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In recent years, the world has witnessed the emergence of new challenges to international security, calling for countries to develop integrated responses and to intensify political articulation among major leaderships. In a time when the global architecture is becoming increasingly complex and in which the State loses its predominant capacity of agency within the international system, the multilateral dialogue transforms itself into an inescapable practice of diplomacies in the sphere of defense, becoming a fundamental path for the construction of institutional mechanisms capable of ensuring peace.

Seeking to deal with this issue and to promote a debate among important decision-makers, scholars and the civil society, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), the Brazilian Center for Foreign Affairs (CEBRI), the Mercosur Chair in SciencesPo - University of Paris and the Center of American Studies (CEAs) of the Candido Mendes University, under the support of the Delegation of the European Union in Brazil, organized the Forte de Copacabana 6th International Security Conference: an European-South American dialogue. On November 12th and 13th, 2009, various experts met in the city of Rio de Janeiro to address the theme: “South American and European reflections on International Security”.

The agenda was set up by the partners aiming to approach the challenges present in the dialogue between European and South-American countries. During the course of two days, they addressed issues, such as: the Brazilian perspectives for co-operation between the two regions, the political space of the African continent in the dialogue between Europe and South America, a common agenda for the new scenario of regional security, and the dilemmas of nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in the choice of interlocutors and scenarios.

On reaching its sixth edition, the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference reflects the increasing interest on the part of the South American public in relation to international themes. Amidst the political discourses, it was possible, once again, to perceive the importance of the partnership between European and South American countries for the maintenance of peace in these regions. Nonetheless, two more recent and fundamental issues were also addressed: the co-operation between institutions of both regions in a number of African countries and the controversial debates regarding the Non-proliferation Treaty. The first topic demonstrates that the bond between Europe and South America no longer characterizes a one-way relationship, in which the Old World plays the role of resource donor, but rather the contrary is the case. A truly productive relationship for both parts that begins to have global consequences, such as in supplying aid to the African continent. The second issue still generates a great debate, particularly within the Brazilian society. According to a number of specialists, instead of accepting a treaty that divides the world into two groups, Brazil should pursue an agreement that leads nuclear-armed countries to eliminate their arsenals, therefore reducing the atmosphere of insecurity in the international scenario.

In this publication we bring together the contributions from politicians and experts that took part in the Forte de Copacabana 6th International-Security Conference. By doing so, we do not seek to exhaust the theme, but, rather aim to present a number of meaningful studies regarding the current panorama of international security and, particularly, the partnership between Europe and South America.

Introduction

Peter Fischer-Bollin
Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil
European-South American Cooperation in the fields of security and defense: which actors for which problems?

Gonzalo Garcia Pino

As always, being loyal to what we expressed on November 13, 2009 during the sixth edition of the V Conference of Forte de Copacabana, I must say that I am very grateful to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for the invitation, which for the third time I received to speak to this forum, organized under the auspices of the Chaire Mercosur - Science Po, and also of the CEBRI, the Center for American Studies (CEAS/Universidade Cândido Mendes) and the support of the European Union.

But probably you do not remember that during those three circumstances my presentation has always been scheduled right after lunch - in the early afternoon - that is to say, a time when sleepiness, the longing siesta and the inner wish for things to come to an end fast are always more demanding than the necessary attention paid to the speaker.

When referring to cooperation I will follow a scheme that makes a distinction among three different questions. The first one refers to the cooperation between Europe and South America on security and defense. The second one is related to the technique of cooperation in these fields. And thirdly, a question referring to the grounds for cooperation and the reasons by which we cooperate.

The structure of cooperation

The structure of cooperation may well be focused on a three-level split. Firstly, what we call the basic institutional conditions on each side of the Atlantic, so as to permit cooperation in the area of defense, is referred to the so-called intra-regional cooperation, both in the political and in the military environments. Secondly, the structure of bilateral cooperation on which some European and South American countries have agreed upon. And, finally, bi-regional cooperation initiatives as such.

The political status of intra-regional cooperation lacks sufficient grounds which otherwise would develop...
into permanent and reliable links that might help us to expect reasonable results in the short and in the mid terms. At first, the EU is concluding a process of institutional reconstruction of its foreign representation capacities. The implementation – despite vicissitudes and resistance - of the Treaty of Lisbon shall not portray a natural space for development in South America. Its capacity to abandon paralyzed structures in that it was immersed, which at the same time offered a growing scene of a decaying prominence in world disputes, seems to be the trial by fire for the creation of a defense and security policy in Europe. The constant pressure that this policy undergoes from the impulses and provocations of the Islamic regime in Teheran in terms of nuclear development, the Palestine-Israeli situation or the European cooperation under the anti-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan are sufficiently powerful to permit focused attention to minor strategic purposes.

On the American side, either on a broader perspective such as the OAS or on a purely regional one such as MERCOSUR, no institutional spaces exist that allow the development of a working platform on these issues, except for some support related to security issues, as drug trafficking. On the other side, in issues referring to defense in South America, over the last twenty months we have witnessed the possibility to experience some diverse stages, from the crisis provoked by the Colombian assault on the FARC in Ecuadorian soil to the construction of the South-American Defense Council (SADC) of UNASUR, and from this latter one to the current confidence crisis that prevents us from directing endeavors in order to strengthen our positions. In turn, the SADC was established as a gradual, flexible and complementary tool vis-à-vis bilateral strategies. Yet the SADC has now been required to comply with objectives not originally specified, skipping the basic institutional consolidation stage. It sounds like asking a 100-meter runner: Are you ready for the marathon?

At the bi-regional level, there is a large number of liaisons, although they confirm the existence of an enormous institutional fragmentation, power asymmetries and connection with precarious military institutionalization. In general, these agreements have been marked by the idea of South America being an possible market for the sale of the arms systems generated by the context of the renewal of the European military since the nineties, and a second stage, associated, to a larger extent, to industrial challenges of higher magnitude, such as the satellite issues or purchases of more sophisticated arm systems for frigates, submarines, tanks or armaments. Institutional agreements to strengthen the position of the Ministries of Defense in a democratizing agenda are scarce and slightly associated to German or Spanish efforts.

At the bi-regional level, this cooperation structure - through the few initiatives that can be tested from the viewpoint of the current relationships between the European Union and South America - has been clearly and visibly expressed in the agreements and documents of the EU-LAC Summit, as a convincing demonstration of the inexistence of an institutional space. Yet exceptions do exist, such as the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Chile – which also addresses political and strategic issues - or the Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership, under a similar perspective. In this regard, we must also highlight the recent Brazilian-French Agreement that will continue to be discussed during the next decade. From a strictly political perspective, we should also bear in mind the recent exception of the initiative by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that supports a meeting with several German institutions and the OSCE, to permit that delegations from the South American Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense can analyze concrete experiences related to advancements of mutual confidence mechanisms and measures.

Summing up, the cooperation structure has been fragmented and a strong technical emphasis upon cooperation could be a way out of this context.

The cooperation technique

A technique of cooperation encompasses some of the following positive experiences:

Good bilateral practices: the most sounding cooperation took place in strategies involving humanitarian demining. Cases such as the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border and the Chilean one have received specific support from the EU.

Good multilateral practices: the most outstanding example is the OPAZ in the MINUSTAH. Here we may see a turning point from the natural military structure associated to the defense of the sovereignty of a country towards a military trained for the support of international peace and safety. This involves a plural and flexible military staff in activities ranging from citizen safety, public order, polls control and even road engineering, demining, including also public health and social assistance issues. The earthquake occurred in January 2010 helps to strengthen cooperation initiatives for this emergency, with permanent focus on reconstruction, though. And, in all the stages of military cooperation, these initiatives will play an essential role, for Haiti can never become the scene for the deployment of power struggles between donor countries. The Latin American hallmark of the MINUSTAH operation has meant a renewed hope and our region is legitimately entitled to walk that path together with the Haitians.

Lessons learned and training centers: plural dynamism has arisen from peace operations, like the lessons learnt about our Armed Forces, which demands a more detailed analysis. And we also need to deepen them, and to achieve this, I must say that we have an incredible number of training centers in our region. Training centers as a whole and in the area of operations are currently and probably our most advanced stage in terms of cooperation and it is precisely here where we can see the refinement achieved by this cooperation structure.

Cooperation standards: asymmetrical positions exist as a result of the strategic weight and the modernization perspectives common to both regions. But, in addition to that, there are fragile questions relating to the cooperation endeavors that do not meet certain basic standards. If an operational situation is missing, inter-operationality cannot exist either. They sell us arm systems, but standards have to be built (perhaps the NATO standards?). On the other hand, in order to get rid of any debit on arm purchases or armament, cooperation must be assessed. The region needs to focus on cooperation standards. Our South American Armed Forces are highly asymmetric, for obvious reasons, that is, for reasons involving strategic weight, also due to the diversity of threats and by the manner in which we get organized to face those threats. However, cooperation should assume certain and basic common standards and, for that, we should highlight the necessary institutional modernization frameworks in order to achieve them. The region as a whole should be in possession of such basic standards. And many times we have witnessed the weaknesses of cooperation when these standards are missing. I would not like to describe now that sometimes those same standards generate high complexity in the domestic order, as I refer only to standards from the perspective of cooperation. Because to some extent, in addition, these perspectives do not only involve South-South cooperation schemes in the military field, because interaction refers necessarily to forces as they were ultimately developed - and that interaction and interoperability with developed forces assumes an increment in the capacity of standards. Standards are not merely material, but are also related to a certain level of basic operationality. A basic operational stage that permits access – I do not like to refer to them as the large leagues -, but certainly to the access to cooperation leagues. These cooperation leagues are not the leagues of the blessed ones that assemble to see what can be done at a certain time. They are, instead, those that will conduct
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For deterring and preventing acts of maritime piracy. This specific scenario - where Latin-American Armed Forces received offers to support the efforts of the European Union in the fight against piracy - may open an especially broad scope for collaboration. The naval scenario demands more refined strategies as a result of the structure of international regulations and the weight of natural resources at stake, due to the enormous mobility of interests critically involved. No player can elude the importance that sea triangulation has had in drug trafficking operations, where some African states portraying complex governance issues - as Guinea-Bissau or Guinea-Conakry for instance - are used as a bridge between drug production and drug users. The naval arena represents an effort with dense basis for interests from which both regions may benefit. Yet certain dimensions need to be addressed carefully, because they may bear significant conflict. Such is the case of the South Atlantic and specifically the Malvinas Islands, a case in which the South American region is fully sympathetic to the Argentine claim on its sovereign rights over the islands. Furthermore, the debate about the role of the United States in their efforts involving the Initiative against Proliferation is there, and this assumes a field in which the interests of states get again crossed, varying from international law to natural resources. The essential point is, thus, to continue with our efforts involving maritime cooperation where a more reasonable environment could be - in this case - the strategy around Operation Atalanta.

The relationship between Europe and South-America offers much more than a purely pragmatic relationship or one merely focusing conceptual matters. The core of the historic relationship comprises significant possibilities to build a policy of partnerships and sharing values around the momentum of democracy and multilateralism. The reconstruction of the axes of power on the grounds of these principles has provided some partial success, but has provided foremost the standard by which we must reflect the results of our work towards cooperation. And this foundation has been, will be and will continue to be the most robust contrast in the quality of the cooperation between two vital regions in the work. Nonetheless it is manifest that full freedom exists to establish alliances or strategic agreements with global players. The presence in the region of a growingly global player (Brazil) is a requirement to keep this variable available for the entire region in plural strategies which also include China, India, Russia or the G-20. Besides, multilateralism in itself portrays a distinct status after the imprint of the G-20 itself. In sum, we have now achieved a stage that allows us to think in depth about cooperation strategies. However, this is not an ordinary attitude in our regions. There are always good reasons to postpone cooperation efforts. For the same reason, we must reject expressions such as the “smoke screen formula”, which will always inspire despondency: “(…) of course cooperation is possible, but…” The reasons behind immobility do overlook the suffering of peoples, for example the Haitians, or have been as insensitive to the strategic debates that put world security at risk. The smoke screen that turns cooperation into something impossible must be dissipated in order to prevent it from becoming an iron curtain.

Grounds for cooperation

As a final point, the basis of cooperation permits institutionalism as well as technique, both having meaning and direction. No much creative exercise is needed to affirm that the source of action lies in the quality achieved in our central agreements between the European Union and South America. This is a difficult argument to support when our discussions are void of the most vital realities and interests of each country. An excellent opportunity would then be that the Spanish EU Presidency during 2010 had a focus on strengthening ties leading us to that kind of thoughts. For the same reasons, to date we are only able to highlight general criteria allowing us to appreciate the quality of the basis for a European-South American cooperation.

We could also provide a response to the question Why do we cooperate, through a definition that ranges from extraordinarily abstract questions saying that its aim varies from the cooperation in the “construction of international security in pure state”, for example, to situations that may take place or not. However, it seems reasonable to build intermediate scenarios more realistically. Among them, we may find the basis for cooperation in some kind of “deferred compensation law”, i.e., a simple and pragmatic furtherance of the formula “today for me, tomorrow for thee”. This deferred compensation can have very vast grounds for further progress. Nevertheless, it does not need to be expressed merely in questions related to security. Certainly it will appear in the context of diplomatic, political or economic negotiations, so as to permit “full-meaning” compensation. Nevertheless in the area of deferred compensations some possibilities must be explored. We have already mentioned that when we referred to Operation Atalanta as for deterring and preventing acts of maritime piracy. This specific scenario - where Latin-American Armed
The inter-regional security and defense partnerships between Europe and South America may be dealt referring to three distinct themes: the dimension of security and defense within the inter-regional relations; the identification of the relevant agents in the two regions; and the evaluation of some common problems in the fields of security and defense.

The problematic of inter-regionalism

The first theme is the theory and the practice of inter-regionalism, a relatively recent problematic in the regionalistic theories of international relations, which began to be drawn up, in recent years, in the studies of the "new regionalism" and, particularly, in the "third-generation regionalism". Its starting points are, firstly, an attempt to identify, especially as of the European integration experience, a new type of regionalism, supposedly exemplary and presented as a model to be pursued by the ensemble of international regions; secondly, the intensification of the interaction between the major regional spaces, including the formation and the expansion of multilateral inter-regional institutions – for example, the Asia Pacific Forum (APEC), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) or the Ibero-American Summits -, as well as the relations between multilateral institutions representing different regional spaces – for example, between the Mercosur and the European Union –, or yet the relations between relevant powers and regional multilateral institutions – for example, between Brazil and the European Union, or between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and, thirdly, the growing importance of the international regions as of the end of the Cold War, which finds confirmation not only through the consolidation of the regional multilateral institutions, but also through the resurgence of the great Asian Powers, such as China and India, and by the emergence of new regional powers, such as Brazil and South Africa.

These questions have characterized a problematic under construction and still undeveloped, but, at the same time, there is an incipient consensus on its relevance and on its pertinence, even without entering...
into a teleological prediction regarding the establishment of a new international order based on “multi-regionalism”, wherein a governance model defined by the regional multilateral institutions would, simultaneously, replace the former Westphalian order and the unipolar post-Cold War order.

Indeed, the dynamics of regionalization showed itself to be a strong trend of the post-Cold War with the principal regions – Western Europe, the Middle East, South America and Oriental Asia – coming to be acknowledged as autonomous spaces within the international system. If the international regions – or the “regional security complexes” – have become relevant and if the issues of security and defense have not yet become obsolete once for all, the theme of inter-regional cooperation in the domain of security and defense can no longer be ignored.

In turn, the inter-regional institutions of security and of defense are an integral part of international politics since the end of the Second World War. As a result, the United Nations is, at the same time, an organization of universal vocation and an inter-regional institution. Against the North-American vision, the British and the Soviets upheld that the post-Second World War order should rest on four or five regional-security organizations – the “spheres of influence” of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of China and of Great Britain in the respective “hemispheres”, with the premium of the British presence in practically all the regional organizations through the Commonwealth and its ultramarine possessions. The regionalistic parochialism of the old empires did not prevail in the institutionalization of the United Nations; however the Charter of the United Nations sets forth, in its article 52, the establishment of regional security treaties.

On the other hand, during the post-World War II and during the Cold War, treaties were set forth and inter-regional defense institutions were established. The first one was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the treaty of Rio de Janeiro on the security of the Western Hemisphere, signed in 1947. The second was the North Atlantic Treaty, the treaty of Washington on the collective defense of the western democracies, concluded in 1949. The North Atlantic Pact resulted, as a matter of fact, from an inter-regional negotiation between a European regional defense institution – the Union of the West - the United States and Canada. The third was the defense treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), signed in San Francisco in 1951. (In 1984, the United States suspended its obligations in relation to New Zealand, which had prohibited the presence of nuclear-armed vessels in its ports, but the treaty remains in force to the extent in which the United States, Australia and New Zealand did not desist from their reciprocal obligations set forth in the terms of the treaty).

In their aggregate, without wanting to dwell neither on their validity, nor on their effectiveness, these three treaties are supposed to guarantee the security of the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic and a significant part of the Pacific. This inter-regional model was reproduced tentatively and mimetically, be it by the western powers in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, bet it by Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. At the end of the War in Indochina, in 1954, the United States, Great Britain and France joined Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines (and later on, Bangladesh) to establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which, however, did not survive the rifts provoked by the long conflict in Vietnam and ended up by being extinguished in 1977. In 1955, Great Britain sought to unite Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact to form the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (which began by calling itself METO – Middle East Treaty Organization), and which did not survive to successive regional crises as of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez and was definitely buried as a result of the Iranian revolution of 1979. In parallel or symmetrically, the Soviet Union - subsequent to the Federal Republic of Germany having joined NATO in 1955 - created the Warsaw Pact, wherein it included all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe with which it maintained bilateral defense agreements. The Warsaw Pact was not able to survive the European revolution of 1989 and was dissolved in March 1991.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which came together for the first time in August 1975 and gave origin, subsequent to the Cold War, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is yet another of the inter-regional security institutions that failed, given that neither managed to neutralize the Atlantic alliance nor establish itself as an alternative formula to NATO for structuring the collective security of the northern hemisphere "from Vancouver to Vladivostok", to evoke the phrase (and the vision) of the American Secretary of State, James Baker.

Lastly, in the post-Cold War, one witnessed not only the continuity of the liberal-disposition model - "the American system" - of which the regional and inter-regional institutions are a constitutive part, but also the reproduction of this model in all dimensions and regions.

The resurgence of the international regionalization dynamics, silenced during the Cold War through bipolar competition, was important for the expansion of the multilateral model on a regional and inter-regional scale. The Mercosur, The North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Community of Independent States (CIS) were created at the end of the Cold War. During the following years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the European Union are going to expand themselves to integrate the ensemble of the States of the respective regional spaces. During this period, the expansion of NATO made it possible to integrate the great majority of the European democracies into the Euro-Atlantic space, while the CSCE and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) institutionalized themselves, respectively as the OSCE and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In the same manner, the inter-regional relations between multilateral organizations and between regional powers underwent significant development since the end of the Cold War. The European Union established formal relations not only with the Mercosur, but also with other sub-regional multilateral organizations of Latin America and the Caribbean, and, furthermore, with the African Union and the

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4 Bjorn Hettne suggests a distinction between trans-regionalism, inter-regionalism and multi-regionalism. Trans-regionalism does not presuppose an institutionalized relation among regions and among countries of different regions, whereas inter-regionalism refers itself to more institutionalized and formal relations among actors and regional institutions. Multi-regionalism predicts the possibility of a regionalized order at the irreg and similarity of the European model, as of the “schematic relations among all regional organizations to create a form of global governance, a “European world order”. The distinction between trans-regionalism and inter-regionalism is excessively vague, but the distinction between inter-regionalism and multi-regionalism is clear and important. Bjorn Hettne (2003). Regionalism, Inter-regionalism, and World Order: the European Challenge to Pax Americana. American University Council on Comparative Studies Working Papers #3: 8.


9 The exceptions are Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Austria.
ASEAN\textsuperscript{10}. In 1999, a preeminent troika assembling the three leading continental powers - China, Russia and India\textsuperscript{11} was established, prior to the decision of the new trilateral relationship between India, Brazil and South Africa to institutionalize itself as the Dialogue Forum of IBSA\textsuperscript{12}. The G7 expanded by including Russia and, since 2007, began to meet regularly with the Outreach Five (OS) – China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico - before being surpassed by one of its own creations, the G20, which met for the first time in October 2008, at the level of Heads of State and of Government, to respond to the international financial crisis. Given that, the trilateral inter-regionalism of the G7 had been surpassed by the intercontinental inter-regionalism of the G20.

The inter-regional dimension of defense and security does not have - or did not yet have - a comparable development in the post-Cold War era. From early on, the United States, the leading architect of inter-regional security institutions, did not display interest in creating new formal frameworks of collective defense and security, whereas the emerging regions, which might be interested, seem to be primarily concentrated in the development of regional structures. Although for very different purposes, the United States ensured the continuity of the TIAR, the ANZUS and the NATO in the post-Cold War - particularly of the latter, given that the Atlantic Alliance was decisive for ensuring a framework of regional stability at the moment of German reunification. The NATO continued to be relevant to the international strategy of the United States and has been in Afghanistan and in the Indian Ocean through military engagements, under North-American priorities.

Nevertheless, since 1991, the successive North-American administrations have sought to define ad-hoc coalitions, so as to sustain their military interventions as well as to solve regional security problems\textsuperscript{13}. Right at the beginning of the first Gulf War, George Bush turned down the British proposal for a western intervention against Iraq, assembling instead a formidable inter-regional coalition under the banner of the United Nations to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait, in the Yugoslavian secession wars, the United States assembled the interested powers into a Contact Group, wherein Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain (and, later on Italy) had say-so; the same formula of informal cooperation among relevant powers was employed in the Six-Party Talks, assembling in Beijing, the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea, or in the 5+1 format (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) to try to impede the development of military nuclear by North Korea and by Iran, respectively.

The same rule of informal flexibility rules joint naval maneuvers that the United States began to conduct with Japan, Australia and India, within a format the Indian analysts describe as the QUAD – the quadrilateral mechanism formed by the United States and its old and new allies on the maritime axis linking the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. However, the Asian QUAD\textsuperscript{14} does not correspond to any formal security treaty and only signals a common will to counter the swift ascension of China.

On the other hand, the very multilateral institutions have begun to study an inter-regional intervention pursuant to the security dimension, if one is ready to accept a broader and “multi-sectoral” definition of the security concept, in which one may include both the heaviest themes of nuclear dissuasion and old classical themes of frontier, minorities or refugees, energy security, access to raw-materials or even lighter themes of democracy, human right and humanitarian security.

The interventions in the Kosovo and in East-Timor, the former under the auspices of NATO, the latter with a direct military intervention of the United Nations, appeared under the realm of “normative interventions”\textsuperscript{15} and both are inter-regional, given their composition by multinational military personnel - Americans, Europeans (including the Portuguese) or Russians on the Balkan front, Australians, Portuguese, Malaysians or Brazilians on the Timorese front. The latest military missions against piracy on the Indian Ocean includes not only NATO and European-Union naval forces - Operation Atalanta also relies on Norway, Croatia and Montenegro, European countries, albeit not members of the European Union – as well as on warships from almost all leading powers - the United States, Russia, China, India, Japan and South Korea.

In parallel, the European Security and Cooperation Organization deals with electoral processes and with frozen conflicts within the “post-soviet space”. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has debated over regional security issues, including those in the Southern China Sea related not only to China, Japan and India, but also to Russia, the United States and the European Union\textsuperscript{16}. The G7-8 took part in the creation of new security regimes including the containment of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction\textsuperscript{17}. After “September 11”, the fight against pan-Islamic terrorism networks opened new structures of inter-regional security cooperation, notably between the European Union and the United States, but also between the United States, Russia, China and India.


\textsuperscript{13} The trend towards ad-hoc coalitions was theorized, among others, by Richard Haass, counselor to Secretary of State Colin Powell and a defender of a la carte multilateralism. See Ivo Daalder, James Lindsay (2003). America Unbound. Washington: Brookings Institution.

\textsuperscript{14} The original QUAD is Western and includes the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain, the four powerful nations of NATO. See Helga Haltengren, Robert Krohane, Celeste Wallander, editors (1999). Imperfect Unions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Finally, and more significantly, China and Russia established a new inter-regional security institution in conjunction with the former soviet republics of Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has, as observers, India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its initial strategic purpose was to compensate a relative isolation of Russia, as a result of the eastern expansion of the Atlantic Alliance and to avoid the risks of competition between the two continental powers in the strategic vacuum of Central Asia, at the same time in which the members join forces to neutralize moves in Uzbekistan or in Xinjiang. The new institution, which has already conducted joint military maneuvers, formalized its bilateral relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), wherein Russia includes its allies of the Independent States Community. The multilateral security and defense institutions continue to be the exception, not the rule, in international relations. To date the only institution that have shown themselves to be longstanding combine three factors: 1) the presence of a major power – Raymond Aron lectured that only major powers are able to establish alliances and Kenneth Waltz demonstrated that only preponderance is able to guarantee the stability of a coalition, 2) the cultural homogeneity which, as Martin Wright pointed out, is the indispensable element of internal cohesion in coalitions – the political homogeneity, the alliances between democracies, may reinforce this rule within a broader spectrum; and 3) a common security agenda, which is, at the same time, the intensified - or not - perception of a common threat or enemy, being the classical origin of defense alliances.

The regional security agents in Europe and in South America

The second theme is the identification of the relevant agents in the security and defense cooperation in South America and in Europe, which has a manifest part – the enumeration of the (four or five) relevant regional powers – and another more complex one, regarding the evaluation of the multilateral institutions. Since 1998, after ten years of failed attempts for the definition of a European common defense framework, Western Europe now relies not only on one, but on two multilateral security and defense institutions – the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

Actually, the process opened by the bilateral French-British summit of Saint-Malo brought about the conditions for the institutionalization of the European Security and Defense Program (ESDP) and, with the treaty of Lisbon, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which represent a small revolution in European politics.

It is not a matter, well-understood, of replacing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which have acknowledged as being responsible for the collective Atlantic and Western defense. It is underscored by the Treaty of Lisbon that the defense obligations of the member States of the European Union belonging to the Atlantic Alliance may not be jeopardized by their commitments in the framework of the Common Security Policy. But the ESDP and the CSDP institutionalized the European Union’s dimension of security and defense, including the creation of European military forces to be mobilized for international peacekeeping missions. Within the framework of the new European treaty, the Permanent Structured Cooperation anticipates the development of a European defense industry and formation of European Special Forces.

In 2004, the European Union began to conduct international peacekeeping missions. The most important have been carried out in articulation with NATO, under the framework of the “Berlin Plus” treaties – the Althea replaced NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) by European-Union forces (EUFOR), under the command of a European general officer, who carries out functions as Deputy SACEUR. However, the European Union may also conduct autonomous military operations, as in the case of the mission in the Congo (Artemis), or the naval mission on the Indian Ocean (Atalanta).

In parallel, subsequent to the Cold War, NATO transformed itself, not only to include post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and to institutionalize its relations with Russia, the Ukraine and the ensemble of New Independent States of CEI in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), but also to successively broaden the domain of its military interventions (out of area or out of business), reinterpreting article 6 of the Washington Treaty, to conclude that, after all, the Atlantic Alliance does not have frontiers.

NATO’s military forces began by intervening in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996 to 2003, in Serbia and in the Kosovo during 1999, conducted joint naval maneuvers with the Ukraine on the Black Sea, carried out a naval patrol mission in the South Atlantic off the Cape Verdean coast, in 2006, and began to deploy to the Arctic, where the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway intend to maintain access to the North-Pole energy reserves. At this moment, they represent core contingent of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, while maintaining permanent presence not only on the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, but also on the Indian Ocean. The Active Endeavour – a NATO naval mission that entered the Mediterranean subsequent to “September 11” – has incorporated numerous external partners, such as Israel, Egypt, Morocco or Russia, the Ukraine and Montenegro. In the same way, the European Union, although vindicating its subordination to the mandates of the United Nations, does not acknowledge neither formally nor in its official strategy documents, any geographic limit to scope of its military interventions and has forces in the Balkans, in Africa – Congo, the Chad, Somalia – and also on the Indian Ocean.

Simultaneously, both the Western allies and their European partners began to resort to the coalitions of the willing model in NATO and in the EU to ensure an increased flexibility on the part of the major powers in the definition of international military missions, notably with regard to their assembly.

For instance, France holds the initiative of the military mission in the Congo and with Spain a naval mission on the Indian Ocean was launched. In both cases, only a part of European Union’s member states participate. Besides, the NATO’s naval presence on the Indian Ocean includes only a small number of the members of the Atlantic Alliance (Great Britain and Greece took part in two missions). At the same time, the leading European powers began to limit their foreign military interventions to

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19 The treaty is partially redundant, given that the majority of the members of SCO are also part of CSTO, of which Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizstan and Kazakstan, in addition to Belarus and Armenia are part.
22 All the States of the European Union are part of NATO, with exception of the former neutral ones - Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland –, as well as Malta and Cyprus.
multilateral frameworks, including the United Nations (Lebanon), the NATO or the European Union. (The small number of members of the Atlantic Alliance – Great Britain and Denmark – which decided to militarily accompany the United States on occasion of the invasion of Iraq, in March 2003, were an exception to this new rule).

In South America, the creation, in 2008, of the Union of South-American Nations (UNASUL) and of its South-American Defense Council (CDS) represents an important change in the regional security framework. Similarly to the European Union and the CSDP, UNASUL and the South-American Defense Council did not form a defense alliance, nor did they enter into a collective security treaty (although the Treaty of Lisbon includes a provision of “collective solidarity”, designed to respond to threats of “catastrophic terrorism” or “natural catastrophes”). The CDS sets forth as mission the “consultation, cooperation and coordination in matters of defense” and does not refer itself to the formation of military forces, or to the authority to conduct international peacekeeping missions. Apparently, it paves the way for the development of combined projects in the economy and in the defense industry, as well as for convergence in the definition of a conception for the regional defense of South America27 – independently from the divergences expressed with regard to the purpose of the CDS, where those wanting to create a “little NATO” against the United States, such as Venezuela, separate themselves from the majority that does not wish to disturb the relations with the United States in the domains of security and defense.

On the other hand, Brazil began to be acknowledged as a relevant international player. From the outside, Brazil began to be perceived as primarily responsible for the regional integration into the Mercosur and into UNASUL and for stability in South America. The institutionalization of the relationship between Brazil and the European Union confirmed this perception. Its position in the Heiligendamm process, at the side of China, India, South Africa and Mexico e, moreover, in the G20, enhanced the international standing or Brazil. The Brazilian presidency, with Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva, began to be taken seriously in international politics.

The New Brazilian National Defense Strategy28, presented by the Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, and by the Minister of State, Head of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, on December 18th 2008, confirmed the evolution of the Brazilian strategic thinking, open to crucial security and defense issues, inclusive of space for cybernetic threats or those to nuclear energy. This new concept of national security accentuates the regional standing of Brazil and the need for consolidating its preeminence in South America as a prior condition to its international relevance. In these terms it reproduces the strategic pattern of China, of Russia, or of India, which develop, albeit in different ways, the same regional priority. The official document does not envisage relations with multilateral institutions outside the regional framework, with the exception of a brief reference to the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries), and limits Brazil’s foreign military interventions exclusively to peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations and by regional multilateral institutions. The relations with extra-regional powers are implicit in the pursuit of technological partners for the development of domestic defense industries, notably in the relations with extra-regional powers.

South America’s regional security should begin by ensuring the stability and the security among the States comprising this space, nearly all members of the Union of South American Nations. The vocation of the South-American Council of Defense seems to be the containment of conflicts among the States of their region. The strategic discontinuity that separates the three sub-regions of South America29 makes this priority particularly exacting. In the same manner, the lack of a clear preponderance of Brazil, the persistency of intra-regional rivalries and the presence of regional disturbers tends to impose a fixation on the domestic security problems of South America – the tensions between Colombia and Venezuela or between Ecuador and Colombia - in detriment of its external projection. In turn, regional security also has a considerable maritime dimension, notably in the South Atlantic and, beyond the conventional limits of the Atlantic, in the direction of Antarctica. In 1986, Brazil established a Zone of Peace in the South Atlantic (ZPCAS), wherein twenty-four South American and African States take part – including, apart from Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, all twenty-one sub-Saharan States along the Western African coast – which represents an interesting example of inter-regional cooperation, without the participation of regional multilateral institutions, albeit limited by the absence of a positive definition regarding security problems in common, notably the maritime, and characterized by the deep disparateness, both political and cultural among its members. Within the Atlantic dimension30, Brazil is accompanied by Argentina and by Uruguay, whereas the Antarctic dimension should rely not only on Argentina and Uruguay, but also on Chile31.

Pursuant to this framework, the foremost relevant agents in the security and defense domain have been reasonably identified. The Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, the African Union, the Union of South American Nations and the South-American Defense Council seem to be the regional multilateral institutions with authority in this restricted domain, whereas Germany, Great Britain, France and Brazil appear to be, consensually, the most relevant powers in the security dimension.

Common problems in defense and security

The third theme is the evaluation of common problems to the security and defense of Western Europe and South America. To begin, one should admit that there is not a significant relation of strategic interaction or inter-regional politics among any of the agents identified on the European side and on the South-American one, with the relevant exception of Great Britain and Argentina, due to the statute of the Falkland Islands.

From early on, the successive strategic concepts of the Atlantic Alliance never refer themselves to Brazil, to South America or even to the South Atlantic. The European Union’s documents of security strategy do not refer themselves to Brazil, to South America and not even to the South Atlantic. The Brazilian National Defense Strategy does not refer itself to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to the European Union and no even to the three regional powers of Western Europe. Apparently, the South-American Defense Council has not yet produced documents expressing its strategic or international vision. The official documents of the summits between the European Union and the Mercosur, or those of the summits between the

29 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever (2003).
30 Since 1995, within the framework of security partnership of the Western Hemisphere, the multilateral naval exercises UNITAS take place, which may include maneuvers on the Atlantic, on the Caribbean or on the Pacific. The Navies of all American States, with the exception of Cuba, take part in the UNITAS exercises UNITAS, obviously including the United States and Brazil, as well as NATO-allied countries, such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Spain, Holland and Portugal and other countries, such as South Africa.
31 Since 2008, Brazil also conducts annual naval maneuvers with its BISAG partners, the first of which took place along the Western coast of South Africa, on the South Atlantic.
European Union and Brazil, do not address relevant security and defense issues.

On the other hand, the strategic studies on the European Union, generally, address its relations with Russia, China, Eastern Asia, Africa and, above all, with the Middle East, but very rarely, save for specialized monographs, its relations with Latin America (and, until very recently, it did not address its relations with India as well). The strategic studies of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Western security no longer dealt with South America or the South Atlantic as of the beginning of the eighties, subsequent to a decade of afflictions on the strategic consequences of the Soviet penetration in Africa and the Falklands war. In the regionalistic studies there is a vast literature on the European Union, the Mercosur and other multilateral institutions, but which rarely refers itself to the realms of defense and security.

In the end, it is difficult to come upon significant political statements regarding the strategic importance of the relations between Western Europe and South America. The Portuguese and Spanish exceptions confirm this European tendency. Since 1986, the Portuguese and Spanish politicians in charge - the socialist government of Antonio Guterres and the conservative administration of José Maria Aznar - multiplied position-taking on the importance of Brazil, the Mercosur and Latin America. In the case of Spain, the definition of Brazil as the most important regional strategic ally, represent a marked turnaround, begun by José Maria Aznar, and confirmed, later on, by his socialist successor. In the case of Portugal, the position of Antonio Guterres also marks a change in the Portuguese foreign policy, which not only accentuated the singular relevance of Brazil, disregarded since the Portuguese democratic revolution, but also associates the new priority given to bilateral relations with the multilateral frameworks of the European Union and the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries). For its part, Brazilian foreign policy was able to take advantage of the Portuguese and Spanish efforts for consolidating the relations with the European Union, although Brazil, as the leading regional power of South America has the tendency of seeking a preferential relationship with its European partners, to wit Germany, France and Great Britain.

The lack of significant interactions in the domain of security underlines the separation between the two regional spaces, but does not jeopardize the definition of common problems in security, nor the conditions of their cooperation in the realm of security and defense.

The two “regional security complexes” are different both in nature and internal structures. Firstly, Western Europe has been defined as a “security community” wherein the Kantian principle of peace among the republican princes has imposed itself (although there is still a debate on whether the strategic preponderance of the United States is more important than the pluralistic democracy for silencing the security dilemmas in the relations between the European states). South America leans towards a regional model, but still seems to be on the path between the old Hobbesian order and the liberal Lockean order, where the intensification of the economic integration relations should contribute to the limitation and containment of potential conflicts among the states in the regional “security regime”. Secondly, although both Western Europe and South America display a reasonable cultural homogeneity, within each region and between the two regions, there is not the same level of political homogeneity, to the extent that both within and outside the regional institutions, there still are political regimes, in which liberal democracy has not yet been stabilized. Thirdly, the regional power structure is different in South America, where the trend seems to be the consolidation of a major federative power vis-à-vis Western Europe, in which a tripartite model persists.

This scenario defines a certain number of positive conditions. The inter-regional cultural homogeneity is an important factor for the durability of strategic security partnerships, just as the relations among liberal democracies bestow on the frameworks of strategic cooperation, a relation of trust that cannot exist in the relations with non-liberal regimes. The limits imposed on interstate conflicts, as well as the absence of a significant security interaction, significantly curtail the risks of a negative involvement in the domestic issues of each region, an aspect that has disturbed, for example, the relations between Western Europe and the Middle East. The preponderant position of the democratic powers - the leading powers of South America (Brazil, Argentina and Chile) are pluralistic democracies of the Western type, as well as the presence a limited number of relevant partners, makes less complex the definition of the frameworks and the programs of strategic cooperation among States or among regional multilateral institutions.

The common problems to security are numerous, if one accepts a broader definition of the security concept, including not only the problems of war and peace among the States, but also the economic, energy and humanitarian realms of regional and international security. To avoid an excessively long list, it is worthwhile to allude to three problems, which may be recognized, without excessive controversy, as common problems security in the relationship between Western Europe and South America.

The first problem is the issue of energy security referring itself not only to the security of the reserves concentrated on both margins of the South Atlantic, but also to the security in the maritime transportation of energy products and of the maritime communications within the South Atlantic. On the African margin, there are evident vulnerabilities regarding the effective protection of the reserves and of the petrolierous installations, whereas the constant growth of piracy, with or without links to the Islamic terrorist organizations, makes it legitimate to question the security of maritime communication means on the West African coast. Western Europe is dependent, to a certain extent, on African petrolierous products (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, S. Tomé and Príncipe) and needs to guarantee, on the Indian Ocean, as well as on the Atlantic, the security of maritime communications, crucial for its foreign economic relations. Brazil, the leading power in the South Atlantic is the natural partner for Western Europe in this sphere, which must also involve Argentina, Uruguay, with Nigeria, South Africa and Angola.

The second problem is the expansion of the transnational networks of drug trafficking between South America, Western Africa and Western Europe. The networks of organized international criminality (drug trafficking) are not only a problem per se, but seem to have a growing political-penetration capacity and a strategy for the creation of territorial sanctuaries implying destruction of small and vulnerable States (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Cape Verde), with evident consequences on regional security. The containment of this threat justifies cooperation between the security institutions of Western Europe and South America, in articulation with the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries) and African sub-regional multilateral institutions (For instance, Portugal and the European Union have programs of military and security cooperation with Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde; in turn Brazil is engaged in military cooperation with its African partners of the CPLP and conducts a political-training program in Guinea-Bissau, whereas NATO has already carried out naval maneuvers off the coast of Cape Verde, in articulation with the authorities of the archipelago).

33 José Maria Aznar was one of the few European politicians who developed an interesting essay for the new policy, with his project of integrating the two Worlds: the old Ibero-American West in the modern Anglo-Saxon West, or the West of the old world and the West of the new American world. José Maria Aznar. Presentation in FAES (2007). América Latina: un espacio de libertad. Madrid: FAES.
The third problem is the structuring of bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the domain of nuclear, cybernetic and spatial security. The evident partners in these domains are the leading regional European and South-American powers, the only ones to have the technological, industrial and financial capacity to structure the programs of investigation, production, installation and distribution of these means, including the new generation of nuclear power plants, geo-stationary satellites, their launching sites and means, not to mention cybernetic defense. Nonetheless, the creation of the European Defense Agency and the forecast of coordination among the South-American defense industries within the framework of the South-American Defense Council may imply an innovative multilateral cooperation between the European Union and the Union of South-American Nations.

The advantages of such a security and technological liaison among the leading powers and multilateral institutions of Western Europe and South America are evident. It is difficult to deny the implications of these cooperation frameworks for the security of the states and, within this scenario, a technological partnership implies an actual strategic partnership. This principle of common sense shall, very quickly, acquire a more concrete meaning when one begins to reveal, in all its extent, the strategic competition between the principal regional spaces.

The identification of the regional-security agents and of the security common questions on security may pave the way for the definition of common frameworks and initiatives. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense of the Union of South-American Nations and of the European Union could meet, on a yearly basis, within a forum for the debate of international strategic issues, which might be a stimulating option, given that there would be no need for the issuance of joint communiqués, or for the assuming of common standpoints on regional European or South-American issues. NATO, the European Union, including Great Britain, France and Germany should conduct missions of naval security in the South Atlantic in conjunction with Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria (these new missions may represent an opportunity for reconciliation between Great Britain and Argentina). Moreover, NATO and the European Union, including France, Spain and Portugal should ensure joint naval maneuvers off the coast of Cape Verde in conjunction with Brazil (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should institutionalize strategic partnerships with the South-American democracies, beginning with Brazil).

The old issues of alliances and convergences between democracies are bound to return to the forefront of international politics. Yet they shall no longer be focused upon European and Asian territories, which dictated the realities during the Cold War: they shall be expanded to include all regional spaces.
“Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?”

Odilon Antonio Marcuzzo do Canto

Representative of the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABACC)

“The world is over-armed and peace is underfunded”, these were the words of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, during a conference in Costa Rica, on November 7th 2009. The General Secretary alluded to the fact that global military spending this year shall exceed the 1 trillion dollar mark. Solely the outlay with programs related to the maintenance and security of the American nuclear arsenal, shall reach an amount of half a billion dollars.

Therefore, everything that can be done, everything that can be said or written towards a world without armament, is more than welcome. In this manner, I would like to felicitate the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Brazilian Center of Foreign Affairs, the Study Center of the Americas of the Cândido Mendes University and the Chaire Mercosur of the Science Pos, realizers of this event, including all those that provided support to this 6th Conference.

I also wish to express my gratitude for the invitation to take part in this panel. The Secretariat of the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) feels honored with the opportunity to take part in the debate of such an important and current theme as that of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Ever since the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world has coexisted with the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust. In these almost seven decades of the “nuclear era”, the nuclear-armed nations have sold the idea of the power of deterrence of their arsenals as a form of global equilibrium. However, such an idea has not only shown itself flawed but also extremely costly. In recent years, a series of statements by renowned public figures of the international arena, have called upon society for a stricter reflection on the danger of humanity’s total annihilation through these arsenals and the need for measures leading to a world free of nuclear weapons.


The pronouncement by Barack Obama, which became known as the "speech of Prague", brought relief and renewed hope that the abolishment of nuclear weapons might be on the horizon. It remains to be seen whether the Nuclear Posture Review, currently on the agenda in that country, shall lead to the concretization of these intentions, diminishing the role of nuclear armament in the American defense policy.

Non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) currently ratified by practically the unanimity of nations, and whose review is scheduled for May 2010. Evidently, these three pillars are intimately related and must progress together.

Unfortunately, the effort of the nuclear-armed countries towards concrete actions aimed at the diminishment and ultimately at the complete elimination of their enormous arsenals, has not even remotely accompanied their endeavors to convince the non-nuclear-armed of the risks of proliferation. Such an attitude begins to be perceived more as a posture of restriction to the access of nuclear technologies, thus creating a market reserve, instead of a real intention of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The success of the NPT shall be proportional to the effort and commitment of the signatory nations to all the objectives of the Treaty.
Not even a century has gone by since the discovery of the nuclear fission phenomenon and of the perception that the energy released by it could be manipulated, opening horizons never dreamt of by humanity. Unfortunately, the first utilization of such an enormous energy potential did not serve the needs of construction, but rather that of destruction. This “original sin” has kept pace with the development of nuclear technology for decades. Nobody visits “ground zero” at Hiroshima without experiencing a profound feeling of horror and of disbelief in humanity.

Nevertheless, the development of nuclear technology in its numberless applications has brought enormous benefits to humanity with important contributions in the areas of industry, agriculture, the environment and particularly in that of medicine. Furthermore, one should bear in mind that the stringent standards of technological excellence required by the nuclear industry end up creating an favorable atmosphere to an upswing in the quality level of the whole inter-related industrial complex.

The challenges that humanity faces at this beginning of the millennium are both enormous and urgent, in at least two of them, possibly the biggest, namely the ones related to food shortage and to the environment, nuclear technology may provide a fundamental contribution. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that already in this year of 2009, the segment of the world population with nutrition levels below the 1,800 calorie/day mark shall surpass the barrier of 1 billion individuals.

The Water Management Institute informs that alone on the Asian Continent there will be a population increase of 1.5 billion individuals until the year 2050, with the aggravation that within that region, the existing hydric resources shall not be able to meet such an increased demand, unless new irrigation technologies are developed by means of the optimization of the existing potential and the development of new crops with lower hydric requirements.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) already develops a huge effort within this area in partnership with FAO and other regional agencies, employing appropriate nuclear technologies.

The utilization of nuclear energy in the form of electric energy, initially begun in the former Soviet Union in the 1950 decade, experienced strong opposition from all countries during the past century, chiefly as a result of the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents. The scientific progress of recent years brought technological developments, which in turn gave rise to expressive increases in the levels of safety and reliability of the current nuclear reactors. This fact, coupled to the awakening of a concern with global warming triggered by the exponential rise of the curve representing fossil-fuel utilization in the energy matrix, brought nuclear energy back to the global agenda. Within this context, nuclear fission reactors began to be perceived as low-carbon-emission source, compatible with the preoccupations of the battle against climate change.

The IAEA in its publication “Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power: Developments and Projections-25 years Past and Future” (2007), reveals that nuclear power plants were responsible for 2,626 of the 16,932 terawatt-hours (Tw-h) of electric energy generated throughout the world in 2005. The same year, the IAEA also estimated that the energy released by nuclear power plants is likely to double, surpassing the 5-thousand-tw-h threshold. A forecast that, evidently, shall depend on the evolution of a series of factors, such as the international price of fossil fuels, the performance of the reactors – both current and future ones – the level of public acceptance, etc. In any case, as widely acknowledged, we are going through a nuclear-energy “revival” phase throughout the world.

On the other hand, different international forums, such as the InterAcademy Council and the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OCED), are unanimous in affirming that the future importance of nuclear energy in the global energy matrix is intimately linked to the capacity of responding satisfactorily to the concerns regarding nuclear safety, nuclear waste and nuclear proliferation risks. Such preoccupations point to the importance of international treaties of non-proliferation and to the mechanisms and organizations responsible for the management and application of safeguards.

The strengthening of a country’s nuclear sector requires a structure of robust organizations and institutions not only in execution, but also in sector’s regulation. The field of nuclear science and technology is not different from other sectors of science and technology and benefits enormously from experience-sharing and knowledge exchanges. In this aspect, at the moment in which the nuclear industry begins to be reactivated, the mechanisms and institutions capable of creating a favorable atmosphere for these exchanges gain importance, giving rise to the need for strengthening those already existing and, if need be, the establishment of new ones.

As the proposal of this panel infers, Latin America has put in place an ensemble of treaties and institutions which, under due respect of the geopolitical differences specific to each region, may serve as a paradigm for other regions of the globe. Verily, Latin America relies on a number of important binational and multinational institutions and arrangements, which provide support to and strengthen the objectives of the NPT.

The environment of regional integration within the nuclear area in Latin America is facilitated by the fact that all countries are signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Entered into in 1967, the signatories commit themselves to the exclusively peaceful utilization of nuclear technology and to the prohibition of tests, utilization, readying, production or acquisition by any means of whatever nuclear weapon, as well as the receipt, installation or any possession, in their territories, of such a type of armament. With this nuclear-weapon proscription treaty the countries of the region defined Latin America as a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ). Several countries, like Brazil, promoted this commitment to the constitutional level.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL) is, possibly, the broadest and most encompassing of these treaties. Begun as a series of the NPT.

The Treaty is based on the principle of horizontal cooperation, both technical and economic, with the purpose of promoting the peaceful employment of the various nuclear techniques and the mission of providing a mechanism for the meeting and discussion among active professionals in the nuclear sector as well as to contribute to the economic and social development of the lesser advanced countries by means of the transference of technologies.

In its eleven years of activities, ARCAL boasts 49 executed projects and 20 in progress, the majority of them involving more than two countries of the region. The number of existing binational treaties reflects the harmony reigning among the countries of the region.

Argentina and Brazil, as the two leading countries of the nuclear sector, have set a strong example of integration, which had its beginning with the treaties of mutual understanding in the eighties and took definite form in 1991 through the signature of the Bilateral Treaty for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Energy, creating the Joint System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), as the managing body of the SCCC. Since this milestone, the cooperation within the nuclear area has become an essential element in the foreign policy of both countries.

The Quadripartite Treaty signed in December of the same year between the two countries, the ABACC and the IAEA, completed the normative framework of the safeguards system. In this treaty the two member-states commit themselves to accept the applications of safeguards to all nuclear materials and activities conducted under their jurisdictions or under their control, within their territories. Given that, the sole objective is that of guaranteeing that such materials are not diverted for application in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The ABACC was the first binational organization established by Argentina and Brazil and continues to be the only binational safeguards organization in the world. The implantation of the SCCC and the creation of the ABACC is a clear demonstration of the political will of both countries to construct an environment of mutual trust, wherein it shall prosper the cooperation in the solution of political and technological challenges arising out from the development of transparent and fully peaceful nuclear programs.

With headquarters in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the Agency maintains an office in Buenos Aires. Its organizational structure is very simple, constituted of two secretaries, one Argentinian and one Brazilian - who take turns in titularity yearly -, four technical sectors, one administrative segment and one institutional-relations sector.

The staff of ABACC bears international official status, not receiving, therefore, orders or instructions from either government in the performance of their institutional activities. This fact, coupled to the commitment of both nations in preserving institutional independence, by providing the necessary resources for its satisfactory functioning, has guaranteed the Agency’s institutional autonomy.

The inspections in the safeguarded installations in Brazil and in Argentina are carried out by a team of ninety highly qualified inspectors, recruited in equal proportions from both countries’ nuclear institutions. These inspectors become members of the Agency only for the period of each inspection.

Prepared at the headquarters of ABACC and under orientation of its officials, these inspections are invariably carried out in conjunction with the IAEA. Moreover, the Brazilian installations are inspected by Argentinean inspectors and the Argentinean ones by Brazilians.

The caution exercised by the Agency in the recruitment of its inspectors, employing only professionals of wide-ranging experience and high-level technical qualification, has ensured the application of the control system and of the verification of the nuclear materials with efficiency and effectiveness as well as the independence of its conclusions.

Another relevant factor for the success of the ABACC has been its coordinated work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ensured by a swift and efficient communications system with national authorities and the IAEA. The equipment utilized for control and monitoring, in the various installations, may belong to either one of the agencies, since a protocol entered into by them guarantees joint use of the same. This procedure facilitates the acquisition of new, invariably “state-of-the-art” equipments, at the same time that it optimizes the utilization of resources.

It should be emphasized that the application of safeguard measures of the ABACC are carried out in common accord with the IAEA, under due respect to the independence of conclusions by each agency, always pursuant to what has been set forth by the Quadripartite Agreement.

The combined work developed by the ABACC and the IAEA during the course of the years has brought about an atmosphere of mutual understanding and growing trust between the agencies, becoming a highly positive experience as model for the applications of safeguards. Furthermore, international acknowledgement has become manifest in numerous periodical articles within the nuclear area, through excerpts quoting the ABACC as paradigmatic.

With the reactivation, in recent years, of the nuclear sector in both countries, there was a resumption of the integration activities. The constitution of the Binational Committee of Nuclear Energy (CDBEN) on March 3rd 2008, followed by the “Foz do Iguacu Seminar”, prioritized five areas of cooperation: 1) Nuclear applications; 2) Fuel cycles; 3) Reactors and waste management; 4) Creation of a Binational Enrichment Company; and 5) Nuclear regulation.

To date eight meetings of the Committee have been conducted and 28 projects have been approved. The reference terms of the binational company are already approved and a task force has been set up to study the technical feasibility of the company’s constitution.

When one addresses perspectives and strategies for growth of the nuclear sector, the issue of human resources becomes fundamental, not only with regard to proper qualification, but also with regard to its insertion in the sector. Associations representing the interests of the professionals of the sector can and should play an important role in this field. The meetings and congresses organized by these associations represent forums of the highest importance in the development of this sector. The meeting venues where professionals can exchange information and experiences represent a “cultural medium” for interactions and the establishment of significant partnerships.

The existence of robust and active professional associations, while providing a dimension of the sector’s vitality, constitutes a privileged site for the exchange of experiences and for the socialization of best practices.

The countries of the region that were the most active in the nuclear area, to wit Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Brazil, have strong and active domestic professional associations. In addition, on April 14th 1975, the Latin-American section of the American Nuclear Society (LAS-ANS) was established with the purpose of representing the interests of nuclear-sector professionals in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The primary objective of the LAS has been to promote the development of nuclear sciences and technologies in all areas (industry, agriculture, medicine, the generation of energy, etc.). Furthermore, in this realm, it has given emphasis upon the integration of the different activity areas.

To reach these objectives, the activities of the LAS take place through the promotion of regional technical meetings, lectures and a major annual congress. The LAS-ANS is headed by an Executive Committee, comprised of a president, a vice-president, a secretary and a treasurer (technical committees are appointed for the various activities). It is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, with the position of the Chair functioning in rotation among the member countries.

In conclusion and yet again, I would like to felicitate the organizers of this event, which already in its sixth edition, has incomparably contributed to the debate over issues of paramount importance to our societies.
On occasion of the innumerous meetings, where dialogues on the political and strategic level between representatives of Brazil’s Ministry of the Defense and their counterparts of European countries take place, the cooperation with African countries in terms of security and defense has invariably been present on the agenda.

To limit to the year of 2009 the list of the meetings in which this matter was discussed, one may mention the conferences conducted by the delegations of France, Portugal and the United Kingdom, to which I shall come back further ahead.

Preliminarily, with the purpose of better identifying the centrality of Africa to Brazilian Foreign Policy, it should be borne in mind that, since the sixties, Brazil has been intensifying its initiatives with regard to that continent, with increased emphasis upon those related to mechanisms, such as the Community of Portuguese-Language Countries (CPLP), the Africa-South America Summit and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, as well as upon the expansion of the diplomatic-representation network.

In the same manner and with regard to the delimitation of our strategic surrounding, the Brazilian National Defense Policy, whose original edition dates back to 1996, being recently up-to-dated by virtue of a presidential decree as of 2005, extrapolates the subcontinent’s mass to include the projection via the frontier of the South Atlantic and the bordering countries of Africa. Besides, this policy gives special priority to the countries of the austral segment of that continent and to those belonging to the CPLP. And, complementary to the military attaché-ships established in South Africa, in Egypt, in Mozambique and in Namibia, Brazil has maintained wide-ranging relationships by means of bilateral-cooperation instruments.

As for Namibia, Brazil’s Navy also serves as a model for the Namibian Naval Force and the bilateral relationship between the two institutions has been intense, particularly with reference to courses and exchange programs.

In São Tomé and Príncipe, the Brazilian Navy is active in the structuring of a Naval Force or Coast Guard, capable of the monitoring and protection of the country’s maritime coast. In addition, the Brazilian Army, with the support of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, provides scholarships in its educational institutions for military personnel of that country.

Brazil’s Technical-Military Cooperation Plan with Mozambique has imposed the task of systemizing the support of the Brazilian Army with regard to the qualification of the military units of that country in peace-mission operations, whereas the “Cooperation Treaty in the domain of Defense” between the Governments of Brazil and of Guinea-Bissau provided the conditions for the implantation of the “Brazilian Mission of Technical-Military Cooperation” in Bissau, with the purpose of drawing up a plan for turning the Guinean Armed Forces into a professional organization.

There is a solid relationship between Brazil and South Africa in the sphere of defense, characterized by the various joint operations conducted by their two Navies; by the joint development of projects
in the defense industry area, and by the increasing exchange of delegations and participants in military courses, including opportunities for South-African officers to take part in training courses at the Peacekeeping Operation Training Center of the Brazilian Army.

After presenting these initiatives, I consider it necessary to close the present summary with some comments about the Brazilian participation in UN Peace Missions under way in Africa, as well as to make a brief reference to the activities conducted by the CPLP.

As an overall norm of conduct, Brazil intends to maintain its contribution to the peace processes in Africa, by means of the appointment of observers and instructors, and of the creation of the Centers of Excellence for the Qualification of Opinion Leaders of the CPLP. The objective is to provide an ambiance for the Africans to perform properly in the maintenance of the existent peace treaties.

Currently, the Brazilian Armed Forces contribute with approximately 50 military personnel, between observers, chief-of-staff officers, advisors and liaison Officers in 7 of the 8 peace missions (Morocco, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the Central-African Republic and the Chad) that UN have developed in the continent.

Within the sphere of the CPLP, the cooperation in peace missions based itself on the position of the African Union, which defends the attribution to member states, the very responsibility for the resolution of the conflicts on the continent, thus diminishing exogenous interventions.

Under such a perspective, it was identified the opportunity for developing Centers of Excellence for the Qualification of Opinion Leaders in the territory of member states, with the objective of preparing military instructors of these countries to act as multipliers of the know-how required by peace missions. Furthermore, this opportunity can be visualized in the future, concerning the preparation of officers and soldiers from other African countries. Here, the perception a peace mission must have a multidisciplinary ground, including the desirable contributions to the various branches that constitute a governmental structure, therein included the reform of the security sector.

Still within the context of the CPLP, the annual realization of the FELINO Operation stands out, being aimed at the joint multinational training carried out - in the territory of one of the countries of this community - with the purpose of improving the performance of the Armed Forces in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

Reverting to the talks that are being held with European countries, and which may give rise to concrete results in the sphere of the cooperation with African countries, I would then like to underscore the relevance of the strategic-dialogue meetings maintained by the Department of Politics, Strategy and Foreign Affairs of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense.

Such mechanisms are put into practice under the expectation of promoting trust among the nations (by means of a straightforward debate over relevant issues in defense) as well as of identifying areas of interest for the development of joint actions.

With regard to this last topic, I begin by pointing to the systematics adopted with Portugal, which has already come fully on stream and registers the occurrence of three Meetings of Strategic Cooperation in Defense. This event takes place annually with the purpose of harmonizing the efforts of both countries so as to make the best use of resources and to avoid duplicate undertakings in actions developed for the benefit of the African countries.

With reference to the current potential areas of cooperation on this field, there are several initiatives, ranging from the recuperation of military infrastructures in São Tomé and Príncipe and in Guinea-Bissau to the joint use of support structures maintained by Portugal in Angola and in Mozambique. At the moment, one already envisions the convenience of a closer relationship between the two responsible agencies for the international technical cooperation on defense in Brazil and in Portugal.

During the talks on occasion of the 2nd Meeting of the Brazilian-French Strategic Dialogue held in May 2009, the predisposition of the Europeans became evident vis-à-vis the objective of strengthening the African peace and security framework, particularly the structuring of the regional brigades of the African Prompt Deployment Forces. This convergence of interests, which sides with the policies of the CPLP on the theme, already constitutes, in itself, a common element for the development of partnerships between Brazil and France.

With such a propensity, one may infer activities with Brazilian participation, for example, in the Program of Reinforcement of the African Peacekeeping Capabilities (RECAMP), set up by France in 1997 and recently restructured and transferred to the sphere of the EU. The program, as becomes clear by its name, has the objective of strengthening the African capabilities in peacekeeping, pursuant to the basic principle of preservation of the African national sovereignties.

Such a positive vision regarding the possibilities for the establishment of additional partnerships between Brazil and France within the scope of military cooperation in Africa was also expressed by the “Directorate for Military and Defense Cooperation” of the French Foreign Affairs Ministry, in view of the following reasons:

- the acknowledgment achieved by Brazil in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations, as well as in
international talks related to the subject, particularly as result of its performance in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH);

- the current trend for increased closeness in the Brazilian-French strategic partnership;

- and the symbolic appeal of the Year of France in Brazil.

Thus, as a concrete result of the consolidation process our country is experiencing in its relations with France, Brazil sent, in July 2009, two military instructors to serve in the “Center for Improvement of Post-Conflict Mine-Removal and Clean-Up Operations” in Benin, with purpose of holding courses directed at teams of the African Portuguese Language Countries (PALOPs).

Similar opportunities were envisaged during the course of the 1st Brazil-United Kingdom Strategic-Dialogue Meeting, held in October 2009. On the occasion, the British delegation commented that both insecurity and instability have jeopardized efforts to improve the life of the African population, which has led the United Kingdom to attribute priority to the prevention and to the resolution of conflicts in the region. Reflecting this priority, the British government acts in a coordinated manner through its Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, and the Ministry of Defense, which share a common objective, i.e., “to deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support in conflict prevention by addressing the long term structural causes of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction”

In addition to the prevention of conflict and the post-conflict stabilization activities, the delegates of the United Kingdom argued that one of the key-components of the British strategy for Africa is its support to African countries or organizations aimed at increased capacity in peacekeeping operations.

A major part of this support is financed by the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), a British interdepartmental mechanism that combines knowledge on the prevention of conflicts, the competences and the resources of the three mentioned ministries, with the support of the HM Treasury and coordination, at a ministerial level, of the Cabinet Office.

Apart from having already provided support through the concession of financial resources for the deployment of several UN missions in Africa, the British government has been cooperating with the leading entities linked to the African Union in: operational qualifying of military and civilian personnel for peacekeeping missions; sponsorship of course programs in peacekeeping operations; reform of the security and good governance sector, in addition to the development of peacekeeping qualifying centers within the chief-of-staff military academies of the African countries. In all these spheres, the cooperation of Brazilian personnel may be envisaged.

Moreover, to add yet another important element to the framework of possibilities regarding Brazil’s performance in Africa, in cooperation with European countries, it is pertinent to notice some level of resistance, on the part of African countries, in welcoming cooperation from their former metropolises. Within this context, Brazil may assume the role of a privileged intermediary insofar as its image has not been associated with colonial exploitation and, also, due to its strong cultural and historical ties with Africa.

Finally, to focus on the subject of this panel as regard the current status of our Forces, it is fitting to state that the involvement of significant troop contingents in peacekeeping missions taking place on different continents− the MINUSTAH in Central America and any one in Africa − would require a complex and costly logistical effort, beyond the bearable limit of the resources available.

Furthermore, Brazil’s international relations have been based upon the principles of International Law, such as the sovereignty of states and the prevalence of multilateralism, not forgetting the principles established by the Federal Constitution of Brazil.

Thus, in light of the constitutional principle of “non-intervention”, the participation of Brazil in operations or activities that characterize themselves by enforcing the intervention of the international community into a sovereign entity, as in the case of the majority of the peacekeeping operations in Africa, shall not find endorsement by the Brazilian Federal Constitution.

However, pursuant to guidelines set forth in the Brazilian National Defense Policy, the Ministry of Defense maintains a favorable understanding in relation to the participation – within their possibilities – of the Armed Forces in the largest possible number of peace missions, be it by sending military observers or by the deployment of troops, be it by offering required equipment. Yet these operations must be authorized by the UN Security Council beforehand and must correspond to Brazil’s national interests as well as to our available resources.
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the Technical Cooperation of Brazil with Developing Countries

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Context and the creation of the ABC

During the first decades of technical cooperation activities between the Brazilian government, the most industrialized countries and international agencies (as of the fifties), the focus of the programs and projects rested upon the structuring of public institutions that would assume a strategic role for the Brazilian economy. Institutions, such as EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) and TELEBRAS (Brazilian Telecommunication), for example, benefited from the support of international consultants for the qualification of a technical staff capable of dealing with our development challenges. Like the private sector, technical cooperation was, equally, an important instrument of modernization, as in the case of the projects that contributed to the betterment of several SENAI (National Industrial Apprenticeship Service) centers. During this first stage of international cooperation in our country, the programs were primarily financed by foreign resources. In turn, the cooperation rendered by Brazil abroad was very small.

In the mid-eighties and particularly subsequent to the promulgation of the new Federal Constitution in 1988, this model of cooperation gave way to a broader theme-enriched agenda, based on a new policy of international partnerships with predominance of domestic financing, by prioritizing modernization-related issues in the three federative levels. It was also based on the conception and implantation of innovative programs in the field of social development as well as on new processes directed at the preservation of the environment. Simultaneously, this period marked the beginning of an effective work in the design of the technical cooperation rendered by Brazil to other developing countries.

Given this context, during 1987 the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was created within the structure of the Ministry of External Relations, unifying into a sole body - the negotiation, coordination and execution of the international technical cooperation programs, in the modalities received from abroad and rendered to developing countries. To the Itamaraty, in particular, the creation of the ABC provided the very instrument for boosting Brazil’s South-South cooperation, which had already become a significant component of the Brazilian foreign policy. The institutional mandate of the ABC was emphatically defined as being that of putting into operation the Brazil’s international technical cooperation, by means of the executive action of coordination of the entire cycle of the international technical cooperation, from the stage of conception up to the approval, execution and monitoring of projects and activities.

Among the developing countries, Brazil was one of the first to create an agency for international technical cooperation. Our rendered cooperation has contributed in a very significant manner to the diffusion of Brazil’s image as a country that – in practice – promotes one of the top principles of the United Nations, according to which the maintenance of peace also occurs through the political stability provided by the social and economic development of nations. The international cooperation, in this circumstance, has proven to be instrumental par excellence. The work of the ABC and of the Brazilian institutions which act as cooperators abroad, has verified the confirmation of such an assertion, to wit several achievement cases involving successful processes of embracing Brazilian experiences by institutions of other countries. Given the diversity inherent to Brazil’s continental profile, the potential for identifying and sharing experiences is far from exhausting itself, what provides ABC assuredness as regards the feasibility of expansion of Brazil’s South-South cooperation agenda.

The challenges of the South-South cooperation include: efforts for an effective articulation between the performance of the Brazilian institutions that render cooperation and their local counterparts of the...
beneficiary countries; the mobilization, in an increasing scale, of the Brazilian institutions to meet the demands received from abroad in a satisfactory way; the pursuit for a equilibrium between the availability of domestic physical and financial resources; the growth in demand originating from abroad; making viable the necessary requisites for ensuring sustainability of increasingly encompassing projects; and, lastly, the adequacy of the operational structure of the ABC and of the domestic regulatory mark vis-à-vis the international prospective for Brazil’s international performance.

The cooperation among developing countries operated by Brazil (South-South cooperation)

The technical cooperation among developing countries (or South-South Technical Cooperation) has had the mission of contributing to closer relationships between Brazil and the developing countries. Sustained economic growth, political stability, the upgrading of domestic public policies and the diversity of social and economic contexts within the country have allowed Brazil to create a platform for an increased proactive performance abroad, based on the sharing of a rich aggregation of knowledge and successful development experiences.

In the our case, the South-South technical cooperation bases itself on the concept of “Solidary Diplomacy”, in which Brazil places at the disposal of other developing countries the experiences and expertise of specialized domestic institutions, in areas considered more relevantly by the very partners, without imposing conditionalities or commercial interests and lucrative purposes. On providing technical cooperation, Brazil observes the principles of respect to sovereignty and of non-intervention in the domestic issues of other nations. The cooperation among developing countries represents, furthermore, an important instrument for promotion of Brazil’s image and potentialities abroad. In terms of the South-South cooperation, it is not only transferred what is considered the best in terms of know-how and services, but it is also transmitted the posture of the country as an active performer in support of development and solidarity, thus materializing one of the traditional aspects of the Brazilian foreign policy.

On the one hand, Brazilian practical performance in the South-South technical cooperation, bases itself on exemplary cases, structured as a result of the noteworthy and continuous public investments. At a given moment, these entities became active in the offer of Brazilian technical cooperation to developing countries, turning the country into one of the most present players in the international cooperation scene. On the other hand, the comparative advantages of Brazil in comparison with other players of the international cooperation, not only in terms of geographical localization, but also due to cultural links and common challenges in the social and in the economic sphere, have also favored the expansion of Brazil’s South-South cooperation.

Given this context, the President of the Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to systematically expand the agenda of Brazil’s bilateral horizontal technical cooperation, because of its important role as an instrument for creating closer ties between Brazil and the developing countries, in line with the country’s commitment of assuming increased responsibilities on the international scenario. For this purpose, the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has made possible an expansion of the ABC’s activities, by means of an increase in the Agency’s budget. The expansion of Brazil’s Embassy network also converges towards the success of this strategy. The exchange of experiences and of know-how, the ultimate objective of technical cooperation, benefits not only the countries that receive the Brazilian cooperation, but Brazil as well, since, in this process, no country knows so much that it might not have something to learn, nor so little that it might not have something to teach. As Celso Amorim pointed out, to practice solidarity it is not necessary to be rich, and this may be perceived in the day-by-day of the poorest individuals in a society.

The costs of the Brazilian cooperation are low, mainly due to the fact that for the realization of some qualifying activities, technicians from other Brazilian institutions can be deployed and used, without the need of additional wages by ABC. Yet it remains up to the ABC to finance the acquisition of goods, materials, services and, when pertinent, the adequacy of the physical infrastructures that can become capable of meeting the objective of promoting social and economic development, achieved through the evolution of institutional capacities and the qualification of human resources.

The evaluation of the results obtained at the Center of Professional Qualification of SENAI in Paraguay gave rise to the adoption, on the part of the ABC, of a new approach for Brazil’s South-South cooperation, based on “structuring” actions, directed at imprinting a new status and a new dynamics for itself. Projects with this new profile provide several advantages to the Brazilian cooperation and, especially, to the beneficiary countries, for it can promote the social and economic impact on the target-group of cooperation initiatives as well as accomplish to ensure increased result-sustainability of Brazil’s cooperation measures. The ABC’s planning envisages 10 SENAI centers (4 already created and 6 under installation). Within this line of “structuring” projects, the ABC coordinates the implantation - operated by EMBRAPA - of “model-farms” in Haiti and Mali. In Haiti, this model-farm already under way shall perform as a nucleus of the Brazil-Haiti Program of Cooperation in Agriculture and Nutrition Security. In Mali, the project shall have regional coverage, with the objective of promoting the sustainable development of the cotton-planting chain of the “Cotton-4” countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, the Chad and Mali).

Brazil has maintained technical cooperation relations with Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, with
punctual performances in Asia (particularly in East Timor), in the Middle East (Lebanon and Palestinian Territories) and in Oceania. Apart from the “government-government cooperation”, with qualification activities carried out, in their majority, by experts deployed by domestic public institutions, the ABC has maintained an increasingly regular contact with entities of the organized civil society, with the aim at expanding the portfolio of Brazilian horizontal-cooperation opportunities. Brazil’s bilateral South-South technical cooperation concentrates itself in areas such as agriculture (including nutrition security), professional qualification, education, justice, sports, healthcare, the environment, information technologies, urban development and bio-energy.

South-South Technical Cooperation Programs

Between 2003 and 2009, the ABC coordinated the negotiation, approval and implementation of more than 370 treaties, adjustments, protocols and memorandums of understanding with governments of developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Oceania. Among these instruments there is the inclusion of those enabling trilateral South-South operations in partnership with developed countries and international organizations. This same period bore witness to a growth in excess of 100% of the countries benefiting from the Brazilian cooperation (from 21 to 56 countries), the multiplication by ten of the resources invested in technical cooperation, in addition to the incorporation of relevant themes for the less developed countries, such as electronic governance, renewable energies, civil defense and foreign trade.

Between 2004 and 2008, the equivalent of US$ 60 million was invested in approximately 250 projects of more than fifty Latin-American, Caribbean, African, Asian and Oceanian countries. On adding this sum to the value of the agenda of negotiated projects, not excluding those ones for the year of 2009, the total value would come close to US$ 80 million. The financial amounts mentioned above refer themselves exclusively to the operational expenditures of the South-South cooperation programs. If to the mentioned values an equalization factor were to be added, permitting a comparison with the average income of the developed countries, and if the non-financial costs of the Brazilian technical cooperation were to be aggregated, the total amount would grow to the equivalent of more than US$ 300 million. For the years 2009-2011, the ABC has a portfolio of approximately US$ 75 million, with US$ 38 million assigned for 22 African countries and US$ 35 million for 22 Latin-American countries, in addition to initiatives in other regions.

Triangular cooperation

The trilateral cooperation permits to potentiate the Brazilian bilateral South-South technical cooperation and should be perceived as a complementary action to this cooperation. Within this trilateral structure, on the one hand, it can be congregated the comparative advantages of Brazil in terms of cultural affinity, ethnical diversity, solidarity and the availability of better-adapted technologies to the reality of other countries. On the other hand, the comparative advantages of the traditional donor countries (financial resources, logistical structure, etc.) can be gathered together with the Brazilian initiatives.

Among the countries with which Brazil is working on triangular projects, Japan and the United States clearly stand out. With both, ABC is in the negotiation and elaboration stage of “structuring-profile” projects in the field of agriculture. With Japan, the project adopts more of a “developmental” profile rather than that of cooperation itself. The idea is to replicate the successful experience of “Proceder” (Japanese cooperation project in the Brazilian Cerrado) in the savannah areas of Northern Mozambique. Should the project experience a satisfactory evolution, the idea is that the model be reproduced in other African countries. With the United States, the ABC cogitates to invest in the configuration of “structuring” projects, probably something that envisages the installation of an agricultural model-farm in Mozambique. In both partnerships, the idea is for the ABC to finance to 30% of the projects.

Additionally, the ABC negotiates with USAID the implantation of pilot projects in Mozambique’s healthcare area. In addition to the projects cited above, there are cases of partnership between Brazil and the United States regarding malaria-eradication projects in São Tomé and Príncipe and in the modernization of Guinea-Bissau’s legislative system. Also with Japan, the Third-Country Training Program (TCTP) continues active, having, over its twenty-year existence, accounted for 1,200 foreign technicians trained in Brazil in the domains of the environment, healthcare, agriculture, urban development and transportations areas.

Other trilateral partnerships involve Spain, Canada, and Argentina, respectively in reforestation, public health and family-farming projects in Haiti. With France, the ABC already maintains negotiations for combined cooperation in Africa, especially in Mozambique and the Cameroons in the field of agriculture, besides an initiative in Haiti for the creation of a human milk bank. With Italy and also Egypt, Brazil has signed Memorandums of Understanding for cooperation with third countries. With Norway, the Netherlands and Germany, talks are already under way envisaging triangular cooperation.

In addition to the triangular cooperation entered into with countries, the ABC also has been working in triangular cooperation with some UN agencies. In this sense, a Complementary Adjustment was entered into with the ILO (International Labor Organization) for the implementation of technical cooperation with third countries, by means of Brazilian best practices, with the support of the ILO on the Hemispheric Agenda on Decent Labor (3 projects already under elaboration in Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador on the issue of the fight against child labor and future projects in the Social Security sphere). Other triangulation activities of the ABC with international entities include the execution of projects with the United Nations Population Fund – UNPF (projects on fighting against gender violence in Haiti and on demographics in Paraguay and in Guinea-Bissau), with the World Bank (School-Lunch Program and Solid Waste Management Program in Haiti) and with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (Public Security in Guinea-Bissau). Within this context, it must come to mind the partnership of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). One of the projects of the IBSA Fund managed by the headquarters of the UN Development Program, to wit the Handling of Solid Waste, has been prized as a model of cooperation among developing countries. With regard to project-financing, the ABC intends to manage the largest part of its expenditures directly, avoiding the transference of expressive resource amounts to the ILO, thereby preventing the risk of “idleness” in their utilization.

The current demand for the joint performance between Brazil and developed countries or multilateral organizations has meant an explicit acknowledgement of the operational excellence and effectiveness of the technical cooperation being rendered by Brazil.
Potential European-South American Cooperation Initiatives with Africa in the field of security

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From Science to Political Science

In 1915, Einstein completed the General Theory of Relativity - the product of eight years of work on the problem of gravity. In general relativity Einstein shows that matter and energy actually mould the shape of space and the flow of time. What we feel as the ‘force’ of gravity is simply the sensation of following the shortest path we can through curved, four-dimensional space-time. It is a radical vision: space is no longer the box the universe comes in; instead, space and time, matter and energy are, as Einstein proves, locked together in the most intimate embrace.²

You may ask, why are you being told about Einstein’s general theory of relativity? Well, in a number of ways, the author feels the same about this paper. The space that is the subject of this paper deals with Europe, an entity of 27 nations which can proudly trace itself back to the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951. Further, the paper includes the continent of South America, embracing 14 states, two of which belong to the European Union! Lastly, the scope of the paper covers the continent of Africa and its 53 states. Having to deal with significant tracts of real estate of three continents, the air above it and the seas and a sizeable portion of the world’s population that belong to no less than 92 nations in 15 minutes, requires a feat of relativity; we’ll have to use wave power to bend time so as to fit in the conceptual spaces.

The subject matter of the paper deals with potential European Union – South American co-operation initiatives with Africa in the field of security. For the purpose of the paper, “security” will include the constructs designed to enhance peace, security and associated development and co-operation. The paper will therefore not deal with health, economic, environmental, energy and other areas of human security, even though poverty is a primary cause of dissent (not only) in Africa³ and the AIDS pandemic continues to lay to waste swathes of Africans.

Time and space constraints necessitate the tracing of a golden thread in the theme, by identifying and pursuing generalities that hold true. This can be done by gaining an overview of progress with
integration by both the EU and South America, for the latter has recently commenced a very interesting integrative programme, replete with ambitious time scales.

Does Africa lag behind in this effort to unite itself, and is the nexus between security and development holding it back? It will be argued that, although there has been significant and encouraging progress, inadequate levels of security has been achieved on the African continent. Some of the encouraging trends in Africa will be reviewed, while areas of security endeavour will be identified that require a metaphorical shoulder to the wheel, and indeed, where the combined thrust of the European and South American goodwill should and can make a difference for the better, in Africa.

Both the EU and South America are role models for Africa in terms of their respective continental integration processes. Yet, in important ways the EU and South America are dissimilar. One, the EU has not only had to break new ground, but also had to contend with an expanding, virtual doubling of its member states, while the Union of South American Nations (USAN) potentially has limited anticipated membership growth – which would facilitate the ambitious time-scales for integration that it has set for itself. What follows are concise briefs about the contemporaneous state of the EU and South America as it pertains to the subject matter.

The European Union and The Treaty of Lisbon

The EU and its Treaty of Lisbon present a critical juncture in the development of the Union, making it a requirement to sojourn briefly. The stated aim of the treaty is to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and by the Treaty of Nice in 2001, with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action. Opponents of the Treaty argued that it would centralise the Union and in fact weaken democracy by shifting power away from national electorates. Thus, from port and starboard, there are a host of critiques and opprobrious epithets but also commendation and encomia about the EU.

Two issues arise from the state, progress and processes of the EU: firstly, not many are neutral on this issue, often viewed as a cumbersome, unwieldy model – which is a necessary, inherent, by-product of what is often an emotional process. Secondly the EU – and not only for Africa – serves as an excellent model even taking into account what its detractors have to say. Often, not nearly enough credit is given for a pioneering, unique, process – especially by those intimately involved. The EU has paved the way where others have either not walked or where they fear to tread. Yet, the EU appears to have reached such an advanced stage of development that the present bickering may be viewed, in essence, as mere fine-tuning – making small adjustments that are necessary for optimal performance – to what is in fact a grand achievement, one worthy to emulate.

As the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified, the EU will adopt the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty of Lisbon states that

“The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.”

The UK, together with France, was at the forefront in launching what would become European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the Saint-Malo summit ten years ago. Since then the EU has launched more than 20 civilian and military missions in three continents. Operation ATALANTA has been assembled to ensure the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia as well as protection to other vulnerable shipping off Somalia and to provide deterrence to acts of piracy by presence and surveillance.

The Union of South American Nations

This leads the debate to the new kid on the block - the Union of South American States. The Union of South American Nations (USAN), Portuguese União de Nações Sul-Americanas (UNASUL), Spanish Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) is an intergovernmental, continental union integrating two existing customs union (Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations) as part of an ongoing process of South American integration. USAN is patterned on the European Union model, and its plans include a common currency, parliament, and passport. USAN believes that a complete union like that of the EU should be possible by 2019. The USAN Constitutive Treaty was signed on 23 May 2008, at the Third Summit of heads of state, held in Brasilia, Brazil. The Union’s headquarters will be in Quito, Ecuador. At present it comprises 12 member states and two observer nations (Mexico and Panama). USAN aims for a single market, infrastructure co-operation (including an interoceano highway), free movement of people, economic development plans. In addition, its security architecture is planned to be a NATO-like structure under the South American Defence Council. A number of South American countries are or have been involved in UN peace operations in Africa.

The African Union

In terms of successfully integrating its 53 states, Africa appears to lag significantly behind both Europe and South America, even though the first African structure was formed in 1963 already. There are a number of reasons for this, which fall outside the scope of this paper.

The author assumes a certain level of institutional knowledge from the readers of this paper, and therefore will give cursory overviews of the African Union only, and not delve into its forerunner, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In order to manage the constraints on both time and space, further, the paper will look at trends and developments over the past and future medium term by highlighting reasons for optimism, firstly, but also countervailing and also signs of despair.

The African Union’s inaugural meeting of the AU took place in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The AU Council of Ministers adopted a resolution stipulating that “(…) there shall be five regions of the OAU, namely, Northern, Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern”. The formulation of the AU’s Constitutive Act, by which defining sovereignty in the conditional terms of a state’s capacity and willingness to protect its citizens had shifted the focus from regime security to human security and which even goes so far as to recognise the AU’s right to militarily intervene in its member states’ affairs in cases that require humanitarian, crimes against humanity redress. The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 31 January 2005.
Reasons for Optimism

One of the most important reasons for optimism is a relatively recent adaptation to the continent’s security architecture, and what rises therefrom. It was brought about by the impact of globalisation, apparent waning of world interest and humanitarian catastrophes in Africa. A new pan-Africanism has spurred the realisation that Africa can really only break away from the cycles of violence, interstate conflict, poverty, underdevelopment that continue in many ways to create suffering and keeps it at bottom rung of the human development ladder – when it becomes captain of its own destiny. In addition, the OAU’s fanatical insistence on sovereignty and non-interference in others’ affairs eroded humanitarian issues; whereas the present wave of pan-Africanism “has been pitting the values of unity and solidarity against those of democracy, accountability, democratic governance and transparent politics, all of which are considered vital correlates of continental security.” This change of focus will hopefully mark the ‘African Renaissance’.

The African Standby Force and its regional brigades

Considering the African Standby Force (ASF) entered into force barely 17 months after being signed, this demonstrates a serious political commitment to conflict prevention and a multidimensional approach to conflict management on the continent. Thus, ASF is further proof of Africa’s pledge to commit to human security on the continent. The ASF constitutes of five standby brigade level forces, one in each of Africa’s five regions, supported by civilian police (CivPol) and other capacities. When fully established, the ASF will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment anywhere in Africa, and possibly even outside the continent. Two of the regional brigades, have had fully-fledged peacekeeping exercises, in their broadest spectrum, in recent months, while a third is planning an exercise.

Africans in African Peacekeeping

There appears to be general agreement that Africans are increasingly willing to take on greater peacekeeping duties in Africa, in large part to prevent non-Africans from interfering on the continent, along the lines of the slogan “African solutions to African problems.” Some key peace operations have been and continue to be successful, while other continue to demand resources, while a small number have been termed failures. Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, and South Africa, among other countries, have well-trained divisions in their militaries, experts say. But resources (logistics, qualified human, financial, infrastructures, etc.) and often hardware (transportation (land, air and sea), even combat helicopters are a problem. The AU has doubled its own budget for peacekeeping to 12 per cent of its total budget as its responsibilities have grown with demands to maintain peace on several fronts. There is little flexibility, sustainability or predictability to its stream of resources.” Few African nations can afford to send soldiers abroad or provide the logistics for extended missions. Experts say the key to successful future African-led peacekeeping missions on the continent will be the continued support – in funds, training, and logistics – of the international community. In addition, the combined efforts of the AU and the UN have led to ‘hybrid’ peace operations.

Continent Early Warning System (CEWS)

CEWS was established under Article 12 of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council Protocol. Once established, the heart of the System will consist of a Situation Room that will be part of the Peace and Security Department. The Situation Room will, in turn, be linked to the observation and monitoring units of regional organisations. These are to collect and process data at their respective levels and transmit the same to the continental Situation Room. The CEWS is specifically mandated to collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs. The information gathered through the CEWS will then be used “(...) to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol [on the Peace and Security Council].”

The Continental Early Warning System is to collect and analyse country data on the basis of an appropriate ‘early warning indicators module’. This module must be based on political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators. However, although established de iure, the de facto operation is marred by underfunding, insufficient political will, and critically – a tendency for nations’ intelligence services to intervene in the CEWS process, and so effectively undermine and subvert the intentions of the CEWS.

Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC)

In its declaration on 3 February 2009, the African Union Assembly called for a meeting of the 30 African states that are Parties to the Rome Statute of the Court to discuss the Court’s work in Africa. This meeting, eventually held on 8 and 9 June 2009, could not have come at a more strategic time given the developments. States not party to the Rome Statute were barred from the meeting after discussions among parties. This meeting took place amid a lot of anxiety on the future of the Court in Africa, with fears of massive de-ratification by member states. This speculation however was proven wrong. The outcome of the AU meeting was encouraging. The Member States reiterated their unflinching commitment to fighting impunity on the continent as demonstrated by the number of African member states from Africa (30 out of 108) that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. Whether President El-Bashir of Sudan, indicted by the ICC’s for “war crimes and crimes against humanity”, attends a conference in Nigeria (a signatory to the Rome Statute) remains to be seen.

Democratic elections

As The Economist states, “sinking the roots of democracy is no easy task.” All too often, legitimate opposition is equated with treasonous behaviour and sedition; and the ‘big men’ of Africa yield power with great reluctance. Yet, increasingly, there are signs that democratisation is taking hold in Africa, and leaders continue to step aside once their term of office has expired. Recent successful elections in Ghana (a close-run affair), South Africa, Angola (an historical event in many respects), Botswana and Mozambique tell of positive trends.
Signs of Despair

Although some of the reasons for optimism have been highlighted above in terms of the reasons for optimism, there remain a number of definite challenges and continuing obstacles to effective and efficient inter- and intra-African co-operation. This paper will accordingly view the more important issues.

Undemocracy

Yet, the institution of democracy needs to be enshrined so as be beyond negotiation. There continues to instability and humanitarian catastrophes, such as the massacre of more than 150 people at a protest action in Guinea last month, and the rise in authoritarian regimes, such as Niger. Democracy has also failed in a number of instances, as unhappily has been the case in compromise-dependent, non-won brokered solutions in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. A number of African governments play lip service to democracy, but are in fact semi- or full autocracies. In an interesting longitudinal study, it has been proven what may appear to be obvious, namely that “rigged elections work for the riggables. Incumbents running in clean elections average six and a bit years in office; in rigged votes, 16 years”. It may be obvious - but ten extra years may not be expected of a democratic imposter.

A plethora of regional groupings

Despite the injunction of the AU that there shall only be five regional groupings to be recognised, there remains a plethora of regional institutions. The reason is that some countries feel they can gain economically and to lesser extent, politically, from multiple memberships. This brings about associated problems of co-ordination, competition and unproductivity: Overlapping membership of regional organisations, that in a Venn-diagram picture of confusion impacts on implementation programmes, and exacerbates resource contestations. It compounds, unnecessarily so, the formalisation of structures and processes, the concurrence on common values and the reduction – in so far as this may be possible – asymmetrical regionalisation. In addition, some regions – such as ECOWAS - are stronger in taking collective action again miscreants, than for instance the SADC in dealing with the Zimbabwe issue.

To surmount these challenges remain key to an enduring African security regime.

Conclusions: Areas of Potential European – South-American Co-operation with Africa

The remaining issue relates to the areas of potential European – South American co-operation with Africa; firstly, Africa needs to be informed by the successes of integration by both the EU and South America. Africa needs access to expertise from both the EU and USAN to expedite its integrative process. The EU has, to extant knowledge, a delegation at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; USAN should follow suit.

Secondly, aside from this non-governmental organisation Konrad Adenauer Foundation-initiated structure, an institutionalised mechanism to efficiently and effectively coordinate co-operation between Europe and South America does not exist with respect to third parties, such as in the case of the continent of Africa. This ought to be done at an official Union level.

Further, the issues that are open to potential co-operation between EU and South America on the one hand and Africa on the other, are listed above as the subject matter and as issues of priority.

The positive reasons for optimism should be encouraged, and reinforced towards permanency through appropriate support mechanisms, including funding and allocation of human and other resources. It is important to note that joint projects should be carried out in a manner of a partnership, one that is perceived by African nations as neither patronising nor patronial; for in the minds of many these attitudes serve as a reminder of the subjugation under repressive colonial regimes.

The reasons for despair need to be noted by EU and South American governments and their associated non-governmental organisations. Pressure as appropriate (via the UN Security Council, Amnesty International – whatever avenue produces results) needs to be applied, sanctions applied where deemed suitable. Where required, education and training can be given to elevate understanding about issues such as (security sector reform) governance, democracy, the nexus between security and development, legitimacy and functioning of parliamentary opposition, transparency - to name a few important ones.

Lastly, one thing many would agree on: Africa probably needs less arms sales from the world’s arms manufacturers, a significant proportion of which belong to the EU or South America; Arms have not contributed to peace and security in Africa.

Endnotes and References

1 Paper by Frank C. von Krosigk. Prior to joining the South African Institute of International Affairs in July 2009 as its Security Fellow in the Emerging Powers Programme, he spent time in Captains (South Africa Navy) Dealings with maintenance heavy-duty ships. He is currently serving as the second-in-command of the Southern African Development Community’s Standing Maritime Committee and the Sea Power for Africa symposia.

2 http://www.idrivertheory.com/online_n2/History_n2/index_n2/emdrn_n2.html, accessed 09 Nov 09.


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10 Martin Arquero: “Brazil proposes alliance of Latin American Nations; security plank part of larger union without U.S.” Washington Times, 05 Jan 08.


15 Significant address by Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, Harare, 25 October 1997.

16 More than 5,000 troops from 12 countries participated in the Southern African Development Community’s field exercise GOLFINHO, hosted in South Africa in Sep 09, with the maritime portion having been hosted by Namibia. The East African African Standby Force is planning an exercise for 2010.


18 At its session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 30 to 31 October 2003, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government adopted decision Assembly/Acc.16(4)/1 on the Operationalisation of the PIC Protocol, involving the Commission to take the necessary steps for the establishment of the CEWS. <http://www.iss.org.za/index.php?link_id=4893&link_type=12&slang_id=12&slang_type=12&tmpl_id=3>, accessed 04 Nov 09.

19 “As a follow-up to this decision, the Commission organised a workshop on the establishment of the CEWS, from 30 to 31 October 2003, in Addis Ababa. The workshop recommended that the AU: begin with significant threats of violence and loss of life as the entry point for the AU’s early warning system; build a measurable, verifiable and standard database that is simple, user friendly, based on multi-level and field-based sources, develop an analytical capacity and expertise within the AU on early warning, conflict prevention and conflict management, and establish diagnost linkages between analysis and desired outcomes so as to provide the AU with the tools to ensure the CEWS’s operational readiness.”

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Introduction

Both Europe and South America are changing. Europe is changing as the result of a twofold process of enlargement and deepening of the EU integration process. Together, these two processes of institutional change in Europe are producing, however fitfully and incrementally, a new economic, monetary and political 'presence' in the international system that is acquiring some of the attributes and capabilities of an international security actor. South America, on the other hand, is changing as a consequence of the emergence of Brazil as one of the emergent economies in the international system, and because of its role as a motor of regional cooperation and integration.

The ongoing processes of change and transformation that are currently underway in both Europe and South America raise important questions about whether the peoples and nations of these two continents share common interests in shaping the architectural contours of a more multipolar international system, and the extent to which they face shared security concerns. These questions are particularly pertinent in the context of a post-Cold War shift in the global balance of power which is associated with the rise of the 'BRIC' (Brazil, Russia, India and China) emerging economies, and which is contributing to the erosion of U.S. global primacy and the emergence of a more multipolar global order.

This paper explores the composition and limits of the common international security agenda between Europe and South America. It begins by examining the emergence of the EU as an international actor and the contemporary European security agenda. It then considers the drivers of change in the international system and their implications for both Europe and South America. The central argument advanced in this paper is that Europe and South America have common security interests, but they also have separate – primarily regional – security concerns, as well as issues on which their strategic and security interests diverge.

The EU as an International Security Actor

‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free’. Thus begins the European Union’s first attempt to define a ‘European Security Strategy’, entitled ‘A secure Europe in a Better World’. This document – agreed by EU Heads of State and Government in December 2003 after a year of acute divisions within Europe on the Iraq war – neatly sums up the dominant European perspective of its interests and place in the world: Europe seeks both to ensure its security (its primary interest) and to make the world a ‘better place’ (its normative agenda – or moral mission). The assumption is that the two fit seamlessly and naturally together; the reality is that foreign and security policy in a competitive, self-help international system is a realm of moral ambiguity, tragic dilemmas and painful choices. This means that protecting and furthering Europe’s security interests is not always the same as making the world a better place, and that at times, European policy-makers face painful choices and political dilemmas between doing good and serving their own interests.

At the same time, the EU as an international security actor faces a gap between its aspirations and its capabilities, its rhetoric and its ability to shape regional and international affairs – what Christopher Hill termed the ‘expectations-capabilities gap’. The EU has undergone a remarkable transformation since the launch of the CFSP as a consequence of the Treaty of Maastricht, and particularly since St Malo and the creation of the ESDP. The EU is no longer a ‘civilian power’, and it is certainly not a ‘normative power’ in

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the sense of the term coined by Ian Manners, despite its considerable reserves of soft power. It is developing a capacity for military crisis management in the framework of the ‘Petersburg tasks’, but there is still much to do before it can launch anything more than small-scale peace-keeping missions (the possible exception being in the naval area, which will be discussed below). Whilst it aspires to be ‘more active, more coherent and more effective’ as an international security actor, the EU remains hamstrung by limited military capabilities, divergent national interests between its member states, and ‘clunky’ decision-making procedures. The Lisbon Treaty will go some way towards addressing a number of the most pressing institutional deficiencies, but how effective it will operate in practice remains to be seen.

Contemporary European Security

The annus mirabilis of 1989 – the twentieth anniversary of which we have recently celebrated – ended the bipolar division of Europe and profoundly transformed the continent’s security agenda. Europeans since then have been seeking to heal their divisions and build a Europe ‘whole and free’. There is still a way to go before Europe is truly whole and free, but what is undeniable is that Europe no longer lives in the shadow of nuclear Armageddon and is no longer divided into two hostile military and political alliance systems.

One of the most significant consequences of the end of the Cold War for our purposes is that Europe has been transformed from a security consumer into a potential security provider. Europeans no longer need the American conventional and nuclear security guarantee in the way they did in the Cold War, and rather than focusing on their internal divisions and conflicts, Europeans can now turn their attention to projecting stability into their ‘near neighbourhood’ and beyond. The European capabilities embodied in both NATO and the European Union can now be used in and around Europe’s periphery, and further afield where European security is threatened and European interests are at stake.

Although the European Union’s collective security interests are primarily regional in focus, EU member states also have global interests, and are beginning to use the CFSP/ESDP as an instrument for pursuing their common global foreign and security policy interests. The 2003 European Security Strategy identifies five ‘key threats’: terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; state failure; and transnational organised crime. In addressing these key threats, EU member states have specified two ‘strategic objectives’: ‘Building Security in our Neighbourhood’ and ‘Effective Multilateralism’.

‘Building Security in our Neighbourhood’ and ‘Effective Multilateralism’

In terms of the former (‘Building Security in our Neighbourhood’), the European Security Strategy stresses that this is of primary importance because even in an era of globalisation, ‘geography is still important’. Enlargement of the Union ‘brings the EU closer to troubled areas’, namely: the Balkans; the Southern Caucasus, i.e., Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; the Middle East, where ‘resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe’; and the ‘Mediterranean area generally’. The EU thus faces an ‘arc of instability’ around its borders, running from Murmansk in the north, through Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, down into the Balkans, and then running westwards along the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea to include the ‘MENA’ countries (‘Middle East and North Africa’).

Within this arc of instability, there are two primary geostrategic sources of concern. The first of these is a new ‘Eastern Question’ focused on Russian recrudescence and intensified great power security competition resulting from the reconstitution of Russian power and its re-emergence as a Eurasian great power. In the 1990s, Russia faced a calamitous decline in its relative power capabilities, and the Euro-Atlantic community was able to expand its influence deep into Eastern Europe, and use its military power within the framework of NATO to reshape the political order of the Balkans. Russia’s weakness meant that it could do little except voice its concerns and vent its frustration. But in the early twenty-first century, Russia is back, and back with vengeance. Buoyed up by hydrocarbon revenues and enjoying more effective – albeit more authoritarian – political leadership, Russia has been able to reassert its interests in what it perceives as its ‘near abroad’, and have its voice heard on a range of other global security issues. The consequence of this resurgence of Russian power has been intensifying security competition between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, with the flashpoints being Ukraine, Georgia and energy supplies.

The second major focus of security concern for Europe is the Middle East and North Africa, a region which is generating the most complex, multifaceted and potentially serious problems on Europe’s contemporary security agenda. Indeed, if Cold War bipolarity structured European security along an East-West axis, in the twenty-first century, European security is increasingly being reconfigured along a North-South axis. The North-South economic divide remains one of the primary political cleavages of the global system, and it is along the southern coast of the Mediterranean that Europe meets the global South. All of the EU’s five security threats are most acutely felt in the Middle East and North Africa, from terrorism (primarily rooted in a sense of Muslim grievance and powerlessness and fuelled by frustration with dysfunctional Middle Eastern polities and sclerotic economies); proliferation (above all Iran – perhaps the gravest single threat to the long-term security of contemporary Europe); regional conflicts (such as the 2006 Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah, and the 2009 Gaza conflict, 3

1 Brian Knowlton, ‘Merkel’s moment in Washington’s Elite Ring’, International Herald Tribune, November 4, 2009. As Chancellor Angela Merkel said in the first ever address by a German Chancellor to a joint meeting of the US Congress (November 3 2009), ‘Zero tolerance needs to be shown when there is a risk of weapons of mass destruction falling, for example, into the hands of Iran and threatening our security’. She added that ‘a nuclear bomb in the hands of an Iranian president who denies the Holocaust, threatens Israel and denies Israel the right to exist is not acceptable’.
Operation ‘Cast Lead’); failed, failing or fragile states (including Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Iraq and Afghanistan), and transnational organised crime. In addition, the European economy remains dependent on oil from the Gulf States, and across the Mediterranean it is confronted by potential problems associated with demographic growth trends, economic stagnation and jihadist militancy in the Maghreb. Overshadowing these growing economic, political and security problems is the fear of a full-blown ‘Clash of Civilisations’ between Europe and the Arab and Muslim world, a fear that is occasionally fanned by events such as the fatwah on Salman Rushdie or the Danish cartoons.

The second ‘strategic objective’ identified by the European Security Strategy is ‘effective multilateralism’. EU member states have emphasised that ‘well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective’. At the heart of ‘effective multilateralism’ is the UN system, but it also includes the WTO and other international economic organisations like the World Bank and the IMF; regional organisations like MERCOUR and the African Union; and a network of ‘international organisations, regimes and treaties’, including the G8 and more recently, the G20. The EU’s strategic objective is thus to contribute to ‘an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world’.

Having looked at some length at the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union as an emerging international security actor and the contemporary European security agenda – and before identifying the common, separate and differing security agendas of Europe and South America – it is important to outline the key drivers of change in the post-Cold War international system, and it is to this that we now turn.

A World Transformed

Both Europe and South America face a global international system being steadily and ineluctably transformed by a series of far-reaching processes of change. The tectonic plates, upon which the institutional and political architecture created in the late 1940s rests, are shifting. This will have important implications for the constitution of world order and the structural dynamics of international politics. For our purposes, four key drivers of change can be identified. These are the demise of the ‘unipolar moment’, the rise of the BRIC and the changing global balance of power, the emergence of a new international security agenda, and global challenges such as climate change and poverty in the developing world which serve as ‘multipliers’ of insecurity and conflict.

The first driver of change is the passing of America’s ‘unipolar moment’. The implosion of the Soviet Union left the United States as the world’s only remaining superpower, and in this context, it acquired the characteristics of what the former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine termed ‘hyperpower’. For Europe, the emergence of the American hyperpower enjoying its unipolar moment was accompanied by a steady process of ‘continental drift’, as the ties binding Europe and America weakened. With the collapse of communist power in the East and the breakup of the USSR, Europe no longer needed the US security guarantee. At the same time, the focus of attention of the US shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. Many Europeans found the US hyperpower unresponsive and arrogant, whilst Washington viewed many of its former European allies as unreliable free-riders, unwilling to contribute to the costs in blood and treasure of ‘international peace and security’ – despite their talk of ‘effective multilateralism’. Even with the waning of the ‘unipolar moment’ and the election of President Barak Obama, transatlantic relations have not enjoyed the revival many on both sides of the Atlantic hoped for; indeed, as Hubert Vedrine has noted ‘Europe for Obama is not a priority, not a problem and not a solution for his problem’.4

Nonetheless, for both Europe and South America, the waning of America’s ‘unipolar power’ raises questions about who or what will shoulder the responsibility for safeguarding international peace and security as the USA becomes more selective and more focused in its global responsibilities. ‘For the roughly two decades since 1989’, Fareed Zakaria has argued, ‘the power of the United States has defined the international order. All roads have led to Washington, and American ideas about politics, economics, and foreign policy have been the starting points for global action’. This unipolar moment reached its apogee with Iraq, but it is now waning, ‘not because of Iraq but because of the broader diffusion of power across the world’. Consequently, he notes, we are now moving into the ‘post-American world’.5

The second driver of change – and one closely associated with the first – is the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the shift in the global balance of power. The overall impact of these two drivers of change will be a more multipolar system. For Europe, this will mean a weakening of its influence and a further diminution in its ability to shape the contours of the twenty-first century international system. EU member states individually will be less and less able to project their power globally and defend their interests in the wider international system, and even if they act collectively through the EU, their power will decline in relative terms. As the November 2008 US report (Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed) noted, the key shift in the global balance of power is from the West to Asia, with China emerging as the big winner of the process of power transition currently underway. For the countries of South America on the other hand – particularly Brazil – this shift in the global balance of power presents new opportunities, as well as potential challenges. More generally, the changing global balance of power raises the spectre of growing great power rivalry and security competition. All previous power transitions have been accompanied by great power war: one factor mitigating this risk is nuclear weapons – which make war between nuclear armed states unthinkable and irrational. The existence of a stable nuclear deterrence between the great powers makes a major war between them highly unlikely: nuclear weapons are the great ‘game changer’ in the international system, and produce a new dynamic of international security which will make the current process of power transition potentially different from previous power transitions.

Third, the emergence of new security threats, risks and challenges. ‘We have slain the dragon’, it was said after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, ‘but the woods remain full of dangerous snakes’. 9/11 and insurgencies in Iraq and now Afghanistan are the starkest demonstration of the new security challenges of the twenty-first century, but there are other ‘dangerous snakes’ lurking in the undergrowth. These include the problem of piracy and threats to maritime sea lines of communication, epitomised above all by Somali pirates; regional conflicts and ‘frozen conflicts’ such as those in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Bosnia and Kosovo; ‘new wars’ in Africa and parts of Asia; the threat of cyber-terrorism and cyber-conflicts targeting vital infrastructure; the rise of ‘resource wars’ focusing on water, energy and arable land; and the apocalyptic implications of the nexus of terrorism, failed states and weapons of mass destruction.

The final driver of change is the emergence of new global challenges that, whilst not directly security threats per se, can serve as ‘multipliers’ of insecurity and conflict. The two most important of these multipliers are climate change and poverty in the global South. Climate change is not an international security problem per se, but it is exacerbating conflicts and is likely to generate new conflicts over scarce resources – especially arable land and freshwater resources. It is also likely to trigger large-scale population movements and deepen socio-economic poverty in the South, where its impact will be most

severely and most directly felt. The North-South economic divide is also a multiplier of insecurity and conflict, as growing poverty and relative deprivation creates fertile conditions for conflict.

International Security – the Central Problem

One way of conceptualising ‘security’ is in terms of the balance between threats and capabilities. When capabilities exceed threats, a situation of security can be said to exist. When, however, a gap opens up between threats and capabilities, insecurity mounts, fears grow and the potential for conflict increases. The central problem in the international system today is that the security agenda has become ever more complex and demanding, and yet the institutions of global governance and for the collective management of shared problems are weak and suffering from growing over-stretch.

In this context, the need for greater and more effective cooperation between European and South American states and organisations is ever more apparent and pressing. The complex and multifaceted processes encapsulated in the concept of ‘globalisation’ have created new interdependencies, but also new vulnerabilities. In this context, the EU agreement with Brazil in December 2007 during the Portuguese EU Presidency that created a new ‘Strategic Partnership’ takes on new significance, and reflects a growing recognition in both continents that cooperation to tackle common problems is essential. The Plan of Action agreed between the EU and Brazil includes cooperation in five key areas: promoting peace and security through efficient multilateralism; sustainable development; regional cooperation; promotion of science and technology; and citizen exchanges. The EU is also seeking to expand and institutionalise its trade relations with MERCOSUR, the South Common Market comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Despite these promising developments, however, it is clear that Europeans and South Americans do not always have an identical view of what constitute the most pressing international security problems, or how to address them. There are some issues on which Europeans and South Americans see eye to eye, but there are also more specific regional problems which give them different sets of priorities and concerns. Finally, there are some issues on which the political representatives of the two continents have very different perspectives, interests and agendas.

The Common Security Agenda

In terms of their shared security concerns, there are a number of potentially fruitful areas for common action. To begin with, both Europeans and South Americans have a shared interest in ensuring that the relative decline of U.S. power is managed in ways that ensure the continued stability of the international system. This means that they have a common interest in reshaping and recalibrating the institutions of global governance – from the UN to the Bretton Woods system – in ways that take into account the shift in global power that has taken place since the late 1940s and early 1950s when America took the lead in framing the post-war international order. One indication of this desire to find new forums for international economic governance has been the use of the G20 (rather than the G8) to address the global financial crisis of 2008, with meetings in Washington (November 2008), London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009).

Second, Europeans and South Americans have a shared interest in maritime security and ensuring that sea lines of communication (SLOC) are not interdicted. Both continents are highly dependent on trade, and even in an age of globalisation, approximately 90% of global trade is still transported by water. Both the EU (EU NAVFOR Atlanta) and NATO are involved in naval operations to combat Somali pirates. Piracy is also a growing problem off the coast of West Africa. Maritime cooperation is thus clearly an area where cooperation between Europeans and South Americans would be mutually beneficial. This could be developed in either the framework of NATO or the EU. Brazil’s growing recognition in the importance of maritime security is evident from its acquisition of four new submarines from France (three conventional Scorpene class, and one nuclear-powered) and its new naval doctrine that emphasises the importance of protecting the Brazilian ‘blue Amazon’ – a task that has acquired greater importance following the discovery of large oil and natural gas reserves in the so-called ‘pre-salt deposits’ 300km off its south-east coast.8

Third, crisis management and peacekeeping in Africa, both the EU and Brazil have engaged in a number of peace-keeping operations in Africa over the past decade or so (in the framework of the UN), and cooperation and sharing of ‘lessons learned’ is an obvious area for more regular and institutionalised security cooperation. This could be done in the context of the development of ‘strategic partners’ for the ESDP, analogous to initiatives undertaken by NATO in developing ‘partner countries’. The conceptual framework for this cooperation could be provided by the UNDP’s notion of ‘human security’.

Fourth, terrorism, whilst terrorism is more of an irritant than a major threat to international peace and security, combating international terrorism is an area of clear mutual interest. This involves improving intelligence sharing, targeting terrorists’ financial and logistical networks, and counter-terrorist cooperation at an operational level.

Finally, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Europeans and South Americans share a common interest in, and commitment to, preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. With the Obama administration’s lead in working towards a ‘global zero’ in nuclear weapons, there is now real momentum building towards a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference. However, there are some differences between European and South American governments on tactics and strategies. These arise because two EU member states are Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) under the terms of the NPT, and because Europeans favour more intrusive and robust forms of verification (in the shape of an Additional Protocol) with which the Brazilians are less comfortable. There is also a sense in Europe (as well as in Washington) that some South American governments do not fully recognise the seriousness of the Iranian uranium enrichment programme, or its dire implications for regional stability in the Middle East.7

Regional Agendas

Although there are a range of important international security threats and risks on which Europeans and South Americans see eye to eye, there are also some security problems that are primarily regional in character and consequences.

Europeans, for example, are increasingly concerned about the growing power and assertiveness of Russia, which has manifested itself in disputes over oil and gas supplies to Eastern Europe; conflicts over the political orientation of Ukraine and Belarus; and the ‘August war’ with Georgia in 2008. EU member states are also preoccupied with a range of security threats, risks and challenges emanating from the Middle East:

7 Alen Murilo, ‘Obama asks Brazil for help in persuading Iran to accept nuclear proposal’, International Herald Tribune, November 26, 2009
and North Africa – from the Israeli-Palestine conflict, Lebanon and Syria, to the uncertain future of Iraq, the regional aspirations of Iran and maritime security in the Persian Gulf and Straights of Hormuz.

These are very distant and somewhat abstract security threats for most in South America, whose regional security concerns are focused on the problems of regional integration and cooperation in South America and the Caribbean. These differing regional security concerns are a natural and inevitable feature of international politics, given that all states are primarily concerned about developments in their immediate regional environs, rather than with seemingly distant problems occurring thousands of miles away.

**Differing Security Agendas**

There are some issues, however, on which European and South American governments have very different interests and approaches. The first and most significant is the issue of sovereignty and military intervention – humanitarian or otherwise. In the wake of developments in the 1990s (most significantly, the 1999 Kosovo War, NATO’s Operation Allied Force), the UN Secretary-General appointed a 16-member High Level Panel in 2004 which issued a report on what is now known as RSP – the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Most EU and NATO member states place a high premium on human rights, and interpret R2P as signifying a mandate for humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide or gross violations of human rights, if and when the state in question is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens. However, this is anathema to many other UN member states, including the BRICS and many African and Asian states, which regard the legal and normative principle of sovereignty as a protection – however flimsy – against outside intervention in their domestic affairs by powerful (Western) states – most of whom have a history of imperialism and colonialism.

The second issue on which there are differences is the global multilateral trading system and the WTO Doha Development round. Here there are competing economic interests between Brazil and its South American neighbours on the one hand, who want to see a fairer international trading order, and the EU on the other – which remains committed to protection of powerful European economic interests, most notably through the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy).

In addition to these two key areas where there are significant policy differences, there are other issues on which divisions within Europe weaken the development of closer European-South American relations. One issue is reform of the UN Security Council; this is long overdue, but remains controversial. United Germany has waged a long-running campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC, and shares a common interest in this with Brazil, India and Japan (the ‘G4’). However, although Britain and France are rationally committed to reform of the UNSC, they are in no hurry to see their relative diplomatic weight diluted, and therefore remain half-hearted in their support for reform of this crucial institution of global governance. Different EU member states also have different sets of interests they pursue with South American partners, whilst Germany works in the G4 with Brazil for reform of the UNSC, the French are interested in arms sales to Brazil and the wider region. Portugal and Spain, on the other hand, favour developing EU relations with the region because of their historical and linguistic ties. These diverse European interests in cooperation with South American countries mean that it is not always easy to develop a coherent and focused EU policy.

**Conclusions**

It is evident that in an increasingly globalised world, EU member states and the countries of South America have a number of overlapping security concerns, from recalibrating institutions of global governance in ways that reflect shifting power relations, to cooperation in maritime security, counter-terrorism, WMD proliferation and peacekeeping in Africa. At the same time, however, it would be foolish not to acknowledge that for the peoples and countries of both continents, their primary security concerns are regional, and that given their geographical separation, and this gives them different priorities and concerns. Moreover, one must also acknowledge that on some issues – notably sovereignty and human rights, and agricultural protectionism – there are significant differences of interest that are hard to reconcile.

Looking at Europe, it is evident that if the EU is to be a more effective international actor, it must be ‘more active, more coherent and more capable’ as the European Security Strategy recognises. Some important steps have been taken, but much remains to be done, and as the EU struggles to implement the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and create a European External Action Service, it is clear that the EU is in for a period of institutional upheaval, policy incoherence and dissipated activity. With enlargement to 27 member states and futile economic growth in the Eurozone, it is also apparent that the dream of an ‘ever closer union’ has run up against the barrier of European public opinion. Consequently, although the Spanish Presidency is likely to push for a reinvigoration of relations between the EU and its South American partners, progress in this domain is likely to be slow and incremental at best.\(^8\)

In terms of the fundamental issue facing both Europe and South America – the reshaping of the institutions of global governance to reflect the shifting international balance of economic and political power – the prospects for a root-and-branch transformation of international order are limited. There has been talk of a ‘global grand bargain’ to reshape the Western-led international order, analogous to that which followed World War Two – which saw the creation of the UN and Bretton Woods systems; the establishment of NATO and the beginnings of the European integration process.\(^9\) That there is a need to restructure and recalibrate – if not re-design – the multilateral institutions of global governance to fit the age of globalisation and the rise of the BRICS is incontrovertible. The problem, however, is that finding a workable political formula based on mutually acceptable compromise in a diverse and pluralist international system is extremely difficult, given differing interests and visions amongst the major international political actors. The post-2nd World War international order was basically designed by American policy-makers and underpinned by U.S. global power, influence, money and might. Today the U.S.A. cannot play this role, and there are too many political rivalries and suspicions between different states to forge a global ‘grand bargain’. Consequently South Americans and Europeans should expect a series of incremental and ad hoc changes to the institutions of global governance, with a marginally greater role for the BRICS and others within the governing councils of the IMF and the World Bank, and an institutionalisation of the role of the G20 as a forum for global economic and financial governance. Whether this will be sufficient for dealing with the complex and multifaceted agenda of security risks, challenges and threats of the early twenty-first century are a moot point. This, in turn, raises a question which many European policy-makers are unwilling to consider openly and honestly: namely, whether ‘effective multilateralism’ – which is at the heart of the EU’s collective vision of itself as an international actor – is a feasible goal given the lack of reform of international organisations and their diminishing legitimacy and effectiveness. For both South Americans and Europeans therefore, the future outlook is uncertain, given nagging doubts about whether multilateral solutions to global problems are really possible in a pluralist and diverse international system undergoing an unsettling power transition and far-reaching socio-economic changes.

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Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?

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Introduction

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are inextricably linked. Nevertheless, the objective of non-proliferation, that is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, cannot be limited to preserving simply any kind of a status quo for the sake of it. This point of view is generally accepted, but stems from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One has to keep in mind that this is legally bound through the various articles of the NPT, and it is not just a statement of its own. As a starting point for instance, the article VI of the NPT creates an obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament not only for the nuclear-weapon states, but for all parties, including the non-nuclear-weapon states. This implies that any analysis of the position of a given state on this subject must begin with establishing whether this state is a party, or not, to the NPT, and whether it is an NPT nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon state.

As for the lessons to share, in the context of a conference aiming at promoting dialogue between South-America and Europe, and in connection with the presentations made by ABACC and EURATOM representatives, it is of special interest to focus on what can be derived from such regional agreements in terms of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, keeping in mind when it comes to applying those lessons, that no other group of countries has developed such arrangements.

Since all States that are parties to ABACC and EURATOM regional arrangements are also members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they undoubtedly share the final objectives of the Treaty and aim at demonstrating the fulfillment of their obligations. The articulation between the regional agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency must naturally preserve the possibility for each entity to draw independently its conclusions, even if they use a common set of data; at the same time, the implementation of the regional and international verification systems should cross-fertilize the organisations that each one gets a benefit from it, with a view to facilitating the development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the NPT regime.
Non-proliferation and regional arrangements

Today, the great majority of UN Member-States are also party to the NPT and do observe their non-proliferation commitments. It is generally a policy based on a national assessment. The rationale is that the pursuit of nuclear weapons would not add to their national security, and that they derive positive benefit from the non-proliferation regime. If the issue has been settled in Europe rather long ago, it is interesting to note that the debate sometimes resurfaces in South American media. In the context of this conference between our two regions, what could be a European reading of this issue? Of course, this is not referring to military thinkers who may just assess nuclear weapons as practical ones, identical to any other military means except for their destruction capabilities. Anyone agrees that a nuclear weapon is not a military tool identical to any other. This is demonstrated by the wide global adhesion to the NPT, including its nuclear disarmament side that will be addressed later.

What it is referred to, is the opinion that joining the NPT was an unacceptable loss of sovereignty. In Brazil, for instance an expert in Social Sciences such as Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, discussed recently1 whether having nuclear weapons was, or not, an attribute of power in today’s world. His conclusion was that certainly producing nuclear weapons was not in the interest of Brazil, neither economically nor politically, but that the decision taken under President Cardoso removed the freedom of choice of the country, and therefore was a mistake. Others have also raised the issue, but what makes especially interesting Guilherme’s position, is that he is also the author of « the Reasons of Disorder » (Razões da Desordem). If we apply to this discussion his view that there is only one set of analytical tools in social sciences, instead of one for developed countries and one for developing ones, it implies that countries from the North and from the South have to evaluate their decisions and policies with the same set of rules. With that in mind let’s go back to the subject of the unacceptable loss of sovereignty, and see what lessons can be shared.

The EURATOM Treaty dates back to 1957, or 1958 if one takes the Treaty of Rome as the real starting point. It aims among other things at achieving progress in peaceful achievements, and at ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended purpose. All non-nuclear weapons states that are founding members of the EURATOM Treaty did join the NPT in the early days it was open for signature. This took place in the first leg of the Cold War, at a time some feared that their territory could even be a nuclear battlefield. The benefits of joining the non-proliferation regime were clear: renouncing for themselves to nuclear weapons with the assurance that their neighbours were doing the same, working towards nuclear disarmament in the framework of general and complete disarmament, and benefiting from the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

As for ABACC, its birth certificate is dated from 1991, but it was conceived around the time the Argentinean and Brazilian presidents adopted the Declaration of Foz de Iguazu. They announced a formal renunciation to nuclear weapons with the assurance that their neighbours were doing the same, working towards nuclear disarmament in the framework of general and complete disarmament, and benefiting from the development of peaceful nuclear energy.

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Nuclear Disarmament

As for nuclear disarmament, the situation is different in our two regions: there is no nuclear weapon state in South America and the nuclear-free zone treaty of Tlatelolco is in place. The European Union comprises twenty-five non-nuclear-weapon states and two nuclear-weapons states. However, all states are concerned by nuclear disarmament, because this is an essential issue of collective security. For instance, the existence of an effective non-proliferation regime plays its role, as well as the regimes against other weapons of mass destruction. It obviously depends also on the establishment of a stable strategic environment. More generally, and as mentioned in the NPT, nuclear disarmament is to be considered within the context of general and complete disarmament.

In nuclear disarmament, size matters. In Europe, France’s deterrence policy is based on a concept of « strict sufficiency ». Taking into account the current international situation, France has announced a unilateral reduction of its arsenal to a total number of warheads below 300, as well as a reduction of one-third of its nuclear air-force component. France has no ground-based component. The United Kingdom has announced it wants to get down to 160 operationally deployed warheads (the actual total is larger but has not been disclosed), and possesses only a submarine component. The situation clearly puts the USA and the Russian Federation at the forefront since their arsenals are much larger. The post-START negotiations truly deserve the attention they receive.

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As for the testing of nuclear weapons, all European States have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This is also the case in South America, when taking into account the geographical definition. Technically, in the CTBT definition, the region includes also Central America and the Caribbean, thus raising the question of Cuba, Dominica, and Guatemala. In any case, within the list of 44 states contained in the Annex 2, whose ratification is needed for the Entry into Force (EIF) of the Treaty, one finds two nuclear-weapons states (China and the USA), the three non-signatory states of the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) plus Iran, North Korea, Egypt and Indonesia. Most of them remain to be convinced to ratify, and, India, Pakistan and the DPRK still need to sign and ratify the treaty. None of these remaining States are from South America or Europe. As for the two European nuclear-weapons states, France and the United Kingdom were the two first Nuclear Weapons States to announce, jointly, their ratification. In addition, France has irresponsibly dismantled its nuclear test site, and invited the IAEA to verify it. The United Kingdom has no nuclear-test-site of its own. The well-known list of states whose ratification is still required for the EIF of the CTBT is an example that nuclear disarmament is not solely the responsibility of nuclear weapons states, but a shared burden.

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As for the negotiation of a Cut-off Treaty banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear

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1 Carta Capital, Diálogos, 14/11/2008.
Weapons, hope has been raised during the last session of the conference on disarmament that might be confirmed in the coming months. In any case, four nuclear weapon states (the USA, the UK, the Russian Federation and France) have formally declared a moratorium on their production. France has also started the dismantlement of its production facilities, and the process has now reached an irreversible status, as demonstrated to the ambassadors to the conference on disarmament, to non-governmental organisations and to journalists during visits on the premises of the former production facilities of uranium and plutonium of military grade.

The negotiation of a Cut-off Treaty is important in itself and is also a good example of the links between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This is because verification techniques in a Cut-off Treaty will most likely, at least conceptually, resemble the IAEA safeguards or ABACC and EURATOM regional systems as for the non-diversion of nuclear materials. In addition, the verification techniques and reporting channels will have to guarantee the absence of dissemination of useful information for would-be proliferators.

**Peaceful use of nuclear energy**

The last, but not least, pillar of the NPT is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The « nuclear renaissance » is a fact and the world community must make sure that it does not present new proliferation risks. The non-compliance cases that emerged since the indefinite prorogation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have shown that a lessening of commitment to non-proliferation by some countries is still possible.

The spread of nuclear technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing is a show case of the problem. On the one hand, these technologies of the fuel cycle are useful, for instance for countries developing large civilian nuclear energy programmes, or having large mine resources, or any other industrial reason as long as it is undoubtedly linked to a peaceful use. On the other hand, these technologies allow also for producing weapon-grade uranium and plutonium. The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), that includes among others key European and South American countries in the field of nuclear energy, puts in place control export rules that basically consider the topic at the very beginning, before the facility or the technology is transferred. Despite the importance of the rules edited by the NSG, a corner stone is the IAEA’s verification capability.

The Agency’s ability of verifying the solely peaceful use of nuclear energy relies on three points: detection, detection and detection. More precisely this verification regime requires an accurate detection, an early detection, and a comprehensive detection. Accurate detection allows for a proper characterisation of treaty violations, enhancing the ability of the international community to take effective action. Early detection is a deterrent for a would-be proliferator, by denying it the possibility to produce a weapon without being caught. Comprehensive detection, by covering all activities that may be linked to a nuclear-weapon programme, strengthens the confidence of the community as part of the stable strategic environment needed for nuclear disarmament.

History has shown us that, to date, proliferation has involved undeclared nuclear programmes. Indeed, declared (and hence safeguarded) programmes could be destabilising by providing rapid breakout capability, but only if undeclared activities such as weaponisation have secretly taken place beforehand. It is therefore clear that if the current compulsory standard remains solely the comprehensive safeguards or its regional equivalent, that is the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material, the only reinforcing factor for non-proliferation would be the difficulty to access to weapon-grade fissile material. Giving the dual possibility of the technologies, the only reinforcing factor for non-proliferation would be the difficulty to access to producing fissile material. This technical issue would probably be translated, wrongly, in a political issue between those who « have » and those who « have not » when it is indeed not the issue. In fact, reinforcing the NPT is especially essential to developing countries. With the risk of being seen as provocative, recent history has shown that the temptation for prolifera
tion has developed in a few developing countries, and that the main risk has been for the security of other developing countries in their neighbourhood. But of course the whole world would benefit from the implementation of higher standards for the verification of non-proliferation.

The assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in countries would definitely provide a better environment for a prompter development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, that we would all benefit from (just to mention the issue of climate change and the diminution of fossil fuel for instance).

**Regional arrangements and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities**

As recalled in the first part, ABACC and EURATOM systems come into force as regional agreements before their respective member-states joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which means that, at that time, the IAEA safeguards did complement the regional agreements rather than vice-versa. It is interesting to note that generally the agencies created under regional agreements are considered by their members as useful partners in the verification system. In a way it seems that a regional agency, being closer to home is closer to heart. Most likely, in both cases, part of this perception comes from the history that preceded their creation and the political goals they were intended for, beyond the technical aspects. At the same time one should consider why the IAEA safeguards are, on the contrary, often seen as an imposition, when the Agency is indeed a partner in helping each state to demonstrate to the international community its full compliance with its NPT commitments.

Apart from this perception, let’s consider the question of the detection of undeclared nuclear activities. First, and if it goes without saying it is better to recall it, there is no question on the general commitment of states to the goals of the NPT and hence the corresponding duties it imposes. Second, one essential argument for nuclear disarmament is the need for guarantees that are as watertight as possible that no country will be in a position to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, there is no question that the higher standards should be applied in this regard. Thus, based on recent failures, the sole verification of declared activities is not enough to bring such assurances. This implies the need for universality in the verification of undeclared nuclear activities, whether nuclear materials are actually involved or not, so that any weaponisation research for instance could be investigated and denounced.

It is of importance to consider the role that regional arrangements could play in this context. A first option would be to modify the regional agreement so that it covers the detection of undeclared material and to put in place a corresponding verification system. Defining, negotiating and implementing such modifications in a regional agreement are probably not a straightforward task. On the other hand, it provides flexibility and regional tailor-made solutions. In addition, at the end of the day, the concepts will most likely be close to those contained in the additional protocol. Therefore, the other option is to adhere directly to the additional protocol, considering the aim for universality of the NPT and the IAEA verification regime. This is the solution that has been adopted by the European countries. Our experience is that it works and, at least from a pragmatic point of view, that this articulation between a regional arrangement and the additional protocol is worth being considered.
Conclusion

Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty from a pre-existing regional agreement is a unique situation to countries from Europe and South America, which gave them the specific point of view. My European reading of the events is that, no country has lost its freedom of choice by doing so. On the contrary, it seems that countries have accessed to more freedom, once and for all, by joining a global regime on the basis of their regional experience. In fact, at the time of their adhesion, the IAEA safeguards did complement the regional agreements rather than vice-versa.

As for nuclear disarmament, all states are concerned since this is an essential issue of collective security. For instance, the existence of an effective non-proliferation regime plays its role, as well as regimes against other weapons of mass destruction. It obviously depends also on the establishment of a stable strategic environment. More generally, and as mentioned in the NPT, nuclear disarmament is to be considered within the context of a general and complete disarmament.

The assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in countries would definitely provide a better environment for a prompter development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, that we would all benefit from. It is of importance to consider the role that regional arrangements could play in this context. The European experience to adhere directly to the additional protocol, considering the aim for universality of the NPT and the AIEA verification regime has proven workable and, at least form a pragmatic point of view, this articulation between a regional arrangement and the additional protocol is worth being considered.

The closed loop between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is for instance demonstrated in the verification techniques that will be negotiated for the Cut-off Treaty since they will most likely, at least conceptually, resemble the IAEA safeguards or ABACC and EURATOM regional systems as for the non-diversion of nuclear materials.

This brings us to the next sessions of the Conference on Disarmament and to the Revision Conference of the NPT on which we all, Europeans and South Americans, expect progress in the field of disarmament.
Thursday, November 12th, 2009

Welcome
João Pacheco
Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in Brasilia, Brazil

Marcos de Azambuja
Ambassador, Vice-chairman of the Board of Trustees, Brazilian Centre for International Relations (CEBRI)

Peter Fischer-Bollin
Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil

Alfredo Valladão
Director, Chair Mercosur of Sciences Po, France

Clóvis Brigagão
Director, Centre for American Studies (CEAs), Cândido Mendes University, Brazil

Opening Speeches

Cooperation between Europe and South America in the fields of security and defence: A Swedish view
Sten Tolgfors (tbc)
Minister of Defence, Sweden

Cooperation between Europe and South America in the fields of security and defence: A French view
Michel Miraillet
Under-Secretary of Defence • Ministry of National Defence, France

1st Panel
A common agenda between Europe and South America for international security

Marco Aurélio Garcia
Special Advisor to the Brazilian President on International Affairs, Brazil

José Antonio Bellina Acevedo
Ambassador, Vice-Minister of Defence, Peru

Adrian Hyde-Price
Professor at the University of Bath and ex-Research Fellow on the International Security Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), United Kingdom

Moderation
Antonio Carlos Pereira
Editorialist, O Estado de São Paulo Newspaper

2nd Panel
Potential European-South American cooperation initiatives with Africa in the field of security

Ricardo Alves de Barros
Captain, Chief of the Division of National Defense Policy • Ministry of Defence, Brazil

Frank van Rooyen
Retired naval officer (South African Navy Captain), Senior researcher of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

Marco Farani
Minister, Director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) • Brazilian Ministry of External Relations

Gert-Johannes Hagemann
Colonel, Assistant Director Policy Planning and Advisory Staff for European and African Affairs. Ministry of Defence, Germany

3rd Panel
Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?

Raul Jungmann
Deputy, Chairman of the Special Subcommission for Weapons and Munitions, Member of the Commission of Foreign Affairs and National Defence at the Chamber of Deputies, Brazil

Roland Kobia
Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in Baku, Azerbaijan and former Member of the Cabinet (Private Office) of the European Commissioner for Energy (EURATOM)

Odilon Antonio Marcuzzo do Canto
Representative of the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABACC), Brazil

Philippe Denier
Counselor of the Nuclear Sector • Delegation on Strategic Sector • Ministry of Defence, France

4th Panel
Fourth Panel - European-South American cooperation in the fields of security and defence: which actors for which problems?

Gonzalo García Pino
Undersecretary for War • Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Chile

Markus Kaim
Head of International Security Division, German Institute for International and Political Affairs (SWP), Berlin, Germany

Miguel Carvajal
Secretary-General • Ministry of Defence, Ecuador

Carlos Gaspar
Director, Portuguese Institute for International Relations Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal
The End