THE POLITICS OF
PARTY COALITIONS
IN AFRICA
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IN AFRICA

Edited by
DENIS KADIMA

Foreword by
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FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MAURITIUS

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A book on political party coalitions in Africa was long overdue. This area of political science has been neglected on the African continent in terms of academic oversight, research and analysis. Yet political parties in Africa have increasingly seen the value of cooperation and have built alliances in order to achieve common goals. Mauritius, for example, has, since independence, been governed by a coalition government. In Kenya the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won the 2002 elections, giving meaning, for the first time in nearly 40 years, to democratic alternation. The Kenyan constitutional referendum of December 2005 also saw the emergence of two main party alliances, namely, the Banana coalition, which called for a Yes vote, and the Orange Coalition, which campaigned for the rejection of the draft constitution.

South Africa has a broad range of ruling and opposition alliances at national, provincial and local levels. These alliances are formed for a variety of purposes, such as governing the country, uniting and growing the opposition, and contributing to nation building and reconciliation. In Malawi in the past twelve years there have been nearly as many coalitions built as split, mainly because of the tendency of party leaders to enter into alliance agreements and terminate them when the alliances do not meet their office-seeking goals. Mozambique provides a unique example of a lasting opposition alliance formed around the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO). This coalition has helped improve the quality of political representation with the entry of ten small opposition parties to Parliament.

These experiences are seldom systematically documented. At the same time there are few substantial comparative studies of this increasingly important aspect of African politics. This book is an attempt to fill this gap by studying five countries, namely, Kenya, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. Chapter 1 is a general introduction covering existing theories of coalition politics and the research framework. The five countries are individually covered in chapters 2 to 6 and chapter 7 compares their experiences and draws lessons from them.

One of the major challenges inherent in the study of political parties in general, and party coalitions in particular, is that party leaders are not easily accessible or prepared to share critical information about their election strategies, including alliance building. Even when they agree to do so, it is not unusual for parties to present themselves in a positive light at the expense of their rivals. This can affect the objectivity of the study. In addition, coalition negotiations between parties are not conducted in the open. The public is
often only informed about them through press communiqués issued by the coalition partners. The book is unique in that much of the information and data have been gathered from primary sources through extensive face-to-face interviews with key political leaders who played a leading role in building, breaking up and/or reviving alliances in their countries.

Denis Kadima and his co-authors are to be congratulated on their persistence in seeking first hand information about party coalition politics as well as on their constant search for other sources which substantiate the information received from the respondents.

The interviews with key party leaders and other resource persons helped the authors gather information on the important aspects and contextual features of party politics in Africa, including ethnicity, race, class and ideology; the constitutional, legal and administrative framework governing party coalitions; the electoral system, party structures and intra-party dynamics. The study also document aspects such as the motives for building a party coalition, the nature of coalition agreements, the driving forces, the selection of affiliated parties, the distribution of portfolios, coalition management procedures, the challenges of sustaining a coalition, the consequences of some coalitions for the affiliated parties, the role of the international community in relation to coalition politics, and the survival and effectiveness of party alliances. The study demonstrates that party coalitions impact on political stability, nation building and national reconciliation. It also shows the effect of factors such as ethno-linguistic dynamics and formal and informal rules on party coalitions in individual countries.

The material was gathered over a period of three years of fieldwork in the five countries. This is not an historical book nor is it a full account of the political history of party alliances in the countries studied, rather its aim is to offer explanations for factors which influence coalition politics in Africa so that the lessons can help improve practices which will, in turn, contribute to the vibrancy of multiparty democracy on the continent.

This book is of great interest to political party leaders, parliamentarians, elected local government authorities, journalists; election practitioners and monitors; representatives of civil society organisations operating in the field of election, democracy and governance, academics and students of political science.

_Cassam Uteem_

Former President of the Republic of Mauritius
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study forms part of my PhD research at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. I am grateful to many people for helping make this book a reality. I am indebted to Mr Cassam Uteem, former President of the Republic of Mauritius, for endorsing the book. I am also grateful to the EISA Board of Directors for allowing me to house my research work in the organisation as an EISA project and lead it myself, thus killing two birds with one stone. Without such flexibility, I would not have found the time to complete my research and finish the book.

I wholeheartedly thank Ms Andrea Ostheimer, former Resident Director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in South Africa, for her financial support as well as for engaging with the content of the research methodology in the early stage of this project. I also thank the Embassy of Finland in Pretoria for providing additional funding.

I carried out the doctoral research initially under the supervision of Professor Tom Lodge and now with Professor Sheila Meintjes, when the former left the University of the Witwatersrand to join the University of Limerick in Ireland in 2005. I am grateful to both of them. In the early stage of the research, Professor Susan Booysen kindly discussed with me a few thoughts on the under-researched subject of political party coalitions in Africa. I also thank Professor Adam Habib for his skilful facilitation of a crucial EISA roundtable/focus group meeting on party coalitions in South Africa, an exercise which helped me identify several of this study’s research areas.

My co-authors participated enthusiastically in the project. Dr Roukaya Kasenally (Mauritius), Samson Lembani (Malawi), Zefanias Matsimbe (Mozambique) and Felix Owuor (Kenya) all made valuable intellectual contributions to the development of the chapters they co-authored with me. The fact that they live in the countries under study provided unique insights into the specific conditions prevailing in those countries and the workings of party coalitions there. Dr Kasenally is to be further thanked for proofreading some of the draft chapters, besides the Mauritian chapter, of which she is the co-author. Her feedback was very insightful.

Political party representatives from Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa were very kind to us. We held lengthy face-to-face meetings with one serving president and with ministers, members of Parliament and senior party officials from governing and opposition parties. They shared with us detailed information about their experiences with party coalition politics and provided related documentation, where available. We
are indebted to them for this. We did not attribute to their authors sensitive information, declarations, views and opinions given on condition of anonymity.

Dr Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of South Africa, went an extra mile in her efforts to secure meetings with key politicians in South Africa. Dr Gerd Bossen, Director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Kenya, arranged critical meetings with leaders of the National Rainbow Coalition. I am indebted to both of them.

My EISA colleagues were very supportive and I thank them very much for this. Shumbana Karume served as the programme officer in the first couple of months of the project until she moved back to Zanzibar, Tanzania, her home country. Zahira Seedat and Dipti Bava provided much-needed administrative and financial reporting backups. Zahira also helped retype coalition memoranda of understanding, constitutions and related documents provided as hard copies.

The following colleagues proofread one or more sections of the book and provided useful feedback: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Dr Luis De Brito, Ilona Tip, Thobile Thomas, Robyn Smith, Martinho Chachiua, Bertha Chiroro, Belinda Musanhu, Victor Shale and Professor Philippe Kodi Muzong. Other colleagues helped to collect important data from secondary sources. They are Dr Jackie Kalley, Beth Strachan, Deane Stuart and Alka Larkan-Grobler. Dr Kalley also assisted with the cover, the index and the overall production of the book.

The text flows smoothly and reads well thanks to Pat Tucker, who copy edited the manuscript within a limited timeframe. I am grateful to her for her assistance.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my family. Christian (15) and Sarah (13) demonstrated patience with a father who was often away on fieldwork or busy writing. Moreover, they assisted in the development of the book by reading out, word by word, the originals of the complex legal texts of coalition agreements which form the appendices, while I double-checked the accuracy of the typed texts with the originals. Béatrice, my wife, has supported me throughout all the phases of the project with her encouragement and trust.

Denis Kadima
Johannesburg, December 2006
Denis Kadima has been the Executive Director of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) since December 2002. He played a key role in the development and adoption of the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region and has observed and/or supported over 30 electoral processes in Africa and beyond, including those in Malawi, South Africa and Mozambique in 1999 and 2004 and Mauritius in 2000 and 2005. Founder of the *Journal of African Elections*, Mr Kadima has published extensively on electoral processes, democracy and governance in the SADC region. He holds a Master’s degree in political and administrative sciences from the Université de Lubumbashi in the DR Congo and an additional Master’s degree in political studies from the University of the Witwatersrand, as well as a Postgraduate Diploma in Business Administration from Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand. This book is based on Mr Kadima’s doctoral research on political party coalitions in Africa, currently being completed at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Roukaya Kasenally, co-author of the chapter on Mauritius, is a media and political communication specialist and also teaches at the University of Mauritius. She holds a PhD in broadcasting and has written and published on the state of media and the process of information democratisation within Southern African and on the Asian continent. Dr Kasenally is currently Chairperson of the Standards Committee of the Independent Broadcasting Authority in Mauritius as well as the Regional Chairperson of the SADC Media Award.

Samson Lembani, co-author of the Malawi chapter, has been National Coordinator of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Malawi since 2001. He is a political analyst and specialises in the coordination of development support, political party development, parliamentary work and research. He has co-authored a number of publications and policy documents, including the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Mr Lembani has Master’s degrees from the University of Bochum in Germany and from the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Zefanias Matsimbe, co-author of the Mozambique chapter, has an MPhil degree in Land and Agrarian Studies from the University of the Western
Cape, South Africa. For the past two years Mr Matsimbe has worked as Programme Officer of EISA Mozambique, focusing on electoral conflict management and the misuse of state resources for electoral purposes.

Felix Odhiambo Owuor, co-author of the Kenya chapter, is currently the Senior Programme Officer of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Political Parties Programme in Nairobi. He has nine years of experience in the field of Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights, specialising in elections and political parties. His work in these areas has encompassed strengthening political party institutions, gender equality and women’s access to elective politics, constitutional and electoral reforms and election observation. He participated in election observation missions in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria. Mr Owuor holds a BA degree in political science from the University of Nairobi, and a graduate diploma in Business Administration. He is also a final year law student at the University of London.
ABBREVIATIONS

Kenya
Democratic Party DP
Electoral Commission of Kenya ECK
Friends of Esther and Deborah FREDA
Fredrich Ebert Stiftung FES
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy FORD
Green African Party GAP
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group IPPG
Institute for Education in Democracy IED
Kenya African Democratic Union KADU
Kenya African National Union KANU
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung KAS
Kenya National Democratic Alliance KENDA
Kenya National Congress KNC
Kenya Social Congress KSC
Liberal Democratic Party LDP
Labour Party of Kenya LPK
Memorandum of Understanding MoU
National Alliance for Change NAC
National Alliance Party of Kenya NAK
National Rainbow Coalition NARC
National Democratic Institute NDI
National Development Party NDP
Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya PICK
Social Democratic Party SDP
Shirikisho Party of Kenya SPK
United People’s Party of Kenya UPPK

Malawi
Alliance for Democracy AFORD
Congress for National Unity CONU
Congress for Second Republic CSR
Democratic Progressive Party DPP
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa EISA
Forum for the Defense of the Constitution FDC
Labour Party LP
Malawi Congress Party MCP
Malawi Democratic Party MDP
Malawi Democratic Union MDU
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi Electoral Commission</td>
<td>MEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi Forum for Unity and Development</td>
<td>MAFUNDE</td>
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<td>Malawi Freedom Party</td>
<td>MFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi National Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass Movement for Young Generation</td>
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<td>Movement for Genuine Democracy</td>
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<td>Mtendere Ufulu Party</td>
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<td>National Solidarity Party</td>
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<td>Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Congress for Democracy</td>
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<td>New Dawn of Africa</td>
<td>NDA</td>
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<td>PFP</td>
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<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
<td>PDP</td>
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<td>People’s Freedom Party</td>
<td>PFP</td>
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<td>People’s Popular Front</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>(formerly Christian Democratic Party)</td>
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<td>United Democratic Party</td>
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<td>United Front for Multi-Party Democracy</td>
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**Mauritius**

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<td>All Mauritian Hindu Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comité d’Action Musulman</td>
<td>CAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral Supervisory Commission</td>
<td>ESC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Forward Bloc</td>
<td>IFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritian Labour Party / Labour Party</td>
<td>MLP/LP</td>
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<td>Mouvement Démocratique Mauricien</td>
<td>MDM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement des Travaillistes Dissidents</td>
<td>MTD</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mouvement Militant Mauricien</td>
<td>MMM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement Militant Socialiste Mauricien</td>
<td>MMSM</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement Républicain</td>
<td>MR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien</td>
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<td>Mouvement Socialiste Démocrate</td>
<td>MSD</td>
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<td>Mouvement Travailliste Démocrate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim Personal Law</td>
<td>MPL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parti d’Alliance Nationale</td>
<td>PAN</td>
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<td>Parti Gaetan Duval</td>
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<td>Parti Mauricien Socialiste Democrat</td>
<td>PMSD</td>
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<td>Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval</td>
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<td>Parti Socialiste Mauricien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rassemblement des Travailлистes Mauriciens</td>
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<td>Renouveau Militant Mauricien</td>
<td>RMM</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Aliança Independente de Moçambique</td>
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<td>Coligação Frente Alargada da Oposição</td>
<td>FAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coligação Frente Unida para Mudança e Boa Governação</td>
<td>MBG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coligação União para Salvação de Moçambique</td>
<td>USAMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente de Acção Patriótica</td>
<td>FAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frente Democrática Unida</td>
<td>FDU</td>
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<td>Frente Unida de Moçambique – Partido de Convergência Democrática</td>
<td>FUMO/PCD</td>
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<td>Movimento Nacional Moçambicano – Partido Social Democrata</td>
<td>MONAMO-PMSD</td>
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<td>Partido Congresso Democrático Unidos</td>
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<td>Partido Conservador Africano</td>
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<td>Partido da Unidade Nacional</td>
<td>PUN</td>
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<td>Partido de Ampliação Social de Moçambique</td>
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<td>Partido de Congresso Democrático</td>
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<td>Partido de Convenção Nacional</td>
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<td>Partido Democrático de Moçambique</td>
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<td>Partido Democrático Liberal de Moçambique</td>
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<td>Partido de Reconciliação Democrática</td>
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<td>Partido de Reconciliação Nacional</td>
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<td>Partido de Solidariedade e Liberdade</td>
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Partido do Progresso do Povo de Moçambique (PPPM)
Partido Ecologista – Movimento da Terra (PEC–MT)
Partido Independente de Moçambique (PIMO)
Partido Liberal de Moçambique (PALMO)
Partido Nacional de Moçambique (PANAMO)
Partido Nacional Democrático (PANADE)
Partido Nacional dos Operários e Camponeses (PANAOC)
Partido os Verdes de Moçambique (PVM)
Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (PDD)
Partido para Todos Nacionalistas Moçambicanos (PARTONAMO)
Partido Popular Democrático de Moçambique (PPD)
Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD)
Partido Social Liberal (SOL)
Partido Trabalhista (PT)
Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAWO)
RENAWO União Eleitoral (RENAWO UE)
União Democrática (UD)
União Moçambicana da Oposição (UMO)
União Nacional Moçambicana (UNAMO)
União para Mudança (UM)

South Africa
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)
Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging (AEB)
African Independent Movement (AIM)
African National Congress (ANC)
African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL)
Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (ADP)
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO)
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)
Democratic Alliance (DA)
Democratic Party (DP)
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)
Federal Alliance (FA)
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
Government of National Unity (GNU)
Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA)
Independent Democrats (ID)
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
Keep It Straight and Simple Party (KISS Party)
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)
Member of the Executive Council (MEC)
Minority Front (MF)
National Action (NA)
National Party (NP)
National Executive Committee (NEC)
New National Party (NNP)
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)
Peace and Justice Congress (PJC)
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA)
South African Communist Party (SACP)
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO)
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)
United Democratic Front (UDF)
United Democratic Movement (UDM)
Young Communist League (YCL)
THE STUDY OF PARTY COALITIONS IN AFRICA

Importance, Scope, Theory and Research Methodology

DENIS KADIMA

IMPORTANCE

In the period after the re-emergence of multiparty politics in Africa in the 1990s, party coalitions were formed for the purpose of securing enough votes or combining a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to govern. Some coalitions have undoubtedly contributed to consolidating countries’ initial steps towards democracy and peace, through power-sharing arrangements. Others have been accused of being ‘unprincipled’ because their members were ideologically remote and were therefore perceived as political opportunists interested in short-term gains rather than long-term policy goals.

Yet political party coalitions have increasingly become a significant feature of contemporary African politics in both presidential and parliamentary systems. The need to deepen our understanding of the formation, survival and effectiveness of such coalitions in Africa cannot be overstated, as countries must learn from their own experience as well as from the relevant experience of other comparable countries. This comparative study seeks to record the politics of party coalitions in Africa.

To date there have been virtually no major comparative studies of the politics of political party coalitions in contemporary Africa, largely for historical reasons. In most African countries, multiparty politics was banned soon after independence in the 1960s and replaced by one-party systems. So, while early studies of government in Africa covered aspects of party coalitions in countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mauritius and Uganda, which experienced coalition governments in
the pre-independence and/or immediate post-independence periods, studies of political parties in Africa from the 1960s to the end of 1980s centred, with some rare exceptions, on single-party systems and related subjects.

In most African countries, political pluralism was only re-introduced in the 1990s. This has made it possible to study coalition politics in Africa, but research has largely been confined to aspects of party coalitions in individual countries and even then, the scope has been narrow. There is now an opportunity to expand such research broadly and deeply and to study coalition politics from a comparative perspective in order to come to some general conclusions.

Another reason for the absence of such studies is that most African countries have opted for presidential regimes, which tend to encourage the emergence of a dominant party, especially when they take the extreme form of presidentialism, in which parliaments are weak. In most parliamentary and semi-parliamentary regimes, in order to form a stable government it is necessary for a party to secure at least 50 per cent plus one of legislative seats. Where no single party enjoys an absolute majority in Parliament, party coalitions are formed. This is particularly true of proportional representation electoral systems where no party has won an absolute majority, as in most of the parliamentary regimes of continental Western Europe. However, in a presidential system the formation of a government does not necessarily depend on securing an absolute majority in parliament since the president is elected by universal suffrage. Scholars therefore do not regard the study of party coalition politics in presidential regimes as being as crucial as it is in parliamentary democracies. This partially explains why the study of political party coalitions has essentially focused on government formation and survival in parliamentary regimes rather than on coalition politics in presidential systems. It is also possible that the prevalence of presidential regimes in Africa may have resulted in a limited interest in the study of party coalitions on the continent. Yet even in presidential regimes, the control of the majority in Parliament is desirable for political stability and easy processes of law and policy-making and, more broadly, for making the state governable.

A study of political parties and party coalitions would not be deep enough if it were based solely on information gathered by means of secondary sources. Yet collecting reliable primary source data is not only costly and time consuming, party leaders are frequently reluctant to disclose ‘sensitive’ information about their internal functioning, challenges and strategies. All these factors have, to date, discouraged scholars from embarking on such demanding research.
THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to document, analyse and explain various aspects of this under-researched, yet important aspect of political processes in Africa. It covers five countries, namely, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa.

The concluding chapter compares and draws lessons from the experiences of all five countries.

The countries studied were chosen on the basis of four criteria, the first of which was pre-selected by virtue of the fact that the study was limited to Southern and East Africa, the geographical areas covered by the two donors who sponsored the project, thus excluding research in Central, West or North Africa.

Second, each country had to have had experience with party coalitions in at least two general elections or referenda so the longevity and effectiveness of the coalitions could be studied. There have been coalitions in Mauritius since the pre-independence period in the 1960s and South Africa and Malawi have experienced coalition politics since their first multiparty democratic elections in 1994.

Kenya’s 2002 presidential, parliamentary and local government elections were fought by two main party coalitions, as was the 2005 constitutional referendum. Mozambique, too, provides an example of a strong opposition party alliance which contested national and local elections in 1999, 2003 and 2004, thus offering the opportunity to examine how coalitions are formed and managed between elections.

The third basis for choosing the subject countries was the type of political regimes involved. It was necessary to have a mix of parliamentary and presidential regimes in order to analyse how practice and theory apply in the two contexts and the five countries selected cover both systems. Mauritius and South Africa are parliamentary regimes while Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique are presidential regimes.

Fourth, there was a need to study party coalitions in both countries that use the first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation systems in order to draw some general conclusions about the way a particular electoral system can influence the formation, survival and collapse of coalitions. Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius essentially use the FPTP system for their national parliamentary elections while the system in Mozambique and South Africa is closed list proportional representation (PR). It is worth
noting that South Africa has a mixed electoral system (a combination of FPTP and PR) for its local government elections.

If the conclusions reached were to be relevant, a significant number of appropriate cases had to be studied. The five countries selected meet all the necessary criteria and offer useful and unique examples which contribute to an understanding of coalition politics in the rest of Africa and, perhaps, elsewhere.

In South Africa, for example, though the country’s politics are clearly characterised by the existence of one dominant party, the African National Congress (ANC), the formation of governing and opposition coalitions at the national, provincial and local levels has become common practice. These coalitions have involved, on the one hand, only opposition parties and, on the other, the ruling party and some opposition parties. Of great importance in South Africa is the fact that the election of the president, provincial premiers and mayors is not carried out directly by the electorate but indirectly by the national Parliament, provincial legislatures and local councils (Kadima 2003). To be elected, the leaders all need to secure a minimum of 50 per cent plus one in the relevant representative chambers. This is where the interplay between various elements makes South Africa’s experience with party coalitions worth learning from. These elements include the electoral system, ethnicity, race, class, ideology and the weight of history.

Kenya has become Africa’s model of how opposition parties can succeed in replacing an entrenched ruling party and access power by building a vibrant and diverse electoral coalition. The experience of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) of 2002 will go a long way towards encouraging coalition politics in the country, as already demonstrated when the constitutional referendum of December 2005 was fought essentially by two coalitions, Banana (Yes) and Orange (No). NARC’s experience has inspired many parties in Africa, but remains unequalled to date.

Malawi’s politics is essentially characterised by short-lived party coalitions. The limited opportunities outside the state, the absence of a dominant party in an ethnically divided country and the rapid fragmentation of the party system have made it obligatory for parties to coalesce in order to access or maintain power.

The case of Mauritius, one of very few countries on the continent with a long tradition of multiparty government, is unique. Any party that is serious about winning an election must enter into a coalition. Since independence in 1968, Mauritius has never been governed by one single party. Characterised by its racial and religious diversity as well as well delineated social classes
and consciousness, Mauritius has held eight successful general elections, of which all but one were contested by two major pre-election alliances. Ethnic calculation has been central to these elections in which, essentially, an incumbent coalition has been challenged by an opposition one (Kadima and Kasenally 2005). Mauritius is exceptional not only because of the regularity of well-run elections but also because of the frequency of alternation in power of successive coalitions.

The formation of party coalitions in Mozambique has been largely an adventurous enterprise. All coalitions except one have failed to enjoy a continued presence in Parliament. The Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) União Eleitoral is an example of an opposition alliance which has had significant representation in Parliament since its inception in 1999 and has remained active during the periods between elections, in spite of losing two consecutive presidential and parliamentary elections.

THEORIES OF PARTY COALITION POLITICS

The theories of party coalitions are essentially based on the experiences of continental Western Europe and have focused on predicting and explaining models of government formation in parliamentary democracies. Two main approaches are used in studying the subject: the theories of size and ideology, and the new institutionalism.

Theories of coalition based on size and ideology emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. They centre on the effects of a potential coalition’s size and ideology on its chances of formation and may be subdivided into office-driven and policy-oriented theories.

Office-driven theories are based on the assumption that the main goal of political parties is to access power. This is why these theories are also known as ‘office-seeking’ or ‘office-oriented’. For the defenders of this viewpoint, government formation is a win-lose scenario in which Cabinet portfolios are the payoffs. Therefore, if the most important thing for political parties is to receive Cabinet portfolios, a majority coalition in Parliament would not accept the existence of a minority government and would take the spoils of office for itself.

These theories have gradually been refined. The ‘minimal winning hypothesis’ was introduced by L von Neumann and O Morgenstern (1953) in the area of economic games and was subsequently applied to government formation by William Gamson (1961) and later ameliorated by William Riker (1962). The theory is based on the assumption that government
coalitions should comprise as few political parties as possible – just enough to win the legislature’s vote of confidence. Minimal winning governments, therefore, carry no passengers, in order to maximise possible office benefits. In 1968 Michael Leiserson also supported the minimum winning theory, arguing that the prospective government should seek to minimise the number of political parties in the coalition because it is easier for a smaller group of parties to reach consensus. Bazazel Peleg (1981) and A M A van Deemen (1989) argue that the largest party in the legislature is central in coalition negotiations and cannot easily be excluded from office.

The assumption on which the policy-oriented theories are based is that party coalitions are justified by policy goals. The early theories argued that coalitions are motivated not only by policy goals but also by the quest for office. Robert Axelrod (1970) suggests that office-driven coalitions pursue the maximisation of their benefits while minimising the coalition’s bargaining costs by forming only those winning coalitions that contain ideologically adjacent parties; hence the hypothesis of minimal connected winning coalitions. Similarly, Abram De Swaan (1973) notes that political parties will form the minimal winning coalition with the smallest ideological range, which positions the hypothesis of ideologically compact winning coalitions. Concurring with Axelrod and De Swaan’s views, Paul Warwick (1994) argues that ideologically diverse governments tend not to survive because of the greater policy compromises that coalition members have to make.

Michael Laver and Norman Schofield (1990) introduce two ideas. First, they argue that if parties are not interested in office but only in the implementation of their preferred policies the party controlling the median legislator will become a kind of policy dictator and will definitely get into government. Second, they note that ideological differences within the parliamentary opposition may be as relevant to the viability of minority coalition governments as the ideological diversity of the minority government itself. Echoing Laver and Schofield, Kaare Strom (1990) argues that minority governments have often survived by exploiting effectively the divisions between opposition political parties in the legislature.

In the early 1980s the role of size and ideology in explaining coalition formation was matched by a new approach focusing on institutions. The new institutionalist theories emphasise the role of a variety of institutional procedures in structuring coalition formations and survival. In addition to these procedures, the rules and norms governing decision-making within the government itself are increasingly being taken into consideration.

Two institutional procedures shape pre-government formation
negotiations. The first relates to the power of the *formateur* (the prime ministerial candidate, usually from the largest party) to consult and suggest his options on possible coalitions before bargaining over other proposals can begin. Potential government partners are given the choice either to accept or reject the *formateur’s* proposals. Predictive models emphasising the role of the *formateur* party have suggested that it has the ability to structure government formation outcomes by securing its own place in government and influencing the ideological composition of the coalition in its favour (David Baron 1993). The second procedure is the ability of incumbent prime ministers and incumbent coalition partners to time government formation bargaining to their advantage (David Baron 1998; Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T Stevenson 1999).

Another important institutional hypothesis is the investiture rule, which is the requirement that a potential government be supported by a formal majority vote in Parliament. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that, in the presence of an investiture vote, only majority governments can be formed. This is common in Scandinavian politics (Kaare Strøm 1990).

Three additional theories have been developed based on behavioural norms rather than institutional procedures. The first is that party pre-electoral commitments or pacts on governmental coalitions are likely to be constituted. The second is that publicly made party pre-electoral commitments not to enter into coalition with certain other parties (or ‘anti-pacts’) make it unlikely for coalitions with certain parties to be formed. The third theory is that coalitions with anti-democratic or anti-system parties are unlikely to be constituted, regardless of the existence or absence of anti-pacts.

A recent version of the new institutionalism focuses on the institutions that shape post-formation government decision-making. It is based on decision-making within the coalition government rather than the rules and norms of the process of coalition formation itself. In their portfolio allocation theory, which is based on policy-driven models of size and ideology, Michael Laver and Kenneth A Shepsle (1996) argue that Cabinet ministers enjoy a dictatorial control over the policy-making of their ministries. They note that the presence of political parties that enjoy a strategic advantage in coalition formation because of their size and ideological position is a determinant of government decision-making. They distinguish ‘Very Strong Parties’ (VSPs), to which a majority coalition prefers to give all the Cabinet portfolios rather than support any other coalition options, and ‘Merely Strong Parties’ (MSPs), less strong than VSPs, but still able to get into government.
It is easy to understand why scholars have focused the study of party coalitions on Western European parliamentary regimes. The parliamentary democracies of continental Europe essentially use proportional representation electoral systems and voters usually do not give a single party a parliamentary majority. After the election, which constitutes one of the three stages of government formation in parliamentary multiparty democracies (Mikko Mattila and Tapio Raunio 2004), parties bargain over the allocation of ministerial portfolios, with the negotiations usually led by the formateur. The government may be subjected to a vote of investiture in Parliament. Clearly, at the heart of parliamentary government is the fact that Parliament must have confidence in the government.

The explicit condition in parliamentary democracies that Parliament must have confidence in the government does not often exist in presidential systems (Guy-Erik Isaksson 2001). Yet, while not subject to a potential vote of no confidence, presidential systems build a majority coalition for many of the same reasons that parliamentary regimes do, such as the need for the executive to get its programme through the legislature. Coalitions in a presidential democracy may also serve a different purpose from those in a parliamentary system. Tensions between government and Parliament in a presidential system may lead to one of the following undesirable scenarios: divided government or stalemate, constitutional crisis, attempts to circumvent the legislature, impeachment, and regime instability (David Altman 2000); hence the need to build coalitions in presidential systems as well.

In Africa these theories apply in some contexts, but in many others they are of little relevance. The office-seeking theory, for example, applies in many African countries where the securing of posts in government, Parliament, parastatals or the diplomatic corps is extremely competitive in the context of general impoverishment, and coalition building serves as an avenue to accessing such positions.

There are few cases of post-election coalitions in Africa given that most electoral systems on the continent call for pre-election alliances in order to avoid wasting votes. In the circumstances, coalition partners tend to join up with as many parties as possible in order to win elections, as is evident in the chapters that follow. As for post-election coalitions, the theory that the party with the most representatives in the legislature is central to coalition negotiations is contradicted in Mauritius and South Africa where, in the few cases of post-election coalition, parties that have won more seats than the others were kept out of government by a coalition of smaller parties. This was the case in Mauritius with the coalition formed by the Labour
Party (LP) and the Parti Mauricien Socialiste Démocrate (PMSD) against the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) in 1976 and in South Africa with that between the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) against the ANC in the Western Cape province in 1999.

The formateur procedure does not exist in the countries featured in this study. Negotiations among the parties are conducted informally, with no one enjoying a special legal status. However, the party of the incumbent prime minister, in the case of Mauritius, or the presidential party, in the case of South Africa, Kenya and Malawi, tends to be favoured as its leader has the prerogative of setting the election date. This allows the ruling party not only to organise itself ahead of the election but also to take the lead during the negotiations leading to the formation of a pre-election alliance.

Scholars in Western Europe have placed an inordinately high emphasis on predicting and explaining why some coalitions form and others do not. This is probably the result of the fact that coalitions in Western Europe are formed essentially after elections in the context of proportional representation electoral systems when no party has won an absolute parliamentary majority. In the five countries studied party coalitions are essentially formed prior to elections. As a result, the predictive dimension of the theories offered by Western European studies appear to be of limited relevance in the African context, especially when elections are clearly won, as often happens, by a single party or by a pre-election party coalition with an absolute majority.

Furthermore, the study of party coalitions has been dominated by a focus on executive or ruling coalitions. This study devotes equal attention to both governing and opposition coalitions. As part of opposition politics, parties often enter into coalitions in order to limit the electoral gains of a dominant governing party at national, provincial and local government levels. Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa all offer interesting examples of such opposition coalitions.

Another important aspect of the study of coalition politics is the assumption by coalition theorists that political parties behave like unitary actors, a belief based on the assumption that party leaders are relatively shielded from pressure from below with regard to strategic decision-making. Many scholars who have studied the party organisational determinants of coalition politics argue that the more centralised a party the easier it becomes for the leadership to screen inter-party politics from intra-party conflicts. However, some oppose this view. Moshe Moar (1998) argues that organisational decentralisation is crucial in enabling party elites to manage intra-party conflicts in such a way that splits are avoided and dissent can be absorbed constructively. The present
study limits itself to testing how alliances cope with intra-party tensions and how parties deal with coalition-related tensions.

In general, the applicability of the above theories to the African context varies from country to country because of the particular socio-political and economic context of those countries, as the chapters in this book demonstrate. Some dominant features of African politics are not considered in these predictive models. These features include the pervasiveness of ethno-regionalist politics within political parties and coalitions combined with the dominance of identity-based voting behaviour over issue-based choices; the presidentialist deviation of presidential regimes, which tends to endow the presidency with excessive executive powers, to the detriment of Parliament; the prevailing unstable party systems; and the limited opportunities outside the state, which often lead to the prevalence of opportunistic coalitions.

Moreover, party coalitions in Africa are likely to be affected by factors such as the inadequate institutionalisation of democracy on the continent and the dominance of founding leaders over the party as well as the structural and organisational weaknesses of the parties themselves. Because these theories do not take into account these important features, a study of African party coalitions based essentially on such theories would result in superficial conclusions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Data for this study were collected on the basis of a questionnaire consisting of 35 questions and were supplemented by face-to-face interviews with party and coalition leaders in each of the countries concerned. In one case, a round table in the form of a focus group meeting involving key leaders of a dozen parties allowed the author of the South African chapter to gather substantive first-hand information about party coalition politics in the country. Secondary sources and direct observation by the authors in the countries in which they live also provided valuable data and information.

In this study, a party coalition is defined as the coming together of a minimum of two political parties for a certain period, in pursuit of an agreed set of common goals to be reached by means of a common strategy, joint actions, the pooling of resources and the distribution of possible subsequent pay-offs. The words ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ are used interchangeably.

The study deals only with alliances made up of political parties. For this reason, pre-election alliances between political pressure groups, faith-based
organisations and non-governmental organisations, which worked towards the effective introduction or maintenance of a democratic multiparty system in countries such as Kenya, Malawi and South Africa, are not included systematically. This decision derives from the fact that, unlike civil society organisations, which do not seek political power, political parties are structured and organised around the ultimate objective of accessing or maintaining power and therefore have different organisational structures, procedures and priorities from those of social groupings. In addition, by joining a coalition a political party becomes subject to various internal and external political pressures which affect its viability and effectiveness. In order to achieve its objective a study of party coalitions must pay as much attention to the analysis of the coalition as to the examination of its affiliates, the political parties.

In the light of the above, the study excludes the United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa and the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in Kenya. The various pre-electoral alliances in Malawi, which consisted of non-governmental organisations, religious groups and other stakeholders agitating for political pluralism and electoral reforms, are also not considered. The only exception is the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) because of its particular involvement in government as a key member of South Africa’s ANC-led Tripartite Alliance.

The research was conducted between 2003 and 2006 and faced a number of challenges. First, it was not easy to gather relevant information from secondary sources given that there has been virtually no major research on party coalitions in the five countries. Second, the research was conducted when most countries were in the process of elections and party leaders were not comfortable sharing their views and divulging what they termed strategic information. Ballots were held in 2003 (Mozambique local government elections), in 2004 (national elections in South Africa, Malawi and Mozambique) and in 2005 (legislative elections in Mauritius and the Kenyan constitutional referendum). Most party representatives were nonetheless willing to engage with the research team (see Appendix 1 for the list of respondents) in spite of their busy schedules.

The research was largely guided by the following questions asked about each of the countries studied: What brings particular political parties together in a coalition? How are negotiations conducted? Who is entitled to negotiate? What are the objectives of these coalitions? How are coalition partners selected? What is the legal basis of party alliances? How does the electoral system in use in the various countries impact on the nature of party coalitions
in those countries? What role do ethnicity, race, class and ideology play in the formation (and collapse and revival) of party alliances? Who are the driving forces behind the alliances? How are alliance relationships nurtured? How does the coalition affect intra-party dynamics and vice-versa? How does the process of selecting coalition candidates impact on women’s representation in Parliament? What explains the longevity and effectiveness of some alliances while others fall apart or into desuetude? What impact does coalition-related conflict have on intra-party dynamics? What have been the consequences of particular alliances on individual political parties? Having answered the above questions, the study offers explanations for the formation, survival and effectiveness of alliances in Africa.

ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK

Chapter 1 provides the overall introduction, which includes the importance of the study, the research methodology, the scope of the study and the literature review, and assesses the relevance to the African context of the existing theories on party coalitions.

Chapters 2 to 6 present the case studies in the following order: South Africa, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique and Kenya. Each chapter is structured more or less as follows:

- The first section gives the historical background to political parties and party coalitions in the country, their ideologies, organisation and challenges.
- The second section analyses the effects of ethnicity, race, ideology and class on party coalitions in the country.
- The constitutional, legal and administrative framework governing political party coalitions is covered in the third section.
- The impact of party coalitions on women’s representation at national level is covered in the fourth section.
- The fifth section describes the formation of party coalitions, including issues such as the choice of coalition partners, the driving forces behind the coalitions, the selection of candidates and the allocation of portfolios.
- The sixth section deals with the management and maintenance of coalitions.
- The seventh section presents a general view of the issues pertaining to the survival, effectiveness and collapse of political coalitions in the country.

Chapter 7 is an overall conclusion, covering the factors which influence the formation, effectiveness, survival, sustainability and collapse of party coalitions. The chapter also analyses the impact of coalitions on the political system and more specifically on variables like national reconciliation, ideological harmonisation, the party system and individual political parties and women’s representation. It also draws lessons for the countries concerned from the practice of party coalitions.

The collection and analysis of the data are intended to contribute to the reduction of the knowledge gap by documenting the individual experiences of the five countries. The study ultimately aims to ensure that party coalitions contribute to the vibrancy of democracy and party systems in Africa.
PARTY COALITIONS IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATIONAL COHESION AND IDEOLOGICAL RAPPROCHEMENT

DENIS KADIMA

INTRODUCTION

The formation of party alliances has become a regular feature of the political landscape of post-apartheid South Africa, evolving from a forced marriage under the constitutionally entrenched governments of national and provincial unity to various marriages of convenience. This development became commonplace particularly after the second democratic general elections, in 1999, when political parties increasingly came together at national, provincial and local levels to achieve some common political goals.

Some party coalitions were formed for the purpose of either strengthening the governing party or creating a viable and stronger parliamentary opposition. Others were aimed at ensuring that partner parties did not compete with each other in their respective strongholds. In some cases, especially at local government level, coalition or multiparty governments were formed to ensure that the business of government was carried out.

Although some coalitions undoubtedly contributed, through power-sharing arrangements, to consolidating South Africa’s initial steps towards democracy, other, ‘unprincipled’, coalitions have resulted in political opportunism and short-term political manoeuvring. There has been a tendency for political parties to coalesce in order to serve the particular short-term interests of the key players. Undoubtedly, alliances and other forms of inter-party agreements have significantly directed the politics of post-apartheid South Africa.
The formation and collapse of coalitions and their reconstruction in new forms has been symptomatic of the nature of party coalitions in South Africa. The country’s political environment has seen racially and ethnically configured coalitions, ideologically matched or disconnected coalitions, as well as politically opportunistic ones. Essentially, the tradition of coalition building has become firmly entrenched. South African coalition politics is an interesting case on which to reflect and from which to draw lessons.

This chapter reviews some of the major political party coalitions formed in the post-apartheid era, that is, from 1994. Pre-1994 alliances of various faith-based organisations, civic organisations, trade unions and non-governmental organisations, like the United Democratic Front (UDF), which worked towards ending apartheid and introducing universal suffrage in South Africa, are not studied systematically.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is an exception. Although it is a trade union umbrella body and therefore has the ultimate mandate of protecting and advancing workers’ rights, COSATU participates in government as one of the partners in the African National Congress (ANC)-led Tripartite Alliance and includes national and provincial government ministers and members of the national Parliament and provincial legislatures and local councils. It is therefore justifiable to include it here.

The chapter devotes equal attention to the history of both governing and opposition coalitions in South Africa from April 1994 to March 2006. Specifically, it examines:

- the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU;
- the ANC, National Party (NP), renamed later New National Party (NNP), and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) Government of National Unity;
- the Democratic Alliance (DA) in its initial configuration, which included the Democratic Party (DP), the NNP and the Federal Alliance (FA);
- the ANC and IFP coalition governments at the national level and in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province;
- the ANC and the NNP cooperative arrangement at the national level and in the Western Cape province;
- the DA-IFP Coalition for Change; and
- the coalition government between the DA, the African Christian
Democratic Party (ACDP), the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and others in the Cape Metropolitan Council.

It also makes cursory observations about other opposition and government alliances and cooperative arrangements that existed in the same period.

The study seeks to document this under-researched yet crucial aspect of the political process in South Africa and describes and explains how a variety of factors determine the longevity and effectiveness of party coalitions as well as the impact of these groupings on South Africa’s national cohesion and ideological harmony. Apart from this introduction and the conclusion, this chapter is divided into six sections. The first gives a detailed overview of political coalitions in South Africa, offering the necessary backdrop to the understanding of the nature of party coalitions in South Africa’s political landscape. The second examines the impact of ethnicity, race, class and ideology on party alliances. The constitutional and legal framework governing political party coalitions is covered in the third section. The fourth describes the formation of party coalitions, including issues such as the choice of coalition partners, the driving forces, the selection of candidates, and the allocation of important portfolios. The fifth section analyses the management and maintenance of coalitions and the sixth draws conclusions about issues pertaining to the survival, effectiveness and collapse of political coalitions in the country.

The research was based on information collected through interviews with key party representatives on the basis of a pre-established questionnaire, verbal and written submissions by party leaders at an EISA roundtable on ‘Strengthening Democracy through Party Coalition Building’ held in Cape Town on 19 June 2003, a review of relevant literature on political party alliances and the author’s direct observation of day-to-day events in South Africa.

It is worth pointing out that, in spite of his efforts to get the views of the ANC, SACP and COSATU on the Tripartite Alliance and more broadly regarding party coalition politics in South Africa, the author did not succeed in securing interviews with the representatives of these organisations. The author assumes that there were mitigating factors in their reluctance to make themselves available for an interview. These factors may include their focus on the 2004 and 2006 elections and the stepping down of the deputy president and the resultant political tensions within the alliance and its individual affiliates. Much of the information on the ANC, SACP and COSATU and the Tripartite Alliance was therefore drawn from secondary and informal sources.
OVERVIEW OF PARTY COALITIONS

The Governing Tripartite Alliance: An Enduring Marriage Despite Deep Divergences

The alliance between the ANC, COSATU, and the SACP started well before the end of apartheid. In fact, the alliance, known as the Tripartite Alliance, was initiated with a view to ending apartheid by whatever means and establishing a non-racial, inclusive and democratic political and socio-economic dispensation. Eventually, the alliance succeeded in achieving this outcome when the struggle in the factories (Friedman 1987), combined with other forms of resistance, played a substantial role in forcing the NP to renounce apartheid as the system became increasingly counter-productive in relation to the economy, and thus unsustainable. The alliance became more formalised and better structured and organised after the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP in 1990. The ANC and its alliance partners have governed South Africa since 1994. The SACP and COSATU have visible influence on the conceptualisation, formulation and implementation of policies. Owing to its unique role in policy-making in the country since 1994, the Tripartite Alliance is deliberately and justifiably studied here under ‘post-apartheid coalitions’.

The alliance also includes the once highly effective South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), an association of civic groups which, through the UDF, staged a decade-long fight against apartheid at local government level. But SANCO has remained largely a relatively minor player because of its failure to reposition itself strategically in the post-apartheid era as well as because of the ‘brain drain’ it suffered with the advent of democracy, compounded with leadership infighting and frequent allegations of corruption. Nonetheless, SANCO tends to resuscitate itself at the approach of elections. At times the alliance is referred to as the ‘Tripartite Alliance plus 1’, a recognition of SANCO.

As soon as it assumed power, the ANC government launched the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a programme conceived ahead of the first democratic elections of April 1994 by the Tripartite Alliance partners, with COSATU playing a leading role. The RDP was aimed at uplifting the socio-economic conditions of the historically marginalised poor, through massive public spending. It soon became obvious that the ANC had to make some serious choices given the potential strain of the RDP on South Africa’s macroeconomic balance and uncertainty about its sustainability as well as the government’s objective of making South Africa
attractive to foreign investment. As the government of the day, the ANC had to consider the needs and interests of a much larger constituency than its traditional one – the black poor – and to choose between implementing its then leftist ideology, on the one hand, and adopting more market-oriented policies, on the other. In mid-1996, the ANC adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, a macro-economic programme that espouses neo-liberal policies. This phase marked the beginning of open tensions between the ANC and its alliance partners, who opposed GEAR publicly, condemning privatisation, jobless growth and the ever-decreasing role of the state in the economy in a country characterised by striking inequalities and where large segments of society live below the poverty line.

The divisions between the ANC and its partners have been deepening since that time. The ANC is increasingly perceived by its partners as catering excessively for the middle and upper classes, while the SACP and COSATU cast themselves as representing the black poor and the working classes. In 2002 President Thabo Mbeki referred to those members of COSATU and the SACP opposed to the ANC’s macro-economic policies as the ‘ultra-left’, and invited them to leave the alliance or align themselves with the views and policies of the ANC. This was not the first time an ANC President had made a similar demand – in July 1998, at the tenth national congress of the SACP, then President Mandela ‘castigated the SACP for ridiculing government programmes and told the party openly to toe the ANC line or get out of the Tripartite Alliance’ *(Sunday Times* 27 November 2005).

At the ANC’s December 2002 congress many observers expected further divisions between the Tripartite Alliance partners, with some predicting that the alliance would not survive, given the extent of the divergences. In the event, COSATU and SACP representatives did not leave the alliance.

Dale McKinley (2001) is of the opinion that there is a deficit of democracy within the Tripartite Alliance. He argues that ‘the ANC’s pursuit of an elite-led liberal democratic and deracialised capitalism has precipitated serious ideological opposition, class confrontation, and more general political debate and dissent within its own ranks and those of its alliance partners [and] through a combination of outright political intimidation, ideological mysticism and the co-option […] of key ANC “trouble-makers” and COSATU/SACP leaders into his governmental inner-circle, Mbeki had largely succeeded in quashing genuine opposition and controlling the boundaries of debate’. In the same article McKinley gives an account of summits and meetings at which robust written and verbal exchanges took place, sometime
publicly, between the Tripartite Alliance partners, contradicting his main argument that an absence of debate and political intolerance and intimidation are rife in the alliance. It is, however, true that government has made some decisions unilaterally – such as the introduction of GEAR and the subsequent declaration by former President Mandela that GEAR was sacrosanct – before they have been debated even at party level, much less within the alliance. This development was the result of a new reality, the emergence of government as a new centre of power, in addition to the ANC party structures.

Is it unacceptable for the ANC leadership to assert itself as the main alliance partner and resist attempts by its ‘junior’ partners to revert to what it sees as budget straining socialist policies? Is such assertiveness undemocratic? Can COSATU and the SACP claim more space in the alliance than the ANC itself? If they really need such space to criticise the ANC’s policies and, more importantly, to advance effectively the legitimate interests of the working classes and the poor whom they claim to represent, should not they consider other options? The left wing of the alliance has at least three choices: to capitulate and align itself completely with the ANC’s neoliberal policies, to quit the alliance and form a new left-wing party, and to remain in the alliance in the hope of influencing policy-making from within. The SACP and COSATU seem to have opted for the last option. At this juncture this is a wise strategy, despite the inherent tensions that it entails.

The failure of the left-wing members of the alliance to achieve some of their objectives should not be seen as a reflection of a lack of inner democracy in the Tripartite Alliance but as the increased determination of the ANC to play by its own rules as the government of the day. The dynamics within the alliance should not be seen as proof that intra-alliance democracy is being undermined. It is important to see the contradictions within the alliance as a natural evolution. The centrists or reformists, led by the ANC and, more precisely, by the President of the Republic, Thabo Mbeki, and the leftists vocally represented by the SACP and COSATU are, currently, essentially two sides of the same coin. Fundamentally, they share similar convictions about the ultimate goals and vision of the alliance, but differ on the strategies for achieving them.

The reformists believe in ‘redistribution through growth’, while the leftists hope to achieve ‘growth through redistribution’. In other words, the ANC prefers to spend only the wealth government has created while its partners argue that the state must stimulate growth through massive public spending for the poor. Despite the fact that the centrists are seen as focusing on consolidating the emerging black middle and upper classes through
affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE) frameworks, among other things, while the left prefers a working-class-oriented strategy, these standpoints could be reconciled. Indeed, the two sides could define priorities and determine, on the one hand, areas where public spending should necessarily wait for growth to take place and, on the other, those areas where public spending can inevitably precede growth. This can be achieved without causing macroeconomic instability and imbalances while addressing in a sustainable manner the daily hardships faced by large segments of the South African population.

Contradictions within both the Tripartite Alliance and the ANC itself are not atypical. Even old political parties in stable Western democracies, such as the French Parti Socialiste, have different tendencies within themselves. At this stage, the reformists in the ANC have the upper hand. The less the governing party needs its left wing to maintain power, the less attention it will pay to that group’s demands. The reformists are using their position of influence, which is derived from the posts they occupy in government and the current economic world order, which favours neoliberalism, to advance their agenda.

As for the ANC itself, Mbeki and his technocratic government, supported by international consultants, have been accused of undermining the long tradition of internal debate which, for decades, has characterised the ANC. Good governance practice recommends that policy-making should ideally involve broad consultation within the party from the grassroots to the top levels, so, while acknowledging that the ANC should revert to its old consultative approach for the sake of democracy and for its own survival as a democratic organisation, it must also be acknowledged that when the party came to power on 27 April 1994 only a few of its members had the necessary expertise and experience to articulate economic and social policies beyond the socialist rhetoric in the face of post-apartheid era challenges. Resorting to technocrats and outside expertise was a logical approach and the reliance on them should naturally and gradually diminish as the party and the alliance build their own internal capacities.

Equally important, before it came to power the ANC was used to having a single centre of power, namely the party. After its electoral victory in 1994 it faced a new situation where the party apparatus was no longer the only structure which provided vision, leadership and strategy. The ANC-led government came into being with extensive executive powers and, for the first time, there were two centres of power – the party and the government. Because President Mandela chose to be a quasi-ceremonial president, focusing
on nation-building and national reconciliation, the existence of the two centres of power was not as divisive during his tenure. President Mbeki has fully exercised his prerogatives both as head of state and as leader of the governing party. In this new context Mbeki enjoys considerable power; more than any ANC President in history, a situation justified by the contextual change.

At the same time the ANC government’s constituency grew beyond its traditional boundaries. Governments worldwide have a responsibility to consult with and take into consideration the views of all the major sectors and segments of society. The ANC had, therefore, to take into account not only the needs and expectations of its traditional constituents, namely the historically disadvantaged, but also those of the business sector, the international community, and even South Africa’s opposition parties. The party’s policies tend to reflect these views, including those of its partners and of its adversaries, a fact that has often displeased the SACP and COSATU.

With its mammoth task of meeting the expectations of the poor, the dispossessed and the working class while appeasing the fears of the business community and the country’s international partners, the new government did not have an easy choice to make. The decision to shift the party to the centre through the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies with strong similarities with the structural adjustment programmes recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was essentially an elite decision and did not involve broad consultations with ordinary members, and even many party cadres were unaware of the development of a new economic plan to replace the RDP (Gumede 2005). While the ANC itself, as a party, is not fundamentally opposed to its new centrist stance, its critics have attacked what they term Mbeki’s unilateralist and elitist approach in closing the RDP office and formulating and implementing GEAR and other important policies. In reality, the ANC had to provide leadership and exercise its executive prerogative as the government of the day in the face of the complex and often contradictory needs and expectations of various constituencies. In this case, the challenge facing the ANC government was essentially to strike a balance between, on the one hand, demonstrating leadership and pragmatism by acting on the pressing issues confronting the country as a whole and, on the other, seeking consensus through time-consuming consultative processes within such heterogeneous groups as the party and the Tripartite Alliance.

It must be admitted that the government has introduced important pro-poor policies and invested massively in health, education, housing, and
access to potable water, electricity and social security. The party has also helped enact pro-worker legislation, like the Labour Relations Act, the Employment Equity Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. However, these achievements are not always acknowledged, not only by opposition parties but also by the SACP and COSATU. Yet they are the direct result of the collaborative efforts by all three Tripartite Alliance partners.

In addition, in the last several budget cycles government has increased its public expenditure component and relaxed deficit targets. Apart from the fact that 2004 and 2006 were election years in South Africa, which might have resulted in the government trying to please the electorate by increasing social spending, and the fact that higher growth rates were recorded in 2005, another reason for this shift might include the fact that the alliance left is undeniably influential in the policy-making process.

It should be clearly understood and accepted that, as long as it is in power, the ANC will have centres of power at both party level and in government and there could even be a third centre of power if Parliament developed its independence and oversight function more effectively. The ANC therefore needs to review its policy development and coordination processes in the new context, bearing in mind the possible limitations of each of these individual centres of power.

So, what is the glue that keeps the Tripartite Alliance together despite deep ideological cleavages and divergent class interests? There are several explanations for its survival. One is that it is a principled alliance, initially formed to fight a common enemy, the apartheid system, and eventually working towards the transformation of South African society into a non-racial, non-sexist one characterised by equal rights and opportunities for all. With respect to transformation, the coalition has largely been effective and this joint achievement by the alliance partners has contributed to the alliance’s survival despite the deep cleavages and related pressures.

The longevity of the alliance can also be explained by the long historical association among the partners, which has resulted in the formation of strong bounds. The SACP and the ANC have been working together since the 1920s, under difficult circumstances characterised by repression and oppression. Their partnership was reinforced during decades of exile when the ANC looked to the SACP for intellectual guidance and the financial support provided by the then Eastern European Communist Block. Similarly, the alignment of COSATU’s predecessor (the South African Congress of Trade Unions – SACTU) with the ANC in the 1950s and of COSATU itself from
its creation in 1985 explains the strong bonds between the trade union umbrella and the ANC. On 4 December 2005 ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma acknowledged these bonds and encouraged their strengthening as follows: ‘I urge the leadership and membership of COSATU to continue to claim the ANC as your own, and to stand guard over our Movement, never allowing the things we hold sacred to be sacrificed at any cost. In the same way, the ANC must claim COSATU as its own and play an active role in the life of our trade union federation (Zuma 2005).’

It is worth noting that the SACP and COSATU have built a strong relationship since the creation of the trade union federation and the relationship has grown stronger as the ANC has moved further right. This closeness was praised by SACP Secretary General Blade Nzimande when he affirmed, on the occasion of COSATU’s 20th Anniversary in 2005, that ‘together we have taken up the battle against an economic system based on exploitation of the majority and private profits for the few. Together we have opposed privatisation. Together we have sought to highlight the job-loss blood bath that has engulfed our country over the past decade. Together we have embarked on struggles for gender transformation. Together we have endeavoured to fund programmes to address joblessness, casualisation and underdevelopment. Together we have committed ourselves to making the second decade a decade of workers and the poor (Nzimande 2005).’

Equally important is the fact that COSATU officials are members of the ANC and/or the SACP just as many cadres of the SACP are also members of the ANC and vice versa. It is reported that Thabo Mbeki only resigned from the SACP’s Central Committee in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and ended his membership of the SACP following the unbanning of the ANC in the early 1990s. The co-option of communist leaders to the ANC government has deprived the SACP of its best minds, including Jeff Radebe, Alec Erwin, Charles Nqaquila, Essop Pahad, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Sydney Mufumadi, and Ronnie Kasrils. Although many communist leaders are still with the SACP, their allegiance is divided between it and the ANC. COSATU has also lost leaders to the ANC government, the most prominent of these being Mbhazima Shilowa, the former secretary general of the trade union federation, who is the ANC provincial premier for Gauteng. In 2005 Shilowa went as far as to terminate his membership of the SACP. These developments have caused a crisis of loyalty and have ultimately divided the ANC’s partners. Clashes between these cadres and their original organisations have undermined the SACP and COSATU’s ability to counter some of the ANC-led government’s policies. Like the ANC,
COSATU and the SACP are not monolithic groups and are divided on policy matters and on their stance vis-à-vis the ANC’s policies. In such circumstances, splitting from the ANC might not be seen as easy or desirable at present because of a lack of cohesion among themselves.

Another reason for the survival of the Tripartite Alliance is that the alliance’s MPs and members of the provincial legislatures were elected on closed electoral lists under the ANC. As such they are ‘stuck’ with the ANC and, should any of them leave the alliance, they would lose their seats, unless they quit during the floor-crossing window period. If the SACP and COSATU were represented directly in the chambers they might have taken different positions on a number of policies, including GEAR. The alliance would then have faced even greater tensions and its survival might have been compromised.

On many other occasions the divisions within both the ANC and the other alliance partners have been exposed publicly. Two examples are the ANC government’s handling of the HIV/AIDS and Zimbabwe crises. These intra-party and intra-alliance divergences are most clearly illustrated by the political polarisation engendered by the Jacob Zuma arms deal corruption case and his subsequent sacking by President Mbeki as the country’s deputy president, a development that has caused divisions not only within the alliance as a whole but also within each of its affiliated components and some of their sub-structures. Two opposing camps have emerged in each of the three organisations – the pro-Mbeki group and the pro-Zuma group – against any ideological logic. The Zuma case provided an opportunity for various sides to fight over the ANC’s economic policies and succession in the governing party. The Star reported that the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), some members of the ANC itself, the Young Communist League (YCL), and COSATU’s leadership were clear that the fight over the Zuma saga was all part of the succession battle: ‘the SACP has implicitly argued that its Zuma crusade was aimed at recapturing the ANC from the Centre-Right and Zuma happened to be a central rallying point’. The newspaper noted that, interestingly, ‘all the deputies in the pro-Zuma bloc have rebelled against the pro-Zuma stance’ (The Star 5 December 2005). This viewpoint was substantiated by the Mail & Guardian when it published an extract from a paper written by Mazibuko Jara, Deputy National Secretary of the YCL, questioning what he saw as the SACP’s uncritical and unprincipled support for Zuma. Asking what Zuma’s role was in the rightward shift of the ANC and what political programme Zuma stood for, Jara argued that ‘the communist party has an opportunity to use its political and organisational
preparations for its 12th congress in 2007 to revisit all key issues of strategy, programme and tactics, including a debate on the contestation of elections by a working-class socialist party, hopefully the SACP’ (Mail & Guardian 25 November-1 December 2005). Clearly, a split in the Tripartite Alliance is likely to lead to a split in each of its individual affiliated organisations as well, a prospect most of the partners would not wish to contemplate seriously at this point.

Another important reason for the longevity of the Tripartite Alliance is the relatively small support bases of the SACP and COSATU, which tends to discourage any attempt to stand on their own for election. If they were bigger and able to win more seats they would be more vocal and rebellious and, possibly, go it alone. Presently, they are likely to win far fewer seats than they have done under the secure ANC umbrella. COSATU’s leadership is convinced that most COSATU members would vote for the ANC rather than support a new left party, should one emerge from the alliance. The alliance, therefore, has afforded COSATU and the SACP more influence, even if the ANC has the final say.

For its part, the ANC endeavours to keep the SACP, COSATU and SANCO on its side rather than have these powerful mass-based organisations outside its influence, which might render the country difficult to govern, especially if they were in opposition to the ANC government.

As is the case with any other coalition government, a strong incentive for cooperation is that, through their association with the ANC, some SACP and COSATU leaders have been redeployed to powerful and lucrative government jobs. Others have won important contracts through BEE opportunities. A break-up might compromise access to lucrative business deals.

All the above factors constitute the glue that helps keep the Tripartite Alliance together. But like any glue, it will not last forever, unless it is renewed, a renewal which will essentially be determined by South Africa’s basic economics as well as by politics within the Tripartite Alliance and in its individual affiliated organisations.

The Government of National Unity: A Forced Marriage
The Government of National Unity (GNU) was not a voluntary coalition but a multiparty government entrenched in the transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993 and based on the electoral performance of parties in the 1994 national and provincial elections. However, since it comprised three parties it is worth including it in this study in order to
understand the inter-party relationships it represented. South Africa’s transitional Constitution of 1993, negotiated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), provided that any party which secured a minimum of 5 per cent of the national vote (20 seats) was entitled to be part of the GNU, which would govern the country in the first five years of democracy. This mechanism was intended to ensure, inter alia, continuity, political inclusiveness, and racial and ethnic reconciliation.

The transitional Constitution provided that a party that held a minimum of 80 seats in the 400-member National Assembly (20%) should be entitled to designate an executive deputy president from among the members of the National Assembly, and that a party holding at least 20 seats (5%) should be entitled to be allocated one or more Cabinet portfolios in proportion to the number of seats it held relative to the number of seats held by the other parties. Similarly, the Constitution stipulated that ‘a party holding at least 10 per cent of the seats in a provincial legislature shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the provincial government portfolios in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the provincial legislature relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties’.

Accordingly, the ANC, the NP and the IFP formed the first democratic, non-racial Government of National Unity in 1994 at both national and provincial levels. Parliament elected Nelson Mandela as President of the Republic assisted by Executive Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. Former President Frederik de Klerk became the second Executive Deputy President in the GNU. IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi was appointed Minister of Home Affairs. In addition, each of the government partners held a number of ministerial positions calculated pro rata to the number of seats won in the 1994 elections (See Table 1).

In addition, various political parties participated in provincial government in several provinces based on their performance in the elections for the provincial legislatures. Accordingly, ‘governments of provincial unity’ were formed in several provinces, including the Free State, Gauteng, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, essentially between the ANC and the NP. In KZN, the government included the IFP, the ANC and the NP.

From the beginning tensions emerged between the ANC and the NP. Differences in ideology and social background and the weight of history haunted the ‘coalition government’. Personal animosity between President Mandela and Deputy President De Klerk did not help the situation. This was not a coalition but a cohabitation, or even a forced marriage. As such it did not last in its initial form.
The NP had a dilemma. It was not certain whether to remain in a government where it had reduced room for manoeuvre or to quit in order to play fully its role in Parliament as the official opposition. As a minority party in the government, the NP could not always influence policy in the face of the ANC’s massive representation. In addition, the ANC’s adoption

Table 1
1994 Election Results: National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% votes</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>62,65</td>
<td>12 237 655</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party (NP)</td>
<td>20,39</td>
<td>3 983 690</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>10,54</td>
<td>2 058 294</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front (FF)</td>
<td>2,17</td>
<td>424 555</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>1,73</td>
<td>338 426</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)</td>
<td>1,25</td>
<td>243 478</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>0,45</td>
<td>88 104</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Muslim Party</td>
<td>0,18</td>
<td>34 466</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Moderates Congress Party</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>27 690</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikwankwetla of SA</td>
<td>0,10</td>
<td>19 451</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Party</td>
<td>0,09</td>
<td>17 663</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Front</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>13 433</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCER</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>10 575</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Democratic Movement</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>9 886</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Rights Peace Party</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>6 434</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ximoko Progressive Party</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>6 320</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep It Straight and Simple (KISS)</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>5 916</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ List Party</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>4 169</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luso-SA Party</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>3 293</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 533 498</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission October 1994
of neo-liberal policies made the NP redundant. On the other hand, the NP’s apartheid baggage, its background of racial injustice, largely unaccountable governance, and human rights abuses reduced its respectability as a value-based opposition. De Klerk and the NP resigned from the GNU late in 1996.

The withdrawal of the NP did not affect the marriage of convenience between the ANC and the IFP. Indeed, the two parties consolidated their collaboration in KZN with a view to preserving peace in a province traumatised by years of so-called black-on-black violence which had led to the killing of thousands. The KZN government of provincial unity served essentially as a conflict management mechanism. Inaugurated under the auspices of the transitional Constitution, the IFP-ANC coalition government lasted for a decade at national level and continued in KZN beyond the 2004 elections. The ANC-IFP post-election coalition in KZN is the second longest-lasting coalition government in post-apartheid history, after the Tripartite Alliance.

The GNU provided an opportunity for very dissimilar political parties to work jointly in the Cabinet. Within two years of the cohabitation, the three parties had harmonised their views on a number of policy issues. P Eric Louw (2000) affirms that ‘GEAR was sold to the ANC by the NP during the GNU-period when the NP controlled the Ministry of Finance under the power-sharing arrangement’. This ensured smooth economic continuity between the NP and the ANC and demonstrated that the former ruling party had, to some extent, inspired the ANC in this regard. This influence probably started during the negotiations over a transition pact and culminated during the cohabitation in the GNU when the NP acted as the protector of the interests of the business community. The adhesion by the ANC to neo-liberal policies made the presence of the NP in the GNU irrelevant.

The Democratic Alliance: A Failed Marriage

The results of the 1999 election (see Table 2) confirmed the gradual demise of the NNP. Dropping from 20,39 per cent of the national vote in 1994 to 6,87 per cent in 1999, the party lost its place as South Africa’s official opposition in favour of the DP. Almost extinct after receiving only 1,73 per cent of the national vote in the first democratic election, the DP took stock of its performance and the political situation in the country and concluded that, because of its apartheid past, the NP was an impediment to effective opposition, and decided to destroy it. The DP’s strategy included vigorously opposing the ANC and repositioning itself to reassure and attract the NP’s
Table 2
1999 Election Results: National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abolition of Income Tax and Usury Party</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>10 611</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>1,43</td>
<td>228 975</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>66,35</td>
<td>10 601 330</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>46 292</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azanian People's Organisation</td>
<td>0,17</td>
<td>27 257</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>9,56</td>
<td>1 527 337</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Alliance</td>
<td>0,54</td>
<td>86 704</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
<td>8,58</td>
<td>1 371 477</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Front</td>
<td>0,30</td>
<td>48 277</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party</td>
<td>6,87</td>
<td>1 098 215</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania</td>
<td>0,71</td>
<td>113 125</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government by the People Green Party</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>9 193</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Socialist Party of Azania</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>9 062</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0,78</td>
<td>125 280</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
<td>3,42</td>
<td>546 790</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheidsfront / Freedom Front</td>
<td>2,17</td>
<td>424 555</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.eisa.org.za/WEP/sou1999results1.htm

Table 3
The Western Cape Provincial Legislature, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
supporters. As demonstrated by the results of the 1999 election the strategy worked and the DP secured 38 seats in Parliament (from 7 in 1994) while the NNP won only 28 seats compared to its 82 in the previous election. In addition, in 1999, the DP won more seats or votes than the NP in six of the nine provincial legislatures – the exceptions were the Northern Cape, Northern Province and Western Cape.

The outcome of the 1999 election in the Western Cape, as indicated in Table 3, led to a hung legislature, making it impossible for one party to govern the province alone. The NNP was divided about the choice of a coalition partner. The majority of NNP members were in favour of entering a coalition with the DP, with only a few preferring to work with the ANC. A coalition was finally formed between the NNP, the DP, and, initially, the ACDP, which eventually withdrew, reportedly under pressure from former President Mandela. The DP-NNP coalition aimed to keep the ANC out of government in the Western Cape and ultimately to run the province. Following mass demonstrations by COSATU against what it termed the Western Cape’s ‘white government’ Mandela is reported to have stepped in and convinced the ANC to accept the NP-DP provincial government (Louw 2000).

The Democratic Alliance (DA) was formed on 14 June 2000 and initially comprised the DP and the NNP. It was later joined by the FA. Its short-term goal was to ensure that the DP and the NNP would jointly fight the local government elections in December 2000. The DA’s medium-term objective was to become a strong opposition party which would contest the national and provincial elections in 2004.

Although the preamble of the outline agreement between the DP and the NNP states, *inter alia*, that the two parties share the desire to build a political movement that is ‘home to South Africans from all communities’ (see Appendix 4), the gradual fusion of these two historically white political parties was widely viewed as a racial reconfiguration, a prelude to racial polarisation in South Africa’s politics (Habib and Taylor 2001). The alliance partners campaigned under a single banner in the 2000 local government elections and planned to transform the coalition into a political party by the 2004 general election. The DP leader, Tony Leon, became the DA’s national leader in recognition of the fact that his party had come second to the ANC in the 1999 national elections. NNP leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk became deputy national leader.

In the December 2000 local government elections the DA received 22.1 per cent of the proportional representation (PR) ballot, a great achievement
given that the combined results achieved by the DP, NNP and FA in the 1999 general election represented only 17 per cent of the national vote. The DA won the Cape Metropolitan Council by 53.49 per cent, beating the ANC (38.54%). The alliance was determined to make Cape Town and the Western Cape the showpiece of the DA’s ability to govern and deliver (Africa Research Bulletin 2001) but ultimately infighting and animosity between the two leaders of the alliance prevented it from achieving its objective.

Coalitions are temporary and necessary in order to make government or opposition work but the concept of them turning into a permanent relationship requires that there be fundamental agreement on, among other things, ideological principles, and that they share the same kind of constituency and political culture. Historically, the DP and NNP were archrivals in the apartheid Parliament. The former (and its predecessor, the Progressive Federal Party) was home primarily to English-speaking South Africans and the latter to Afrikaans-speakers. The two parties also had different political cultures, structures and procedures, and their leaders had different, if not incompatible, leadership styles. According to an NNP member, the integration of the two entities proved to be difficult, even impossible, because Van Schalkwyk professed moderation vis-à-vis the governing ANC while Leon believed in aggressive opposition politics, as demonstrated in his ‘Fight Back’ election campaign in 1999 and his constant criticism of the ANC government, which alienated the majority of the black electorate. This opinion is echoed by William Gumede when he argues that ‘Mbeki and the ANC leadership believe that Leon’s criticism of the government has racist undertones, and that he personifies the condescending viewpoint that blacks cannot govern, and that a black South African government must necessarily be as corrupt as any other in Africa’ (Gumede 2005).

With regard to the differences between the two parties in terms of structure and political culture a DP member explained that the DP was open, critical and liberal, while the NNP had a background of patriarchal leadership, and argued that the NNP had no principles and was focused on acceding to power. He illustrated his point with the example of recruitment strategies, saying the DP recruited activists while the NNP’s strategy was mass-based. In addition, the NNP started meetings with prayers, while the DP refused to do so.

Equally important, perceptions that the ANC government’s affirmative action and black economic empowerment policies were leading to the disempowerment of Afrikaners justified their rejection of the NNP’s
cooperative opposition in favour of Leon’s confrontational style (Snyman 2005). The majority of Afrikaans voters, therefore, approved of Leon’s approach; hence their massive support for the DP in the 1999 election, and their subsequent shift to the DP/DA after the collapse of the DP-NNP alliance.

The continued existence of the NNP caucus within the DA made Leon nervous as it retarded the speed of integration of the two parties into a single political party. On the other hand, Leon’s leadership was questioned by the NNP faction of the DA in the Western Cape, where Van Schalkwyk’s party had received more votes than Leon’s in the 1999 provincial election. Furthermore, coloured segments of the alliance, who constituted the power base of the NNP, complained that the DA leadership lacked political will and thus failed to deal with ‘the complex and contradictory questions of race and class as they permeate South African society (Faull 2003)’. Tensions between the two leaders were palpable and the final clash was unavoidable.

Another contentious matter within the DA was that the DP group wanted to promote one leader and one image by elevating Leon. In 2001, a strategy aimed at portraying Leon as the key leader of the DA was exposed when DP key strategist Ryan Coetzee’s lap top computer was stolen and documents leaked to the media. What became known as the Coetzee Papers were written in August 2000, only a month after the formation of the DA. In these papers Coetzee wrote to Leon complaining that Van Schalkwyk was more prominent than Leon in the DA. The papers also alleged that there was a conspiracy in which former President F W de Klerk, then patron of the NNP and the DA, was promoting the NNP within the alliance as the most important partner, through the F W de Klerk Foundation and an international touring campaign. As a way forward, Coetzee offered a strategy for Leon to strengthen his image. He also indicated that he believed the ANC was conspiring to break up the new political organisation.

In an attempt to maintain his image as a national leader, Van Schalkwyk, accompanied by his NNP constituency and staff, started a reconciliation tour to boost support (Africa Research Bulletin 2001). One element of this campaign was a symbolic visit to Robben Island undertaken without consulting his DP partners, an act that caused tensions. The DP found him divisive and undisciplined.

After becoming the official opposition in the National Assembly in 1999 and following its coalition with the NNP, the DP reinforced its strategy of destroying the NNP by ‘hugging him around the neck and boxing him in the stomach’, as it was eloquently put by a DP member during an informal interview. Clearly this strategy had the effect of winning substantial numbers
of NNP members to the DP, but it also had the side-effect of causing divisions and factionalism in the DA. In the latter half of 1999 and early 2000 the DP encouraged NNP members to defect to the DP and the fact that it spared no effort to give these defections the maximum publicity resulted in the NNP feeling undermined. Intra-coalition defections can only be detrimental to the relationships between coalition partners.

A controversy over the renaming of streets saw Leon and Van Schalkwyk calling each other names in public. The saga started soon after then Cape Town Mayor Peter Marais, who originated in the NNP faction, initiated a process aimed at renaming Adderley and Wale streets in Cape Town after Nelson Mandela and F W de Klerk respectively. Marais was accused of lack of transparency and vote rigging. In July 2001, a commission, headed by Judge Willem Heath, was set up and recommended disciplinary action against Marais and his accomplices. Despite the fact that in October 2001 the Cape Town Council Rules Committee cleared Marais, Leon insisted that he be expelled for causing controversy within the party. Van Schalkwyk vehemently opposed the move. The animosity and the leadership struggle between the DA’s two national leaders reached new heights and led to an irreversible polarisation within the alliance, essentially along DP-NNP lines. According to analysts Leon’s aggressive and abrasive style did not help contain the crisis. The Africa Research Bulletin notes that Leon had ‘stirred considerable dislike in the breasts of diehard Nationalists – and those who, on cultural and language grounds, dislike what they perceive as English liberal arrogance’ (2001). Eventually, Marais resigned from the DA and formed his own party, the New Labour Party, after having reportedly tried unsuccessfully to join the ANC. The alliance split in October 2001 and now consists only of the DP, significant numbers of NNP dissidents, and the FA.

Several writers had predicted that the DA would be affected by the deep differences in the personal political aspirations of its two leaders (Booysen 1999, pp 249-25), their different values and styles of opposition, and the lack of mutually agreed political strategy (Kotzé 2001). None had, however, envisaged that a matter as trivial as the street-naming controversy would inflict such disproportionately high damage on the alliance. Like the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in 1997-1998, which had two leaders, Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer, the DA was a two-headed monster. The lifespan of such a monster is naturally short. The only way for it to have a more or less normal life beyond the critical first year is to separate the two heads. The ANC ‘helped’ perform the ‘surgical operation’ through the enactment of the floor-crossing legislation.
The disintegration of the DA disenchanted segments of the electorate nationally and, more particularly, in the Western Cape. The DA and its leader also lost some credibility in the process. After the split Van Schalkwyk was able to ask his MPs to follow him back to the NNP, but the councillors could not change parties because they had been elected under the DA umbrella. The enactment of the floor-crossing legislation made it possible for them to move. It was estimated that of 1 400 DA councillors, some 800 originated from the DP and 600 from the NNP. During the September 2002 window period for crossing the floor, the NNP lost 200 of the 600 to the DP and, essentially, the remaining 400 either stayed with the NNP or joined the ANC.

The subsequent formation of an ANC-NNP coalition (Africa Research Bulletin 2001) allowed the ANC and the NNP to win Cape Town and the Western Cape. In March 2003, the floor-crossing period in Parliament and the provincial legislatures, the NNP lost eight of its parliamentarians and some NNP provincial ministers (Members of the Executive Council – MECs) in the Western Cape left the NNP for the DA, thus moving into opposition.

Though this was an impressive achievement by the DA, the developments in the DP-NNP alliance had a devastating effect on the party system in South Africa, furthering the fragmentation of the opposition and contributing to the erosion of trust in opposition politics by demonstrating their inability to unite and work together. The DP-NNP coalition was a marriage of convenience because it was not principled but focused only on ganging up on and opposing the ANC. As a result, the glue holding the two parties together was not strong enough to compensate for the divisions between them.

_The ANC-IFP coalition: A Lasting Marriage of Convenience_

The Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, now the The Inkatha Freedom Party, was formed on 21 March 1975 at KwaNzimela in KwaZulu-Natal by Mangosuthu Buthelezi (IFP Website 2004). The organisation remained essentially a Zulu movement, owing, _inter alia_, to apartheid’s restrictions on black organisations recruiting members outside their own cultural groups. Unlike the liberation movements like the ANC/SACP and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which advocated armed struggle and economic, political and cultural boycotts of the South African racist regime, Inkatha highlighted the dangers of resorting to violence and opposed sanctions. ‘These differences were brought into sharp relief by the Soweto revolt of the mid-1970s – particularly in the varying responses to these events
by the ANC-SACP alliance on the one hand, and Inkatha on the other’ (Jeffrey 1997). The indelible marks left by this divergence still characterise the relationship between the ANC and the IFP.

Inkatha came into conflict with ANC-affiliated organisations during the apartheid era and into direct competition with the ANC after the liberation movements were unbanned as the two organisations struggled for control of KZN. The contest led to acrimonious relationships between the two organisations, which culminated in high levels of violence leading to the death of thousands of people, especially in KZN and, to a lesser extent, in parts of Gauteng. It was consistently reported, and eventually proved that some of the violence was fuelled by the apartheid intelligence and military services referred to as the ‘third force’. From 1994 the two parties learnt to work together in the GNU.

After the withdrawal of the NP from the GNU elections, the IFP continued to work with the ANC at both national and KZN government levels. On several occasions Buthelezi was appointed acting president when President Nelson Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki were both out of the country. This symbolic gesture contributed to a gradual building of trust between the leaders and increased peace and political stability in KZN. Jacob Zuma, later to become the country’s deputy president, was credited with involving himself in peace efforts in the province.

Despite the fact that the final Constitution of 1996 did not provide for power sharing, the ANC and the IFP chose to continue their coalition after the 1999 national and provincial elections, a decision motivated by their willingness to consolidate peace in KZN in order to facilitate development in the province. The arrangement allowed Buthelezi to continue to improve his image as a national leader by virtue of being a minister in the national government, and gave opportunities to IFP cadres to become ministers and deputy ministers as well as to secure posts in parastatals and in the diplomatic corps. The same arrangement also allowed the ANC to hold executive positions in the IFP-led provincial government in KZN from 1994 to 2004.

The ANC-IFP coalition faced many difficulties. The IFP experienced an identity crisis because it was part of the national government but still wanted to maintain its status as an opposition party. As a result, at times it would support the ANC-led government’s policies and at others would oppose them, which caused tensions within the coalition. Some of the legislation initiated by the ANC was adopted by Parliament with robust resistance from the IFP. Among this legislation were laws relating to the power and functions of traditional chiefs, the immigration laws and the floor-crossing legislation. A
more fundamental difference between the two parties has been the IFP’s advocacy of federalism while the ANC has always preferred a unitary state.

Interestingly, while in coalition with the ANC, the IFP had a separate practical arrangement with the DP/DA in KZN in order to ensure that a one-party system did not evolve at every level of government with the ANC controlling the central government, all nine provinces and the metropolitan councils.

The floor-crossing legislation, which allowed some IFP Members of Parliament, provincial legislatures and local councils to join the ANC without losing their seats, strained the coalition and was one of the direct factors which precipitated its collapse at the national level. The government’s policy and law-making processes heightened the divergences between the coalition partners, almost irreversibly affecting the relationship. The handling of the Immigration Bill was one occasion when the divergences between the two parties were publicly displayed. Buthelezi wanted to establish an immigration board with executive powers chaired by himself as the Home Affairs Minister while the ANC preferred to have these powers remain vested in the ministry’s administration. Buthelezi took the government to court, aggravating the crisis.

In the 2004 national and provincial elections the ANC won a relative majority of seats in the KZN legislature (see Table 4). Initially the IFP disputed the results and lodged a complaint with the Electoral Court in Bloemfontein, accusing the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of declaring the elections free and fair without investigating alleged electoral irregularities such as political intimidation and violence in some areas and reports that 367,731 votes in KZN were cast by unregistered people. Laurence Piper (2004a) dismisses the seriousness of these claims arguing, among other things, that it would unreasonable to assume that all 367,731 votes were illegal and that they would all have benefited the ANC. He also argued that ‘the allegations around significant levels of fraud are implausible. Such allegations are better seen in the light of post-election disappointment and perhaps jockeying for position. This is especially the case with the IFP’s allegations and court case – the timing of which coincides with negotiations over power-sharing in KZN and nationally. ‘The withdrawal by the IFP of its court case two days before the Electoral Court was to hear it was seen as a proof that the party was not serious about the allegations and wanted only to strengthen its position at the negotiating table’ (Mottiar 2004a).

President Mbeki did not invite Buthelezi into his national government in 2004, instead he appointed two moderate senior IFP members, Musa Zondi and Vincent Ngema, as the Deputy Minister of Public Works and the
Deputy Minister of Sports and Recreation respectively. Because Buthelezi had been excluded from the national government, the IFP’s National Council rejected these appointments, accusing the ANC of trying to ‘divide and rule’. President Mbeki replaced Zondi and Ngema with Ntobile Kganyago (UDM) and Gert Oosthuizen (ANC). It was argued that by choosing who to appoint to government the ANC was sending ‘a clear message that the age of coalition government was over and that the ANC is no longer under any obligation to make appointments in response to the threat of conflict or violence’ (Piper 2004a).

South Africa’s national government thus comprised the ANC, with its Tripartite Alliance partners; the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), the UDM and the NNP, until the disbanding of the latter and its integration

Table 4
Results of the 1994, 1999 and 2004 General Elections in KwaZulu-Natal

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>24 690</td>
<td>53 745</td>
<td>48 892</td>
<td>0,49</td>
<td>0,67</td>
<td>1,78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>1 181 118</td>
<td>1 167 094</td>
<td>1 287 823</td>
<td>32,23</td>
<td>39,38</td>
<td>46,98</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>78 910</td>
<td>241 779</td>
<td>228 857</td>
<td>2,15</td>
<td>8,16</td>
<td>8,35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>1 844 070</td>
<td>1 241 522</td>
<td>1 009 267</td>
<td>50,32</td>
<td>41,90</td>
<td>36,82</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>48 951</td>
<td>86 770</td>
<td>71 540</td>
<td>1,34</td>
<td>2,93</td>
<td>2,61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>410 710</td>
<td>97 077</td>
<td>14 218</td>
<td>11,21</td>
<td>3,28</td>
<td>0,54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>26 601</td>
<td>7 654</td>
<td>5 118</td>
<td>0,73</td>
<td>0,26</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>34 586</td>
<td>20 546</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,17</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total seats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total valid votes</strong></td>
<td>3 664 324</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 963 358</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 741 264</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spoilt ballots</strong></td>
<td>39 369</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>46 141</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>41 300</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ballots</strong></td>
<td>3 703 693</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3 009 499</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 782 565</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Registered voters</strong></td>
<td>4 585 091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3 443 978</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3 763 406</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage poll</strong></td>
<td>80,78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>87,38</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>72,84</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quota for a seat</strong></td>
<td>44 687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>36 585</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>34 782</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laurence Piper (2004b)
into the ANC. Interestingly, while the ANC-IFP coalition collapsed at the national level, it continued at the provincial level, where the two parties finally reached an agreement – the IFP would have three of the ten MEC positions and the position of deputy speaker in the provincial legislature. The IFP agreed that the newly-appointed premier, Sibusiso Ndebele, would make the final announcement of the appointments, departing from the tradition of parties nominating their own representatives to the provincial government (Piper 2004a).

The greatest achievement of the ANC-IFP coalition has been to end the systematic politically motivated violence in KZN. Essentially, there were no ‘no-go areas’ in the 2004 elections. Conflict management initiatives put in place by the IEC in collaboration with political parties, mainly the ANC and the IFP, as well as civil society organisations, with technical assistance provided by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), contributed to peaceful elections and the ultimate acceptance of the election results by all in the province.

*The ANC-NNP: United for Life*

As the break-up in the DA in 2001 deepened, the NNP and the ANC became closer. Talks between the two parties culminated in a collaborative agreement in 2001. Of all the coalitions in post-apartheid South Africa, the ANC-NNP coalition has been, to date, the most opportunistic – based as it was on the short-term selfish interests of the two parties. The NNP switched allegiances in order to continue to enjoy some political power in the Western Cape and so that Van Schalkwyk would become premier of the province. By focusing on provincial matters in the Western Cape, the NNP became a mere provincial party. In the same way, an excessive focus on KZN matters affected the IFP, transforming it essentially into a provincial party.

The ANC’s wish to decapitate the DA and thus control the Western Cape was realised. The argument advanced by the NNP and the ANC for their alliance – that the intention was to minimise racial polarisation – was regarded by many as a smokescreen. The realignment initially caused discontent in the Tripartite Alliance because of the baggage carried by the NNP. It also so disturbed the IFP that it initiated discussions with the DA, which culminated in the formation of the short-lived DA-IFP Coalition for Change in 2003.

History repeats itself. During the negotiations that led to the 1994 elections and the formation of the GNU, the NNP influenced the crafting of a constitution that ensured its continued participation in government in the
new South Africa in the name of national reconciliation and economic stability. Admittedly, at that time, such a view was justified by the need to ensure continuity and reassure investors, given that the ANC was still a novice in the area of governance. So, there was a sense of déjà vu when the NNP again played the anti-racial-polarisation card in 2001.

In their submission to EISA’s 2003 round table in Cape Town on ‘Strengthening Democracy through Party Coalition Building’, the NNP representatives argued that a small party is in a much better position to deliver to its constituents when it works hand in hand with the governing party. They argued that when the NNP opted to work together with the ANC to improve the quality of life of the people the ruling party was receptive and willing to assist the party to achieve its goals. Voters judge parties on whether or not they deliver and there were concrete examples of delivery as a result of the collaboration between the ANC and the NNP.

The NNP’s arguments in support of its concept of cooperative political opposition were that this ‘was in line with African tradition, where discussion and communication, as part of negotiation to come to an agreement, is valued much more highly than the Westminster opposition model. The DP/DA tends to practise conflict politics in line with the Westminster model … The intention was not to antagonise the ANC by robust and frequently intemperate attacks, but to encourage the government to moderate policies which the NNP regards as unwise’ (Snyman 2005).

Subsequently, the ANC initiated the enactment of the controversial floor-crossing legislation, supported by the NNP, which hoped that the new provisions would help it remain in power in the Western Cape. The legislation, among other things, made it possible for members of a local council, provincial parliament or the National Assembly to quit their party for another without losing their membership of the legislature. Interestingly, during the parliamentary debate on this issue, parties’ arguments tended to be motivated more by partisan interests than by a long-term vision of a stable and accountable representative democracy and party system. Ironically, the DP/DA which had proposed the introduction of such legislation several years earlier, initially supported its passing because it saw an opportunity to consolidate its membership with defectors from the NNP.

The floor-crossing legislation has weakened the party system and has the potential to destabilise the country, especially if the governing ANC were to experience a major split from its own ranks. This could easily lead to a constitutional crisis. The impasse in the KZN legislature after the IFP threatened to call for early elections after losing a number of its MPs to the
ANC in 2003 was only resolved through eleventh-hour negotiations between the two parties.

The extent to which the legislation affected the party system in 2003 can be seen in the example of parties such as the NNP, deserted by a substantial number of its MPs, who moved to the DA, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which lost one of its three MPs, Patricia de Lille, who formed a new party, the Independent Democrats (ID). The UDM lost the

### Table 5

**2004 Election Results: National Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>69,69</td>
<td>10 880 915</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alliance (DA)</td>
<td>12,37</td>
<td>1 931 201</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)</td>
<td>6,97</td>
<td>1 088 664</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>2,28</td>
<td>355 717</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democrats (ID)</td>
<td>1,73</td>
<td>269 765</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party (NNP)</td>
<td>1,65</td>
<td>257 824</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)</td>
<td>1,60</td>
<td>250 272</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front +</td>
<td>0,89</td>
<td>139 465</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)</td>
<td>0,75</td>
<td>117 792</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congresss of Azania (PAC)</td>
<td>0,73</td>
<td>113 512</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Front (MF)</td>
<td>0,35</td>
<td>55 267</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)</td>
<td>0,25</td>
<td>39 116</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>17 619</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>National Action</td>
<td>0,1</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Justice Congress</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>15 187</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>14 853</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Labour Party</td>
<td>0,09</td>
<td>13 318</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>0,08</td>
<td>11 889</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Employment Movement of SA</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>10 446</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organisation Party</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>7 531</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep It Straight and Simple (KISS)</td>
<td>0,42</td>
<td>6 514</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 612 671</td>
<td>400</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

majority of its parliamentarians to the ANC, who thus succeeded in gaining a two-thirds majority (68%) in the National Assembly between elections.

It is clear that one of the most damaging party coalition building exercises in the post-apartheid history of South Africa was the alliance between the ANC and the NNP because it took place at the expense of the consolidation of representative democracy and a stable party system.

The results of the 2004 national and provincial elections (see Table 5) confirmed the demise of the NNP. The NNP, which had won 20,39% of the national vote in 1994, and 6,87% in 1999, received only 1,65% in 2004, that is, 257 815 votes. Apart from its excessive focus on the Western Cape and, to a lesser extent, on the Northern Cape, at the expense of the rest of the country, the NNP failed to explain to its electorate what its cooperation agreement with the ANC entailed and what value it had for the party’s constituents. By the 2004 general elections there was little evidence that the agreement between the two parties was bearing any fruit, an argument used by the dissident NNP MPs who crossed to the DA (Snyman 2005).

Tables 7 and 8 show the party reconfigurations in the national Parliament after the 2003 and 2005 floor-crossing windows elapsed. On 7 August 2005 the Federal Council of the NNP decided to join the ANC and contest future elections under its banner. Van Schalkwyk took advantage of the floor-crossing legislation to join the ANC formally in September 2005. This was his last action as NNP leader – an action which led to the demise of the NNP, which has now been integrated into the ANC. Time will tell the extent to which the alliance contributed to its ultimate objective of de-racialising South Africa’s politics.

**The DA-IFP Coalition for Change: A Short-Lived Union**

In 2003 the DA and the IFP entered into a coalition they named the ‘Coalition for Change’. According to the IFP, the intention was not to oppose the ANC, it intended to maintain its relationship with the ANC while trying to affirm that it was part of the opposition. The DA, which had apparently hit its ceiling and was struggling to penetrate the black electorate, hoped that the coalition would help change its image as a political organisation concerned exclusively with white interests and position it as a party that also cares for blacks.

In 2003 the DA and the IFP signed an agreement providing that the two parties would contest the 2004 national and provincial elections separately, refrain from attacking one another, not stand in one another’s strongholds, share campaign costs such as the training of party agents and
not poach one another’s members. Within the DA, as in the IFP, were members opposed to the coalition. Some IFP members were seduced by the DA’s robust approach to the ANC, wanting the IFP to emulate it. Others did not appreciate the fact the DA invariably criticised the ANC and would have preferred the IFP to respond to the needs of poor rural people by means of a constructive approach which would entail agreeing with the ANC where necessary.

It was anticipated that the Coalition for Change would help to contain the dominance of the ANC by reducing its election margins as well as expanding the collaboration between the DA and the IFP after the elections. But the coalition did not last. Soon after the 2004 elections it became inactive, thus failing to deliver on its promises. There were several reasons for the failure. Although ideologically the two parties seem to be close, they cater for and draw their membership from different political milieux. The DA, in most provinces, is home to the white urban middle and upper classes. The IFP, although it has a national outreach and structure, has its stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal and is particularly able to mobilise in rural and poor constituencies. Whilst the DA’s transformation from the liberal Democratic Party to the more centre-right Democratic Alliance came along with a change in leadership, the political engagement of IFP president Mangosuthu Buthelezi dates back to the early days of the South African liberation struggle.

The DA has built an image of a very well organised and modern party with clear structures, procedures and principles and a culture of open debate. However, what is perceived as sectarian politics in favour of its essentially white constituents has alienated black voters, who tend to reject all its criticism of the ANC government as racially motivated. Stuck as it is in minority-based politics, with controversial election slogans such as “fight back” and “Mugabe has a 2/3 majority” seen as an assertion that blacks cannot provide clean governance, it is unlikely that the DA will succeed in winning more than 15 per cent of the national vote unless it improves its image among large segments of the electorate.

The IFP, on the other hand, sees itself as democratically structured, with party congresses organised annually, but it has constantly to counteract an image propagated by the national media which highlights its rural and traditional roots in KZN and paints a picture of a patriarchal political organisation.

The DA and IFP had different views on some key issues and, as a result, their priorities not only differed but were, at times, contradictory. The example of the choice of a capital city for KZN illustrates these
contradictions. The IFP strongly advocated that the provincial capital remain in Ulundi and not be returned to Pietermaritzburg, while the DA expressed, somewhat timidly, its preference for the capital to be transferred back to Pietermaritzburg. The ANC was unequivocal about its wish to reinstall Pietermaritzburg as the capital.

Shauna Mottiar (2004b) noted that the Coalition for Change partners lost about 50 000 votes – representing up to two provincial seats in KZN, where ‘a Capital Coalition backed by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Business and more than 50 leading businesses in the Midlands had placed adverts in newspapers and distributed pamphlets calling on people to keep Pietermaritzburg as the capital of the province by voting for the ANC at provincial level’. Laurence Piper (2004b) gives a different view, pointing out that there was little difference between the election results at municipal level in 1999 and in 2004. He notes, however, that in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding municipalities the ANC did better, at the expense of the DA, but points out that the number of votes involved amounted to only a few thousand.

The author believes that the shortcoming of these two views is that they are both based on the assumption that voters in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas were the only ones in the province to be concerned about the issue of the capital, hence they have considered only the number of votes secured by the parties in these specific areas. It is important to note that this was a provincial election and the issue was of a provincial rather than a local nature. It can be expected that voters in other parts of KZN, including Durban, which is only 90km away from Pietermaritzburg, might have cast their ballots with the provincial capital issue in mind. Also important is the fact that the total number of votes in an area depends on various factors, such as success of voter registration. Therefore an increase or decrease in votes for a political party or a coalition of political parties might relate to such factors, unless the variance in the results is substantive. Unless a survey of voter behaviour is conducted, it would be difficult to know with certainty whether there was strategic voting on the Pietermaritzburg/Ulundi matter or not and whether, as a result, the DA lost support because of its alliance with the IFP.

Thabisi Hoeane (2004) argues that

the rejection of the IFP and the DA by the electorate, especially the black majority, can be directly attributed to policies that do not resonate with the interests of the largest segment of the South African electorate, the black voters. For example, their insistence on
unbridled privatisation, a factor that is seriously contested within the Tripartite Alliance and has arguably made the ANC tread cautiously, clearly pits the DA/IFP alliance against the majority of voters.

After failing to reach its ultimate objective through its alliance with the DA, the IFP joined the ANC-led KZN government after protracted negotiations. The Coalition for Change brought no change and was short lived.

**The DA-ACDP-FF+ Coalition Government in the Cape Metro: Another Marriage of Convenience**

In the 1 March 2006 local government elections the ANC won all but one of the metropolitan councils in the country, namely, Johannesburg, Tshwane, the Nelson Mandela Metro, Ekurhuleni and eThekwini. The DA won a majority of votes in the Cape Metropolitan Council. Given that there was no clear winner in the Cape Metro, political parties entered into cutthroat negotiations with a view to forming a government. Table 6 shows the number of votes and council seats the various parties won in both the ward and proportional representation ballots.

From the results it seemed that the ID would hold the balance of power in the city and was likely to be the ‘kingmaker’. However, De Lille remained intransigent, refusing to make deals with either the DA or the ANC and insisting on doing away with the executive mayoral system in favour of a collective executive committee in which there would be a non-executive mayor and parties would be represented in proportion to the seats won in the elections. The ACDP was not prepared to support the ANC mayoral candidate, Nomaindia Mfeketo (*Cape Times* 16 March 2006). The formation of the ACDP-led 16-member forum of seven smaller parties changed the dynamics. Despite the eventual withdraw of the one-seat PAC, the forum, which favoured working with the DA, became a player to be taken seriously.

After two weeks of unsuccessful negotiations only an election in the council would determine who would occupy the posts of mayor, deputy mayor, speaker and other positions on the city’s executive committee. The election took place in the council on 15 March 2006.

By the time the secret ballot was held two blocs had emerged. On the one hand there was the ANC and the ID, on the other the DA, the ACDP, the FF+ and the forum of smaller parties. This realignment favoured the DA, especially since the PAC councillor chose to abstain from the first vote, in which the speaker was elected, and eventually left the hall.
The results were as follows:

- FF+ Jacob Derek Smit received 105 votes against the ANC’s candidate for speaker, Gavin Paulse (104 votes).
- DA mayoral candidate Helen Zille secured 106 votes against ANC former executive mayor, Nomaindia Mfeketo, who received 103 votes.
- ACDP deputy mayoral candidate Andrew Arnolds won against the ID candidate, Simon Grindrod, by 105 votes to 104.

The DA-ACDP-FF+ post-election coalition is likely to be fragile because its survival depends on the collaboration of each of the disparate smaller parties. These smaller parties were impressive as they voted en bloc throughout the ballot in the council. The challenge is to maintain that cohesion during the lifespan of the council. Subsequent to the vote the DA offered two posts to

Table 6
Results of the 2006 Local Government Elections in Cape Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Valid Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Ward Seats</th>
<th>PR Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>100,00</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>210</td>
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</table>

Source: http://www.eisa.org.za
the ID, which the latter turned down, sticking to its demand for a non-executive mayor with a multiparty executive committee. It is worth pointing out that, later, the ID maintained that its decision to vote with the ANC in the council did not mean that the two parties had entered into a coalition but was justified by the fact that the ANC was amenable to the ID’s proposal of a collective executive system, which the DA had strongly rejected.

Interestingly, while in fierce competition for control of the Cape Metropolitan Council, the ANC and the DA entered into what they refuse to call coalition governments but term, instead, power-sharing arrangements, in a number of hung municipalities in the Western Cape. A controversial former ANC Central Karoo Chairman, Truman Prince, and his populist Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA), performed well in those municipalities, winning a number of seats almost equal to that of the ANC in Laingsburg, Beaufort West, the Central Karoo District Municipality, Knysna and Prince Albert. This allowed the DA to hold the balance of power.

Since neither the ANC nor the DA wanted to see these municipalities fall under the control of Prince, the ANC and the DA traded senior municipal posts. In Laingsburg, where the two parties had the same number of seats, the mayor and deputy mayor came from the DA and the speaker from the ANC. In Beaufort West, the ANC had the mayoral and deputy mayoral posts and the DA the speaker and one post on the executive committee. In the Central Karoo District Municipality and Knysna respectively the ANC had the posts of mayor and the DA got the deputy mayorship (Sunday Times 12 March 2006).

THE IMPACT OF ETHNICITY, RACE, CLASS AND IDEOLOGY ON PARTY COALITIONS

Race and ethnicity have pervaded South African politics for centuries. The country essentially has four main racial groups: African (largely unmixed people of African descent, essentially the Bantus), white (largely unmixed people of European descent), coloured (a mix of various African groups, whites and Indonesian Malays) and Indian (people who originated from India, or what is known today as Pakistan). There are subdivisions within each of these groups. For example, among the Africans there are subgroups such as Khoisan, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu while the white group consists essentially of Afrikaans- and English-speaking people.
The prevalence of racial and ethnic politics in South Africa is not the result of the existence of many ethnic and racial groups in the country but a direct consequence of politicians’ exploitation of racial and ethnic identities as the basis for political, economic and socio-cultural inclusion or exclusion. As a result of this racial segregation and discrimination, which marked the country for centuries, wealth and the lack thereof coincide with race. The majority of the population lives below the poverty line and the bulk of unskilled workers are Africans, whereas the rich and the employer class are essentially whites. Coloureds and Indians are, by and large, skilled workers and a sizeable number of Indian people are involved in small, family-owned businesses.

Political parties are formed essentially in order to express the needs and expectations of their constituents and to advance their interests. In South Africa the majority of political parties are racially or ethnically based. Even those parties professing to be issue rather than identity based tend to find support, ultimately, among members of the racial or ethnic group to which their leader belongs. As a result, the articulation of ideologies and policy formulation and implementation by political parties has been fundamentally influenced by race, ethnicity and class. Contrary to Hoeane’s categorical view that ‘ethnicity and race do not play a central role in explaining voting behaviour and the performance of parties’ (Hoeane 2004, pp 1-26), the author argues that a combination of identity and issue considerations is taken into account by voters when making their choices. Most South African voters would vote on a racial basis when they have to choose between the DA and the ANC, but on an ideological or issue basis when deciding between the ANC and the PAC or between the NNP and the FF+.

The NP-NNP was essentially a home for the Afrikaners. The party introduced apartheid in 1948 in order to protect and advance the interests of its various Afrikaans constituents. Ideologically, the NP was a rightwing Christian Democracy party which evolved towards the end of the apartheid era to become a centrist party, attracting a majority of coloured voters. Coloured people share with white Afrikaners several cultural features, especially the use of the Afrikaans language. In 1994, the NP managed to attract substantial support from coloured voters, came second in the national elections and won the Western Cape province, where the coloured people constitute the major racial group. Beyond the cultural similarity between the Afrikaner and coloured people, it must be said that the latter group feared the advent of an inexperienced, leftist and black African government and felt more reassured by the NP than by the ANC. The situation changed
in 1999 when, after five years of ANC rule, these fears proved to have been essentially groundless. In 1999 the ANC won a majority in the Western Cape with massive support from segments of the coloured community but not enough to allow them to form the provincial government alone. As detailed above, the DP-NNP post-election coalition government kept the ANC out of power in this province. However, developments in the Democratic Alliance and the ultimate collapse of the DP-NNP coalition made it possible for the ANC to win the province in 2004 following a cooperative arrangement between it and the NNP. However, the decline in support for the NNP resulted, in the last few years of its existence, in its constituents being divided between the DP/DA, the ANC, the ID and the ACDP.

Since its inception the ANC has attracted Africans from all ethnic groups. The party’s African nationalism combined with a leadership drawn from all the African ethnic groups proved attractive to African voters. It can be argued that the ANC’s relatively successful management of the country during the critical first term of office, from 1994 to 1999, and its unequivocal embracing of neo-liberal policies reassured new groups of voters. Thus, in 1999 and 2004 the ANC won a substantial number of coloured votes in the Western and Northern Cape. Interestingly, because of the provincial capital issue detailed above, the ANC in KZN also received a boost (at the expense of the DA and the IFP) from white business, which would not normally support it. Whether this support translated into more votes for the ANC or not, it was an interesting case of issue-based voting patterns in an identity-oriented electorate. In addition, tactical alliances have allowed the ANC to be the only party able to grow its support beyond ethnicity and across all racial groups, though this increase has been slow among white and Indian voters.

The ANC adopted its famous Freedom Charter on 26 June 1955. In its preamble, the charter declares ‘that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people’ (ANC Department of Information and Publicity 1993). The Freedom Charter decrees that all the people of South Africa shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities without reference to colour, race, sex or belief.

The IFP, often presented as a party that focuses on Zulu nationalism and one whose politics centres on the advancement of the interests of traditional leaders and on its rural constituents in KZN, insists that its vision and aims encompass the whole country and all South African groups. It
appears, however, that this sectarian image has prevented the party from expanding its base beyond KZN. As a result, it is viewed essentially as a provincial party.

The growth of the DP/DA has been impressive – from 1.73 per cent of the national vote in 1994 to 9.56 per cent in 1999 and 12.37 per cent in 2004. During the apartheid era, the party essentially provided a home for English-speaking South Africans and it failed to position itself well during the first democratic elections, when it was all but extinguished. A change of leadership and, more specifically, the advent of Tony Leon brought a fresh perspective and attempts have been made to attract non-African voters – white, Indian and coloured. The DP’s aggressive opposition politics vis-à-vis the governing ANC echoed with the sentiments of those segments of the electorate, particularly with white voters. In 1999 the DP attracted most of the support the NP had enjoyed in 1994 and became a home for almost all white voters, both English and Afrikaans speakers, and the official opposition in the national Parliament. Its coalition with the NNP and the eventual integration of many NNP members into the Democratic Alliance, consolidated its support in 2004. Ironically, the policy that helped the DP-DA to grow substantially in 1999 and 2004, its attraction as a non-African niche, is now the reason for its inability to grow beyond this niche. The formation of alliances and coalitions may be one of the strategies it could use to get out of this trap but the DP-NNP saga is still too fresh and any alliance will need to be well thought out if it is to be effective.

The realignment of all the major South African political parties at the centre of the left-to-right spectrum saw the ANC, the UDM and the ID to the centre-left, the DP/DA, the now defunct NNP, IFP and the ACDP to the centre-right and the FF+ moderately to the right. This realignment pushed most of the other parties to the peripheries of the political debate and the policy-making processes in the country. These peripheral parties, both left- and rightwing, have been ineffectual probably because of their narrow outlook in relation to the new political order in South Africa. Among the rightwing parties is the Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB). The far rightwing political organisations such as the Conservative Party have simply disappeared. Leftwing parties are essentially the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA).

Given the limitations of identity-based politics, opposition fragmentation, and the loyalty of voters to their chosen party, many party leaders have resorted to party coalitions and alliances as a way of broadening
their support base. In reality, most political party coalitions have in fact been nothing more than a weak juxtaposition of parties with major differences between them – different constituencies and political cultures, and different, if not conflicting, constituency interests. As a result, the minor election alliances formed in 2004, among them the IFP-FF+, the IFP-Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (Limpopo), the FF+-Cape Coloured Congress (Western Cape), and the New Labour Party-Christian Democratic Party, have proved futile.

On the other hand, it seems that the relative effectiveness and longevity of the ANC-IFP coalition government in KZN has been made possible by the essential similarities and convergence of interests of the two parties, which outweigh their differences. The similarities include the realisation that they should put an end to political instability in order to improve the quality of life of the rural poor in KZN. In the same way, there was a substantial convergence of interests between the constituencies of the NNP and the DP in the new South Africa, including their fear of the over-dominance of the ANC and worries about the affirmative action policy and black economic empowerment. These affinities would theoretically have made it possible for the alliance to survive and be effective. But the leadership crisis made the coalition unworkable.

**THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PARTY COALITIONS**

*The Constitution and the Electoral System*

Several provisions in South Africa’s 1993 transitional Constitution and in the 1996 Constitution and its subsequent amendments provide for political parties to come together in order to form a government at national, provincial or local level.

Section 83 of the transitional Constitution provides that ‘every party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President, from among the members of the National Assembly’. Moreover, this section stipulates that ‘should no party or only one party hold 80 or more seats in the National Assembly, the party holding the largest number of seats and the party holding the second largest number of seats shall each be entitled to designate one Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly’. Section 88 of the same Constitution states that ‘a party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has decided to participate in the government of national unity, shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the Cabinet portfolios...
[...] in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties’ (1993). The section details a formula for the allocation of Cabinet portfolios to the participating parties. It also makes it clear that the president of the republic must consult with the executive deputy presidents and the leaders of the participating parties before allocating Cabinet portfolios.

With regard to the provincial government, section 149 provided that ‘a party holding at least 10 per cent of the seats in a provincial legislature and which has decided to participate in the Executive Council, shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the Executive Council portfolios in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the provincial legislature relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties’ (1993). The section provides a formula for the allocation of ministerial posts in the provincial government.

The 1996 Constitution requires a candidate to win an absolute majority in order to be elected president of the country or premier of a province. It states that ‘if no candidate receives a majority of the votes, the candidate who receives the lowest number of votes must be eliminated and a further vote taken on the remaining candidates’. In order to receive a majority of the votes and govern, coalitions of political parties are formed when no candidate has secured 51 per cent or more. With the exception of the 1994 national elections, when the transitional Constitution provided for a government of national unity, the Tripartite Alliance has been able to secure more than 51 per cent at national level and has therefore not needed to enter into a coalition with any other political group in order to form a government. However, in the Western Cape, the ANC won the 1999 elections with a relative majority of 42 per cent but lost the province to the NNP and the DP after they formed a coalition government. Similarly, in 2004 the ANC won 46.98 per cent of the provincial vote in KZN against the IFP’s 36.82 per cent, which was not sufficient to form a one-party government. After protracted negotiations with the Minority Front (MF), UDM and ACDP, the ANC settled for a coalition with the IFP, which also included the MF.

In terms of the closed list PR system seats are allocated to the contesting parties according to their share of the vote. South Africa uses the Droop formula, also known as the highest remainder method, to allocate seats. ‘This system means that there is no formal threshold for parliamentary representation’ (Lodge 2004). Unlike the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, the list PR makes every vote count. As a result, parties do not necessarily have to enter into pre-election alliances but tend to build post-election alliances.
in accordance with the number of seats secured by each party. The cases of the coalition governments in KZN from 1994 to 2004 and the Western Cape in 1999 and 2004 illustrate this.

**Floor-Crossing**

The PR system means the electorate votes for parties on the basis of their politics – candidates must be sponsored by a party and are not voted in as individuals, as is the case with a constituency-based FPTP system.

According to Jonathan Faull (2004), ‘a bill to allow for floor-crossing started as a DA backed initiative to bring South Africa into line with other established democracies and allow for more fluid politics’. This position was confirmed by veteran DP/DA politician Colin Eglin, who was among those who, as far back as 1994, championed the floor-crossing tradition. The DP/DA itself submitted proposals to Deputy President Jacob Zuma and the Speaker’s Office in 2001 on how best to remove the anti-defection clause from the Constitution. At the time, the ANC did not see the need for such legislation but the DP-NNP saga changed its view on the matter.

A set of laws introduced in 2002 governs floor crossing in South Africa. These laws include the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002 and the Constitution Second Amendment Act 21 of 2002 as well as the Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002 and the Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002. These provisions enable an elected representative in Parliament, the provincial legislature or a local council to become a member of another party while retaining membership of the legislature. It also makes it possible for an existing political party to merge with another party or to subdivide into more than one party while allowing an MP affected by such changes to retain membership of the legislature. This law has changed South Africa’s party system and political representation as substantial realignments take place between elections, affecting the initial choice of the electorate.

It is important to note that for the floor-crossing legislation to apply, the number of members leaving the original party must represent not less than 10 per cent of the total number of seats held by the original party in that legislature. It has been argued that this provision is aimed at preventing solo, unprincipled departures. In reality, it effectively protects large parties at the expense of smaller ones, given that the smaller the party, the easier it is for those who wish to defect to achieve the required 10 per cent threshold.

On 15 September 2005, floor crossing affected a major political party,
the DA, adversely, when five of its MPs left the party. Four of them joined the ANC, while one, Craig Morkel, formed his own political party, the Progressive Independent Movement. The fact that all the defectors were black raised the interest of the media (The Citizen, 27 September 2005).

After the Speaker of the National Assembly, Baleka Mbete, rejected the DA’s request to reverse the losses, the party took the matter to the Cape High Court, requesting it to declare unlawful and invalid the defection of the five MPs, arguing that the defectors had failed to reach the statutory 10 per cent threshold. The DA’s argument was that by the time the members defected on 15 September 2005, the last day of floor-crossing window, the party had boosted its parliamentary representation from 50 to 52 seats after two MPs joined the party after leaving the UDM and the IFP respectively (Sowetan 22 September 2005). The five MPs therefore constituted only 9,615 per cent of the party whereas, according to the DA, six MPs would be the minimum required for floor-crossing to be valid. The Cape Town High Court dismissed the DA’s application, with Judge Burton Fourie stating that ‘if the DA’s construction were to be adopted, the threshold rule of 10% would be subject to constant change as and when members left and joined a party’ (Business Day 4 October 2005). The DA did not appeal against the judgement.

The floor-crossing legislation has led to a flurry of defections by elected representatives either to join other parties or to form new ones. This legal yet unprincipled practice has been decried for several reasons. Admittedly, floor crossing gives effect to freedom of association, expression and conscience and reduces the party leadership’s control over MPs. However, the disadvantages offset the advantages. The extent to which the legislation has affected the party system can be seen in the example of parties such as the NNP, deserted by a substantial number of its MPs and councillors; the PAC, which lost one of its three MPs; and the tensions running high in KZN threatening to undo the gains of the past in relation to peace consolidation when the IFP lost some of its elected representatives to the ANC. The UDM lost the majority of its parliamentarians to the ANC, who, as a result, and between elections, achieved and exceeded a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. At times the floor-crossing practice had all the elements of a farce, as in 2003 when the sole national representative of the AEB, Cassie Aucamp, chose to quit and form a new party, the National Action, probably to represent himself.

The legislation undoubtedly undermines democracy by ignoring the choice of voters and weakening small parties as the 10 per cent clause is too
high to protect them from defections. In addition, floor crossing creates the potential for political corruption with, for example, promises of jobs, money or other political or financial privileges, thus damaging the political integrity of the country. Indeed, smaller parties, among them the IFP, the UDM and the ID, suffered the greatest losses, although, in the opinion of one analyst, the common feature of those three parties was that they were personality

Table 7
Configuration of Party Representation in Parliament Before and After the Floor Crossings in 2003

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<tr>
<td>African Independent Movement (AIM)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (ADP)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Action (NA)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Justice Congress (PJC)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
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Source: IEC 2003; various media sources in 2003 adapted by the author
driven. ‘So they have suffered internal democracy crises’ (*The Star* 30 September 2005, interview with independent analyst Aubrey Matshiqi).

The experience of Lesotho in 1997 where the governing Basotho Congress Party (BCP) lost its majority in Parliament through floor crossing to the benefit of the then newly formed Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and the chaos that ensued after the May 1998 elections, illustrate the unfairness of the system. This lack of fairness is even more striking when applied in a party list PR system as used in South Africa. In the extreme case of Lesotho, the BCP was reduced to a mere official opposition and the

Table 8
Configuration of Party Representation in Parliament Before and After the Floor Crossings in 2005

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<td>ANC</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Convention (NADECO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Independent Front (UIF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party of South Africa</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progressive Independent Movement</td>
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Source: *City Press* 18 September 2005
newly born LCD became Lesotho’s governing party overnight, which caused extreme tensions in the tiny kingdom. The post-election crisis of 1998, which resulted in the South Africa-led military intervention under the banner of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was an indirect consequence of the frustration caused by the 1997 floor-crossing saga. Many politicians, political analysts and the media have raised serious concerns about floor crossing, which is seen as a threat to the country’s democracy. The IFP has referred to it, cleverly, as ‘crosstitution’. More explicit condemnation came from the media. One newspaper described floor crossing as daylight robbery – the theft of party seats by politicians (City Press 4 September 2005). The newspaper stated ‘As the main beneficiary of floor-crossing, [the ANC] is unlikely to move with speed to repeal the floor-crossing legislation. The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, […] accuses the ANC of entrenching its one-partyism by dangling carrots to floor-crossers. On the other hand, [the DA] welcomes those who have joined it from other parties, saying that it is consolidating the opposition. This is hypocrisy.’ The newspaper called for the ANC to repeal the legislation, claiming that it had served its purpose. Indeed, it ‘helped’ end the marriage between the DP and the NNP as well as facilitating a new one, between the ANC and the NNP, which has been so ‘successful’ that the two parties have become one. For the sake of democracy and the credibility of politicians, indeed, this legislation should be abolished without further delay.

In general, South Africa has a sound legal framework for the formation of party coalitions. The repeal of the floor-crossing legislation will go a long way towards reversing its adverse impact on public perceptions of the integrity of politicians, the general disillusionment about politics and the value of elections, as well as the weakening of the party system and representative democracy.

THE FORMATION OF PARTY COALITIONS

This section draws extensively on two complementary documents, drawn up by the DP and the NNP, which formed the basis of the Democratic Alliance. The documents are the Outline Agreement and Clause 14 (see Appendices 4 and 5), the only agreement documenting a party coalition in South Africa that was available to the author. The section also draws on the responses of party representatives who made themselves available for an interview.
The Objectives of and Driving Forces Behind Party Coalitions

The many party coalitions formed in South Africa since 1994 have taken various forms. As indicated above the constitutionally entrenched GNU was intended to guarantee that all races and ethnic groups participated in government at national and provincial levels in order to ensure political cohesion and stability, inclusiveness and continuity. The long-lasting coalition government in KZN between the IFP and the ANC was established in order to end the recurrent violent conflicts, to consolidate peace and to reduce poverty in the province among the rural poor, who constitute the common constituency of the two parties.

The Democratic Alliance was formed to create a stronger opposition in Parliament as well as governing the Western Cape to showcase what the DA was capable of. After the collapse of the DA in its initial form, the ‘new’ DA and the IFP entered into the short-lived Coalition for Change, also formed to strengthen the opposition in order to reduce the dominance of the ANC.

The object of the Tripartite Alliance was to end apartheid and create a new dispensation in order to redress the imbalances of the past and give equal rights and opportunities to all. This is being achieved through government’s affirmative action and black economic empowerment policies and law reforms in areas such as labour and the Bill of Rights. Ironically, government policies to empower blacks have been perceived and presented by some politicians as reverse racism against whites. Therefore, beyond the short-term goals of winning/keeping the Western Cape, the ultimate object of the ANC-NNP cooperative arrangement was to initiate a rapprochement between blacks and whites in order to reassure the latter that the new South Africa belongs to all. The instigators of these coalitions have, in most cases, been the party leaders. The GNU did not require particular negotiation as it was entrenched in the transitional Constitution. Nonetheless, before it was formed there were discussions between the leaders of the constituent parties. The DA was negotiated essentially by Leon and Van Schalkwyk.

As for the driving forces behind the successive coalitions between the ANC and the IFP, leaders at national and provincial levels led the negotiations and helped keep the coalitions together. Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Sibusiso Ndebele were among the ANC leaders who engaged in the successive negotiations while Mangosuthu Buthelezi was the driving force behind the IFP’s role, assisted by senior party cadres such as Albert Mncwango, Musa Zondi and provincial leaders and past IFP premiers in KZN. Both Buthelezi and Leon played leading roles in the negotiations between the IFP and the DA for the formation of the Coalition for Change.
The driving forces behind the ANC and NNP cooperative arrangement were, on the ANC’s behalf, then Safety and Security Minister, the late Steve Tshwete, and later ANC National Chairman and Defence Minister, Mosioua Lekota. The NNP was represented by Van Schalkwyk.

Selection of Coalition Partners, Candidates and Sharing of Positions

– Selection of Coalition Partners –

South Africa has experienced both pre-election and post-election alliances. The two major pre-election alliances were the Tripartite Alliance, which has seen the ANC, SACP and COSATU joining forces in every national, provincial and local election since 1994 and the Democratic Alliance, formed ahead of the 2000 local government elections. The 2004 pre-election alliance between the DA and the IFP had relatively few consequences, especially as it did not have integrated electoral party lists. The other pre-election alliances were just too insignificant for lessons to be drawn from them.

The selection criteria for pre-election coalition partners vary and are not always straightforward. The Tripartite Alliance partners have come together at each election essentially because of their shared vision of a new South Africa in which people enjoy equal rights and opportunities, as well as the guarantee through the ANC-led government of access to and maintenance of positions of influence in government, Parliament, parastatals the diplomatic corps. Equally, it is in the interests of the ANC to have the SACP, COSATU and SANCO on its side rather than in opposition.

The main reason for the formation of the DA was to increase the size of the opposition, its representation in selected executive positions at local and metropolitan councils and, where possible, to keep the ANC out of power, as was the case in the Cape Metro. The Coalition for Change was formed for similar reasons. It was hoped that, together, the IFP and the DA would control an absolute majority of votes in KZN and keep the ANC out of power there but this objective was not reached because of the relatively poor performance of the IFP in 2004.

A fundamental criterion common to all these pre-election alliances is what each partner could potentially bring to the grouping in terms of votes. Local government elections are based on a mixed electoral system where half of the representatives are elected on the basis of proportional representation and the other half through the first-past-the-post system. In this context, a pre-election alliance is desirable because otherwise parties would waste votes in the constituency ballots. A party therefore enters a
coalition to maximise overall votes by calculating the value to the parties of the combined votes of a particular constituency.

A few political party coalitions in South Africa have been formed after elections by parties which have combined their seats. Among the main post-election coalitions are the IFP-ANC national and KZN coalition governments in 1994, 1999 and 2004; the short-lived NNP-DP government coalition in the Western Cape in 1999; and the ANC-NNP coalition governments in the Western Cape and Cape Metro in 2002 and 2004 as well as the DA-led Cape Metro government of 2006.

Post-election coalitions in South Africa are essentially based on the number of seats secured by each party. While at national level it has not been important to form such coalition governments because of the overwhelming majority won by the ANC, since 1994 in KZN and the Western Cape the main parties have had to engage in negotiations for the formation of provincial governments. The same has occurred at local government levels in areas such as the Cape Metropole and individual municipalities throughout the country.

It is worth noting that ideology has not been the defining element in the selection of potential coalition partners because of the centrist stance taken by most of the main political parties represented in the South African Parliament. As a result, any coalition is possible because of the ideological affinities between most of the parties.

Radical parties such as the AEB, PAC and AZAPO were too insignificant in terms of number and influence nationally and too ideologically skewed to be taken into account in coalition formation consultations. An exception has been the hung metropolitan council in Cape Town after the March 2006 local elections, which forced the major parties to negotiate with the numerous small parties that hold one or two seats in the council.

In addition, AZAPO has secured a separate arrangement with the ANC which has enabled its leader, Mosiblidi Mangena, to be appointed to the national government since 2001. The UDM has had a deputy minister in the ANC-led national government since the 2004 elections.

– Selection of Candidates –

The problem of selecting candidates is only relevant to pre-election alliances when at least two parties must agree on their electoral lists.

The ANC selects candidates according to guidelines issued by its National Executive Committee (NEC). These guidelines involve primary
elections at branch level followed by adjustments made by the party leadership with a view to ensuring that the list is representative of the party’s constituents. In substance, the selection criteria are as follows (Thomas 2004):

- Geographical representivity in that the list reflects the different regional structures of the party.
- A minimum of 30 per cent of women in order to comply with Rule 6 of the party’s constitution.
- A fair reflection of South Africa’s racial and ethnic groups.
- A balanced representation of current members of Parliament or provincial legislatures to ensure continuity.
- The inclusion of members from COSATU, the SACP, SANCO and other organisations sympathetic to the ANC.
- A balanced blend of youth, the aged, and people with disabilities.
- An attempt to acquire appropriate skills and experience, especially in critical areas such as finance and economic development.

With regard to the DA, Clause 14, an expansion of Article 14 of the 2000 Outline Agreement between the DP and the NNP which formed the basis of the creation of the DA, was an elaborated provision which defined the approach to and criteria for the selection of candidates. It stipulated that the selection of candidates for the municipal elections was to be determined on the basis of relative voting strength (as indicated by the election results in the national ballot in 1999) taking into account the availability and suitability of candidates and subject to the right of appeal to provincial management committees (PMCs). Variations of the arrangement could be negotiated on a consensus basis.

In allocating wards to a DA partner party, Clause 14 classified wards within each municipality in three groups. A ward was considered to be safe when the sum of the votes cast for the NNP and the DP together in the 1999 national parliamentary elections was equal to, or greater than half the total votes cast in that ward. A ward was considered to be winnable when the sum of the votes cast for the DP and the NNP together in the 1999 national parliamentary elections was less than 50 per cent but exceeded the number of votes cast for any other single party. A ward was considered a standard-bearer ward in all other cases. In determining the allocation of a ward to a party the local management committee (LMC) or the PMC concerned used, inter alia, the following criteria:
• Individual meritorious councillors or candidates.
• The need to maximise the DA vote.
• The need to promote representivity or to augment the skills base.

Various articles in Clause 14 describe in some detail the procedures for allocating positions on the lists to the parties as well as the basis on which a partner party qualifies to submit a candidate for a local or metropolitan municipality or mayoral post. Positions on the lists were allocated to the parties based on their relative strength within a particular municipality, and were divided proportionally and regularly throughout the list. Some list candidates were also allowed to stand in wards. In metropolitan municipalities the first position on the list was drawn from the party with the greater relative strength, and the second from the other party. The balance of the list tended to reflect the relative strength of the parties in a given metropolitan municipality. Mayoral candidates came from the ranks of the party with greater relative strength in the municipality and were nominated by the PMC concerned.

The DP-NNP and the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance are among the few party coalitions to have well-defined written criteria and procedures for the selection of candidates.

– The Sharing of Positions –

The sharing of positions is very much linked to the selection of candidates and the results obtained by each party. Most coalition partners might have discussed and agreed on a formula before an election, but very few have had the opportunity to win a province, a metropole or even a municipality. For this study, the sharing of positions would therefore apply only to the Tripartite Alliance, the ANC-IFP coalition governments, the ANC-NNP national, Western Cape and local governments and the DP-NNP Western Cape and local governments. There have also been many arrangements between various parties at local government level, including the ANC and the DA, especially in the Western Cape, as detailed above.

For the ANC-IFP coalition governments, for example, the basis for the sharing of governmental positions is first and foremost the number of seats secured in an election and the subsequent negotiations between the two parties. Thus, following the 2004 provincial elections, in which the ANC secured 38 seats and the IFP 30 in KZN, the ANC had, for the first time, the upper hand in the negotiations. However, because the IFP had won the
elections in 1994 and 1999, the party got the lion’s share. The same criteria applied to the 1999 coalition between the DP and the NNP in the Western Cape and to that between the ANC and the NNP in the same province in 2002.

MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PARTY COALITIONS

Coalition Management Procedures

Some political party coalitions are formed without a written agreement. Examples of these are those between the ANC and the IFP and the Tripartite Alliance where coalition management procedures have developed over time.

The ANC and the IFP also set up ad hoc structures where an equal number of representatives from each of the two parties would meet to discuss specific matters and make recommendations. The number and calibre of participants in these meetings depended on the nature and importance of the issues being discussed. Since the coalitions between the ANC and the IFP were either in national government or in the KZN provincial government, such meetings tended to take place at national and provincial levels. This mechanism has also been used extensively by the two parties to resolve conflicts.

The Tripartite Alliance has a similar arrangement, with an equal number of representatives from the ANC, the SACP and COSATU coming together to hold ad hoc meetings with a view to reaching agreement on a given matter and making recommendations to the relevant organs.

Some coalition partners sign memoranda of agreement which form the basis of their collaboration and define coalition management procedures. This was the case with the Democratic Alliance and the Coalition for Change. In the latter case, a joint DA-IFP committee was formed to implement the agreement.

The outline agreement between the DP and the NNP is, as stated above, an elaborate document which describes in some detail the nature, objectives, values and principles of the alliance between the two parties as well as the management procedures. The ultimate goal of the alliance was to establish a new political party to be known as the Democratic Alliance and the agreement clearly defines the relationship between the two affiliated parties.

The organ responsible for managing the alliance until the first ordinary congress of the DA was the National Management Committee (NMC), which consisted of the leader (the DP leader), the deputy leader (the NNP leader) and the federal chairperson (the DP chairperson), as well as a number of
representatives from each party in proportion to the relative voting strength of the two parties as indicated by the election results in the 1999 general election.

The NMC was to seek to reach consensus in all decisions. If consensus could not be reached in a particular matter it was to be resolved by the leadership (that is, the leader, deputy leader and chairperson). Given that the DP had more representatives than the NNP in the various deliberative organs of the alliance this provision naturally gave it the upper hand.

The NMC was responsible for the establishment of provincial management committees (PMCs) constituted on the same principles as those at national level. Decision-making at provincial level was to be reached by consensus, failing which the majority would prevail, subject to appeal to the NMC.

It must be recalled that the DP and the NNP received respectively 9.56 per cent and 6.87 per cent in the 1999 national parliamentary elections. The DP therefore enjoyed a higher representation in the NMC than the NNP, and was entitled to have the final say when consensus could not be reached. However, in the Western Cape, the NNP enjoyed a much larger representation (17 out of 42 seats) than the DP (5 seats). The NNP attempted to use its strength in the Western Cape to redress to its advantage the balance of power in the coalition, even for national matters.

The Challenges of Sustaining Party Coalitions

Party coalitions face many challenges. Some relate to inter-party relationships and others are caused by intra-party challenges within the individual parties.

In the case of the ANC-IFP coalition governments, for example, because the ANC is a broad church encompassing many different ideologies and tendencies, some members of the party and of its partners were not in favour of the coalition and made it difficult for the two parties to work harmoniously, putting pressure on President Mbeki to end the coalition. Similarly, there were IFP members who opposed the coalition and placed considerable pressure on Buthelezi to terminate it.

Other tensions between the IFP and the ANC were caused by factors such as deep mistrust between the leaders as a result of a long history of violent conflict between the two parties and policy differences on matters like the immigration bill, the floor-crossing legislation, the status of traditional chiefs, incompatible approaches to local government and the IFP’s support for federalism versus the ANC’s preference for a unitary state.
In addition, competition between the two parties for the control of KZN, even while they were in coalition, and the perception that the ANC wanted to swallow the IFP by means of mechanisms such as the floor-crossing legislation, have made it difficult to sustain the coalition. President Mbeki’s unilateral appointment of Zondi and Ngema to the national government in lieu of Buthelezi was interpreted by the IFP as an attempt by the ANC to divide and rule.

As a result of its coalition with South Africa’s governing party, the IFP suffered from a crisis of identity – it was part of the national government but it wanted to maintain its status as an opposition party in the national Parliament. This contradiction was illustrated by its conflicting signals as it selectively supported and opposed the government’s policies, confusing its supporters and placing considerable strains on the coalition. The situation was further complicated by the absence of a coalition agreement and the fierce competition between the two parties at local government level, where they frequently found themselves on opposing sides.

The DP and NNP also faced serious challenges in sustaining their alliance. Among the factors that affected the alliance were the long history of mistrust between the Afrikaner constituencies and their English counterparts, the unhappiness of some coloured members with the DP’s approach to issues of class and race in South Africa, differences in leadership, opposition styles and political cultures, and competition and rivalry between their leaders.

A crucial factor which should, in theory, have made the DA-IFP Coalition for Change work much more smoothly than the IFP-ANC and DP-NNP alliances was that the two parties did not have to compete for support from the same constituents and should therefore have complemented one another. The reality was that, because their constituencies were so different – the DA’s being urban, affluent and largely white, the IFP’s traditional chiefs and the black rural poor – they had little in common in terms of priorities. Ironically, this meant that the IFP had more in common with its archrival, the ANC, than with the DA, and partially explains the dissolution of the Coalition for Change in favour of the resumption of the ANC-IFP coalition government in KZN.

More importantly, if the IFP were to become a mere opposition party in KZN for five years it would lose its influence in the province. As a corollary, the attraction of the powerful positions the ANC was offering in the KZN government was a strong incentive for IFP leaders to join the ANC-led provincial government and for the continued coalition between the two parties in the province.
The challenges that affect the sustainability of party coalitions differ from one coalition to another. They include differences in policies, political culture and constituencies; intra-party pressures; competition between coalition partners; and the conflicting personal ambitions of party leaders.

Consequences of Coalitions for Affiliated Parties
The formation and collapse of party alliances have consequences for the affiliated parties. Some of these are direct, others are implied and difficult to demonstrate without conducting a scientific survey of voter behaviour. For example, the participation of the IFP in the coalition government with the ANC in KZN from 1994 to date and in the national government from 1994 to 2004 is said to have caused some confusion among the party's supporters about the status of their party, with many unsure whether the IFP was an opposition or a governing party. An IFP member claimed that, because of its association with the ANC, the IFP had lost considerable support as some voters might have chosen to vote for the governing party rather than for its junior partner.

Similarly, the belief that the DA/IFP stand on the question of the KZN capital caused DA voters in Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg to turn to the ANC should be tested scientifically beyond a simple comparison of the total votes received by each of the parties in the concerned areas in 1999 and 2004.

In 1994, the Freedom Front had a cooperative arrangement with the ANC similar to the one that emerged between the ANC and the NNP in 2002. The FF thought that if it worked with the dominant party rather than opposing it, it would be able to achieve more for its constituents. The agreement resulted in two members of the party being appointed ambassador and in ministerial positions in the Northern Cape and Limpopo provinces until 1999. The then FF leader, General Constand Viljoen, was also given the opportunity to take a Cabinet post, which he declined. The party paid the price of this collaboration in the 1999 national and provincial elections when its representation in the National Assembly shrank from nine to four seats. A study commissioned by the FF reportedly showed that voters felt that General Viljoen was ‘sitting in the lap of the ANC’ and they would rather support a party that would fight the ruling party. As a result, the FF withdrew from the cooperative arrangement with the ANC in 1999. Another coalition with negative consequences for the affiliated parties was that between the DP and the NNP. It was clear that the DP’s ultimate goal was to swallow the NNP, while the latter saw the coalition as a survival mechanism, given the decline in its electoral support since 1994. The widely publicised
defections of NNP members to the DP during the alliance were undoubtedly part of the DP’s strategy to consolidate the balance of power within the grouping in its favour. Contradictions and incompatibilities between the two partners resulted in the collapse of the alliance, accelerated the demise of the NNP and further fragmented the party system in South Africa. The most remarkable consequence of this coalition and its collapse was the massive floor crossing to the DP/DA by NNP members in the national Parliament and provincial legislatures in 2002 and in local councils in 2003 as well as the substantial decline in the NNP’s electoral support in the national and provincial elections in 2004.

The NNP’s decision to enter into an alliance with the ANC, as a result of which Martinhus van Schalkwyk became premier of the Western Cape, not only reduced the NNP leader’s status from that of national leader to provincial leader, it also, and more importantly, made large segments of the disillusioned NNP support base query the motivation and relevance of such alliances.

These developments marked the demise of the NNP, which was formalised with its incorporation into the ANC in 2005.

The consequences for South Africa’s party system of the DA experience are serious. Formed to strengthen the opposition in the face of the ANC’s increasing domination of the country’s politics, the alliance had the short-term result of growing the DP support base but the long-term result of furthering the fragmentation of and therefore weakening the opposition. As a result the main South African political parties have become reluctant to enter into coalitions and parties are likely to be more prudent in the future about forming alliances. Already Patricia de Lille, leader of the Independent Democrats, has taken a strong stance against coalition politics, declaring that her party will remain independent as, indeed, it did in the negotiations over the formation of the Cape metropolitan government after the 2006 local government elections.

COALITION SURVIVAL AND EFFECTIVENESS

South Africa’s experience with political party coalitions demonstrates that the survival of a coalition depends on a number of factors, among them the existence of an agreement in which issues of commonality are the basis of cooperation while areas of divergence are isolated. The successive post-election coalition governments formed by the ANC and the IFP illustrate this eloquently. The two parties have not only fought each other violently
over many years in an attempt to control the province of KZN but also have some substantial policy differences in areas such as the devolution of powers from the central government to provinces, local government and traditional chiefs. However, the ANC and the IFP coalition at the national level lasted for more than a decade and the one in KZN, which was formed in 1994, has entered its twelfth year because of the focus by the two parties on areas of convergence. The IFP claimed that even in those areas of divergence, and thanks to the coalition, it played a persuasive role and led the ANC to change some of its positions on issues like privatisation, the powers and functions of provinces and the decentralisation of local government. Similarly, the NNP noted that a coalition should not be created for wrong reasons such as ‘building a strong opposition’, as advocated by its former partner, the DP/DA. Such logic would result in opposition parties engaging in unsustainable politics of opposition just for the sake of opposing.

Most of the respondents interviewed have pointed out that honesty is crucial in party alliances as it helps build trust among the leaders of the affiliated parties. The NNP and the IFP noted that they were conscious that the hidden intention of their respective coalition partners, the DP and the ANC, was to swallow them and therefore render them irrelevant, if not redundant. The defections of NNP and IFP members to the DP and the ANC respectively put considerable strains on the relationships between the coalition partners.

The existence of an integrated policy platform would help the various political parties in a coalition develop and adopt common policies which would contribute to ensuring cohesion and a shared vision and objectives. The Tripartite Alliance has struggled in this area as its junior partners, who were influential in the early stages of the ANC government, as demonstrated by the role played by COSATU in the development of the RDP, have complained that they were not informed about the development of GEAR, which replaced the RDP. COSATU and the SACP have nonetheless been in a position to influence workplace-related lawmaking processes such as the Labour Relations Act, the Employment Equity Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. As for the DA, the DP-NNP outline agreement provided for the appointment of a policy review commission but stated that, in the interim, existing DP policies would be accepted as the basic policy framework of the DA. Clearly, in the final analysis, the DA’s ideology and policies were not only shaped by the DP but were, in fact, the DP’s pre-alliance policies.

Among the factors which impact on the survival of a party coalition are the personalities of the leaders and the political cultures of the partner
parties, both of which must be accommodated if the coalition is to function smoothly. Linked to the personalities of the leaders are leadership styles. Incompatible leadership styles may render the partnership unworkable and cause its collapse.

The electoral model also has a great impact on the survival of party coalitions. The representatives of the Tripartite Alliance at all levels of government were elected on an ANC ticket and could therefore not easily leave the alliance, except in terms of the floor-crossing legislation, because they would lose their seats.

By contrast, the representatives of the 1999 DP-NNP coalition were elected on their respective parties’ lists, and a party could quit the coalition without losing its seats. Unable to transcend its first significant political hurdles, the DP-NNP coalition collapsed easily. From this perspective it can be argued that pre-election alliances in a system of integrated closed electoral lists stand a better chance of lasting than post-election alliances. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the floor-crossing window period has weakened pre-election alliances just as the individual parties have become more vulnerable.

The longevity and effectiveness of the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance can be explained by the fact that it was a principled grouping aimed at fighting apartheid and transforming South Africa. By contrast, the DP-NNP was formed essentially to gang up against the ANC, without specifying which of the ruling party’s policies it wanted to oppose. Alliances will therefore last longer and be more effective if they are based on fundamental principles and are therefore born out of conviction rather than convenience.

Finally, a strong incentive to keeping coalitions together has been the possibility for coalition partner representatives to be appointed to powerful and lucrative jobs in government and parastatals as well as to gain access to economic empowerment schemes. It is believed that these opportunities have contributed to keeping the Tripartite Alliance together even in the face of serious intra-alliance crises, just as they have contributed to ensuring the survival of successive ANC-IFP coalitions.

Interestingly, not all partners have been seduced by such incentives. Some independent-minded leaders from the ANC, COSATU and the SACP have not sought to access the opportunities provided by the ANC government beyond their parliamentary seat, and have been among the most vocal opponents of some of the government’s policies and their consequences for the livelihood of the populace. Similarly, the fact that some of the NNP’s MECs left the provincial government in the Western Cape to join the DP/
DA during the 2003 floor-crossing window, thus becoming opponents, means that, in South Africa, the office-seeking explanation is important but not a sufficient requisite for the formation and longevity of a party coalition.

CONCLUSION

One of the most obvious effects of coalition building in South Africa has been the gradual growth of ideological and policy rapprochement within the South Africa polity. Accordingly, in today’s South Africa neo-liberalism has undoubtedly become the dominant ideology, a development that suggests that there is likely to be continuity in macroeconomic policy-making in the foreseeable future, even in the unlikely event that there is a change of government. Indeed, party coalitions in post-apartheid South Africa have contributed to further reducing the ideological gap between the country’s main parliamentary parties. Whether the choice of neo-liberal policies is good or bad is not the subject of this section. This evolution has naturally made the major opposition parties unattractive as a political alternative to the governing ANC because they have been unable to offer policy options other than neo-liberalism. The dominance of neo-liberalism in South Africa has transformed the political debate among the country’s main political parties into a sort of monologue, which has resulted in large segments of the population, especially the poorer majority, being somewhat inadequately represented.

On the other hand, the split within the largest opposition coalition ever, the DA, has disillusioned many about the ability of (opposition) parties to present a viable and sustainable alternative to the ANC. More importantly, the most damaging party coalition has been the 2002 cooperative agreement between the ANC and the NNP. These two parties initiated the controversial floor-crossing legislation for their own short-term self-centred gain, thus undermining representative democracy and the party system in the country (Kadima 2003).

Beyond ideological convergence, party coalitions tend to begin and end at the elite level. Yet what matters is not the bringing together of the elites but the coalition of the constituents they represent. Coalitions work when the leadership of the parties brings those constituents together to meet their common needs. If the coalition is formed solely to serve the interests of the elites, it will simply not be sustainable.

One of the most successful coalition experiences in South Africa has been the successive post-election alliances between the ANC and the IFP which have undoubtedly contributed to a substantial decrease in the political
violence which characterised the province of KZN for some two decades. Through the arrangement, the leaders of the two parties have learnt to work together for the benefit of their constituents, particularly the rural poor, and to resolve their differences peacefully through dialogue. The leaders seem to have successfully explained to their constituents in the province the raison d’être of the coalition government and the majority of people in their constituencies have renounced political violence for the sake of peace, a prerequisite for socio-economic development.

The future of representative democracy and the party system in South Africa will depend heavily on the emergence of political parties that will come together to form principled, viable, well-structured and organised coalitions aimed essentially at safeguarding the welfare of the poor majority, whose interests are currently inadequately represented.

In the final analysis, South Africa’s experience with political party coalitions is rich and offers many lessons about the way factors such as race, ethnicity, class, ideology, electoral system, constitutional framework, political cultures, leadership style, personality of leaders, intra-party dynamics, mechanisms for the management and resolution of conflicts at inter-party level as well as the country’s own context all have a bearing on their formation, survival and effectiveness.
INTRODUCTION

Mauritius’s politics have been characterised by ‘devastating political tsunamis’ as far as party coalitions are concerned. The shifting of party coalitions is a recurrent phenomenon and since the country achieved its independence there have been nearly twice as many coalitions as there have been parliamentary elections. Few of these coalitions last and most collapse spectacularly. Interestingly, the collapse of a party coalition does not mean that former partners do not consider reuniting at some later point; hence the continual revival of political party coalitions on the island.

Since independence Mauritius has held eight general elections. All but one have been fought between two coalitions. The exception was the election of 1976, which was a three-horse contest. The nature of these coalitions lends itself to further scrutiny. In seven of the eight post-independence general elections, namely, those of 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2005, the coalitions were formed before the election, while in 1976 a coalition was formed after the election.

The formation of these coalitions raises a number of questions such as what brings particular political parties together, how negotiations are conducted, who is entitled to negotiate, how the relationships are nurtured,

\footnote{An earlier version of this chapter can be found in \textit{Journal of African Elections} 4(1), pp 133-164}
and what the impact is of party coalitions on women’s representation in Parliament.

Despite more than 35 years of post-independence political history, there is no research systematically documenting this aspect of the Mauritian political process. This omission can partly be explained by the dichotomous nature of Mauritian politics – at one level these ‘marriages of convenience’ are hailed as a national ‘sport’, at another they remain a private matter. In fact, negotiations and exchanges between political parties are rarely conducted in the open, a factor which leads to rumour mongering and speculation until an official statement is issued to the media by the parties to a particular coalition. As one would expect these speculations reach fever pitch at the approach of a general election.

Party coalitions in Mauritius have been far from being alliances between parties of equal standing or status. In all eight post-independence general elections a dominant party has scooped the highest job on offer – the post of prime minister. The only case of more or less equal partnership was in the 2000 election, when there was an electoral agreement to ‘split’ the term of the prime minister between the two coalition leaders, a compromise, political observers argue, that resulted from the weakened position of one of the partners. On that occasion history was made not only because of the split term of the prime minister but because a non-Hindu occupied the top place in government.

In any coalition a great deal depends on the breadth and depth of discussion and leverage of each party leader, which often defines the amount of bargaining capital to which he is entitled. It is not unusual to hear reports that a political party that has practically agreed on an alliance with another party is being ‘courted’ by or is ‘courting’ a third party.

Although, our research concentrates on post-independence Mauritius, pre-independence Mauritius merits some consideration, as, between these two eras, there has been a fundamental shift in the political ideology that has fuelled the different parties as well as an evolution in the nature of electoral alliances.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

*The General Elections of 1963, 1967: Setting the Tone of Marriages of Convenience*

The two pre-independence general elections that will be considered are those of 1963 and 1967 as they were instrumental in paving the way to inde-
pendence. The 1963 election was fought by the Labour Party (LP) also known as the Mauritian Labour Party (MLP), the Independent Forward Bloc (IFB) and the Parti Mauricien Socialiste Démocrate (PMSD), on the theme of independence. The PMSD played on the fears of the minorities by opposing independence while the LP campaigned for full independence. Though the LP, with its ally the IFB, won an overall majority of seats, it sustained severe reversals in the urban area to the benefit of the PMSD.

The 1963 election saw a regrouping along ethnic lines, which, in subsequent elections, become one of the core features (but also one of the complications) of political coalitions and alliances.

As had been agreed at the London constitutional conference of July 1961 which authorised the governor to appoint the leader of the majority party in the Legislative Council as chief minister, the leader of the Labour Party was made premier of the colony; the Legislative Council was restyled the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council was upgraded to Council of Ministers. The succeeding years proved to be particularly tough as the question of independence continued to divide the different political parties. In 1966, an Electoral Commission led by Lord Banwell was set up to devise an electoral system and the most appropriate method of allocating seats in the legislature and to set the boundaries of electoral constituencies. The same electoral system persists to this day.

The 1967 general election once again saw political parties align themselves more or less ethnically. The LP was allied with two other Hindu parties – the IFB and the All Mauritian Hindu Congress (AMHC) – and the Muslim party known as the Comité d’Action Musulman (CAM) joined forces with them. In many ways the election was a referendum on independence, the rural/urban fracture became more pronounced and the PMSD campaign hardened and deepened communal divisions and rivalries. The LP campaigned on political, economic and social issues, arguing that independence would give the country an opportunity to tap additional resources for its development, while the PMSD exploited the fear of the unknown in an uncertain world as well as the numerical dominance of a united Indo-Mauritian group.

As shown in Table 1, the LP and its allies won handsomely, with 54 per cent of the popular vote, and secured 43 of a total of 70 seats.

Mauritius achieved its independence on 12 March 1968. Soon afterwards a coalition government was formed, led by the LP. One of the first tasks of this coalition government was to pass through Parliament three constitutional amendments: the postponement of the following general
Table 1
Results of the 1967 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MLP*</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFB</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSD</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Smith Simmons 1982
* MLP: Mauritian Labour Party / Labour Party

elections, which were supposed to be held by August 1972 at the latest, the suspension of the fundamental rights of the citizens of Mauritius (to allow for the imprisonment of political detainees without trial) and the abolition of by-elections for the legislature. These harsh and undemocratic measures were justified by the government on the grounds that economic development and social peace were threatened by the activities of a new political party, the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM), which emerged as a political movement in the 1970s to meet the aspirations of the youth of a newly independent country, disappointed by the politics of the old parties. The MMM accused the parties of political irrelevance and of creating communal tension and believed they could no longer be trusted by the younger generation. Independent Mauritius needed a paradigm shift in its political system and the MMM responded appropriately to that expectation. From 1973 to 1975 political activity was largely proscribed, the press was censored and the MMM was subjected to political repression and physical violence against its founders, leaders and supporters that only served to harden the resolve of its followers.

General Elections of 1976 and 1982: The Rise of the MMM as a Political Force

The years 1968 to 1976 were difficult ones for the LP, which struggled to contain its coalition partners. It is interesting to note that one of its most ferocious enemies – the PMSD – became an ally from 1969 to 1973, a fact that throws an important light on the type of ‘ideology’ that brings political parties who are in total opposition to secure a ‘marriage of convenience’ aimed at remaining in power.
The first post-independence general election was held in December 1976. The MMM won, with 30 directly elected members, followed by the Labour Party and its ally with 25 seats and the PMSD in third position with only 7 members. After the allocation of the best-loser seats, the MMM had 34 parliamentarians in the new Assembly, the Labour Party and its ally secured 28 and the PMSD 8 (see Table 2).

The LP and the PMSD entered into a post-electoral coalition, essentially to prevent the MMM from acceding to power, but the coalition government was weak and was no match for the MMM team in Parliament. The 1976-1981 Parliament saw the erosion of the authority of the Labour government. Dogged by internal division and a slim parliamentary majority, it encouraged some members of the MMM to cross the floor for ministerial and other office. The leadership was undermined by fractious groups either calling for reform or jockeying for power. On two occasions (1979 and 1980) the opposition filed motions of censure against the government, which were only averted after certain members of the opposition sided, for opportunistic reasons, with the government.

An ageing Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the then prime minister, bent on holding office at any cost, could not see the writing on the wall. Economic difficulties arising from two International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed devaluations of the local currency compounded the discomfort of the government. Fraud and corruption denounced by a commission of enquiry added to the agony of a languishing regime. The Labour Party, in a frenzy of self-inflicted injury, expelled three of its National Assembly members, who formed a new political party, Parti Socialiste Mauricien (PSM), led by Harish Boodhoo. The PSM rallied many of the disillusioned Labour supporters, laying the ground for the final assault on the Labour government and its landslide defeat in the 1982 general election.

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**Table 2**

Results of the 1976 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>38.64</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP and CAM</td>
<td>37.90</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSD</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mathur 1991
Despite these tumultuous years, democracy worked well, with an opposition party that was able to keep the government and its allies in constant check. In fact, the 1976-1981 opposition party was among the most functional and productive of post-independent Mauritius.

The 1982 general election is an interesting test case in ethnic politics. With the LP considerably weakened, the MMM enjoyed the support of a people certain that a wave of change was about to sweep the country. Despite this ‘certainty’, the MMM was not ready to risk going alone to the polls, an uncertainty essentially triggered by the fact that the party had, since its inception, been viewed as one that had made space for the Muslim community as well as a real alternative for the Creole people and it required a political partner that would secure the Hindu community. Bowman sums up the situation eloquently when he says that the MMM’s alliance with ‘the PSM and its promise that Anerood Jugnauth would be prime minister if the election was won were clear gestures toward the Hindu population and, as such, diluted the party’s non-communal, class-based image’ (Bowman 1991). Table 3 illustrates the landslide victory of the MMM and the overwhelming repudiation of the LP.

Table 3
Results of the 1982 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMM/PSM</td>
<td>64.16</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN*</td>
<td>25.78</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSD</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mathur 1991
*Parti d’Alliance Nationale, led by the Labour Party as the major partner with the Muslim Action Committee and dissenting PMSD members.

The enthusiasm and euphoria and the carte blanche given by the population to the MMM/PSM alliance to steer the future course of the country were short lived. Only nine months after its resounding victory, the government collapsed over a series of issues ranging from the status of the Creole language to the stringent economic policies proposed by the then Minister of Finance, Paul Bérenger. A dominant portion of the MMM, led by Bérenger, resigned, rupturing the party. Jugnauth was quick to react by forming the Mouvement
Socialiste Mauricien (MSM). A fresh election had to be called in 1983 as the MSM, into which the PSM had integrated, did not have the required majority in Parliament.


The 1983 and 1987 general elections could be termed the reunion of the Hindu community – ethnic politics and calculation were rampantly practised. Jugnauth’s MSM called on the LP and the PMSD, which, ironically, he had help oust from power, to form a new coalition, while the MMM confronted the electorate alone. According to certain political observers the election results provided a fine example of the way in which the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system can distort and misrepresent the wishes of the electorate. Despite winning some 46,4 percent and 48,12 per cent of the popular vote in the 1983 and 1987 elections respectively, the MMM secured a minority of seats (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of Votes 1983</th>
<th>% of Votes 1987</th>
<th>No. of Seats 1983</th>
<th>No. of Seats 1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSM/LP/PMSD</td>
<td>52,2</td>
<td>49,86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>46,4</td>
<td>48,12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mathur 1991

What is interesting but equally disquieting is that parties had become aligned along geographic and ethnic lines – the MMM had come to represent the urban areas, where the Creole and Muslim communities were largely located, while the MSM and LP reigned supreme in the rural areas, where the majority of the Hindus resided, and, as expected, ethnic politics was at its peak.

The numerical majority the MSM/LP/PMSD coalition government had secured in the 1983 election was far from offering any guarantee of stability. In fact, within six months of taking office, the coalition government underwent its first tremor with the sacking of the leader of the Labour Party, Sir Satcam Boolell. At this point another common feature of the Mauritian political landscape emerged – the labour party split and a group of three labour party ministers and eight Labour Party members of Parliament decided...
to continue to lend support to Jugnauth’s government by forming the Rassemblement des Travailleurs Mauriciens (RTM). However, the ‘defining’ factor that marked the 1983-1986 era and was seen by many political observers as the major cause of instability was the rise of graft and corruption within government ranks, which culminated in the arrest at Schipol Airport in Amsterdam in late 1985 of four members of Parliament from the coalition government when one of them was found with 20kg of heroin in his luggage. That episode was followed by general panic within the coalition government when the ‘architect’ of the 1983 election victory, Boodhoo, resigned as chief whip in 1984 and started a bitter campaign against Jugnauth, claiming that the latter’s party had benefited directly from corruption money. His ‘revelations’ caused a cascade of resignations and defections from the MSM. This resulted in Jugnauth calling on Boolell, who he had sacked some years before, to lend his support to the ailing coalition government. It is interesting to note that the opportunistic nature of Mauritian politics and the overriding urge to remain in power at any cost brought Boolell back into the coalition government, which enabled it to survive for another year when the general election was called for August 1987.

The 1987 party coalition line-up was similar to that of 1983 despite the major problems and splits of the 1983-1986 period. The inevitable happened just a year after the coalition’s electoral victory when the PMSD, led by Sir Gaetan Duval, left the government. The departure of the PMSD did not really affect the ruling coalition but suggested that an important segment of the Mauritian population was no longer represented within the ruling coalition party. The MMM, an important rallying point for the general population, was the official opposition party.

Other failed attempts to redefine the Mauritian ethnic landscape caused various levels of tension and unease within the ruling coalition party as well as among opposition party members. Something quite extraordinary was to happen in early 1990 (two years before a general election was due) when the MSM and LP were officially the ruling coalition government and the MMM was the opposition party, which largely explains the never-ending permutations and combinations to which political parties lend themselves.

In 1989, with the LP keen to rebuild the political strength it had lost after the 1982 debacle, there were bilateral discussions and negotiations between it and the MSM, between it and the MMM and between the MMM and the MSM. Issues pertaining to parity between coalition parties dogged the discussions between the LP and the MMM as well as those between the LP and the MSM and, by mid-1990, the MSM and MMM had finalised a
partnership deal, leaving the LP no choice but to leave the coalition, while the MMM, the existing opposition, was invited to join the government. Anticipating that electoral victory was clearly within the reach of the coalition, it called a general election a full year in advance of the scheduled date.

The 1991 general election saw a confident ‘reconstituted’ ‘militant’ family, while the opposition parties – the LP with a new leader at its helm, Dr Navin Ramgoolam (son of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam), and the PMSD were weakened and badly organised and no real match for the MSM/MMM alliance. The alliance scooped 57 seats and won 56,3 per cent of the popular vote (see Table 5). Political bliss was short lived as the MMM underwent its second split. The Renouveau Militant Mauricien (RMM), led by Prem Nababsing and some of the key figures of the MMM, was formed and stayed in government, while Bérenger and his loyal ‘lieutenants’ stepped into opposition. By the time the 1995 general election was due, Jugnauth had been prime minister for some 13 years, always as leader of the dominant party that had forged a series of alliances since 1983.

Table 5
Results of the 1991 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSM/MMM</td>
<td>56,3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP/PGD*</td>
<td>39,9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EIU 1991
*PGD: Parti Gaetan Duval, a faction of the PMSD

The 1995 general election saw the triumphant return of the LP, supported by the MMM. What ensued was a total red and purple ‘raz de marée’; red and purple being the party colours of the LP and MMM respectively. The political reign of Jugnauth came to an abrupt end. The LP/MMM won 63,7 per cent of the popular vote and all the seats, while the MSM/RMM reaped a mediocre 19,3 per cent of the popular vote and remained seatless (see Table 6). In fact, the MSM/RMM won the lowest percentage of the popular vote recorded by an alliance in any of the post-independence general elections. However, it did not take long before the now familiar pattern of a ruptured coalition government emerged, and the MMM was urged to leave government in 1997.
For the 2000 general election it was once more back to basics, with the grand ‘reunion’ of the ‘militant’ family, resulting in an almost clean sweep for the MSM/MMM coalition, as shown in Table 7.

Table 6
Results of the 1995 general election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LP/MMM</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM/RMM</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EIU1996

For the 2000 general election it was once more back to basics, with the grand ‘reunion’ of the ‘militant’ family, resulting in an almost clean sweep for the MSM/MMM coalition, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7
Results of the 2000 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSM/MMM</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP/PMXD*</td>
<td>36.95</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral Commission Office 2004
*Party Mauricien Xavier Duval (PMXD) is another split part of the PMSD

The pre-electoral accord (popularly known as the ‘medpoint’ accord) was in fact a feat of electoral agreement/negotiation as it historically split the term of the prime minister, allowing the two coalition leaders each to take a turn and providing for each of the main coalition parties, the MSM and MMM, to receive 30 parliamentary seats. As mentioned above, the accord was even more unusual in allowing a non-Hindu to occupy the position of prime minister, which had always been reserved for a particular sub-group within the Hindu majority (Lodge, Kadima and Pottie 2002).

In the most recent general election, in 2005, the MMM-MSM coalition leaders came up with what they called a ‘winning formula’ – a repeat of the split prime ministership, with the leader of the MMM as prime minister for the first two-and-a half years and the leader of the MSM taking over for the remainder of the five-year term. The slogan of the LP’s Alliance Sociale was
‘Bizin Changement’, meaning ‘there is the need for change’. Despite the fact that the 2005 general election was contested using the existing FPTP electoral system, the results were not totally skewed in favour of the winning alliance as had been the case in the 1991, 1995 and 2000 general elections (see Table 8).

Table 8
Results of the 2005 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>No. of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Sociale*</td>
<td>48,8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance MMM-MSM</td>
<td>42,6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Electoral Commission Office 2005
* This is a coalition led by the Labour Party and consisting of five small parties: the Parti Mauricien Xavier Luc Duval, the Mouvement Républicain, Les Verts, the Mouvement Militant Socialiste Mauricien and the Mouvement Socialiste Démocrate

A little less than a year after the 2005 general election, the ruling Alliance Sociale is still going strong, while the members of the opposition alliance, the MMM and the MSM, have decided to go their separate ways. Matters have been aggravated by the decision of the PMSD leader (who had been given a seat from the MMM quota in the previous general election) to leave the MMM and sit as an independent parliamentarian. No doubt, this new scenario has placed in question the current position of the Leader of the Opposition, Paul Bérenger, as the latter’s party, the MMM, no longer has a numerical majority, especially in relation to the MSM.

It is also important to note that Mauritius is currently facing serious economic and social problems linked to the dramatic drop in the price of sugar as well as the abolition of preferential textile quotas. This potentially bleak situation has led some political leaders from both the opposition and ruling parties to talk about the need to form a government of national unity. Only time will tell what the dynamics of the different parties represented in the present Parliament will be. However, it must be noted that the dominant party, the LP, which currently leads the ruling alliance, has a very strong majority (approximately 80 per cent of elected members of the ruling Alliance Sociale belong to the LP) and this will no doubt have an impact on its ability to dictate the rules of the current coalition government.
Examining the various coalition governments enumerated above, one can detect a systematic pattern of triumphant electoral victory followed by alliance decay and an early poll. In the more than 36 years of post-independence Mauritian political history, political parties have forged alliances with other parties that have been historically and ideologically opposed to them or with the very parties with whom relationships had broken down when they were in a coalition government. No doubt the above is just the tip of the iceberg of complex political alliances where ethnicity, the presence of dominant parties and leadership style/personality are predominant ingredients in devising a ‘perfect’ winning formula.

**Ethnicity: The Necessary Evil of Coalition Political Parties**

Mauritius prides itself on being a multi-ethnic, linguistically rich and culturally diverse nation. Celebratory slogans like ‘unity in diversity’, ‘one people one nation’ and ‘rainbow nation’ are devised and popularised by politicians. However, the irony and hypocrisy lie in the fact that these very politicians practise and thrive on a politics of ethnic division and calculation. As shown in an earlier section of this paper, pre- and post-independence elections have been marked by ethnic considerations with the ‘choice’ of an alliance partner determined by its ethnic co-efficient as opposed to its ideological proximity or compatibility.

Ethnicity is, and will continue to be, an important feature of Mauritian politics. People living in Mauritius are constantly ‘split’ between the multiple identities of their ancestral homeland and the one in which they have grown up. This layering of identities is usually exploited, not to say abused, at election times, when certain politicians appeal to the basic instincts of voters, asking them to support ‘people of your kind’.

The omnipresence of ethnicity within the Mauritian political context is further embedded by the current electoral system which, for many, legitimises/institutionalises the process of political ethnicisation. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that coalition parties were sought and alliances forged using ethnic ‘logic’ based on securing a majority base. This will be further explained in the section on the legal framework of the study and illustrated by the system of ‘best losers’, or variable correctives, which, in the search for a balance of ethnic representation, requires that each candidate for Parliament declare his or her ethnic affiliation.

Parties abound within the Mauritian political landscape and in the general election of 2005 there were 71 registered with the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). This is no doubt indicative of the interest
of parties in fielding candidates. Despite this diversity, the post-independence Mauritian political landscape remains dominated by three political parties, namely, the LP, the MMM and the MSM. An interesting feature of all three parties is that, in the past 30 years or so, they have undergone multiple splits which have generated new parties, some of them short lived, others driven by a communal/ethnic purpose and some essentially becoming one-person or one-issue parties.

Each of the mainstream parties has a particular ethno-electoral baseline. In the case of the LP, its pro-independence struggle allowed it to rally most of the Indo-Mauritian groups (Hindus, Muslims, Tamils and others) behind it, while the PMSD essentially represented the Creole community and the minority group of people of European descent (the whites). Post-independence Mauritius saw the emergence of a new party – the MMM, which was to challenge the old LP guard and appeal to certain ethnic groups, namely the Muslims, a fair segment of the Creole community and certain minority strands within the Hindu majority group. The ‘hegemony’ that the LP had acquired vis-à-vis the Hindu community was eroding and this deterioration was exacerbated by the creation of the PSM, which, in joining forces with the MMM for the 1982 general election, allowed the MMM to overcome the perception that it consisted entirely of Muslim, Creole and certain ethnic minority groups.

After its creation in 1983 the MSM rallied a large section of the Hindus who had been staunch supporters of the LP prior to that party’s 1982 decline. Indeed, when the MSM was formed, it was able to appeal to and attract a fair majority of the LP’s electoral base. However, this base, essentially made up of Hindus, began to return to the LP in the mid-1990s, leaving the MSM with diminished support. The period between 1983 and 1989 saw a great reunion of the Hindu community, with the MSM taking on board for two successive elections (1983 and 1987) the LP as well as some minority parties.

As for the PMSD, the presence and clout it had secured among the Creole community before independence dwindled steadily with the creation of the MMM. The PMSD has also suffered from multiple splits, which further fragmented its electoral base.

Mention was made above of several splits within the three mainstream parties since their inception. Although the formation of splinter parties has not made a substantial difference to the electoral balance, a fact that has been ascertained on several occasions by opinion polls, these parties have nevertheless been able to chip away at the electoral capital of the three
mainstream parties. The LP, for instance, has ‘generated’ splinter parties like the Parti Socialiste Mauricien (PSM), Rassemblement des Travaillistes Mauricien (RTM) and the Mouvement Travailliste Démocrate that emanate from and represent the Hindu community.

The MMM has undergone three splits since its inception (in 1973, 1983 and 1993). The only one which allowed for the advent of a significant party was that in 1983 when the MSM was created. The Renouveau Militant Mauricien (RMM), created in 1993, was not significant and, as mentioned above, the MSM and RMM recorded the lowest percentage of the popular vote in any post-independence general election when they garnered only 19.3 per cent.

Since its inception the MSM has undergone several turbulent phases, essentially marked by the departure of senior members of the party. In 1994 the party experienced its first official split when Madan Dulloo, a senior minister in Jugnauth’s Cabinet, left to create the Mouvement Militant Socialiste Mauricien (MMSM). The MMSM remains a one-person party and is currently part of the Alliance Sociale led by Navin Ramgoolam’s LP. In February 2005 several members of Parliament, led by Anil Bachoo (who in the mid-1980s had created the Mouvement des Travaillistes Dissidents (MTD) – a breakaway group from the LP) had left the MSM, blaming its leader, Pravind Jugnauth, for being unable to steer the party and giving in too much to its coalition partner, the MMM. Bachoo’s new party is known as the Mouvement Socialiste Démocrate (MSD) and is currently a minor partner of the ruling alliance, led by the LP and four small parties.

In the last decade or so, the Mauritian political landscape has also been marked by the advent of ethnically-driven parties like the Hizbullah, the Mouvement Démocratique Mauricien (MDM) and Les Verts, who claim to represent respectively the voices of a given section of the Muslim, Hindu and Creole populations. These three parties have not really caused a major stir but their ethno-political claims have, from time to time, struck a sympathetic chord among people belonging to certain ethnic groups.

Officially the mainstream parties like the MMM, LP and MSM appeal to a broad-based electorate but on the ground the reality can be very different, something that has been borne out in numerous general elections, particularly those of 1983 and 1987, during which ethnic differentiation was most obvious. From the early 1980s to the early 1990s the Muslim community was ostracised by the government coalition for supporting the MMM, who were in opposition. Two events lend support to this claim. In 1984 the then prime minister, Anerood Jugnauth, expelled the Head of
Mission of the Libyan Embassy, who was believed to be over sympathetic to the MMM. In 1987 the Muslim Personal Law (MPL), which gave legal status to the marriage of Muslims who opted to marry only religiously, was withdrawn and, to date, has not been reinstated. This has caused great anguish and concern among a section of the Muslim community.

It is obvious that certain political parties in Mauritius and, by extension, their coalition partners, operate a policy of carrot and stick – encouraging and rewarding ethnic groups that support them while punishing those that oppose them. Clearly this policy goes against the tenets of democracy and broad-based representivity but, unfortunately, it fits the logic of ethnic politics.

The 2005 general election offered an interesting perspective on the extent to which ethnicity is embedded within the culture of political parties and their leaders. It was no secret that the colour of the outgoing prime minister and the proposed prime minister of the MMM-MSM alliance, Paul Bérenger, a Franco-Mauritanian, unleashed ethnically charged and communally biased debates. Ethnicity was also at work in the selection and nomination of candidates from the two main alliances. In fact, a simple analysis of the profile of the candidates nominated from the two alliance blocks demonstrates the extent to which political leaders were concerned about ensuring that the candidates they nominated had the ‘right’ ethnic profile. The ethnic component was further evidenced in the fact that Muslims (traditionally an MMM electorate) and Hindus massively endorsed the Alliance Sociale, while the general population rallied behind the MMM-MSM alliance. In fact, it is interesting to note that the coming together of Hindus and Muslims is reminiscent of the pre-independence general elections of 1963 and 1967.

So it seems that ethnic politics is here to stay. Should the current situation be allowed to continue unchallenged or should the necessary mechanisms be instituted to loosen the grip of ethnicity on politics? There is no doubt that the second option is desirable in the interests of every Mauritian citizen. However, it would require enormous political commitment and determination from some political parties to do away with a system that has favoured them to the detriment of other parties. There are two events that have provided a glimmer of hope that matters might be heading in the right direction, namely, the post of prime minister being occupied by a non-Hindu and the series of discussions leading to electoral reform. Although both these developments are important steps in the right direction, they are being jeopardised by a revival of ethnically
charged language and the call from certain quarters to restore the ‘due’ of the Hindu community. In relation to electoral reform the 2005 general election was a missed opportunity to make changes to an electoral system that had served its time.

**Party Coalitions and the Invisibility of Women**

Before the 2005 general election, Mauritius had one of the lowest percentages of women in Parliament (5.7%) (Inter-Parliamentary Union Database 2005), a situation that can be explained by the fact that Mauritian society is highly patriarchal and by the nature of the current electoral system, which has systematically proved to be prejudicial to female representation. The Sachs Commission Report (2002) describes the low level of women’s representation in Mauritian politics as ‘a grave democratic deficit’.

The 2005 general election was supposed to be a watershed in ensuring greater female representivity. Despite the fact that only 16 women on a list of 120 candidates (6 for the Alliance Sociale and 10 for the MMM-MSM coalition) were nominated, 12 of them (11 directly elected and 1 nominated through the best-loser system) form part of the Fifth Legislative Assembly. Statistically, the representation of women in Parliament has been boosted from an abysmal 5.7 per cent to a relatively honourable 17 per cent.

This new female presence seems to be more a matter of coincidence than a deliberate move by political leaders to field more women candidates. Another reading might be that the electorate is more willing in certain cases to vote and subsequently elect a woman rather than her male counterpart or opponent. This is evidenced by the results in certain constituencies where women candidates were elected in pole positions and in others where women were successfully elected whilst certain ‘star’ male candidates were miserably defeated. This is an ideal time for all relevant stakeholders to come together to demand more concrete measures to ensure greater representation of women and the advocacy work that was started by certain civil society groups prior to the 2005 general election should not only continue but perhaps intensify.

Elections have always been extremely competitive in Mauritius because of the winner-takes-all electoral system that compels party bosses to select those of their members who are most likely to win. These candidates are invariably men. Although some political parties are discussing the institution of a quota system to correct this gender imbalance until now there has been no formal mechanism to ensure that more women are guaranteed a ticket.

This situation is further aggravated by the fact that general elections in Mauritius have essentially been fought on a coalition basis. The formation
of coalitions brings an additional level of competition to that which already exists at party level, where women are already significantly marginalised. At inter-party level, negotiations are always tougher because fewer seats are available for each party and this results in even fewer women being nominated.

Table 9 gives a breakdown of the number of women fielded as candidates in the post-independence general elections.

It is clear from the above that there is little difference between the number of women fielded by coalitions and those fielded by single (mainstream or small) parties. The proportion of women candidates has never exceeded 8 per cent in any coalition combination or mainstream single party. Matters improved slightly in the 2000 general election, when the LP/PMXD fielded the largest percentage of women candidates (13%) in any general election. It is also interesting to note that in 1995 and 2000 the Parti Gaetan Duval and the MDN (two small parties) each fielded 10 per cent of women candidates, but none of them was elected.

Table 9
Number of Women Fielded as Candidates in General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government coalition</th>
<th>No. of women candidates</th>
<th>Opposition coalition</th>
<th>No. of women candidates</th>
<th>Single party opposition</th>
<th>No. of women candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Independence Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MMM/PSD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Parti de L’Alliance Nationale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MMM/PSM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PMSD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>MSM/LP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MMM/PMSD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>MSM/LP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MMM/MTD/FTS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>MSM/MMM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LP/PMSD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>MSM/RMM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>LP/MMM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parti Gaetan Duval</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>LP/PMXD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>MSM/MMM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>MDN</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>LP/PMXD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MMM/MSM</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lalit</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data Complied from the Electoral Commission Office 2005
Note: Each coalition or single party has a list of 60 candidates.
Party leaders promised to field more women in the July 2005 general election. As shown in Table 9, the MMM/MSM increased the number of women from 4 to 10 in 2005, an increase of 250 per cent over that in 2000, whereas the LP/PMXD reduced the number from eight to six, a decrease of 25 per cent.

It must be pointed out that the number of women candidates is not a sufficient indicator of the commitment of party leadership to gender balance. Beyond the numbers, in the first-past-the-post electoral system, this commitment will be assessed by investigating whether or not female candidates are fielded in winnable constituencies and if the number of such female candidates is sufficient to reverse the current gender imbalance. In a proportional representation system, the number and ranking of female candidates on the party list is the ultimate criterion used to determine how serious a party is about gender parity.

**Party Structures and Ideology**

The major political parties, namely, the LP, MMM and MSM, have undergone a significant shift in ideology since they were founded. This shift could be interpreted as the death of party ideology and the rise of political opportunism. In fact, the major concern of most political alliances seems to be to retain power or to return to power, an assumption backed up by the strange bedfellows they choose. Over the years, the leaders of different political parties entering or about to enter a coalition have offered various justifications for their choice of political partners. In this regard the comments of Paul Bérenger on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the MMM are quite telling. ‘There are,’ he said, ‘natural coalitions as well as coalitions that go against the natural order of things’ (*L’Express* 18 September 1994).

As mentioned above, the LP was forged in the spirit of bringing independence and autonomy to the then British colony of Mauritius. The party was driven by an inherent belief that it offered an alternative to the oppressive forces of colonisation and hence preached the political and social emancipation of the masses. Shortly after independence, the party put into place a fully-fledged and comprehensive welfare system and instituted a culture of government subsidies which still exists today. The MMM was founded to provide a new approach to local politics after the old guard failed to solve the country’s post-independence economic, social and political problems.

At its inception it was viewed as a leftist/radical party, with its major support coming from the trade unions. In the early 1970s it promoted itself
as a people-centred party. The MSM is, in fact, a fragment of the MMM, formed after a split from that party in 1983. The party has evolved with the economic situation of the country and the evolution of the society itself. Indeed, in the mid-1980s and 1990s the then prime minister and leader of the MSM, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, was credited as the ‘father’ of economic success. However, today there seem to be no real ideological differences between the three parties – they all say that they promote a pragmatic socialist ideology based on social justice and redistribution of wealth. This emerges in their election manifestos, which use similar language and converge in terms of ideas and objectives (MSM / MMM 2000, 2005 and LP / PMXD 2000, 2005).

When it comes to party structure and organisation each party is bound to its constitution. In fact, the party’s constitution offers the operating guidelines as well as the different substructures for the entry and dissemination of views, opinions and decisions at all levels of the party. The three parties have more or less similar structures and all pride themselves on operating an inclusive and bottom-up approach.

The mainstream political parties, as well as some of the smaller ones, have a four-tier structure comprising a political bureau that is in charge of policy conceptualisation, a central committee responsible for decision-making, a general assembly that meets at least once a year, and regional branches that gather the grassroots members. Despite what appears to be well-oiled party machinery, closer scrutiny of the actual operations of the political parties demonstrates the overriding authority of the leader of the party, an authority that often includes the power of veto when it comes to critical issues such as nomination of candidates, party funding, and the formation and dissolution of alliances.

According to a former senior cadre of the MMM more than a decade ago, the MMM’s central committee would meet fortnightly, with meetings ending with a press conference. Today’s MMM, says the same cadre, is under the total control of its leader, there is no longer any separation between government and party and the grassroots members are consulted less and less. This view was corroborated by another former MMM senior official, who argues that the party once had mechanisms in place for consulting its support base but today the leadership decides for the party. This top-down approach, with the party leader playing a central role, is not unique to one party, it is a feature of all political parties in Mauritius and demonstrates that, despite promoting a discourse of internal political democracy, political leaders retain absolute control of their parties.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS

Mauritius is often cited as an exemplar of democratic success within the Southern African region. The regularity with which it holds elections, its culture of multipartyism, its track record of political stability, management of diversity, political alternation and the fact that election results have not been contested are some of the positive elements of the ‘Mauritian democratic model’. However, several questions must be posed about the ‘quality’ of this democracy. Is it sufficient only to have elections every five years or should citizens be consulted on policy in the interim? Should electoral reforms remain merely political pledges or should they ensure the consolidation of democracy and good governance? Should the law not give more leverage and latitude to the Mauritian Electoral Commissioner in the discharge of his electoral activities?

Some of the above questions have been left partly unanswered because of the absence of any specific electoral or political party law. Legally, political parties are required by the Constitution (1968) to register with the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) at least 14 days prior to the nomination of their candidates for any general election (Constitution, First Schedule, s 2). The National Assembly Elections Act of 1968 lays out the modus operandi of the registration of political parties, which should be recorded in ‘form 3 and shall be made and signed in the presence of the Electoral Commissioner, by the president, chairman or secretary of the party duly authorised to do so by a resolution passed by the executive committee of such party and such application shall be supported by a certified extract of the minutes of proceedings of the meeting at which the executive committee of such a party passed such resolution’ (s 7(2)). It is important to note that the above regulations apply solely to election periods. At other times political parties are completely unregulated.

The law is usually supplemented by the constitutions of the parties, which provide the necessary internal party guidelines. However, the applicability of the party constitution is questionable as members of some political parties have said that they have never been able to access such documents.

This relative freedom and flexibility has allowed political parties to register and nominate the candidates of their choice. Candidates may also stand as independents and do not require any party affiliation or nomination. In previous general elections the number of political parties and independent
candidates registered with the ESC has been significant – in 2000, 43 political parties were registered (Electoral Commission 2004). Mere registration does not, of course, mean that all these parties play an active role or have a significant impact. In fact, the Mauritian political landscape has, for some decades, been dominated by three major parties – the LP, the MMM and the MSM – and this situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, while the rest are condemned to remain fragments of little or no importance.

The absence of any electoral or political party law per se seems to be adequately compensated for by the Constitution, which defines Mauritius as a sovereign democratic state and ensures the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary as well as providing them with the necessary mechanisms for the discharge of their respective duties. In 1991 the Constitution was amended and the country became a republic, with a president who is the head of state and commander-in-chief and who ‘shall be elected by the Assembly on a motion made by the prime minister and supported by the votes of a majority of all members of the Assembly (Constitution of Mauritius, s 28(2)). The President of the Republic, in turn, appoints the prime minister and his deputy (s 58(1)) who, together with the Cabinet, are accountable to Parliament. Should Parliament pass a resolution of no confidence in the government and should the prime minister not resign within three days of such a resolution, ‘the President shall remove the Prime Minister from office’ (s 6(1)). Even the post of leader of the opposition is enshrined in the Constitution (s 73).

There is no doubt that these provisions ensure a system of checks and balances which prevent unilateral decisions being made and offer each ‘player’ an important stake. What impact does this have on parties or members of parties in coalitions? Section 59(3) provides that the ‘President, acting in his own deliberate judgment, shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of the Assembly who appears to him best able to command the support of the majority of the members of the Assembly’. This clause not only officially determines the majority governing partner (although in most of the cases of pre-election alliances this is already established and ‘sold’ to the electorate) it allows one of the partners of a ruptured governing alliance to hold on to power, as happened in 1984, 1989, 1993 and 1997.

Although the Constitution legitimises the ruling and opposition parties, the FPTP electoral system that has been operational since 1886, together with the ‘best-loser’ system, has led to countless permutations and combinations of pre-election alliances. The FPTP is in fact a first-three-past-the-post system, allowing for 60 elected members to be represented in the
National Assembly, each of the 20 constituencies returning three MPs and the island of Rodrigues two. In addition, a system of best losers (variable correctives) prevails, attributing an extra eight seats to non-elected candidates based on their ethno-religious affiliation. Many political observers believe the FPTP and the best-loser system have been at the root of the proliferation, creation and ultimately the disbanding of political party alliances. In addition, the system has resulted in the crude ethnicisation of political parties, which have essentially focused their attention on the electoral benefits of party alliance formation.

In fact, the constant ethnic calculation in which political parties engage is ‘legitimised’ by the Constitution, making it necessary for ‘every candidate for election at any general election of members of the Assembly to declare in such manner as may be prescribed which community he belongs to and that community shall be stated in a published notice of his nomination’ (First Schedule, s 3(1)). This process of deliberate ethnicisation has been further compounded by the drawing of electoral boundaries that perpetuate a rural-urban divide based on ethnic agglomeration.

Electoral reform has been one of the political pledges of the main parties, even appearing in their election manifestos. As early as 2001 they set up a ‘Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform’ presided over by a Judge of South Africa’s Constitutional Court, Judge Albie Sachs). The commission presented its recommendations a year later, following which a Select Committee of the Assembly was appointed to study the report. The select committee only made its recommendations public in 2004 (Select Committee 2004). What is striking about the two reports is that they both recognise the deviant and disproportionate distortion of the prevailing FPTP system where ‘the three member constituencies frequently produced results which were grossly disproportionate to the share of votes obtained by the different parties. At times, although obtaining a substantial vote, the Opposition was completely or nearly completely eliminated’ (Sachs Report 2001, para 33). The main aim of the two reports was to ensure an electoral system where fairness and representivity were not forsaken, especially when it came to ‘correcting the over-representation of the leading party or alliance’ (Sachs Report 2001, para 37).

Despite the investment of considerable time and resources in these two committees nothing much seems to have happened and, as mentioned in an earlier section, the 2005 general election was a lost opportunity to change the existing system. Electoral reform is one of the elements expected to consolidate the fabric of Mauritian democracy. The absence of any electoral
or political party law is to be lamented, as the mere registration of political parties, particularly since this only happens at election times, is far from sufficient.

POLITICAL PARTY COALITION FORMATION

This section analyses the formation of political party coalitions in Mauritius and attempts to answer the following questions: How are these coalitions formed? What are their purposes? What are the driving forces, including those located behind the scenes? What are the real motivations of the political leaders in entering into coalitions? How is the power shared amongst the affiliated parties? To answer these questions, the authors held extensive interviews with current and past senior members and leaders of the LP, the MMM, the MSM and the PMSD. Secondary sources were also consulted, but in a limited way, because the subject of political party coalitions in Mauritius has barely been studied.

The Objectives of and Driving Forces behind Party Coalitions

There are several factors, of varying degrees of importance, which compel political parties to enter into pre-election coalitions and which shape the conditions of these partnerships. The dominant factor in Mauritius is the ethnic set-up of the country, which makes it impossible for one party to win more than 50 per cent of the vote. Prior to independence, the LP was the strongest party, as it had been able to rally practically the whole of the Indo-Mauritian community and consequently was able to win on its own. With independence, the population became ethnically segmented, especially with the coming of the MMM. Thus, contracting an alliance has become an important ingredient in the formula for election victory.

Another factor that explains why Mauritian leaders tend to resort to coalitions is the three-member constituency first-past-the-post electoral system. This compels parties to spread across ethnic barriers and enter into pre-electoral alliances in order to avoid wasting votes.

There is also a psychological reason for these coalitions – they reassure voters, who feel secure when a party demonstrates that it is open to others and can, if need be, rally their forces. Explaining this symbolism, one respondent notes that even the majority community, the Hindus, feels the need to reassure the other communities by entering into coalitions, even with small parties. The quest for social cohesion is therefore not a negligible factor.
Most respondents maintain that coalitions are formed to accommodate ethnicity. The authors do not concur with this view. As in other parts of the world, political parties in Mauritius enter into pre-election coalitions with a view to winning elections and governing. Party coalitions are ultimately formed in order to access or maintain power. To achieve this, the architects of party coalitions resort to ethnic calculation and logic. It can therefore be argued that, though the factors described above, including ethnicity, shape the formation of political party coalitions, the overarching objective of entering into these coalitions is to remain in power or to access it and govern the country.

The first case of a post-election party coalition was the 1969 coalition government, which took the form of a marriage of convenience between the Hindu-dominated pro-independence party, the LP, and the Creole and white dominated anti-independence party, the PMSD. This arrangement accommodated ethnicity when the ethnically based political polarisation that resulted from the bitterly fought pre-independence election in 1968 made it difficult to run the country. The solution seemed to be to bring the two main pre-independence parties together in a government of national unity.

On the other hand, the ‘economic bourgeoisie’, which consisted mainly of white business people, had voted against independence and was resented by the new ‘political bourgeoisie’, comprising the Indian-dominated pro-independence groups led by the LP. To ease the tensions between the economic and the political bourgeoisies, which did not augur well for the newly independent state, France and the United Kingdom, the former colonial powers, brought the two parties together in a consociational arrangement.

Interestingly, the two main political parties at the time, the LP and the PMSD, agreed subsequently to suspend elections, thus entrenching their joint rule beyond their term of office. This development showed that political leaders did not hesitate to sacrifice their professed ‘democratic’ values in order to consolidate their grip on power. For seven years Mauritius was transformed into a kind of two-party ‘dictatorship’.

The 1976 post-election coalition between the LP and the PMSD was partly justified by some ideological considerations – the two parties were alarmed at the emergence of the leftist party, the MMM, which they regarded as communist. Fearing the possible geo-political impact of an MMM victory on other countries in the region, such as Madagascar, Seychelles and Reunion, France and the United Kingdom encouraged the LP and the PMSD to form a coalition, which they did, successfully keeping out of power the MMM,
which had actually won the election. In summary, the objectives of the 1976 post-election coalition were threefold: the self-interest of the losing parties, the preservation of the national economic bourgeoisie who had been frightened by the MMM’s socialism, and the external forces which were threatened by the MMM’s leftist ideology.

All the subsequent coalitions have been pre-election alliances. The respective ideologies of the political parties involved have become increasingly irrelevant because, since Mauritius is an export-oriented country, successive governments have had to maintain liberal economic policies in order to continue to enjoy preferential treatment and quotas. This trend was reinforced from the late 1980s with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the advent of Perestroika.

As indicated above the driving force behind most coalition negotiations has been the party leaders. In 1976, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Sir Gaetan Duval combined to keep out their ‘common enemy’, the MMM. In 1982 the leaders of the MMM and the PSM, respectively Anerood Jugnauth (before he quit to form the MSM) and Harish Boodhoo, along with Paul Bérenger, the then secretary general of the MMM, drove the formation of the coalition of those two parties, although the MMM also consulted other strong party members who, no doubt, had an important role to play. When the coalition collapsed, the MSM’s Jugnauth formed an alliance with the LP, having negotiated directly with its then leader, Sir Satcam Boolell.

1983 saw the start of the reign of Jugnauth’s MSM as the dominant party in the 1983, 1987 and 1991 coalition governments. Another important point to bear in mind was the practically undisputed choice of Anerood Jugnauth as the prime minister of the pre-electoral coalition.

In 1995, the electoral agreement between the LP and the MMM saw the return of the LP as a dominant party after nearly 13 years of absence. Bérenger personally conducted the negotiations.

In 2000 Bérenger and Jugnauth reached an historic agreement on an MMM-MSM coalition. Two high-ranking officials, Anil Bachoo of the MSM and Pradeep Jeeha of the MMM, are also credited with having played a crucial role in the negotiations. Harish Boodhoo of the PSM, a smaller coalition partner, was another important force. The MSM and the MMM were each entitled to 30 parliamentary seats but each was to share its seats with minority coalition partners. Indeed, the MMM gave two seats to the PMSD and the MSM offered one seat to the Verts and another to the Mouvement Républicain (MR). It is worth noting that the decision to share the post of prime minister between the leaders of the MSM and the MMM
was not explicitly included in the agreement. It was agreed that after three years Jugnauth would voluntarily cede the post to Bérenger. During Bérenger’s term Jugnauth became the ceremonial president of the Republic of Mauritius. Also by agreement Pravind Jugnauth, son of Sir Anerood Jugnauth, became minister of finance for the first three years and deputy prime minister for the last two years of the government’s term. When his father became president of the Republic, the son became leader of the MSM.

While many in the MSM were happy with the arrangement, realising that the coalition was necessary for an election victory, others were hostile to it and hoped it would not last.

Party coalition negotiations usually take between one and three months, although, in exceptional cases they have lasted for a year and, in one case, they took just one week. It is undeniable that party leaders are the driving forces behind most coalitions, though, in some cases, the initiative of approaching a potential partner has come from high-ranking party officials, one level below the leaders.

The role played by party members and supporters in the formation of coalitions should not be underestimated. If members and supporters favour a particular potential partner or coalition composition it is difficult for leaders to ignore the popular will.

**Selection of Coalition Partners and the Sharing of Power**

It is argued above that there are no longer fundamental ideological differences in Mauritius and that what differences there are are created by political parties in order to build their own style and identity. All Mauritian parties lean towards social democracy and the centre-left and stand for social cohesion, national unity, democracy, anti-corruption and social progress.

As an export-oriented country subject to World Trade regulations, Mauritius has sacrificed its sovereignty by constantly seeking support from the world, including the European Union, the United States and South Africa, a factor that has led to an ideological realignment.

The selection of affiliated parties is therefore based on criteria other than a common ideology. All the respondents recognise that the underlying criterion in the formation of political party coalitions is the accommodation of ethnic diversity. Each coalition ascertains that it is seen as ethnically representative, an important requirement for social cohesion. Apart from this first criterion related to the need for political correctness in matters of ethnic representivity, several other criteria determine the selection of potential coalition partners.
The second criterion is the relative strength of political parties. This is an important element because the ultimate objective of a coalition is to win the election, so it is important to assess how many seats a party can bring to the coalition in order to secure victory. The strength of a political party can be measured by means of opinion polls, the most recent election results, and the size of the crowds attracted to rallies. All these factors play a part in determining each party’s share.

A third criterion is the ability of a leader to govern. This helps to explain why a particular party leader might be invited to join a coalition and play a leading role even if his political party is relatively small. This was the case with the MSM in 1991 and 2000.

The drive for political stability in the interests of the economy is another factor that has been instrumental in shaping coalitions, for instance that between the LP and the PMSD in 1976.

The outgoing prime minister is in a position of strength to negotiate unless polls show that his popularity is in decline. Indeed, the prime minister has substantial leverage not only in determining the date of the next election but also in choosing with which political party his party will form a coalition. In the same vein, economic problems under a particular prime minister may make him and his party unattractive as a coalition partner in the next election.

The final criterion determining the formation of a coalition is agreement about how power is to be shared among the partners. Extensive interviews with current and party leaders revealed how power sharing is negotiated. The basis of the allocation of Cabinet portfolios and other senior positions is negotiation. This includes the selection of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the president of the Republic, the vice-president of the Republic, the speaker of Parliament, the deputy speaker, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of finance.

In addition to negotiations, other factors explain the sharing of positions both within the parties and between coalition partners. Among these are the internal dynamics of a party which allow some individuals to secure posts for themselves and their protégés. The selection of parliamentary candidates is carried out by the political bureaux of the two main parties in the coalition and takes into account, *inter alia*, the ethnic profile of the constituency as well as the rural-urban divide. Loyalty to the leader from within the party is an important criterion in the internal selection of candidates because the leader requires the assurance that in case of a breakdown of the coalition the majority of members will remain with him.
and will not cross the floor. In the past the MMM had lost many members, who, following the collapse of the coalition, chose to form a new party and remain in the coalition.

The mechanisms of selecting parliamentary candidates within the coalition are influenced by factors such as the balance of power between the coalition partners. In this regard, the leading party in the coalition, needing to ensure that it keeps its majority even if the coalition breaks down, must have a sufficient number of seats for this to be possible. In addition, the determination of the number of parliamentary candidates for each partner party depends on the size of the partner. If the coalition is formed with a smaller party, such as the MSM, the larger party would be assured of receiving the majority of seats.

An implicit element must be factored in when posts are shared out. Until recently, all the country’s prime ministers have not only come from the Hindu community but from a specific caste within that community. This implicit criterion has made it possible to predict the next prime minister from among a handful of Hindu party leaders.

The advent of Bérenger as the country’s prime minister was initially appreciated by the electorate. Eventually, though, it caused a great deal of discontent among some conservative Indians. It will be interesting to see in the future whether the inauguration of a non-Hindu as the prime minister of the islands in late 2003 was just an exception that proves the rule; an accident de parcours.

MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PARTY COALITIONS

In-depth interviews with past and current senior party officials and leaders have enabled the authors to look at the internal mechanisms of political party coalition management and maintenance. This section examines these procedures, analyses the challenges of sustaining coalitions and determines the consequences for individual affiliated parties of joining a coalition. In addition, the section examines internal party procedures and mechanisms in the area of consultation with the party membership in order to determine how internal party dynamics influence the functioning of the coalition, and vice versa.

Coalition Management Procedures

The formation of party coalitions is preceded by speculation and rumour, a situation that persists until the agreements are announced in press statements.
Typically, press releases do not provide detailed information on matters such as management procedures. The fact that these procedures tend to remain informal means that coalition management systems tend to depend on personal relationships between the leaders, and negotiations are initiated or arranged with the support of close allies sympathetic to the parties.

The leaders of the coalition partners in government meet on an almost daily basis, giving them an opportunity to harmonise their views. In 1992, for example, the MSM-MMM coalition government held weekly meetings known as the Réunion des Eléphants or Meeting of Elephants, which provided a platform for discussion and action. There is no doubt that these regular meetings, although they are essentially informal, afford the leadership an opportunity to avoid conflict, although, at times it has proved necessary to bring in brokers or wise men to help sort out differences or misunderstandings between coalition partners. Problems arise when one of the coalition partners leaves or is forced to leave government – a recurrent feature as, historically, coalitions (especially governmental ones) have a short lifespan.

Leaders of the opposition party and other smaller parties which are not represented in Parliament continue to hold meetings but tend to concentrate on internal party matters, although it is important to note that opposition parties frequently join forces. The exception was the case in which members of the opposition MMM joined forces with the ruling MSM, allowing the latter to continue its mandate.

Very little is known about the mechanisms used to initiate, develop and finalise coalition agreements between political parties as matters are always conducted behind closed doors and in the greatest secrecy. For the purpose of this paper, three coalition agreements are studied – those of 1991, 1995 and 2000 – and the only sources of information documenting aspects of these agreements are newspaper reports of the chronology of events leading to the signed coalition agreements.

In the case of the 1991 agreement that saw the MSM and MMM in partnership, negotiations started when the former was still in coalition with the LP and the MMM was in opposition. This was, no doubt, a very awkward situation for the LP, and especially for its then leader, Sir Satcam Boolell, who had fallen out with the leader of the MSM, the then prime minister, over a series of issues, one of them being a change in the Constitution to make Mauritius a republic. This awkwardness was exacerbated when, on 19 July 1990, the MSM and MMM issued a press report detailing the essence of their pre-electoral agreement (L’Express 20 July 1990 and Le Mauricien 20 July 1990).
The communiqué covered 11 points dealing with the number of candidates each party would field (MSM 33, MMM 27); the distribution of important posts such as president, vice-president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, speaker and deputy speaker of the National Assembly and the commitment of the two political partners to making Mauritius a republic. This pre-electoral agreement was made official more than a year before the 1991 general election was called. As expected, this situation became unbearable for the LP, who soon left the coalition government, and the MMM stepped in.

The 1995 coalition agreement brought together the LP and the MMM. In 1993, after a series of problems arose between Paul Bérenger (then Minister of Finance in the 1991 ruling coalition government) and Sir Anerood Jugnauth (then Prime Minister), a split MMM left the coalition government and moved into opposition.

The negotiations between the LP and the MMM started in early 1994 and, after some three months of intense exchanges between the party leaders, the parties came up with a ‘package deal which was acceptable to the two parties and more importantly that could be sold to our respective electorate’ (L’Express 5 April 1994).

The electoral accord was signed on 9 April 1994, more than 18 months before the 1995 general election. The main features dealt with the sharing of tickets (35 for the LP and 25 for the MMM), the prime ministership (LP) and deputy prime ministership (MMM), the allocation of ministerial portfolios (12 for the LP, 9 for the MMM), the presidency (MMM) and the vice-presidency (LP) as well as the position of speaker of the National Assembly (LP) (L’Express 9 and 10 April 1994 and Weekend 10 April 1994).

Of the three agreements under consideration here, the 2000 agreement required the most extensive negotiation and lobbying. Only a week prior to its signing, the two political protagonists were still proclaiming their intention of going it alone. On 15 August 2000 (less than a month before the election) the historical pre-electoral accord that would see for the first time a split prime ministership and an equal share of tickets (30 for the MSM and 30 for the MMM) was signed, as described above (L’Express 14, 15 and 16 August and Le Mauricien 16 and 17 August). In light of the above, it is clear that coalition electoral agreements are never final until they are signed and made public. Potential coalition partners enter into negotiations which intensify when the prime minister dissolves Parliament and sets the date of the general election, as provided in the 1968 Constitution. The aim of these negotiations is for each political partner to get a fair deal, which can, in
turn, be ‘sold’ to its electorate. Another important feature of these pre-electoral negotiations is that although they can last anything from a whole year to just a week it is always the 24 hours prior to the signing of the electoral accord by the party leaders that are deemed the most crucial.

**Challenges of Sustaining Party Coalitions**

The sustainability of a party coalition comes with a set of challenges for the coalition itself and for the affiliated political parties. These challenges start at the formative stage of the coalition, continue throughout its life and only end when the coalition collapses. What makes party coalition maintenance particularly challenging in Mauritius?

All political parties want to be seen to be politically correct by presenting an inclusive government encompassing all the ethnic groups. This lack of homogeneity constitutes the main weakness of party coalitions in Mauritius. Because of the divergences of policies and personal interest among the coalition partners it is difficult to reach consensus and satisfy everyone and the compromises and agreements that betray principles cannot go on indefinitely. This makes the survival of the coalition unsustainable over time. The requirement of diversity, which allows a coalition to win an election, is the very same factor that is the origin of its collapse. It is a political absurdity.

According to one of the respondents, it is more difficult to maintain a coalition made up of two parties of comparable size. He argues that when a dominant party, like the MMM or the LP, each of which enjoys the support of about 30 per cent of the electorate, enters into a coalition with a smaller party, such as the MSM (10%), the coalition is likely to last longer. It is true that the only time the LP and the MMM did coalesce, the alliance did not last, whereas the MSM-LP coalition of 1983 lasted for four years (the LP was made to leave the coalition after a year and was brought back a couple of years later) and the 2000 MMM-MSM coalition lasted the full term. However, the assumption that party coalitions last when they consist of a dominant party and a smaller one is contradicted by a number of examples. Neither the 1982 coalitions between the MMM and the PSM nor that in 1987 between the MSM and the LP lasted. In fact, it seems that the length of survival of a coalition relates to its term of reference and, since coalitions are rarely electoral agreements of equal status (except that of the 2000 general election), they cannot be expected to last.

As detailed above, the collapse of a coalition government does not necessarily mean the end of the government – the frequency with which MPs leave the departing coalition party and form their own to join the government
in a new form ensures that most survive, albeit in a different form. Anerood Jugnauth has proven to be most skilful in reconstituting coalitions to his own advantage, a talent that enabled him to remain prime minister without interruption for 13 years, from 1982 to 1995.

Why do so many party coalitions fail to survive in their initial form? The reasons are numerous and include deep differences in policy, power struggles, personal gain, incompatible leaders’ personalities and perceived unfairness of the deal, measured by the number of ministerial and diplomatic appointments and posts in parastatals allotted to each of the affiliated coalition partners. Satisfying the personal ambitions of divergent constituents in relation to promotion, appointments and various favours and privileges has been the main challenge to the maintenance of party coalitions, given that expectations are high while the means of meeting them are limited.

Beyond material gain, at times tensions or splits have occurred because of inadequate consultation and dialogue within the coalition. Regular meetings help coalition partners to harmonise their views in a transparent manner and iron out differences. All of this contributes to building trust and confidence, which are indispensable to the sustainability of any coalition.

The collapse of coalitions may also be the result of internal political problems. Strong leadership is needed to keep the coalition together.

Several respondents interviewed by the authors indicated that it was difficult to sell the concept of the 2000 MSM-MMM coalition to many MSM supporters. These supporters only accepted the arrangement in the hope that the coalition would collapse before the end of the three years, when Bérenger was due to take over from Jugnauth as prime minister.

The break up of coalitions has also been a purely electoral strategy, used particularly when the coalition government is doing badly in the opinion polls and a coalition partner has left some months before the next general election in order to become ‘clean’.

It is worth noting that the above challenges apply essentially to ruling party coalitions. Opposition coalitions face other challenges. First, it is difficult for them to access the state-owned media. Similarly, financial resources are less accessible to the opposition than to the party in power. In addition, the state apparatus is controlled by whoever is in power. It is also not easy for opposition coalitions to convince the electorate that they constitute an alternative government. This can be even harder when the government of the day is perceived to be delivering on its election promises, just as it can be challenging for a ruling coalition to enter an electoral race when the economy is bad and people are unhappy.
A unique difficulty that opposition coalitions face is the challenge of managing the pressure from members who are impatient to get into power. To their advantage, however, is the fact that opposition coalitions are under no pressure to meet the demands of the electorate.

Affiliated parties are affected by coalition related intra-party tensions. According to the respondents interviewed, the MMM, having lost two successive elections (1983 and 1987) by standing alone, was desperate to enter a coalition with a large party ahead of the 1991 elections. Reportedly, Bérenger wanted to coalesce with the party’s traditional adversary, the Labour Party, while his lieutenants hoped for the reunification of the militant family (ie, the MMM-MSM). After the MSM-MMM coalition won the election, Bérenger allegedly destroyed the coalition, using his role as the party secretary general to criticise the coalition government, in which he was minister of finance.

The selection of MP candidates and appointments to important posts outside government is a difficult and competitive process. Competition takes place at two levels: among the coalition partners and among officials within the party. It has been observed that this process runs relatively smoothly when the chances of winning are greater, especially when one of the parties clearly dominates the coalition.

The fact that a coalition means that fewer seats are available for members of the partner parties often results in some party members opposing the coalition. In extreme cases, intra-party tensions arising out of some appointments have led to the break up of the coalition.

In addition, when there are divergences of policy, and for the sake of the coalition’s survival, the leadership of one of the parties may choose to accommodate its coalition partners. As a consequence backbenchers may find it difficult to defend unpopular steps taken by the government, which may result in an explosive situation within the party.

**Consequences of Coalitions for Affiliated Parties**

Although the majority of voters are essentially faithful to their party of origin and are most likely to vote for it in an election, sizeable numbers may ‘sanction’ a party for entering certain kinds of coalition.

Most respondents reported that the MSM, which is classified as a conservative Hindu-dominated party, has lost considerable support because of its alliance with the MMM in 2000, making it possible for a representative of a minority group to occupy the top job of prime minister for the first time. Indeed, many sectors of the Hindu community who had hoped that
the coalition would collapse by the end of the third year, before the MMM leader could take over as the head of government, expressed their discontentment with the arrangement when Bérenger was sworn in as Prime Minister in 2003.

The MMM-MSM coalition government is believed not to have delivered on several of its election promises and the country is going through a socio-economic crisis. It would be interesting to conduct a survey to determine whether the resentment of the government is caused fundamentally by ethnic feelings against Bérenger or by socio-economic hardship. Would the resentment have been as strong had the Bérenger government clearly delivered on its electoral promises?

Another important question deserves to be answered separately in order to determine the extent to which discontent with Bérenger’s premiership is essentially ethnically motivated. Is the MSM not weakened more by the discontent over the perceived weak leadership of Pravind Jugnauth than by the fact that it allowed a non-Hindu to become prime minister? Was the political ‘haemorrhage’ in 2005 that has further weakened the MSM an electoral positioning strategy by some MSM members, a rejection of Jugnauth junior’s leadership, or a distancing from Bérenger’s leadership? Could it be argued that the results of the 2005 general election, in which Pravind Jugnauth lost his parliamentary seat while Bérenger kept his, sustain this hypothesis? Future studies should investigate these questions.

As stated above, a further consequence of party coalition has been rifts within parties, with the MMM the major victim of this phenomenon. Generally, however, the splinter parties do not survive beyond the following general election, the MSM being an exception. For example, after the split of the MMM-PSM government in 1983, the newly created MSM attracted MMM dissidents and joined forces with the PSM, putting the MMM out of government. Similarly, the MMM-MSM coalition government, which had won 100 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 1991 general election, collapsed following tensions in the coalition and the MMM was again out of government. Led by Prem Nababsing, the Renouveau Militant Mauricien joined the MSM prime minister, allowing the coalition government to continue in power.

Because, until recently, the leader of the MMM did not ‘qualify’ to be prime minister because he was not a Hindu, the MMM has always been on the losing side. Interestingly, with Bérenger as prime minister for the first time, it is also the first time that his party has not split as a result of its participation in a coalition government. Instead, roles have been reversed
and the MMM’s main partner in the coalition, the MSM, lost members in 2005.

**COALITION SURVIVAL**

Few party coalitions have survived the full five-year term of office in their original form. Only the 1976 LP-PMSD and the 2000 MMM-MSM have achieved this feat. What are the underlying causes of the longevity of some coalition governments and the short life expectancy of most of them?

One of the respondents believes that success or failure depends on the relative strength of the main coalition partners. He argues that when partners are equally powerful, as, for instance, the LP and the MMM in 1995, there is more likely to be confrontation between the two. When one party is clearly dominant, the coalition is likely to last longer because each party knows the limits of its bargaining power, as was the case with the MMM-MSM coalition of 2000.

While there is some logic in this argument, the 1982 MMM-PSM, the 1987 MSM-LP and the 1991 MSM-MMM coalition governments were all characterised by the existence of one dominant party (the MMM in 1982 and 1991 and the LP in 1987) and one smaller party – the MSM. They all collapsed. Clearly the explanation is more complex and needs to take into consideration other factors as well.

Some respondents argued that, given that pre-election coalitions come with a common programme ahead of the general election in contrast to post-election coalitions, whose members contested the elections defending different programmes, the former have a better chance of success than the latter.

This viewpoint is contradicted by the fact that the only two post-election coalition governments formed in the country (in 1969 and 1976) did not collapse before the end of their term of office while pre-election coalitions with common programmes, which have been numerous in the history of Mauritius, have rarely lasted a full parliamentary term. Conversely, the development of a governmental programme after an election does not necessarily mean that post-election coalition governments are more vulnerable to early termination than pre-election ones.

The study of the longevity of party coalitions in Mauritius is complex because there are both objective and subjective factors at play. Furthermore, a specific constellation of these factors and circumstances during periods of economic recession or prosperity, the weight of ethnic politics, personal
ambition, the leadership skills and personality of party bosses, electoral strategy, the relative strength of coalition partners, and trust, respect and dialogue, or the lack thereof, all impact on their survival or premature termination.

CONCLUSION

The formation, collapse, and revival of party coalitions is an integral part of Mauritian political culture. Party coalitions are seen as indispensable to the accommodation of the country’s ethnic diversity, consensus building, and social cohesion. Coalitions have usually taken the form of ethnic accommodation, a vehicle politicians have used extensively to access or maintain power. The packaging and ultimately the selling of these coalitions to the electorate is done with the necessary spin and very often the coalitions are named in celebratory language such as ‘Parti de L’indépendance’ (1967), ‘Parti d’Alliance Nationale’ (1982), ‘L’Alliance Bleu Blanc Rouge’ (1983), ‘L’Union pour le Futur’ (1987) and ‘Alliance Sociale’ (2005), which essentially emphasises the sense of solidarity and consensus that brings different parties together.

Another point to bear in mind is the adherence of Mauritius’s mainstream parties to the same fundamental ideologies. In interviews key political actors from all three mainstream political parties define their respective parties as centre-left.

This study has attempted to answer broad questions such as: what brings political parties together in a coalition? How are coalitions negotiated? Who is entitled to negotiate on behalf of the political parties? How are coalition relationships nurtured? What makes coalitions survive, collapse and revive? Extensive interviews have led us to conclude that the ultimate objective of political party coalitions is to win elections and govern the country. Contrary to widespread belief, party coalitions are not formed essentially to accommodate the country’s ethnic diversity. While highly desirable and desired, ethnic accommodation has been a vehicle through which to access or maintain political power; it is not an end in itself – the 1983 and 1987 coalition governments, for instance, consisted of parties essentially dominated by one group. Similarly, it has been found that party coalitions put extra pressure on woman candidates who are forced to compete at both the intra- and inter-party levels. In the case of intra-party competition, they are confronted by ‘ferocious’ opposition from their male colleagues, which is compounded when a coalition is formed, because of the sharing of electoral tickets.
The study has also noted that coalition negotiations are conducted essentially by party leaders and other senior party officials and coalition management procedures are informal and often lack explicit conflict management mechanisms.

As to the mechanisms for maintaining the coalition, regular and periodic meetings (preferably weekly) are essential. By means of sincere dialogue, coalition partners may learn to trust and respect each other, develop a sense of tolerance and flexibility, and enhance their commitment to the coalition because problems arise when each party tries to get the best of a deal, undermining the value and relevance of the meetings.

It is also crucial that the coalition agreement be fair to all parties. Coalitions serve their purpose well if policies are spelled out and addressed. The electorate judges the value of a coalition by its ability to improve the quality of life. This means that the coalition government must strive to deliver on its promises.

It has been observed that coalitions become more fragile as a general election approaches; this is especially the case when the outgoing coalition government is rated low in public opinion polls and is expected to lose the coming election.

One of the weaknesses of coalitions in Mauritius is the fact that there is no law governing them. They should be registered and their objective, duration and agreement be made public. The agreements linking political parties in coalitions should be in the public domain. At the same time, excessive regulation of coalitions and political parties should be avoided, as this could impinge on freedom of association.

In the final analysis, the strength of party coalitions in Mauritius is the consensus over the need to accommodate the country’s ethnic diversity in its political institutions. Party coalitions win elections thanks to ethnic accommodation, which, in turn, helps increase their appeal among a broader constituency than the narrow groupings of the constituent parties; a reassuring sign of inclusiveness for the electorate. It is argued abundantly above that the main weakness of party coalitions in Mauritius is to be found in the precedence of ethnic over ideological identity, which makes them fragile in the face of ethnic pressure. Can it, however, be argued that by coalescing along ethnic lines Mauritian parties and their leaders have, over time, learned to work together beyond their ethnic allegiances and evolved toward a common social democracy ideology, which, if not examined more closely, tends to look like an absence of ideology?
MAKING, UNMAKING AND REMAKING POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS IN MALAWI

Explaining the Prevalence of Office-Seeking Behaviour

DENIS KADIMA AND SAMSON LEMBANI

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary history of political alliances in Malawi dates back to the early 1990s when Malawian political and social groupings joined forces and succeeded in voting out the 30-year-old one-party regime of Kamuzu Banda in 1994. While a recent unpublished study by Lars Svåsand, Nixon Khembo and Lise Rakner (2004) gives an account of the reconfiguration of Malawi’s party system after the 2004 general elections, there is no chronological and comprehensive account of the main coalitions of political parties in the country, their accomplishments and setbacks and the lessons that can be drawn from their experience. This explains the need for this study as well as the unique contribution that it makes to the field of party coalition politics.

The study deals only with alliances made up of political parties. For this reason, the pre-1994 election alliance of various political pressure groups, faith-based organisations and non-governmental organisations, which worked towards the effective introduction of a democratic multiparty system, is not given significant attention.

The study devotes equal attention to the history of both governing and opposition coalitions in Malawi. Specifically, it examines the short-lived coalition between the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) after the 1994 general elections; the 1995 alliance between the United Democratic Front (UDF) and AFORD; the alliance forged between the MCP and AFORD prior to the 1999 general elections; the UDF-AFORD-NCD Coalition preceding the 2004 general elections and the
Mgwirizano coalition of 2004. It also makes cursory observations about other opposition and government alliances that existed in the same period.

The making, unmaking and remaking of political party coalitions has been a recurrent characteristic of Malawi politics. Like the other chapters in this book, the Malawi chapter sheds light on some of the questions raised by this aspect of the political process by studying the objectives, functioning and survival of party coalitions in the country.

The study is divided into six sections, an introduction and a conclusion. The first section gives the historical background to the emergence of political parties in Malawi, their ideologies, the weight of ethnic politics, resignations and defections. The second gives an overview of political coalitions and intra-party and inter-party developments. The constitutional, legal and administrative framework governing political party coalitions is covered in the third section. The fourth describes the formation of party coalitions, including issues such as the choice of coalition partners, the driving forces behind alliances, the selection of candidates and the allocation of important portfolios. The fifth section deals with the management and maintenance of coalitions and touches on the impact of party alliances on women's representation in politics. The sixth considers issues pertaining to the survival and collapse of political coalitions in the country.

BACKGROUND

History
As of May 2004 Malawi had more than 30 registered political parties. The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) is the oldest, having been formed as a national mass movement to fight for independence from colonial rule. It remained a post-independence ruling party under Kamuzu Banda until 1994, when it was challenged and lost power to the United Democratic Front (UDF). Most of the parties formed in the 1990s, including the UDF, came into being out of the need to have an effective opposition so as to bring about democracy and to ensure respect for human rights. The UDF was formed in 1993 as an underground conscience-raising movement against the single-party dictatorship of the MCP.

The formation of political parties in Malawi falls into four categories. The first comprises about six parties formed before the national referendum of 1993. These include the MCP, originally established in 1944 as the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), before the name was changed in 1959 (NAC was formed as a national liberation mass movement to fight for
independence from colonial rule); the Congress for Second Republic (CSR), founded in exile in 1975, as was the Malawi Democratic Union (MDU), in 1981. The other three, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP) and the UDF, initially existed as pressure groups in 1991-92 before the 1993 referendum (Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation 1998). All parties apart from the MCP, which was registered in 1960, were officially registered in 1993 in time for the multiparty general elections.

The second category consists of eight political parties formed and registered between 1995 and 1997. They are: the Malawi Freedom Party (MFP), the National Patriotic Front (NPF), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the Sapitwa National Democratic Party (SNDP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP), the United Front for Multi-Party Democracy (UFMD) and the United Party (UP). All these, as well as others not mentioned, participated in the 1999 multiparty elections from which the UDF emerged victorious. After the 1999 elections, most of them either lost momentum and dissolved or have become inactive and defunct. The UDF, MCP and AFORD, which secured representation in both the 177-seat 1994 Parliament and the 193-seat 1999 Parliament, have hitherto remained major political parties. The MDP was the only party outside Parliament to have some visibility thanks to its leader, Kamlepo Kalua.

The third category comprises four splinter parties that emerged after 2001 as breakaway factions from the three main pre-1994 political parties (MCP, AFORD and UDF). These include the Republican Party (RP), the New Congress for Democracy (NCD), the Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), all of which are led by an old generation of politicians. They are discussed in detail below.

The fourth and final category comprises parties formed by professional groups, business executives and newcomers with no active political profile. The first of these was the Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE), which was launched in mid-2002. It was hoped that MAFUNDE would create more competition on the political landscape across the regional divide and break the tendency to recycle old politicians across the parties. In addition, the People’s Transformation Party (PETRA) was registered by the end of 2002. Distinct from the two relatively new parties was a third, the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), formed in 2002 by a group of professionals, including lawyers, academics and prominent individuals from the Chamber of Commerce. In the spirit of inclusivity, the
PPM has a blend of both old and new politicians, among them its current president, Aleke Banda. Table 1 gives the list of registered parties and the date of their registration. Most of them are not represented in Parliament and tend to be active only once every five years, during general election periods.

### Table 1
**List of Political Parties in Malawi, their Registration and Status in mid-2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date of Registration</th>
<th>Status*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Congress Party (MCP)</td>
<td>1960/19.08.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)</td>
<td>21.07.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front (UDF)</td>
<td>27.07.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front for Multi-Party Democracy (UFMD)</td>
<td>27.07.93</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Democratic Party (MDP)</td>
<td>05.08.93</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP)</td>
<td>11.08.93</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for Second Republic (CSR)</td>
<td>18.02.94</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>15.02.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(formerly Christian Democratic Party)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Patriotic Front (NPF)</td>
<td>24.05.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Party (NUP)</td>
<td>31.07.95</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Freedom Party (MFP)</td>
<td>26.01.96</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>10.10.96</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (LP)</td>
<td>29.05.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party (UP)</td>
<td>15.08.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapitwa National Democratic Party (SNDP)</td>
<td>24.10.97</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Movement for Young Generation (MMYG)</td>
<td>19.08.98</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Party (NSP)</td>
<td>17.02.99</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for National Unity (CONU)</td>
<td>17.03.99</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progressive Movement (PPM)</td>
<td>20.03.02</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are no distinct ideological differences between and among political parties in Malawi. Soon after the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections it became apparent that most of the old politicians who had either managed to secure political influence in the new government or in opposition did not espouse and advocate a clear policy agenda to offer ideologically different solutions to the poverty and other social ills in society. To date, most of these parties can only be identified with specific tribal and elite groups and party colours, but not with unique ideology-based policy orientations. As Mekki Mtewa (1998) observed

Political violence starts from lack of appealing programmes to enable political parties to win support. But ability to construct party ideologically based programs cannot be out of nothingness. After all, most of the parties were formed out of the need to have an effective opposition so as to safeguard democracy and to ensure respect for human rights. As a result, there have been overlaps in the foci of various parties which make it difficult for those parties to be distinct from each other …
Without clearly defined ideologies, however, political parties become redundant and difficult to distinguish from each other, and ‘the electorate increasingly resorts to parochial criteria for the choices it has to make. As such, some of the political problems currently facing Malawi are clearly the result of ideological fuzziness among the political parties leading Malawi’ (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) Mission 2002) manifested in the opaqueness or banality of the message party leaders deliver, even on crucial national occasions; the ease with which some leaders are able to defect from one party to another, usually in pursuit of personal or material gain; and the extent to which, in the absence of clearly articulated political philosophies, regionalism and ethnicity have tended to become the main guiding principles for the rank and file of Malawians (Ott 2000). As further observed by the NIMD Mission (2002), most political parties see democracy, anti-corruption, poverty alleviation and education as their main guidelines for policy-making, but philosophies such as liberalism, socialism and humanism are not found in party manifestos or principles. This may be one reason why politicians have so easily been able to defect from one party to another or make and unmake coalitions with an erstwhile rival, based on short-term convenience and with little regard for ideological symmetry.

ETHNICITY AND COALITION POLITICS

Malawi is a country of 118,480 square kilometres within which live slightly more than 10.9-million inhabitants. Nearly half of the population is aged 18 or below. About 47 per cent live in the southern region while 41 per cent and 12 per cent live in the central and northern regions respectively (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo 2003, p 224). The 1998 Integrated Household Survey revealed that 65.3 per cent of the population (roughly 6.3 million inhabitants) is poor.

The population is characterised by a fairly diverse mix of ethnic, racial, religious and regional groups, with blacks making up more than 95 per cent. Indians constitute a tiny minority but a powerful economic group and reside essentially in urban areas. The northern region is mostly inhabited by the Tumbuka tribe and other minor tribes like the Ngonis, Nkhondes and Tongas. Tumbuka is the dominant language in the North. The central region is mainly occupied by the Chewas with the Ngonis and Mang’anjas forming a minority and the main language Chichewa. The southern region is a mixture of most of the tribes in Malawi – the Yaos, Senas, Lomwes,
Ngonis, Tumbukas, and Mang’anjas. There are several dialects spoken by the tribes but Chichewa, Yao, and Chilomwe are the most commonly spoken languages (Lembani 2000). More than 75 per cent of the population professes to be Christian and about 20 per cent Muslim. The rest subscribes to indigenous traditional beliefs and other received religions such as Hinduism. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and historically religion was not a significant divisive factor. This changed after 1994 with the advent of a Muslim State President, Bakili Muluzi, who was seen by Christian groups as promoting Islam and Moslems at the expense of Christians and Christianity.

However, the most important divisive factors in Malawi are regionalism and tribalism. Regionalism has been the single most dominant characteristic of Malawi’s electoral politics and this has a strong impact not only on the creation of political parties but also on their regrouping into coalitions. Thus, the elections of 1994 and 1999, which were relatively fair and non-violent, resulted in a tri-partitioned party-political landscape between the AFORD in the north, the MCP in the centre and the UDF in the south (Lodge, Kadima and Pottie 2002). Before 2004 coalitions tended to be shaped around the North-based AFORD, the then third-largest party, which maintained the balance of power between the two largest parties, the UDF and the MCP.

RESIGNATIONS, DEFECTIONS AND SPLITS

Malawi’s democratic metamorphosis has come through interesting episodes of resignations and defections of prominent members in all parties. Nearly 80 per cent of the political parties have experienced defections from their party to other parties (Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation 1998).

Consequently, the formation of political alliances has been both the cause and the result of infighting within parties, giving rise to the emergence of political factions which form part of an existing or new political grouping, opposed to the ‘parent’ standpoint. Because of the deficiencies of intra-party democracy these intra-party differences have mostly tended to manifest themselves at top leadership level across all parties since 1994. Key decisive factors include: the fact that party conventions are held rarely and, when they are, tend to be manipulated; the imposition of election candidates on the electorate during primary nominations and the attempt by former President Bakili Muluzi to seek an open and subsequently a third term of office. Specific intra-party splits are discussed in the next section.
**Splits in the UDF**

The failed open and third-term bids by Muluzi and the subsequent nomination of Bingu Wa Mutharika and Cassim Chilumpha, both handpicked by Muluzi, as the UDF’s 2004 presidential candidate and his running mate caused deep internal divisions within the UDF.

Mutharika was deputy central bank governor until 12 March 2003, when he was appointed minister of economic planning and development. On 30 March 2003 he was nominated as the UDF’s presidential candidate. Cassim Chilumpha, the UDF’s publicity secretary, was a founding member of the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution (FDC), a loose grouping of church groups and NGOs who pioneered the opposition to the proposed constitutional amendments seeking open and third terms for Muluzi.

The selection of the pair resulted in the resignation and expulsion of prominent executive members of the party, who subsequently either joined another party or formed new opposition parties. In December 2001 the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was formed by a founding member of the UDF and former senior Cabinet minister, Brown Mpinganjira, to oppose the Third-Term Bill. Six other UDF members of Parliament, who had fallen out of favour with the ruling party, joined the pressure group, which was registered as a political party in 2002 and contested the 2004 general elections with Mpinganjira as its presidential candidate.

Those who later followed Mpinganjira included the former leader of the government in Parliament and long-time Cabinet minister, Harry Thomson, and former UDF treasurer general, James Makhumula. In mid-2003 former UDF first vice-president and Cabinet minister, Aleke Banda, resigned from the party and joined the opposition People’s Progressive Movement (PPM). Muluzi’s own state vice-president, and former vice-president of the UDF, Justin Malewezi, joined the PPM as the new party’s vice-president upon his resignation from the UDF in early January 2004, before announcing his independent presidential candidature in the May 2004 elections.

**Splits in the AFORD**

The amendment in 2002 of s 65 of the Malawi Constitution (1995) threatened the expulsion of any member of Parliament (MP) who associated with any political party or grouping other than the party which had sponsored the MP’s election to Parliament. This amendment made the MCP-AFORD alliance, formed to contest the 1999 elections, illegal. AFORD President Chakufwa Chihana pulled out of the alliance in 2002. However, the
constitutional amendment was challenged in the High Court and was declared invalid and nullified. Subsequently, Chihana joined the UDF in a ‘Government of National Unity’ coalition and supported Muluzi’s third-term campaign.

After the collapse of the MCP–AFORD alliance in 2002, the government again convinced AFORD to join a controversial and unofficial alliance of convenience to win votes for the unpopular third-term Bill. Chihana was given the position of second vice-president of the Republic, while a number of his AFORD colleagues were given ministerial positions. Inevitably, this development created squabbles and a split in the smallest opposition party in Parliament between those loyal to the party president and those opposed to him. The beleaguered group broke away and formed a splinter party, the Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE), in 2003. The Chihana faction signed a coalition agreement with the UDF for the 2004 general elections.

Splits in the MCP

In the opposition MCP the protracted rivalry from 1999 to 2003 between the then party president, Gwanda Chakuamba, and the party vice-president, John Tembo, was not without cost to the party’s numerical strength.

Animosity, regionalism and power struggles between the two leaders were exacerbated ahead of the 1999 general elections by Chakuamba when he chose AFORD’s Chihana as his running mate, abruptly ending Tembo’s hopes of becoming the country’s next vice-president. The MCP’s defeat in 1999 did not help the situation. Eventually, rivalries between the two leaders resulted in factionalism developing within the MCP. A temporary truce was reached in January 2003 after a long-awaited reconciliation, when the two leaders promised to work together. Tembo agreed to surrender the leadership of the opposition in Parliament to his president, while Chakuamba withdrew all court cases against his vice-president, party secretary general Kate Kainja and other Tembo supporters. The conflict reached new heights when Chakuamba sued Tembo and Kainja for proceeding with a party convention of their faction even though the High Court had served them with an injunction not to do so. The two were convicted of contempt of court and, as a consequence, were expelled from Parliament in June 2003 and were barred from standing for public office for seven years, as stipulated in the Constitution.

The High Court verdict was successfully challenged in the Supreme Court, where it was reversed by the unanimous decision of five judges in
December 2003. Before this, in mid-2003, the parties held a joint convention at which Tembo and Chakuamba swapped positions. The same convention also elected Kate Kainja vice-secretary general. While the Supreme Court ruling ended the seven-month exile of the two legislators from Parliament and cleared them to stand for any public office in the 2004 general elections, the celebration within the party was short lived. The hidden, but still existing rift between the two leaders manifested itself in early 2004 in the sudden resignation from the MCP of Gwanda Chakuamba, along with 16 MPs, to form the Republican Party.

Simultaneously, the late Kamuzu Banda’s personal physician and former party publicity secretary, Hetherwick Ntaba, announced his resignation from the MCP and launched his own party, the New Congress for Democracy (NCD), in December 2003.

### Table 2

The Positions of the Parties that Contested the 2004 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>No. of Seats secured in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
<td>AFORD*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for National Unity</td>
<td>CONU</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Forum for Unity and Development</td>
<td>MAFUNDE**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Congress Party</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi Democratic Party</td>
<td>MDP**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Genuine Democracy</td>
<td>MGODE**</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Congress for Democracy</td>
<td>NCD*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Movement</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Party</td>
<td>NUP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamodzi Freedom Party</td>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Transformation Party</td>
<td>PETRA**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progressive Movement</td>
<td>PPM**</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>RP**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
<td>UDF*</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ruling Coalition  ** Opposition Mgwirizano coalition

Source: Adapted by the authors from *EISA Report* 2004, p 15
His resignation followed his suspension from the party’s national executive on allegations that he had been closely and suspiciously associating with Bakili Muluzi since July 2003. Ntaba was also accused of having accompanied Muluzi’s ailing mother to South Africa for medical attention without the party president’s permission. On 26 March 2004 Ntaba and the NCD announced that they had joined the ruling UDF-AFORD alliance after an earlier application to join the Mgwirizano coalition was rejected.

Thus, of the more than 30 registered political parties in Malawi only 15 contested the 2004 general elections under two main coalitions: one formed around the ruling UDF, the other by the opposition under Mgwirizano (EISA 2004). Table 2 shows the parties by their coalition grouping and the number of seats each secured in Parliament.

**POPULARITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS**

As the NIMD Report (2002) observes, the popularity of political parties in Malawi is decreasing. This is reflected in the declining participation in elections, from an impressive voter turnout of 80.54 per cent in 1994 and 93.76 per cent in 1999 to 65.6 per cent in 2004. There are two possible reasons for the disillusionment among voters – the lack of fulfilment of high expectations and promises made by politicians in the last two terms of the UDF administration and the widespread feeling that, regardless of who wins, the quality of life of the population will not be affected.

Political parties, including the UDF-AFORD-NCD coalition, will have to do some soul searching – the 2004 parliamentary election results attest to the fact that the electorate was ‘punishing’ the parties for decisions taken against its will. The verdict of the voters raises the question to what extent the decisions of political parties, including those to enter coalition arrangements and choose parliamentary candidates, intersect with or reflect the popular will.

As can be seen from Table 3, for example, in 1994 when AFORD contested the elections alone it secured 36 seats. In 1999, when the party formed an alliance with the MCP, it won 29 seats. In 2004, with the support of the government coalition, AFORD won a mere six seats.

It would be simplistic to try to explain the poor electoral performance of the parties purely in terms of the coalitions they formed. Other factors, both internal and external, influenced the electoral outcome. However, for the purposes of this study, the concentration will be on these coalitions and the myriad diverse challenges and experiences associated with them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>As % of Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48,02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFORD</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGODE</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONU</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETRA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Candidates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats not yet contested</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A: Either the party did not exist or did not secure a parliamentary seat

Source: Figures obtained from Malawi Electoral Commission, various years, and adapted by the authors

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS IN MALAWI

**UDF-led Common Electoral Group of 1994**

The first party coalition arrangement that emerged as early as 1994 was formed around the UDF. Relatively smaller parties, including the CSR, SDP, MNDP, UFMD and PDP, entered into an electoral alliance with the UDF and campaigned for Bakili Muluzi as its presidential candidate. Only the UDF secured parliamentary representation in the 1994 legislative elections. The UDF candidate also won the presidential election. As the leaders of the other parties were either appointed to embassies or given positions on parastatal boards, their parties became dormant.
**MCP-AFORD Alliance 1994**

In 1994, though the UDF won the election, it won only 85 seats (four short of an absolute majority). ‘For the first four months of the new government (25 May to 24 September 1994) the ruling party was therefore in a minority position since the opposition parties, AFORD and MCP, formed a coalition’ (Meinhardt and Patel 2003). The two parties dominated the legislature, played an unconstructive role in Parliament and ‘proved to be an impediment to the regular conduct of governmental business’ (Meinhardt and Patel 2003), making the UDF government ineffective and the country ungovernable.

**AFORD-UDF Alliance 1995-1996**

Political analysts have described AFORD’s president, Chakufwa Chihana, as the ‘most flexible’ politician with regard to political alignments. After the 1994 elections, he worked very closely with the MCP as both found themselves on the opposition bench in the legislature. AFORD had 36 MPs while the MCP had 56 in the 1994 legislature of 177 seats. As noted above, without an absolute majority the UDF was unable to pass laws, which made the country somewhat ungovernable. With the encouragement of the donor community, the UDF coaxed AFORD into a government alliance. In 1995 Chihana joined the UDF and was given the position of second vice-president. Six of his party lieutenants – the late Matembo Mzunda, the late Mapopa Chipeta, Rev Pat Banda, Chamaere Phiri, Mayinga Mkandawire and Melvin Moyo – were given ministerial portfolios.

Because of deep disagreements between the two parties the coalition did not survive its full term of office (EISA 2004). In 1996 Chihana ditched the alliance and resigned from his government position, alleging massive corruption in the first Muluzi administration. However, his six AFORD Cabinet ministers remained in government.

**MCP-AFORD Alliance 1997-2001**

In the run-up to the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections Chihana paired up with MCP president Gwanda Chakuamba as a presidential running mate. As detailed above, the MCP-AFORD alliance marked the beginning of a costly rift between Chakuamba and his vice-president, John Tembo, which lasted for almost four years. According to the MCP constitution the party president and his vice-president were natural presidential candidate and running mate. However, Chakuamba decided unilaterally to pick his running mate, Chihana, from another opposition party, AFORD, in order to improve the coalition’s chances of winning the elections.
According to the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC)’s interpretation of the country’s Constitution, this act by Chakuamba contravened the supreme law. By the eve of the 1999 elections the court had not yet decided whether to allow Chakuamba and his selected running mate to run in the election. The decision was made on the morning of the election when the High Court ruled that no constitutional provisions had been contravened by the fact that the two candidates came from different parties. From that point Tembo and his sympathisers, feeling frustrated, sought tirelessly to initiate and support moves aimed at persuading Chakuamba to resign or withdraw from the alliance. Chakuamba employed similar strategies against his vice-president and the latter’s faction. Tactics included repeated litigation and attempts by each of them to have the other expelled. In its divided state the MCP did not perform effectively as an opposition. Many within the MCP and AFORD considered the arrangement to be temporary and intended merely to fulfil short-term ambitions. Although the alliance lost the election it survived until mid-2001 when s 65 of the Constitution was amended (a decision reversed later on appeal), thereby making such a political alliance unconstitutional.

The most notable development during the period of this contentious relationship was that, on 6 August 2000, the party president and his vice-president held simultaneous party conventions (one in Blantyre and one in Lilongwe) and the leaders of their respective factions, MPs and national executive members attended both conventions. Chakuamba and Tembo were elected by their respective ‘faction conventions’ as the ‘president’ of the MCP and executive members elected at each convention ran their official affairs in the name of the MCP. Interestingly, Kate Kainja was elected to the post of secretary general by both conventions.

On 4 July 2001 the Supreme Court ruled that the two parallel conventions were invalid and violated the MCP’s constitution. The Chief Justice, who delivered the judgement, said the effect of the ruling was that the hierarchy of the MCP was to remain as it had been prior to the two controversial conventions. In other words, the Court decided that Chakuamba was the bona fide president of the party. The Chief Justice further stated that

The issue of who is the legitimate leader of MCP is a political question which must be resolved by the generality of the MCP membership. This Court cannot be the proper forum for it. Nor can this Court be the proper forum to resolve the deep divisions that exist in MCP...
In the aftermath of this judgement, attempts were initiated by the High Court to resolve the bitter leadership crisis in the main opposition party. However, its attempts to mediate between the two party leaders collapsed because of a lack of consensus between the two rival leaders over the terms and conditions of the mediation process. It must be noted that from 2000 Tembo’s political behaviour and language were considered to be more sympathetic to the UDF than to the opposition. This was concluded from his persistent support in Parliament for government Bills, among them the removal of the Senate Bill, the Crossing the Floor Bill and the 2002 Presidential Open-Term Bill.

As Tembo, until July 2002, enjoyed the simple majority support of all MCP MPs in parliament, the MPs petitioned the Speaker of Parliament to recognise him as Leader of Opposition in place of Chakuamba. This move succeeded with the support of the UDF MPs, a situation that was viewed as another informal but progressive alliance between the Tembo faction of the MCP and the UDF. It was widely alleged that the convention held by the Tembo faction had been funded by the UDF to dislodge Chakuamba from the party leadership. It must be noted that directly or indirectly the UDF government thrived on the wrangles within the MCP. In a new turn of events, Tembo was strongly criticised by more than half of his MPs after his vote in July 2002 in support of the Open-Term Bill. The MPs called for Tembo’s resignation from politics, maintaining that his vote for an open presidential term signalled that he had no intention of ever becoming Malawi’s president.

Mgwirizano Coalition 2003-2004

In an attempt to remove the ruling UDF from power, opposition parties, coordinated by the Anglican, Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, resolved to form a grand opposition Mgwirizano coalition. The combined membership of these churches is estimated to be more than 75 per cent of the country’s total voting population. Their support of the opposition alliance was, not surprisingly, sharply criticised by the ruling party. It was also generally noted that NGOs supported a more organised opposition to guarantee a change of government in 2004.

The parties which participated in the initial coalition discussions in early November 2003 were: the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), the National Unity Party (NUP), the Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE), the People’s Transformation
Party (PETRA) and the Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE) (*Chronicle* 9 November 2003).

The Mgwirizano coalition was inspired by the success of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in Kenya in ending the 39-year rule of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). However, critical to the success of the Mgwirizano coalition was that it learn from the challenges that beset the NARC. Importantly, Mgwirizano coalition leaders needed urgently and willingly to agree on both their common presidential candidate and running mate and on a campaign strategy based on their relative support across the country. The obvious setback was the refusal by the leading parties, the MCP and the NDA, to join the coalition. The two parties, considering themselves to be the most popular in the country, insisted that they would do so only if they were given the presidential candidacy. In the end, the Mgwirizano coalition comprised relatively small opposition parties such as the PPM and the RP, which joined the group in early 2004, the MDP, the MAFUNDE and MGODE. Advantaged by a divided opposition and by its incumbency the UDF and its allies won the presidential election with only 35.8 per cent of the total valid votes. More than 64 per cent of the electoral support received by the combined opposition in the presidential race was wasted (see Tables 4 and 5).

**POST-ELECTION POLITICAL RECONFIGURATION**

On 20 May 2004 the UDF-led government coalition, comprising the AFORD and the NCD, emerged victorious in the most closely contested presidential elections since 1994. Both the presidential candidate and his running mate came from the UDF. Even with its access to state resources and government machinery, the UDF coalition won a mere 49 seats, as against 94 in 1999. The performance of the other two partners, the AFORD (six seats) and the NCD (none), was equally dismal (Table 4). The winning presidential candidate, Bingu Wa Mutharika, assumed office with a bare 35 per cent of the total vote. Almost two-thirds (65%) of the electorate voted for an alternative government, clearly demonstrating that the majority of voters wanted a change of government. Table 5 shows the outcome of the 2004 presidential race in absolute and percentage terms.

Unlike the elections in 1994 and 1999 when the UDF, MCP and AFORD successively monopolised the legislative representation the 2004 general elections brought six new parties into Parliament, bringing the total number of parties there to nine. An additional unusual feature of the 2004 elections
was the emergence of independent MPs. As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, 39 MPs were voted into Parliament as independent candidates. The MCP boasted a majority of 59 and the combined opposition mustered a majority of more than two-thirds before some of the independent MPs defected to the UDF. The UDF and its coalition partners faced formidable challenges in getting government business through such an opposition-dominated Parliament.

Three conclusions are implicit in these results. Firstly, the government coalition had miscalculated its popularity and now needed to ‘lure’ some opposition parties to join it. Secondly, the poor performance of the AFORD and the NCD made it necessary to co-opt more opposition parties into government, but also meant that certain obligations imposed by the pre-election coalition agreements had to be waived to provide incentives for prospective new partners in government. Finally, the political logic behind the UDF-AFORD coalition hung in the balance. The results made it evident that the popularity of the AFORD and its leadership in its northern region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDF*</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFORD*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,11</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP**</td>
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<td>7,77</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
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<td>PPM**</td>
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<td>MGODE**</td>
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<td>1,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONU**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETRA**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats not yet contested</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>193</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Government Coalition ** Mgwirizano coalition
Source: Malawi Government Gazette 24 June 2004
stronghold was declining and that there had been a vote of no confidence in
the UDF-AFORD government coalition arrangement itself.

People in the north had also shown through their protest vote that the
political conduct of the AFORD party elite, especially during the infamous
presidential third-term bid, was unacceptable.

The opposition’s marginal loss in the presidential race was predictable, clearly
manifesting the pervasive sense of personal greed for power rather than for
collective success. If the MCP, NDA and Justin Malewezi had worked to
achieve a compromise within the Mgwirizano coalition and had fielded and
supported a common presidential candidate, the Mgwirizano coalition would
have secured an absolute majority in both the legislature and the executive.

In 1999 the MCP-AFORD coalition had came close to taking over the
government and would have done so had it not been for the internal divisions
within the MCP.

In his inaugural speech President-Elect Bingu Wa Mutharika invited
any willing members of the opposition to serve with him in government.
Subsequently, more than 25 independent MPs joined the UDF, a not
unexpected development since they were not really independent but had
been compelled by controversies surrounding the conduct of primary
elections within the UDF to stand as independents.

Some surprises characterised the aftermath of the 2004 general elections.
Three major developments were received with mixed feelings by the public.
The first was a court challenge by the Mgwirizano coalition, led by RP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bingu Wa Mutharika</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>1 119 738</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Tembo</td>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>846 457</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwanda Chakuamba</td>
<td>Mgwirizano</td>
<td>802 386</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Mpinganjira</td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>272 172</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Malewezi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>78 892</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 119 645</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EISA 2004
president Gwanda Chakuamba, against the results. As members of the coalition gathered on 3 June 2004 at Chakuamba’s house to plan their court strategy, Chakuamba was signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the UDF, in which he and his RP effectively joined the UDF-led coalition government. Chakuamba was quoted by the media as saying that he had decided to join the government ‘because it was the best way forward for the country’ (*The Nation* 4 June 2004). As part of the agreement Chakuamba promised to withdraw the court challenge and pledged to retire from politics (*The Nation* 4 June 2004).

Commentators described Chakuamba’s ‘jilting’ of the Mgwirizano coalition as ‘treachery’ and ‘betrayal’ of the electorate. Magolowondo (2004) argues that ‘the crossing of the floor may partly demonstrate that in Malawi the pervasive notion of politics is putting primacy on individual interests other than the common good’. Magolowondo further observes that ‘as part of the deal, Chakuamba secured the return of property that was seized by government when he was in jail in the 1980s. In addition, he will get 5 million Malawi Kwacha (MK), equivalent to US$ 0.5 million, in arrears of rent and more than 30 million MK in interest.’ The RP was offered two ministerial posts and secured the position of second deputy speaker of Parliament, while Chakuamba received no position in government. Although the MDP also resigned from the Mgwirizano coalition after the elections, the remaining coalition members (PPM, NUP, MAFUNDE and PETRA) pledged to pursue the litigation.

Secondly, and almost simultaneously, the MGODE also defected from the Mgwirizano coalition to join the government coalition. Thirdly, and following the trend, the NDA’s president, Brown Mpinganjira, announced the dissolution of the NDA and its merger with the UDF. Neither Mpinganjira nor his close associates secured any Cabinet portfolio in the new government. However, a number of other NDA leaders decried the unilateral move by their former president and pressed for the continuity of the party in opposition but, as events moved rapidly, the party was de-registered before it could be saved.

Under Malawian law, once a registered party is de-registered, no other party may be registered under the same name or use the symbols associated with it. Following these developments, the government coalition comprised the UDF, AFORD, NCD, RP and MGODE.

Parallel to these events was the emerging rift between the UDF chairperson, Bakili Muluzi, and the UDF-sponsored presidential candidate, now President of the Republic, Bingu Wa Mutharika. The conflict apparently
arose out of differences between the two regarding incompatible lists for Cabinet appointments. The former president is alleged to have proposed a list of ministerial candidates which included some party officials who had lost their seats but needed to be consoled with Cabinet positions. The new president, however, had to stick by his inaugural pledge that he would govern with a ‘lean professional Cabinet’. After Mutharika announced his Cabinet of 21 ministers and eight deputy ministers on 13 June 2004 the tension between the two leaders assumed another dimension, with Mutharika and his Cabinet colleagues on the receiving end of bitter resentment from the party’s executive committee members. The tension was exacerbated by the relentless arrests by the new administration of some key UDF officials on corruption charges (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo 2003). Tensions between Muluzi and Mutharika escalated when the latter withdrew from the UDF, accusing the former President of planning to assassinate him. Subsequently the UDF sponsored a parliamentary procedure to impeach Wa Mutharika.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PARTY COALITIONS

The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi guarantees fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of association, which allows the formation of political parties and, by extension, the formation of political party coalitions. In general it is easy to form a political party in Malawi. However, the legal framework does not explicitly recognise party coalitions, which makes party alliances mere gentlemen’s agreements. Indeed, when several political parties form an electoral coalition with one presidential candidate, the law does not recognise this candidate as belonging to a coalition. The candidate registers as a candidate of his/her political party, using the symbols of that party. The consequences of this situation include the fact that coalition partners have to market their coalition presidential candidate while campaigning for their respective parties for the parliamentary election. This not only confuses the electorate but also adversely affects the coalition’s parliamentary candidates.

This situation was illustrated by the 1999 case of the running mate discussed above. The strict interpretation of the law, according to the MEC, effectively makes it difficult for political parties to enter pre-election alliances to contest the presidential election. Similarly, based on the same case, one party’s symbols are used for the coalition, resulting in undue advantage for that party in both presidential and parliamentary elections, at the expense of the others. For example, the RP’s symbols were used for the Mgwirizano
coalition at the expense of parties such as the PPM and other coalition partners, whose members then supported the RP in the presidential election.

The amendment of s 65 of the Constitution to provide for the expulsion from Parliament of any MP who associates with any party or grouping other than that which sponsored his or her parliamentary campaign brought to an end the already ineffective and dysfunctional MCP-AFORD alliance, formed to contest the 1999 election, by making it retrospectively illegal. AFORD president Chakufwa Chihana withdrew from the alliance in 2002. However, the constitutional amendment was successfully challenged in the High Court, which declared it invalid and nullified it. The nullification of the provision allowed Chihana to join the UDF in a government of national unity.

Interestingly, s 80(5)(b) of the Constitution clearly encourages the formation of coalitions by stating that the President of the Republic shall appoint the second vice-president from a party other than his or her own.

In addition, Malawi’s presidential system, combined with the absence of a dominant political party, influences coalition politics. Indeed, the dominance of the executive over the legislature in Malawi makes it possible for a president who does not control the majority of seats in Parliament still to wield a great deal of influence and rule the country using his or her presidential prerogative to make appointments to government, the diplomatic service and parastatals to create some leverage for him or herself in Parliament. This is the case with President Wa Mutharika, who, after resigning from the UDF, still heads the country without a single MP representing his newly registered Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This situation is, however, not sustainable in terms of smooth policy and law-making processes. The president needed to build a parliamentary coalition, a particular necessity in Wa Mutharika’s case in light of the impeachment proceedings instituted against him by his former party, the UDF. Learning from Muluzi, Wa Mutharika began to ‘poach’ independent and party-sponsored MPs to reinforce his DPP, which today enjoys the support of just less than half of the 193 MPs.

**FORMATION OF PARTY COALITIONS**

*Objectives*

For the opposition the ultimate object of a party coalition is to unseat the ruling party and get into power. For the ruling party it is to maintain or consolidate power. According to one respondent, soon after its electoral defeat in 1994, the AFORD formed an alliance with the MCP, a decision based not
on rational thinking but on disappointment following the election results. The AFORD had fought one-party rule tirelessly and did not want to work with the MCP. However, it realised that little could be achieved in opposition, particularly because the 1994 MCP-AFORD alliance was poorly organised. The AFORD wished to be part of the executive and make itself relevant. With the encouragement of the donor community, the leaders of the UDF and the AFORD entered into an alliance in 1995 but it was not long before this shotgun marriage fell apart and, in 1997, the MCP and the AFORD joined up again, with the object of putting the UDF out of power in the 1999 elections. As stated above, this coalition fell apart in 2002 and AFORD party leader Chihana, who was already flirting with the UDF by supporting the Open- and Third-Term Bills, formalised the UDF-AFORD alliance and joined the UDF government as the second vice-president of the Republic. Six of his followers were appointed ministers. At the time of the May 2004 election the ruling coalition comprised the UDF, the AFORD and the NCD.

Equally important was the unofficial parliamentary coalition formed in 2002 by the UDF and John Tembo’s MCP faction, resulting in Tembo and his sympathisers supporting the Open- and Third-Term Bills. After he won the MCP party presidency from Chakuamba, Tembo stopped supporting the Third-Term Bill and ended this informal alliance, behaviour interpreted by some as motivated by the new MCP leader’s political selfishness and opportunism.

The 2004 Mgwirizano coalition was a pre-election alliance of all the political parties willing to dislodge the UDF government. Negotiations lasted for three to four months and the memorandum of understanding was signed some three months before the election. Not enough effort was put into the area of policy development, nor was there a post-election strategy in case of defeat. The focus was on winning the 2004 election. When the Mgwirizano coalition in fact lost the election key parties left it to join the winning side, the UDF-led government.

There is a recurrent pattern in the formation of party coalitions. For the opposition alliances, the sole aim is to defeat the UDF and form a new government, while UDF-led ruling coalitions are motivated by their quest to remain in power. There is no place for ideological affinity and the common post-election strategy in the case of defeat is to join the winner. Alliances usually collapse as quickly as they are formed because they are, themselves, essentially an office-seeking strategy used by politicians to position themselves in such a way as to make themselves attractive to the governing party or coalition.
**Ethnic Politics in the Coalitions**

Party politics in Malawi is shaped by the tribal and regional composition of the country, which is divided into the northern, central and southern regions, traditionally controlled by the AFORD, the MCP and the UDF respectively. While there is a reconfiguration of political parties after parties split as well as after the emergence of new political parties, support for leaders tends to be based on their regional origin. In the absence of clear ideological differences between parties, ethnic and regional identities tend to emerge as the dominant distinctive criteria for supporting a particular party.

In the same vein, coalition politics is shaped by regionalism and ethnicity, as coalitions tend to be formed by party leaders from different regions as a way of appealing to a broader constituency. The tendency has been to draw the presidential candidate, the candidate for first vice-president (running mate), and the proposed second vice-president from the three regions as a way of accommodating all the communities.

Prior to the 2004 elections, the north-based AFORD, then the third-largest party, was able to ensure the balance of power between the south-based UDF and the centre-based MCP by forming coalitions with one of the two. The emergence in Malawi’s political landscape of new parties is not likely to change these patterns because the regional identities of the leaders of the new parties mean they are still perceived as regional parties.

Religion in Malawi was not a significant divisive factor until the advent of Muluzi, a Muslim, who was seen by Christian groups as promoting Islam at the expense of Christianity. Muluzi’s handpicking of a Muslim as the presidential running mate in the 2004 election reinforced this perception.

**Selection of Coalition Partners and Driving Forces**

Between the period following the 1994 elections and 2002, there were no explicit criteria for the selection of coalition political party partners because there were only three parliamentary parties, namely, the UDF, the MCP and the AFORD, and party alliances revolved around AFORD, the smallest party, which ensured the maintenance of the balance of power. Therefore, during this period party coalitions were formed between the MCP and the AFORD on the one hand, and the UDF and the AFORD on the other. Hostilities between the UDF and the MCP, the two largest parties, have been too deep to allow for any formal alliance between them.

The splits within each of the above-mentioned parties in the run-up to the 2004 elections as well as the formation of new parties in the same period allowed for a reconfiguration of party alliances, offering many possible
combinations. In general, opposition coalitions have tended to have a simple selection criterion – a shared aversion to the UDF – and therefore any party opposed to the continuation of the UDF government and which wished to enter the Mgwirizano coalition was acceptable. One respondent noted, however, that parties whose leaders were perceived to be UDF spies were not allowed to join the coalition. This was reportedly the case with Hetherwick Ntaba of the NCD, whose application to join the Mgwirizano coalition was turned down because of his close association with Muluzi.

On occasion animosity between politicians prevented some coalitions from forming. For example, the former MCP colleagues Tembo (who comes from the centre) and Chakuamba (from the south) were unable to work together in the Mgwirizano coalition because of political rivalries exacerbated by regional cleavages.

Finally, an additional criterion for selecting coalition partners was the personality of the party heavyweight. The better a leader was known and the more followers he or she had, the better his or her chance of being welcomed into a coalition, because a coalition is fundamentally about the arithmetic of how many seats a particular party can bring to it.

The primary driving forces behind any coalition are usually party leaders. For example, the 1995 UDF-AFORD alliance was formed by Muluzi and Chihana, with the blessing of the donor community. When it collapsed, Chakuamba and Chihana negotiated the 1999 MCP-AFORD alliance. In 2004, Muluzi and the leaders of the AFORD and the NCD were the driving forces behind the UDF-led ruling alliance. Finally, the Mgwirizano coalition of 2004 was initiated by leaders of the Anglican, Catholic and Presbyterian churches, who facilitated negotiations among the opposition political parties so they would present and support a single presidential candidate.

In 2004 there was strong public support for the formation of a broad-based opposition coalition in order to achieve a regime change. By failing to unite, the opposition did not capitalise on this support.

Selection of Coalition Candidates

The selection of presidential candidates, their running mates and parliamentary candidates both in political parties and in alliances has been a divisive and risky enterprise that has often resulted in resignations and defections. There are many explanations for this, including a lack of internal democracy both in parties and in coalitions, personal ambition, power struggles, political patronage, regionalism and leadership styles.
The 1997 MCP-AFORD alliance is a classic case. Chakuamba chose the AFORD’s Chihana as his presidential running mate for the 1999 election, and not the MCP vice-president, Tembo, with whom he had a difficult relationship characterised by power struggles, mistrust and regionalism. This violated the MCP constitution, which provides that the party’s president and vice-president should be the presidential candidate and his or her running mate. Given that Chakuamba is from the south and Chihana from the north, this move was presented to Tembo’s supporters as the sidelining of the central region. The memorandum of understanding between the MCP and the AFORD was signed publicly, but Tembo did not attend the signing. The MCP went into the elections divided, with Tembo reportedly urging voters to vote for the MCP in the parliamentary elections and to ‘make up their own minds’ about the presidential election. Reading between the lines, many analysts deduced that Tembo had indirectly campaigned for Muluzi in 1999. Obviously, the MCP and its ally lost.

In 2004, a new dispute broke out between Chakuamba and Tembo, each of whom aspired to be the presidential candidate for the Mgwirizano coalition. There was a divergence of views about the best formula for choosing the candidate, with the Tembo side favouring one that would recognise the parties’ electoral performance in the most recent general election. The MCP had come second to the ruling UDF in the 1999 election and was the largest opposition party in Parliament. Tembo supported this view by drawing on the case of Kenya, where Mwai Kibaki had been chosen as the presidential candidate of the then opposition National Rainbow Coalition on this basis.

On the other hand, the small and newly created political parties that constituted the bulk of the Mgwirizano coalition membership wanted a more ‘democratic’ formula entailing the direct election of the candidates by the coalition partners. The MCP’s proposal was therefore rejected as undemocratic. Allegedly, the churches did not want John Tembo as the presidential candidate. In addition, Chakuamba and his RP had reportedly successfully lobbied most of the small parties to support him. Since all parties that constituted the Mgwirizano coalition enjoyed an equal vote, Chakwamba was assured of election.

The MCP and NDA felt that they were too big to be given an equal vote with other, smaller parties and the MCP pulled out of the opposition coalition and stood alone. The NDA’s leader, Brown Mpinganjira, also withdrew from the coalition and stood alone after realising that he would not be able to win the support of the majority of the affiliated parties.
This left six parties in the coalition that elected Gwanda Chakuamba and Aleke Banda as the presidential candidate and running mate respectively. The coalition was also beset by intra-party splits, including the resignation of prominent members, developments which substantially undermined the opposition’s electoral solidarity.

After his failed attempts to get the Open- and, subsequently, the Third-Term Bills through Parliament in order to continue in office beyond his second and last constitutional term, Muluzi handpicked a supposedly loyal presidential candidate and running mate over whom he was certain to have tremendous influence in order to continue to run the country after his official retirement. This frustrated the ambitions of several UDF heavyweights who wished to lead the country, and resulted in defections and resignations from the party.

Similarly, the selection of parliamentary candidates for the UDF and the UDF-led ruling coalition was as divisive as that in the opposition coalition. The lack of internal democracy in the UDF resulted in many candidates who felt that they had lost the primaries unfairly quitting the UDF and its coalition and standing as independents. In addition, the UDF’s decision not to field candidates in some constituencies in the northern region, in conformity with the agreement reached with its coalition partner, AFORD, was rejected by some of its members, who quit the party and subsequently stood as independents. The 2004 general election saw a record number of independent candidates – more than 300 compared with 114 in 1999 and only 12 in 1994. Of these, 39 were elected, the third largest group after the MCP (59) and the UDF (49).

**MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF COALITIONS**

Normally, party alliances are governed by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and/or the coalition’s constitution, which sets out how the parties will work together. However, respondents invariably noted that that while these MoUs provide for regular meetings at various levels of the alliance, meetings are not held regularly and tend to be convened only during election campaigns. While both ruling coalitions and opposition alliances have the opportunity to meet regularly in Parliament and this addresses the necessity for consultation, it does not remove the need for the alliance’s relevant structures and committees to meet more formally as parties in coalition. In addition, partner parties tend not to have consistent mechanisms to manage conflict within the coalition. As with the coalitions, parties’ failure to meet
has resulted in their resorting to Parliament and to the courts to address internal party problems such as disputes over leadership.

Dynamics within coalitions cause intra-party conflicts, and vice versa. This is illustrated by the impact of the tensions between Chakuamba and Tembo during the 1999 elections and beyond, as well as by the AFORD leadership’s flirtation with the UDF over the Open- and Third-Term bids, which resulted in a party split and the subsequent formation of MGODE.

Party constitutions provide that decisions by coalition leaders are to be approved by the national executive committee. Given the centralised nature of parties and the fact that leaders own them as they would private enterprises, there is limited consultation with the party base about decisions to form or quit an alliance. For example, when the AFORD entered into its alliance with the UDF in 1995, the decision was not explained to party members. For personal gain, six AFORD ministers remained in the UDF coalition government in 1995 after its collapse. Similarly, there was little consultation with members and supporters over the decision to withdraw from the coalition with the UDF in 1997, nor was there internal discussion ahead of the subsequent alliance with the MCP. Clearly, party members were not in favour of the AFORD’s support of the Open- and Third-Term Bills and the subsequent formation of the UDF-AFORD-NCD alliance ahead of the 2004 elections. However, lack of consultation prevented the AFORD leadership from ascertaining the preferences of their supporters in terms of coalition partners, a factor that led to the demise of the AFORD as the third-largest party in Malawi and its relegation to the periphery of the country’s politics. An extreme case of total disregard of party supporters was when the leader of the NDA dissolved the party to re-join the UDF not only without taking into account the feelings of the party’s members but without even consulting its MPs. ‘Who are party bosses ultimately accountable to?’ is a logical question that such developments raise. Apparently, the answer is ‘nobody’.

Tensions within a coalition make it difficult for the coalition to be sustainable, a factor exacerbated by the absence of regular dialogue among the partners. Soon after the constitution of the UDF-AFORD alliance in 1995, the AFORD felt that because the UDF had won the 1994 elections on its own, the ruling party saw it as opportunistic and showed no respect for it.

Obviously the challenges for opposition coalitions are even more serious than those for governing coalitions and include a lack of resources. In addition, power struggles, lack of ideology and the absence of a post-
election opposition strategy make opposition coalitions difficult to sustain. In the context of Malawi, it has been easy for the government of the day to buy off opposition leaders after their electoral defeat, which tends to be compounded by bankruptcy resulting from the lack of public funding for parties.

The formation of coalitions has had both positive and negative consequences for affiliated parties. The most positive effects have been that they have helped the ruling party to retain power by drawing on the support of its allies, as the UDF did in 2004. In addition, through the coalition, the AFORD was able to raise its image from that of a regional to a national party, thus making it more appealing to a broader national constituency, although this did not translate into more votes. More generally, alliances have allowed leaders of different political parties to work together, harmonise their views on a number of divisive issues and work towards the same goal. In government, alliances have ensured the political stability and governability of the country, while, in opposition, they have allowed opposition parties to work together in Parliament.

However, party coalitions in Malawi tend to be better known for their adverse effects on individual parties. Indeed, they have led to the fragmentation of political parties such as the UDF, the AFORD and the MCP. For example, the Open- and Third-Term Bills caused divisions in the MCP and fragmentations in the AFORD. The lack of transparency and internal democracy in the AFORD led it to support Muluzi’s bid without ensuring that it had the support of its base, a repeated tendency that had, in the past, cost it many votes. While the party won 36 seats in Parliament when it stood alone in the 1994 elections, the number decreased to 29 in 1999, after its alliances with the UDF in 1995 and the MCP in 1997, and to only 6 in 2004, after its controversial alliance with the UDF.

It must be recalled that the AFORD tabled the Open-Term Bill in Parliament. One of our AFORD respondents claimed unconvincingly that this was a way of strengthening the UDF-AFORD relationship in order to demonstrate that the north-based AFORD was not hostile to the south-based ruling UDF. Despite this, many segments of society saw the alliance as an attempt by the AFORD to perpetuate corruption and mismanagement. Heated debate ensued in the party, causing irreversible cleavages and splits, which resulted in the ‘political balkanisation’ of the northern province, as demonstrated by the outcome of the 2004 election.

Once in government, because of its poor electoral performance AFORD was allowed only one minister and one deputy minister. Within seven months
the minister (Chihana), a close ally of Muluzi, was fired in a mini Cabinet reshuffle. As for the UDF, its own lack of intra-party democracy characterised by the fact that for years it failed to hold a national convention and by the handpicking of the presidential candidate and his running mate by Muluzi as well as flawed primaries for the selection of parliamentary candidates all frustrated aspirant candidates, several of whom left the party and stood for election on their own.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY COALITIONS ON THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS

In general, the representation of women in the Malawi Parliament has improved progressively. In 1994, a total of 10 women (5.6 per cent) was elected to the 177-member Parliament. After the 1999 general elections, 17 women were elected, 8.8 per cent of the 193-seat legislature. As seen in Table 6, the number rose to 27 MPs, 14.6 per cent of the 185 constituencies contested in 2004. Of these 27 women MPs, 8 are returning incumbents while 19 are new legislators. ‘Of the 1 267 candidates who contested the 2004 parliamentary elections, only 152 (12 per cent) were women’ (Boniface Dulani 2004). Given that 52 per cent of the population of Malawi is female, these figures reflect a worrying gender imbalance.

This limited progress is partly explained by the role played by coalitions and alliances, which tend, in various ways, to limit opportunities for women’s participation in politics. One of the problems is that women are frequently verbally harassed and humiliated by their male colleagues, as a result of which some women opt to run as independents and, in a few cases, have won seats from their male opponents. Close to 20 per cent of elected women MPs have come to Parliament as independents.

Another problem is that women’s historical economic disadvantage relative to that of men has made it difficult for them to fight their way through the double obstruction created during the selection of candidates, first at party level and second at coalition level. The emergence of numerous independent women candidates in 2004 bears undeniable testimony to the systematic marginalisation of women and, in many instances, the deliberate manipulation of primary election results in favour of men.

The third problem is that as coalition negotiations are held behind closed doors between party presidents, who are themselves usually men, issues of women’s representation in the coalition leadership as well as gender equality naturally do not constitute part of the negotiation agenda. Even
where one party president showed a commitment to include more women in leadership positions within his party, this commitment weakened once coalition discussions started, as most of the other parties did not consider gender equality a priority. Consequently, women are relegated to the periphery and are only considered suitable as support forces for the male candidates and for dancing at campaign rallies.

As of August 2004, the 27 female MPs indicated their party affiliations as follows: AFORD (1), NDA (1), MCP (4), Petra (1), RP (2), UDF (14), and Independents (3). This numbers varies slightly from the official election results in the table above because one NDA MP declared herself Independent and three Independents joined the UDF (Smiddy 2004).

Most respondents proposed the following interventions in order to remove barriers faced by women and ensure gender equality in Malawi’s top political positions. First, coalition MoUs should clearly make provision for women’s representation and this should be implemented. Further,

<table>
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<th>2004</th>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Source: Compiled by authors based on Malawi Electoral Commission figures
coalitions should use neutral symbols and slogans specific to the coalition itself, and not those of the coalition presidential candidate’s party. This will allow for visibility of and equal opportunities for women from all participating parties. Second, the electoral law should be reformed to change the current winner-takes-all electoral system, which is known worldwide for its adverse effect on women’s representation, and offer incentives to parties and coalitions who take affirmative action that favours the substantial increase of elected women. For example, the introduction of a ‘quota system’ would guarantee that a specific number of seats are reserved for women contestants only in addition to allowing women to compete with men in all other constituencies. Third, international and regional declarations should be domesticated and enforceable once ratified to ensure mandatory compliance by the signatory governments. This would oblige governments (and political parties) to adhere to the minimum 30 per cent female representation set out in the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development signed in 1997 in Blantyre, Malawi. In tandem with these proposals, civic education on gender issues should also be informed by research into good practices in the region and beyond relating to the performance of women in political leadership. This will assist in removing the negative traditional beliefs, stereotypes and cultural values that have militated against women.

CONCLUSION

This paper has demonstrated, among other things, that political party alliances in Malawi do not last the full term of Parliament. The 1995 UDF-AFORD coalition ended in 1996 when AFORD realised, after it had lost a by-election in Mzimba to the MCP, that the party was losing popularity in its stronghold. After the collapse of the coalition, several AFORD ministers chose to remain in the UDF government, thus ending their membership of AFORD.

The longest alliance ever was that between the MCP and AFORD, which was formed in 1997 ahead of the 1999 general elections and ended only in 2002. However, in reality, this alliance was dysfunctional and, several years before its formal collapse, it was ineffective, if not irrelevant, only existing on paper.

The Mgwirizano coalition was officially launched three months before the 2004 election but once it was defeated some of its main affiliate parties simply abandoned it. Coalitions tend not to survive because they are not a policy platform but a strategy by leaders for their political and career
advancement. Personality clashes and lack of ideology and policies explain both the collapse of party coalitions and their eventual revival.

It can be concluded that the frequent collapse of party coalitions is the result of many factors, including, *inter alia*, the lack of internal democracy and transparency within the affiliated political parties, personal ambition and power struggles, mistrust, nepotism, tribalism and regionalism, and the absence of ideology. A leader who forms a party or a coalition becomes an attractive bargaining chip, which can result in his/her appointment as a minister or even as vice-president in exchange for his or her support. Given that political parties operate like private companies, with the leader being the entrepreneur, politicians tend to find it normal that the leaders make deals for their personal benefit. This has resulted in leaders joining another party or alliance in exchange for a position or for financial and material advantages, and often members are not consulted on such decisions.

While the making, unmaking and remaking of political party alliances has become a dominant feature of Malawi politics, it has been observed that neither political parties nor coalitions is particularly sustainable. Opposition coalitions do not develop a post-election agenda in case of defeat and tend to be inactive and reactionary, which leads to their irrelevance between elections and ultimately to their disbanding. Their lack of resources has also been a major issue. They borrow during elections and bankrupt themselves, enabling the ruling party to buy off its opponents, which usually results in the further weakening of the opposition as a whole.

Ruling coalitions are more sustainable because of the financial security they provide. The main party in the coalition government (in this case the UDF) tends to dominate the coalition, with partner political parties playing a minimal role. As a result, the tensions within the UDF invariably affect adversely the effectiveness of the coalition. Like opposition coalitions ruling alliances lack strategy and detailed policies and the dominant parties tend to dishonour the MoU, to the distress of their allies.

In general, coalition practices in Malawi have led to the distortion of competition between real parties and parties which only exist on paper, without tangible membership, often to the advantage of opportunistic politicians. Coalitions have led to the demise of many political parties and leaders with some leaders being appointed ambassadors and posted outside the country as a way of sidelining them. Furthermore, the mix of old and new ‘wine’ exposes the coalition to attacks. Also noteworthy is the fact that intra-coalition fighting has led to questionable compromises. There have also been splits within parties because of tensions resulting from preferences
for specific coalition partners and refusal to form coalitions with certain parties and individuals.

On the other hand, the strength of alliances has been in public support for some of them (eg, the Mgwirizano coalition in its early stages), the ability to mobilise a larger pool of funding and the creation of a national face which many parties cannot achieve on their own because of their strong regional identity.

The effectiveness of party coalitions in Malawi will depend on improvements at both party and coalition levels in terms of better intra-party consultation, transparency, the development of short-, medium- and long-term goals, and in the attitudes of party leaders, whose single-minded office-seeking approach to the formation of both political parties and party alliances has been instrumental in their downfall. Mechanisms should be put in place to regulate and reinforce internal party democracy, good governance, accountability and transparency. At inter-party level, there should be more dialogue among the partner parties and in-depth consultation with political party structures and members, and negotiations should take place in good faith.

In addition, Malawi’s laws should recognise party coalitions by explicitly establishing binding procedures for forming and disbanding them, while MoUs should bind the parties to respect the expressed will of the electorate.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Recent developments in the UDF-led coalition following the realignment of forces either in support of Muluzi or in support of Mutharika confirm the central argument of this study.

The power struggles between the two, with Muluzi using the party machinery to control government remotely and Mutharika resorting to his presidential prerogatives to fight back, culminated in Mutharika’s resignation from the UDF. The initiation by the UDF of impeachment proceedings against Mutharika has confirmed the critical point of the rivalry. This inevitably had a ripple effect on the effectiveness of the pre-election government coalition, precipitated by divided loyalties within the UDF and the AFORD between the former and incumbent presidents. In Parliament the UDF associated itself with the opposition camp, led by the MCP, while Independent MPs became the most sought after ‘brides’ by both the government and the opposition. Conversely, Chihana was dropped from the Cabinet, allegedly
because of his suspicious association with Muluzi. Within the AFORD, executive members deemed sympathetic to the Mutharika government gave Chihana a vote of no confidence and elected an interim party leader. The matter is under judicial review following a disrupted extraordinary party convention ordered by the courts. The Mutharika government has attracted the sympathy of some Independent MPs in addition to the support received from MPs who are Cabinet ministers, their deputies and those who resigned from the UDF and declared themselves either independent or members of Mutharika’s newly created party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

It must be observed that when this report was compiled MPs who joined the DPP were not officially identified with their new party since the DPP did not exist at the time of the 2004 general elections. Practically, the government coalition comprises the RP, the MGODE, the DPP, the AFORD and the NCD. In addition, former MCP secretary general, Kate Kainja, also forms part of government, following her appointment in June 2005 as Minister of Education. Although she still claims that she is a loyal MCP member her Cabinet appointment was strongly contested by the MCP leadership and the party’s internal tribunal is reviewing the matter.

What is clear is that the government coalition arrangement engineered by Muluzi has collapsed. Mutharika’s government is working with individuals from those parties, although the individuals cannot claim officially to represent their parties in the present government. This support still falls short of a comfortable government majority in Parliament. The opposition Mgwirizano virtually collapsed in tandem with the dropping of the legal challenge to the election outcome, a scenario aggravated by the earlier withdrawal of other political parties from the coalition.

Following his dismissal from the Cabinet and after serving as vice-president for the DPP, Chakuamba returned to the RP, while the party’s deregistration court case was still pending. He was made ‘honorary chairman’ of the RP. While he was settling into his regained glory, he was arrested for defaming the state president and later released on bail. Barely a month after appointment as chairman, he was expelled from the RP for what the party claimed was divisive conduct (The Malawi Nation 7 October 2005). Gwanda has since registered a new political party, the New Republican Party (NRP). While a few MPs from his home district still pledge allegiance to him, his political base and national credibility have simultaneously crumbled. A number of chiefs from his political base in the Nsanje and Chikwawa districts have withdrawn their support and pledged support to the government because of what they term Chakuamba’s instability and opportunistic
conduct. Subsequently he addressed joint rallies with Muluzi (again) in an informal alliance and the two have one common cause – to use Parliament to remove Wa Mutharika.

AFORD’s embattled Chakufwa Chihana continues in the company of Muluzi albeit that, while a leader, he has no following since his trusted political lieutenants led a crusade for his resignation.

The UDF seized the opportunity of Chakuamba’s move from government to rush through presidential impeachment procedures against Wa Mutharika despite uncoordinated but overwhelming objections from civil society, other opposition parties both in and out of Parliament, the Human Rights Commission and donors (The Daily Times 20 October 2005; The Nation 18 October 2005, 20 October 2005, 27 October 2005).

On 27 October 2005 a three-member panel of Constitutional Court judges issued an injunction restraining Parliament from implementing the impeachment. This decision followed an application from Karonga Nyungwe MP, Richard Msowoya. Mutharika was expected to appear on the same day before Parliament, where the indictment was to be read to him.

In a related development, the president of the MCP announced that his party would no longer support the impeachment Bill unless it was preceded by the tabling of the National Governing Council (NGC) Bill. The MCP argued that passage of the Bill would guarantee the MCP’s control of government. It was alleged that the UDF was dragging its feet over the tabling the NGC Bill in order to dupe the MCP and revert to the constitutional order which currently states that, in the event of the state president’s office falling vacant, the vice-president (currently the UDF’s Cassim Chilumpha) would take over (Bright Sonani 2005).

Coincidentally, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and a contingent of police officers simultaneously besieged Muluzi’s three private residences in Lilongwe, Blantyre and Machinga on 27 October 2005. They confiscated, among other things, assorted documents, bank statements and returned cheques which the bureau intends to use as evidence of K1,4-billion which Muluzi allegedly received from ‘donor countries, foreign organisations and local private firms, and deposited into a personal account during his ten-year tenure of office’ (The Nation 28 October 2005).

The MCP has not yet resolved its dispute with its estranged secretary general, Kate Kainja, following her appointment as education minister. The party still contends that she effectively resigned when she accepted the ministerial position. Kainja insists she is still a member of the MCP and has sued ‘her’ party for dissolving her constituency committee.
Recent developments within political parties and their coalitions show the same patterns of office-seeking behaviour that have been the central strategy of leaders of political parties and party coalitions and is an essential cause of the weakness of the party system and the deficit of representative democracy in Malawi.
5

RENAMO UNIÃO ELEITORAL

Understanding the Longevity and Challenges of an Opposition Party Coalition in Mozambique

DENIS KADIMA AND ZEFANIAS MATSIMBE

INTRODUCTION

The formation of political party coalitions in Mozambique is not a new phenomenon. By the run-up to the first multiparty elections, in 1994, leaders of some of the so-called small political parties had realised that the existence of a minimum electoral threshold of 5 per cent of the national vote in parliamentary elections for a political party to gain representation in the National Assembly would make it an uphill race for them to get into Parliament. They therefore entered into a pre-election coalition. Had they not done so, votes for them would have been wasted. Since then the country has seen the formation and collapse of about half a dozen political party coalitions nearly all of which have fallen, between elections, into a vegetative state. However, one coalition, formed in 1999 around the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO), has managed to survive (for seven years, at the time of writing). It is known as the RENAMO União Eleitoral (RENAMO UE).

There are virtually no studies of political party coalitions in Mozambique, an important aspect of the political process that has often been touched on only in passing. This study attempts to fill the gap by collecting data and recording relevant aspects of the formation and management of the RENAMO UE. Data were gathered through interviews based on a pre-established questionnaire which was essentially directed to key people from selected political parties and individuals within the RENAMO UE (see the list of interviewees in Appendix 1). The respondents included a senior leader of RENAMO, a former top leader of RENAMO and two leaders from the so-called small parties, which have congregated around RENAMO in the RENAMO UE. Among the respondents was a senior official from the
governing Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), who was included in order to capture the view of the largest party in Mozambique about the most important political party coalition in the history of the country in particular and on party coalitions in Mozambique in general. The responses helped us understand, from various perspectives, the dynamics within the RENAMO UE coalition. Many unstructured and informal interviews were also conducted with Mozambican electoral stakeholders, including middle level cadres of various political parties. Secondary sources were also consulted.

This study attempts to grasp the raison d’être of the RENAMO UE, its management and longevity, with a view to drawing lessons from this party coalition experience for Mozambique and for Africa as a whole.

The paper is divided into six sections. The first describes the electoral history of the country under the multiparty dispensation, provides a brief history of RENAMO from its creation as a military organisation to its transformation into a political party, with an emphasis on its organisational arrangements and internal procedures, and lists all the party coalitions in the history of the country up to the 2004 general elections. It is followed by an analysis of the constitutional and legal provisions governing party coalitions in Mozambique. The three sections preceding the conclusion represent the nucleus of the study. They examine the driving forces behind the formation of the RENAMO UE, its objectives, and the selection of partners. They go into some detail on aspects of the management and maintenance of the coalition with a special focus on the challenges of sustaining it. Finally, the study explains the reasons for the survival and longevity of the RENAMO UE coalition and assesses its effectiveness. The conclusion draws lessons from the RENAMO UE experience.

Two main challenges were confronted in conducting the research. First, it was not easy to gather relevant information from secondary sources given that there has been virtually no major research on party coalitions in Mozambique to date. Second, the fact that the first set of interviews took place just before the December 2004 general elections might have limited the ability of the respondents to speak without reserve.

**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTY COALITIONS**

**A Brief History of Elections in Contemporary Mozambique**

The establishment of multiparty politics in Mozambique resulted from a constitutional amendment in 1990 following the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) by FRELIMO and RENAMO, which ended nearly 16 years
of civil war. The pre-GPA Constitution, enacted after independence in 1975, and its subsequent amendments, provided for a one-party state, that party being FRELIMO. Thus, the period between 1975 and 1990 was marked, among other things, by the gradual institutionalisation of a monolithic system of Marxist government (with some relevant changes along the way) as well as the restriction of fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of association and assembly. Elections only took place within the party leadership, with national, provincial and district assemblies representing the people at these levels. This was the so-called popular democracy.

The global revival of democracy that was precipitated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the end of Cold War and the wave of changes that swept through the African continent, giving expression to a long-repressed internal aspiration for democratic change, left FRELIMO with no alternative but to change the political dispensation in the country. In contrast to the experiences of most African countries, where the quest for democratic and accountable governance by political pressure groups, faith-based organisations, non-governmental organisations and social movements began soon after independence and persisted throughout the years, in Mozambique events took a different course. Civil society movements were weak, probably because most of the mass organisations were historically affiliated to the governing FRELIMO party.

One of the salient features of the 1990 constitutional amendment was the provision that, to win, a presidential candidate had to obtain more than 50 per cent of the valid votes in the entire country. In the absence of a clear winner in the first round, the Constitution provides that a second round of elections had to be conducted between the two candidates with the most votes. A fixed presidential term (two five-year terms) was also introduced without retrospective effect. President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who had replaced the late Samora Machel and had served for four years from 1986, was therefore eligible to contest the subsequent two presidential elections. He was, indeed, FRELIMO’s presidential candidate in 1994 and 1999. The period after 1990 was characterised by the creation of a large number of political parties, which subsequently contested the 1994 general elections with the results shown in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that FRELIMO’s Chissano won the 1994 presidential election with an absolute majority. His party also won the legislative elections, securing an absolute majority of seats, as shown in Table 2. RENAMO came second in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, and the União Democrática (UD) was third, winning nine parliamentary seats.
Table 1
Results of the 1994 Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party* and Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO Joaquim A Chissano</td>
<td>2 633 740</td>
<td>53,30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO Afonso M M Dhlakama</td>
<td>1 666 965</td>
<td>33,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PADEMO Wehia M Ripua</td>
<td>141 905</td>
<td>2,87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UNAMO Carlos A dos Reis</td>
<td>120 708</td>
<td>2,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MONAMO – PMSD Máximo D J Dias</td>
<td>115 442</td>
<td>2,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PACODE Vasco C M Alfaçema</td>
<td>58 848</td>
<td>1,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PIMO Jacob N S Sibindy</td>
<td>51 070</td>
<td>1,03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>FUMO – PCD Domingos A M Arouca</td>
<td>37 767</td>
<td>0,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Independent Candidate Carlos J M Jeque</td>
<td>34 588</td>
<td>0,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SOL Casimiro M Nhamithambo</td>
<td>32 036</td>
<td>0,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Independent Candidate Mário F C Machele</td>
<td>24 238</td>
<td>0,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PPPM Padimbe M K Andrea</td>
<td>24 208</td>
<td>0,49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brazão Mazula 1994; 1996
* The list of abbreviations on p xiii gives the full names of the parties
The results of the 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections were almost identical to those of the 1994 general elections. Chissano, who was running for his second and last term, won the presidential elections with 52.29 per cent of the total vote (Table 3). FRELIMO also won a majority of votes in the 250-member National Assembly, gaining 133 seats, an increase of four from the 129 it won in 1994, as illustrated in Table 4. The UD’s failure to be returned to the National Assembly was one of the dominant features which differentiated the 1994 and 1999 electoral outcomes. Luis de Brito advanced two hypotheses to explain the UD’s surprising good performance in the 1994 general elections. The first was that of ‘a symbol effect’ – the UD chose as its symbol a cashew nut, well known, especially in rural areas. The second related to the party’s position at the bottom of the ballot paper,

Table 2
Results of the 1994 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Elected MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>2 115 793</td>
<td>44.33</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>1 803 506</td>
<td>37.78</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UD</td>
<td>245 793</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>99 031</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>79 622</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>FUMO-PCD</td>
<td>66 527</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>60 635</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PIMO</td>
<td>58 590</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>PACODE</td>
<td>52 446</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>PPPM</td>
<td>50 793</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>48 030</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PADEMO</td>
<td>36 689</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UNAMO</td>
<td>34 809</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>26 961</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 402 940</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>250</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brazão Mazula1994; 1996
suggesting that because FRELIMO’s presidential candidate, Chissano, had been at the bottom on the presidential ballot paper, many FRELIMO voters had marked the bottom square on the parliamentary ballot paper too, thus voting accidentally for the UD (de Brito 1996, p 467). Thus, the 1999 Parliament consisted only of representatives of FRELIMO and RENAMO and its allies, reinforcing Mozambique’s two-party system. The second hypothesis seems to be more plausible.

Table 3
Results of the 1999 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party and Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO Joaquim A Chissano</td>
<td>2 339 848</td>
<td>52.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO UE Afonso M M Dhlakama</td>
<td>2 134 255</td>
<td>47.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: STAE 2001

Table 4
Results of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections and Parties’ Representation in Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Elected MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>2 008 165</td>
<td>48.55</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO UE</td>
<td>1 604 470</td>
<td>38.79</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>111 280</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PALMO</td>
<td>102 115</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>83 515</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PADELIMO</td>
<td>33 247</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PIMO</td>
<td>29 456</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PANAOC</td>
<td>24 615</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UMO</td>
<td>64 182</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UD</td>
<td>61 276</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PPLM</td>
<td>11 684</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PASOMO</td>
<td>2 153</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 136 158</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: STAE 2001
Another characteristic of the 1999 elections was that there were only two presidential candidates: President Joaquim Alberto Chissano and Afonso Marceta Macacho Dhlakama. The formation of RENAMO’s electoral coalition in 1999 largely explains the reduction in the number of presidential candidates as well as the decrease in the number of political parties that contested that year’s general election. Similarly, the formation of the RENAMO UE coalition explains the substantial increase in RENAMO’s share of vote in both the presidential election (from 33,73% in 1994 to 47,71% in 1999) and marginally in the parliamentary election (from 37,78% to 38,81%). The RENAMO UE secured 117 seats, up from RENAMO’s 112 seats in 1994.

In 2004 FRELIMO nominated a new candidate, Armando Guebuza, the governing party’s secretary general, since Chissano was constitutionally ineligible, having run the country for two consecutive terms under the new Constitution. The election was characterised by a record low voter turnout of 36,3 per cent, compared with 87,9 per cent in 1994 and 69,5 per cent in 1999. Moreover, in contrast to the 1999 presidential election, which was contested by only two presidential candidates, Chissano and Dhlakama, several other candidates stood for the 2004 presidential election, including Raúl Domingos, formerly RENAMO’s parliamentary chief whip, who had earlier been expelled from the party, as will be explained below.

Table 5
Results of the 2004 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party and Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO Armando E Guebuza</td>
<td>2 004 226</td>
<td>63,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO UE Afonso M M Dhlakama</td>
<td>998 059</td>
<td>31,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PDD Raúl M Domingos</td>
<td>85 815</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PIMO Jacob N S Sibindy</td>
<td>28 656</td>
<td>0,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MBG Carlos A dos Reis</td>
<td>27 412</td>
<td>0,87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Conselho Constitucional 2005
FRELIMO’s Guebuza won the presidential election with the highest percentage recorded since 1994 (Table 5), while his party fell short of winning a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The main opposition candidate, Dhlakama, came second in the presidential race, with a meagre 31.74 per cent of the vote, and his party coalition also came second. The RENAMO UE lost a total of 27 parliamentary seats to FRELIMO, which won a total of 160 seats. The RENAMO UE secured only 90 seats (Table 6), losing its status in the political life of the country. The 2004 elections marked the death of the two-party system in Mozambique, transforming the country into a virtual dominant-party system like those of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Elected MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>1 889 289</td>
<td>62.03</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RENAMO UE</td>
<td>902 289</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>60 758</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>7 591</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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The recent history of party coalitions in Mozambique can be traced to the period preceding the 1994 elections, when a coalition named the União Democrática (UD) was formed. At that time the UD consisted of three new political parties, namely, Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD), Partido Nacional Democrático (PANADE) and Partido Liberal de Moçambique (PALMO), created especially to contest the first democratic elections. The UD managed to win nine seats in the first multiparty legislature, as explained above. By the second democratic election, in 1999, other party coalitions had emerged, including the RENAMO UE, the largest ever coalition in Mozambique. The number of party coalitions increased further ahead of the 2004 general elections. Table 7 shows the evolution of party coalitions in Mozambique from 1994 to date. This list is restricted to those coalitions which contested at least one general election.

**Table 7**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Affiliated Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1994             | União Democrática (UD) | PRD  
PANADE  
PALMO |
| 1999             | União Democrática (UD) | PANADE  
PANAMO |
|                  | União Moçambicana da Oposição (UMO) | PADEMO  
PACODE  
PAMOMO |
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party A</th>
<th>Party B</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>RENAMO União Eleitoral (RENAMO UE)</td>
<td>RENAMO ALIMO FAP PRD PUN PPPM PCN FUMO/PSD MONAMO/PSD UDF PEMO UDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MBG</td>
<td>UNAMO PARTONAMO</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
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<td>UD</td>
<td>PANADE PLDM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USAMO</td>
<td>PADRES PSM PSDM UM</td>
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</table>
The formation of a party coalition in Mozambique has been largely an adventurous enterprise. Indeed, most coalitions have failed to gain access to Parliament. Apart from the UD, which won representation accidentally and ephemerally, the RENAMO UE has been the sole coalition to have gained and maintained a significant presence in the National Assembly since that political organisation’s inception in 1999. Yet, together, Mozambique’s so-called small parties were able in the past to garner about 13 per cent of the national vote. However, past election results have also shown that the small parties are just too small to be effective on their own. Coalitions of small parties tend to mushroom only around election time in an attempt to comply with the minimum 5 per cent electoral threshold required to gain representation in Parliament. The emergence of these coalitions only around election periods has not allowed them to organise properly in time to contest the elections successfully. Furthermore, they have not been prepared to accept the leadership of one of their peers in a broad-based coalition which might allow them to win a significant number of parliamentary seats and balance the dominance of FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Given the above constraints, the small political parties were left with very few options. FRELIMO was not inclined to enter into a coalition with other political parties. According to a RENAMO UE respondent, ‘FRELIMO does not see the need to build any party coalition because it is already in coalition with the state apparatus’, insinuating that the Mozambican governing party has used its position in public office to abuse public resources for its own electoral advantage. It is, however, worth highlighting that FRELIMO has so far been able to secure an absolute majority of votes (at least 51%) in every general election. While entering into a coalition would help consolidate its position the party has, thus far, not been in favour of such an arrangement.

In contrast to FRELIMO, RENAMO sees coalition as an opportunity to improve its chance of winning elections; hence its initiative in creating an electoral union with ten other opposition parties. Because the RENAMO UE coalition is organised around RENAMO it is important to devote a section of this study to the party’s history, its organisational structure, processes and challenges as a political party in order to identify the needs of the RENAMO UE and understand the challenges confronting it.

RENAMO: HISTORY, ORGANISATION & INTERNAL PROCEDURES

The success of a party coalition depends not only on the coalition’s own organisational capacity but also on the organisational arrangements within
each of its affiliates. This is even more so when there is a dominant political party in the coalition, as in the case of the RENAMO UE, where RENAMO is ultra-dominant. Indeed, every aspect of the coalition’s strategies and operations virtually centres on RENAMO. It is not surprising, then, that the coalition and its largest member share a name. Mozambique became independent in 1974 after many years of anti-colonial struggle waged by FRELIMO against the Portuguese colonial administration. In 1977 RENAMO was born as an armed group, sponsored by Southern Rhodesia (known today as Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa, who were frightened by FRELIMO’s support for liberation movements fighting the racist regimes in these two countries as well as by the Mozambican governing party’s Marxist-Leninist ideology (Lodge, Kadima and Pottie 2002).

Internally, the population in the centre and centre-north of the country was frustrated by the political domination of the south, from which most FRELIMO cadres and leaders originated; the centralisation of power by FRELIMO; the establishment of a political system characterised by the supremacy of the ruling party over the state; the marginalisation of the traditional chieftaincy system of government and the neglect of rural areas in favour of urban and industrial zones, through forced resettlement and villagisation programmes. Over time RENAMO’s guerrilla warfare received considerable support from customary chiefs and local communities in central Mozambique, thus transforming the rebellion from the creation of the intelligence services of Southern Rhodesian into a Mozambican indigenous phenomenon (Vines 1996).

RENAMO’s guerrilla warfare methods, which included sabotage, destruction of the infrastructure, and raids, were widely decried for their brutality. An estimated 900 000 people were killed between 1980 and 1988 (Abrahamsson & Nilsson 1995) and more than one million people fled to neighbouring countries during the 16-year civil war. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO share responsibility for these killings, though FRELIMO’s propaganda was extremely successful in portraying RENAMO as a brutal and bloodthirsty armed movement, a reputation the opposition party still carries in some sectors, both internally and externally.

Ahead of the 1994 elections RENAMO faced manifold challenges. These included clearing its name, transforming itself from a military organisation into a democratic political party, and recruiting successfully in urban areas outside its rural comfort zone. Comparing RENAMO with other African opposition political parties Carrie Manning (1998) explains that ‘it is not an intellectual, urban-based party trying to put down roots in the
countryside, but a military organisation with weakly developed administrative and political wings having to downplay its military character and strengthen its political and administrative side, largely by recruiting in the cities’.

On the other hand, since its inception RENAMO has always been an opposition movement. It has therefore not had access to public resources and the exposure that the FRELIMO cadres, appointed at all levels of the state throughout the period from independence to the early 1990s, have enjoyed. During the civil war, RENAMO operated clandestinely, counting on networks organised around traditional chiefs in those areas under its control. These networks have continued to be more or less effective in the opposition party’s traditional strongholds.

Since the political liberalisation of the 1990s, efforts by some international organisations to help RENAMO develop an effective and democratic organisation have had mixed results. Obviously, RENAMO, like other opposition parties in Africa, has been under-resourced. The ability of FRELIMO to appoint its members to the public service has made the governing party a more attractive option than RENAMO. Nonetheless, RENAMO received massive support (amounting to US$17-million) from a United Nations Trust Fund ahead of the 1994 general elections. After the election it continued to receive close to US$1,5-million of public funding per year by virtue of being a parliamentary party with 112 seats.

On the other hand, the continued centralisation and control of RENAMO by its historical leader, Afonso Dhlakama, has been seen as a major problem that has prevented the transformation of the party into a democratic organisation. According to Giovanni M Carbone (2003a), ‘internal rules have little relevance. While party congresses should be organised every two years, for example, none was held between 1994 (when a small general meeting took place in Maringue district) and 2001. In October 2001, a Congress re-elected Dhlakama as party president against two hopeless contestants whose candidacy was intended as a façade of internal democracy. A new statute was also approved, but the re-structuring of the party was again marred by confusion and over-concentration of power.’

RENAMO’s entry into the National Assembly was a new development. Because Dhlakama had not stood in the parliamentary election but only in the presidential election, in which he was defeated, the RENAMO party leader was absent from Parliament. The party chose Raúl Domingos, who had been its chief negotiator during the political negotiation of the early 1990s, as its chief whip. As a result of his increased visibility in Parliament
and his moderation and wisdom during parliamentary debates, Domingos grew substantially in stature outside the party machinery. He was eventually removed from RENAMO, reportedly under questionable circumstances. ‘It was widely believed that Domingos was perceived by Dhlakama as a threat in view of the party Congress and of the internal election for the party leadership’ (Carbone 2003b).

Describing what Michel Cahen (1995) termed RENAMO’s ‘legendary disorganisation’, Carbone (2003a) reported that

following the controversial expulsion, in late 2000, of the increasingly influential chief of the parliamentary bancada (feared by party leader Afonso Dhlakama as a potential challenger), the marginalisation of prominent RENAMO figures developed into a pattern in mid-2002. A well-known MP was controversially suspended and another one resigned from the parliamentary group. The secretary general of the party was dismissed only months after he took office, as were the head of the party’s National Council and eventually, on grounds of ‘ unpatriotic’ and ‘undemocratic’ behaviour, the whole Political Commission. Dhlakama himself took over as interim secretary general, combining the latter position with that of party leader and thus further concentrating power and control over the party in his hand.

This was the situation that prevailed in RENAMO ahead of the 2004 general elections.

Obviously, during the war it was crucial for RENAMO to centralise its decision-making process, which proved to be helpful in getting all RENAMO troops throughout the territory under its control to abide by the peace deal when the party leader instructed them to do so in the early 1990s. However, the continued concentration of power in the hands of the party leader after 1994 was anachronistic. This trend has also affected the functioning of the RENAMO UE. In interviews with the authors, coalition partner parties complained about the organisational and democratic deficits within the coalition.

The RENAMO UE came into being at a time when power was being further concentrated in the hands of the RENAMO party leader, a process that accelerated ahead of the 2004 general elections. In interviews, some leaders of the RENAMO UE indicated clearly that both RENAMO and the coalition were run in an erratic and undemocratic manner and that this has caused a great deal of discontent in both structures. It appears that the
organisational and democratic deficit in RENAMO may explain, at least partly, the coalition’s dismaying performance in the 2004 general elections, compared with that in the 1999 elections. It is our hope that future research will provide an in-depth analysis of this coalition in the area of policy formulation.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING PARTY COALITIONS

The transition from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy in Mozambique was accompanied by the necessary constitutional and legal reforms to uphold democratic development in the country. Although the 1990 Mozambican Constitution does not explicitly provide for the formation of party coalitions it leaves the space open for citizens to form or be affiliated to any political party of their choice. All citizens have the freedom to form and to participate in political parties (Art 77.1) and party membership is voluntary, and derives from the freedom of citizens to associate on the basis of the same political ideals (Art 77.2). Article 31.1 recognises that parties are the expression of political pluralism, competing to form and express popular will, and are the fundamental instruments for the democratic participation of citizens in the government of the country. In addition, Article 31.2 stipulates that the internal structure and operation of political parties shall be democratic. Article 32.2 declares that the formation and operation of political parties shall, in particular, be national in scope; uphold national interests; contribute to the formation of public opinion, especially on major national issues; and strengthen the patriotic spirit of citizens and the consolidation of the Mozambican nation. This provision underscores the will of the legislature to avoid ethnic parties, favouring nationally based political parties. Article 32.4 states that the formation, structure and operation of parties shall be regulated by law.

The Mozambican Constitution does not refer to the possibility of merging an existing party with another party. However, Article 1 of the Law on Political Parties, as well as the electoral law, says that citizens may contest the elections as a political party, a coalition of political parties or a group of citizens.

The Electoral Law is one of the most important factors in understanding the formation and practice of party coalitions. Article 203 establishes that a party must win a minimum of 5 per cent of the votes at national level in order to secure seats in the National Assembly. This 5 per cent minimum
threshold has a great impact on the formation of political party coalitions in Mozambique. The electoral system provides for proportional representation through party lists, and votes are converted into parliamentary seats (250 seats in a single chamber) through the d’Hondt method. The distribution of seats in each of the eleven constituencies (ie, provinces plus Maputo City) is in accordance with the number of voters registered in each constituency (see Article 150 of the Electoral Law). The result is that the small political parties are effectively marginalised. The system has been decried not only because it sets a high barrier for entry to Parliament but because all the wasted votes are eventually shared between FRELIMO and RENAMO in proportion to their shares of the vote, thus unduly increasing their parliamentary representation.

It is worth highlighting that the adoption of the current political regime and electoral system was not a product of public debate and broad-based internal political consensus. It formed part of the negotiation between the two political parties at the time of conflict, which culminated in the signing of the GPA. Many analysts have advocated electoral reform, which will include, among other things, the scrapping or lowering of the electoral threshold.

THE FORMATION OF THE RENAMO UNIÃO ELEITORAL

A Partnership of Unequal Status

Mozambique has seen the formation of about half-a-dozen political party coalitions, each of which has collapsed for several reasons, including a lack of strong leadership, weak organisational capacity, personal ambition (everyone wanting to be the leader), and financial difficulties. The RENAMO UE is the only coalition to have secured substantial representation in Parliament and to have survived. This section examines the raison d’être of the RENAMO UE, identifies the selection criteria of the coalition’s partners and the procedure of selecting candidates for legislative and presidential elections, and assesses to what extent the coalition has achieved its objectives.

Objectives and Driving Forces Behind the Coalition

After losing the 1994 presidential election to FRELIMO by about 20 per cent, and with the small political parties together having received a total of about 13 per cent of the popular vote, RENAMO realised that if it joined forces with these small parties the opposition would stand a better chance of winning the presidential election in 1999. In addition, the success of the
joint boycott of the 1998 local government elections by RENAMO and many of these small parties, which had resulted in an unprecedented low voter turnout of about 15 per cent, confirmed that, arithmetically, RENAMO and these parties could make a difference should they come together in a pre-election alliance.

The small parties wished to be represented in Parliament and were aware that if they continued to contest elections individually or in weak alliances they would not achieve the minimum threshold of 5 per cent and would continue to waste their votes in favour of FRELIMO and RENAMO. Moreover, they were conscious that RENAMO needed them more than FRELIMO did. A pre-election coalition became of paramount importance for both RENAMO and the smaller parties.

The formation of the RENAMO UE coalition seemed, therefore, to offer the most likely opportunity for Dhlakama to win the presidential election and for his coalition partners to secure seats in the National Assembly. Indeed, the coalition enabled Dhlakama and RENAMO to win more votes in 1999 than they had in 1994 when they had contested the elections alone. RENAMO increased its share of the popular national vote from 33.73 per cent in the 1994 presidential election to 47.71 per cent in 1999, and from 112 parliamentary seats in 1994 to 117 in 1999, a gain attributed to the small parties, as the coalition ensured that no party other than RENAMO competed with FRELIMO in the presidential race that year. While Dhlakama has not yet attained his goal of ruling the country, the coalition partners have secured their place in Parliament.

In the view of one respondent the RENAMO leader supported the formation of the coalition in order to avoid competition from the other opposition leaders, and to ensure that not many people stood in the presidential election, hoping, in this way, to win the entire opposition vote. He illustrated his argument by recalling that ‘in 2004, Dhlakama tried to prevent Raúl Domingos from running for the presidential election by fear of losing votes, and wrote to the Constitutional Court claiming that it was illegal for Domingos to stand for election in both presidential and parliamentary elections as he did, and therefore requesting the Court to invalidate his candidature.’ The Constitutional Court rejected his application.

Another respondent, however, argues that small parties do not help. ‘With or without them, Dhlakama and RENAMO would receive more or less the same result, he contends. The respondent illustrates this argument with the results of the 1994 and 1999 elections, reporting that in 1994 RENAMO won 112 parliamentary seats and in 1999 the RENAMO UE
won 117 seats, of which 19 were given away to the coalition partners, with nine of them securing two seats each and one partner being granted one seat. In real terms, RENAMO’s representation had decreased from 112 to 98 MPs.

The results of the 2004 general elections tend to support the second position, given that, in these elections, RENAMO together with its RENAMO UE partners received a share of parliamentary seats just below RENAMO’s 1994 electoral performance when it had run for election alone. It must, however, be recognised that Dhlakama has been skilful in ‘uniting’ most of the opposition behind him, which allowed him to increase his share of the national vote in the presidential election in 1999 by 13 per cent, a figure which represents the share of the vote secured by the small parties in the 1994 presidential election. On the other hand, the fact that Dhlakama won only 31.74 per cent of the popular vote in the 2004 presidential election (from 47.71% in 1999) does not necessarily mean that the small parties contributed little. Additional factors must be taken into account before drawing a conclusion. These factors include the overall low voter turnout in 2004 (36.3%) compared to that in 1999 (69.5%), the reported ‘legendary disorganisation’ in RENAMO, the expulsion of senior cadres from RENAMO, and the subsequent creation by Raúl Domingos of a new party, the Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (PDD), which draws its support mainly from former RENAMO supporters. Two additional factors were that more presidential candidates were fielded in 2004 than in 1999, which disadvantaged the RENAMO candidate, and the withdrawal of two parties (the UNAMO and the PIMO) from the RENAMO UE.

The respondents admitted that Dhlakama was the driving force behind the formation of the RENAMO UE, while recognising that the majority of RENAMO officials were opposed to the coalition as it now stands.

Selection of Partner Parties and Incentives for Joining the Coalition

The successful boycott by RENAMO and a group of opposition parties of the 1998 local government elections gave impetus to the formation of a coalition around RENAMO. Negotiations took place between 1998 and 1999. At first there were no criteria for selecting coalition partners, everyone being welcome in order to avoid vote splitting. A respondent argued that this procedure was changed in 2004 and, as a result, a political party wishing to join the RENAMO UE coalition was required to demonstrate grassroots support. It was not clear how this support was assessed between elections.

Some coalition partners were willing to join a RENAMO-led coalition
because their leaders had historical links with the party during the civil war. Others had no real choice, given that FRELIMO enjoyed more than an absolute majority of the votes on its own and did not, therefore, need the support of another party to remain in power. In addition, coalitions formed by leaders of small parties have proved to be unsustainable. A coalition with RENAMO was clearly the only viable option, given that the RENAMO leader was a well-known historical political figure in the country and the party already held a large number of seats in the National Assembly, which guaranteed seats for its coalition partners.

All the respondents argue that the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the country played a limited role in the formation of the RENAMO UE coalition. Nonetheless, one admitted that the Aliança Independente de Moçambique (ALIMO), a political party with Islamic leanings, was brought into the RENAMO UE alliance to balance the representation of religious groups. More importantly, the literature on the political history of Mozambique refers abundantly to the geographical divide between the south, on the one hand, and the centre and centre-north, on the other. The south (Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza, Inhambane) and the far northern province of Cabo Delgado, are seen as FRELIMO’s bastion, while the centre and centre-north (Sofala, Manica, Zambézia, Tete and Nampula) have traditionally been considered RENAMO strongholds. Niassa is often split more or less 50/50. The results of the three general elections have confirmed this geographical divide, though the 2004 election saw FRELIMO make considerable inroads in the centre and centre-north, and win in Tete and Nampula. In Manica, a province won by RENAMO in 1994 and 1999, FRELIMO and RENAMO UE won seven seats each in the 2004 election.

Reinforcing the geographical divide, RENAMO’s partner parties in the coalition are largely led by individuals from the centre and the centre-north. The leader of UMO is the only one of 11 party leaders to come from the south. It is therefore curious that, despite this reality, none of the respondents acknowledged the regional or geographical cleavages as possible factors in the decision of certain parties to join the RENAMO UE and of others not to do so. Table 8 shows the parallels between these geographical boundaries and the voters’ support for the parties.

The incentive for the small political parties to join the coalition is fundamentally the possibility that their leaders will be elected to Parliament. The selection of parliamentary candidates starts with their nomination by each partner party. Prior to the 1999 general election each coalition partner
outside RENAMO had the right to have two members placed in winnable positions on the provincial party lists. The first name on the RENAMO UE provincial list came from RENAMO and the second from the coalition party member (normally the president of the party). A selection committee was put in place for this purpose, though the RENAMO leader had the last word. This allocation ensured the election of 19 MPs from the small parties at the expense of RENAMO, causing tensions within the majority party, and between RENAMO cadres and the RENAMO UE coalition.

This method changed in response to strong pressure applied by party members on RENAMO’s leadership. Although each partner party continues to nominate two candidates to the RENAMO UE political committee for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>RENAMO (UE)</th>
<th>União Democrática</th>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Tete</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (only from 2004)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World (only from 2004)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Underlined figures indicate the party/coalition that won the majority of seats in a given provincial constituency
inclusion in the provincial electoral list, from 2004 only one candidate per RENAMO UE-affiliated party is placed in a winnable position. The performance of the party in the pre-election phase is a key criterion in determining the position on the coalition lists of its second member. But it is not clear how this performance is determined. One respondent complained that RENAMO had violated the alliance agreement, accusing the party of arbitrarily allocating the second seat to the affiliated parties.

In the case of the presidential candidate, RENAMO, being the largest party in the coalition, proposes the candidate and the other parties invariably support the nomination.

The fact that the selection of parliamentary candidates has resulted in RENAMO members losing seats to small partner parties has caused serious tension. Most RENAMO members believe that while the RENAMO UE has been important in improving the RENAMO leader’s chance of being elected president, the alliance has been counterproductive for the party itself, given that it has decreased the chance of party members being elected to the National Assembly, a fact born out by the reduction in the party’s representation from 117 to 98 seats.

The RENAMO UE and Challenges to Women’s Representation
Unlike FRELIMO, RENAMO has no quota for women standing for election to Parliament. As a result, it has contributed little to the relatively high number of female MPs in Mozambique’s Assembleia da República since 1994. It is believed that the share of RENAMO’s female MPs decreased even further in 1999 and 2004 because of the RENAMO UE coalition. Coalition politics brings with it a second level of competition for party members, who must first go through the internal selection of candidates in the party and then surmount another hurdle – the fact that various coalition partners must be accommodated.

Given that neither RENAMO nor the RENAMO UE has a quota for women, and that all the leaders of the 11 partner parties constituting the RENAMO UE are male and are assured of winnable positions on the electoral lists, the opportunities for women to be placed in favourable positions on the lists, or, in fact, to be elected at all, is considerably reduced.

Table 9 shows the number of female MPs from FRELIMO, RENAMO and RENAMO UE in 1994, 1999 and 2004. The candidates were not distinguished by gender. Although the table does not show the ranking of women on the lists, the number of elected women MPs indicates how many were placed in winnable positions. It is clear that the existence of a quota in
FRELIMO has contributed to the overall increase of women MPs in Mozambique. The absence of such a quota in RENAMO and its alliance has limited the ability of the RENAMO UE to advance the cause of women’s representation.

Table 9
Number of Women Candidates and Number of elected Women MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Elections</th>
<th>Total FRELIMO</th>
<th>Total RENAMO and/or RENAMO UE</th>
<th>UD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors

MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PARTY COALITIONS

In order to understand how decisions are made and how the party coalition functions and maintains itself, this study attempts to determine whether there are explicit management procedures in the RENAMO UE. Respondents were asked the following questions: Are there explicit coalition management procedures? How are decisions made? Are the respective coalition partner parties’ support bases consulted in the decision-making process? Are there conflict management mechanisms? What are the challenges of keeping the RENAMO UE together?

Coalition Management Procedures

According to one respondent, the RENAMO UE does not have explicit management procedures and even when articles in the coalition’s constitution provide for regular meetings of the executive committee, which is made up of all the leaders of the affiliated parties, ‘Dhlakama decides and we simply obey’. The coalition agreement provides that meetings should take place monthly. In reality, meetings are held only when there are problems to solve or decisions to make. According to one respondent, at times the leaders of the small parties have to put pressure on their RENAMO colleagues to have meetings convened.
It was, however, observed that the RENAMO UE partners meet on a daily basis in Parliament and this provides an opportunity to interact regularly. Following RENAMO’s debacle in the December 2004 elections, a sizeable number of representatives of small parties were not returned to Parliament, making it crucial that meetings of the coalition be held regularly and periodically outside Parliament.

Table 10
Performance of Leaders of RENAMO’s Allied Parties in the 1999 and 2004 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Name of Leader</th>
<th>Elected in 1999</th>
<th>Elected in 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPPM</td>
<td>Padimbe Mohosse Kamati</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Maneca Daniel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Raul José Xavier da Conceição</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIMO</td>
<td>Khalid Hussein Mahomed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUN</td>
<td>Hipólito de Jesus F. Xavier do Couto</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Abel Gabriel Mabunda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONAMO</td>
<td>Máximo Diogo José Dias /PSD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Janeiro Mariano</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUMO</td>
<td>Pedro Loforte</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMO</td>
<td>Carlos Alexandre dos Reis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Out of coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEMO</td>
<td>Newcomer to the Coalition</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors

The Council of Leaders, which comprises all party leaders, is supposed to meet quarterly. Several respondents have observed that these meetings do not often take place at the times provided for in the coalition’s by-laws. It was also noted that the Council of Leaders meets when the RENAMO leader wants it to. ‘The RENAMO leader decides alone. Both the organs of RENAMO and those of the RENAMO UE hardly function. These organs serve to rubberstamp the unilateral decisions made by the RENAMO leader.’

Similarly, respondents agreed that partner parties had no mechanisms for consulting their own support bases. Parties are highly centralised and
decisions are taken by the leaders, who seldom see the need for consultation and, when they do, it is merely to inform their supporters about decisions made by the coalition. It was reported, for example, that an affiliate party, the Partido da Convenção Nacional (PCN), had quietly dissolved itself into RENAMO without officially informing its base.

**Challenges of Sustaining Party Coalitions**

The maintenance of the RENAMO UE is challenging for several reasons, including the lack of internal democracy within the coalition, the inadequate organisational capacity, the resistance of RENAMO members to the coalition itself, infighting over resources and discontent about the selection of parliamentary candidates and appointments to positions such as the National Electoral Commission.

The mechanism used for the redistribution of funds allocated by government to the parliamentary parties in support of the electoral process was at the heart of the disagreement. RENAMO was accused by its coalition partners of benefiting more from the public funds than the other members of the coalition. The Electoral Law provides that each party (and implicitly each coalition) receives an amount proportional to its representation in Parliament, as a single party as opposed to a coalition. The Ministry of Finances gives Parliament a total of 115-billion Meticais annually (equivalent to US$ 4,618,474) to be distributed to the parties represented in Parliament proportional to the number of seats they occupy. Accordingly, with its 160 MPs, FRELIMO receives US$ 2,981,423 and RENAMO, with its 90 MPs, gets US$ 1,677,050. The funds are distributed within the party or coalition at the discretion of the leader.

Partner parties have also accused RENAMO and its leader of dominating the coalition and of not wanting open debate within it on issues of common interest, resulting in their exclusion from opportunities and from the decision-making process. They complain that the main weaknesses of the RENAMO UE are its lack of vision about how to access power and a lack of organisational capacity, which affect the coalition as a whole.

On the other hand, RENAMO’s partners in the RENAMO UE coalition are blamed for being under resourced and unable to determine their membership size, thus making it difficult to gauge their real weight and contribution to the coalition. Most coalition partner parties are just too small, with an insignificant membership, and cannot, therefore, make a difference. As a result, they are carried as ‘passengers’ at the expense of RENAMO members. The small parties, seen as bringing too little and
benefiting too much from the coalition, are hardly accepted by most RENAMO cadres. This causes tension between the RENAMO UE and RENAMO on the one hand, and between RENAMO members and their party leader, on the other.

Inadequate internal democracy has also resulted in discontent and frustration among the small parties. Reportedly, UNAMO and its leader, Carlos Reis, left the RENAMO UE in 2004 as a protest against the lack of democracy within the coalition.

There has also been limited consultation of the support base of the affiliated parties, which, according to one respondent, went into the coalition without consulting their supporters.

The fact that the coalition does not have explicit mechanisms for conflict management and that formal meetings are held irregularly means that it can take a long time for misunderstandings and differences to be addressed. Problems are dealt with on an ad hoc basis, which causes mistrust, frustrations and tension.

The flawed consultative mechanisms in the RENAMO UE, compounded by the inadequacies mentioned above, have affected the unity of the coalition. For example, in January 2005, after the results of the general election were released, conflict erupted, attracting media attention. RENAMO, alleging fraud and other irregularities, decided not to let its MPs be sworn into the new Parliament. This stand was not shared by most of the small parties in the RENAMO UE, especially those whose members had secured seats. Although the conflict was resolved and all MPs took their seats in the National Assembly on 31 January 2005, this case demonstrates the depth of the contradictions in the coalition. Indeed, at the time of the conflict, some of the small parties threatened to pull out of the coalition in protest against what they considered dictatorship, malfunctioning and incoherence.

It has been alleged that RENAMO tends to forget the small parties when selecting the coalition’s nominees for appointment to parliamentary standing committees or to the National Electoral Commission, a situation which has been decried by the RENAMO UE partners and has caused friction and discontent.

Despite all these problems, the RENAMO UE undeniably has several strengths. These include electoral unity, which results in a more cohesive vote. The fact that the leaders of the small parties receive a relatively good salary as Members of Parliament ensures their financial security and continued commitment to the coalition. Very few opposition coalitions enjoy
such strengths and these characteristics are among the most distinctive features of the RENAMO UE, hence its longevity in contrast to other opposition coalitions in Africa.

Consequences of the Coalition for Affiliated Parties

While the RENAMO UE coalition has helped improve the representation of the opposition in Parliament and local government structures, the dominant opinion is that it has not done much in terms of policy formulation. This often creates the impression that it has achieved nothing. Those RENAMO cadres who believe that their party’s partners have benefited disproportionately from the coalition and that all that RENAMO has achieved is the prestige of being seen to be open to others and accepted by them, argue that the low voter turnout in the 2004 general election can be explained by the fact that RENAMO supporters wondered ‘do we have to vote for these people?’.

The scope of this study does not cover the investigation of this hypothesis. It is hoped that future studies will analyse thoroughly the causes of the unexpectedly low voter turnout in 2004. The conclusion of such studies would enable us to determine whether or not there were consequences of the RENAMO UE coalition for the affiliated parties individually or collectively.

THE LONGEVITY OF THE COALITION

It has been observed that ruling coalitions tend to last longer than opposition coalitions. The RENAMO-led coalition is the only opposition coalition in Mozambique which has been able to secure a sizeable number of seats in Parliament and to last beyond two general elections. This section answers the question ‘What factors explain the RENAMO UE coalition’s survival after seven years of opposition politics?’

The respondents identified several reasons for the longevity of the RENAMO UE. First, the parliamentary representation of the opposition has been enhanced by leaders of the small parties finding a place in Parliament and by the fact that the RENAMO leadership saw the need to reach an agreement with leaders of the small parties in order to avoid dispersing votes and to enhance the prospect of Dhlakama winning the presidential election.

Second, the RENAMO UE coalition gives the leaders of the coalition partner parties financial security and provides some funds for their parties.
Although the affiliated parties have complained that their share is too small, these funds would not have been accessible to them had they not entered into a coalition with RENAMO.

The third reason is that the coalition allows RENAMO to be perceived as an open party which accepts and is accepted by others. The RENAMO leader has been prepared to compromise by accepting the sacrifice of sharing parliamentary seats, often at the expense of the party’s own members.

Finally, the RENAMO UE coalition has survived because Dhlakama’s leadership has never been disputed. Despite the combined 13 per cent of the total valid votes in 1994 which would have allowed the smaller parties to join up and secure a considerable number of seats, their leaders were unable to agree on which of them should lead a coalition. The survival of any coalition depends on the acceptability of its leader.

CONCLUSION

At the time of writing the RENAMO UE coalition has lasted in opposition for seven years, despite having lost two consecutive parliamentary and presidential elections as an alliance, a factor which normally causes opposition coalitions to collapse. Like opposition political parties, opposition coalitions are usually under-resourced and unable to provide for the survival needs of their members. Because opposition politics tends to be an uphill race, it often leads to the rapid disintegration of opposition coalitions. Are there lessons for opposition parties in Africa in the RENAMO UE’s experience with coalition politics? More importantly, how can alliances of opposition political parties organise themselves in order positively and effectively influence policy-making?

Several lessons can be learnt from the experience of the RENAMO UE. First there is a need for clear and rational criteria for selecting partner parties. The RENAMO-led coalition initially unconditionally accepted partners as long as the partners were willing to join the coalition. As a result, some of the affiliated parties who joined this ‘coalition of the willing’ were too small, had an insignificant membership and therefore could not contribute meaningfully to a possible electoral victory. It is the presence of these parties in the coalition which explains the resentment of RENAMO cadres toward the whole coalition.

It is vital to understand that electoral coalitions should be able to assess the relative importance of each of their affiliates. The real strength of each party in the coalition must be measurable in order for it to reap rewards
proportional to its actual contribution. For example, the number of candidates per party in eligible positions on the coalition electoral list should be commensurate with the party’s contribution to the coalition’s victory in the election.

There are several ways of measuring this contribution. Among these are the support enjoyed by the parties and candidates, which can be assessed on the basis of credible opinion polls and the size of the crowds at rallies; and the parties’ financial contribution to and degree of involvement in organising the electoral campaign and mobilising voters. Posts should be allotted to the partner parties on the same basis. Failure to match what an affiliated party gives to what it receives creates the impression that some partner parties are favoured at the expense of others, and this may engender tensions and disharmony within the coalition, making it dysfunctional, which, in turn, can result in the alliance being ineffective and lead to its disintegration.

The longevity and effectiveness of a party coalition depend on the ability of partners to discuss issues of common interest and iron out differences through dialogue which reinforces a sense of mutual respect. Such an approach helps to entrench democracy within the coalition, ensures ownership by all partners of the decisions and policies and motivates the coalition parties to contribute enthusiastically to the vision and objectives of the alliance.
INTRODUCTION

Kenyans made history on 27 December 2002 when two opposition movements consisting of a total of 15 political parties that had joined forces under the National Rainbow Coalition (the NARC) defeated the governing Kenya African National Union (KANU), ending its 39 years of monopoly rule. After the victory, the NARC was visited by opposition leaders from various corners of the continent who expressed their desire to learn from the Kenyan experience with respect to party coalitions.

The NARC has, however, evoked not only a great deal of interest but also serious concern in Kenya itself. Weeks, if not days, after its electoral victory, it began to experience grave factionalism. As described in the background section below, the NARC comprises two main components: the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and the Rainbow Coalition, also known as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a major splinter group from the then ruling party, KANU. Shortly after the December 2002 election victory, serious disagreements arose over the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 22 October 2002, which formalised the merger between the NAK and the LDP. These disagreements threaten the very existence of the NARC as a party coalition.

Such is the seriousness of the disputes that it is not as much a question of when the coalition will split as of when the leaders of its two components will formalise the split that already exists between them and has resulted in the situation that, although they form the government, they are operating as distinct entities with different strategies, opposing each other openly in Parliament, in the media and even in the by-elections.
The dilemma for the two factions is the reality that, legally, any formal split will inevitably result in an excessive number of by-elections, an eventuality for which neither of the factions is prepared.

Despite the great interest generated in political circles by the NARC experience, there has, to date, been virtually no major research into the emergence and sustainability of political party coalitions in Kenya. Journal articles and reports of election observer missions have looked at coalitions from a fundamentally electoral perspective. In addition, these studies have tended to encompass all types of political coalitions, including those that consist jointly of political parties, religious groups and non-governmental organisations. On the other hand, news reports and analyses in the press have tended to emphasise developments within the NARC on the basis of their newsworthiness.

In his study of the NARC soon after its election victory in December 2002, Stephen N Ndegwa (2003) analyses the challenges faced by the coalition in moving Kenya from political transition to democratic transformation. Shumbana Karume (2003) provides a historical background to the NARC, the power struggle within the coalition and its mixed performance in government in its first few months in office. Although the insights offered by these two studies are valuable, there is a need for studies of political party coalitions which document their formation, management and maintenance while analysing the structures, functioning, leadership, support bases and ideologies of the affiliated political parties, given the importance of these factors to the coalition. To date there are virtually no studies of party coalitions in Kenya from such a perspective. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap by documenting key aspects of the formation and management of the NARC coalition, with a view to learning and drawing lessons from this experience for Kenya itself, the rest of the continent and beyond.

The study does not encompass political alliances other than those consisting exclusively of political parties. For example, the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), which was initially a grouping of various political pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, religious groups and other stakeholders to agitate for political pluralism and electoral reforms, is not considered a political party coalition in this study and is therefore not covered.

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1 See election observation reports on the 2002 general elections in Kenya by the Carter Center, the Commonwealth, the European Union and the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) and articles by Ajulu 2003 and Ndegwa 2003, pp 145-158.
The authors have collected and analysed data on the various aspects of party coalition politics in Kenya on the basis of a questionnaire presented to eight key persons (see Appendix 1), some of whom were directly involved in various capacities in the formative stages of the NARC, and some others of whom were attentive independent analysts of the coalition dynamics in the country. The authors ensured that the NARC respondents were drawn from the main factions within the coalition in order to get diverse and representative perspectives and views.

After this introduction, the chapter provides an historical background to the socio-political context and dynamics at play in the formation and management of the NARC. The background is followed by an overview of the legal provisions which impact positively or negatively on the formation, functioning and survival of the NARC as a party coalition. The legal analysis looks, inter alia, into the effects of the Kenyan presidential electoral system (ie, the electoral threshold in use in the presidential elections) on party coalition development in the country. The last four sections preceding the conclusion investigate a variety of issues, including coalition formation (driving forces, motives and objectives), coalition management procedures, coalition agreement (nature and content of the agreement), distribution of Cabinet portfolios and other governmental offices and gender and party coalitions as well as explaining the NARC’s longevity.

The pervasiveness in and dominance of ethnicity on political parties in Kenya emerged as a key feature of coalition politics in the country and is worth exploring in depth. In addition, the ideological variance between parties was not obvious. It thus appeared that the standard question in the study of party coalitions, namely, ‘why certain party coalitions are formed and others are not’, could not be answered rationally from a purely ideological perspective in the case of Kenya. Factors such as the quest for office, the ethnic affiliation of leaders, the electoral system and the political regime, were among the most relevant elements.

The collection and analysis of these data and information have enabled the authors to explain the formation, management and survival of the NARC and to draw some lessons about party coalitions in Kenya.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 2002 Kenya held its third multiparty election since the restoration of multiparty politics in 1991. The first of these was held in 1992 and the second in 1997. From the standpoint of democratisation, these three general
elections and the intervening periods brought out one telling fact: periodic elections are not in themselves a guarantee of sustainable democracy. There is also a need for rules that create a level playing field and have sufficient prescriptive force to motivate obedience and for strong institutions, including political parties, to protect and safeguard democracy.

The restoration of multiparty politics in Kenya was necessitated by a constitutional amendment that repealed section 2A of the Constitution of Kenya revised edition 2001 (hereafter, the Constitution), enacted in 1982, that effectively proscribed multipartyism and entrenched a *de jure* one-party state. The provisions of section 2A explicitly provided that Kenya shall be a one-party state, that party being KANU. Thus, the period between 1982 and 1991 was marked by, among other things, the institutionalisation of a monolithic system of government as well as the curtailment of fundamental freedoms, including the freedoms of association and assembly. Allegiance to KANU was required as a precondition for participating in the electoral process as a candidate, with the KANU Disciplinary Committee ensuring compliance with the party’s policies by using its power to expel members from the party.

Although the quest for democratic and accountable governance began soon after independence and persisted throughout the regimes of Jomo Kenyatta, the first President, and Daniel arap Moi, the efforts intensified in 1990 in the wake of a global resurgence of democracy precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. A fresh gale swept through the African continent giving impetus to a long repressed internal pressure for change. For Kenya in particular, the combined pressure of political action groups, religious organisations and non-governmental organisations saw KANU and former President Moi succumb and, in December 1991, multiparty democracy was reintroduced.

The repeal of section 2A and the subsequent reintroduction of multiparty politics, although hailed as a major political landmark, were, regrettably, not accompanied by legal, constitutional and administrative reforms. Consequently the country embraced multipartyism without the corresponding reforms necessary to a true multiparty democracy. For example, extensive, if not excessive, executive powers were still centralised in the office of the president of the Republic. The legal framework of political parties in Kenya is under-developed, with parties still required to register under the Society’s Act. This represents a failure to recognise political parties as entities of public interest, a status which could oblige the state to guarantee the conditions and assistance required for their development. This situation
has undeniably had consequences for the functioning of political parties in general and the coalition in particular.


The recent history of political coalitions or alliances in Kenya can be traced to the period preceding the 1992 elections, when a broad-based coalition called the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), was formed. FORD brought together various political pressure groups, non-governmental organisations, religious groups and other stakeholders to agitate for political pluralism and electoral reforms. As a result of these interventions, section 2A was repealed, paving the way for the reintroduction of political pluralism in Kenya.

One of the salient features of the 1991 constitutional amendment, besides repealing section 2A, was the provision that a winning presidential candidate, apart from garnering majority votes in a general election, had to win 25 per cent of the vote in at least five of the country’s eight provinces. In the absence of a clear winner in the first round, the section provided that a second round of elections had to be conducted between the first two candidates. Theoretically, this provision was meant to ensure that a winning presidential candidate had national support. In practice, it was intended to forestall an opposition victory, relying on the divisions within the opposition and its consequent inability to unite. A fixed presidential term (two five-year terms) was also introduced. It should be noted that the application of this limit did not apply retrospectively. President Moi, who had served for 12 years from 1978, became eligible to contest the subsequent election, and was KANU’s presidential candidate in both the 1992 and 1997 elections.

Sensing the potential threat to its hold on power represented by the FORD coalition, the KANU leadership allegedly embarked on a scheme to split FORD. A number of strategies were reportedly put in place. Prominent among these was a deliberate propaganda campaign that sowed suspicion between the leaders of FORD, contributing to its split in June 1992. This split resulted in the formation of two parties, namely Ford-Kenya (Ford-K), led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and Ford-Asili (Ford-A), led by Kenneth Matiba. The unusual speed with which the Registrar of Societies moved to register the Ford factions added to the suspicion that the split had been orchestrated by the Moi regime. This period was also characterised by the mushrooming of political parties. There were reports that, in some cases, KANU sponsored the registration of opposition parties, leading to further
fragmentation. Cabinet Minister Johnstone Makau, for instance, formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1992 and later defected back to KANU.

By the time the presidential candidates were nominated nine opposition parties had been registered, which subsequently contested the 1992 general elections. The split in FORD and the fragmentation of the opposition meant that KANU’s victory was almost assured, as can be seen from Table 1.

### Table 1
**Results of the 1992 Presidential Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>1 964 867</td>
<td>36,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel a Moi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-Asili</td>
<td>1 430 627</td>
<td>26,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Matiba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1 064 700</td>
<td>20,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-Kenya</td>
<td>944 564</td>
<td>17,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oginga Odinga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>43 037</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IED-Kenya 1997

### Table 2
**Results of the 1992 Parliamentary Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ford-Asili</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ford-Kenya</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KNC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PICK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECK Elections Report 1992
As shown in Table 2, KANU also emerged victorious in the parliamentary elections, winning 99 of 188 seats. Ford-Asili won 31 seats, Ford-K 31 seats, the DP 23 and the KNC, KSC and PICK one seat each.

The outcome of the 1997 elections was similar to that in 1992 (Tables 3 and 4). President Daniel arap Moi, who was running for his final term, won the presidential election with slightly more than 40 per cent of the vote and the combined opposition won nearly 60 per cent of the total vote. KANU also won a slim majority in Parliament, garnering 113 seats in a 222-member Parliament, with the combined opposition winning 109.

As mentioned above, the transition in Kenya from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy was not accompanied by the constitutional and legal reforms necessary to sustain the multiparty political dispensation the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate and Party</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel arap Moi (KANU)</td>
<td>2 500 856</td>
<td>40,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki (DP)</td>
<td>1 911 472</td>
<td>30,97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raila Odinga (NDP)</td>
<td>667 886</td>
<td>10,82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Wamalwa (FORD-K)</td>
<td>505 704</td>
<td>8,19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity Ngilu (SDP)</td>
<td>488 600</td>
<td>7,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Shikuku (FORD-A)</td>
<td>36 512</td>
<td>0,59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katama Mkangi (KNC)</td>
<td>23 554</td>
<td>0,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Anyona (KSC)</td>
<td>16 428</td>
<td>0,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimani Wanyoike (FORD-P)</td>
<td>8 306</td>
<td>0,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koigi wa Wamwere (KENDA)</td>
<td>7 745</td>
<td>0,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munyua Waityaki (UPPK)</td>
<td>6 194</td>
<td>0,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Mwereria (GAP)</td>
<td>4 627</td>
<td>0,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangari Maathai (LPK)</td>
<td>4 196</td>
<td>0,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Oludhe (EIC)</td>
<td>3 691</td>
<td>0,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kangethe (UPPK)</td>
<td>3 584</td>
<td>0,06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ECK Elections Report 1997
country had embraced. Throughout the electoral process, from the
appointment of the electoral commission to the settlement of electoral
disputes, both the political and legal framework clearly advantaged the ruling
party at the expense of the opposition. As a result, the 1992 and 1997
elections did not meet universally acceptable electoral standards (Domestic

The impartiality of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) in
supervising and administering these elections was seriously in question.
Constitutionally, the appointment of the commission was and has remained
a presidential prerogative. As such, there was a belief that the ECK
commissioners owed their allegiance to the head of state and could therefore
not discharge their responsibilities impartially, fairly and transparently.
Allegations of bribery and other financial inducements were made in the
run-up to both the 1992 and the 1997 elections. Serious logistical and
administrative irregularities on the part of the ECK were also reported. Some
polling stations opened late and ballot boxes meant for one province ended

Table 4

Results of the 1997 Elections and Parties’ Representation
in Parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Elected MPs</th>
<th>Nominated MPs</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>50,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-Kenya</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-People</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-Asili</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>210</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>222</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IED 1997 (+ * authors’ calculations)
up in another, causing enormous confusion that led to the extension of polling in some districts. This further undermined the integrity of the electoral process and the credibility of the ECK. In addition, in the run-up to the elections, rampant political violence was reported, mostly targeting opposition parties. The incidents of violence affected opposition campaigns and disenfranchised potential voters (Kangwanja 2001; Kenya Human Rights Commission Report 1997).

The opposition parties approached both the 1992 and 1997 elections thoroughly fragmented. In 1992, a mediation effort led by environmentalist (now Nobel laureate) Wangari Mathaai’s Middle Ground Group and supported by faith-based groups failed to unite them. The parties were preoccupied with the desire to win and believed they could do so on their own. As a result of the fragmentation, KANU and President Moi were victorious and were able to rule the country with a slim majority.

Ndewa (2003) explains that ‘Five years later, in the wake of successful mobilisation to secure the passage of constitutional and electoral changes, ... civil society groups failed to persuade the opposition to coalesce behind a single candidate to take on Moi. Their painstaking work had planted seeds of cooperation, however, and these would ultimately take root and flourish amid continuous public dismay about splits within opposition ranks as well as about the threat still posed by KANU and the opportunity created by the cracks in its ill-fated merger with the National Development Party (NDP). Taken together, all these factors spelled new leverage for the cause of compromise.’

Between 1992 and 1997 KANU embarked on a deliberate scheme to woo members of the opposition to defect and join it. Indeed, a number of Members of Parliament (MPs) did so, allegedly in anticipation of Cabinet appointments and financial rewards.

In the period preceding the 1997 elections, opposition parties demanded minimum constitutional and legal reforms to level the playing field, as a precondition to participating. Civil society organisations echoed these demands. These efforts resulted in the formation of the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG), which negotiated for the minimum electoral reforms which facilitated the 1997 elections. Among the reforms demanded by the IPPG were the appointment of members of the opposition to the Cabinet, the nomination of opposition members to the ECK (s 16(2) of the Constitution as amended in 1997) and the proportional sharing of the 12 nominated parliamentary seats, which had previously been reserved for the ruling party.
THE 2002 ELECTIONS AND THE NARC COALITION

The 2002 general elections in Kenya were significant in many ways. They presented an opportunity to test the democratic gains the country had made a decade after reverting to multiparty democracy. President Moi, who had served the constitutional limit of two five-year terms, was expected to relinquish power, hence the serious jostling that characterised the electoral environment in the run-up to the elections.

For opposition parties in particular, the lessons of the previous multiparty elections were loud and clear. Although the fragmented opposition had secured an average of 60 per cent of the vote in 1992 and 1997 it had lost the election to President Moi and KANU because of the majority electoral system (one round) in use in the presidential election. It was obvious to all that their chances of winning would be slim if they did not form a coalition in the face of the formidable electoral machinery of the incumbent KANU. Citizens’ expectations and their message to the opposition parties were that they must unite in order to win the elections.

The process of forging unity and a coalition began soon after the 1997 elections but accelerated in 2001. Two competing and parallel processes were being pursued simultaneously. The first was an alliance between KANU and the National Development Party (NDP) that was initiated soon after the elections to give KANU the necessary majority in Parliament to push through its legislative agenda. The second was an alliance between three of the main opposition parties, the Democratic Party (DP), Ford-K and the National Party of Kenya (NPK). This was aimed at enabling the opposition to be more effective in Parliament, as well as at establishing the framework that was to culminate in a formidable electoral coalition.

On 18 March 2002 KANU and the NDP merged to form new KANU. In response to this, the opposition parties became more proactive and in April the National Alliance for Change (NAC) was formed. In August 2002 the NAC was transformed into the National Alliance Party of Kenya, a coalition of 14 political parties. Meanwhile, serious divisions emerged in KANU which threatened its unity, after President Moi announced unilaterally his choice of one of the four KANU vice-chairmen, Uhuru Kenyatta, as his successor, a move that sidelined established figures in KANU, including the country’s vice-president, George Saitoti, and Joseph Kamotho. The other vice-chairmen and the secretary general made public statements accusing President Moi of betraying them by forcing one of the officials on the party. The disgruntled officials of KANU united against Uhuru Kenyatta. The
disagreement in KANU led to the emergence of a splinter group called the Rainbow, with Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, George Saitoti, and Musalia Mudavadi as its torchbearers.

The Rainbow entered into dialogue with Ford-People (Ford-P), a party formed shortly before the 1997 elections when it split from Ford-Asili, and formed the Rainbow Coalition in September 2002. The coalition with Ford-People, however, did not last as Simion Nyachae, the leader of Ford-People, left the coalition and the party contested the elections on its own, with Nyachae as its presidential candidate. Thereafter, the Rainbow Coalition embarked on a nation-wide tour to popularise the party, holding rallies which attracted unprecedented crowds. For its part, the NAK formalised its operations and chose an election line up consisting of Kibaki as the presidential candidate and Wamalwa Kijana and Charity Ngilu for the posts of vice-president and prime minister respectively, in the event of a victory.

Appreciating the need to broaden their base and guarantee victory, the National Alliance Party and the Rainbow Coalition (LDP) joined forces in October 2002 to form the National Rainbow Coalition. The agreement between the NAK and the LDP was contained in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the two parties before a Commissioner of Oaths. The NARC went on to win the 2002 general elections (Tables 5 and 6), taking 125 parliamentary seats. Its presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, won more than 3,6 million votes. KANU emerged second with 69 parliamentary seats and 1,84 million votes for its candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. Ford-People came third, garnering 15 parliamentary seats and presidential candidate Nyachae securing 363 000 votes.

Table 5
Results of the 2002 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki</td>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>3 636 783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhuru Kenyatta</td>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>1 837 479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simion Nyachae</td>
<td>FORD-People</td>
<td>362 668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Orengo</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>24 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waweru Ng’ethe</td>
<td>Chama Cha Umma</td>
<td>9 941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Role of Ethnicity in Politics

It cannot be denied that ethnicity has been a major feature of the Kenyan political landscape. The history of ethnicity impacting on the Kenyan political process can be traced back to colonial days when the colonial government, in a bid to effect the politics of divide and rule, divided the country into provinces which were essentially created along ethnic lines (Mulei 1997). At independence in 1963, the early political parties and pressure groups took on an ethnic pattern.

To begin with, the first nationalist Party, KANU, formed in March 1960, was perceived as an alliance of the then largest ethnic communities, namely, the Kikuyus and the Luos. Among the founding leaders of KANU were Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as its president; Jaramogi Odinga (Luo), vice-president; and Tom Mboya (Luo) as its secretary general. Fearing domination by the big tribes, and with the support of the colonial administration, smaller ethnic groups formed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), to counter KANU. Thus, the 1963 election in Kenya was essentially a contest between the big tribes coalescing around KANU, which advocated a centralised unitary state, and the small tribes coalescing around KADU, which, fearing domination by the bigger tribes, preferred a federal state which would guarantee the provinces significant autonomy. In the ensuing election KANU won a majority of votes and subsequently formed the government. In 1964, however, former President Daniel arap Moi, who was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Elected MPs</th>
<th>Nominated MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-P</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford-A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISI KWA SISI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFINA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRIKISHO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>210</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
then the leader of KADU, dissolved the party and joined KANU with his members and supporters.

A spot check on the development of political parties in Kenya from independence to date reveals a significant emphasis on and manipulation of ethnic feelings as a strategy for securing political power. Although this strategy was initiated by the colonial administration, it was perfected during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Political power and the control of the reins of government became synonymous with tribalism as people in positions of power invariably appointed members of their ethnic communities to senior government positions. Undoubtedly, appointments to the Cabinet and senior government positions were heavily skewed in favour of the president’s tribesmen.

These developments were exacerbated in 1978 when, upon the death of President Kenyatta, Vice-President Moi took over the presidency. It should be noted that President Moi, who was originally the chairman of KADU and who represented a small ethnic community, the Kalenjin, upon assuming office soon engineered the revival of alliances of the small tribes – a platform which was at the core of KADU philosophy. As has been noted in numerous articles by political scientists and by *Sunday Nation* columnist Mutahi Ngunyi, ‘President Moi’s preoccupation with survival hinged more on his ability to unite the small tribes while at the same time marginalising the big tribes that originally coalesced around KANU’. This strategy was catalysed by the fact that the unity of the Kikuyus and the Luos, which was the main strength of KANU, had been broken after the fallout in 1969 between President Kenyatta and the foremost Luo leader, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, following the assassination of Tom Mboya, KANU’s secretary general. This had triggered tension between the Luos and Kikuyus.

When multipartyism was restored in 1991, the Kikuyus and the Luos, and indeed other big tribes, came together to form the pressure group FORD. As mentioned above the alleged machinations of KANU led to the split of FORD into two parties – Ford-K, which was mostly associated with the Luos, and Ford-A, which was seen as Kikuyu-dominated. The subsequent registration of other political parties also, for the most part, took on a tribal pattern, with the Registrar of Societies exercising enormous discretion and registering political parties virtually when it served the interests of the ruling KANU party.

By and large the results of the 1992 and 1997 elections reflected ethnic affiliations. Apart from KANU, none of the opposition parties won 25 per cent of the vote in more than three provinces and some failed to win a seat
in provinces other than their own. KANU was able to win 25 per cent in at least five of the eight provinces and also won seats even in areas which were predominantly opposition zones. One explanation for this is the fact that almost all Kenya’s provinces are heterogeneous, with big and small tribes living in each province. Consequently KANU was able to elicit the support of the minority tribes living in provinces dominated by opposition parties and therefore to get the required 25 per cent minimum while maintaining its advantage in provinces, which were considered its stronghold.

In 2002 tribal considerations came into play once more for a number of reasons. First, the opposition parties realised that they could not win on their own unless they formed an alliance to counter KANU. Secondly, the electorate was dissatisfied with the performance of KANU in the past four decades and desired a change. Thirdly, President Moi was ineligible for another term. This led to the expression of personal ambitions within KANU, which resulted in competition and a lack of unity in the ruling party. The formation of the NARC was, in effect, a response to the above realities, and its subsequent victory was due to affiliate parties bringing their ethnic and regional votes into the NARC basket, effectively guaranteeing a victory. One of the conclusions of this study is that ethnic affiliation is one of the core variables explaining the formation and sustainability of party coalitions.

PARTY STRUCTURES AND IDEOLOGY

Apart from the impact of ethnicity on party coalitions, political parties in Kenya profess certain policy stands which are contained in their policy documents. However, the overriding and unifying principle of political parties has been ethnicity. The prominent role played by ethnicity in Kenyan politics has, in effect, meant that ideology and other policy positions have been relegated to the periphery. However, this does not mean that parties do not have policy positions.

A critical look at the party manifestos and other policy documents in Kenya reveal striking and remarkable similarities. The constitutions of almost all the major political parties are basically the same – modelled on the same format and with similar structures. They are largely centralised, with power concentrated in a group of individuals. The organisational structures are clearly spelt out in their constitutions. In all parties the ultimate source of power is the National Delegates Congress. Between sessions of the Congress, the National Council is the body charged with the general supervision of the party. The day-to-day management of the party is, subject to the general
supervision of the National Council, entrusted to the National Executive Committee, and working under it are the district executive committees.

Decisions in the party tend to be made at the highest level. Political parties are privately owned and are registered like private companies as per the Society’s Act and it has been observed that they often register first and look for members later. As a result, Moi was seen as the owner of KANU, the DP as Kibaki’s property and the LDP as belonging to Odinga. All the parties are managed and controlled by their leaders. They are centralised with decisions made at the top, with little consultation with the grassroots and limited internal democracy.

On the other hand, political parties in Kenya are, regrettably, not formed around any sound ideological framework and this has contributed significantly to the weak party system in the country. Parties lack binding principles, commitments and values to unite their members. Theoretically, they profess some ideological leanings. For example, among the major affiliated parties of the NARC, the Democratic Party is considered to be conservative, the Liberal Democratic Party professes to be liberal and Ford-Kenya leans towards social democracy. Most party members, including senior officials, do not unanimously agree on whether their parties actually espouse these ideologies. A lot of work and development is still needed on this front. The official opposition, KANU, is also closely linked with social democracy. In practice, parties operate without any regard to their declared ideological leanings and, in most cases, neither party leaders nor members stick to their professed ideology.

The absence of an ideological identity is one of the main reasons for the rapid disintegration of the NARC only weeks after it won the election.

PARTY COALITIONS AND GENDER REPRESENTATION

The hypothesis of this chapter in relation to the issue of gender parity in politics was that party coalitions add an additional level of competition to the one that already exists at party level where women are already significantly marginalised. A comparison of the number of women in Parliament representing individual political parties and those who enter through pre-electoral coalitions will help test the hypothesis.

The participation of women in electoral politics in Kenya compares poorly with that of most countries on the continent. Indeed, since the attainment of independence in 1963, Kenya has never reached a minimum quota of one-third of women. This situation is appalling since Kenya is a
signatory to many of the international and regional instruments whose sole objective is to enhance women’s rights in all spheres (social, political and economic). Among the international and regional instruments which incorporate and acknowledge the rights of women to participate in the social, political and economic sectors are the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 1979), the Beijing Platform for Action, the Millennium Declaration on Development, the African Charter for Human and People’s Rights-Protocol on the Rights of Women, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and, most recently, the principles espoused in the Nepad initiative.

The struggle by Kenyan women for equal representation in political leadership and decision-making processes dates back to the struggle for Kenya’s independence. However, it was not until 1969 that the first woman, the Hon Grace Onyango, was elected to Parliament. Although subsequent parliaments (1975-1988) increased female representation, there was no significant breakthrough in terms of equal or equitable representation. Accordingly, the numbers of women elected to Parliament dwindled and even the presidential discretion to nominate 12 MPs did not benefit women much, since most of those nominated were men.

The advent of multiparty politics in 1991 and the 1992 multiparty elections brought with it new hope for women. In 1992, for the first time in Kenya’s history a total of six women (out of 210 members) were elected.

Table 7
Women’s access to Parliament from 1963 to 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Friends of Esther and Deborah (FREDA): 1999
Although this number was certainly low it nevertheless signalled a positive move towards the involvement of women in elective politics. In the period between 1992 and 1997, the number of organisations involved in empowering women politically mushroomed, with the objective of consolidating the gains made in the 1992 election. Unfortunately, this goal was never realised – the 1997 election reversed the gains made in 1992, with only four women elected, although a further four were nominated as a result of the affirmative action principle negotiated by the IPPG. A remarkable feature of the 1997 election was that for the first time in Kenya’s history two women, the Hon Charity Ngilu and Wangari Maathai, contested the presidency. Although neither won, the fact that they stood served to demonstrate that the quest for women to access positions of leadership had reached a point of no return.

The 2002 transitional election and the ushering in of a new administration represented a major turning point for women in electoral politics. For the first time in Kenya’s history ten women were elected and a further eight were nominated, bringing the total to 18 women out of 222 MPs in Parliament (8,1%). Although this percentage was far below the international commitment of one-third, it was nevertheless a step in the right direction.

The extent to which a women’s agenda was an issue for the National Rainbow Coalition, especially during the campaign, is largely debatable. Granted, the need to mainstream women in key leadership position was a concern, especially in the manifestos of the major affiliated parties of NARC. Indeed the DP, NPK, Ford-K, and LDP manifestos all provide for one-third of women in positions of leadership. However, the translation of this declaration into broad based commitment has been lacking. Secondly, all the affiliated parties of NARC were unanimous that the previous KANU administration had done little to increase women’s participation in leadership positions; they lacked a coherent strategy through which the perpetual marginalisation of women could be addressed. Perhaps the greatest obstacle is the lack of a legal framework designed to increase the participation of women. This, together with the fact that Kenya has a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, has seriously undermined women’s access to leadership positions.

Certainly, the NARC administration has instituted more measures to increase women’s participation than the previous KANU regime had done. As an example, of the seven slots that NARC had for nomination after the 2002 elections, five were given to women. In addition, for the first time in Kenya’s history, four women were appointed to the Cabinet. Throughout
the nearly 40-year rule of KANU only one woman, the Hon Nyiva Mwendwa, had held a Cabinet position. A number of women were also appointed as heads of the various departments and parastatals. Despite all these efforts, the number of women in positions of leadership in Kenya is still far below that in many other countries in Africa as well as the minimum international threshold of one-third that many countries are embracing. Looked at in this context, the mere nomination of women and appointment of a few to the Cabinet might be viewed as tokenism that will do little to redress past imbalances.

The NARC coalition’s contribution to the better representation of women demonstrates that, whether at party level or at coalition level, the increase in women’s representation depends on the commitment of the party leadership.

**POST-ELECTION FACTIONALISM**

The growing cleavages within the NARC, which became increasingly visible soon after the electoral victory, have been seen as fundamentally resulting from unprincipled leadership. Only weeks after winning the election in December 2002, the NARC leaders disagreed about the allocation of Cabinet portfolios and other important posts, accusing President Mwai Kibaki and his DP/NAK base of keeping the lion’s share for themselves at the expense of the other coalition partners, contrary to the pre-election agreement.

The LDP faction, led by Raila Odinga, accused the president and his group of dragging their feet, thus impeding the reforms intended to provide the country with a new constitutional framework. Based on the pre-election agreement contained in the NARC’s MoU, Odinga was expected to be appointed prime minister. The MoU provided that the new Constitution would be finalised and adopted by Parliament within 100 days of the inauguration of the new government. Yet it took three years before a draft constitution was produced and rejected by the electorate because it failed to address most of their concerns, especially regarding the excessive powers vested in the country’s president. The emergence of grand corruption implicating senior government officials close to the president has also been a major concern to the coalition. It has been alleged that the people involved are hell bent on raising campaign money that will be crucial for the re-election bid of President Kibaki. The inability of the president to combat this corruption has ensured that speculation continues unabated. A more detailed analysis of the MoU is provided further on in this study.

These developments have resulted in growing factionalism within the NARC. President Kibaki is supported by the majority of his DP/NAK allies.
Odinga and the majority of his former LDP or Rainbow Coalition have re-emerged and are opposing Kibaki vigorously and publicly. *The Nation* (20 September 2004) reported that the LDP announced on 19 September 2004 at Kendu Bay Trading Centre that it would go it alone in the 2007 elections. The newspaper also reported that at Homa Bay Town’s stadium, where the party’s leaders were wrapping up a three-day membership recruitment campaign in Western and Nyanza provinces, party chairman and deputy speaker of the National Assembly David Musila put to rest any doubts about the disintegration of the NARC by declaring: ‘Be under no illusion; we (LDP) have decided to chart our own fate […] by leading our own pack for the next national polls’ (*The Nation* 20 September 2004).

In the course of the same week top party officials had announced that the LDP would break ranks with the NARC and field its own candidate in the by-election for the Kisauni parliamentary seat. Environment minister Kalonzo Musyoka expressed the LDP’s disenchantment with the pre-poll pact it had entered into with its NARC partner, the National Alliance Party of Kenya, declaring: ‘LDP will only enter into any MoU with another party or parties after elections … We have learnt our political lessons’ (*The Nation* 20 September 2004). Odinga also recalled the frustrations after the pre-election pact was not honoured by the NARC colleagues and said the LDP would exercise ‘utmost caution before entering into a similar deal with any party [in the future]’ (*The Nation* 20 September 2004). In an interesting development, the LDP fielded a candidate under the NARC in the November 2004 Kisauni by-election after winning the primary election. However, the by-election was won by Anania Mwaboza of the National Labour Party, who reportedly received support from the NAK faction which had lost the primary when they had contested it as members of the NARC.

Faced with the possibility of a backlash that might affect the implementation of the government legislative and policy agenda, President Kibaki has been trying to reach out to the former ruling party, KANU. On 30 June 2004, for example, he appointed selected KANU members to the NARC Cabinet to create a semblance of a government of national unity. As things stand at present the LDP has indicated its intention of contesting the 2007 elections on its own, and has embarked on a recruitment campaign, while simultaneously continuing to benefit from its presence in the NARC government. President Kibaki, on the other hand, has been attracting new members, including KANU, to the NARC coalition ahead of the 2007 general elections as a way of consolidating his position, and pushing through his legislative agenda.
Currently the NARC exists only on paper. With the LDP virtually having left the coalition and deciding to operate as a separate entity, it has been reduced to NAK, more or less in its pre-MoU form. The latest development has seen a further split in NAK, with the emergence of a group calling itself the third progressive force. As explained above, any formal withdrawal of the LDP would inevitably result in a loss of power and, by extension, political oblivion, as the party would be required to seek a fresh mandate from the electorate. It is predicted that the final and formal pullout of the LDP will only occur close to the 2007 elections.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PARTY POLITICAL COALITIONS

General Legal Provisions

Section 34(d) of the Kenyan Constitution provides that parliamentary candidates must be nominated by a political party – there is no provision for independent candidates to compete in parliamentary elections. The critical role played by political parties in the democratic process is further reinforced by the provisions of s 1A of the Constitution, which states that ‘Kenya shall be a multiparty democratic state’. However, despite this provision and the significance of political parties in a democracy, there is no political party law or constitutional chapter in the country’s legislation that explicitly recognises and provides for the regulation and operation of political parties.

Legally, political parties are required to register under the Society’s Act, Chap 108 of the Laws of Kenya. It is important to note that all other societies, including clubs, welfare groups and women’s groups, also derive their legal existence from the Society’s Act. The absence of an explicit legal framework for political parties and the failure to recognise their significance in the democratic process have clearly undermined the proper functioning of political parties and contributed to the weak institutional structures of parties and coalitions in Kenya.

In the absence of an explicit law governing political parties it has been assumed that they are bound and regulated by the electoral laws, two sets of which govern elections. The first set of laws contains provisions that were enacted exclusively for the purpose of regulating elections and impact directly on the electoral process. In this category are the Constitution of Kenya, the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, the Election Offences Act and the Local Government Act. The second set, although not enacted for the purposes of elections, nevertheless have a collateral impact
on the electoral process (Wachira Maina 1997). There are a number of laws in this category but the most important are the Constitutional Offices, the Remuneration’s Act, the Public Order Act, the Chiefs Act, the Society’s Act and the Penal Code. Equally important are the party constitutions which provide for the internal regulation of individual parties. However, compliance by the various parties with these constitutions has been deficient and blatant abuses have been reported in the past. For example, KANU has held no party elections since 1988 despite the fact that its constitution provides for elections every five years. Most officials of other parties, too, are holding office on an interim basis.

The Kenya Law Reforms Commission has drafted a Political Parties Bill whose object is to deal with issues of registration, funding and the regulation of political parties. The draft Bill will be submitted to the attorney general for tabling in Parliament.

**The Legal Framework of Party Coalitions**

The constitutional and legal framework governing coalition formation has been a subject of considerable debate in Kenya since the formation of the NARC. The question of whether the NARC is legally constituted as a coalition and speculation about the future of any possible coalition government in Kenya have also featured prominently in that debate. The absence of political party law in Kenya and the fact that the parties owe their legal existence to the Society’s Act while invariably being regulated by the electoral law and a variety of other laws have further contributed to the complexity of the debate. Strictly speaking, there is no law in Kenya at present that grants political parties the power to form a governing coalition or recognises the legality of such a government. However, this does not rule out the possibility of forming an election coalition like the NARC.

In order, therefore, to throw more light on the legal nature of the NARC it should be noted from the outset that it is a registered political party with the same legal standing as all its affiliated registered parties. All the parties affiliated to the NARC have retained their legal identities and their entry into the coalition was through corporate and not individual membership, as part of the agreement reached in the MoU. Consequently, member parties of the NARC resolved to field candidates in the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections under the umbrella of the NARC and not through the affiliated political parties.

Given the above scenario, the important question to ask is: ‘What is the impact of the legal status of the NARC as a registered political party, on
the coalition itself? A peripheral question is whether the NARC is a party and, at the same time, a coalition of parties. The answer to this question is better understood if it is looked at in the context of the Constitution of Kenya, particularly with regard to vacation of seats in the National Assembly and appointment to the Cabinet. Section 40 of the Constitution, also known as the Turncoat Amendment, enacted in 1966, with further amendments in 1991, provides that:

A member of the National Assembly who, having stood at this election as an elected member with the support of or as supporter of a political party, or having accepted appointment as a nominated member as a supporter of a political party, ... resigns from that party at a time when that party is a parliamentary party shall vacate his seat forthwith unless in the meantime that party of which he was last a member has ceased to exist as a parliamentary party or he has resigned his seat.

This provision underscores the fact that, legally speaking, all the NARC parliamentarians are in Parliament on a NARC ticket, and legally they cannot defect to their affiliated parties without having to face the possibility of a by-election. This explains why, despite serious wrangles in the ruling coalition, the implications of resignation would be enormous – consequences to which no affiliated party would want to be subjected – and the chances are that the NARC will soldier on until the end of the current term, its coalition partners continuing to cohabit in a marriage in which none of them is interested. It is worth noting that of the 125 seats the NARC won in a 220-seat Parliament the LDP claims 68, while the rest are shared among the 14 parties that comprise NAK.

Other sections of Kenyan law have led to the assumption that despite the fact that the Constitution does not expressly provide for a coalition government there are provisions that may indirectly enable the formation of one. These provisions can be found both in the Constitution of Kenya and in the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act. Section 5(3)(f) of the Constitution deals with the elections to the office of the president and provides that ‘the candidate for president, who is elected as a member of the National Assembly, and who receives a greater number of the valid votes cast, and who in addition receives a minimum of twenty-five percent of the votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces shall be declared to be elected as president.’

Since political parties in Kenya are formed along ethnic and regional lines, the need to secure the constitutional requirement of 25 per cent makes
it almost imperative for them to form coalitions based on their regional strength. The lessons of the three multiparty elections in Kenya are proof of this. President Moi and KANU won the 1992 and 1997 general elections by building ethnic and regional alliances that enabled them achieve 25 per cent in at least five provinces. In 2002, the affiliated parties of the NARC were able to mobilise votes in their various regional strongholds, which enabled President Kibaki to win more than 25 per cent of the total vote in all eight provinces. It should be noted that in 1992 and 1997 Kibaki was unable to win 25 per cent in five provinces.

Another area where the legal framework impacts on coalition politics is the appointment of the Cabinet. Kenya has a presidential system of government with all executive powers vested in the president. The current Constitution allows the president to exercise enormous executive powers. He or she appoints the Cabinet and can dissolve it at will. The president also has the power to dissolve and prorogue Parliament (Part III, ss 58 and 59 of the Constitution). In doing so, he or she is not allowed to seek advice from any authority, which explains why Kibaki made no reference to the pre-election MoU when he constituted the Cabinet in January 2003. The executive authority vested in the president means that, once elected, he or she may choose not to be accountable to his or her coalition partners by virtue of his or her presidential prerogatives. This situation has been at the origin of the crisis and current impasse within the NARC.

The sustainability of party coalitions in a presidential system clearly depends on the president’s good will, on his or her faithfulness to his or her word and willingness to compromise as well as on the fairness of the coalition agreement. If Kenya were a parliamentary regime and Kibaki prime minister with executive powers as the head of government, he could not ignore the views of his coalition partners because the government’s very existence would depend on their continued support. In other words, in a parliamentary system, coalition partners have a say, which is generally based on the number of parliamentary seats they control. Their withdrawal from government, or a vote of no confidence, may lead to the collapse of the coalition government and the formation of a new one or the calling of early elections. As a result, consultation and consensus are the rules of the game in parliamentary regimes.

Kenya has a presidential system, which means that it is not obligatory for Parliament to have confidence in the government. So, once elected, even if the election was the result of the support of his or her coalition partners, the president can choose not to consult these partners. The partners are
vulnerable and may have to wait until the end of the presidential term of office if they do not wish to resign from government. For these reasons presidential regimes do not promote a culture of consensus amongst coalition partners.

The divisions within the NARC have effectively deprived the coalition of a majority in Parliament since the LDP faction, and indeed most of the backbenchers, do not toe the party line in parliamentary debates and voting. This situation makes it difficult for the coalition effectively to implement its legislative agenda.

The Kenyan electoral system gives parties no choice but to enter pre-election alliances in order to form a substantial voting bloc – a dominant characteristic of the single member district electoral system, also known as first-past-the-post (FPTP) or ‘winner-takes-all’ (Chap III, Part III, s 32(1) of the Constitution of Kenya). In the absence of one or two dominant political parties such alliances will continue to be an important feature of electoral and party politics in the country as long as that system is maintained.

However, the legal framework of elections and the electoral system do not alone account for the continuing need for party alliances. The fact that political parties continue to draw most of their support from the geographically concentrated ethnic groups of their leaders is a further determining factor.

Finally, s 16(2) was inserted in 1997 following a deal brokered by the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group to allow the president to appoint members of the opposition to the Cabinet. These appointments are subject to section 17(5), which requires consultation with the party in question. The section dealing with the appointment of the Cabinet, together with s 17(5) of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, allows what may be regarded as a semblance of a governing coalition. Section 16(2) provides that ‘The President shall, subject to any other written law, appoint the Ministers from among members of the National Assembly’, while s 17(5) states that ‘No person who is elected or nominated as a member of the National Assembly with the support of or as a supporter of a political party (other than the party whose candidate has been elected President at an election) shall be appointed a Minister of the Government of Kenya under section 16 of the Constitution without concurrence of the party which supported him for election or nominated him for appointment as a member of the National Assembly.’

This allows the president to appoint to the Cabinet members of Parliament regardless of their party affiliation but after consultation with
the appointee’s political party. Section 1(5) further allows the president to negotiate with and seek the concurrence of opposition parties before appointing any of their members to the Cabinet. These provisions, if properly followed, would theoretically allow genuine governing coalitions to be formed since the president would be required by law to consult with members of the opposition parties before agreeing to the details of including them in government. In practice, however, the president merely negotiates with the various individuals, regardless of whether or not their parties concur.

**FORMATION OF THE NARC**

*Objectives and Driving Forces*

As indicated above, after the 1992 and 1997 general elections it was clear that no political party could win the presidential election alone. Indeed, KANU had resorted to ethnic alliances both during the era of one-party rule and once the multiparty dispensation came into being in order to keep and consolidate its power. It was inevitable, too, that the opposition would have to build a coalition. The electoral results reflected in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show clearly that the combined opposition received far more votes than the ruling KANU but failed to win the elections because of its fragmented state.

In early 2002, the election year, informal consultations took place among opposition leaders. Several interviewees indicated that Mrs Charity Kaluki Ngilu, the leader of the National Party of Kenya, was instrumental in the formation of the NAK, approaching Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP) and Michael Kijana Wamalwa of Ford Kenya. Since she was leader of a relatively smaller party, Ngilu was not seen as a threat and was therefore able to convince them to join her. The consultations lasted some nine months and the group grew bigger as the December 2002 election date approached. In its final form, NAK had 14 affiliate parties.

At the same time another coalition formation process, known as Rainbow, was initiated by Raila Amolo Odinga, following serious divisions within the new KANU after President Moi unilaterally chose Uhuru Kenyatta as his political heir. The new KANU’s heavyweights, including Odinga himself, Kalonzo Musyoka, George Saitoti and Musalia Mudavadi, left the ruling party and formed the Rainbow Coalition/Liberal Democratic Party.

After a month of negotiations the NAK and Rainbow process culminated in the formation of one large coalition. On 22 October 2002, a coalition was formally established between the NAK and the LDP (Rainbow), to be known as the National Rainbow Coalition. It must be pointed out that
NAK, with its 14 political parties of varying sizes, on the one hand, and the LDP, on the other hand, came into the NARC coalition as two equal partners. Article 1 of the MoU signed by the NAK and the Rainbow states explicitly that the NARC was established ‘for the purpose of winning the next general election’. The rest of the MoU is focused on the mutual agreement to run elections as one party and share power in the Cabinet equally after winning the election.

Asked about the objectives of the NARC Titus Mbathi, the coalition’s chairman and leading negotiator during its formation (Interview August 2004), declared that ‘the mission was to win the 2002 elections and the vision to form a better government than KANU. While the mission was accomplished, the NARC is still struggling with its vision.’ However, many of the coalition members interviewed argued that the NARC essentially had only one objective – to remove KANU; hence its apparent lack of direction once this objective was achieved.

In fact, the MoU reveals that the NARC had a number of objectives, including ending corruption, transforming the country politically and economically, providing free education and empowering the people. The coalition also intended, among other things, to change the Constitution within 100 days of taking power and to establish a parliamentary system of government with a ceremonial head of state and an executive prime minister. It was to prove, later, that these objectives were essentially slogans.

It is worth noting that the opposition leaders received technical assistance from international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in their attempt to form a broad-based coalition. These NGOs included the German-based Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the US-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Their assistance was mainly confined to funding retreats at which party leaders could meet, negotiate and organise, with the assistance of experts.

The international NGOs did not coordinate their efforts thoroughly. FES was involved in the initial formative phase of the coalition but pulled out early and KAS took over, playing a more prominent role, given its supposed ideological affinity (Christian democracy) with the main NAK coalition partners and particularly the DP. At the same time the NDI helped the coalition meet some of its technical needs, and invited international experts, among them Roelf Meyer from South Africa and Dan Botwe, Secretary General of the New Patriotic Party of Ghana, to help with the delicate negotiation process.
Finally, the discrete roles of national civil society organisations and the donor and diplomatic community in convincing the various political actors to join an alliance should also be acknowledged.

**Selection of Affiliated Parties and the Sharing of Power**

The criteria for joining the coalition were not explicitly spelled out. Anyone who would agree to join was welcomed. The size of the party was not important, but a willingness to work together with the aim of defeating KANU was crucial. In practice, the strength of a potential partner party in terms of its popularity amongst voters proved to be a key but implicit criterion. This was measured by, on the one hand, the electoral performance of the party during the 1997 elections and, on the other, the size of the crowd at rallies. It should be emphasised that entry to the NARC was limited to corporate membership, which entailed affiliated parties and not individuals joining the coalition. Interestingly, while one would have thought that ideological affinity would be a fundamental criterion for recruiting a partner, it did not prove important at all. The ideology of the NARC members is blurred, despite their claims to the contrary.

Party manifestos do not reveal any fundamental differences and the parties have not been able to articulate convincingly what differentiates them. Indeed, nearly all the partners subscribe to the free market economy. Asked about their ideology, party representatives usually miss the point and expand on their adherence to good governance principles such as rule of law, transparency and accountability as well as insisting on the need for national unity. Conversely, most do not subscribe openly to direct popular participation.

The weak ideological identity of political parties in Kenya can be explained by their strong ethnic identity, a situation which impacts tremendously on the sustainability of the NARC. Indeed, factionalism in the coalition has a strong ethnic connotation.

Ethnic politics have permeated the political history of Kenya. According to Schmidt and Kibara (2002), the five most populous of Kenya’s 42 tribes make up 70 per cent of the population. They are: Kikuyu, 20 per cent; Luhya, 14 per cent; Luo, 11 per cent; Kamba, 10 per cent and Kalenjin, 11 per cent.

Linking the top five parties after the 1997 elections to their tribal constituencies, Schmidt and Kibara found that KANU is a Kalenjin-dominated association of small tribes, the DP is a Kikuyu party, the LDP is a Luo party, FORD-Kenya is a Bukusu party, and the majority of SDP
legislators are Kambas. They conclude that in Kenya ‘political mobilisation is not based on any ideology or programmatic action but on tribal considerations’, arguing that ‘faced with competition for power at the national scene, the political elites behind these parties prefer to rally support along ethnic lines, as emotive ethnic constituencies are easier to maintain’.

The presence of tribal leaders in the coalition attracted massive support from their ethnic groups. The Kikuyus gave more support to the NARC through the DP’s Kibaki than they did to KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta, who was viewed as being exploited by Moi’s Kalenjin. The Luos supported the NARC through the LDP’s Odinga, the Luhyas through Ford-Kenya’s Wamalwa, and the Kambas through the SDP’s Ngilu. Party coalition has essentially been about ethnic arithmetic for electoral purposes.

The selection of candidates for parliamentary and civic seats proved a major challenge in the formative stages of the NARC. This was attributable to many factors. First, the NARC’s affiliated parties were competing among themselves, believing that any slim parliamentary majority was necessary if they were to stamp their influence on the coalition in the post-election government. Second, the NARC was paranoid about KANU machinations, believing that KANU would interfere with the nomination process.

Once it was agreed, after protracted discussions, that the presidential candidate must be a Kikuyu in order to counter KANU’s candidate, the choice of Mwai Kibaki as presidential candidate was relatively straightforward and did not attract much controversy. However, there were numerous problems relating to the selection of parliamentary and civic candidates. The main criterion used was the geographical strength of the leading affiliated parties. As a result, the Democratic Party nominated candidates from Central and parts of the Rift Valley Provinces, the LDP’s nominees came mostly from Nyanza, Eastern, Nairobi and Coast Provinces and Ford-K’s from Western and NPK from Eastern Province (particularly from the Kamba community). Secondly, the NARC directly nominated certain individuals who were to play a prominent role in the national campaigns and others who belonged to the top organs of the party, particularly the Summit and the Coordinating Committee.

Given that the NARC’s ultimate objective was to defeat KANU and run the country, it was essential that its members reach consensus on their election campaign strategy, including the selection of candidates and the allocation of Cabinet portfolios. Accordingly, the coalition fielded one presidential candidate, one parliamentary candidate per constituency and one candidate per civic ward. In practical terms, all parties brought their
nominees to the NARC Election Board (NEB) for selection.

A presidential candidate had to meet the following criteria:

- Be the candidate most likely to win the presidential election. Popularity was essentially judged on the results of the 1997 presidential election.
- Have the ability to raise funds for the campaign (a minimum of one billion shillings).
- Be a consensus candidate.

It was reported that although a consultative process led to a consensus around Mwai Kibaki, it was clear to most people during the negotiations that Kibaki would not step down for another candidate. It is also imperative to mention that the nomination of Kibaki as the presidential candidate was, to a large extent, designed to counterbalance the tribal arithmetic. Since KANU had nominated Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) it was necessary for the NARC to nominate another Kikuyu (Kibaki) to split the Kikuyu vote.

In relation to parliamentary and local government candidates a combination of approaches was involved in decisions about which coalition member party would field a candidate in a given parliamentary constituency or civic ward and which candidate would be nominated from within the qualified affiliated party. The choice of the political party for a given area was not too difficult. The criteria were the party’s popularity in the area, based on the results of the previous election and current trends, measured, *inter alia*, on the basis of the size of the crowds at the party’s recent rallies.

At party level most of the approaches used to select candidates were undemocratic and essentially patronage-based rather than a result of the popularity enjoyed by the candidates. These approaches included both handpicking candidates and holding primaries with balloting. According to one report NAK opted largely for primaries with any voter entitled to express support for a particular candidate; Ford-Kenya resorted to a combination of primaries and handpicking; and 90 per cent of the LDP candidates were handpicked. However, this view was disputed by a respondent who charged that primaries in all parties were essentially a farce, and were not based on the popular will.

The selection of candidates within political parties led, at times, to violence. The stakes were obviously high. The merger of the NAK and the LDP made it clear that most of the candidates fielded by the coalition would
have a strong chance of winning the elections in their respective constituencies and civic wards. Therefore, the selection of coalition candidates was desperately fought at all levels, causing tensions and divisions not only within the parties but within the coalition as a whole. For example, after the choice of Kibaki as the NARC’s presidential candidate, Simion Nyachae of Ford-People and a few others left the NARC.

The MoU signed on 22 October 2002 by the NARC partners provided for the allocation of Cabinet portfolios among the coalition partners after the electoral victory. Equal representation in Cabinet was the rule, with each party (NAK and the LDP) nominating its ministerial candidates. Clause 2 stated that the composition of the Government of National Unity was as follows:

- Hon Mwai Kibaki shall be nominated as the single Presidential candidate.
- Upon successful completion of the national parliamentary and presidential elections, the President-elect shall immediately convene the Summit in order to discuss the appointment of the Cabinet and the distribution of ministerial duties.
- The membership of the Cabinet to be formed will be determined on a 50/50 power-sharing formula between the two political parties [NAK and LDP] and will be composed of individuals proposed by the respective political parties.

This clause also specified which portfolios the leadership of the NAK and LDP would receive.

- The following positions in the Cabinet shall be allocated to the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) to be distributed among Hon Michael Kijana Wamalwa, Hon Charity Kaluki Ngilu and Hon Kaput arap Kiowa, namely, one position of Vice-President and two positions of second and third Deputy Prime Ministers.

- The following positions in the Cabinet shall be allocated to the Liberal Democratic Party (Rainbow) to be distributed among Hon Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Hon Raila Amolo Odinga, Hon Prof George Saitoti and Hon Moody Aware, namely one position of Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and a position of Senior Co-ordinating Minister.
• The first Deputy Prime Minister shall co-ordinate a class of ministries to be identified and specified upon formation of Government.

Because the Constitution makes the appointment of Cabinet members the prerogative of the president, after his election, President Kibaki and the DP and NAK sections of the NARC became more influential than the other partners in the allocation of Cabinet portfolios. Many NARC partners, particularly its LDP component, have reported that disagreements about the implementation of the MoU have led to deep discontent.

The MoU provided for the creation of the posts of executive prime minister and senior coordinating minister after the finalisation of the constitutional review 100 days after the inauguration of the NARC government. The lengthy constitutional review process would also have removed the executive powers currently vested in the President of the Republic, who would have become a ceremonial president. Kibaki did not want to change a Constitution which not only allowed him to win elections but also gave him considerable executive powers. He has been accused by many of his partners of negating the spirit and letter of the MoU by refusing to back the constitutional amendments that were agreed. Few people have attempted to reflect on the extent to which the NARC’s MoU, particularly the provision that the president would lose his executive powers and become a ceremonial president in favour of a prime minister, was fair to the popularly elected president. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that, judging by the examples of 1992 and 1997, Kibaki would not have been elected on his own and is regarded as a team president rather than a popularly elected one.

**MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE NARC**

*Coalition Management Procedures*

Article 5 of NARC’s constitution states that the party (the coalition is registered as a political party) consists of the following organs: the council, the coordinating committee, the parliamentary group, the elections board and any other organ established by the NARC Council. Article 6 makes provision for the following officials: chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary, deputy secretary, treasurer, deputy treasurer, organising secretary, deputy organising secretary, women co-ordinator and youth co-ordinator. The duties of the organs and officials are detailed in the subsequent articles. The constitution also includes a code of conduct for members and a pledge of commitment.
In spite of this detailed constitution, which should guide the functioning of the coalition, the NARC’s organs have never been effective. Apart from the elections board, which worked remarkably well before and during the December 2002 elections, the party’s organs and officials have been virtually paralysed by crises and stalemate.

Meetings were not held consistently, with most post-election meetings being fire-fighting in nature, especially during the early days of disagreements within the coalition when the leadership was trying to salvage it. The Summit, the highest body, composed of leaders of all the affiliated parties and endowed with the responsibility, among other things for dealing with conflicts within the coalition, met regularly before the elections, with minutes taken. Later, its quarterly meetings no longer took place because of tensions within the coalition between the ex-NAK and ex-LDP factions. The last meeting, in April 2004, virtually dealt a deathblow to the NARC. The hostility among the partners worsened when KANU members joined the government on 30 June 2004 as President Kibaki increasingly used his presidential prerogatives rather than the terms of the MoU to make appointments.

Coalition leaders appeared not to use the opportunity provided by their daily meetings in Parliament to iron out their differences. Instead they used Parliament as a battleground on which to attack each other.

How can the NARC achieve its ultimate post-election objective if the coalition leaders do not meet in order to develop and implement policies? All the factions in the coalition agree that the NARC has achieved only one goal: winning the elections. Many internal difficulties, combined with a lack of consultation on policies and strategies, prevented it from achieving its goals, which include free education, job creation, a new constitution for the country within 100 days, and zero tolerance of corruption, all of them crucial pledges it made during the campaign and on which it has since reneged.

The absence of an effective conflict management mechanism within the NARC has prevented the coalition from addressing serious internal tensions which led ultimately to irreconcilable factionalism. The summit has virtually been abandoned as a coalition structure. The informal consultations conducted by the vice-president in the early phase of the conflict, which took the form of retreats and workshops, had little impact on the deep divergences within the coalition.

Article 21 of the NARC constitution states that

any dispute, which cannot be resolved by the organs of the NARC, shall be adjudicated upon through arbitration. The parties concerned
shall agree on three arbitrators and their decision shall be communicated to the NARC Coordinating Committee in writing. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final.

In addition, Clause 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 22 October 2002 states that:

any disputes or disagreement that may arise regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be submitted for final settlement by a committee comprising the heads of the Catholic Church of Kenya, the Anglican Church in Kenya and the Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya.

Apparently, this mechanism was not used.

**Challenges of Sustaining the Coalition**

Coalitions confront many challenges, most of them common to all types of coalitions. The NARC respondents indicated that when they formed the coalition ahead of the December 2002 elections the main problems they faced were the lack of funding and resources as well as the absence of technical expertise in building a coalition. It took a long while for the NARC to get a working structure to function. As a result, its campaign machinery for the elections was put in place relatively late.

Another challenge was the personal ambition of the main players – for a long time no leader wanted to step down for another, especially in the contest for the top post.

The ethnic orientation of the country made it difficult to reach consensus on a presidential candidate. Negotiations took place not only amongst the political leaders but also between politicians and ethnic groups, given that their backing was a *sine qua non* for coalition formation. For example, the choice of Mwai Kibaki as the coalition’s presidential candidate was resented by some individuals and groups who could not accept another Kikuyu as the country’s president – the first was Jomo Kenyatta.

In many cases the overall lack of democracy in the country tended to make the opposition’s campaign particularly difficult. For example, the pre-election political environment in 1992 and 1997 was characterised by political intimidation and violence targeted at the opposition and its supporters. The security forces, the state-owned electronic media and public servants supported the ruling KANU. Although these abuses were limited in
scale in 2002, they still constituted additional hurdles in the way of the NARC’s quest for power.

Once elected the NARC found it difficult to maintain the cohesion of the coalition. Trust amongst the affiliates was broken with the lack of full implementation of the MoU. President Kibaki’s coalition partners accused him of failing to push for the constitutional review and for allocating disproportionately more ministerial and other important posts to the DP/NAK segment of the coalition.

The NAK faction has found it difficult to defend convincingly its failure to honour the MoU, a situation which has paralysed the NARC from the onset. One NAK supporter has argued that the party went into the pre-election coalition on the basis of certain assumptions which are different from the post-election realities on which government bases its decisions. This faction has accused the LDP of being irresponsible in reverting to tribalism and holding the country to ransom by blocking genuine legislative processes in Parliament for political reasons. The respondent illustrated this viewpoint with the example of the Forest Bill, which was acclaimed by many sectors of society but failed to pass the vote in the National Assembly because the LDP faction in Parliament refused to support it. Finally, it would appear that the intention to move from a presidency with extensive executive powers to a new post of prime minister was not considered fair to the elected president. The LDP, on its part, dismisses allegations of tribalism, claiming that of the 125 MPs elected on the NARC ticket 69 sought the NARC nomination through the LDP and it is the only party that has MPs in all eight provinces.

The undermining of the NARC as a coalition is virtually irreversible. New alliances are crystallising around the NAK and LDP and there is discontent in the ranks of Ford-K. Although the split in the NARC has still to be formalised the LDP is operating as a distinct party which has distanced itself from the NARC publicly and openly, is frantically recruiting new members and has vowed to field its own candidates in by-elections and go it alone in the 2007 general elections. In Parliament, where it claims to control 69 of the NARC’s 125 seats, the LDP has the upper hand in its opposition to NAK/the NARC.

The NAK rejects the LDP’s assessment, maintaining that both it and the LDP would have received a much smaller portion of the vote had they gone it alone in the 2002 elections because they would have gained seats predominantly in their respective tribal strongholds and very few outside these areas. The electorate voted beyond tribal lines because the coalition
offered a real chance for change. In addition, the NAK faction claims that the LDP’s Odinga abused the NARC Electoral Board and changed names of the NARC nominees at the Electoral Commission of Kenya ahead of the December 2002 election, affecting 21 candidates in favour of the LDP component of the coalition. The ability to negotiate the share of parliamentary seats for one’s party in the coalition, which resulted in the LDP gaining more seats than its coalition partners, should not be confused with actual electoral popularity, the NAK argues.

Meanwhile, though, the NAK faction has also been organising itself. The move to form a government of national unity to which selected members of KANU have been appointed in their individual capacity can be considered President Kibaki’s attempt to broaden his support base ahead of the LDP’s possible formal withdrawal from the NARC. In addition, two smaller parties, Safina and Sisi Kwa Sisi, which have two MPs each, have joined NARC. But NAK has also suffered setbacks. Ford-K, which was a member of NAK, has decided to retain its individual identity.

Hon Charity Ngilu, leader of the NPK, recently fell out with the president and the minister of finance over a Bill her ministry had tabled and has since resolved to work closely with the LDP and Ford-K, a complication in view of the fact that she is the bona fide chair of the NARC. A further split also occurred when a group calling itself the Third Progressive Force was formed. Increasingly, what is left of NAK is essentially the Democratic Party. Clearly the NAK and LDP factions of the NARC are strange bedfellows.

Consequences of the Coalition for its Affiliated Parties
This section deals with the challenges confronting political parties in coping with coalition-related internal conflicts? Many theorists argue that the more centralised a party the easier it becomes for the leadership to screen off inter-party politics from intra-party conflicts (Groennings 1968; Panebianco 1988). Moshe Moar (1998) opposes this view, arguing that organisational decentralisation is crucial in enabling party elites to manage intra-party conflicts in such a way that splits are avoided and dissent can be constructively absorbed.

The NARC experience has presented serious challenges to the affiliated parties’ internal cohesion. While joining the coalition substantially improved their chances of accessing power, it came with a major trade-off, since member parties had to jostle among themselves for a share of elected seats and Cabinet portfolios.
The limited number of seats and portfolios available for each affiliated party combined with the quasi-assurance of winning these posts because of the popularity of the coalition also caused considerable competition within the party, leading to internal tension and dissension. In addition, disagreements within the NARC about allegations that Kibaki and his faction had failed to abide by the MoU have caused dissent within the parties. Some individuals who were appointed to the NARC government maintained their loyalty to the coalition while their parties, deeply annoyed by what they called Kibaki’s shift, which frustrates their hopes of securing ministerial portfolios and other posts, have expressed their discontent publicly and threatened to quit the NARC.

Political parties in Kenya, as in most countries, are highly centralised, but the personal interests of politicians affect the ability of a political party to behave as a unitary force within coalition politics. The dynamics within the NARC bear this out. Some LDP members are closer to the NAK component while others oppose the continued participation of the LDP in the coalition. Similarly, tensions have been reported in Ford-K because of the failure by Kibaki to abide to the MoU. Ford-K has also complained that it should have been granted more ministerial positions. As a result, Ford-K ministers are pro-the NARC, while those who failed to be appointed minister are anti-the NARC.

THE SURVIVAL OF THE NARC

The failure to honour the MoU has divided the NARC along its pre-October 2002 lines. It also reflects a key dimension of politics in Kenya: personal ambition and lack of trust between coalition partners. In the face of all these problems one wonders how the NARC has managed to ‘survive’ at all.

There are three main reasons for its survival. First, Kenya’s electoral law does not provide for independent candidates to stand in parliamentary elections and, since the NARC is legally constituted and registered as a political party, its elected leaders in Parliament are the NARC MPs. If any of these MPs resign formally from the party they will lose their seats and will have to contest by-elections. Nobody wants to take such risks. They all want to remain in power as long as possible in spite of the internal contradictions and obstructions which have characterised the NARC since it came to power. It is therefore not in the interest of groups such as the LDP to leave the NARC. It is anticipated that the LDP leadership will quit the coalition formally only before the elections. In the same vein, the party (or
coalition) leader can fire elected leaders from the party or the government but the law does not allow the leader to fire elected members from the chamber because they have been elected directly by the electorate on the basis of the first-past-the-post electoral system and, unless they resigned from Parliament, they would still keep their seats even if they were evicted from their party.

The second reason for the relatively prolonged existence of the NARC is that the support of Kenyans for the coalition was tremendous. Any leader seen by the population as being responsible for destroying the coalition might face the consequences in the 2007 general elections. The fear of public blame has therefore had a dissuasive effect.

Finally, the affiliated parties are benefiting from the coalition through their parliamentary seats and ministerial and other well-remunerated posts, such as in parastatals. In other words, the NARC provides financial security for the coalition partners. Power brings many advantages. In most countries it has been observed that there is always an advantage in running for office as an incumbent. Incumbency gives easier (and often undue) access to public resources such as state-owned media, civil servants, vehicles, the state apparatus and even public funding. There have been complaints that most of the appointees to the Cabinet and to parastatals in 2003 were members of the DP faction – of 24 Cabinet portfolios, the DP received 12, the LDP 6, Ford-K 3 and the NPK 1 – and that this situation has been mirrored in all other appointments. Running for election from an opposition party or coalition is an uphill race, given the uneven track that characterises Kenyan elections. The NARC dissidents do not wish to cause such trouble for themselves ahead of the general elections of 2007 and would prefer to leave the coalition as close to the election date as possible.

In light of the above it is clear that the NARC is surviving for reasons beyond the control of its leaders. To be strong and effective, a coalition’s survival should not be the result of external factors but a consequence of its affiliated members’ commitment to and belief in the need for it as a platform for achieving their policies. Given that the NARC has been unable to work toward its programme objectives, its longevity can be seen as benefiting only its members at the expense of society as a whole.

CONCLUSION

Asked what the NARC experience had taught them about coalition formation and sustainability the respondents cited four points.
First, if a coalition is to survive, it should be based on political honesty, mutual trust and respect. The respondents deplored the violation by the DP/NAK elements of the NARC of the letter and spirit of the MoU. They argued that if honesty, mutual respect and trust are not the basis of coalition formation, no coalition will survive. On the other hand, a number of respondents complained that the LDP faction has held the country to ransom over the failure of the NAK faction to respect the MoU and has often undermined genuine lawmaking initiatives as a way of venting its discontent.

Secondly, coalitions should preferably be formed after elections rather than before them because pre-election coalitions are not based on the relative strengths of the affiliated parties and some partners may enjoy undue influence. The respondents also argued that before elections party leaders tend to enter into unprincipled coalitions for the sake of winning, whereas post-election coalitions are based on the real electoral strength of the partners, with the raison d’être being fundamentally to govern. The LDP faction of the NARC felt that the DP/NAK faction used it to access power and, once in office, abused the LDP group by failing to honour the MoU. The LDP has indicated that it has learned its political lesson and, should it enter another coalition, it will do so only after an election.

Thirdly, respondents called for strong legislation governing party coalitions to avoid double-dealing. Some went so far as to advocate punishing any violations of the coalition agreement, citing the fact that after the elections the NAK faction had claimed that the signed MoU was not legally binding. Others suggested that pre-election coalitions be outlawed, or, at least, governed by specific sets of laws.

Finally respondents complained about the pervasiveness of ethnicity in party politics in Kenya, which emerged as a key feature of party coalitions. Ironically, all those who complained had chosen to remain within a faction that largely comprised members of their own ethnic group. Similarly, the inadequate internalisation of and belief in the constituent parties’ declared ideologies and values gives rise to coalitions motivated by short-term personal and partisan goals rather than a long-term vision for the country.

Certainly the fairness of the coalition agreement and the need for the participating parties to honour this agreement are fundamental to the sustainability of a party coalition. Political honesty and mutual trust increase the chances of coalitions lasting long enough to make an impact on policy development and implementation. However, the authors’ view is that even these pre-requisites are not sufficient to ensure the survival and effectiveness of coalitions. The history of such coalitions and alliances elsewhere has
shown that other factors, such as the personality of the various coalition leaders (a point not highlighted by the respondents), may have either a positive or a negative impact on the longevity and effectiveness of a coalition.

More importantly, some of the elements presented negatively by the respondents are, in fact, not problems but factors which should be taken into consideration. For example, the impact of ethnicity on coalition politics is universal and should be seen as normal and dealt with effectively. Given the strong ethnic identity in Kenya, a party coalition can only last and be effective if the existence of ethnic politics is not denied but is acknowledged and accommodated fairly. Such a pragmatic approach would contribute to preventing ethnic polarisation and possible violent ethnically based conflict.

Clearly some legal requirements should be imposed on party coalitions, for instance, their purpose, duration and the manner in which the parties will exert their joint prerogatives. The electoral commission could be given the power to decide whether the coalition agreement or MoU complies with the law. However, extreme regulation of a political process such a coalition might lead to unacceptable restrictions on freedom of association.

The sustainability of party coalitions in Kenya depends on a number of variables, namely:

- the relative autonomy of the president of the republic vis-à-vis Parliament, as is the case with most presidential systems;
- the first-past-the post electoral system used for parliamentary elections compounded by the 25 per cent threshold requirement for presidential elections;
- strong ethnic identity and weak ideological identity;
- the fairness of the agreement between the parties and the extent to which it is honoured after the election, coupled with the impact of leaders’ personality; and
- the proximity of the next presidential election as coalitions tend to collapse close to elections because their leaders attempt to distance themselves from a losing government.

To be effective party coalitions must become part of the political culture of the country. Generally speaking, it must be recognised that a party that wants to win an election in Kenya must join forces with others and make compromises. The NARC has shown that this can be done successfully and, from that perspective, it can be argued that the NARC experience has possibly served its purpose. It is important, however, to realise that it takes decades
to build a political culture of coalition like that of Mauritius or continental Western Europe. And this is a learning process. One of the respondents expressed this quite well by saying ‘when you ride a bicycle and you are afraid of falling, you will never learn to ride a bicycle’.

It would be unrealistic to expect Kenyans to be fully successful in their first real attempt at a broad-based coalition in a multiparty environment. The NARC’s greatest achievement is that party leaders came together in an alliance and won the elections in the face of serious adversity. For this, the NARC has gained a privileged place in the political history of the country. Kenyans need to build on the National Rainbow Coalition’s success in winning elections with a view to enhancing the country’s political party coalition practices and, more importantly, their effectiveness in terms of policy development and implementation.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

**THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND THE CURRENT COALITION RECONFIGURATION**

One 21 November 2005 Kenyans participated in a referendum intended to ratify the new constitution. The overwhelming rejection of the draft constitution and the dissolution and subsequent reappointment of the Cabinet were both historic and unprecedented. The constitutional referendum marked the first time since independence that Kenya’s citizens had participated in a referendum process. Following the rejection of the draft constitution, President Kibaki, in yet another unprecedented move, dissolved the Cabinet, sending the ministers and their assistants packing and promising to reconstitute the body within two weeks. The dissolution of the Cabinet was a departure from the precedent set by his predecessors, Presidents Kenyatta and Moi, who, rather than dissolve the Cabinet, reshuffled it frequently to achieve various political ends. The reconstituted Cabinet omitted the LDP ministers, who had mounted a spirited campaign against the draft constitution and who, for the most part, were credited with the defeat the government suffered in the referendum. Needless to say, the political implications of these events will have profound bearing on coalition politics in Kenya and may well signal the end of NARC.

The rejection of the new constitution means, in essence, that the country must restart the process of constitutional review. The clamour for a new constitutional dispensation has dominated Kenya’s political landscape for
the last 15 years. As mentioned above, the struggle was born of the realisation that fundamental rights and freedoms had been curtailed significantly during the regimes of both President Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, through constitutional amendments whose effect was the centralisation of executive power and the emasculation of other organs and institutions of state.

The Consensus Act, which essentially provided the legal framework for the referendum, outlawed direct campaigns by political parties and instead required them to transform themselves into either Yes (Banana) or No (Orange) committees to support or oppose the new constitution. The committees included other stakeholders, notably non-governmental and religious organisations. One of the major criticisms of the referendum process was the failure of the government to provide a sound legal framework by enacting enabling legislation to facilitate the process. In the absence of a Referendum Act, reliance was on the Electoral Laws of Kenya, which, as the process demonstrated, proved inadequate, especially in mitigating certain problems that emerged in the course of the campaign.

The referendum campaign presented the first real opportunity for the NARC’s affiliated parties to test their political strength as well as the future of the coalition. As noted above, serious divisions and wrangles have characterised the functioning of NARC as a ruling coalition since it assumed power in 2003. While the affiliated parties have striven for the past two years to remain united, the referendum threatened finally to divide the coalition government. For the purposes of the referendum, and as provided for by the Consensus Act, the LDP wing of NARC teamed up with KANU to form the Orange, the symbol of those opposed to the new constitution, while DP, Ford-K and the National Party of Kenya (NPK) teamed up to form the Banana camp, which supported the constitution’s ratification. This effectively meant that the government was split over a process that had been represented by its leading lights as its own project. During the campaign, the LDP and KANU transformed the Orange into a pressure group called the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which was to act as a broad-based coalition of all stakeholders and parties opposed to the enactment of the new constitution.

The referendum was held in mid-December 2005. The ODM successfully led the country into overwhelmingly rejecting the draft constitution. The campaign, which had been characterised by acrimony and name-calling concluded peacefully when Kenyans turned out in large numbers to vote on referendum day. The Orange team won in seven of the eight provinces, with the Banana team winning only in Central Province, which is
also home to President Kibaki, and in pockets of the Rift Valley, mainly the Nakuru and Naivasha districts, and Eastern Province (Embu and Meru Districts), home to Justice Minister Kiraitu Murungi. The Orange side also won in 153 of the country’s 210 constituencies, with the Banana side winning in only 57 constituencies. This effectively gave the Orange side more than two-thirds support in the constituencies, a victory unique in Kenya’s political history. In all, the Orange won a total of 3,548,477 votes (57% of the total votes cast) against the Banana, which won 2,532,918 (43%).

It is remarkable that the campaign strategy employed by both sides was to galvanise the electorate along ethnic as well as party lines. The Orange side was much more effective in this strategy. Once again, the referendum confirmed that coalitions in Kenya are primarily formed along ethnic lines rather than on the basis of policy issues. Although, by and large, issues contained in the draft constitution were widely debated and discussed, most of the major tribes were galvanised against the Kikuyus, as was evidenced in the regional voting patterns.

The results of the referendum also complicated politics within the Government of National Unity. It should be remembered that, in a bid to avoid political rebellion in Parliament and to pass the government’s legislative agenda, President Kibaki formed a government of national unity by including members of Ford-P and KANU. An important element of the Banana team’s strategy for winning the referendum was the ability of Ford-P and KANU appointees to the Cabinet to deliver votes from their respective districts. Unfortunately, these parties were unable to attract substantial votes for the government and thereby diminished their political clout and vote value to the government.

A further implication of the referendum result was the weakening of some political parties, particularly Ford-K. After the 2002 general elections, Ford-K and Ford-P enjoyed an unassailable lead in the Western Province and Kisii districts respectively. The fact that Ford-K lost in all the districts in Western except for Bungoma effectively diminished the party’s stature in the province. Indeed, since 2002, the LDP has waged a formidable fight in Western and the outcome of the referendum clearly gave it the edge there.

For the most part, the referendum result also re-energised political parties in their quest for sustainable political alliances and coalitions. Increasingly, there is talk within KANU and LDP ranks of transforming the Orange Democratic Movement into a political party. The Democratic Party has also put out feelers to other parties, indicating its willingness to negotiate possible alliances. This scenario, if pursued further, would inevitably lead to
alliances taking two formidable directions, namely, the National Rainbow Coalition and the ODM, ahead of the 2007 general elections. The transformation of the ODM into a coalition was catalysed by the president’s action in dissolving the Cabinet and subsequently reappointing it without the leading figures of the LDP wing of NARC. The fact that the president rewarded loyalty, especially that of Ford-K and the NPK, and the choice of the new ministers left little doubt that he intended to run for re-election in 2007 and that the battle lines between the Orange Movement and the NARC were clearly drawn.

The referendum result also confirmed one political reality in Kenyan politics after the 2002 general elections – no party can campaign and win elections without forming a coalition of some sort. Regrettably the post-referendum coalition talks have not been well structured and are taking the same route as those that led to the formation of NARC. Talks have all been premised on positions and appointments as opposed to policy and ideology. This emerged very clearly during the discussions between President Kibaki and Musikari Kombo and Charity Ngilu (chairmen of Ford-K and the LPK respectively). When coalition talks begin in earnest on the part of the ODM it will be interesting to see how they will deal with the question of fielding candidates. Currently the ODM enjoys wide support from the electorate based on its performance in the referendum and as confirmed by a recent opinion poll conducted by Steadman Associates which confirmed that the ODM was more popular than NARC and its leading light, Kalonzo Musyoka, was the preferred candidate for president among 35 per cent of the electorate, beating President Kibaki (26%) and Uhuru Kenyatta, another key ODM figure (17%).
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to investigate why and how political party coalitions in selected countries in Africa are formed, maintained and concluded, to assess their impact on the political systems of the countries studied and to draw lessons from these experiences that will enable party coalitions to contribute to the vibrancy of multiparty democracy on the continent. A review of the literature showed that some theories of party coalition politics were partly relevant to the African context. The study found that scholars in Western Europe have justifiably put a high emphasis on predicting and explaining why some coalitions form and others do not. This approach would be of limited relevance in the African context where, frequently, political parties contest elections in pre-established alliances. In addition, these theories hardly cover opposition party coalitions, an omission this study has addressed by devoting equal attention to governing and opposition coalitions. Equally important, most existing theories about party alliances overlook the main characteristics of African politics and may, as a consequence, lead to superficial conclusions.

This final chapter compares the experiences of Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa by highlighting the factors which influence the building, survival, effectiveness and collapse of coalitions in those countries. It also assesses the impact of coalitions on the political systems of the countries concerned, with particular regard to variables like nation-building, ideological harmony, the party system and individual political parties, and women’s representation. Finally, it draws lessons from the experiences of the five countries for the rest of the continent and possibly beyond, by highlighting some good practices.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FORMATION, SURVIVAL, EFFECTIVENESS AND COLLAPSE OF COALITIONS

The formation, survival, effectiveness and collapse of party coalitions are unevenly influenced by several factors including the nature of the political regime, the type of electoral system, the legislation on political parties and party coalitions or the lack or inadequacy thereof, the nature of political parties and the party system, ethno-linguistic and regional factors, ideologies and classes. The motives, roles and personality of party coalition leaders also influence alliances. More generally, the inadequate institutionalisation of democracy, the domination of founding leaders over their parties and the structural and organisational weaknesses or strengths of political parties also affect not only the parties themselves but also party alliances. Also, the political economy of the country, especially in the context of limited career opportunities outside of government, often leads to the building of unprincipled coalitions.

Types of Political Regime

The type of political regime has an impact on the formation, functioning, survival and effectiveness of political party coalitions. The study allowed for a comparison of coalition politics in both parliamentary and presidential regimes, showing the influences of each on party alliances. In a parliamentary regime like that in Mauritius, the government’s survival depends on the confidence of Parliament.

As a result, partners work hard towards maintaining the cohesion of the ruling coalition. Similarly, South Africa, another parliamentary regime, would face a similar situation to that in Mauritius if the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), needed the support of others to achieve 50 per cent plus one. However, at sub-national levels (the provincial legislatures in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the Western Cape, the Cape Town Metro Council and many municipal councils), parties had to enter into post-election alliances in order to govern.

In presidential regimes like those in Kenya and Malawi, the dependence of the presidential party on its electoral alliance partners is stronger before elections because their support is needed to win. Once in place, this dependency diminishes as presidential parties tend to rely on the constitutionally entrenched prerogatives of the president of the republic to govern the country rather than on pre-election agreements signed with
alliance partners. Nonetheless, the president of the republic and his party would necessarily need the support of their partners to pass laws in Parliament. The deep factionalism in the presidential coalitions in Malawi and Kenya led, in Malawi, to an extreme situation involving a failed impeachment process and in Kenya to the country becoming nearly ungovernable for most of the five-year term of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). This situation resulted from the refusal by some partners to cooperate with the president, accusing him of violating the letter and spirit of the NARC’s pre-election constitution and memorandum of understanding.

In summary, party coalitions in parliamentary regimes tend to be more effective than those in presidential regimes as, for the survival of government, consensus must be sought. In presidential regimes, elected heads of state tend to overlook coalition agreements, giving precedence to their constitutional prerogatives, a situation that often leads to cleavages within the coalition, compromising the functioning and effectiveness of government, especially when the coalition partners choose to use Parliament as a platform from which to resist.

Types of Electoral System

The study has shown that, generally speaking, in first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral systems like those in Malawi, Kenya and Mauritius, political parties choose to enter into pre-election coalitions in order to avoid wasting their votes. By coming together, they increase their chances of winning the elections. In Kenya the requirement that presidential candidates must obtain a minimum of 25 per cent in at least five of the country’s eight provinces reinforces the need for parties to coalesce prior to the elections. Mauritius’s three-way FPTP, combined with the geographical concentration of the various communal groups in rural and urban areas, requires pragmatism. As a result, party leaders adopt a broad-based ethnic approach and enter into pre-electoral alliances in order to ensure their electoral victory.

In a proportional representation (PR) electoral system such as that used in South Africa for the national and provincial elections there is no election threshold and votes are, essentially, not wasted. Parties do not therefore have to rush into pre-election alliances and can build post-election coalitions on the basis of the number of seats each has won. This was the basis of the post-election coalitions between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) from 1994 to date; the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) in 1999 and the ANC and NNP in 2003. It is
worth pointing out that though Mozambique also has a PR system for its parliamentary elections, the requirement of a minimum threshold of 5 per cent of the national vote makes it vital for small parties to build pre-election alliances in order to avoid wasting their votes. This explains why ten small political parties that failed to win a single parliamentary seat in 1994 entered into pre-election alliances with the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO) in both the 1999 and the 2004 parliamentary elections.

South Africa’s local government elections are run under a mixed system, with 50 per cent of seats fought on a FPTP system and the other 50 per cent according to a PR closed party list. In this case, the FPTP element means parties stand a better chance if they enter into pre-election alliances. This was clearly the case in the 2000 local government elections when a DP, NNP and FA alliance paid off in victory in the Cape Town Metro council and many other local councils.

**Legislation**

In most of the countries under study, political parties and party coalitions are affected either by the absence or the inadequacies of legislation. In Kenya, for example, the Society’s Act applies not only to political parties but also to private companies such as large firms, shops and farms. It is not impossible that this situation may partly explain why some leaders run their political parties as their private fiefdoms. Kenyan law does not recognise party coalitions so the NARC was forced to register as a political party. Similarly, in Malawi, the legal framework does not explicitly recognise party coalitions. As a result, in both these countries party alliances have no status beyond that of gentlemen’s agreements.

The consequence of this inadequate recognition of party coalitions is that in both Kenya and Malawi the position of head of state is strengthened at the expense of the alliance and of Parliament. The formal registration of a political party in lieu of a coalition has solved the problem in Kenya, at least during the electoral period, but after the elections, the grouping tends to face new kinds of problems because the MPs are stuck with the party that sponsored them during the elections and cannot leave the coalition/party formally without losing their seats. By the same token, the party leader cannot dismiss an MP because the latter was elected as an individual under the FPTP electoral system. This is why the stalemate in Kenya is likely to last until the next national elections, when the term of office of all MPs will expire.

In Malawi, partner parties do not form a new party but campaign for their joint presidential candidate, promoting his party’s symbol. At the same
time, they campaign for their own parties in the parliamentary elections, using the party’s symbol, a practice that confuses the electorate and negatively affects the chances of parliamentary candidates representing coalition partners that do not field a presidential candidate. This situation is graphically illustrated by the case of the alliance between the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) ahead of the 1999 election, as well as the Mgwirizano coalition in 2004.

In Mauritius any group of parties wishing to contest the elections together must register with the Office of the Electoral Commissioner. The alliance is also required to have its symbols registered with the electoral commissioner. For example, in the 2005 general elections, the Alliance Sociale, which comprised the Labour Party (LP) and five smaller parties, was registered as an alliance. Its partners agreed to register the symbol of the LP and that of one of the smaller parties, the Parti Mauricien Xavier Duval (PMXD). The then ruling alliance was registered as the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) / Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien (MSM) alliance using the symbols of the MMM and the MSM. The fact that the Mauritian legislation recognises party alliances helps avoid the kind of confusion that occurred in Malawi and Kenya. It is important to note, however, that registration with the Mauritian Electoral Office is applicable only to election time, at other times parties are not legally bound.

The introduction of the floor-crossing legislation in South Africa has made it possible for MPs who were elected under the closed PR list system to quit their parties, form new parties, or join other parties, without losing their seats in the National Assembly or the provincial legislatures. This legislation has led to periodic splitting of parties, defections of elected party representatives and, ultimately, to the fragmentation and weakening of the party system. In addition, floor crossing has undermined the meaning of representative democracy as elected leaders have joined parties that stand for views other than those for which their parties were elected.

**The Ethno-linguistic and Regional Factor**

It must be recognised that ethno-linguistic and regional factors still strongly characterises politics in Africa. None of the five countries studied is spared this reality. Indeed, all major parties, both ruling and opposition, in Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa are associated with a particular ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious or regional group. Certain coalitions end up resembling coalitions of tribes and sometimes multipartyism turns into multitribalism. As a result, the ethnic dynamics that impact
adversely on individual political parties often find their way into the coalitions. The coming together of the main party leaders in Kenya was, in fact, the coming together of various ethnic groups in support of the NARC. In Malawi, from 1994 to 2004, the northern-region-based AFORD was able to oppose the southern-region-based United Democratic Front (UDF) against the centre-based MCP, which allowed it to play the role of kingmaker by making and unmaking coalitions, until its own disintegration into smaller parties.

In Mauritius, politicians often ‘sell’ coalitions as the only means of accommodating ethnic diversity, building consensus and promoting social cohesion. The reality is, however, different, as coalition building, and ultimately its breakdown, takes place along ethnic lines and these coalitions are essentially a vehicle that allows politicians to access or maintain power. In other words, the *raison d’être* of a party coalition is ultimately to govern and ethnic accommodation, though desirable and reassuring, has essentially been of peripheral importance. If this were not the case, some party coalitions formed essentially around one particular communal group would not have been a factor in the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Conversely, in order to guarantee its electoral victory, the MMM entered in coalition with a smaller party, the MSM, in 2000, and agreed to share the post of prime minister with the MSM taking the first three years, while the MMM contented itself with the remaining two. This ethnic calculation was based on the recognition of the demographic weight of the Hindu majority, who constitute about half the population. Clearly access to power, not ethnic accommodation, was the ultimate goal.

Ironically, the attempt to attract as many ethnic groups as possible in order to be seen as politically correct and win elections, results in a lack of homogeneity which constitutes the main weakness of any coalition in an ethnically diverse society. The diversity that allows a coalition to win an election is, paradoxically, the factor that is likely to cause it to break up.

**The Ideology Factor**

Ideology has not been an essential factor in party coalition building or splitting in any of the five countries. In Kenya and Malawi, interviews with leaders of the main parties showed that representatives were unsure about their party’s ideology. Even when there were some rudiments of ideology, parties did not live up to it and none of their coalition-related decisions seemed to be clearly based on ideological considerations. As for Mozambique, while it is relatively discernible that RENAMO is a centre-right party and
its longstanding rival, the governing Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) a centre-left party, the ten smaller parties which have coalesced around the RENAMO under the RENAMO União Eleitoral (RENAMO UE), did not all have a clearly professed ideology.

In Mauritius and South Africa, however, the main political parties can be classified with more certainty on a left-right spectrum though a superficial observation of coalition politics in these countries might lead to the impression that, as in Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique, there is a virtual absence of ideology. Both Mauritius and South Africa are export oriented and therefore subject to global trade influences, justifying their adhesion to economic neo-liberalism. The ideological realignment of the main parties in these countries towards the centre has reduced the importance of ideology as a differentiating factor for coalition building, collapse and revival.

**The Financial Security Factor**

It is obvious that political parties enter into coalitions in order to win elections. Access to power often comes with various privileges, including financial advantages. Affiliated parties benefit from a coalition through their parliamentary seats and, where possible, through ministerial and other well-remunerated posts. In other words, the coalition provides financial security for its coalition partners. In addition, in those countries that have a FPTP system it tends to be an advantage to run for office as an incumbent. Incumbency gives easier and often undue access to public resources such as state-owned media, civil servants, vehicles, the state apparatus and even public funding. Interestingly, while financial security is often associated with ruling parties or coalitions, as in Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius and South Africa, the opposition RENAMO União Eleitoral in Mozambique has been able to offer the same to its partners, essentially through their parliamentary seats and public funding of parliamentary parties. The Mozambican case explains, to a large extent, the unusual longevity of its opposition alliance.

**The Personality of Leaders**

The incompatibility of character, personal ambition and power struggles among key leaders have often caused factionalism within alliances and have, in many cases, even led to their rupture. Conversely, accommodating different personalities has contributed to the survival and effectiveness of an alliance. Most political party alliances in the countries under study do not last the full term of Parliament. The personalities of the various coalition leaders have either had a positive or a negative impact on the longevity and
effectiveness of a given coalition. The convulsions in the NARC or the crisis in the DP-NNP coalition have largely been attributed to the incompatibility of the leaders’ characters. Similarly, the age-old rivalry and character incompatibility between Gwanda Chakuamba and John Tembo dating from their time in the MCP as president and vice-president respectively, prevented their parties, the RP and the MCP, from joining force in the Mgwirizano coalition. They paid the price by losing the 2004 presidential election.

The MMM’s Paul Bérenger has a record of leaving party coalitions within fewer than two years after their formation. The collapse of the MMM/MSM alliance in the 1980s was explained by the incompatibility of temperament between Bérenger and Anerood Jugnauth. Interestingly, the same two leaders were able to enter and remain in a coalition for the full duration of the term of office from 2000 to 2005. This was a result of pragmatism and realpolitik, relating to the higher stakes, which included Bérenger succeeding to the post of prime minister for the first time in his long political career, Pravind Jugnauth to the deputy prime ministership and Anerood Jugnauth to the post of president. Another aspect to consider in this regard is the motives of leaders in entering into alliances. Many leaders create a party, as happened in Malawi and Mauritius, as an office-seeking strategy. Indeed, party formation has been a way of enhancing leaders’ attractiveness as a bargaining chip. At times, this strategy has resulted in a leader’s appointment as a minister or even as vice-president, as in the case of Malawi, in exchange for support for the party of the presidential or prime ministerial candidate. Given that political parties in many countries operate like private companies, with the leader playing the role of entrepreneur, party leaders are not shy about making deals for their personal benefit, and often at the expense of the entire party or alliance. This has resulted in leaders joining another party or alliance in exchange for a position or for financial and material advantages, and often members are not consulted about such decisions. In Malawi, the leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) went as far as formally deregistering his party in favour of the ruling UDF without consulting his MPs and supporters.

The ultimate objective of opposition coalition leaders has been to unseat the ruling party and accede to power while, for ruling parties and coalitions, it has been to establish an alliance with a view to maintaining or consolidating power. In Malawi, Kenya and Mozambique parties have come together without a solid programme for the post-election period. As a result, when the elections are lost, the losing alliances usually collapse as quickly as they were formed.
Competition and Deep Differences Between Coalition Partners

Inter-party tensions tend to compromise the survival of a coalition. Tensions between the IFP and the ANC, for instance, were caused, *inter alia*, by a long history of violent conflicts between the two parties and policy differences, permanent competition for control of KZN and the perception that the ANC wanted to ‘swallow’ the IFP. Similarly, the DP-NNP coalition faced serious challenges because of a long history of mistrust between them and differences in political cultures. In Kenya, too, the NARC has been weakened by rivalry, competition and fighting between the Democratic Party (DP) faction of President Mwai Kibaki and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction led by Raila Odinga, and their respective supporters.

The Proximity of a General Election

Experience has shown that the closer the country gets to a general election the more fragile ruling coalitions become. This is more so when the ruling coalition is not seen as delivering on its election promises. As a result, some coalition partners are inclined to jump the sinking ship in an attempt to distance themselves from the poor performers and regain their ‘political cleanliness’, an occurrence regularly observed in Mauritius. The same situation is expected in Kenya as 2007, an election year, approaches.

Inadequate Internal Democracy and Transparency

Inadequate internal democracy and transparency within both the affiliated political parties and the alliance itself often affects the sustainability of party alliances. Virtually all the parties and alliances in Malawi have been accused of undemocratic governance. The same criticism has been levelled against RENAMO UE and the NARC and its individual components as well as against parties such as the IFP. Such situations tend to lead to defections, which, in turn, lead to the weakening of the party or alliance and, ultimately, to its breakdown.

On the other hand, a preference for forming a coalition with specific partners or the refusal to do so with certain others has resulted in splits within parties and to the collapse of alliances. The absence of internal consensus in relation to the choice of an alliance partner weakens both the alliance and its affiliated members. In 1991 an MMM group led by Bérenger wanted to coalesce with the Labour Party, while most MMM officials preferred to work with the MSM. Finally, the party opted for an MSM-MMM alliance, which won the election. Reportedly, Bérenger destroyed this alliance from within, using his role as party secretary general to criticise
the coalition government, of which he was minister of finance. Malawi faced a similar situation when the MCP’s John Tembo, who wanted to be the vice-presidential running mate in the 1999 presidential election in lieu of AFORD’s Chakufwa Chihana, Gwanda Chakuamba’s choice, fought the MCP-AFORD alliance from within. Regardless of whether an affiliated party is structurally centralised or decentralised, intra-party tensions and infighting have usually affected inter-party harmony within coalitions. Limited inner democracy and consultation and transparency have, as a consequence, undermined the sustainability of party alliances.

**Coalition Agreement and Management Procedures**

The nature and content of the coalition agreement, the coalition management procedures and the implementation of the agreement impact on the longevity and effectiveness of a party alliance. In Kenya and Malawi dominant parties in the ruling coalitions have repeatedly been accused of dishonouring the alliance agreement or memorandum of understanding, to the distress of their allies. DP/NARC was blamed for appointing too many of its members to key posts and for failing to deliver on one of the alliance’s main election promises, namely, the enactment of a new constitution with reduced powers for the head of state, within 100 days of the new government’s investiture.

The lack or inadequacy of conflict management mechanisms has often exacerbated a situation of conflict. The RENAMO UE partners complained that conflict was managed on an ad hoc basis and that meetings were rarely convened. They observed that the purpose of meetings was usually to rubber stamp the decisions of the RENAMO leader. NARC partners also blamed the absence of meetings aimed at ironing out differences, indicating that regular meetings took place during election periods but that after winning the election in 2002 the partners no longer met. This situation has compromised the effectiveness of the RENAMO UE and NARC between elections.

**IMPACT OF PARTY COALITIONS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM**

Party coalitions have had both positive and negative impacts on the political systems of different countries, affecting, *inter alia*, nation-building, ideological harmony, women’s representation in decision-making positions, party systems and individual political parties.
Nation-Building

One important objective of immediate pre-independence and post-independence party coalitions in Mauritius in the second half of the 1960s and in South Africa in the mid-1990s was to bring about national unity and nation-building. In Mauritius, after the pre-independence elections of 1967, the LP and its then archrival the Parti Mauricien Socialiste Démocrate (PMSD) formed a post-election coalition which lasted for 15 years, thus helping nation-building by reconciling the Hindu majority represented by the LP and the general population, which consisted mainly of the Creole people, represented by the PMSD.

In South Africa the 1994-1996 Government of National Unity, consisting of the ANC, the National Party (NP) and the IFP, also contributed to nation-building in the racially and ethnically divided country. This transitional constitutionally enshrined multiparty government arrangement brought together the architects of apartheid, the NP, and the party chiefly responsible for apartheid’s destruction, the ANC. One of the most successful party coalitions in the post-apartheid era in South Africa has, surprisingly, been the successive post-election coalitions between the ANC and the IFP in KZN and nationally. The ANC and IFP came together in an attempt to erode political violence in KZN and their coalition contributed to restoring peace in the volatile province after decades of hostility between supporters of the two parties.

Ideological Harmony

In the first section of this chapter it was indicated that in some countries ideological considerations were a factor in the formation of party alliances while, in others, they were not. Conversely, in Mauritius and South Africa, it is the building of alliances between the main parties that has, with time, contributed to some degree of ideological harmony. In both countries all the main parties have embraced a neo-liberal ideology, thus shifting to the centre. Whether the choice of neo-liberal policies is good or bad is another debate.

The fact that there has not been a coalition in South Africa between the ANC and the DA should not be interpreted as a reflection of wide ideological differences between the two parties, rather it is tactical – the result of the anti-pact stance taken by the DA. Indeed, the cornerstone of the DA’s strategy has been to increase and unite opposition against the ANC. Interestingly, the two parties have been able to reach some agreement and have cooperated and engaged in horse trading at local government level.
where other parties were often too small to make a difference to the formation of the local executive committees. In reality, the ANC and DA are in coalition in some municipalities for the sake of making government workable in those areas, even though they refuse to use the term ‘coalition’ to describe their relationship. The ideological closeness of the two parties makes such arrangements possible.

**Party System**

Party coalitions have had the effect of fragmenting the party system in some of the countries under study. It has been observed in Mauritius and Malawi that politicians often leave their parties and form new ones as a strategy to make themselves more attractive as a coalition partner for the ruling party. South Africa, although its party system is relatively stable, has also experienced fragmentation, though as a result of the introduction of the floor-crossing legislation rather than as a consequence of party coalitions. On the other hand, the Kenyan and Mozambican party systems seem not to be affected by fragmentation resulting from party coalition politics. This can be explained by the fact that both have an electoral threshold which encourages party alliances.

**Political Parties**

The establishment and disintegration of party alliances has undeniably affected individual political parties both positively and negatively. Some effects are tangible while others are mere perceptions which must be validated by means of scientifically conducted surveys. In this section, however, perceptions will be treated as facts because, in politics, they are almost as important as facts themselves. The building of party coalitions has improved the image of some regionally based political parties, giving them some national relevance. Just such a case is that of the northern-based AFORD, which, through its intermittent alliances with the UDF and the central region-based MCP, had become a national role player.

The same applies to the IFP, which, thanks to its participation in the ANC-led national government, changed its image from that of a provincial party concerned only with the interests of its Zulu constituents, to that of a national player. The participation of its president, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in government as minister of home affairs and his periodic appointment as acting president of the republic also enhanced his stature.

Mauritius’s third largest party, the MSM, was able to maintain itself in power by taking advantage of the rivalry between the two main parties, the...
LP and the MMM. Anerood Jugnauth therefore managed, for 13 consecutive years, to occupy the position of prime minister, a period that ended only when the LP and MMM agreed to join forces in 1995. However, thanks to a new coalition with the MMM, Jugnauth made a comeback in 2000 and led the country for a further three years as prime minister before he was elected by Parliament as the (ceremonial) president of the republic, a position he still holds.

In Mozambique, some representatives of the ten small parties allied with RENAMO have been able to enter Parliament and enjoy better political visibility and financial security thanks to the alliance.

In South Africa, the ANC has entered into alliances and cooperative arrangements with a variety of smaller and widely different political parties, including the IFP, NNP, the United Democratic Movement, the Minority Front, the Azanian People’s Organisation, the Freedom Front Plus and the Independent Democrats (ID). This openness has enhanced the governing party’s image as a moderate (dominant) party, and has contributed to the reduction of the country’s ethnic and racial polarisation.

Finally, by building a broad-based political party alliance, the different parties which constitute the NARC have been able to dislodge a party which had entrenched itself in power for nearly 40 years. The impact on the Kenyan political system expresses itself not only in terms of changing political personalities but also in political alternation for the first time since independence.

Although there are benefits to individual political parties in coalition building, there are also potential political risks involved in both entering a coalition and withdrawing from one. One such example is that of the NNP, which joined the DP in 1999 only to be progressively ‘swallowed’ by its partner. Its withdrawal from the coalition and the subsequent formation of a second one – this time with the ANC – angered some of its supporters. Ultimately, it was coalition politics that led to the party’s demise, with its former supporters shared essentially between the DA, the ANC and the ID.

Similarly, a study commissioned by the FF+ showed that its 1994 cooperative arrangement with the ANC was punished by its supporters in the 1999 general elections, when the party lost more than 50 per cent of its seats in the National Assembly.

It has also been argued that the DA’s Coalition for Change with the IFP and its consequent support for the maintenance of Ulundi as the provincial capital of KZN resulted in lost votes in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas in the 2004 provincial election. There is also a perception
that the decade-long participation of the IFP in a coalition government with
the ANC in KZN and nationally might have confused IFP supporters. The
decline in support for the IFP in KZN since 1999 and the increase in support
for the ANC has been interpreted by some in the IFP as the party’s supporters
preferring to vote for the governing party rather than for its junior partner.

A more general consequence of the rise and fall of various party
coalitions in South Africa is that parties have learnt their lesson and are
now exceedingly cautious about entering into alliances. This caution was
seen in the March 2006 elections when parties engaging in coalition
negotiations in metropolitan and municipal councils in the Western Cape
preferred to term their alliances ‘multiparty government’ rather than
coalition.

In Malawi, too, coalition politics has led to the demise of some parties.
By entering in coalition with the UDF prior to the 2004 and, more
importantly, because of its support for the UDF leader’s controversial attempt
to extend his term of office beyond the constitutional maximum of two
five-year terms, AFORD not only lost its members through defections, but
was also sanctioned severely by its supporters. Its parliamentary
representation shrank from 29 seats in 1999 to 6 in 2004.

Similarly, in Mauritius it has been argued that the MSM paid for its
leader’s submissive attitude to its coalition partner, the MMM. The fact
that the MSM leader lost his parliamentary seat in the July 2005 general
elections has been interpreted as the consequence of this alliance.

**Coalitions and Women’s Representation**

The hypothesis here was that coalitions create an additional hurdle for
women. At inter-party level, there are fewer seats available for each coalition
partner and this is likely to reduce the chances of women competing and
being selected as candidates representing a pre-election alliance. The
difficulties are exacerbated in first-past-the-post systems where women are
even more unlikely to be elected than their counterparts in PR systems.

This hypothesis was, however, not confirmed by empirical data, which
showed that there was no strong correlation between the formation of party
alliances and women’s political under-representation in Parliament. In fact,
three main factors influenced women’s representation: the type of electoral
system, the existence or lack of a quota system for women and the leaders’
commitment to gender parity. A PR electoral system combined with a
meaningful quota for women and leadership commitment to encouraging a
high level of female representation will go a long way towards improving
women’s representation and will minimise double-level competition (that is, at intra-party and inter-party levels). In a context of FPTP, leadership commitment will be expressed through a quota system in winnable constituencies and, in PR systems, through positioning on party lists.

South Africa and Mozambique are among the leaders in Africa in women’s representation both because of the PR system in use in the two countries and because of the commitment by the main parties – the ANC and FRELIMO – to ensuring greater representation. The combination of the FPTP system, the absence of any type of quota and the lack of commitment of leaders in Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius have resulted in their poor showing on the gender front. It is therefore desirable that party leaders provide for a gender quota system in their pre-alliance agreement and live by it.

LESSTONS LEARNT AND GOOD PARTY COALITION PRACTICE

Recognising that party alliances are an increasingly significant feature of contemporary African political processes in both parliamentary and presidential regimes, this study was aimed at improving our understanding of party alliances in Africa. The case studies of Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa and the comparison of the experiences of these five countries have provided a wealth of knowledge about the formation, survival and effectiveness of party coalitions. The authors believe that these experiences and the lessons drawn from this study will contribute to the vibrancy of multiparty democracy not only in the countries concerned but in the rest of Africa and beyond. It is expected that the findings and conclusions of the study will also contribute to promoting a democratic culture based on dialogue and consensus, and that party leaders will see the value and benefit of building on each other’s strengths through alliance formation.

The lessons learned from the study are presented below in general terms as good practice for the formation, survival and effectiveness of political party alliances.

Legislation

Although in most of the countries featured in this study there are some legislative provisions relating to the formation of party coalitions, these provisions are often isolated and insufficient. The legal framework should set the rules in line with the requirements of a well-functioning multiparty
system and to prevent ‘double-dealing’. Multiparty democracy rests on strong, viable and effective political parties and, where applicable, coalitions. Legal provisions which weaken the party system must therefore be repealed. Because political parties and coalitions are institutions of public interest the law should provide for the registration of coalitions and require that their objectives, duration and agreement be made public. The electoral commission or another appropriate body could be given the power to decide whether the coalition agreement or memorandum of understanding complies with the law. It is, however, worth pointing out that extreme regulation of coalitions should be avoided as it could lead to the infringement of freedom of association. The right balance should therefore be struck.

**Fairness**

A party coalition should not be a mere ‘coalition of the willing’. There is a need for rational criteria for selecting pre-election alliance partners. The unconditional acceptance of partners without selection criteria or the assessment of the size of their membership may cause friction and the resentment of more representative groups. For example, the real strength of each party in the coalition must be measurable in order for it to reap rewards proportional to its contribution. The basis for such an assessment could be the results of the previous general election and/or the support enjoyed by the parties and candidates based on credible opinion polls and the size of the crowds at rallies. Other considerations could include the parties’ financial contributions and degree of involvement in organising the election campaign and mobilising voters. Failure to match what an affiliated party gives with what it receives could create the impression that some partner parties are favoured at the expense of others, and this may engender tension and disharmony within the alliance, making it dysfunctional. This situation can, in turn, result in the alliance being ineffective and lead to its ultimate break up.

**Honesty and Mutual Trust**

Party representatives who were interviewed identified honesty as a crucial pre-requisite for the sustainability of a party alliance, arguing that honesty would help build trust among the leaders of the affiliated parties. In addition, the honouring of the coalition agreement by the leaders is fundamental to the sustainability of a coalition. Political honesty and mutual trust increase the chances of coalitions lasting long enough to make an impact on policy development and implementation.
Conflict Management Mechanisms

The longevity and effectiveness of a coalition depend on the ability of partners to address conflict and iron out differences through dialogue – an ability that reinforces a sense of mutual respect between the partners. Mechanisms to deal with conflicts within the alliance should be instituted and agreed upon by all the affiliated parties in order to ensure that the alliance is functional and effective.

Need to Involve the Constituents

Party coalitions often begin and end at the elite level. It is crucial to bring together the constituents that the elites represent with a view to meeting their common needs. If the coalition is formed solely in order to serve the interests of the elite, it will simply not be sustainable.

Policy Dialogue

It is essential to have a coalition agreement with an integrated policy platform as its basis, thus enabling the constituent parties to develop and adopt common policies, ensuring a sense of ownership, group cohesion and shared vision and objectives. Issues of convergence would constitute the basis of cooperation, while areas of divergence would be isolated for further consultation. In this way, the coalition is poised to meet its set of common goals. One must, however, not be naïve and must keep in mind that alliance compromises by their very nature create gridlocks and delays in decision-making.
APPENDIX 1

LIST OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY

**Kenya**
Mr Gerd Bossen, Director Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Nairobi, Kenya
Prof Lawrence Gumbe, LDP Executive Director
Mr John Arap Koech MP, Minister for East African Cooperation, Chairman of the KANU Parliamentary Consensus Group
Mr Titus Mbathi, NARC Chairman and leading negotiator during the formation of the NARC coalition
Mr Gabriel Mukele, Vice-Chairman, Electoral Commission of Kenya
Mr Peter Oriare, independent researcher
Prof Nick Wanjohi, political scientist and vice-chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University
Dr Noah Wekesa MP, Assistant Minister Livestock Development, FORD-Kenya

**Mauritius**
Mr M Allet, PMSD President
Dr A Boolell, LP Operations Field Manager
Mr I Collendavello, MMM Secretary General
Mr A Darga, founding member of the MMM and currently a political analyst
Mr J C De L’Estrac, long-standing member of the MMM and currently director of one of the most important media conglomerates in Mauritius
Sir A Jugnauth, founder and long-standing leader of the MSM, Prime Minister (1982-1995; 2000-2003) and current President of the Republic of Mauritius
Mr M Khodabaccus, PMSD Secretary General
Mrs V Nabasing long-standing member of the MMM
Mr R Sithanen, LP Director of the Policy Unit and former Minister of Finance

**Malawi**
Prof Wiseman Chirwa, lecturer, University of Malawi
Mr Nicholas Dausi, MCP Vice-President
Mr Boniface Dulani, lecturer, University of Malawi
Hon David Faiti, RP Minister of Development & Planning
Mr Rafiq Hajat, Institute for Policy Interaction
Dr F E Kanyongolo, lecturer/researcher, University of Malawi
Hon Ralph Kasambara, PPM and Attorney General
Mr Khwauli Msiska, AFORD Publicity Secretary
Justice Anastasia Msosa, Malawi Electoral Commission Chairperson
Hon Rodwell Munenyembe, Speaker of Parliament
Mr Green Mwamondwe, MGODE
Mr Rodgers Newa, Human Rights Consultative Committee
Mr Steve Nhlane, columnist & editor of *Nation*
Dr Nandini Patel, lecturer, Chancellor College, University of Malawi
Hon John Tembo, MCP President

**Mozambique**
David Alone, RENAMO
Máximo Dias, MONAMO / RENAMO União Eleitoral
Raúl Domingos, PDD President
Mariano Matsinha, FRELIMO
Lutero Simango, PCN / RENAMO União Eleitoral

**South Africa**
*Interviews*
Mr Albert Mncwango, IFP National Organiser
Mr Pieter J Snyman, former member of the NNP Federal Council
Mr James Selfe, DA Federal Council

*Participants in the EISA/KAF Cape Town Roundtable on Party Coalitions in South Africa, 19 June 2003*
Mr Colin Eglin, DA Member of Parliament
Mr Louis Green, ACDP Vice-President and Member of Parliament
Prof Adam Habib, Human Sciences Research Council
Mr. Claude Kabemba, EISA
Mr. Denis Kadima, EISA
Ms Shumbana Karume, EISA
Mr. Thomas Knirsch, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Mr Rodney Lentit, ID
Mr J T Maseka, UDM
Ms Mavis Matladi, UCDP Secretary General
Mr Sipho L Mfundisi, UCDP Chief Whip
Mr Stanley Mogoba, PAC Leader
Mr N Motsau, AZAPO
Mr Pieter Mulder, FF+ Leader and Member of Parliament
Mr Ian Nielson, DA
Mr. Wole Olaleye, EISA
Ms Andrea Ostheimer, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Mr V Reddy, MF Member of Parliament
Mr R Sithanen, LP Director of the Policy Unit and former Minister of Finance
Mr Peter Smith, IFP
Mr Pieter Snyman, NNP
Mr D Soobramoney, MF Policy Advisor
Ms Rhoda Southgate, ACDP Member of Parliament
Mr Adriaan van Jaarsveld, NNP
Ms Zingisa Zibonti, EISA
APPENDIX 2

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION (NARC)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE PARTY OF KENYA (NAK)

AND

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)

We, leaders and representatives of the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party – LDP (Rainbow):

Recognising that a unified front from the opposition is the key to winning the next general election and therefore saving Kenya from total economic, social, cultural and political collapse;

Recognising the need to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction and the need to work together towards bringing about meaningful political and economic changes in the country;

Sharing a common vision for a prosperous and well-managed Nation;

Committed to placing the interests of the Kenyan people above all personal and political considerations;

Noting that a democratic and legitimate government is one based on popular support and founded on the basis of participatory democracy;

Convinced that there is urgent need to complete the on-going comprehensive people driven constitutional review process which reflects the interests and aspirations of Kenyans;

Having engaged in and completed full and frank deliberations;

Hereby do pledge through this memorandum of understanding to bind ourselves to the principles set herein and to attain the objectives contained hereto as follows:
OBJECTIVES OF THIS MEMORANDUM

1. To establish a coalition between the National Alliance Party of Kenya and the Liberal Democratic Party – LDP (Rainbow) to be known as ‘National Rainbow Coalition’ (the NARC) for the purpose of winning the next general election.
2. To form a Government of National Unity.
3. To adopt a common slogan, symbol and campaign strategy for the next General elections.
4. To formulate a post-elections action plan.
5. To design and implement a programme for the economic, social, cultural and political recovery of Kenya.
6. To develop mutual trust and respect between contracting parties.
7. To commit the leadership of the contracting parties to an undertaking that they will be bound by the electoral pacts, nominations, sharing of power and the programme of recovery.
8. To commit the leadership and members of the contracting parties to desist from issuing any statements or engaging in any activities that may disrupt or otherwise undermine the National Rainbow Coalition.
9. To commit the leadership and members of the contracting parties to unity and mobilisation of support for the National Rainbow Coalition.
10. To commit the National Rainbow Coalition to the democratic principles of openness, tolerance, dialogue conciliation, and consensus building in the implementation of this memorandum of understanding.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS MEMORANDUM

1. That the name of the political party created by this agreement is the ‘National Rainbow Coalition’. Its acronym shall be NARC.
2. That both parties, the National Alliance Party of Kenya and the Liberal Party of Kenya – LDP (Rainbow) enter into this agreement as two equal partners.
3. That the equality of partnership shall be reflected in the power-sharing arrangement in the Cabinet of the NARC Government.
4. That the summit of the Cabinet of the NARC government shall be equitably distributed between members of the two contracting parties on the basis of a formula agreed upon by the contracting parties.
5. That the composition of the summit of the NARC Cabinet shall be a transitional arrangement to facilitate a Government of National Unity in the spirit of the New Constitution.
That the National Rainbow Coalition adopt a symbol derived from the symbols of the contracting parties.

That the National Rainbow Coalition shall adopt a formal set of nomination procedures that will apply to all candidates. Both contracting parties shall have representation in all the relevant structures for the nomination process.

That the National Rainbow Coalition shall present one presidential candidate during the next general elections.

That the National Rainbow Coalition shall present one parliamentary candidate in every constituency, and one civic candidate in each of the local authority wards, to run in the next general election against other candidates for the same positions.

That the National Rainbow Coalition shall have a common manifesto that shall reflect the common policy positions and government structures of the contracting parties.

That the National Rainbow Coalition commits itself to the adoption and entrenchment of the new Kenyan Constitution and the new constitutional order provided therein within six months of winning the next general election.

SIGNED ON THIS DAY, TUESDAY 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER 2002

TITUS MBATHI
Chairperson
National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK)

DENNIS KODHE
Chairperson
Liberal Democratic Party LDP-(Rainbow)

SIGNED ON THIS DAY, TUESDAY 22ND DAY OF OCTOBER 2002

Hon. MWAI KIBAKI MP.
Hon. M. KIJANA WAMALWA MP.
Hon. CHARITY KALUKI NGILU MP.
Hon. KIPRUTO ARAP KIRWA MP.

Hon. RAILA AMOLLO ODINGA MP.
Hon. S. KALONZO MUSYOKA MP.
Hon. GEORGE SAITOTI MP.
Hon. MOODY AWORI MP

PRINCIPALS AND REPRESENTATIVES
NATIONAL ALLIANCE PARTY OF KENYA (NAK)

PRINCIPALS AND REPRESENTATIVES
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (RAINBOW)
APPENDIX 3

EXTRACT FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION (NARC)

ARTICLE 1: ESTABLISHMENT

a) There is hereby established a political party known as the NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION (NARC) (hereinafter referred to as “the Party” or “NARC”) registered as a political party under the Societies Act (Cap. 108) Laws of Kenya.

b) The party is founded on the principles of democracy, unity, justice, freedom and equality.

c) The Leadership of the party shall be based on the equality of all persons and on the highest personal integrity. All leaders of the party and leaders of the member parties and organisations shall support and uphold the Code of Conduct for members and Pledge of Commitment which form part of this constitution.

ARTICLE 2: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

a) To establish a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation of the people of the Republic of Kenya within the framework of a pluralistic democracy and good governance, and founded on the principles of justice, liberty, equality, transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law.

b) To pursue and promote basic human rights, that is to say, civic and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, the right to sustainable development, protection of the environment and the right to peace and security. The party will pay special attention to the right to life and human dignity, fundamental rights and freedoms, gender equality, freedoms of press, worship, liberty and security of the person and property and the right of workers and minorities.

c) To pursue and promote economic, social and political development for the benefit of the people of Kenya.
d) To nominate party candidates in respect of the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections.

e) To promote and establish a fair and just leadership in the governance of the country, devoid of corruption, despotism, tribalism, and all forms of discrimination.

f) To establish a Government of National Unity consisting of President, two Vice-Presidents, Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers and such number of Ministers and Deputy Ministers as shall be resolved upon by the NARC Council.

ARTICLE 3: MEMBERSHIP

a) Subject to the approval of the NARC Council, any political party or organisation which accepts and adheres to objectives, policies and programs of NARC is signatory to Memoranda of Understanding of the National Alliance of Kenya and the National Rainbow Coalition dated 22nd October 2002 or such further memoranda as may be negotiated and executed between the Council and other organisations is eligible for membership.

b) Each successful corporate applicant shall, on enrolment, pay an admission fee of Kshs 100,000.00 or the party may determine such sum of fee as from time to time.

c) Upon payment of the prescribed fee, a member shall be issued with a membership certificate.

d) The council shall at the appropriate time phase out corporate membership and replace it with individual membership.

ARTICLE 4: TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP

a) A member shall cease to be a member if: –

i. By a resolution passed by its own party’s or organisation’s highest decision-making body is delivered to the NARC Council by its National leader who is recognised as such by the NARC Council.
ii. If in the opinion of NARC Council, the member has accepted or promoted through its leadership, activities of political parties or organisations whose aims and objectives are contrary to those of NARC.

b) A member who ceases to be a member shall not be entitled to a refund of any subscription.

ARTICLE 5: ORGANS OF THE PARTY

a) NARC shall have the following organs:
   i. NARC Council
   ii. NARC Coordinating Committee
   iii. NARC Parliamentary Group
   iv. NARC Elections Board
   v. Any other organ established by the NARC Council.

b) Each organ of NARC shall have a chairperson and deputy chairperson elected by members of that organ.

c) The Rules and Regulations of NARC organs shall be made by NARC Coordinating Committee and approved by NARC Council.

d) As far as possible NARC shall ensure that at least one-third (1/3) of the members of all its organs shall be from each gender.

ARTICLE 6: OFFICIALS

a) The party shall have the following officials:
   i. Chairperson
   ii. Deputy Chairperson
   iii. Secretary
   iv. Deputy Secretary
   v. Treasurer
   vi. Deputy Treasurer
   vii. Organising Secretary
   viii. Deputy Organising Secretary
   ix. Women Co-ordinator
   x. Youth Co-ordinator
b) NARC officials shall be appointed by the NARC Council from among individuals of high integrity who shall not be officials of NARC members and who are not candidates for presidential, parliamentary or civic elections. A NARC office holder shall not hold office in any other party or member organisation.

c) There shall be established a secretariat to be headed by an Executive Director appointed by NARC Council and answerable to it through the NARC Coordinating committee.

ARTICLE 7: DUTIES OF THE OFFICIALS

NARC officials shall perform such duties and functions as NARC Council may assign them from time to time.

ARTICLE 8: NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION – (NARC) COUNCIL

a) There shall be a NARC Council which shall consist of the following: –

i. Ten (10) party officials
ii. Leaders of the founding member political parties and organisations
iii. Four representatives from each founding member’s political party and organisation
iv. Members of NARC Coordinating Committee and all its founding sub-committees
v. Leader or Representative of any subsequent member political party or organisation.

b) The NARC Council shall be the highest authority of the party and shall determine the party’s policies. It shall have the following specific powers, duties and obligations: –

i. To review, formulate and or approve all policies of the party.
ii. To nominate the party’s candidate for presidential election.
iii. To consider, modify and ratify the constitution rules and regulations of the party.
iv. To receive, examine and approve the audited accounts of the party.
v. To appoint auditors and fix their remuneration.
vi. To consider any such other items as may be referred to it by the NARC Coordinating committee.

vii. To approve the party manifesto.

viii. To appoint the ten (10) party officials.

ix. To appoint other committees as it deems necessary from time to time or specialised tasks and to determine their terms of reference.

x. To receive reports and recommendations from the various committees and individuals.

xi. To approve NARC’s Elections Board Nominations for parliament and civic candidates.

xii. To make or cause to be made rules or regulations for prescribing anything which requires to be prescribed under this constitution and generally for the better carrying out of the provisions of this constitution and matters incidental thereto.

xiii. To ensure strict adherence to the party’s constitution, policies and programs by the leaders and members of NARC.

c) The NARC Council may convene a convention whose participants shall be officials of member parties and organisations.

ARTICLE 9: THE NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION – NARC COORDINATING COMMITTEE

a) There shall be NARC Coordinating Committee which shall consist of not more than fifteen (15) members appointed by the NARC Council with at least one representative from each of the founding member’s political parties and organisations and the chairs of the founding sub-committees established under article ten (10).

b) The NARC Coordinating Committee shall have the following functions:

i. To act as the executive body of the NARC Council.

ii. To supervise the administration machinery of the party and take such measures as it deems necessary to enforce the decisions and program of the party.

iii. To appoint the Executive Director and full time members of the secretariat.

iv. To approve the terms and conditions of service of the staff employed by the party.

v. To set the agenda for the NARC Council.
ARTICLE 10: NARC SUB-COMMITTEES

a) The NARC Council may establish such sub-committees as it may deem necessary and without prejudice to the foregoing the following shall be the founding sub-committees.

i. The Strategy and Policy Committee (SC)
ii. The Economics Committee (EC)
iii. The Legal Affairs Committee (LAC)
iv. The Resources and Mobilization Committee (RMC)
v. The Communications Committee (CC)

The membership of each sub-committee shall not exceed nine (9) and shall be appointed by the NARC Council on the recommendation of the Coordinating Committee.

b) The sub-committees will consist of people who possess relevant knowledge and skills in the areas in which they are called to serve.

c) The NARC Coordinating Committee with approval of the Council shall determine the terms of reference for such sub-committees.

d) The sub-committees shall have power to consult experts.

ARTICLE 11: NARC ELECTIONS BOARD

a) The party shall establish an Elections Board comprising respected and knowledgeable persons of integrity.

b) The Board shall, consist of Eighteen (18) members, including a Chairperson, a deputy Chairperson, who shall be appointed by the Council, and Sixteen (16) other members who shall be appointed from amongst members by themselves.

c) The Chairperson and Secretary of the party shall be ex-officio members of the Elections Board.

d) There shall be a Director of Elections and a Deputy Director of Elections appointed by NARC Coordinating Committee with the approval of the NARC Council who shall service the Board and manage the Board's Secretariat.
e) Board members shall be persons who are:
   i. Citizens of Kenya over the age of eighteen years.
   ii. Not holders of any office in NARC.

f) The Board shall implement the NARC Nominations and Election Rules.

g) The Board shall organise and supervise party nominations for Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic candidates in liaison with the NARC Coordinating Committee and NARC Council.

h) The Board shall establish Constituency Nomination Panels in each constituency in consultation with NARC member political parties participating in the nomination exercise in each constituency.

i) Members of the Board shall serve for a term of four years and shall be eligible for re-appointment for one more term.

ARTICLE 12: PROVISIONS FOR THE NOMINATION OF PARTY CANDIDATES

a) Presidential Candidate

The NARC Presidential Candidate shall be proposed from a political party which is a fully paid up member of NARC.

The NARC Council shall nominate the NARC Presidential candidate.

1. The NARC Presidential candidate shall pay a non-refundable nomination fee of Kshs. 200,000/= 

2. The NARC Presidential candidate shall meet all the requirements for Presidential Elections under the Constitution of Kenya and the Presidential and National Assembly Act Cap 7 Laws of Kenya.

b) Parliamentary Candidates
FUNCTIONS OF SPECIFIC ORGANS

NGC - It is the National Legislative Arm of the Party. It should be convened/meet during crisis, for disciplinary actions, and for Emergency National Conventions to act on behalf of the National Annual Delegates Convention. The NGC should meet at least once a year.

NDC - The supreme organ of the Party that meets once every two (2) years to ratify constitutional amendments, Party manifesto, for general elections, receive and adopt financial reports of the Party and appoint the Party auditors, etc.

SECRETARIAT - The Executing Arm of the Party that ensures that the party office operates on a day to day basis, carries out the Party business across the Country and executes the Party Business at all times under the Director General and the Deputy Director General in consultation with the National Party officials (NEC).

NEC - This is the Executive Arm of the Party that meets often (quarterly) to give direction to the Party’s Secretariat in order to be able to achieve Party objectives and disseminate Party policies.
APPENDIX 4

OUTLINE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE NEW NATIONAL PARTY

24 June 2000

PREAMBLE

The parties note that they share:

A the urgent need to consolidate opposition strength among like-minded voters in all communities;
B the desire to build a political movement that is home to South Africans from all communities and that effectively challenge the ANC for political power;
C a commitment to strengthen multi-party democracy in South Africa;
D the realisation of the need to consolidate democracy in South Africa and prevent a de facto one party state from evolving in our country.

They therefore agree as follows:

1. The DP and the NNP have agreed to set in motion a process of establishing a new political entity.

2. The values and principles of the party will be those set out in annexure A hereto.

3. The party will be called the Democratic Alliance.

4. The national management committee will immediately appoint a policy review commission to make recommendations about policy matters. Until the policy review commission has concluded its work and final policy positions are adopted by a Congress, existing DP policies will be accepted as the basis policy framework of the DA. Where there are conflicts between DP and NNP policy, the national management committee shall determine policy until the matter is finally resolved at the first ordinary Congress. (No agreement between parties. The DP option is the entire clause whilst the NNP option consists of the last sentence only.)
5. For the first two years after this agreement, the leader of the Democratic Alliance will be the leader of the Democratic Party. The deputy-leader of the Democratic Alliance will be the leader of the New National Party. The current Chairperson of the Democratic Alliance will be the Federal Chairperson of the Democratic Party.

6. The logo and the colours of the DA will be agreed to between the DP and the NNP. If they cannot reach agreement, the matter will be finally resolved by the national management committee.

7. The DA will register as a party for the purposes of the local government elections and will contest the election throughout the country.

8. The process of establishing a new political entity referred to in 1, will culminate in the DA contesting the general election for Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures in 2004.

9. The parties commit themselves to do everything possible to accommodate other opposition parties and groups on the basis of the DA’s values and principles and in accordance with this agreement in an endeavour to strengthen opposition in South Africa.

10. The national management committee will prepare a draft constitution for the DA. The parties will, through their respective governing bodies, ratify this constitution, in time for the registration of the DA to contest the local government elections.

11. Until the first ordinary Congress of the DA, the party will be managed by a national management committee consisting of the leaders referred to in 5 above, as well as such number of representatives from each party in proportion to the relative voting strength of the two parties as indicated by the election result on the national ballot in the 1999 general election. The national management committee will seek to reach consensus in all their decisions. If consensus cannot be reached, the matter will finally be resolved by the leadership referred to in 5 above. A party shall be able to substitute any one of its leaders if he or she is absent or not able to participate in the decision-making.

12. The national management committee will establish provincial management committees based on the same principle of composition as in 11 above. The provincial management committees will attempt
to reach consensus, failing which the majority will prevail subject to
the right of appeal to the national management committee.

13. As soon as possible after this agreement, the public representatives of
the two parties will form joint caucuses in Parliament, in the Provincial
Legislatures and in local authorities.

14. The selection of candidates for the municipal election will be
determined on the basis of relative voting strength (as indicated by
the election results on the national ballot in the 1999 general election)
taking into account availability and sustainability of candidates and
subject to the right of appeal to provincial management committees.
Variations to the arrangement can be negotiated on a consensus basis.

15. The DP and the NNP shall remain registered as parties at national
and provincial level until the next election for Parliament and the
Provincial Legislatures respectively.

16. The parties agree that all public representatives of the DP and the
NNP must also become members of the DA.

17. The coalition agreement entered into between the parties in the
Western Cape will continue unamended.

18. The parties are mindful of the constitutional provisions for, as well as
the practical implications of consolidation and agree to take whatever
steps are necessary to adhere to the Constitution of SA, whilst at the
same time promoting the Democratic Alliance.

19. The parties acknowledge that this outline agreement is a leadership
agreement, subject to the approval of their respective Federal Councils,
and subject to compliance with the Constitution of South Africa.

20. Should this outline agreement be approved by the respective Federal
Councils of the two parties, and the leaders be provided with a suitable
mandate, they will proceed with further negotiations on the
outstanding matters.

21. In order to promote a climate of co-operation, the parties agree that
upon signature of this agreement, all hostile actions between the two
parties shall cease.
Annexure A

1. Vision and Core Values
   1. The party’s vision is of a prosperous open opportunity society in which every person is free, responsible, equal before the law, secure, and has the chance to improve the quality of his or her life.

   2. We are committed to freedom of conscience and religion and believe that the core values that we advocate provide a moral basis for cooperation between people, acknowledging religious diversity.

   3. The party commits itself to passionately promoting the establishment and maintenance of an open society in South Africa, founded on the principles of liberty, justice and equality, and the values of merit, individual responsibility, tolerance of dissent and difference, fairness and compassion.

   4. The party believes that the diversity of our people is a national asset and should be promoted by a spirit of mutual respect, inclusivity and participation.

   5. The party commits itself to safeguarding the language, religious, and cultural rights of each individual and community. We are committed to national reconciliation and to building a strong, dynamic and united multi-cultural nation.

   6. The majority of South Africans experienced the denial of their basic human rights and today most South Africans continue to suffer an assault on their dignity because of pervasive poverty. Mindful of this, the party commits itself to the creation and maintenance of an open society in which everyone, especially those who are most in need, is given meaningful access to opportunity so that the frontiers of poverty can be rolled back in a sustainable and developmental manner and each person has the chance to be the very best they can be.

   7. We are committed to addressing and eradicating economic injustices of previously disadvantaged individuals and communities through pragmatic policies based, inter alia, on human resource development, capacity building and merit without compromising efficiency.
8. The party further believes that certain minimum material safety-nets should be provided for those who are unable to help themselves whether by reason of sickness, disability or the inability to obtain employment.

9. The party believes that individuals, families, and the communities they create through free association, are the cornerstones of stable and successful societies, with legitimate hopes and aspirations, and a right to pursue happiness and fulfilment.

10. We believe that all able people have a primary responsibility to care for themselves and their families and to promote the general well-being of society and their communities through their contribution to the economy.

11. The force behind the growing prosperity of any society is a socially and environmentally responsible free enterprise economy driven by choices, risks and hard work. Without the growth in prosperity created through the exercise of the market economy there can be no opportunity and choices become increasingly limited. The party promotes an enterprise market economy driven by individual effort and choice.

12. The primary duty of the state is to serve and protect the people by upholding and enforcing the law, administering justice fairly, and delivering services efficiently. The party promotes small, competent, and efficient government that serves the people. We are committed to build and safeguard a successful South African society in which government at all levels offers more empowerment and expands choices for the people. In addition, we promote a state that acts in the interests of all and not in the interests of the ruling party.

13. Our democracy cannot flourish unless Government is faced with vigorous, critical, and effective opposition that is loyal to the constitutional order and promotes the well-being of our country. The party affirms the value of such a constructive opposition as a necessary basis for the development and strengthening of democracy in South Africa.

14. An independent civil society is essential to the establishment and
preservation of an open democratic society. Civil society acts as a bulwark against the tendency of the state to encroach into the private realm – it is an antidote to any attempt to wrap society in a smothering hegemony of thought and truth. The party promotes a vibrant, independent civil society free from the dictates of the state.

15. The party believes in non-racial fundamental change. We believe that South Africa must go from being a centralised, authoritarian society of limited opportunity to a society in which everyone has the right to be their own person and choose their own path, as well as the opportunity to take charge of their lives and improve their lot.

16. We support the integrity and unity of our country and its right to freedom, security, and equality, within the international community of nations. We accept the duty to live in peace, friendship and cooperation with all the peoples in the world.

2. Principles

1. The rights and freedoms of every person – including the right to freedom of conscience, speech, association and movement.

2. The rejection of unfair discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, race, gender, sexual orientation, language, culture, religion and disability.

3. The promotion and extension of the rule of law.

4. The defence of the language, cultural and religious rights of individuals and the communities they create through free association.

5. Equality before the law.

6. The separation of legislative, executive and judicial power.

7. A judiciary that is independent.

8. Regular elections that are free and fair.
9. Representative government elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, and which is efficient, accountable, and corruption free.

10. Locating government as close as possible to the people through federalism and the devolution of power to the lowest effective level.

11. The clear division between the interest of the ruling party and the State.

12. A vibrant and independent civil society.

13. A socially and environmentally responsible enterprise economy driven by the choices and effort of free citizens.

14. The rejection of violence and intimidation as a political instrument.

15. The right of all people to private ownership.

16. The central position of family in society.

17. Empowerment of people through education and training.

18. Protecting and conserving the environment.


APPENDIX 5

DP-NNP Clause 14

1. The respective parties are absolutely committed to promoting the Democratic Alliance and to maximising its votes in the municipal election. Our actions should be aimed at achieving this.

2. Owing to the fact that time does not permit the development of a joint DA selection process, each of the respective parties will select candidates from its own ranks and according to its own procedures, who will stand for the DA.

3. The respective parties, taking into consideration the nature of the local government electoral system, agree to ensure that the eventual composition of the DA caucuses in municipalities reflects the relative strength of the two parties as determined by the votes cast for the respective parties in the national parliamentary elections of June 1999 within those municipalities.

4. Wards within each municipality will be classified in the manner provided for in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 below. Wards within each category of classification will be allocated to the respective parties, based in each case on relative strength within that municipality. The allocation of specific wards to each of the parties to contest will be negotiated by the respective LMC, with the right of appeal to the PMC. In the absence of a functioning LMC, the allocation of wards to parties will be determined by the PMC.

5. In determining the allocation of a ward to a party to contest, the LMC or PMC concerned will, inter alia take the following criteria into account

   a) Individual meritorious councillors or candidates;
   b) The need to maximise of the DA vote; or
   c) The need to promote representivity or to augment the skills base.

6.1 The positions on the lists will be allocated to the respective parties, based in each case on relative strength within that municipality, and
positions will be allocated to the parties proportionally and regularly throughout the list.

6.2 The respective parties will, if necessary, amend their own names on the lists using the procedure referred to in item 20 of the First Schedule of the Municipal Structures Act after the election result is known by filling vacancies caused by some of that party’s candidates having been elected at ward level, and to give effect to paragraph 3.

6.3 Where allocations of wards in terms of paragraphs 4, 5 or 16 are varied by agreement between the respective parties, any necessary adjustments to list positions provided for in sub-paragraph 6.1 must be agreed at the same time and prior to nominations for wards and lists being submitted to the electoral authorities.

6.4 In metropolitan municipalities, the first position on the list will be drawn from the party with the greater relative strength, and the second position will be drawn from the other party. The balance of the list will reflect the relative strength of the parties in that metropole.

7. Once the final composition of the council has been determined, any subsequent filling of vacancies will occur by such democratic mechanisms as are laid down in the constitution of the DA.

8. All prospective candidates will be subject to jointly agreed vetting procedures and probity checks, and all elected councillors will be subject to jointly agreed disciplinary procedures. These procedures require further elaboration and will be the subject of further discussion between the respective parties.

9. Candidates standing on the lists may be required to be candidates in wards.

10. The mayoral candidates will come from the ranks of the party with greater relative strength in the municipality, and will be nominated by the PMC concerned.

11. A ward will be considered safe when the sum of the votes cast for the NNP and DP together in the 1999 national parliamentary elections is equal to, or greater than half the total votes cast in that ward.

12. A ward will be considered winnable when the sum of the votes cast
for the DP and NNP together in the 1999 national parliamentary elections is less than 50%, but exceeds the votes cast for any other single party.

13. A ward will be considered a standard-bearer ward in all other cases.

14. Positions on the executives and sub-councils, and other DA office-bearers within the councils, will initially be designated by the respective parties in accordance with the concept of relative strength within that municipality.

15. Both respective parties accept the necessity of contesting all wards.

16.1 Variations to this agreement may be negotiated by the parties in the provinces on the basis of consensus.

16.2 The PMC will consider the nominations for positions on a province-wide basis before these are finalised. Where it believes that one or other party is not adequately represented on the basis of relative strength on a province-wide basis it may, with the concurrence of both parties in that province, effect an adjustment in relation to any local, district or metropolitan council.


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