Latin America: A Panorama of Security and Integration

Clóvis Brigagão
Director of the Center of Americas Studies at Universidade Candido Mendes and Coordinator of GAPCon

This paper provides an insight and overview of Latin America, with emphasis on South America. Dynamic relations are defined here between the historical and political standards and circumstances of the regional security issue in all of its dimensions and development issues, considered from the viewpoint of the integration process which the region is currently undergoing.

These are a number of topics viewed by means of an approach required for diagnoses of what to do and how to do this, with a constant concern on looking closely at the changes that the region has undergone since its return to democracy in the 1980s, which nonetheless has been known as the lost decade. The subjects of democracy, regionalization and economic, commercial, and physical integration, globalization, and its adverse and positive effects, are treated as if to result in a balance sheet and to provide a panorama on both issues: security and integration.

Fernanda Fernandes, a graduate in International Relations (IH/UCAM) and assistant to the Coordination of GAPCon and EPAZ, provided her cooperation in the text’s research and preparation.
The Panorama

We are intent on preparing a panorama of the current trends on security and integration of the region that includes Latin America, the Caribbean region, and in particular South America. These are interdependent topics which will find an improved solution inasmuch as there is greater cooperation between these two areas that are strategic for the region.

The Western Hemisphere of the American continent (Latin America, the Caribbean region, and South America) is not merely a homogeneous conglomerate or a group of physical and territorial entities. Five centuries of life have given rise to multiple heterogeneous groups that include more than a score of independent and sovereign States and as many more territories, still under the guardianship of European states and of the United States.

Even the Latin portion of the Americas is composed of countries of different sizes and wealth, with deep-rooted characteristics of the European colonial past and the new features of American civilization, universal in comprehension, Latin in its actions.

During decades of military dictatorships under the aegis of the ill-fated National Security Doctrine – with thousands of dead, murders, and missing persons – the security environment in the region was a result of adopting the international policy of a world power stalemate by means of the balance of nuclear terror between the USA and the former USSR. The result was more and more Coups d’États throughout the region. History has named this period Latin America’s Leaden Years.

As of the 1980s democratic conditions began to recover, at a slow pace yet with security acting in defense of democracy and not in its violation. At the same time a brisk pace of economic growth was put in place, particularly in the Southern Cone – yet with no practical and real results for greater economic or physical integration (communications, energy, and transport), an increased level of regional cooperation (with mechanisms in action albeit not fully integrated).

A complex interdependence

The region is faced with what we might term as a paradox: it is the region with the least number of conflicts between states. Perhaps it is the most peaceful region on the planet, and at the same time a highly vulnerable. Firstly, the key threats to the region’s security do not arise entirely from conflicts between states, or from domestic issues. They derived from three dimensions:

a) Social and economic development and the absence of institutionalization within the States, yet with incremental improvements;

b) A number of old and dormant inter-state conflicts, which to this day have political significance;

c) The appearance of transnational problems such as drug and arms trades, money laundering, etc., which acquire a strong impact in public order issues (public security).
Regional vulnerabilities do not always respond to classic security actions (the use of military instruments to face a conflict originating abroad). Attention should be given to military vulnerabilities. An example of this bond is found in the dilemma by states in seeking internal political unity by giving evidence to a latent inter-state conflict.

This seems to be what occurred between Peru and Ecuador between 1994 and 1995, with an intensified latent border conflict based on an attempt by national players to seek internal legitimacy. This also manifests in the permanent discussion on the armed forces’ involvement in control of the drug trade. In conclusion, employing the armed forces to control public security is starting to be discussed in Latin America in a democratic context.

Lastly, the expression of the three dimensions involved in regional security appears in different forms in accordance with the sub-region in question. While in Central America and in the Andean regions these factors may be noted almost simultaneously, in South America the issue is somewhat different.

**Structural factors**

Hence, the key temptation is to blame the lack of regional development: officially, it may seem that once poverty and infrastructure development problems are overcome, the solution to other vulnerabilities would come naturally. There is also a trend showing a cause and effect relation between social and economic development problems, state institutional weaknesses, and threats to inter-state security. It may be concluded that the solution for development problems should lie directly in solving the state’s weaknesses and in creating an environment of regional stability.
This seemingly logical argument is true to an extent. Though there are cases that may evidence this assertion, such as in Haiti, cases such as Argentina and Venezuela do not apply. Both countries enjoy expressive levels of social and economic development, yet they currently face serious problems of institutional consolidation.

At the same time topics such as new threats (the drug trade, money laundering, the arms trade) do away with the domestic / international paradigm, as they are interdependent. In the case of drug trade, there are domestic agendas, such as in the Andean region and in the continent’s sub-regions. These overlapping domestic and international agendas require mobilizing the police (public order) with the armed forces (external defense), which provokes, for example, tensions on Colombia’s five borders. Inasmuch as the military will start to participate in this new kind of threats, the drug trade had a direct involvement in the arms trade, which ends up affecting security measures.

Within this outlook, Latin America displays a number of inter-relations of factors (domestic / inter-state and inter-domestic) which should be included in an analysis on security and regional integration.

A. Domestic Levels
Inequality in the distribution of wealth, use of the armed forces to ensure public order, and the state’s low level of institutionality are inter-related levels or indicators of economic and social development. Certainly, there are differences between the several States in each sub-region. South America, in the Mercosur area, is where we may see the lowest levels of conflicts derived from this dimension.

B. Inter-state Levels
In a greater part of this region the use of the national defense forces may be perceived under the assumption of conflicts between neighbors: between 1990 and 2001 sixteen military clashes took place caused by border conflicts, with a further ten border conflicts are relatively active in the region. In some cases, such as between Argentina and Brazil, they were converted from distrust and the likelihood of conflicts to the building of mutual reliance mechanisms, as we will examine below.

C. Inter-domestic Levels
Conflicts here have a multi-dimensional security, i.e.: a domestic dimension and a transnational dimension. The drug and arms trades and money laundering are of this kind.

What attracts more the attention of analysts and specialists are normative issues on regional security. During the Special Conference on the Hemispheric Security (OAS in October 2003), a definition was sought for a restricted security concept, in order not to run the risk of “securitizing” the regional security agenda. Considerations such as the question of poverty as a “threat to security” may cause normative consequences and practices by qualifying any social problem as a security problem.

On the other hand, a broad concept of security such as human security would not necessarily imply the need to think of military responses for conflicts arising from development.
In order to define the concept of regional security more precisely, an extremely clear distinction should be made between the component of an objective view of reality for analysis and the standard considered optimal. An analysis of regional vulnerabilities should cover the three levels (domestic, interstate, and inter-domestic) which are likely to directly or indirectly influence the level of security.

Hence, poverty and a low level of institutionalization by the State could cause some effect on security, but that would not mean that the solution is of a military nature. Issues regarding the drug trade and guerrilla are unquestionably a threat to security in the case of Colombia. Yet the response likely to be placed against the threat from the viewpoint of the Colombian and the Chilean governments is completely different, as the objective conditions of a threat are radically the opposite: while Colombia is dealing with a very complex social, political, and military reality, in Chile’s case this condition is very different, if they exist at all.

A last point to be made is to establish standards of sub-regional threats. A systemic vision of regional reality may be considered, though we know very well that Latin America, as analyzed above, is a region much more complex than we imagined and which has sub-regions or subsystems with singularities that should be taken into consideration: South America’s sub-region; the Andean sub-region; Central America; Mexico; and the Caribbean sub-region. Though there are inter-relations among these sub-regions, from the analytical viewpoint it is very important to consider the difficulties faced by each one of these sub-regions.

**Three Dimensions of Regional Insertion**

A general overview reveals three challenges for the region in the multi-dimensional security issue and the outlook for greater physical, economic, services, cultural relations, and diplomatic integration. The events in the Mercosur region’s plan may be noted (albeit with serious institutionalization), those in the Andean region (albeit with conflicts between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), between both regions with the creation of UNASUR, and now in 2010 with the construction of a South American pillar of security and defense, such as the South American Defense Council, which is likely to be innovative and ingenious from a security viewpoint.

However, the road to the region’s democratic progress is not at all easy. Economic crises were sure to appear, international losses, imbalances in economic and military power: the symbol engraved in literature as the Lost Decade. Yet the point that should be preserved is that there was no rupture of democratic order, and the process of new security issues related to the integration process was able to proceed.

This is how we consider the process started by Brazil and Argentina, at first rescheduled and subsequently also placed in the hemispheric agenda as of the 1990s, and now undergoing dynamic growth in the first decade of the 21st century. Security issues, at least in principle, follow the guidance of democratic policy, such as ensuring continental democratic order. This is a gain, although not a majority one.
There are three new dimensions in regional security, and of course in expanding the regional integration process, more concentrated in South America, although in the Andean region and in Central America integration actions are also thriving in their own forms and with greater cooperation by the United States, Europe, and Asia (China and Japan).

The first of these dimensions is that it has been understood that the basis for the region to acquire greater security and improved integration would be under the form of democracy, consubstantiated in the OAS and the Mercosur Democratic Letter, excluding the likelihood of anti-democratic actions. With crises here and there, the region began to cultivate this feeling with the growing participation by civil society and the institutions of a number of States, acquiring – in some countries still limited when not violated – basic democratic indices with efforts for human rights of the citizenry not to be violated, or its development and integration project.

Hence, the discussions on the Bolivarian doctrine by Chavez (Venezuela), Correa (Ecuador), under several aspects the policies of Evo Morales (Bolivia), the same with the Kirchners (Argentina), acquired this pace and content that does not conform with democratic standards, with the multi-faceted functioning of society and politics, as it seems to be in effect in Brazil, in Chile, in Peru, and even in Colombia (under a very profound conflict with restrictions of civil rights), and in Uruguay.

Realistically and regardless of these important political and ideological differences, the fact is that currently, more than ever, the region has created its own development mechanisms to deal with issues regarding security as well as the complex relations of a progressive integration. Recent data shows that the majority of Latin Americans support democratic changes, albeit gradually.

On the other hand, we have a serious problem of regional security regarding the Colombian situation, whereby the central government has been combating guerrillas for decades, and
little by little these have been converted into armed extensions of the drug trade and encouraged by the ‘kidnapping industry.’ In addition to the marked presence of illegal paramilitary forces, and furthermore, the United States’ intervention in a conflict by a sovereign state gives rise to an internationalization issue of a conflict that is currently entirely regional.

Said conflict affects the borders of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil. Borders which are intermittently violated by the FARC as well as by the Colombian military apparatus (as in the case of the invasion of Ecuadorian territory and even certain helicopter penetrations by Colombia into the Brazilian Amazon region).

The second issue is integration itself, which starts with the cooperation process between Brazil and Argentina, in particular the sui generis architecture created by both countries under mutual reliance of nuclear non-proliferation, the creation of ABACC (Agência Brasileiro - Argentina de Confiabilidade e Controle), in the wake of the Quadrupartite Accord of an international nature, formed by Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of equal importance is the construction of a broad understanding undersigned by all of the systems of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

With this mutual confidence base, Brazil and Argentina were able to create neighborhood cooperation. This process was possible through the settlement of differences in connection with shared hydroelectric resources (the Itaipu hydro plant in Brazil and Corpus in Argentina). This gradually developed into cooperation in security in the nuclear diplomacy area as mentioned above.

It is worth noting that the Falklands/Malvinas war (1992) encouraged the strengthening of diplomatic, commercial, and security bonds between Brazil and Argentina, and currently discussions are under way to create a bi-national company to enrich uranium and compete in the international market. Lastly, bilateral economic agreements resulted in the creation of Mercosur (1991), with the association of Paraguay, Uruguay, and more recently Venezuela.

As to Mercosur, there are a number of things waiting to be done and right now it appears more like a boat docked waiting for repairs. Macro-economic difficulties with partners, neighbours’ economic difficulties, particularly the Argentinean one, are strategic issues that need to be resolved.

The infrastructure’s integration – energy, transportation, and communications – have been boosted by means of actions for Integration of the Regional South American Infrastructure (IIIRSA) forum that began in the South American Presidents’ Meeting held in Brasilia in 2000. Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) played a leading role in the financing of projects for physical infrastructure investments, as have other Brazilian banks, in addition to Corporación Andina de Fomento and the decisive support by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
On the one hand, the level of intra-regional production and trade is already well developed, and the IIIRSA actions are at a reasonable pace. On the other hand, the institutional framework in connection with security and peace issues is still in a lagging stage of development, though it began to move forward in 2009.

Global threats such as the drug trade, international organized crime, and even urban violence which afflicts the region’s capital cities, are among the key concerns in the new regional security agenda.

Under these circumstances, the actions by Brazilian diplomacy are justified during the government of President Lula in the South American Presidential Meeting (2008), when the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was created, under much political and diplomatic motivation. UNASUR is an expressive turning point in Brazilian foreign policy, which until then had kept distant from projects in common with the South American community, having preferred bilateral relations. Currently, there are even criticisms inside and outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to Brazil’s diplomatic activities during the government of President Lula.

During the launching of UNASUR, the South American Defense Council (CDS) was also created, with the participation of most ministers of defense, such as those from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela.

In Santiago, CDS made a historical commitment by coordinating the defense policies as a body for regional dialogue and political cooperation. During this same meeting, Chile’s Minister of Defense was put in charge of preparing a four-year plan.

In principle CDS is not a traditional military alliance (such as NATO) and neither will there be a South American Armed Force. On the other hand, CDS will have as its core objectives:

- a) Supporting steps to build mutual confidence;
- b) Intensification of regional integration; and
- c) Dialogue and cooperation in the region’s defense issues.

In addition to these core objectives, CDS will be in charge of submitting clear and transparent information on defense expenditures, will put in place a joint defense budget project, defense economic indices (pursuant to a model prepared by Comissão Econômica para a América Latina (CEPAL), and a proposal for a unified stance in multilateral security forums.

Please note also that South America is one of the last regions in the world that has created a permanent forum such as the CDS, which provides an appropriate venue to resolve regional and border conflicts, to fight terrorism (and other forms of extremism, separatism, and armed insurgencies).

In summary, the South American Defense Council provides an innovative legal, political, and diplomatic milestone, such as:
Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda

- Joint defense policies for South America
- Armed Forces personnel interchange, with projects for joint military exercises
- Joint operations in UNO Peace Missions and special OAS missions
- Interchanges of outlooks and political analyses of the world’s defense scenarios
- Integration of basic industries for regional defense.

CDS is also perceived in a number of quarters as part of a decision by Brazil of emphasizing the region as a Brazilian strategy for international security insertion, by acquiring a more active role in UNO Peace Missions and in special OAS missions, and which also includes the claim for a permanent seat in the UNO Security Council.

The third and last element is the globalization process: Latin America and in particular South America has become a stage for the entry of overseas capital, in addition to more liberal commercial and communications policies, which initially has caused certain regional imbalances. Nonetheless, globalization will subsequently serve for Latin American capital, in particular Brazilian capital, to become international in a two-way channel, albeit the regional insertion pattern will remain unequal with regard to overseas capital.

Regional Security Actions

The democratic process which goes back to the 1980s, seeks to integrate itself with regional security mechanisms, based on more traditional institutions and with the reinvention of new mechanisms.

According to the OAS Charter, security is considered a collective vision. Both the TIAR (Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty) and the Pact of Bogotá (American Treaty on Pacific Settlement) were devised as pillars of the hemispheric security system. TIAR lost its legal and political efficiency with the Falklands/Malvinas war, and the Pact of Bogotá was never applied.

In addition to these two regional security milestones, we should mention the Inter-American Defense Board (JID, 1952). JID was always defined through the vision of national security doctrine which led to the entire chain of military regimes in Latin America during the Cold War period. Formally very little active in the sense of conflict prevention and resolution, and lacking transparency with regard to its attributions, JID left aside the multilateral management of peace and regional security in favor of ad hoc groups created based on the Summit of the Americas and the Conference of Defense Ministers. Mention should also be made of the Rio Group’s extra-institutional role, which by virtue of its nature more informal than that of the Presidential Summits, has provided important support to regional conflict prevention, resolution, and management actions over the last 15 years.

The OAS security structure was devised to carry out collective security missions and for diplomatic consultations regarding conflict prevention. The latter was especially designated for conflict prevention and solution among the critical region’s States but not always successfully, though in recent years this mechanism changed and assumed more vigorously the intense political and social dramas that took place in the hemisphere.
In 1991, as part of new security measures, the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in order to proceed with a number of consultations among different regional security institutions and civil society organizations (OSC), within the new multi-dimensional outlook, with an imperative need for greater cooperation in solving problems involving not only one but all of the states.

In 1995 the Committee on Hemispheric Security was created as a permanent body of OAS, with the attribution of reviewing the hemispheric security system.

Nonetheless, hemispheric security conditions are still a source of concern. A consultation in 2002 by the OAS Hemispheric Security Commission to the member States on new approaches and threats concluded that the drug trade, the several forms of organized crime, and the arms trade were considered priority.

A decade has gone by and the situation does not reflect satisfactory improvements in this field, with the sum of new forms of urban violence such as ‘las pandillas delictivas,’ according to the expression employed by Elsa Llenderrozas.

In the field of regional cooperation, it should be mentioned that the relations between OAS and UNO are growing ever closer as of the 1990s. This effort is due to a broader review of regional security mechanisms. Hence, cooperation has taken place by means of meetings between OAS and UNO representatives and through the approval of joint resolutions and the undersigning of conventions. The key cooperation areas are: humanitarian matters, mine removals, human rights programs, etc.
The case of Colombia is a good example of how the regional security mechanism in the Americas is still not concluded. Closer cooperation with the UNO Security Council, by means of permanent communications and interchange channels would allow OAS to improve its ability of creating an environment of peace, through more efficient decision making processes. We might mention here article 53 in the UNO Charter. As of the 1990s, institutional renewal can be felt in OAS in connection with new security concepts.

The perpetuation of non-resolved conflict situations – such as in Colombia – is a risk that cannot but concern the entire region: as it extends further and until 2014, when the term of office of President Juan Manuel Santos comes to an end, the Colombian armed conflict will be 50 years old, i.e.: half a century active.

A political exit and under an extended viewpoint of human security may be able to put an end to this persistent “guerra sin nombre” (an appropriate expression by Colombian historian Gonzalo Sánchez) which goes on right in the middle of South America and which encourages the destabilizing participation of hemispheric and extra-regional players, such as the USA.

We may mention in this area new actions of a more permanent nature and of a number of practical ranges. One of these mechanisms was the Conference of Defense Ministers which began in 1995 – with 15 years of very policy oriented activities in which security and defense policies became more transparent, open, and converging, albeit it is still possible to detect contrasts and different approaches, for example, between the United States and some South American countries.

However, South America in particular, is resuming levels of non-recommended ‘arms race’ activities, initially triggered by the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela, and followed closely by Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.

On the subject of new threats, these deserve special attention. Latin America, the Caribbean region, and South America are currently more taken by intra-state conflicts than by the traditional inter-state conflicts. Regional security in this early stage of the 21st century has been looking very closely at the new threats to regional security, and has attempted to create new structures and mechanisms to face these new threats.

As stressed by political analyst Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “Es paradójico que la debilidad estatal se presente – con razón – como un peligro significativo, pero no así la desregulación del mercado. Este último nos afecta y afecta por su impacto devastador para el bienestar básico de las sociedades en el área. La proliferación armamentista es una cuestión crítica – a no dudarlo – pero la reaparición de estratagemas de contrainsurgencia entre las principales potencias de Occidente con planes estratégicos tambien lo es para nosotros”.

This new kind of low intensity militarism is very little discussed in the region and features a player that has proven to be little interested in the subject – in terms of offsetting policies for its limitation in the region – the United States. Moreover, the defense of and reliance
on democracy and human rights are vital for the region, which does not pose a threat to the security of the United States.

According to disclosures from the ‘Wikileaks’ website, Brazil does not trust the intentions of the United States, in particular with regard to the Amazon region, to Brazil’s efforts on behalf of regional integration, and more recently, to the oil discoveries along its coast. From July 2006 to October 2009, Wikileaks referred to the opposing reactions by Brazil to the then recently signed the United States-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement.\(^1\)

“Brazil is jealous because it does not like matters to be treated or discussed without its participation in a leading role: ambassador Marcelo Biato, counselor in foreign policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained to the Americans that though acknowledging Colombia’s sovereign right of entering into a military agreement with the United States, Brazil cannot ignore the serious implications of this agreement to the region’s stability.

“While the United States – as well as other powers – maintain their presence in the region, this issue will be difficult and crucial and will crop up regularly, requiring constant supervision. At the same time, Brazil understands the reasons for the presence of the United States in Colombia, but also its government aims for making efforts to eliminate the conditions that make this presence necessary.”\(^4\)

What may be concluded is that putting these facts together with Brazil’s concerns over the US Navy’s 4th Fleet, sailing in the region under the justification of fighting drug trade and terrorism, the age-old concerns with the Amazon region, all of this shows the low level of confidence many Brazilians have in the United States, which is something to be considered essentially especially as the bilateral partnership is being expanded.”\(^5\)

The United States do not represent an antagonist to Latin America, as Hugo Chavez and his associates wish to believe and several actions by Brazilian diplomacy seem to suggest. But Washington may become a problem for the region if it presses the armed forces to perform tasks outside of their competent functions. In addition, if the United States should expand the role of the Southern Command over the State Department in matters of inter-American relations, and if it intends that its security agenda should also be the entire region’s agenda.”\(^4\)

In this regard, the Obama administration, which aroused so much interest on intensifying inter-American relations in order to strengthen democracy and human rights, has not been completely effective. In this regard there is a debt by the Obama government related to the region regarding security and also integration aspects. The contradictions and ambiguities with which the United States view the Latin American region have become more or less evident.

With the Republican victory, the recent legislative elections may strengthen and increase even more internal political obstacles regarding the Southern hemisphere. Merely as an indicator, the new Republican majority and the likely appointment of Illeana Ros-Lehtinen to preside the cold war, as in Cuba’s case.
With regard to Venezuela and Brazil, and several other countries in the region, the trend is to maintain an atmosphere of little innovation and priority to other areas and strategic topics in US policy for the region. Relations with Brazil during President Lula’s government were full of misunderstandings and ‘false expectations’ from both sides. Now with the new government in place and with the country’s first female president Dilma Roussef, it may be possible, and that is what is expected, to resume the good relationship, in a mature and realist way.

In any case, Brazil’s increasing international projection and its regional ‘soft power’ leadership, as with the boost provided by UNASUR, may possibly be subject to change, albeit modest and also realist. At any rate, it is worth referring to the Military Agreement between Brazil and the United States, entered into in 2010 after Brazil’s criticism to the renewed Plano Colombia agreement for the use of seven Colombian military bases. The new Brazil-United States agreement ensures greater cooperation between both armed forces in a number of areas that are likely to improve the unproductive and politically unreliable environment existing between the two largest countries in the Americas.17

New Prospects of Mutual Reliance

I would like to assert that there is also a mutual reliance environment in the Latin and South American continent, with methods for ratifying defense expenditures with emphasis on the role of the White Defense Book as a measure of mutual reliance, and the exercise of peace operations by Latin American Armed forces.

Hence, security and society are entering a new stage of possibilities for regional cooperation, such as training civilians in the defense area, experience in disarmament procedures, and the armed forces’ contribution to social development through their participation in logistics, and intelligence in dealing with the drug traffic, banditry, and organized crime, etc.

In order to ratify this renewal process regarding regional security, the Special Hemispheric Conference was held in Mexico in October 2003, which produced the Declaration on Security in the Americas, with the intention of strengthening the inter-American system’s mechanisms related to the several aspects of security in the hemisphere, in order to produce greater coordination and cooperation among them.

Two issues were broached that are very important in our times in terms of public policies: Improvement of the ability of both OAS and American States to face (1) traditional threats and (2) new threats and other challenges related to regional security.

This proposed agenda was given to the member states for practical implementation, with results that were subject to assessment in the subsequent Special Hemispheric Conferences18.

With regard to other forms of cooperation on security issues, we should pay attention to the growing cooperation provided by non-governmental organizations and academic institutions that practice citizen diplomacy. In this regard, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the actions developed by Coordinación Regional de Investigación Económica y Social
(CRIES) in their articulation of movements, social organizations, and states in a multidimensional security outlook.

The challenges faced by social movements and civil society organizations in the Americas has been building networks and social organizations with an increasing desire of influencing regional processes and contributing to launch the integration project.

It is necessary that this effort by civil society should not be dissociated from the dynamics of local and regional development, or from global dynamics. This effort is closely linked with local claims and aspirations to allow joining forces around specific projects and topics, with the purpose of encouraging greater interaction with clearly identified participants from local, national, and regional governments, with movements and social organizations of a global nature.

At this point we should heed the focus and priorities of the several social and political aspects in the promotion and defense of the so-called global public assets, such as eradication of poverty and inequality, preservation of the environment, equality of genders and development, defense and promotion of human rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.

In the scope of regional organizations, the increased dynamics by these bodies (OAS, UNASUR, CDS) may be seen regarding participation by civil society in their resolutions. Despite their limitations, the work performed by the organizations and by civil society in matters of conflict prevention and resolution has been more fruitful in countries in which OAS develops pioneering actions, in particular where there are specific missions for greater commitment with civil society organizations.

Advancing simultaneously in these aspects creates forthwith an expectation of collective action. Within our protracted historical tradition, that of the region indicating that when threats occur to regional security, the societies’ human resources are readily mobilized in order to check and resolve such conflicts.

This is the great challenge of at the same time consolidating collective regional security jointly with an effort for physical, productive, and social integration.
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Annex 1: Map of Latin America

Taken from http://portugues.avis-int.com/
Biography

Clóvis Brigagão is a Political Scientist and specialist in Peace and International Security Studies and Research.

He is a Renowned Doctor in International Relations at Universidade Candido Mendes (2005), and a Doctor in Strategic Affairs at the Strategic Affairs Post-Graduate Program, Faculty of Economic Sciences, at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (2011).

Also Director of Centro de Estudos das Américas (CEAs), Coordinator of Grupo de Estudos de Prevenção de Conflitos Internacionais (GAPCon) and of Escola Sérgio Vieira de Mello – EPAZ, Institute of Humanities, at Universidade Candido Mendes, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Brigagão prepares research projects, and publications and partnerships in academic events as of 2002 with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Rio de Janeiro.

Endnotes

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2 (Brigagão and Paz Neves, 2011)
3 (Sources, Julio and Saavedra, 2004, p. 8).
5 (Hertz, 2003, p. 133).
6 We might mention entities related to combating terrorism, the drug trade, and prevention regarding public health, such as Comité Interamericano Contra Terrorismo (CICTE), or Comité Interamericano Contra Drogas (CIGAD) and Organização Panamericana de Saúde (OPS), etc.
7 (Brigagão and Dalla Costa, 3/05/2005).
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14 (O Globo newspaper, 1/04/2011, p. 34).
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17 (Serbin, 2010, p. 43-44).
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