developing world.

Pro democratic interventions, pro self-determination interventions and humanitarian interventions can be carried out in response to human suffering of a twofold nature, the first involving the basic human rights of the citizens of the target state and the second relating the treatment of citizens of the intervening state residing in the target state. Both aspects could play a role in one and the same case of foreign intervention.

5) W. Michael Reisman has played a prominent role in the more general debate on these issues. In his article on the interplay between sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law Reisman (1990) argues in favour of defining sovereignty as the right of people and not the right of the ‘sovereign’, believing it is generally accepted that the term ‘sovereignty’ has gone through such a change. For a critical assessment of the issues and their implications see Ryan (1991: 55-71).

6) The doctrinal debate relating to the key concepts ‘pro democratic’, ‘pro self-determination’ and ‘humanitarian’ interventions is not included in this paper nor is an overview of how to define external involvement and various forms of foreign intervention for two such overviews see Amer (2007c, 1997: 17-60).
Proponents of humanitarian intervention are not unaware of the problems associated with such interventions and the risk of abuse. By looking at the criteria listed by some proponents one can see that the requirement of “disinterestedness” on the part of the intervening state is of particular concern. Some proponents do not address this requirement in a satisfactory manner since they accept that an intervening state can have motives other than purely humanitarian ones, as long as the humanitarian aspects are the most important. Such an approach complicates matters and it raises the question of how it would be possible for third parties to assess the relative importance of the different motives put forward by the intervening state. Furthermore, to allow the intervening actor to have other motives than purely humanitarian ones would create a situation in which an intervening state may deliberately argue in humanitarian terms while carrying out the intervention for other reasons. Finally, by allowing other motives for an intervention one might legitimate any kind of interventionary behaviour as long as it is carried out under the banner of “humanitarianism”.

If this line of argumentation is pursued then it is necessary to discuss if the

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7) This awareness and the emphasis put on criteria such as proportionality and limited duration of the intervention can also be seen in the way that proponents of an extensive interpretation of the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the right to use force in self-defence are formulating criteria to minimise the risk of abuse. For overviews of the debate relating to the interpretation of the provisions of Article 51 see Amer (1994: 429-430); Johansson & Amer (2009a: 42-44, 2009b: 94-95).

8) Tesón sets up three basic criteria to be fulfilled in order to make an intervention a humanitarian one. The first criteria is that the purpose of the intervention must be “truly” humanitarian to be justified, in other words the intervening states have to fulfil the requirement of ‘disinterestedness’. The second criteria is that the intervention has to be proportionate both to the gravity of the human rights abuses and to the probability of remedying the situation. Furthermore, military intervention should only be resorted to when all peaceful means have failed or are ‘likely’ to fail. The third criteria is that the victims of the human rights abuses in target states must welcome the foreign intervention and this requirement is met when the victims are ‘actually willing to revolt’ against the oppressive government (Tesón, 1988: 115-120).
intervening state claims to be acting for humanitarian purposes and whether this can be accepted at face value. It is argued here that this it not necessarily the case. In fact, in order to properly address the issue of foreign interventions claimed to protect human rights it is necessary to bear in mind that an intervention can be presented and portrayed as an intervention for humanitarian reasons by the intervening state, but it might prove to have been carried out for much less idealistic reasons. There is also a relationship of the opposite nature, namely, that a military intervention can be carried out as a response to an armed attack from the target state or for other strategic reasons, but nevertheless put an end to or limit human suffering and human rights abuses in the target state. In other words an intervention can primarily serve other purposes and still have positive humanitarian effects.

If the requirement of “disinterestedness” was to be applied to these two different lines of motivating an intervention, then the first line would result in the intervention being classified as a humanitarian one, whereas the second line would result in the intervention not being classified as humanitarian. Of course proponents of humanitarian intervention would argue that there are other requirements, which would ensure that the abusing situation taking place in the first line of motivation would be addressed, and that such interventions would not be regarded as humanitarian.

The political reality in the world is that many governments have little or no respect for basic human rights but this has not caused them to be “removed” through foreign military interventions. If concern for the people of a state in which serious human rights violations are committed was a decisive factor, a much more consistent reaction to such violations through foreign military interventions could be expected. It can therefore be concluded that a decision to
intervene militarily in another state solely on consideration of protection of human rights is unlikely. This applies to an even higher degree when it comes to the way in which issues of human rights and democracy are used as foreign policy tools. The attention paid to any given country’s human rights record is governed more by economic, political and geo-strategic interest of foreign powers. Thus, resulting in a high degree of inconsistencies in how for example the United States uses criticism of foreign countries over their human rights records. It also creates a gap between stated principles to guide the foreign policies of several so-called western democracies and the foreign policy priorities that are made in practice. Economic considerations take precedence over human rights even for a country like Sweden. It can be argued that principles are often difficult to uphold when confronted with other priorities such as investment opportunities.

To revert to the concept of humanitarian intervention, it cannot be discussed without addressing the issues of self-determination and sovereignty. After all, a humanitarian intervention that is carried out without the consent of the target state has an impact on that state’s internal affairs. The arguments for and against interventions to protect human rights can be summarised as follows. One basic argument is that the issue of human rights is an internal and domestic one, which falls under the jurisdiction of each individual state, and as such this issue cannot justify a foreign military intervention, no matter how extreme the human rights record is. The opponents argue that violations of human rights are serious breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that other states are duty bound to ensure, by all necessary means that human rights are respected.

The two positions take into account two very different viewpoints with regard to the enforcement of respect for internationally recognised norms of human rights.
The first viewpoint stresses the notion that non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state takes precedence over the respect for human rights in a state. The second viewpoint subscribes to the notion that international responsibility for ensuring that international norms pertaining to respect for human rights are enforced supersede the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Thus, the basic disagreement in the scholarly debate is between those defending the sovereignty of the state and those who argue that such sovereignty is not absolute and that it is not the state but the people who has a right to self-determination. This debate raises the question of the continued relevance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

An assessment of the merits of the arguments put forward by the proponents of intervention for the purpose of promoting peoples’ right to self-determination against the will of the state in which they live has to begin with the legal aspects. The legal limitations of such intervention are the principle of non-intervention and relevant provisions of the UN Charter, e.g. the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) and the principle of non-interference in matters that are essentially under the internal jurisdiction of the state in Article 2(7). Proponents have a different interpretation of the provisions of the Charter and choose to refer to Articles 1, 55 and 56.

The non-legal aspects can be formulated into a question: How are peoples right to self-determination best promoted? Proponents of foreign intervention in favour of peoples’ rights to self-determination would argue that if human rights are violated in a state then the self-determination of its people is denied. In order to rectify this situation they would hold the opinion that foreign intervention against the will of that state is permissible. This raises the issue of whether the
self-determination of a people can be achieved through foreign military interventions. If a foreign power imposes a new political system it can hardly be regarded as an act of enhancing the self-determination of the population in the target state. After all, the inhabitants of that state would not be given the opportunity to choose the new political system; in fact it would be imposed on them. Pursuant to this line of argumentation it can be further argued that such foreign military interventions would alter the political situation but would not alter the basic condition of self-determination deprivation of the people in the target states.

Thus far the discussion has been related to the concept of humanitarian intervention and the question of self-determination of people versus the sovereignty of the state and the scholarly debate on these issues. Some basic problems have been highlighted by critically evaluating central aspects of the line of argumentation presented by proponents of humanitarian intervention and of the right to intervene to promote the self-determination of people in other states.

If attention is turned to a more political level and how the state actors look at these issues it can be noted that a change in attitude seems to have taken place in the post-Cold War era, indicated by the emergence of the new type of foreign intervention – “peace enforcement”. In the early 1990s the Security Council begun to delegate to member-states of the UN the right to carry out military interventions on their own. A higher degree of United Nations involvement in civil-war situations is also an indication of a change in attitude. Do these changes imply a shift towards accepting humanitarian intervention against the will of the target state?
Proponents of humanitarian interventions would argue that its does while opponents would point to the fact that all Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII refer to threats to international peace and security as a basis for adopting the resolution. Humanitarian concern might be mentioned but would not be the official reason for adopting a Chapter VII resolution.

As it seems the strongest opposition to humanitarian intervention and to foreign interventionary behaviour in general comes from developing world, how might this be explained? Could it be attributed to disparate human rights values? In the context of this analysis it will be argued that this is not necessarily the case but that there could very well be differences between the North and the South in the importance given to different forms of human rights. The debate of the 1990s between proponents of the so-called ‘Asian values’ who put more emphasis on economic and social rights and the proponents of primarily promoting individual and political rights, such as Australia and the USA, indicates that differences in perception exists.

More importantly, most foreign interventions are carried out in Third World states and the examples in the literature on the need for humanitarian intervention often refer to the situation in the Third World (e.g. Reisman 1990: 869-874; Hoffmann 1995-96: 37-49). One cannot expect the leaders of Third World states to stand up and support interventions that could contribute to their downfall or in fact aim directly at overthrowing them. Not surprisingly, most Third World states are keen to uphold the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. However, this does not mean that they would not themselves carry out military interventions in other states if they feel that they legitimate reasons to do so, e.g. India in the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the early 1970s, Vietnam in Cambodia and
Tanzania in Uganda, respectively, in the late 1970s. Hoffmann sees such
behaviour as weakening their position as opponents to interventions in general
(Hoffmann 1995-96: 36). An alternative line of argumentation is that such states
are no different from states in North America and Western Europe, but since they
fear becoming victims of foreign interventions, they oppose such behaviour
when other states resort to it. After all, no leadership of a state in the world
would, on a voluntary basis, welcome a foreign intervention that is hostile to it.

In other words even countries supporting interventionism in other countries
would not accept to be the target of a hostile intervention. In examining the
position taken by China and ASEAN, respectively, this aspect will be taken into
consideration when assessing their policies relating to the principle of non-
interference.

**Chinese Foreign Policy**

Chinese foreign policy is still governed by the *Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence* which were formulated for the first time in agreement between
China and India of 29 April 1954. These principles are fundamental not only to
China’s overall foreign policy but also to China’s bilateral relations with several
countries. The essence of the five principles have been summarised as follows by
Zou:

(1) respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-
aggression, (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4)
equality and mutual benefit and (5) peaceful coexistence. (Zou 2009: 25)
Respect for sovereignty and non-interference display strong commitment to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Non-aggression is in line with the prohibition of the threat or use of force since it rules out attacking another country. Peaceful coexistence implies that a country does not threaten or use force against another country. Thus, although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was not representing “China” in the UN in 1954 – the Republic of China (Taiwan) did so until 1971 – the foreign policy of the PRC was in tune with key aspects and principles of the UN Charter. After the PRC gained control of China’s seat in the United Nations and of the Permanent membership in the UN Security Council, it has pursued a foreign policy adhering to the five principles and thus in line with key aspects and principles of the Charter.

Given the principles governing China’s foreign policy, it has taken a negative stand on foreign military interventions in the international system. China has been highly critical of US-military interventions and even actively opposed the US-intervention in the Second Indochina Conflict. During the Sino-Soviet conflict China also opposed Soviet-led interventions. China continues to be opposed to foreign military interventions also in the post-Cold War era, in particular those carried out by other major powers without explicit Security Council authorisation, i.e. Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. The extent – both in terms of intensity and in length of time – to which China will criticise an intervention and possibly act against it depends on the direct or indirect impact on China and also which principles are being negatively affected by the interventionary behaviour. In this context the case of Kosovo is important both because China was directly targeted when its embassy in Belgrade was bombed and because the intervention violated both the principle of non-interference and the prohibition of the threat or use of force. Other aspects also played a role such as the “humanitarian” debate that surrounded the intervention and the challenge
to the principle of territorial integrity. Both aspects prompted China to respond negatively and to oppose the intervention.9)

China was also initially reluctant to both support and participate in peacekeeping operations. There has been a change in China’s attitude towards peacekeeping and China has gradually come not only to openly support such operations through its voting behaviour in the Security Council, but also through direct active Chinese participation in peacekeeping operations.10) It appears as though China can reconcile it stands on non-interference with peacekeeping operation as long as the existing government in the target country welcomes an operation.

If the above developments and observations are taken into account it appears as though China is consistently guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and that principles such as non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity are very important to China and in China’s foreign policy. However, how China responds to breaches of these principles by other countries seems to be guided by China’s national interest and how they affect China directly or indirectly. Thus, China is pragmatic and flexible in its approach but would not act in such a way as to compromise its own national interest. This should not be interpreted as though China has abandoned the basic principles guiding its foreign policy.

9) The case of Kosovo is discussed by both Zou (2009: 28); Carlson (2004: 9-27). Carlson examines China’s recent stance on both sovereignty and “Multilateral Intervention” ranging from non-United Nations authorised to peacekeeping operations.
10) For two detailed studies on China’s attitude towards peacekeeping see Gill & Huang (2009); Stähle (2008: 631-655).
Principles Governing ASEAN

Six key ASEAN documents are examined in the context of this paper to identify the importance of non-interference within the ASEAN framework. The six documents are: The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, and, the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter). These key documents are examined in chronological order based on the dates of adoption by ASEAN.

The ASEAN Declaration

The ASEAN Declaration, adopted on 8 August 1967, spells out the overall goals and aims of ASEAN and set the stage for a process aiming at defining the way in which the Association should function and the mechanisms by which the goals and aims of the Association should be achieved. The importance of non-interference is explicit as outlined in the Preamble of the Declaration:

CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; (ASEAN Declaration)

The importance of the UN Charter in the context of promoting regional peace and the commitment of the member-states of ASEAN to the Charter is also

422 COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
explicit as displayed in the following:

To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; (ASEAN Declaration)

**The Declaration of ASEAN Concord**

The evolution that followed during the so-called “formative years”\(^\text{11}\); i.e. 1967 to 1976, led to the signing of the *Declaration of ASEAN* Concord on 24 February 1976, in connection with the First Summit Meeting of ASEAN held in Bali.

The *Declaration of ASEAN Concord* relates to the member-states of ASEAN. The *Declaration of ASEAN Concord* contains both general principles relating to the overall goals of the Association and principles relating to the specific goal of managing disputes and expanding co-operation among the member-states. Emphasis is put on the respect for the principles of “self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations” (*ASEAN Concord 1*).

In order to achieve the overall goals the Declaration of ASEAN Concord includes a programme of action which constitutes a framework for ASEAN co-operation in the following fields: political, economic, social, cultural and information, security, and improvement of the ASEAN machinery (*ASEAN Concord 1*).

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\(^{11}\) Askandar argues that the First Summit Meeting marked the end of the ‘formative stage’ of ASEAN regionalism and that the signing of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC marked the beginning of the ‘second phase’ (Askandar, 1994: 68).
The TAC

The TAC was also adopted on 24 February 1976 in Bali. In Chapter I, dealing with “Purpose and Principles”, Article 2 outlines the fundamental principles that should guide the relations between the signatories to the Treaty. The principles are:

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion of coercion;
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f. Effective co-operation among themselves. (TAC)

The principles include three main factors for managing inter-state relations: non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of disputes, and, overall co-operation.

In Chapter III, dealing with “Co-operation”, the areas in which mutual co-operation can be established and expanded are outlined and the linkages between co-operation, peaceful relations and non-interference are displayed. The later is most evidently shown in Article 12, which states that, the signatories:

...in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, co-operation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia. (TAC)
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

The Declaration ASEAN Concord II, adopted on 7 October 2003 in connection with the Ninth ASEAN Summit held in Bali, displays the continuity in the development of collaboration within ASEAN. The preamble confirms that fundamental values and principles are still very much in evidence as displayed by the fact that it is stated that the member-states are “Reaffirming the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN Cooperation” (ASEAN Concord 2).

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II also includes a part in which the member states adopt a framework to achieve a: “dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN community”. To achieve this overarching goal the Association will strive to create an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and, an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASSC) (ASEAN Concord 2).

In the part relating to the ASC, Point 3 outlines that ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation and in this context it is stated that: “Member countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in the internal affairs.” Point 4 also relates to this dimension but is more general and it states that:

“The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.” (ASEAN Concord 2)
Thus, both Points confirm that continued relevance and importance of the principle of non-interference in the ASEAN framework for regional collaboration and relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

*The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action*[^12]

The process aiming at establishing the ASC was reinforced at the Tenth ASEAN Summit held in Vientiane in late November 2004 when ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action. This Plan outlines that the ASC should be based on “shared norms and rules of good conduct in inter-state relations; effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms; and post-conflict peace building activities”. The Plan also stresses that the ASC process shall be “progressive” and that it shall be guided by:

...well-established principles of non-interference, consensus based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for the national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes which has served as the foundation of ASEAN cooperation. *(ASEAN Security)*

Thus, the Plan clearly displays a high degree of continuity and adherence to established principles for inter-state collaboration in ASEAN. It also states that ASEAN shall not only strengthen existing “initiatives” but also launch new ones and set “appropriate implementation frameworks”.

[^12]: Unless otherwise stated all factual information in this section is derived from the text of ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’ *(ASEAN Security)* and ‘ANNEX for ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’ *(ASEAN Security Annex)*.
The Plan includes seven sections; I. Political Development; II. Shaping and Sharing of Norms; III. Conflict Prevention; IV. Conflict Resolution; V. Post-conflict Peace Building; VI. Implementing Mechanisms; and, VII. Areas of Activities.

In the section on shaping norms it is stated that the aim is to achieve a standard of ‘common adherence to norms of good conduct among the members of the ASEAN Community’ in any norm setting activity the following principles must be adhered to:

1. Non-alignment;
2. Fostering of peace-oriented attitudes of ASEAN Member Countries;
3. Conflict Resolution through non-violent means;
4. Renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and avoidance of arms race in Southeast Asia; and
5. Renunciation of the threat or the use of force. (*ASEAN Security*)

*The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*¹³

*The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN Charter) – adopted on 20 November 2007 in Singapore – reaffirms a number of fundamental principles governing inter-state relations among its member-states. In paragraph 7 of the Preamble it is stated: “Respecting the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity” (*ASEAN Charter: 2*).

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¹³ Unless otherwise stated all factual information in this section is derived from the text of ‘The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN Charter).
In Article 2 – “Principles” – both non-interference, peace, and dispute settlement are highlighted as displayed by the following principles that ASEAN member-states should “act in accordance with”:

(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;
(b) shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity;
(c) renunciation of aggression and the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law;
(d) reliance of peaceful settlement of dispute;
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member-states;
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion;

(…)
(k) abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States” (ASEAN Charter: 5-6).

The non-interference dimension is extensive and explicit in these principles. The strict adherence to the provisions on the UN Charter relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force in inter-state relations is also notable.

Peacekeeping in Asia14)

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14) This section is revised and updated from Alldén & Amer (2007, 2009)
Two cases stand out from other cases of UN engagement: Cambodia in 1992-1993 and East Timor\textsuperscript{15}) from 1999 onwards. These are the only two cases in Asia where the UN has taken over more or less of their national administration in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding attempt; i.e. cases of international administrations. They differ from traditional peacekeeping missions through their interest in, and often also their responsibility for, the functioning of a state (or a territory). At each point of time, the mission undertaken was the most extensive and expensive peacebuilding attempt by the UN.

\textit{Cambodia}\textsuperscript{16)}

On 23 October 1991 two agreements concerning Cambodia were signed in Paris in connection with the second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC): “Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict” and “Agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia” (A/46/608-S/23177). The agreements officially resolved the so-called “Cambodian Conflict”.

The Paris Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict included provisions for the creation of a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). As expressed in the Agreement, UNTAC’s mandate in Cambodia would be to exercise the powers necessary to ensure the

\textsuperscript{15}) East Timor formally changed its name into Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste when they officially became independent in 2002. However, the conventional short-form for the country is still East Timor and is used throughout the paper to avoid confusion.

implementation of the Agreement. In regard to “Civil administration” all administrative units acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information would be under direct UNTAC control. Other administrative units would also come under direct UNTAC control, if deemed necessary. UNTAC was to have access to all administrative operations and information and it could require the reassignment or removal of any personnel. Furthermore, all police would operate under UNTAC supervision and control. In regard to “Military functions” UNTAC’s duties were divided in accordance with the two phases envisaged by the Paris Agreement. During the first phase UNTAC was to supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces and their non-return to Cambodia as well as the cessation of foreign military assistance to the Cambodian parties. UNTAC would also supervise the cease-fire to be observed by the Cambodian parties upon the signature of the Paris Agreement. During the second phase, involving the demobilization and cantonment of the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, UNTAC would supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to cantonment areas. UNTAC would also control and guard the military equipment handed over by the parties. In regard to “Elections” UNTAC’s role would be to organise and conduct the general elections to be held in Cambodia. In order to carry out this task UNTAC was to ensure that appropriate laws were in existence. Furthermore, UNTAC would register as well as educate voters, design and implement a system of registration of political parties, and establish lists of candidates (A/46/608-S/23177: 8-47)

On 16 October 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 717 in which it was decided to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to be sent to Cambodia immediately after the signing Paris Agreements on Cambodia (S/RES/717 (1991). The formal decision to set up
UNTAC was taken by a unanimous Security Council on 28 February 1992 (S/RES/745 (1992)). UNTAC was officially established with the arrival in Phnom Penh of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 15 March 1992. The withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia took place between August and December 1993. On 24 September Cambodia’s new Constitution was promulgated and the Constituent Assembly was transformed into a legislative assembly. This formally terminated UNTAC’s mandate in Cambodia.

The major positive feature of the operation was the success of the general elections, carried out from 23 to 28 May 1993, both in terms of registration of voters and of the impressive turnout in the elections. In fact 89.56 per cent of the nearly 4.7 million registered voters participated in the elections. Another notable success was the repatriation of some 365,000 Cambodian refugees ahead of the general elections. Major efforts were made to promote the respect for human rights and to combat politically motivated violence in the country. However, the UN did not succeed in creating a truly politically neutral climate for the elections. The UN also failed to adequately address the problem of regularly occurring armed attacks against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. To a certain extent the actions taken by the UN had the effect of worsening the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese. Another shortcoming was the decision to pay salaries to the peacekeepers in US dollars, thus contributing to the dramatic depreciation of the local currency and causing a sharp increase in the cost of living of the Cambodian population. However, the most serious shortcoming was in the military field where the demobilisation and cantonment of the military forces had to be abandoned because the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) refused to join in the process. As a consequence the stage was set for continued civil war in the country following the withdrawal of UNTAC.
After the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, interim president, Habibie, announced on 29 January 1999 that if East Timor did not accept an offer of autonomy, he would recommend a complete separation from Indonesia. The future of East Timor was thus to be decided through a popular consultation (Martin 2001: 19; Martin & Mayer-Rieckh 2005: 105).

On 30 August 1999, a remarkable 98.6 per cent of the registered East Timorese voters went to the ballot box and the result was unambiguous: 21.5 percent in favour and 78.5 per cent against the proposed special autonomy. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, urged all parties to accept the results of the popular consultation, but the result nevertheless incited Indonesia-backed militia forces to mass-violence, killing thousands of people, displacing hundreds of thousands in-and outside of East Timor, and destroying over 70 per cent of the infrastructure (Fox & Soares 2000).

The developments in early 1999 sparked a series of meetings and continued negotiations between the UN, the foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, and the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative for East Timor (Martin 2001:18; Marker 2003:10). On 5 May 1999 an agreement was signed between Indonesia and Portugal, considered a “triumph of 16 years of UN diplomacy”. The agreement consisted of three draft agreements: the Basic Agreement that covered the broad political issues; the Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot; and East Timor Popular Consultations: Agreement Regarding Security (Agreement Between, 1999).
Article 2 of the Basic Agreement formed the basis for the establishment of a United Nations Mission in East Timor mandated to conduct the popular consultation and it was also requested that the Secretary-General maintained an “adequate presence” in East Timor in the period following the ballot and the implementation of its results (Agreement Between, 1999). This was later confirmed in a report of the Secretary-General formally establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) (S/1999/595).

The mandate for UNAMET included three components: a political component responsible for monitoring the political climate and ensure the freedom of political parties and NGOs to carry out their activities; an electoral component responsible for activities relating to registration and voting; and an information component responsible for providing information about the voting procedures and process as well as about the text of the General Agreement and the proposed autonomy framework to the electorate (S/RES/1246 (1999)).

The deteriorating security situation that followed after the popular consultation led to the deployment of an international peace enforcement force, and then to the establishment of a state-building and transitional administrative mission, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The security mayhem after the popular consultation caused international pressure on Indonesia to fulfil its obligation under the 5 May agreements. This prompted the Security Council to establish an international peace enforcement force – the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) (S/1264 (1999)). The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 15 September, mandated to restore peace and order, protect and support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations (S/1264 (1999)).
The next move by the Security Council was to replace INTERFET with a UN peacekeeping mission – the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (S/RES1272 (1999)). The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII on 25 October. UNTAET was to provide security and maintain law and order; establish an effective public administration; support in the development of social and civil services; coordinate and ensure delivery of humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development assistance, strengthen institutional capacity for self-government, and establish conditions for sustainable development (S/RES1272 (1999)).

UNTAET was assigned to prepare East Timor for its independence in 2002. However, it was expected that the UN would deploy a successor mission of some sort. The United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) was established through a Security Council resolution adopted on 17 May 2002 (S/RES/1410 (2002)). UNMISET was mandated to provide support to governance and administration in the independent state. It was to work parallel to the new Timorese government and provide assistance to core administrative structures; provide interim law enforcement and public security, assist in the development of a national police force; and contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security (S/RES/1410 (2002)).

UNMISET mandate was eventually prolonged up to 20 May 2006, although in 2004, its mission was reduced and its mandate focused on providing support to the public administration and justice system, to the development of law enforcement, and to the security and stability in East Timor (S/RES/1543 (2004)). In 2005 the Secretary-General recommended that the UN remain in the country beyond 20 May 2005, in a scaled-down mission up until 20 May 2006 (S/2005/99). The Security Council decided along these lines the same year.
The Resolution also formally established the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) – a one-year political mission – assigned to monitor and support the development of critical state institutions, to monitor and support further development of the police, and to provide training in democratic governance and human rights (S/RES/1599 (2005)).

Renewed violence in the spring of 2006 caused political unrest and thousands of people fled their homes, fearing a repetition of the 1999 violence. In response to this situation the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) on 25 August 2006 (S/RES/1704 (2006)). UNMIT was initially deployed for six months but with the intention to renew its mandate for further periods, which was done for a period of 12 months by the Security Council on 22 February 2007 (S/RES/1745 (2007)). UNMIT consists of a civilian component that includes police personnel and one component of military liaison and staff officers (S/RES/1745 (2007)). Today the UN is still present through UNMIT with the mandate extended until 26 February 2010 (S/RES/1867 (2009)).

Lessons from Peacekeeping in Asia

Until today, only two cases of UN-initiated and led international administrations can be found in Asia. In both Cambodia and East Timor, the UN’s missions are considered successful by some observers whereas others are more cautious in their assessments. The UN did well in preparing and conducting elections in both cases, although the aftermath proved less successful for both Cambodia.

17) The mandate was first prolonged until 20 June 2006 (S/RES/1677 (2006)), then until 20 August 2006 (S/RES/1690 (2006)), and finally until 25 August 2007 (S/RES/1703 (2006)).
and East Timor. Whereas UNTAC did well in repatriation of refugees while the issue of demobilisation and cantonment was less successful. The latter was also the case in East Timor, and the failure to completely demobilise and reintegrate former militia- and Falintil members backfired in February 2006. With regards to human rights and law and order, both cases bear proof of inadequate international engagement. These shortcomings have left both Cambodia and East Timor with fragile judicial systems, flawed legislations and violations of human rights.

The importance of addressing and dealing with local partners is a lesson highlighted in both Cambodia and East Timor. In the former case, the need to involve a wide range of actors in order to successfully implement a peace agreement became evident, especially the precarious issue of dealing with the PDK in the implementation of the peace agreement and of UNTAC’s mandate. In East Timor, the political situation was not as complicated as in Cambodia, but failure to involve local partners nevertheless managed to impede successful implementation of the UN mandate.

The case of Cambodia highlights the need to have contingency plans if local actor(s) opt to withdraw from the implementation of a Peace agreement and cease collaboration with a UN mission. The fact that the PDK decided to withdraw from the process and to resume armed activities should be understood as displaying that the organisation perceived that its expectations and goals were not met. In all evidence there was no contingency plan to deal with such a development neither politically nor militarily. It was the armed forces of the State of Cambodia (SOC) that had to assume the task responding to the military challenge of the PDK. The UN needs to have contingency plans when carrying out peacekeeping operations to deal with local actors who opt out of peace
agreements during the implementation phase.

Another interesting lesson from Cambodia is the paramount importance to obtain the collaboration and active participation of the major local actor, i.e. the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – the ruling party within the SOC. Put bluntly had the CPP opted to withdraw from the implementation process of the peace agreement, then the whole operation would have collapsed. After all the CPP controlled the vast majority of the territory of Cambodia where about 90 per cent of the population lived and given that situation a CPP withdrawal would in all essence have implied a premature termination of the peacekeeping operation. Although the CPP was not fully collaborating, in particular not when it perceived that UNTAC was interfering with issues of vital political interest to the CPP, the fact that the CPP stayed within the process made it possible to carry out the Cambodian operation and most importantly to carry out successful elections.

In the case of East Timor, the main Timorese fraction, the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (CNRT, i.e. the National Council of Timorese Resistance) – under the leadership of freedom fighter and later president of the Republic, Xanana Gusmão – was not considered a “neutral” partner for the UN to collaborate with. The CNRT, nevertheless, had the support of the majority of the population, and had prior to the arrival of the UN, been involved with negotiations with the UN Department of Political Affairs. When UNTAET was deployed, it answered to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and CNRT’s collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs was not communicated between the two UN departments. In September 1999, the CNRT presented a plan to the UN and the World Bank, proposing the establishment of a Council of East Timorese Transition to work in partnership with the UN to facilitate the transitional period. This plan was ignored when planning and
establishing UNTAET, arguably because there were reservations about acknowledging CNRT as the Timorese partner. In sum, the UN acquired a somewhat “colonial character” in East Timor, seriously impeding the successful implementation of the peacekeeping/peacebuilding mandate. A major lesson in this context is that the major national actors have to be part of the implementation of a peace agreement and broadly collaborate with the peacekeepers if the operations will have a chance to succeed and facilitate the transition to democracy. Failure to include national partners can leave them feeling deprived, causing civil unrest and a return to violence.

**Concluding Remarks**

Both China and ASEAN pursue policies that are strongly in favour of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. They also pursue policies that adhere to the prohibition of the threat or use of force. Furthermore, both China and ASEAN are committed to the peaceful settlements of disputes.

The principle of non-interference is a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy since the 1950s as enshrined in the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* (Jia 2003: 20-21). However, the increased number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council since the end of the Cold War, involving the authorisation of the use of force and expanded peacekeeping mandates, indicates a more flexible stand on interventionism on China’s part. Recent research findings support that notion and trend (Carlsson 2004: 9-27; Gill & Huang 2009; Stähle 2008: 631-655; Zou 2009: 21-42). Nevertheless, as argued in this paper this does not imply that China has altered its basic stand on the principle of non-interference. China would not tolerate any such action directly affecting China and China strongly
reacts when its national interests are threatened by actions carried out elsewhere in the international system.

The fundamental importance of non-interference within ASEAN is confirmed through research since the Association was established. Following an internal debate in the late 1990s on proposals that the non-interference principle ought to be relaxed, ASEAN opted not to change its policy and re-affirmed the primacy of the principle of non-interference (Ramcharan, 2000: 60-88). The importance of that principle as part of the regional collaborative structure was displayed during the expansion of the Association in the 1990s (Amer 1999: 1031-1045). As displayed by the overview of six key ASEAN documents non-interference is a cornerstone within the ASEAN framework for regional collaboration. Furthermore, the peaceful settlement of inter-states disputes and prohibition of the threat or use of force are also fundamental aspects of the ASEAN framework.

Within ASEAN the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states prevents member-states for intervening in internal conflicts in other member states. This implies that only if a member state requests assistance or the intervention of ASEAN, selected member-states and/or individual member-states, can they intervene. The nature of such intervention can differ depending on the request and on the role that ASEAN or the member-states are willing to provide.

As in the case of China the individual member states of ASEAN display more flexible policies towards interventionism and to peacekeeping outside the region. Each member state pursues its own independent foreign policy and given the differences in history, politics and economics among the ASEAN members the foreign policies and the foreign policy priorities outside the ASEAN context
varies considerably. However, none of the ten member-states of ASEAN would accept to be the target of a hostile foreign intervention.

The two UN peacekeeping operations in Asia – Cambodia and East Timor, respectively – are of considerable relevance given the extensive mandates given to the UN in both cases. Also the lessons that can be identified from both operations are of considerable relevance and should be taken into account when new operations are being initiated. However, in practice it is not straightforward that lessons will be relevant in other operations give the specific characteristics of each of the target states for peacekeeping operations. In other words the lessons might not be relevant in the context of another country or region. Another dimension is that the UN system in itself may not be apt at learning from earlier experiences. After all, shortcomings might not feature in the official assessment of an operation nor in the evaluations and reports done by those in charge of the peacekeeping operations.

To conclude it can be observed that although China and ASEAN so strongly adhere to the principle of non-interference is notable that they were not part of the process of drafting the UN Charter. The PRC was not yet established and of the current ten member states of ASEAN, only Thailand was independent at the time. In fact the principle of non-interference was put firmly on the agenda by the Latin American countries where opposition to US-interventionism had led to the formulation of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention and to the emergence of widespread support for the principles. A number of Latin American countries took part in the drafting of the Charter and could influence its content and together with like-minded countries. Thus, they could push for the inclusion of a principle like non-interference in the Charter. In other words although China and ASEAN nowadays strongly
support the principle of non-interference, both the concept and the principle have their roots elsewhere.

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Introduction

Scholars and analysts largely agree that the European Union (EU) will in the years ahead continue to remain reluctant to develop a security profile in Asia in accordance with its business and economic interests and influence in the region.

This, as EU policymakers usually point out, is not least due to the fact that the EU institutions’ mandate and authority to implement foreign and security policies on behalf of EU 27 Member States are too limited to “do” more with regards to global security, including in Asia. If that is true (and EU policymakers typically argue it is), then the EU Commission and EU Council do all they “can” or all they are “allowed” to do with regards to (hard) Asian security which translates into a very limited or even a “non-role” in Asian hard security.

The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the emerging and recently re-
emerging intensifying ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia\(^1\) are “reminders” of the “realist” character of Asia’s security environment, and the EU will continue to have a fairly limited role contributing to the resolution of these and other “hard security” conflicts in Asia.

To be sure, the EU’s “soft security” policies in Asia are a very different matter even if this sort of engagement does not make it to the front pages of the international press. The EU is the biggest donor of global humanitarian, food and development (providing more than 50% of the total) and the EU’s “capacity-building” policies (e.g. technical assistance, technology and know-how transfers, etc.) in many Asian countries have without a doubt contributed to peace and stability in Asia in recent years and decades.

The shortcomings and problems (such as problems related monitoring and supervision of projects on the ground) aside, there is agreement amongst Asian policymakers and analysts that a more prominent and visible European engagement in Asian “hard security” issues could never be as constructive and promoting security as Brussels’ “soft security” policies in Asia.

This paper will provide an analysis of the EU’s political, economic and security relations with Japan, China and North Korea, essentially addressing the question: What does the EU “do” or does not do in terms of politics, economics and security with Japan, China and North Korea?

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1) Recommendable are IISS scholar Tim Huxley’s writings on recent and emerging ethnic and other conflicts in Southeast Asia; see http://www.iiss.org/about-us/staffexpertise/list-experts-by-name/tim-huxley/
While seeking to provide an overview of the EU’s political, economic and trade and security relations with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang, it will at the same time seek to draw conclusions on the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security. Put another way, what does and does not EU security co-operation with Japan, China and (to a lesser extent North Korea) say about the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security?

This approach of seeking to qualify and quantify the overall EU security involvement in Asia has its limits: The analysis of the EU’s relations with three Asian countries in general and security ties in particular cannot provide results and conclusions regarding all issues and aspects of European security involvement in Asian security. In other words, the analysis of the EU’s security relations with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang is not necessarily representative of everything the EU “is” and “does” in terms of Asian security.

It will also be assess whether the EU’s approach and policies towards Asian security relations point to the existence of a coherent and clear-cut overall strategy towards Asia in general and Asian security in particular.

The conclusions in this context drawn below are somewhat sobering: The EU’s relations in general and security ties with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang in particular do not necessarily enable the analyst and observer to detect common and recurring patterns of EU security policies towards Asia. Instead, individual European governments will continue to formulate and implement their own national foreign, foreign economic and security policies towards Asia competing with, or worse, contradicting EU Commission Asia policies.

The controversy (or from an EU and European policymaking perspective the
“debacle”) surrounding the EU and European policies and approaches towards the EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 demonstrated this “impressively.” The EU Commission’s position on the lifting of non-lifting of the weapons embargo back in 2004 and 2005 lost much of its credibility when EU Member States (without consultation with the EU Commission) chose to advocate and implement their weapons embargo positions and policies individually (and there contradicting official EU positions).2)

**EU-China Relations**3)

Leaving aside controversial areas like human rights, the EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 and the ever growing trade surplus in China’s favor, the expansion of EU-China institutional links and bilateral cooperation (at least on paper) has been second to none in recent years.4) The 25 EU-China “sectoral dialogues” are part of this and take place on either working or ministerial levels covering areas such as energy, environmental protection, consumer product safety, civil aviation, competition policy, education and culture, employment and

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2) During the height of the weapons embargo controversy in 2004 and 2005 hardly a day went by when EU Commission and EU Member States contradicted each other on whether and when to lift and not to lift the weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989; while some Member States (above all the Scandinavian countries) urged the EU Commission to leave the weapons embargo in place other EU Member States frequently changed their position on the embargo, especially those under Chinese pressure to lose out on business opportunities in China if opposed to the lifting of the embargo (Germany, France and the UK). Worse, from an EU policymaking perspective, the statements regarding the possible lifting of the weapon coming from the EU Council were not always compatible with the official EU Commission positions.


4) For a recent analysis see also Grant, Charles, Barysch, “Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order?”, Centre for European Reform London 2008; http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_837.pdf
social affairs, intellectual property rights (IPR), consumer product safety, maritime transport, regulatory and industrial policy and others.\(^5\)

Various stakeholders are involved in these dialogues, including officials, politicians and business. The dialogues take the form of working groups, conferences, annual formal meetings or regular informal meetings and representatives from 19 Directorates General in the European Commission and their respective counterparts in China are involved in these dialogues.

Although not the same level of progress is being achieved in all dialogues yet (none on human rights), some of these dialogues have in recent years produced concrete and relevant results, such as the one on the environment: EU-Chinese talks on car exhaust emission standards recently resulted in Beijing adopting EU rules and standards in this area.

To be sure, Chinese officials in both Beijing and Brussels continue to insist on the “informal” (as opposed to “legally-binding”) character of those dialogues when refusing to meet European demands voiced e.g. in the sectoral dialogues dealing intellectual property rights and market access in China.

The EU-China Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) sets out three main areas for cooperation and the multi-annual indicative program is allocating €128 million for the first four years (2007-2010).\(^6\) These funds will be invested in areas covered by

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EU-China policy dialogues, including the ones dealing with trade, socio-economic development, support for China’s internal reform process, climate change, the environment and energy. In addition to the EU’s assistance and aid programs a number of EU Member States run individual assistance programs in the areas of poverty reduction, energy, healthcare, rule of law, environment and others.

**Not One but (Too) Many Voices**

The EU Commission’s mandate and authority to implement one “set” of European policies towards China on behalf of the Union’s 27 Member States is limited and there is very little institutionalized coordination between the EU Commission (in charge of the Union’s overall trade and economic policies) on the one hand and the EU Council (in charge of the EU’s foreign and security policies) on the other.

In fact, there are no inner-EU mechanisms and fora coordinating respective Commission and Council policies towards China. Apart from the fact that the lack of inner-EU policy coordination slows down the Union’s decision-making process, it has in the recent past resulted in at times inconsistent and contradictory EU China policies. The controversy and inner-European disagreements in 2004 and 2005 over the EU weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989 is an (infamous) example in this context.

European inconsistencies and contradictions on whether the weapons embargo

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7) For further details see e.g. European Commission, External Cooperation Programmes, China http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/country-cooperation/china/china_en.htm
should be lifted led Beijing to claim (and complain until the present day9)) that the EU is not a credible foreign and security policy actor and consequently not “worthy” and qualified to implement the “strategic partnership” with China.

To be sure, Beijing was (and still is) exploiting the inner-European disagreements and controversy on the weapons for its own purposes, EU and European weapons embargo policies were an example of how not to recommend itself as unified foreign and security policy actor.

Beijing’s policymakers and their Brussels-based diplomats are of course aware of and well-informed on the EU’s problems and complexities with regards to decision-making and inner-EU policy coordination and are without a doubt taking advantage of them. Beijing and their representatives in Brussels have over recent years made it a habit pointing out and complaining about the inner-European policy inconsistencies.

For the time being, Beijing is very likely to continue to choose dealing with either EU institutions or individual EU Member States’ governments according to what suits its interests best, as a European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) April 2009 paper authored by François Godement and John Fox argues in a very straightforward manner.10) EU Member States for their

9) Until today, Chinese officials and scholars likewise typically and persistently urge Brussels to lift the 1989 weapons embargo and end, as Beijing puts it, the “political discrimination” against China at EU-China Track (i.e. official) and Track II (non-official) meetings.
10) See François Godement, John Fox, “A Power Audit of EU-China Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations. April 2009 http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozmf6b9bz4.pdf; the paper, this author learned through various conversations with EU officials, has been perceived fairly negatively by policymakers in charge of the EU’s policies towards China at the EU Commission as the paper argues that the EU does not only not have a coherent strategy towards Beijing but also because it is unable to have one in view of the EU Member States’ competing China policies
part will like as in the past continue to implement their “own” individual China policies as they see fit regardless of the fact that these policies are not necessarily in compliance with or worse still contradict the EU Commission’s China policies.

**EU-China Security Cooperation**

It has become increasingly clear over recent years that the EU and China pursue fundamentally different approaches towards security, be in East Asia, Central, Africa and elsewhere. While the EU claims to formulate and implement (at least paper) its policies taking into account the protection of human rights, democracy (or willingness to democratize), accountability and transparency in countries it is getting engaged in (above all in the fields of financial and development aid as well as technical assistance), China is being accused of conducting “value-free diplomacy”, implementing economic and foreign economic policies regardless of political oppression or human rights violations (or both) in countries it is doing business in. This accusation has (in Europe and the US) in recent years in particular been voiced in the context of China’s energy and energy security policies in Africa and Central Asia as well as in parts of Southeast Asia, i.e. Burma). What Europe and the US refer to as “value-free diplomacy” is what Beijing for its part calls policies along the lines of what it calls the “principle of non-interference”, i.e. policies which do not “interfere” with domestic politics in countries China is doing business in.

To be sure, the credibility of Beijing’s “principle of non-interference” is debatable (or non-existent) in the context of Beijing’s policies towards Burma, Sudan and North Korea. Economic, political, financial support for oppressive
regimes (and in the case of Burma for a military junta) must realistically be defined as interference in the affairs of the countries-in this case at the expense of the population obliged to live under oppressive regimes.

**EU-China and Taiwan**

Brussels does not have a position on the “Taiwan issue” beyond declaring that Brussels is supporting a peaceful solution of Chinese-Taiwanese disagreements over the status of Taiwan being opposed to the use of force between Taipei and Beijing. Brussels’ refusal to have e.g. an outspoken position (beyond being “concerned” on paper) on the number of (reportedly still growing number) of Chinese missiles directed at Taiwanese officially is to be understood in this context.

EU-Taiwan trade amounted to roughly €38 in 2008 making Taiwan the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in Asia (after China, Japan, South Korea and India). In view of these significant trade ties (plus in view of the fact that roughly 10,000 Europeans live and work in Taiwan) one would expect that the EU is more interested in and concerned about stability of cross-strait relations.

Leaving aside the existence of Chinese ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan, current cross-strait relations and the current quasi-absence of Chinese-Taiwanese

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11) For details see European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations, Taiwan; http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/taiwan/index_en.htm
tensions related to Taiwanese independence do not (at least not for now) necessarily require a more outspoken EU opinion which from a European perspective would (as this what the EU Commission worries most about) upset Beijing’s policymakers.13) Indeed, in the past Beijing - be it at official or non-official encounters - has reacted typically reacted very strongly towards “too much” EU (or anybody else’s) interest in the “Taiwan question” reminding Brussels’ policymakers that a European opinion on China-Taiwanese relations going beyond announcing to be committed to the “one-China-principle” is not welcome in Beijing.

The EU – to distinguish from the EU minus the EU Parliament which much to Beijing’s annoyance has in recent years been the author of a number of resolutions dealing with the Taiwan question – usually plays along and seeks to avoid Taiwan as a topic as much as possible during official encounters, reflecting Realpolitik EU-style.

**Discussing Human Rights, Sort of**

The EU discusses human rights with Beijing twice a year, in the framework of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue.

The results of this dialogue, as EU Commission officials involved in the dialogue admit, must be described as very limited at best, not least because Brussels and

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13) Any time in the past when the “Taiwan issue” made it onto the agenda or even to it in the context of EU-China exchanges be it Track I or Track II, the Chinese side (scholars usually included) reacted fairly strongly referring to it as “interference” in China’s internal affairs.
Beijing do not agree on what exactly constitutes human rights. Whereas freedom of speech and expression, political and civic rights fall under the EU’s definition of human rights, Beijing typically defines human rights above all as “economic rights”, i.e. the right to leave poverty behind and prosper economically. What is more, Beijing has in the past been very clear about its limits to talk about human rights with others. Back in April 2007, Beijing, for example, decided to unilaterally cancel the Track II (i.e. the non-official and “Experts Seminar”) part of the EU-China human rights dialogue after the EU and Berlin invited a Beijing “blacklisted” NGO – the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin – an NGO that published regular reports on the conditions and problems of Chinese laborers. 14)

The cancellation of the EU-China summit in December 2008 in Lyons15) again demonstrated that Beijing remains very sensitive about what it considers to be interference in its “internal affairs” and European “advice” on human rights in China clearly falls into the category of such “interference”.16) In view of the dialogue’s limited results, Brussels (as well as some EU Member States) have in

recent years established bilateral dialogue on the rule of law.

Leaving persisting disagreements aside, these dialogues (the one between China and Germany e.g. is one example) have produced some results and Beijing has proven much more receptive to European advice and input on the rule of the law than human rights.

**Trade and Investment Relations**

The EU became China's biggest trading partner in 2004, but the EU still exports more to Switzerland than to China, which according to the EU Commission is not least a result of market access obstacles for European business and investors in China.

In 2008, EU-China bilateral trade amounted to €325 billion with a €170 billion trade deficit in Beijing’s favor.¹⁷) Then again as economists and the EU Commission itself would argue, approaching the EU-China deficit in isolation is not necessarily doing justice to the quality and scope of Beijing’s trade surplus with Brussels. In fact, Asia’s share of EU imports has remained stable at 20-25% over the past decade and the growing trade deficit with China can to some extent be explained by the fact that exports from China have partly been replaced by exports from other Asian countries. Besides, foreign multinational companies (many of them European) are responsible for roughly 65% of exports out of China, in fact meaning that Europe (and ultimately European consumers who

enjoy the cost benefit of products made in China) contributes to or indeed “produces” a large part of the EU’s trade deficit with China.

Intellectual property rights (IPR) violations in China are another EU concern and EU statistics indicate that European business has lost up to €20 billion in China through copyright and trademark infringements in 2008 alone. Beijing has in recent years adopted a number of (at least on paper) effective laws and regulations related to the protection of intellectual property rights, but the enforcement process in China remains slow and only partly transparent, as Europe continues to maintain. 60% of counterfeit and pirated products sold in Europe are still made in China, the EU Commission complains.

EU business and its representatives in Beijing – above all the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing – complain in regular reports about persisting and numerous tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on exports from Europe, as well as restrictions on investment in manufacturing and services. In non-compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regulations, the Chamber’s 2008 “EU Business in China Position Paper” argued, Beijing continues to maintain a number of high tariffs in industries of particular importance such as textiles, clothing, footwear, leather and ceramics.


As regards Chinese non-tariff barriers, according to the EU Chamber of Commerce, European exporters are facing an increasing number of non-tariff barriers such as product certification, labeling standards, import-approval requirements and customs clearance delays. Brussels and the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing also request Beijing to abolish government-initiated “China-first approaches” in what Brussels and the Chamber refer to as “key sectors”, such as steel, automobiles, shipbuilding and semiconductors. China, however, has only recently introduced these policies aimed at aiding and protecting local industries and limiting EU (and US) exports in the above sectors which makes it very unlikely that Beijing will abolish them any time soon as requested by the EU (and the US). While the process of enforcing intellectual property rights in China will continue to be slow, the EU will continue filing anti-dumping cases against China at the WTO in Geneva on a (fairly) regular basis.

**Implications**

The bilateral EU-China agenda will continue to be dominated by issues related to trade and investments, above the trade deficit in China’s favor, intellectual property rights, market access obstacles for European business in China and most recently the controversy centered around the EU extension of additional tariffs on shoes made in China (with the EU accusing China of dumping Chinese-made on the European market, i.e. selling (supported by subsidies

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provided for by the Chinese government) Chinese-made shoes below the price of production in China).\textsuperscript{21}

The EU’s above mentioned position on the ”Taiwan question” and Brussels’ decision not to “rock the boat” – for instance by urging Beijing to reduce the number of Chinese missiles directed at Taiwanese territory – is an indication that Brussels is not willing to get further involved in Asian hard security, especially if one of the concerned parties is China. To be sure, Beijing will continue not to have to “worry” about too much EU interest in the Taiwan issue with Brussels “obeying” China declaring its commitment towards the “One-China-principle” (acknowledging Beijing as the sole of all Chinese people, including those in Taiwan) at some point during every official EU-China encounter.

The EU-China “strategic partnership” (proclaimed in 2003) will continue not to include the notion of “strategic” in a security sense (even if the US and Japan initially thought and feared so, especially when the possible lifting of the EU weapons embargo made it to the top of the EU-China agenda in 2004/2005). Instead, “strategic” will continue to stand for “comprehensive” in the context of bilateral relations, amongst others reflected by the number of the steadily increasing number of the above mentioned “strategic dialogues”.

The “EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)” is supposed to be the next “big bang” on the EU-China agenda, Brussels has been announcing

\textsuperscript{21} This is a very controversially discussed issue inside of Europe, mostly because China is designated as “non-market” economy meaning that the prices of Chinese shoes are compared with prices in a third country, in this case Brazil. See also Alan Beattle, “Q&A: Dumping Shoes”, \textit{Financial Times}, 18 November 2009.
for more than three years. However, apart from reading the official record that the PCA will take EU-China relations to the “next level”, there is very little information available on how bilateral relations will change in scope and quality once the PCA gets adopted. As it has become increasingly clear in recent years, China remains very unlikely to sign the PCA unless the EU decides to lift the above-mentioned weapons embargo, to which China refers to as “political discrimination”. As the EU remains unlikely to lift the embargo any time soon, the PCA is unlikely to be signed any time soon either. To be sure, when and if adopted, the PCA will not result in any additional EU-China security cooperation, due to the reason explained above.

EU-Japan Ties

Joint European-Japanese global policies and policy initiatives go usually unnoticed and very rarely (i.e. almost never) get coverage by the international press. Put bluntly, EU-Japan relations and policies are not “front page material”. Back in 2001 Tokyo and Brussels had very ambitious (on paper) plans as regards international economic, political and security co-operation when adopting the

22) There is yet very limited (essentially none) information available on the new envisioned partnership agreement other than announcing that the new agreement will take EU-China relations to (a yet to be defined) “new level”; for some limited information see, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/dialogue_en.htm


“EU-Japan Action Plan for Co-operation” in 2001 (also “EU-Japan Action Plan”, for details see below). However, very few of the envisioned joint policies have actually been implemented and even if political rhetoric voiced during official EU-Japan encounters suggests otherwise, this is unlikely to change in the years ahead—not least in view of a lack of urgency to upgrade and intensify concrete EU-Japan co-operation in international politics and security.

Nonetheless, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last ten years established a framework for regular consultations and bilateral meetings, including regular consultations ahead of the annual session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.

Furthermore, the EU and Japan are jointly supporting international initiatives to achieve global nuclear disarmament and efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This was accompanied by jointly signing various international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols.25)

To be sure, jointly signing nuclear disarmament protocols was one thing, following up on the signatures and implementing joint policies quite another as it turned out. In other words: The EU and Japan citing their joint signatures under international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols as achievements of bilateral policies in the areas of international politics and security have only so much credibility if these signatures do lead not and result in joint policies with a concrete and measurable impact on international security.

**Tokyo and the EU in the 1990s**

Following the EU-Japan “The Hague Declaration” in 1991\(^{26}\), a “EU factor” made it into Tokyo’s policymaking circles when identifying Japan’s foreign and security policy partners in a post-Cold War era. The Japanese (at least on paper) motivation for expanding its relationship with the EU in the early 1990s was to “diversify” its regional and global security policies which, throughout the Cold War, had been defined and limited by its security alliance with the US.

Intensifying relations with the EU, it was announced in Tokyo back then, should in the post-Cold War era balance Japan’s global foreign and security policies, making it less dependent on US regional and global foreign and security policy strategies. This announcement to make Japanese foreign and security policies less focused on the security alliance with the US resulted in the establishment of the “Task Force on Foreign Relations”, a body set up by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002. The November 2002 task force report identified the EU as a “strong partner” in selected areas of cooperation arguing that “In a new world order Japan needs to have a strong partner according to individual issues. In some issues, Europe can be a rational choice as such a partner.”

Co-operating with the EU in “some issues”, however, did not sound as if Japan was willing to embrace the EU as important global foreign and security policy partner. Indeed, the report did not result in any new EU-Japan policy initiatives which could have been understood as a (partial) “diversification” of Japanese

\(^{26}\) The Hague Declaration was not least the result of a Japanese “Europhoria” after the end of the Cold War and was accompanied by Japanese political rhetoric that the first decade of the 21st century would be a “decade of Euro-Japanese cooperation”.

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464 COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
foreign and security policies. In reality, the opposite took place when Junichiro Koizumi took office in 2001: After the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 Japan intensified its security and military cooperation with the US which amongst others led to a Japanese refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of US military in Afghanistan and the deployment of 1000 Japanese military troops to Iraq in 2004 to provide humanitarian and medial aid.

Furthermore, Tokyo expanded its security cooperation with Washington in Asia officially signing up for the co-development and co-deployment of a regional missile defense system to counter the threat posed by North Korean Nodong and Taepodong missiles. Also in 2005, Washington and Tokyo decided to revise the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which for the first time (at least on paper) would give Japan an active (as opposed to a role centered around providing logistical and other forms of back-up support) military role in a regional contingency. This would (also for the first time) possibly (and semi-officially) include a regional contingency in the Taiwan Straits in the case of a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan.

The EU-Japan Action Plan

In December 2001, the EU and Japan adopted the “Joint Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation” which identified more than 100 areas of bilateral

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cooperation, ranging from joint peacekeeping and security cooperation to strengthened economic and trade cooperation.\textsuperscript{29)}

Today and nine years later there is agreement amongst analysts that the action plan suffered from a lack of focus listing far too many areas of bilateral cooperation to be tackled with the limited available resources. This is reflected by how little Brussels and Tokyo were actually able to “do” (as opposed to signing protocols and documents) with regards to international politics and security over the last nine years. And this is despite the fact that the action plan committed the EU and Japan to coordinate their respective development, humanitarian and peacekeeping policies, and intensify cooperation in areas such as conflict prevention, non-proliferation, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and assistance in Europe and Asia.

Very recently, the EU and Japan have started working on a new EU-Japan action plan which is likely to be adopted in 2011. There is a consensus amongst policymakers in Brussels\textsuperscript{30)} (and probably also in Tokyo) that a new action plan will have to cover far fewer areas and issues of co-operation in order to produce tangible results and provide policymakers in both Brussels and Tokyo with guidelines and policy recommendations in the areas of the envisioned cooperation.\textsuperscript{31)}

\textsuperscript{29)} The plan is divided into four main sections: “Promoting peace and security”, “Strengthening the economic and trade partnership”, “Coping with global and societal changes”, “Bringing together people and cultures”.

\textsuperscript{30)} This author’s conversations with EU Commission officials directly involved in the drafting of the new action plan confirm this. Conversations with Japanese scholars who are part of a “wise men group” to provide Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs with advice on the new envisioned action plan, agree that a new version of such a plan must be much more focused.

\textsuperscript{31)} This author is part of a group of scholars invited to EU Commission-sponsored brainstorming meetings (the first took place in October 2009, the second taking place in February 2010) dealing with EU-Japan relations in general and a new EU-Japan Action Plan in particular.
However, it remains unlikely that the political will and probably more importantly the resources in Brussels and Tokyo will be increased to make a second EU-Japan Action Plan more successful and result-oriented than the first one. China and not Japan will continue to remain the EU’s foreign and foreign economic policy priority in the years ahead and judging by Japan’s newly-elected Prime Minister’s foreign policy announcements and initiatives, Tokyo is planning above all to intensify the country’s Asian policy agenda, including the resumption of Japan’s leadership role as regards regional economic and political integration.\textsuperscript{32}

Furthermore – and probably more importantly for a successful implementation of an action plan with a list of issues and areas to cover and work on daily – the number of Japanese officials and bureaucrats within Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs working on Europe and relations with the EU are still by far outnumbered by their colleagues working on the US (or China for that matter). As regards the EU, it is fair to point out that the number of Commission officials working on relations with Japan within the Commission Directorate for External Relations (DG Relex in Brussels lingo) is not sufficient enough to dedicate the required resources and time to a more successful and result-oriented implementation of an “EU-style” action plan, i.e. a plan that is far too ambitious typically reading like a “shopping list” of unresolved international issues\textsuperscript{33}, unless a new action plan with Japan will indeed list far fewer issues and areas of envisioned bilateral cooperation.

\textsuperscript{32} The Prime Minister is particularly keen on putting Japan to the forefront of the promotion and the envisioned establishment of the “East Asian Community”, a (yet vaguely defined) “community” comprising states in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia as well as Australia and New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{33} The EU’s action plan with India, for example, is only but one example of the EU’s action plans with other countries or regions are typically listing too large a number of issues and areas of envisioned cooperation for policymakers to follow-up on and implement.
EU-Japan Security Cooperation

EU-Japan cooperation on security issues focuses on non-military (or what is referred to as “alternative”) security co-operation, i.e. security co-operation using financial and economic resources to contribute to peace and stability through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of development and financial aid.34)

However, non-military security cooperation with the EU continues to complement Tokyo’s close military security cooperation with the US in a very limited fashion. From a Japanese perspective, the EU can contribute very little, if anything at all, to the country’s security given the security environment in Tokyo’s immediate geographical neighborhood. Close defense ties with the US, supported by roughly 50,000 US troops on Japanese territory, Japan’s political mainstream and defense establishment maintain, is what keeps North Korea from attacking Japanese territory with conventional ballistic missiles or worse.

Japan’s focus and dependence on the US for its national security notwithstanding, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last 10 years undertaken a number of bilateral and initiatives and established bilateral dialogue fora to deal with international non-proliferation and security issues. These included35):

- Jointly signing the “Joint Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-

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35) Information provided by Japan Desk, European Commission, Brussels September 2009.
proliferation” in June 2005\textsuperscript{36})

- Joint promotion of the reform of the Conventional Weapons Protocol on anti-personnel landmines
- Joint adoption of a declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation in 2004 promoting the acceleration of the UN Action Plan on small arms and light weapons
- Joint implementation and co-ordination on small arms and light weapons in Cambodia
- Cooperation on the reconstruction and rehabilitation in Southeast Europe by supporting projects through the United Nations Human Security Trust Fund
- Launch of the EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia with 5 meetings from 2006 to 2008
- Joint financial sponsorship of the International Criminal Court (ICC)\textsuperscript{37})

Jointly signing non-proliferation and disarmament protocols, however, is not the same as implementing joint policies as a follow-up of signatures under international nonproliferation and disarmament protocols and EU policymakers do indeed admit that much more – to put it bluntly – has been done on paper than on the ground over the last decade between the EU and Japan.\textsuperscript{38})

\textsuperscript{36}) The goal of this agreement is to support the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Main Battle Tank and Light Armor Weapon Law and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols

\textsuperscript{37}) There is agreement that European and Japanese financial contributions over the years turned out to be vitally crucial for the ICC to operate and function.

\textsuperscript{38}) Author’s conversations with EU Commissions policymakers in Brussels October 2009.
Talking About East Asian Security

In 2005 Brussels and Tokyo started to discuss Asian security issues on a regular institutional basis by launching the “EU-Japan Brussels Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security” in September of that year. The establishment of the “EU-Japan Dialogue on East Asian Security” was preceded by the establishment of the EU-US Dialogue on East Asian Security in 2004 and given that EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 was at all times the central issue on the dialogue’s agenda\(^{39}\), it is probably fair to assume that the motivation for Tokyo to initiate regular exchanges on East Asian security was identical to Washington’s motivations in 2004: institutionalizing pressure on Brussels to leave the weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989 in place.

Throughout 2004 and 2005, Tokyo and Washington were preoccupied (unnecessarily as it turned out as the lifting of the embargo is nowhere near the top of Brussels’ China agenda) that the EU would lift the embargo, and resume weapons and military technology exports to China actively supporting Beijing’s efforts to modernize its armed forces.

In retrospect (and in view of the fact that neither Tokyo nor Washington ever sought to include the EU in its security strategies for East Asia beyond informal consultations) it can be concluded that neither Tokyo nor Washington would have suggested to set up a dialogue on East Asian security without the possible lifting of the embargo on the agenda.\(^{40}\) Before the embargo issue was discussed

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39) If not the only relevant issue for the US and Japan.
40) EU policymakers, of course, would disagree with this conclusion and argue (as they did when speaking with this author) that both Japan and the US were interested in discussing their respective regional security policy strategies with the EU.
in 2004, Washington and Tokyo have essentially not shown any interest in discussing Asian security with Brussels and neither the US nor Japan have ever advocated a more prominent EU role in solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula such as encouraging or inviting Brussels to become a member of the Six Party Talks – the multilateral forum to achieve North Korea’s de-nuclearization.41)

Trade Relations

In 2008, bilateral EU-Japan trade amounted to €117 billion42), down from €121 billion in 2006.43) Like in the years before the EU in 2008 reported a trade deficit with Japan amounting to €32 billion.44)

Among the EU 27 Member States, Germany (€ 12.8 billion or 30% of the total EU-Japan trade) was the largest exporter to Japan in 2008, followed by France (€ 5.6 billion or 13%), the UK (€ 4.6 billion or 11%) and Italy (€ 4.3 billion or 10%). Germany (€ 17.4 billion or 23%) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands (€ 11.5 billion or 15%), the UK (€ 9.6 billion or 13%) and

41) The Six Party Talks: A multilateral forum hosted by China and aimed at de-nuclearizing North Korea. The Six Party Talks were established in 2003 and the participating nations are the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea.


43) The data on EU-Japan trade available on the EU’s websites (on the DG Relex and DG Trade websites) ends with the year 2005. Getting up-to-date data from EU websites is cumbersome and analysts often have to rely on press releases from DG Trade of Eurostat publishing recent data in press releases.

44) Most Member EU States recorded trade deficits with Japan in 2008. The largest in the Netherlands (€-8.5 billion), Belgium (€-6.2 billion), (UK €-4.9 billion), Germany (€-4.6 billion) and Spain (€-2.4 billion). The only significant surpluses were registered in Denmark (€+1.1 billion), Ireland (€+0.9 billion) and Finland (€+0.5 billion).
Belgium (€ 8.4 billion or 11%).

Even though the EU’s trade deficit with Japan remains a concern to EU and European economic policymakers, given the relatively limited scale (limited as compared with China above all, see below), the trade deficit does no longer feature on top of Brussels’ trade agenda with Japan as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s.

In recent years, the EU and Japan launched and held a number of dialogues, either to increase bilateral trade and investments or (probably more importantly) to help each other protecting themselves from intellectual property rights or patent right violations. These dialogues are amongst others:

I. The High-Level Trade Dialogue

II. EU Industrial Policy Dialogue

    (since November 2005)

IV. EU-Japan Energy Policy Dialogue (since 2007)

In 2007, Brussels and Tokyo also adopted the EU-Japan Action Plan on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection and Enforcement, a plan to strengthen und coordinate European-Japanese cooperation on IPR at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.


46) “Target” from a European-Japanese perspective of this dialogue is without a doubt China which has after the establishment of the dialogue voiced claims that Brussels and Tokyo are “ganging up” on China and its difficulties implementing intellectual property rights in China.
This dialogue was established not least due to the common problems Europe and Japan are confronted with when doing business and investing in China. Unsurprisingly Beijing called that dialogue targeted at China and Chinese business when the dialogue was launched.47)

In the 1990s, the EU and Japan established the EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue48) aimed at facilitating European exports to Japan burdened by red tape and a complex and above all expensive Japanese distribution system.

Many industry and trade sectors in Japan are still subject to regulations and, in Brussels view, are excessive rules and requirements for foreign investors, including agriculture, food safety, transport services, telecommunications, public construction and the financial services sector.

Despite the obstacles for European business operating in Japan, the EU was Japan’s main foreign investor in recent years with investments amounting to an average $5.5 billion per year, driven by investments in telecommunications, car manufacturing, retail and insurance sectors. European business leaders and business associations based in Japan49), however, argue that European FDI to Japan could and indeed should by now be much higher if it were not for the continuous existence of obstacles and regulations distorting competition and rendering investments in Japan unnecessarily costly.

47) And which in China was perceived as EU-Japan dialogue “aimed” at China as the author’s recent interview with Chinese officials indicate.
49) Author’s conversations with European business leaders in Tokyo in December 2009 suggested this and is in line with what the EU Commission in Brussels argues as obstacles to European investments in Japan.
Implications

The EU’s December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) envisioned a strategic partnership with Japan (as well as with China, see below). Until today, however, it is not entirely clear what exactly the “strategic” dimension of bilateral ties is and why the EU and Japan are the “natural allies” the EU Commission refers to Japan as when describing ties with Tokyo at official encounters. Not least because too little of what Brussels and Tokyo were planning to do on paper over the last decade with regards to international politics, economics and security got actually done and the EU-Japan Action Plan envisioned much more of what Brussels were able and willing to do, particularly in the area of security.

EU-Japan security cooperation over the last decade is a decade of many lost opportunities. Very little of what was envisioned to take place in terms of bilateral “soft” security cooperation in the framework of the EU-Japan action plan (beyond the signing of disarmament and non-proliferation protocols) has actually taken place. As regards the above mentioned EU-Japan ‘Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security, almost five years after its launch, the dialogue remains hardly known outside of Brussels and will very likely continue not to lead to joint EU-Japan Asian security policies. To be fair, European and Japanese officials counter criticism on the lack of results coming out of the dialogue by arguing that the dialogue was not supposed to produce joint EU-Japan policies, but is instead to be understood as an instrument and forum to inform each other on respective security policies in East Asia.

As regards EU-Japan cooperation in Afghanistan, Japanese Prime Minister has late last year announced to assign additional $5 billion in civilian aid for Afghanistan and some of the funds are envisioned to be spent on joint projects with the EU. There is certainly scope for further EU-Japanese cooperation in Afghanistan, but it remains to be seen – to put it bluntly – whether policymakers in Europe and Japan will put the money and cooperation where their mouth is, i.e. whether the envisioned civilian cooperation in the months and years ahead will actually take place in 2010 and beyond.

Furthermore, the Japanese Prime Minister announced during his speech at the UN in New York shortly after taking office last September that Japan plans to increase cooperation with the EU on global environment and climate issues (which as it is now widely agreed amongst analysts and policymakers have at least indirect implications on global security). However, the recent UN climate summit in Copenhagen did not experience a noteworthy increase in EU-Japan cooperation with regards to climate change and so far it must be concluded that the intensification of EU-Japan cooperation on climate change issues as envisioned by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama takes place on paper and paper only.

In conclusion, from a European perspective, security cooperation with Tokyo has yet not turned out to be Europe’s “entry ticket” into Asian security as it was hoped in European policymaking circles after the signing of the EU-Japan Action Plan back in 2001. Tokyo for its part remains relatively disinterested in including Europe and the EU in its regional security policy thinking and strategies, unless EU Asian security policies towards Asia have a potentially direct impact on Japanese security as it could have been the case if the EU had decided to lift its weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989.
EU-North Korea Ties

North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 200951) (the first one took place in October 2006) confirmed that the EU’s role to denuclearize North Korea will be the same as the in the years before: Providing however-shaped “political support” for the Six-Party Talks while continuing a very limited engagement course towards North Korea through equally limited and sporadic humanitarian and food and economic engagement activities.

The EU’s current relative inactivity on the Korean Peninsula stands in contrast to the Union’s economic and political engagement policies towards North Korea of the early 2000s.

In May 2001, the EU established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and many EU Member States followed the EU example in 2001 and 2002. Today, 26 out of 27 EU Member States (except France which cites North Korea’s human rights situation as obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang) maintain bilateral diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.52)

The establishment of EU-North Korea diplomatic relations, however, has not led to increased EU influence on politics and security in North Korea (as it was

52) While seven EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Great Britain, Poland and Hungary) maintain embassies in Pyongyang, the other Member States have themselves represented by either their embassies in Seoul or Beijing. The EU itself does not maintain an embassy in Pyongyang and is (depending on the issue and the political circumstances) represented by its ambassador in Seoul.
hoped in Brussels in the early 2000s), not least because Brussels did not turn into a counterweight of US policies towards North Korea as it was initially hoped in Pyongyang.53)

After the detection in 2002 of what was believed to be a clandestine North Korean nuclear program, Brussels instead followed almost immediately (and without spending much time to verify whether what US spy satellites have detected was indeed a secret North Korean nuclear program) Washington’s lead to interrupt economic and political engagement with Pyongyang.

The EU and the Six-Party Talks54)

The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 after US reconnaissance satellites in October 2002 detected a clandestine North Korean nuclear program producing nuclear weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. The talks gained additional relevance when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 and declared itself a de-facto “nuclear state”. The talks continued despite the nuclear crisis eventually leading to the “February 2007 agreement” which codified the provision of economic, financial and energy aid for North Korea in return for the verifiable and sustainable end of Pyongyang’s nuclear programs (and eventually dismantlement of all North Korean facilities). Brussels has never publicly requested a seat at the Six-Party Talks negotiation table in Beijing either and has

54) A multilateral forum hosted by China and aimed at de-nuclearizing North Korea. The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 and the participating nations are the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea.
until the present day essentially limited itself to offering verbal political support for the Six-Party Talks.\textsuperscript{55}

In a speech at the European Parliament on 11 October 2006, the EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner mentioned EU political support for the Six-Party Talks, but did not quantify and qualify what kind of “political support” the EU is willing and able to offer to a forum and a negotiation process it is not part of.\textsuperscript{56}

After Pyongyang agreed in February 2007 to disable and dismantle its plutonium-producing reactors in return for the provision of energy and financial aid, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) announced that the EU would from now on request to be a “player” as opposed to only “payer” in a post-nuclear North Korea. Glyn Ford, former member of the European Parliament and frequent visitor to North Korea calls this a “No-say-no-pay” approach towards North Korea. The EU and Solana, Ford writes, were planning to take North Korea’s (at least on paper) willingness to make progress with regards its denuclearization process as an opportunity to define and formulate a new and possibly expanded EU role in a post-nuclear North Korea.


After February's deal in Beijing (2007), the spokesperson of Javier Solana, the High Official for the CFSP, speaking to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee made it clear that this time around the EU wanted to be a player not a payer in any final accounting.57)

However, these plans have not materialized and the EU Council and Solana have never followed up on that rhetoric which back then indeed sounded like a “new” and decisively more active EU security policy approach towards North Korea. The EU remains as “shy” as ever on North Korean hard security issues. North Korea in general and EU-North Korean trade in particular (see below) are seemingly not important enough for the EU to seek to include itself more visibly and actively in “hard security” issues on the Korean Peninsula.

Food and Humanitarian Aid

The EU has provided North Korea with humanitarian aid worth roughly €370 million from 1995 to the present even if the EU’s most “recent” notable provision of food aid for North Korea dates back to November 2006.58) What is more, transport costs to and distribution costs in North Korea are included in the overall amount provided for humanitarian aid significantly reducing the actual money available for actual food and humanitarian aid such as medicines and medical supplies.

Through the EU Food Security program, the EU is funding NGO projects over the period 2007-2010 out of a € 35 million budget set aside for the DPRK in 2002, but for the time being the EU has no plans to provide North Korea with additional humanitarian and food aid arguing that North Korea’s current humanitarian and food situation does not require additional large-scale food aid. The World Food Program (WFP) does not share that assessment and maintains that North Korea’s 2008 harvest is the worst in a decade. What is more, malnutrition amongst infants, children and women is still and as ever above 30% and more than 50% of North Korea’s population, the WFP states in a report on North Korea, does not have access to basic medical services and supplies.\(^59\)

**EU Economic Engagement Policies**

As formulated in the EU’s 2002 North Korea Country Strategy Paper (CSP) a total of € 35 million had been set aside for EU technical assistance projects until 2006.\(^60\) The CSP-together with the EU’s National Indicative Program (NIP) for North Korea-set out the framework and objectives for technical assistance projects in North Korea. At the time, this made the EU the only substantial donor of technical assistance to North Korea and the CSP and NIP were to

\(^{59}\) Furthermore, the WFP estimates that 2008 could have been the worst harvest in North Korea for more than a decade. According to WFP, there is a deficit of 1.6 million tons of grain and crops meaning that up to 7 million North Korean could suffer from acute hunger in the years ahead. For details, see World Food Programme, “Where We Work-North Korea”.

provide for training in market economic principles and projects designed to support and promote sustainable management and the efficient use of natural resources and energy in the DPRK, as well as institutional support and capacity-building.61)

The basis for the aid and projects formulated in the CSP was the EU’s assessment that support for North Korea’s industrial sector (above all coal, steel) as opposed to support for the agricultural sector is crucial for a possible economic recovery in North Korea. Back then Brussels concluded that the structure of North Korea’s economy is similar to the structure of many Eastern European economies of the 1990s (as opposed to the structure of fellow Asian economies with and large and developed agricultural sectors). Consequently, EU aid and technical assistance in 2002 focussed on North Korea’s industrial sector such as coal and the heavy industry.

Initially, North Korea seemed willing not only to accept EU economic and financial aid but also to learn from Europe how to run and manage an economy in need of economic and structural reforms.62) Amongst others, Pyongyang sent a group of senior officials to Europe in 2002 to learn about EU economic policies and models and welcomed the EU Parliament’s initiative to establish

61) See also, Axel Berkofsky, “EU’s North Korea Policy a Non-Starter”, Asia Times, 10 July 2003; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EG10Dg01.html

regular exchanges between the European Parliament North Korea’s political leadership.

The precondition for the successful implementation of European aid and technical assistance programs was Pyongyang’s willingness and efforts to implement economic and structural reforms. Initially, North Korea’s political leadership seemed prepared to implement fairly and (by North Korean standards) wide-ranging economic reforms and in 2002 and partially liberalized wages and prices to enable farmers to make and increase profits.63)

Many of Pyongyang’s economic reforms, however, have been interrupted, for now indefinitely as many analysts fear. Although the outbreak of the nuclear crisis in 2002 put an end to the implementation process of the EU’s North Korea CSP, Brussels has not suspended all economic assistance and engagement activities in North Korea. In 2004, 2005 and 2007, for example, EU Commission delegations visited North Korea to hold seminars on EU-North Korea relations and economic reforms in North Korea.

EU-North Korea Trade Ties

The EU-North Korea trade volume is negligible and given its very small volume it does not even feature on the website of the Commission’s Directorate-General

for External Trade (DG Trade). The most recent data of bilateral trade available on EU Commission websites dates back to 2002.\(^{64}\) According to more up to date (non-EU) sources the bilateral EU-North Korea trade volume between 1995 and 2005 fluctuated between $200 and 400 million annually representing an almost irrelevant share of the EU’s overall external trade.

North Korea’s overall external trade volume = thanks mainly to its booming bilateral with China – however, has increased in recent years. Bilateral trade between China and North Korea in 2007 amounted to $1.7 billion and China is by now far the largest investor in North Korea. Roughly 150 Chinese companies are operating in North Korea and more than 80% of consumer goods sold in North Korea originate in China.\(^{65}\) In 2008 trade with China amounted to more than 70 percent of North Korea’s overall external trade.

**Implications**

The EU could have continued its economic engagement towards North Korea in spite of the nuclear revelations offering North Korea and the international community an alternative approach of how to deal with a failing state on the brink of going nuclear. It did not do so and has instead chosen to follow the US lead back in 2002 and suspending its originally ambitious and comprehensive

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\(^{64}\) More up-to date data are to be found on the website of the European Union Delegation to South Korea; [http://www.delkor.ec.europa.eu/home/relations/dprkrelations/economytrade.html](http://www.delkor.ec.europa.eu/home/relations/dprkrelations/economytrade.html) See also Hans-Joachim Schmidt, *Peace on the Korean Peninsula-What can the EU Contribute to the 6-Party Process?*; Peace Research Institute Frankfurt PRIF Reports No. 75, 2006; [http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf](http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf)

\(^{65}\) For more on China-North relations, see *China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?*; International Crisis Group Asia Report No.112, February 2006. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920&l=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920&l=1)
economic engagement programs towards North Korea as soon as Washington announced that is reconnaissance satellites have detected a clandestine North Korean nuclear program.

Brussels’ initial willingness to engage North Korea politically and economically as well as its contributions to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the mid-1990s have not convinced interested parties (US, South Korea, Japan) that the EU is “qualified” for a role in solving “hard security” issues on the Korean Peninsula. To be sure, Brussels has not sought such a role and has never requested (at least not officially) to become a member of the Six Party Talks, thereby probably confirming its (and its Member States’) disinterest in investing resources and energies into a forum dominated by US and Chinese influence. Accordingly, limiting itself to offering “political support” for the Six Party Talks represents for the EU’s a de-facto decision to exclude itself from solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

**Conclusion**

The above analysis of the EU’s relations with Japan, China and North Korea sought to provide the reader with some explanations on why the EU’s role and engagement in Asian security is bound to remain very limited and will continue to take place on an ad-hoc basis in the years ahead.

This trend will continue, not least – or probably above all in terms of day-to-day-politics – because Brussels is faced with the task of seeking to initiate and implement security cooperation with states and governments with different political cultures, political systems and different levels of preparedness to
cooperate on (sensitive or controversial) security issues with others, including the EU.

While security cooperation with democracies (e.g. Japan, South Korea, India) should be (at least on paper) comparatively unproblematic (or at least possible), the same cooperation with authoritarian regimes and non-democracies is inevitably more difficult or more often than not often impossible, especially (as this is, for example, the case with Beijing in relation to the “Taiwan question” and with North Korea on the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula) if the partner envisioned for security cooperation is part of a security conflict or contingency in question.

The inner-European conflicts and problems with regards to the formulation and implementation of European foreign and security policies towards Asia aside, Asian security (as opposed to security closer to “home” such as in Eastern and Central Europe and Russia) will continue not to be a priority on the EU’s external relations agenda in the years ahead, despite of strong European trade and business ties in and with Asia.

Nonetheless and concluding on a positive note, the EU will continue to remain Asia’s main provider of “soft security” such as food, humanitarian, economic and financial aid thereby contributing more to Asian regional peace and stability than involvement in Asian security ever could.
“… key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.”

Javier Solana, Brussels 28 July 2009

Introduction: Connecting Policies

As Europe’s Security Policy needs to develop a long-term, comprehensive perspective in order to align efforts to advance domestic safety and security with those to promote international security and crisis response, a broad continuum of operations needs to be addressed. This continuum is ranging from societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilisation, that provides a general framework

1) This paper reflects only the opinions of the author, and does not represent in any way the positions of the Luftwaffe or of the German Government.
for contingencies at home and abroad and can be interpreted as a value chain along which each instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of military and non-military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organisation of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus. This paper takes a conceptual look at the “comprehensive approach”, focuses on the issue of prevention and highlights the requirement for a dedicated process of change management in order to strengthen Europe’s Security Policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.

The ratification of Europe’s Lisbon treaty has been completed. European leaders have chosen their representatives for the top jobs being created by Lisbon: Herman Van Rompuy has become the President of the European Council. Catherine Ashton is the new high representative for foreign policy with enhanced responsibilities. Ashton, Barroso and Van Rompuy have become the new European Union (EU) “Dream Team”. It is now predominantly in their hands,

- making it – after a period of introspective, institutional manoeuvres – work comprehensive and effects based,
- bringing together all the dimensions of its external action and making it more coherent,
- striking the right balance between security and other global governance issues.

Until today, the EU external policies have been largely disconnected from each other. Trade, development aid, the international dimension of policies such as energy, internal market, justice and internal affairs, have followed their own
logic, with minimal attempts to ensure real coherence and to place them in a single integrated international strategy. This situation will now be challenged by the institutional modifications brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, institutional reform will not solve the problem by itself.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in 1993, and was strengthened under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. The objectives of the CFSP under the Treaty on European Union are to

- safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union;
- strengthen the security of the Union;
- promote peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- promote international cooperation, and
- promote better governance through the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Amsterdam Treaty created the operational arm for the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), with the potential for later creating a common defence structure. The first phase of ESDP development dates back to the period between 1999 and 2003, when institutional requirements were established and ESDP was set up by voluntary national contributions of traditional armed forces composed of up to 60,000 troops. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 and especially its realisation gave start to a second phase in ESDP development that can be seen as
an attempt to develop “transformed” rapid reaction elements and respective strategic assets, and to boost its willingness and capabilities to act cohesively and effectively in security and defence matters. (Solana 2003: 2)

The ESS defines three strategic objectives:

- to take preventive action at an early stage using all the instruments at its disposal.
- to focus on establishing security in its direct neighborhood with the aim of creating a ring of well-governed countries extending from the EU’s eastern border to the Mediterranean region.
- to commit itself to a global order based on effective multilateralism, founded on international law.

From the very outset the ESS has been conceptually aimed at building relevance through capable structures, instruments, analysis, situational awareness, decision support and processes in a holistic approach. These objectives have not really been incorporated by all parts of the EU machinery. There has not been sufficient coordination between the different strands of foreign policy. Obviously the EU machinery requires changes. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon ESDP has been renamed to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).  

2) Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU) “1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.” CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 9.5.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 115/13, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF
and security will become available to enhanced co-operation. The personal union of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations as well as the European External Action Service provided in the Lisbon Treaty will allow for the integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from the creation to the implementation and evaluation of policy.

**Comprehensive Approach**

The EU today faces security challenges entirely different from those at the time of its inception. The European Union and its Member States are part of a highly interdependent, dynamic and complex world. Europe is vulnerable. It has global interests. Europe’s economic and financial interests, energy security, environmental protection, etc., require a global approach. The EU itself and various member countries are at the centre of the system of global governance and wish to maintain such a role.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries such as in Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. To break this, both development assistance and measures to ensure better security need to be employed. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Failed states, border disputes, environmentally induced migration, and resource conflicts: all have increasingly intercontinental, if not global, repercussions.

The related security challenges range from money laundering and corruption to organised crime and violent terrorist acts to weapons of mass destruction, natural
disasters and pan–demics. The EU is obliged to cope with these external risks and threats – or their potential impact – on its domestic security. This is reflected in the growing involvement of its Member States and their militaries, police forces and civil protection institutions in peacekeeping and nation building across the world.

There are two interrelated dimensions to this challenge. The first is security at home. During the Cold War, “territorial security” was linked to a potential Soviet assault across the plains of Central Europe, and was thus primarily an issue for the military, whereas fighting terror was considered primarily within a domestic context as an issue of emergency response and law enforcement. Today societies face asymmetric threats that blur the distinction between internal and external security. When facing the potential for catastrophic terrorism, the concept of “territorial integrity” becomes inadequate, since the aim of such terrorism is not to acquire territory but to destroy or disrupt societies. As a result, we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift from Cold War total defence systems, which focused on the security of the territory, to post-Cold War societal security systems, which focus on the security of critical functions of society within and beyond the confines of a single state.

Antagonists wishing to inflict harm upon a society are interested in finding the key nodes where critical arteries of our societies connect. Terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction or mass disruption are not interested on seizing and holding our territory. They seek to destroy or disrupt the ability of our societies to function. Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groupings are acting as flexible and agile lethal networks, constantly able to reconfigure themselves, to address new challenges and seize new opportunities. They are networks that target other networks – i.e. vulnerabilities of our societies that accompany the
free flow of people, ideas, goods and services. These range from global electronic financial networks, networked information systems, “just-in-time” supply chains and air, sea and land transportation to flows of fossil fuels or nuclear energy.

A security system focused on protecting the functioning of society needs to protect critical nodes of activity while attacking the critical nodes of those networks that would do us harm. A societal security approach would identify potential vulnerabilities linked to the technological complexity of the modern world and seek to transform them into high reliability systems. It would seek to anticipate and prevent possible “cascading effects” of a breakdown or collapse of any particular node of activity. It would develop processes to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not built into future systems.

Military forces may or may not be involved in this approach. Many of these challenges are not susceptible to military tactics. Instead, the key is to link the military as one key element of an all-societal mobilization. Moreover, it would
be essential to integrate government response together with active participation of the private sector, which actually owns and controls most of these networks. The interdependent nature of complex modern societies makes civil-military and public-private collaboration essential to prepare a nation for peacetime crises in ways that may also benefit preparedness for catastrophic attack by a thinking enemy.

Given rapid changes in technology and the growth of even more complex interdependent networks, societal vulnerabilities will change over time, revolutionary developments in science and technology could affect critical functions of society and consequently need to be permanently monitored and assessed. An integrated, networked system needs to align efforts to advance domestic security with those to promote international security and crisis response in ways that better enable Europe and its partners to relate the security and defence of nations to the safety of citizens.

This leads to another dimension of the challenge, and that is how to project stability beyond the borders. Tackling the vast majority of today's global problems requires a careful mix of hard and soft security instruments. Military response can be important, but it will often be but part of a wider campaign that includes diplomacy, law enforcement, international intelligence cooperation, and efforts to support civil society. Of course, military forces still have a particular role in interventions and defence. They are also important in complex emergencies when escalation dominance – the ability to revert to combat if other parties escalate violence – is essential.

Conflict resolution requires the application of all relevant security instruments. These need to contribute to addressing a continuum of operations ranging from
societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilization, and which provides a general framework for contingencies at home and abroad. The continuum itself can be interpreted as a value chain along which each instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of civilian and military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organization of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus.

Experience not only from EU but also from NATO operations has demonstrated that coordination with a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. This calls for structured, regular, network enabled coordination, consultation and interaction among all actors involved. A Comprehensive Approach is required to deal with most of 21st century security challenges.
The Comprehensive Approach is aimed at preventing crises, combating them once they have escalated, mitigating their impacts, and providing stabilisation in their aftermath. The relevant security instruments include diplomacy, information, military, law enforcement, and economic measures. The range of security tasks to be accomplished in this context includes conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation. A systematic networking of all relevant security actors and levels of decision-making and implementation – from the international level within NATO, the EU and the United Nations to local levels of inter–action – drastically im–proves situational awareness and under–standing. It in–creases transparency, shortens decision-making cycles, and enhances the ability to employ instruments rapidly. It ensures a deliberate and superior exploita–tion of one’s own possibilities and optimises – also in an interagency context – the cost-benefit equation through speed, precision, selecti–vity and parallel, integrated action.

The Comprehensive Approach requires developing a sense of common purpose and resolve, the clear definition of strategies and objectives before launching an operation, as well as enhanced planning to support nations’ contributions to operations. Civilian and military capabilities need to be embedded into a grand strategy, an "overall package" of governmental and/or international measures. The civilian and military actors involved in such operations need to agree on the political end-state and engage in the joint planning, execution and evaluation of their operational activities in order to achieve it. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for operations conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness in cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology.
A Comprehensive Approach would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict's root causes. Early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Often civilian agencies have presence in crises regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions and are rather focused on long-term solutions. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particular valuable resources when it comes to design action and effects, methods for assessments and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates participation of NGOs but honours their autonomy and neutrality.

Addressing the root causes and the consequences of new types of conflicts requires new types of operations. Thus, there is a need for operational concepts that help blending civil and military capabilities on the one hand and the integration of non-state actors on the other. Capabilities for interagency and joint planning are required as well as command and coordination capabilities, which ensure that the most appropriate means are employed.

The Comprehensive Approach requires new knowledge, which is to be based on a holistic analysis of the challenges to be addressed. Institutions, decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible and adaptable. In this context it is quite obvious that better information is needed, as better processes and tools to design and conduct network enabled operations in an interagency context, including international and non-governmental partners.

The core capability within the Comprehensive Approach is a superior, integrated command and control process which, based on a network of governmental and
non-governmental expert knowledge and instruments of power, makes it possible to project all available instruments of power at an early stage and in an integrated fashion in order to achieve a maximum outcome. In order to get there, a systems approach is necessary. The key actors need to be analyzed from various perspectives, with particular attention paid to political, military, economic and social, information and infrastructure aspects. Providing relevant insights requires intensified cooperation with academic disciplines in terms of social, cultural, and regional studies. In this context, it is essential to take account of the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders in the broadened spectrum.

**Priority for Prevention**

EU Member States have accepted that they have a “responsibility to protect” the innocent. The ESS refers to the need to develop a strategic culture that “fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (Solana 2003: 11). This relates not just to humanitarian considerations, but also because instability, conflict and state failure have a detrimental impact on our own security in this interdependent world. Particular attention is needed with regard to the phenomenon of “small war”. Its protagonists observe neither international standards nor arms control agreements. They make use of territories where they do not have to expect any sanctions because there is no functioning state to assume charge of such sanctions or because the state in question is too weak to impose such sanctions. This type of war does not provide for any warning time. It challenges not only the external security of the nation states and international community, but also their internal safety (ZASBw 2002).

The fundamental idea of conflict prevention and preventive action corresponds
to the general understanding that prevention is better than cure. In view of the expense of carrying out large-scale interventions and post-crisis rehabilitation, this understanding applies equally well to the prevention of conflicts, quite apart from the fact that great human tragedies such as famine, expulsion, war, and genocide could perhaps be prevented. Instability, conflict and deprivation lead people to flee their own countries. Integrating refugees and accepting economic migrants are difficult issues and pose huge challenges.

The challenge is to establish a dynamic stable international order within the framework of a cooperative, effective multilateralism based on the steadily increasing mutual dependence of national economic systems within the scope of globalization. It must ensure the advancement of good governance, which permits the satisfaction of the economic, social and cultural, needs of an ever-increasing number of people. The goal of the inter-national order must be to pre-vent governmental and non-governmental prota-go-nists from trying to influence this process by war. For this purpose, a comprehensive set of foreign and security policy instruments needs to be developed into a comprehen-sive
strategy. It particularly needs to take account of crisis prevention and the post-crisis period rather than focusing only on ending a conflict.

The essential elements of a 21st century security policy will be:

- further development of collective security
- reinforcement of the states' exclusive right to use force,
- strengthening of good governance, and
- containment of the phenomenon of "small wars".

Within the new security environment, prevention has priority in every respect. Because of the potential damage that may be caused in future conflicts and possible consequences for people, including economic and social development, the time dimension – there will be no sufficient warning time and no long-time implications – will only allow the authorities in minor cases to wait and see what damage is caused before reacting to a threat. In those cases with far-reaching consequences – for example in which there is a threat to the very survival of nations and to their economic and social development – priority must be given to preventive action. Moreover, a policy aimed at prevention will encourage economic development and reduce the overall costs. The advancement of the international order towards a world in which there is less force as well as the encouragement of civilization development and the containment of the phenomena of the small war are the fundamentals of such a prevention policy and instrumental in reducing the causes of violence and in establishing non-violent mechanisms for conflict management.

To achieve and secure a non-violent international order, the two most important strategic objectives of future security policy will be the establishment of a
cooperative, effective multilateral world order and the prevention and containment of interstate and "small wars". Consequently, the development of the military instruments of the international community will head in the direction of enabling successful intervention. This approach requires military capabilities, which support deterrence by denial – i.e. the real capacity to deprive one or several states or non-governmental actors of the capability to wage war.

What are needed to influence developments on the ground and enforce the political purpose are both defensive and offensive military capabilities, which allow both military control of and the exertion of influence on the protagonists. Of course, the required capabilities are not only of a purely material nature. Legitimacy, for example, is of particular importance. Considering all the experience available, there will be two essential tasks for the armed forces in the future: One is to win a conflict militarily in a rapid and decisive manner – predominantly from a distance. The other is to consolidate the military success on the ground. Both tasks support the political purpose. There is no imperative sequence for them, so the focus of action between decision and consolidation can always shift in the course of an operation. It is determined largely also by the protagonists.

The military superiority of the intervention forces will probably prevent a conflict from escalating, especially when the political goals of all the parties involved are limited. If there are any doubts concerning the willingness or capability to intervene, the probability of the military decision phase being entered will increase distinctly. Priority should always be given to the goal of influencing the opponent's will not to make use of his warfare capability: either by stressing one’s own convincing military superiority or by providing the enemy positive incentives to forgo force. If used cleverly, both elements can
complement each other.

Especially in the case of “small wars”, when the state has disintegrated or social, economic and government structures have to be rebuilt, new capabilities are required in the area of “nation-building”, the armed forces notably being needed to support consolidation. Non-governmental and governmental protagonists will develop new areas in the course of asymmetric warfare. These will include: urban areas, the information area, the international media world, the different areas of social, economic and political life and perhaps even outer space. Every form of risk potential in societies and all forms of transition from non-violent to violent action – for example, guerrilla action, terrorism, intifada, organized crime, migration, piracy, etc. – can be instrumentalized militarily. Especially urban areas, which will probably grow considerably in the decades to come, offer the protagonists a wide range of possibilities to use organized force and thus wage war in the grey area of organized crime with considerable financial backing.

Consequently, the security elements of the future should be designed as follows:

- Command and control:
  interconnected complex of command and control, communications and information collection and processing as well as intelligence (C4ISR) at the disposal of the political and military leaders as well as an adequate logistics set-up for all civilian and military task elements used.

- Forward-based elements:
  small modular task groups with a high C2 capability, the necessary situation picture, access to land-, air- and sea-based active options as well as strategic-operational mobility.
• Force multipliers and stand-off elements:
  land-, air- and sea-based active systems which ensure that decisions can be brought about in a stand-off manner with or without the support of the forward-based task elements.

• Consolidation elements:
  militarily organized and armed police or similar units with components for nation-building, economic and social intervention as well as for countering international criminality/terrorism. This includes experts from the areas of administration, social affairs, infrastructure, judiciary, civil defence etc. as well as possibly support from and cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

All these elements must be able to participate in multinational coalition operations.
Besides a small number of major nations, there will be few states left with war fighting capabilities with any prospect of success in an interstate war. This is in stark contrast to the emergence of more and more new and non-governmental protagonists prepared to wage war. But this is the rationale of warfare: While modern industrial states are interested in preventing war out of self-interest, there are states and non-governmental protagonists which use war as an economic or ideological factor leading to another cost-benefit calculation. Furthermore, information warfare offers the possibility to considerably affect especially those protagonists who depend on command and control systems and employ them hierarchically.

While the military decision is increasingly sought from a distance, the implementation of the political goals calls for forces on the ground. Based on the existing conflict analysis, these must as a rule have capabilities enabling them to
win the hearts and minds of the societies concerned. In this type of operation, military power has the purpose of denying the protagonists of such failing states the use force and of helping to promote the stable development of a region by supporting political, social and economic development. This requires the build-up of a wide range of elements of self-organized units within these societies.

So, purely military approaches are just as likely to fail as wholly civilian ones if the exclusive right to use force is left too early to the regional interplay. But the regional exclusive right to use military power is primarily a question of internal safety, i.e. the use of force by the police and police clearing-up methods in the sense of the adequacy of means.

The prerequisite for successful conflict prevention is a well-functioning early-warning system. As conflicts normally have a prehistory they can theoretically be recognized at an early stage and to a certain extent are also predictable. The crucial problem, however, is the correct assessment of a multitude of information and drawing timely conclusions. The criterion “timely” reveals the dilemma of early warning. Early warnings, which are not followed by direct actions, suggest a lack of credibility. A timely early warning does not necessarily imply that rapid and preventive action will be taken to hinder the outbreak of a conflict or war or to contain them, as the examples of Rwanda or the Balkans show. As direct national interests of states potentially intervening in international conflict prevention are often not at stake, it is often very difficult to justify the efforts which preventive action involves vis-à-vis the own population. Even if crisis prevention is successful, it may become a victim of its own success. Early action is not evidence enough that a war or a conflict did not take place just because of this. But if a warning is issued too late, there is no point in such a warning.
**Manage the Change**

Nothing can be achieved without the means to do the job. For the years to come, the primary policy responsibility is to make Europe function better, including its crisis prevention and crisis management structures and to enhance its collective ability to handle global crises. As Europe’s ambitions are growing, there is a gap between the ambitions and the reality of European capabilities. To successfully engage in more complex and risky endeavours, it is essential to own the personnel and capabilities – both civilian and military, to back up the political decisions. To actually achieve this capability requires dedicated change management.

Change management is a structured approach to transitioning *individuals, teams, and organizations* from a current state to a desired future state. Change management is a well-established tool in the business world and is well suited to be applied in the field Common Security and Defence. Change management requires

- a clear vision,
- a plan that synergistically addresses
  - people,
  - organisation (both processes and structures/architectures) and
  - technology.
- It includes the communication of objectives, progress and outcomes.

As the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide for a framework to strengthen the EU’s capacity to address the upcoming challenges through an improved coherence, better institutional co-ordination and enhanced strategic decision-making, this opens a window of opportunity to introduce a change management
process in order to building a Common Security and Defence in Europe that supports a Comprehensive Approach to Security.

Taking the road towards a Comprehensive Approach the related vision should aim at a holistic, inter-departmental and multilateral approach that aims at effectively integrating governmental and non-govern–mental instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation to provide a sustainable overall strategy (Federal Ministry of Defence 2006: 4).

To this end the EU’s needs to improve its ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. Particular focus is needed to enhance cooperation between civil and military resources in order to make full use of the EU’s enormous potential for conflict prevention and crisis management. This requires a concrete, practical approach that includes the exploration of possible synergies in the development of capabilities for use in civilian and military missions. This aspect of CSDP needs to be developed by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. The EU needs to plan and build appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters. For civilian missions, Europe must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. National contingents need to have full interoperability between each other.

Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonised for interagency actions. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is
especially in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy and rapid action are crucial factors. For military missions, EU members have to strengthen significantly their efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development.

The ways in which equipment is made available and procured needs to be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been driving this process. There has been some success, but there is the need for much more. To ensure that dual-use technologies respond to military and civilian needs and provide more value for money the EDA needs to explore ways to connect Defence Research and Technology Investment with Technology Investment in the civil sector in order to increase interoperability.

The Comprehensive Approach builds on technology. Technology matters in the 21st century. Technological capabilities are key to the successful conduct of
missions in conflict and human disaster environments. Of course this also requires a new mindset to enhance the cooperation of civil and military authorities that, in many instances, use similar organisations and equipment. Technology affects particularly the value creation chain of network-enabled operations, which is based on a common clear and thorough situational understanding and the networking of all relevant actors. Implementing the value creation chain makes it possible to effectively enter the decision cycle of criminal, terrorist or hostile actors and to prevent them from carrying out their plans or to limit the damage done immediately.

Network-enabling technologies play an ever-important role in the interdepartmental context. The inherent potential of affordable high-performance sensor, information and communications technologies opens up vast possibilities for a successful fulfilment of even complex, time-sensitive tasks. Networked security in interdepartmental, multinational and joint operations requires the staffs, agencies, forces and actors involved to fully cooperate across all echelons and on the basis of a common operational picture and situational understanding for the planning, command and control of operations. For networked planning and action, all parties involved need to be supplied with extensive information in near real time and without interruptions.

With both affordable and powerful state-of-the-art information and communications technologies – combined with knowledge management, modelling and simulation – and up-to-date sensors, it will be possible to generate an operational picture that reduces complexity in near real time, allows for higher-quality actions with significantly improved response time behaviour and, most importantly, significantly improves the integration of civilian and military coordination partners into operational decision-making processes. In addition to
political requirements, profound findings from the work carried out by civilian actors can be included from the first planning stage. Decisions and actions are taken on the basis of a common situational understanding and implemented in a coordinated manner.

To be effective, the Comprehensive Approach must be complemented by sustained and coherent communication process. Maintaining public support for European global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining the commitments abroad. As the EU deploys police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world, governments, parliaments and EU institutions need to communicate how this contributes to security at home. Information campaigns should be substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. It is important to ensure that the information strategies of the main actors should complement and not contradict each other.

Engagement and Partnerships

Europe’s neighbourhood is the world. Threats and risks to be confronted are clearly global. The strategic goals that will guide the political EU actions will also in future be based on three pillars:

- extending the “security belt” around Europe,
- strengthening the world order while observing current international law and promoting good governance by promoting democracy, fighting corruption, and developing co-operation, and
• proactively fighting old and new threats.

The guiding principles for future international EU activities need to build on an effective multilateralism under UN primacy and preventive actions in a comprehensive security sense.

While the political will for engagement may rapidly grow as global issues are becoming dynamically more threatening, the EU capabilities have to be built step by step and in close cooperation with partners. The Comprehensive Approach builds on partnership. Partnerships will be decisive factors in meeting tomorrow’s security challenges, but to this end they need to provide for a solid foundation in order to successfully cooperate in a complex, dynamic environment. In sum, legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making, crisis prevention and crisis management in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions. This very fact highlights the necessity to spell out the Comprehensive Approach and to getting engaged in a dedicated change management process that enables the partners with regard to their people, organisations and technology to work closely together for common purpose and common objectives.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Over the last two decades, the premises on which this security architecture was built have largely vanished, and the roles and relative importance of the security institutions have undergone significant changes. NATO has taken on multiple functions. The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) does not play the central role originally envisaged for it. The EU has developed its own security and defence dimension. Both the EU and NATO have enlarged. The altered roles of the EU, NATO and other institutions as they have developed need to be recognised. For example, NATO will have to be an essential element of any future architecture – but not the only one. The role of the OSCE could perhaps be strengthened. And what about Asia?

Without any doubt the geopolitical point of gravity has been shifting to the east. Europe needs to come to grips with that evolution. In terms of security, the first challenge is to define European interests in Asia. How much does Europe need to care about this region for its own stability? Europe has already deepened links with its Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, and security. China and India, both nuclear powers, are rising rapidly to meet Japanese economic, industrial and technological strength. All three have – respectively are rapidly acquiring – the capacities to challenge Europe and the United States in many fields. The future of international stability and security will largely depend on their ability and willingness to manage their respective growth without major conflicts and on their decision to share responsibility with regard to the challenges of global governance.

The relations with Japan are particularly promising, since it is a strong and stable democracy, an ally of the United States, and a long-term member of the G-8, clearly supporting international stability and security. Certainly there is potential to strengthen the relationship between the EU and Japan on the security policy level – for example by an enhanced, long-term cooperation in security issues, including peace operations and crisis management. In fact, the development of the European relations with the other Asian powers calls for further advances in
the Euro-Japanese relationship. A couple of policy issues may be particularly promising, among those climate, non-proliferation, free trade agreement, and Afghanistan. Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell and the world began to change. The time has come to make the Comprehensive Approach work – not only in Europe and for the European Union and NATO, but also beyond. The Comprehensive Approach is added value for everyone involved. The underpinning logic – the distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – has proven its validity. It provides a sound basis not only for Europe’s security policy on which to approach the coming fifteen years.

References


Introduction

Globalization is usually equated with the killing of distance, growing interdependence, greater organizational complexity and more sophisticated technology (Beck 1997). Decisions made somewhere and events in any part of the globe thus resonate dramatically stronger, wider and faster than at any time before. To live in splendid isolation is no longer possible. The increasingly borderless world offers unprecedented opportunities for enhancing wealth and prosperity, but it has also exacerbated traditional security threats and created an array of new non-traditional security threats. Irregular migration, environmental degradation, global warming and climate change, energy shortages, pandemics, international terrorism and organized transnational crime, all these pathologies of globalization cannot be managed by nation states individually. States confronted with them face the typical collective action problem. In the absence of a hierarchical world government with capacities to enforce authoritative decisions, a system of global governance is seen as an institutional device to manage complex interdependence (Rüland 2006; Messner & Nuscheler 2006).
Regional organizations are often seen as building blocks for global governance. Gone are the days when globalization and regionalism were regarded as competing patterns of international order. For quite some time now, international relations scholars agree that global and regional systems of governance are closely intertwined and interdependent (Wyatt-Walter 1995). As building blocks, they are expected to perform institution-building, agenda-setting, rationalizing and executive functions for global multilateral forums (Rüland 2006). In such a capacity, they may act, to use Dent’s felicitous term, as “multilateral utilities” (Dent 2004). Admittedly, this is a cosmopolitan perspective popular among liberal institutionalists in the West. I argue that in the field of security, ASEAN performs “multilateral utility” functions only to a limited extent. However, this does not mean that ASEAN is an alliance-type regional organization enmeshed in balancing games and exclusively relying on realpolitik. It is better described as a “hedging utility” with the objective of insulating ASEAN members from great power politics in the region.

What Is a Multilateral Utility?

States or organizations acting as a “multilateral utility” perform supportive or “subsidiary” (Segal 1997) functions for the global multilateral order and global governance. They make proactive contributions to global multilateral forums “to foster stability, peace, prosperity, and equality in the global system” (Dent 2004: 221), “empower relevant institutions at the international system” (ibid.: 224) and thwart actors undermining the multilateralism (ibid.: 229).

Regional organizations may aid emergent global governance structures in a fourfold way: by institution-building, agenda-setting functions, rationalizing
functions and executive functions. Institution-building refers in the first place to the creation of new forums and organizations through regional organizations which may smoothen international transactions. This can be intermediary institutions linking the global and the regional level such as interregional dialogue forums, or linking the regional with the national level such as sub-regional transborder cooperation schemes (Rüland 2006). Additionally or alternatively, this can also be the formation of functional regimes in a broad array of issue areas or the creation of auxiliary institutions strengthening the cohesion, collective identity and effectiveness of a regional organization itself. More important in this respect is however the production or protection of norms conducive to multilateralism. One such key norm is peaceful dispute settlement and non-threatening security politics. In other words, regional organizations acting as “multilateral utility” should not be traditional military alliances and also not otherwise display threatening behavior. Other important norms supportive of multilateralism include the propensity to legalize and contractualize international relations. This means, regional organizations must be prepared to enter binding and precise agreements including dispute settlement mechanisms (Abbot & Snidal 2000). “Soft law” may facilitate the beginning of a cooperative process, but in the long run, effective, transparent and predictable multilateral cooperation necessitates a shift towards “hard law.” “Rationalizing” stresses the clearing-house functions of regional organizations for global multilateral organizations which have to contend with a growing and increasingly heterogeneous membership and increasingly complex policy issues (Rüland 1999, 2001, 2006). Regional forums may also be used as sounding boards for new themes and hence serve as agenda-setters for global forums (ibid.). Finally, regional organizations may act as executive arms of global organizations. An example is Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which allows mandating security functions to regional organizations.
Because regional organizations are not unified actors comparable to a nation state, the extent to which they are able to perform functions of a “multilateral utility” strongly depends on their actorness. Following Doidge, actorness is a relational and behavioral concept based on certain enabling capacities. In other words, the degree of actorness of a regional organization can only be determined in relation to other actors in the international system. Doidge defines three major criteria constituting actorness: First, actors must be able to respond to action triggers purposefully (i.e. they must have goals, interests and principles which enable them to respond); second, actors must have developed policy structures and processes (i.e. they must possess authority to take decisions which, in turn, requires a modicum of institutionalization); and, third, actors must be able to implement decisions (Doidge 2004, 2008).

Furthermore, regional organizations claiming to act as “multilateral utilities” must have developed a role concept and an identity that resonates favourably with the functions of a “multilateral utility.” But even with a role concept supportive of their multilateral utility functions, it is by no means assured that regional organizations may actually perform “multilateral utility” functions. The question then is whether they are able to conceptualize and eventually implement the policies associated with multilateralism.

Conceptualization and implementation of multilateral functions depends on quite a number of requisites. One is knowledge and expertise. Global and other border-crossing non-traditional security threats are usually highly complex and demand technical and professional expertise. Regional organizations must thus rely on an academic infrastructure producing the knowledge needed. A dense network of think tanks and well funded and developed research facilities, are crucial in this respect. A second requisite is implementation capacity.
Influencing global multilateral forums presupposes “soft power” and prestige, in short: recognition as a “multilateral utility” by others. Regional organizations must thus be credible to others, in fact, have a proven track record of multilateral action. Regional organizations, which themselves or whose members are represented in many other international organizations, especially organizations championing cosmopolitan norms, have a better chance to acquire such recognition. A third requisite is a sizeable and professional diplomatic apparatus of the member states and at the regional level a secretariat staffed with competent officials. They must be able to adopt policy proposals coming from the academic sector, translate them into an agenda and perform the necessary coordinative and operative tasks for effectively implementing multilateral initiatives.

**Is ASEAN a Multilateral Utility in the Field of Security?**

Based on the criteria developed in the previous section, this part of the paper reviews ASEAN’s performance as a “multilateral utility” in the field of security. I do this by first determining the actorness quality of ASEAN, before I examine ASEAN’s performance across the four major functions identified above. Underlying my analysis is a broad security concept that transcends military aspects and also includes non-traditional security issues.

**ASEAN’s Actorness**

ASEAN’s capacity to respond to action triggers is purposefully ambiguous. ASEAN has responded effectively particularly to regional challenges, albeit
challenges that did not imply infringements on members’ sovereignty. A high point of ASEAN responsiveness was the Cambodian conflict which ASEAN successfully multilateralized. ASEAN first brought the case to the UN and later-on was pivotal in initiating peace negotiations that eventually brought the efforts for conflict resolution under a multilateral framework. Although the Paris Accord was not brokered by ASEAN, the successful peace initiative of the UN, France and Australia is unthinkable without the previous intermediary role of ASEAN (Narine 2002; Haacke 2003a). Other examples for ASEAN’s capacity to respond to action triggers in the security domain included its declaration of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Zone Treaty of 1995 and the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea.

By contrast, much less impressive was ASEAN’s capacity to multilateralize issues in which national sovereignty of members was at stake and where multilateralization would amount to interference into the internal affairs of member states. Cases in point are the grouping’s Burma policy, the crisis in East Timor and environmental issues. Although in the case of Burma, ASEAN supports the special envoy appointed by the UN Secretary General, it did not sponsor the resolutions of the General Assembly calling for his appointment. Neither did ASEAN members join resolutions of the General Assembly condemning the Burmese military junta’s appalling human rights record. The intervention in East Timor following the post-referendum violence in September 1999 was mandated by the Security Council and only grudgingly accepted by ASEAN. In the absence of a collective ASEAN response only Thailand and the Philippines provided troops to the Interfet and subsequent United National Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) missions.

Even less persuasive is ASEAN’s response to global challenges. A case in point
is climate change. Although climate change begins playing a greater role on ASEAN’s agenda, the grouping has so far been a rather passive and reluctant participant in the international negotiations for climate change accords (*The Jakarta Post*, 24 and 25 October 2009). The same applies to other global issues, except for international terrorism to which ASEAN responded more actively and with determination to act.

In the 42 years of its existence, ASEAN has developed a well-established machinery for deliberation and decision-making. The initially intermittent summitry has been regularized on an annual and henceforth twice-a-year basis, whereas the ministerial rounds have been diversified and adjusted to new challenges facing the association. Today, virtually every policy field has been ASEANized. Apart from this, a plethora of auxiliary meetings addresses a broad array of security, economic, environmental, societal and cultural issues. More than 400 of such meetings take place per annum. Yet, ASEAN’s policy structure and the underlying policy processes are not without serious shortcomings. The growth industry of proliferating meetings has long become a byzantine phenomenon with limited effectiveness. Often such meetings end without tangible results or, if there are some, translation into actual policies is tedious and unsystematic.

But of still much greater impact on actorness is ASEAN’s stubborn holding on to an intergovernmental mode of decision-making. Central to ASEAN intergovernmentalism are the non-interference norm and consensual decision-making. Especially the non-interference has been fiercely defended by the majority of ASEAN members, although it has been frequently criticized for its rigidity and the problems it creates for collective problem-solving.
Implementation capacities have been strengthened over time, but still exhibit weaknesses. ASEAN’s secretariat as an information management facility and as a coordinating and implementing entity, has been continuously upgraded through staff expansion, professionalization and networking with regional centers of knowledge. Yet, the secretariat is still too small to be a major agent for transforming ASEAN into a full-fledged “multilateral utility.” In terms of “soft power” ASEAN has acquired a lot of recognition as a force supportive of multilateralism. This reflects its active role and presence in many international organizations, although its reputation is better than its actual performance.

**Institution-Building**

Among the world’s regional organizations, ASEAN has definitely been a major institution-builder. Since the mid-1970s, it has established a web of dialogue relations with major partners second only to the EU. Over time, these dialogues have also increasingly become forums for discussing security issues. In 1994, ASEAN took the lead in forming the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Other forums initiated by ASEAN include ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asian Summit (EAS) and interregional dialogue relations including the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Far East-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC). Although some of these forums were originally set up to strengthen the region’s economies, political dialogue and security issues have become important components of their agendas. Yet, most of these forums are thinly institutionalized as ASEAN jealously guards their non-binding character. Their meetings discuss a wide range of regional and global security issues, but hardly go beyond an exchange of views.

As stated before, regional organizations acting as “multilateral utilities” should
not be of a threatening character. ASEAN is indeed threatening nobody. Even though its formation in 1967 at the height of the second Indochina War had a security background, it was a defensive one, and the Bangkok Declaration as the founding document highlighted economic and cultural cooperation as major objectives. The reasoning behind these non-military priorities was the expectation that economic cooperation would enhance member states’ prosperity and deny pro-communist insurgencies’ opportunities to advance. Although Vietnam’s victory in the second Indochina War markedly changed the power equation in the region and according to realist logic would have to be followed by adjusting balancing moves, ASEAN never seriously considered becoming an anti-Vietnamese defense pact. ASEAN’s vision to become a full-fledged security community as outlined in the Bali Concord II of 2003 is thus perfectly in accordance with the concept of “multilateral utility.”

ASEAN has been a “norm brewery” (Katsumata 2006). Although ASEAN’s norm of peaceful conflict settlement is not an exclusive Southeast Asian norm, it is certainly a key norm for a “multilateral utility.” There were indeed no wars between Southeast Asian states after they have joined ASEAN (Kivimäki 2008). With its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), ASEAN devised a regional code of behavior, which through accession by non-ASEAN states has been exported beyond the confines of Southeast Asia. Yet, relations between ASEAN members are less peaceful than conflict statistics would make appear. There have been frequent border clashes between ASEAN members such as Burma and Thailand and Thailand and Cambodia, and near-encounters in disputed maritime zones between Indonesia and Malaysia. Many of these disputes are accompanied by shrill and aggressive nationalist rhetoric and the politics of brinkmanship. So far last minute restraint has forestalled more serious military encounters, but the question is whether this remains so in the future.
As far as the other norms of the ASEAN Way as the embodiment of ASEAN’s cooperation culture are concerned, it is less clear whether they are supportive of “multilateral utility” functions or not. They are not directly at variance with multilateralism, but with their strong emphasis on the sovereignty principle, they stand for a conservative and static variant of multilateralism. Non-interference, as the most important of these norms, stands for a classical Westphalian international order which rejects any behind-the-border impact of international cooperation. The ASEAN Charter has supplemented the ASEAN Way with cosmopolitan values such as democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights, but as only three ASEAN members may be considered as democracies, the impact of these norms on ASEAN policies is not yet very credible. Rather than transforming the ASEAN Way, there is much evidence that ASEAN has successfully “localized” (Acharya 2004, 2009) these norms into its traditional repository of norms.

**Agenda-Setting and Rationalizing Functions**

ASEAN’s role as agenda-setter and rationalizer in international forums has been quite limited. The grouping was a major agenda-setter during the Cambodia conflict when it wielded considerable influence in the United Nations. Not coincidentally, the General Assembly’s resolutions on the conflict largely reflected ASEAN positions. In other issues ASEAN’s influence was much less visible. The Razali Plan of 1997 for reforming the United Nations is still a document from which all new reform proposals draw (Dörflinger 2009: 51). But it was not an ASEAN proposal; only a plan proposed by a Malaysian diplomat appointed by the UN Secretary General to preside over reform efforts. UN reforms were also discussed under the aegis of ASEM, but without tangible results. Regular consultations between ASEM and EU officials prior to the UN
General Assembly have been initiated in 2001, but have likewise not been able to launch any initiative of global significance. Of greater resonance were the resolutions that ASEAN helped to pass in a great number of forums in support of a global multilateral order. Such resolutions were passed by ASEAN itself, ASEM and APEC. They marked a thinly veiled critique of the unilateralism practiced by the United States under the Bush administration. A low-level effort of rationalizing also took place in the climate change negotiations under the umbrella of ASEM, but again without marked impact. As far as other major non-traditional security issues of regional or global reach were concerned, ASEAN’s voice was hardly heard. This is the case in the Asian financial crisis in which ASEAN succumbed to “multilateral deference,” leaving crisis management in the hands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even less was heard of ASEAN initiatives in the current financial crisis. ASEAN was more active in the field of fighting international terrorism, but again mainly responding to the initiatives of others such as the American Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (Haacke 2003b).

**Executive Functions**

“Multilateral utilities” should also perform implementing functions for global multilateral organizations. In the domain of security, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows the world organization to outsource security functions to regional organizations. However, without own peacekeeping forces, ASEAN is not in a position to execute peace missions. An Indonesian proposal to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre by 2010 and a standby force including a deployment mechanism by 2012 got a cool reception by ASEAN partners and had no chance to be incorporated into the ASEAN Security Community concept (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 May 2004, p. 19). Thus, unlike other regional
organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS or the EU, ASEAN has not been involved in peace missions delegated to it by the UN. The exception was the joint monitoring mission of ASEAN and the EU in the aftermath of the Aceh Peace accord, although the latter was not brokered by the UN, but by the Crisis Management Initiative, a NGO led by former Finnish President and Nobel laureate Ahtisaari. Also individual members have frequently contributed troops to UN peace missions, in particular Indonesia. Currently Indonesia has 1,362 troops in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Darfur (UNMIS) and Nepal (UNMIN). Contributions to coalitions of the willing such as in the 2003 Iraq War were mainly of a symbolic nature. In addition, coalitions of the willing are more eroding than strengthening multilateralism. Although there may be cases when such missions are “illegal but legitimate” – as in the case of NATO’s Kosovo intervention – more frequently they are an expression of American unilateralism. They enhance the flexibility of U.S. foreign and security policies by freeing them from institutional constraints.

Conclusion

ASEAN’s role as a “multilateral utility” is a case of ambiguity. The paper has shown that ASEAN has institutional potentials which have been occasionally nurtured to strengthen global multilateralism. Noteworthy in that respect are particularly ASEAN’s institution-building capacities. Yet, even in this domain ASEAN’s contributions do not fully meet what liberal adherents of global

governance expect. ASEAN’s cooperation norms invariably strengthen an intergovernmental, Westphalian type of multilateralism that raises doubts whether it is able to manage complex interdependence and new global security threats successfully. It is the result of the grouping’s great heterogeneity and a security thinking which is still dominated by notions of political realism. Adverse historical experience has kept alive in the collective memory of Southeast Asian societies concepts of security and power that can be traced far back to the pre-colonial era.

These strands of security thinking are certainly at variance with notions of global governance and “multilateral utility.” They emphasize national resilience, sovereignty, national survival and self help. In their references to a great ancient past and given their aspirations for a great future, they are more identity-building than role concepts of a “civilian power” or a “multilateral utility.” But it would be entirely wrong to conclude from these reflections that ASEAN pursues a mainly realist security agenda. Such a view would be at variance with the substantial cooperation activities and the institutional channels that have been created in the past four decades. ASEAN’s main security objective – even under the conditions of a markedly changed security environment – remains to keep great powers out of the region and retain a maximum of political autonomy. What it does to this end is hedging against great power influence.

Hedging denotes a two-pronged counteracting security strategy located on a continuum between engagement and containment. While engagement strategies seek to accommodate a perceived threat by cooperation, containment is a security strategy by which smaller states seek alignments with stronger partners that may or may not include a military dimension (Kuik 2008). Many of
ASEAN’s multilateral policies perfectly fit the hedging concept. Cooperation and institutional politics help to socialize great powers such as China in norms such as those propagated by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and bind them in agreements such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) (Dent 2006) or the U.S. in the Enterprise of the ASEAN Initiative (Haacke 2003b). Moreover, these cooperative arrangements pursue the objective of harnessing the goodwill of great powers towards ASEAN and benefitting from their superior resources. Institutional politics of ASEAN thus follow instrumental, pragmatic objectives and not a normative agenda as inherent in the “multilateral utility” concept. Given the strong emphasis on national sovereignty in ASEAN’s conservative regional cooperation culture, there is little space for normative objectives such as the deepening of institutions through the legalization and contractualization of international cooperation.

This form of shallow institutionalization also tallies well with the containment dimension of ASEAN’s security policies. Containment expresses distrust against great powers, in particular rising China. Yet, as we have seen before, containment policies do not reach the threshold of military pacts. An ASEAN military pact would antagonize at least one of the great powers in the region and markedly reduce the benefits derived from the cooperative strategy component. Therefore, the military component of containment is a soft variant that entails cooperation agreements, joint exercises, arms deliveries and training. Moreover, it is not pursued at a collective ASEAN level, but rather by individual member states. In fact, it is part of a carefully calibrated equilibrium of policy components. Seen in this context, ASEAN’s multilateral policies are more of a “hedging utility” than a “multilateral utility.”
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