RETHINKING DIPLOMACY:
NEW APPROACHES AND DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
IN EAST ASIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The end of the Cold War brought about a gradual change in the way in which countries viewed politics. Where politics and diplomatic relations were traditionally means for the state to safeguard its sovereignty at any cost, politics in the post-Cold War world was no longer so much about forcefully promoting one state’s national interests. Rather, politics in the post Cold War world increasingly came to be about “soft power”. This shift away from traditional perceptions of the role of politics has necessitated a rethinking of diplomacy.

Diplomacy was no longer seen as a tool to consolidate a state’s national interests and power. Instead, it was now about the promotion of cultural or public diplomacy. This changing perception of the purposes and practices of diplomacy resulted in traditional concepts of state sovereignty giving way to the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism. In turn, this led to the establishment of informal Track II diplomacy (wherein the participants are scholars and experts rather than diplomats) and Track III diplomacy (wherein the participants are members of non-governmental organizations and global citizens) at multilateral forums.

Despite these changing perceptions of politics and the roles of non-diplomats in diplomacy in the post Cold War World, it is not an easy task to rethink diplomacy and its functions. The world’s top political leaders may be hesitant to change their traditional view of diplomacy for
fear that it might mean a diminishment of their own influence. They might likewise be dismissive of these perceptions of diplomacy and the new informal Track II and Track III channels of diplomacy because they feel diplomacy is a matter best left to professional politicians and diplomats. Similarly, interest groups and competing institutions within a country might be comfortable with the way in which diplomacy has traditionally functioned, and be reluctant to rise to the challenge of taking on more active roles in Track II and Track III diplomacy. Another impediment to the rethinking of diplomacy is in the fact that tax payers and politicians have differing perceptions vis-à-vis the role of public diplomacy. For instance, politicians may believe that diplomacy serving the interests of the state is in the public interest, whereas the tax payers believe diplomacy could only be said to serve public interest if it benefits society at large. Due to these differing opinions as to how diplomacy benefits the public interest, some members of the general public tended to be distrustful of diplomacy.

The international symposium on “Rethinking Diplomacy: New Approaches and Domestic Challenges” sought to address the issues highlighted above and rethink diplomacy in the East Asian context. However the “Rethinking Diplomacy” event did more than that. Jointly organized by the Japan Foundation and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), the conference brought together a panel of scholars from Japan, China, Korea and Europe to offer their insights and analyses of diplomacy past, present and future.

The panellists’ observations and insightful remarks on the prevailing issues in diplomacy as well as the challenges in rethinking diplomacy are compiled in this volume. This publication would not have been
possible without the invaluable assistance of Mr. Hideki Hara and Ms. Teruyo Horie of the Japan Foundation, for they were instrumental in organizing the roundtable workshop and ensuring its success. Thanks are also extended to the guidance of Dr. Lam Peng Er of the East Asian Institute in Singapore, for it was he who first conceived the idea of this symposium on critically rethinking diplomacy.

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INTRODUCTION

Rethinking Diplomacy

Lam Peng Er and Colin Duerkop
There are at least four international trends requiring us to rethink traditional diplomacy, which has hitherto been primarily concerned with the state and its quest for national interest and power. First is the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism which have gradually eroded the traditional concepts of state sovereignty. Corollary to this is the emergence of track two (including scholars and experts who are not diplomats) and track three (including NGOs and global citizens) diplomacy in multilateral forums. Second is the diversification of actors such as Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational organizations. Third are non-traditional challenges and global issues such as environmental protection, humanitarian disaster relief, terrorism and epidemics. Fourth is the greater attention some states and societies pay to “soft” power, cultural or public diplomacy rather than traditional means of force.
However, there are at least three domestic challenges to this shift away from traditional diplomacy. The first obstacle is that the mindsets of top political leaders may still be locked in the traditional mode of thinking vis-à-vis diplomacy. Second are competing institutions and interest groups within a country which are comfortable with traditional diplomacy and therefore resistant to change. Third is the ‘perception gap’ between those in power and the tax-payers as to the basic idea of public interests that diplomacy should fulfil. This has, in turn, led to the apathy or distrust of the general public in some countries towards diplomacy.

This book seeks to rethink diplomacy in the context of East Asia and the European Union (EU). Scholars from East Asia and the EU offer their insights to diplomacy past, present and future. In chapter one, Lee Jang-Hie notes that East Asia is bedevilled by historical and territorial disputes even in the post-Cold War era. In the task of regional reconciliation, states and their nationalistic agendas often create more problems than they resolve. He makes a clarion call for a non-state approach:

The egoistic national diplomacy of the Korean, Chinese, and Japanese governments neither resolves these historical disputes nor establishes an East Asian Peace Community. It is time for the Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of Korea, China, and Japan, which are free from national egoism, to step up and achieve these goals. These NGOs, working for peace and an upright settlement of past history, should play an essential role in raising international public opinion to pressure the Korean, Chinese and Japanese governments through international solidarity and the NGOs’ building peace networks.

In chapter two, Hosoya Yuichi argues that Japan must rethink its diplomacy in the wake of new developments after the Cold War. To
Hosoya, a “normalizing” Japan is a country which fulfils its responsibilities in international society. He writes:

Japan has to define its new international identity. This is more so given that the economic-oriented “Yoshida Doctrine” is less relevant today. This essay examines the transformation of Japanese diplomacy, and argues that “globalization”, “normalization” and “democratization” are the three new elements in post-Cold War Japanese diplomacy.

In chapter three, Lam Peng Er asks whether Japan has adopted a “New Thinking” in its diplomacy especially after the reformist Democratic Party of Japan captured power following 54 years of conservative Liberal Democratic Party rule. Lam notes that there are at least four areas in which the new DPJ national government has sought to make a fresh start in Japan’s foreign policy. They are: the mitigation of climate change, the promotion of an East Asian Community, a more equal relationship with its US ally, and politicians rather than bureaucrats taking the lead in policy-making in a democratic polity. Lam writes:

I argue that the DPJ’s inexperience as a ruling party, its weak leadership, and the persistence of traditional power politics in East Asia make it difficult for the DPJ’s “New Thinking” to come to fruition. However, in non-traditional security issues such as global warming, biodiversity and peace-building, the DPJ government has the latitude and opportunity to play a larger global role. Indeed, in issues which are not entwined with traditional interstate security and conflict, NGOs and civil society can become more active players in Japan’s New Diplomacy.

In chapter four, Satoh Haruko addresses the puzzle as to why Japanese think tanks are relatively weak and marginal in international affairs despite the fact that Japan has the third largest economy in the world. She writes:
The paucity of understanding toward policy think tanks can partially be explained by the particular political regime that governed Japan since the advent of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. The so-called 1955-regime of single-party rule by the LDP was neither dynamic nor open in terms of policy formulation. There was little room for policy debates let alone policy research with the view to offering alternatives.

However, she is not sanguine that think tanks in Japan will enjoy a renaissance even though the DPJ has displaced the LDP from power. Indeed, the new DPJ government has been implementing brutal cost-cutting measures against institutions like the premier Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Japan Foundation. These measures would surely diminish Japan’s voice and “soft power” in the world. This might well be a case of “penny wise, pound foolish”.

In chapter five, Li Minjiang examines the approaches adopted by provincial governments instead of the national government in Beijing towards ASEAN. This topic is rarely explored in the academic literature on Chinese foreign policy even though the provincial governments’ fierce competition with each another in economic development necessitates good relations with the external world. Interestingly, some Chinese provincial governments manage a population size larger than many EU and Asian countries.

Li Mingjiang writes:

Other scholars exploring alternative explanations for various puzzles in China’s international relations have found it very useful to look inside China. These scholars have examined including Chinese leadership
division, domestic political instability, the perceptions of the elite, public opinion, Chinese culture, and bureaucratic politics and pluralism in foreign policy-making. But such efforts are far from sufficient, and our understanding of the domestic sources of China’s foreign policy needs to be substantially and substantively improved. What is almost totally missing in this body of literature is a systematic study of the role played by provincial governments in China’s foreign relations in recent years.

Li Mingjiang concludes that local governments matter and do exercise initiatives in foreign policy – hitherto the purview of the Beijing central government:

The Yunnan government’s “bridgehead” strategy, Guangxi government’s Pan-Beibu scheme and the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor, and the impact of Guangdong’s industrial restructuring are likely to have major impacts on China-ASEAN relations unforeseen by the decision-makers in Beijing.

In chapter six, Pavin Chachavalpongpun examines the rise of Digital Diplomacy in Southeast Asia as a new mode of communication. He writes:

Digital diplomacy... acts to reduce the traditional manner in which diplomacy is conducted in Southeast Asia. This phenomenon effectively responds to the emergence of track two (including scholars and experts who are not diplomats) and track three (including NGOs and global citizens) diplomacy in multilateral forums, by allowing the actors to use new-age media to communicate with each other more directly and less formally. The open space and the informal nature of this kind of diplomacy allows diplomats and non-state actors to discuss a wide range of issues, including non-traditional challenges such as
environmental protection, humanitarian disaster relief, terrorism and epidemics.

However, Pavin notes that Digital Diplomacy can be a double-edged sword. Rather than harnessing technology to bring countries and citizens in Southeast Asia together, it can also ferment hate and violence between neighbouring countries as in the case of Thailand and Cambodia. He cautions that digital technology:

...can also be employed to discredit enemies. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen used his website to attack Thailand’s Abhisit Vejjajiva at the height of their conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple. Likewise, Abhisit conversed with the Thais through his Facebook page, explaining his country’s position vis-à-vis Cambodia.

Previously, the conduct of diplomacy and security policies was tightly held by states in the pursuit of their narrow national interests. However, the European Union is at the vanguard promoting a common regional approach to foreign and security policies which transcends the traditional role of the nation-state. In chapter seven, Frank Umbach examines Germany’s and the EU’s policies towards foreign and security policies. He also examines the role of soft and hard power in the diplomatic approaches of the EU.

Umbach affirms at the outset:

After the end of the Cold War and the “cheque-book diplomacy” during the Gulf War in 1990/91, Germany’s foreign and security policies underwent major changes. These changes were more of an evolutionary rather than revolutionary character. Germany’s foreign and security policies are embedded in the EU’s evolving common foreign and
security policies (CFSP). Its peaceful and successful enlargement process to the EU-27 since the 1990s has often been cited as the clearest illustration of its newfound soft power. ... The EU’s soft power capabilities, supported by military means, may become even more important in the future. This is especially so in light of the dramatic rise of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacemaking missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations as well as conflict-prevention and humanitarian missions.

To recapitulate, the contributors of this volume have written on the different facets of “New” Diplomacy in the EU and East Asia. Driven by the forces of globalization, regionalism, technology and even the fury of Mother Nature in natural disasters, states can no longer rely on traditional diplomacy to address problems old and new. The mitigation of increasingly complex, diverse and novel problems confronting humanity requires imagination, fresh ideas and new modes of cooperation beyond the traditional modes practiced by nation states. However, it remains to be seen whether governments and the public are willing to invest in the common good beyond national borders.
CHAPTER 1

NGO’s Role for Peace Building Diplomacy in the East Asia

Jang - Hie Lee
I. The 21st Century is the Asian Century

The year 2010 marks the 100th anniversary of the Japanese annexation of Korea as well as the 60th anniversary of the breakout of the Korean War. The Korean Peninsula has endured colonialism and civil war (fratricidal war), and is still reeling from its colonial history and recovering from the wounds of war.

Regional integration and cooperation since the 1990s have enabled the international society to enjoy a century of peace in the post-Cold War era. Although struggles against terrorism and religious feuds still exist, regional economic communities (European Union in Europe, the Organization of African Unity in Africa, and the Organization of American States in the Americas) have been established in all regions with the exception of Asia. It is difficult to establish a regional
economic community Asia due to its wide geographical scope, cultural diversity, and the economic gap among states. Moreover, the UN adopted the Durban Declaration at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2001. The Durban Declaration defined 18th – 19th century slavery and colonialism as crimes against humanity.

Asia has been at the centre of world economy, culture, politics, and diplomacy until the 18th century. Western colonialism, however, forced Asia into the periphery. The situations have changed since the 21st century. Asia, with a population of 4.1 billion (mainly in China, India, and Japan), is making a comeback to the centre of world economy.

During the Global Financial Crisis, emerging Asian states such as China and India led the way to the Era of a New Asia. Following remarkable economic growth of China and India, South Korea, the host of the G-20 Leaders Summit in 2010, also took on an important role in the realignment of the global order after the Global Financial Crisis. The Independent, a British newspaper, stated that China, then the 4th largest in the world in 2007, will catch up with the US by 2025 and eventually surpass the US by 180% by 2050. India, currently the 12th largest economy in the world, will grow to be the 3rd largest economy by 2050, followed by China. Professor Nouriel Roubini of New York University Business School, who predicted the US financial crisis two years before it happened, stated that “the 21st century may be the century of Asia or China.”
II. Unresolved Colonial Legacies & Distortion of History in Asia

1. Imperialism and the origins of military tensions in Asia

Military tensions are escalating in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. These military tensions arose from the competition for military hegemony and Neo-imperialism\(^1\) between the US, Japan and China. The inevitable by-products of military hegemony and imperialism such as military alliance treaties, nuclear development, competition for missile development and Theatre Missile Defence systems (TMD) may be seen throughout Northeast Asia. The division of the Korean Peninsula is a primary cause of military tensions in Northeast Asia.

Politically and militarily, Northeast Asia (which centres on the Korean Peninsula), is still far from achieving regional cooperation due to military tensions and the dark shadows wrought by North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile threats.

The problem in Northeast Asia lies in the fact that the Japanese government has neither admitted the illegality of its past colonialism nor apologized or compensated for the colonialism victims. A more serious problem is the Japanese government's attempts to distort the history of Japan by legitimizing and glorifying its illegal colonialism. The unresolved problem of Korea, China, and Japan stems from the fact that

\(^1\) What is imperialism? According to *Evangelisches Staatslexikon*, imperialism is defined as a diplomatic policy of expansionism aimed at direct or indirect control over other foreign countries by means of politics, military, economy, culture, or civilization. Hermann Kunst, Roman Herzog, Wilhelm Schneemelcher (eds), *Evangelisches Staatslexikon*, Neu 2. völlig neu bearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1966, pp. 1002 - 1003.
the wounds from past imperialism and colonialism have not been honestly settled. Distorted history taught to future generations could destroy peaceful relations between Korea, China and Japan. Japan should bear in mind that German Prime Minister Willy Brandt’s apology to the Polish victims of the Nazi regime at the Memorial Cemetery was one of the foundations for peace in Europe. It should also be borne in mind that this apology provided the impetus for the reunification of Germany and the establishment of the European Union.

2. Japanese Government

The Japanese government’s behaviour towards the victims of East Asian colonialism was quite different. The extreme right Aso Administration did not seek to settle the issue of Japan’s past colonialism and was never active in building peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Prime Minister Aso only emphasized the North Korea’s nuclear threat, the importance of strengthening the Japan-US alliance, and the glorification of its past colonial history. For instance, in April 2009, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology approved the history textbook published by Jayoosa, which denied and disparaged the sovereignty of Korean history, legitimatized the invasion of Korea, and glorified the past acts of imperialism. This textbook, which was to be used in Japanese middle schools, was the third of the newly published history textbooks endorsed by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. This textbook, along with Hoososa’s New History Textbook (published in 2001) and The New History Textbook: Revised Edition (published in 2005) actively glorified Japan’s imperialist past. On 17 July 2009, the Japanese Ministerial Conference voted for the military white book, which described Tokdo as a Japanese territory. Subsequently, the reformist Prime Minister Hatoyama
of the Democratic Party adhered to the stance of the past administration regarding Tokdo and proposed the liquidation of the past history of colonialism and invasion. However, Hatoyama failed to resolve the issue and resigned from the office after a nine-month term. The new Democratic Prime Minister Naoto, who came into power in September, only echoed former Prime Minister’s war apology statement of 1995 during his statement of August 2010. Also, he did not draw a clear line in the Japan-US military alliance. Unable to put up a firm stance against the US on the issue of the relocation of a US military base, he eventually conceded to the US’s demands.

3. Chinese government

Although China is a victim of Japanese imperialism, it too has distorted the ancient history of Korea in the 2002 Northeast Project (東北工程). The Chinese government stated that Gojoseon, Buyeo, and Balhae were not sovereign nations of Korea, but regional governments of China and therefore part of Chinese history. This debate on Korea’s ancient history is ongoing. The pre-modern history of China erroneously stated that the history of Gojoseon started from Gija Joseon established in 12 B.C. when King Mu of the Chou Dynasty installed Gija as the king of Joseon.

Moreover, the ruling class of China is not free from the inertia of socialist central control. China should not seek to escape from its past experiences by free riding its responsibility onto the international society. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China should also respect the international environmental and human rights standards.
4. Korean government

Meanwhile, the Lee Myungbak administration of South Korea, which came into power on March 2008, put up pragmatism as the main principle of its foreign policy. The administration had no fundamental philosophy vis-à-vis the problem of colonial history and opted to maintain the Cold War mindset as a means of securing peace in Northeast Asia. It put the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before the normalization of North-South relations, and also emphasized the importance of pressuring North Korea and strengthening the alliance with the US and Japan. The administration’s aggressive policy towards North Korea led to the suspension of all dialogues and inter-Korean economic cooperation including the tour to Kumgang Mountains and Gaesung. As a result, the North Korean government condemned the South Korean government’s decision to join the PSI (Proliferation security Initiative), interpreting it as a declaration of war and a sign that the Korean armistice was invalidated. The Lee administration’s sanctions on North Korea after the recent sinking of the Cheonan warship on 26 March 2010 and the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group statement on 20 May 2010 halted all North-South exchanges and cooperation except Gaesung Industrial Complex. Furthermore, South Korea, Japan, and the US appear to be working together to entrap North Korea in the international arena by executing UN Resolution 1874 and imposing sanctions on finance and nuclear tests in North Korea. Currently, there are intense military tensions in the Northern Limited Line (NLL) of the Western Sea. In addition, there are four joint military exercises (inclusive of the foreign military) ongoing in four areas of the three sides of the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese government condemned the Korea-US joint military exercise where US aircraft carrier ‘George
Washington’ appeared. The Lee administration stated that it respects the Joint Declaration of 15 June 2010 and the North-South Summit Declaration of 4 October 2010, but never took any corresponding action. In response, China and Russia are cautious vis-à-vis the South Korea-US-Japan sanctions on North Korea. The Lee administration continues to emphasize hard-line policies towards North Korea and considers the South Korea-US Alliance as its highest priority. It also postponed the redemption of the wartime operational control from the US to December of 2015, which was originally scheduled for 2012.

Ⅲ. Action Plan for Exit Strategy:
NGOs’ Role for Peace Building Diplomacy in the East Asia

The egoistic national diplomacy of the Korean, Chinese, and Japanese governments neither resolves these historical disputes nor establishes an East Asian Peace Community. It is time for the Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of Korea, China, and Japan, which are free from national egoism, to step up and achieve these goals. These NGOs, working for peace and an upright settlement of past history, should play an essential role in raising international public opinion to pressure the Korean, Chinese and Japanese governments through international solidarity and the NGOs’ building peace networks.

Governments obsessed with national egotism should not be allowed to dominate Northeast Asia diplomacy, distort past history or establish their versions of a peaceful regime in East Asia. The pro-peace groups and the conscience groups of Northeast Asian NGOs, which are free from
the entanglements of national borders and sovereignty, must rise to the occasion by establishing peace and mutual prosperity in Northeast Asia.

The 21st century is a crucial turning point for East Asia. Though the region is the centre of world economy, it is suffering from internal disturbances caused by historical and military tensions between Korea, China, and Japan. In addition, the Korean Peninsula is still ideologically divided and the North Korean nuclear disputes could provide an excuse for the military intervention of the US, Japan and China, which are competing for the military hegemony of East Asia. Although governments actively influence diplomacy, Korean, Chinese and Japanese civilian NGOs could also play important roles in vitalizing communication and exchange throughout East Asia vis-à-vis issues of historical disputes and building a peace community. If East Asia is to avoid becoming a victim of the segmentation policy of 19th century Europe, the Korean, Chinese and Japanese governments have to overcome national egoism on the issues of history and peace through truthful dialogue, exchange, and cooperation. Now is the time for the civilian NGOs to actively participate in peace diplomacy.

1. Action plan for resolving historical disputes

   - Establish a Joint History Textbook Compilation Committee. This committee should comprise of historical experts of Korea, China, and Japan. It should also jointly compile a history textbook on the civilian NGO level.
   
   - Establish a joint history forum between Korea, China, and Japan. Regular meetings should be held to discuss and exchange ideas, cooperate, and communicate on controversial historical issues.
   - Use the methods above to conceptualize a method of organizing
documents and agreements so as to more effectively launch a petition campaign. Continuous campaigns should also be initiated to urge the affiliated governments to rectify historic distortions.

2. Action plan for resolving colonial legacies

– An “Asia Durban Declaration” should be adopted. This declaration should define colonialism as a crime against humanity on the Korea-China-Japan civilian NGO level.
– Establish a peace network throughout the NGOs of Korea, China, and Japan so as to urge the affiliated governments to enact a “Committee for the Investigation of Truth about Colonial Rule”. This committee would then document the facts about past colonial rule and make a joint report on the civilian NGO level.
– Launch campaigns to draw support and understanding for the joint report. So doing would help to actualize legislation of post-war compensation for the victims.
– Vitalize interactions among Korean, Japanese, and Chinese NGOs working for peace by visiting, exchanging, and cooperating.

3. Action plan for establishing a Multilateral Northeast Asia Peace Community

– Use civilian diplomacy to develop the Six-Party Talks. These Six-Party talks, which were originally organized to solve the North Korean nuclear disputes, could be transformed into a Multilateral Northeast Asia Peace Community capable of managing comprehensive issues on regional peace and security.
– To achieve the aforementioned goal, the North Korean nuclear disputes must be settled. Therefore, NGOs must rouse public
opinion to ensure that the Joint Declaration of 19 September 2005 is realized. So doing would put pressure on the affiliated government.

- Normalization of North Korea-Japan relations and North Korea-US relations are also essential to the achievement of the aforementioned goals. Therefore, peace diplomacy at a civilian level needs to be initiated. Cooperation and solidarity of peace NGOs of Korea, Japan and China is necessary.

### IV. Conclusion

The Korean peninsula is the sole remaining ‘island’ of tension in the post-Cold War world. The division of the Korean Peninsula is a stumbling block in the establishment of cooperation and peace in Northeast Asia. Therefore, an environment and conditions conducive to peace and the peaceful unification of the two Koreas are needed if peace, security and prosperity are to be secured in Asia and the World. Furthermore, China, the US and Russia are nuclear powers. North Korea and Japan are potential nuclear powers. The division of the Korean Peninsula could likely bring military tensions in Northeast Asia. Korea and China have many complicated issues on the issue of past colonialism, and both these countries have ongoing territorial disputes with Japan. There is still deep military and political mistrust among countries in Northeast Asia.

How can a peaceful environment and peaceful regimes be established in Northeast Asia and between South and North Koreas? There is no alternative beyond disarmament and arms control through multilateral
cooperation of the Northeast Asian countries. All existing military issues in Northeast Asia have been handled through bilateral treaties between Korea and the US, and between Japan and the US. This bilateral approach has been very profitable to powerful countries like the US. However, bilateral solutions limit the establishment of a permanent peace regime in this region. US-Japan bilateral security approaches, such as the “Guidelines for Japan-US defense cooperation” announced in September 1997, could hurt the hegemonic interests of China and lead to hegemonic conflicts among powerful countries in the region. The US-Japan Guidelines of 23 September 1997 could be conceived by China as the formation of an organization similar to NATO.

To exacerbate matters, there are no mechanisms to settle multilateral disputes in Northeast Asia in the event that regional military conflicts (including nuclear weapon issues) take place in the region.

Thus, the establishment of an Asian peace community in Northeast Asia is important and comparable to the CSCE in Europe. An Asian peace community built on disbarment and arms control is necessary for a permanent regional peace regime. The Asian peace community would naturally dissipate the threat of inimical national self-interest of powerful countries in favour of regional cooperation and security. As

some countries have already supported this proposal, it would not be farfetched to recommend the application of this multilateral approach to nuclear issues in the region.

The establishment of the Asian peace community should be promoted at both government and NGO levels.

In order to remove the imperialistic dominance of the US and Japan in Asia, I hope this conference launches a peace campaign to adopt and practice the NGOs’ Declaration for the Establishment of Peace Community in Asia. This declaration, spelling out the objective, principles of practice, Action Program, and directions for NGOs’ movement, includes a step-by-step plan for the integration and organization of the Asian peace community.

The Anti-War Pact of 1928, the first multilateral treaty to ban all kinds of wars in history, was also initiated by peace-loving civilian movements. I sincerely wish that the NGO activists of Korea, Japan and Chinese, will stand at the centre of the civilian campaign for the construction of a peaceful East Asian Community.
Rethinking Japanese Diplomacy: New Developments after the Cold War

Yuichi Hosoya
Introduction

The end of the Cold War transformed the practice of diplomacy in many countries. Japanese diplomacy was no exception.¹ There are several reasons for this transformation. First, Japan had to adapt to the rapid rise of globalization, like many other states. The demise of the East-West split brought the emergence of new global politics. Thus, it was necessary for the Japanese governments to extend their relations beyond East Asia. Diplomacy, like many other social activities, needs to be globalised today.²


Second, Japan’s international relations needed to become “normalized”. In other words, it was widely thought that Japan needed to transform itself from a mere “civilian power” to a “normal” power. It means Japan should undertake more responsibility in international security. Thus, Japanese diplomacy can be more balanced than before. The “Yoshida doctrine”, named after Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who concentrated on Japanese diplomacy upon economic reconstruction during the late 1940s and early 1950s, has long prevented Japan from being a “military power”. Broadly speaking, Japanese diplomacy is often regarded as no more than economic statecraft. However, two international crises in the first half of the 1990s awoke the Japanese to serious security challenges. These two crises are the Gulf War of 1991, and the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-4. Having seen its failure to respond effectively to these crises, Makoto Iokibe, an eminent Japanese diplomatic historian, regarded Japan as a diplomatic “loser” in the 1990s. He said that “it is increasingly becoming difficult to separate Japan’s defence from that of the rest of the world, and the trend of Japan sharing a larger burden of international security cannot be ignored.”

Thirdly, several important political, electoral and administrative reforms have thrown Japanese diplomacy into a process of “democratization”. Until recently, post-war Japanese diplomacy had largely been monopolized by leaders of a conservative party, the Liberal Democratic

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3) Two books brilliantly deal with this process of “normalization” and “militarization”. See Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power (London: Routledge, 2006); and Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). However, the emphases in these two books differ.


5) Ibid., p.232.
Party (LDP), as well as by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Japanese governments have to pay much more attention to public opinion both within and outside Japan, as it is now one of the most important determinants of foreign policy. Besides, the rise of nationalism in Northeast Asia appears more salient than before.\(^6\) Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 and his repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since 2001 marked the turning point. Severe criticisms from within and outside Japan often paralysed Koizumi’s diplomatic activities. Japanese diplomats cannot ignore the public opinion of their own country. The entrenchment of democracy has certainly transformed Japanese diplomacy.\(^7\)

In order to face these new challenges, Japan has to define its new international identity. This is more so given that the economic-oriented “Yoshida Doctrine” is less relevant today. This essay examines the transformation of Japanese diplomacy, and argues that “globalization”, “normalization” and “democratization” are the three new elements in post Cold War Japanese diplomacy.

1. The “Globalization” of Japanese Diplomacy

In 1957, the first Japanese diplomatic blue book described Japan as adhering to “three basic principles” in its diplomacy, namely the United Nations, Western Alliance centred at the US-Japan alliance, and Asia.\(^8\)

\(^6\) This problem is fully examined in Gilbert Rozman, *Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


Since the late 1940s to the end of the Cold War, both the United States and Asia kept in line with the philosophy of the UN and dominated Japanese diplomacy.

The Gulf War of 1991 became a wake-up call for a new foreign policy. Japan could not respond effectively to the new crisis in the Middle East. Consequently, Japan was criticised for its unpreparedness vis-à-vis challenges pertaining to international peace and security. The demise of the Cold War division necessitated Japan’s adoption of a broader diplomatic view. Yoichi Funabashi, an eminent journalist, argued that Japan should become a “global civilian power” by combining its global role with the concept of “civilian power”.9) At the time, it was widely felt that Japanese diplomacy ought to be globalized.

There are several directions to which Japanese diplomacy should progress. First, Japan went to the Asia-Pacific.10) Asia and the United States have been the two of Japan’s “three basic principles”. As neither of them could be excluded, the Japanese government focused its effort for regional cooperation upon the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). On the other hand, the Japanese government declined the proposal by then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad for the creation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). The Japanese government regarded the proposed EAEC as a form of anti-Western regionalism, which is contradictory to the tradition of post-war Japanese diplomacy. Through APEC and the framework of Asia-Pacific regionalism, Japan was able to reinforce its economic partnerships with both East Asia and the United States. With the rise of Asian economies,

Japanese economic diplomacy in the 1990s centred on Asia-Pacific regionalism.

Second, Japan began to strengthen its partnership with Europe. Previously, the power of the European Community (EC) had largely been underestimated by Japanese government. But several MOFA officials including Hisashi Owada appropriately acknowledged the importance of this international actor. Therefore, in December 1991, the Japanese government signed the Hague Declaration of political cooperation between Japan and the EC.\textsuperscript{11} The 1992 project for the “Internal Market” of the EC drew Japan’s attention to the increasing importance of the EC as the biggest single market in the world. The following year saw the emergence of a new international actor, the European Union (EU), and Japan began to meet leaders of the EU annually from then on.

Japanese diplomatic activities further expanded in the 1990s. One such example is Hashimoto’s diplomacy. Ryutaro Hashimoto, who became prime minister in 1996, endeavoured to strengthen Japan’s relationship with Russia. The Russo-Japanese relation had been tense for more than a century since the end of 19th century, and the northern territories had been the most eminent source of the conflict. Hashimoto’s “Eurasian diplomacy” sought to strengthen Japan’s position in the Eurasian continent by solving these conflicts.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12} On Hashimoto’s “Eurasian Diplomacy”, see Kazuhito Togo, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy} (Leiden: Brill, 2005) pp. 251-6; Joseph P. Ferguson, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Russia”, in Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhito Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (eds),
Japan was one of the few developed countries focusing on the importance of African development in the early 1990s. In 1993, Japan convened an important conference, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Kazuhiko Togo, then a MOFA official, said, “it was an initiative to attempt to direct the attention of the global community to Africa, when the word’s attention was absorbed by the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the War in the Gulf.”

While Japan was unable to contribute to German unification or the Gulf War, Japan’s economic diplomacy resulted in the initiative to aid African development. TICAD was followed by TICAD II, III, and IV, and these initiatives successfully publicised the importance of African development to the international community.

A similar attempt was made by Japanese government on “human security”. On 2 December 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi highlighted the concept of “human security” as an importance agenda for Japanese diplomacy. Drawing on Japanese funds, the “Trust Fund for Human Security” was created in March 1999. While the US and UK governments concentrated their efforts on the crisis in Kosovo at that time, Japanese humanitarian actions were more civilian and economic-oriented. These activities are related to the notion of “global civilian power”.

2. The “Normalization” of Japanese Diplomacy

Since Japanese diplomacy had been generally limited to economic diplomacy, Japan was often criticized for insufficiently contributing to

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13) Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003, p. 327.
14) Ibid., p. 401.
international peace and security. In fact, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan from engaging in war as well as the right to collective defence. These prohibitions make Japanese diplomatic strategy less comprehensive. When the Japanese economy threatened American economic and technological pre-eminence in the early 1990s, the American government pressured Japan to share more security burdens. At the time, Japan was widely regarded as a “free rider” in international community. Japanese government was fully aware of this criticism.

As mentioned above, two crises in the Gulf and the Korean Peninsula woke the Japanese government to the importance of international security. The first important step towards more proactive security policy was shown in the Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) in Cambodia.\(^\text{15}\) When the United Nations Transition Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) was created in 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the PKO Cooperation Bill.\(^\text{16}\) This made it possible for Japan to dispatch 1200 Self-Defence Force (SDF) personnel along with some civilians. There were several reasons for this change in Japan’s security policy. First, the head of UNTAC was Japanese, UN Under-Secretary Yasushi Akashi. Akashi recalled that the success of the Cambodian PKO owed much to Japan’s active diplomacy for improving cooperation among the Security Council members.\(^\text{17}\) This Japanese contribution was unprecedented in post-war Japanese diplomacy.

\(^{15}\) On the general overview of Japan’s role in Cambodian PKO, see Tomoaki Murakami, “Kambojia PKO to nihon: “heiwa no teichaku” seisaku no genkei”, in Gunjishi gakkai (ed), *PKO no siteki kensho* (Tokyo: Kinseisya, 2007) pp. 130-151.

\(^{16}\) Iokibe, “Japanese diplomacy after the Cold War”, pp. 180-1.

Broader Japanese security roles after the Cold War were further consolidated, due to the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance. US Assistant Secretary of Defence, Joseph S. Nye, initiated the process of redefining and reinforcing the alliance. This process resulted in the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty-First Century” in April 1996. Based on the sharing of common values, the Declaration signalled the importance of Japan’s security role in the Asia-Pacific. Japan was no longer just an economic power. From then on, Japanese diplomacy came to have a security dimension. Prime Minister Hashimoto’s decision to dispatch SDF airplanes to Cambodia and East Timor to evacuate Japanese nationals stemmed from the “normalization” of Japanese foreign policy. No prime minister prior to Hashimoto would have done the same in a similar crisis.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks became the first important case testing the “normalization” of Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister Koizumi was determined to support the “war on terror” led by the George W. Bush administration. In October 2001, the Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law (ATSML) to support the primarily American and British operations in Afghanistan. In November 2001, the Japanese government deployed the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force in the Indian Ocean to support the campaign in Afghanistan. The Japanese government of the time resolutely did not want to repeat the failure in the Gulf War, and was accordingly quite flexible and quick in responding to the crisis.

But one important question remains. Was Prime Minister Koizumi’s

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18) See Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, pp. 98-9; and also Iokibe, “Japanese diplomacy after the Cold War”, pp. 186-7.
20) Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, p. 126.
decision widely supported by Japanese public opinion? Was Koizumi’s decisiveness to support George W. Bush’s war in Iraq legitimate? It may be said that democracy now comes before diplomatic activities. Like many other governments, the Japanese government cannot ignore the public opinion of its own citizens or other countries.

3. The “Democratization” of Japanese Diplomacy

The last two decades clearly shows the increasing importance of non-governmental actors as well as public opinion in diplomatic activities. The UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office argues that “as the impact of new technology and globalization grows, a wider variety of participants will have international influence”.21) It continues, “This may be fuelled by further erosions of public confidence in governments, international organizations and global business”. Simply put, governments can no longer monopolize diplomacy. Diplomats have to consult these “wide variety of participants” as well as diplomats of other countries.

Thus, Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne wrote in their book on diplomatic practice, “Cultural, ethnic and religious movements have acquired a new global significance; civil society organizations (CSOs), be they charities, professional bodies or single- and multi-issue pressure groups, have assumed a higher profile on the world stage; and transnational banking and business corporations have tended increasingly to look towards states as facilitators rather than regulators of their otherwise independent actions.”22)


One of the salient results of this transformation is the expansion of public diplomacy. Nancy Snow wrote that traditional diplomacy of “government-to-government” (G2G) has been transformed into “governments talking to global publics” (G2P). Furthermore, public diplomacy now “involves the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions (P2P)”. This transformation makes it difficult for governments to control diplomacy. This is also the case for Japanese governments.

This then may be regarded as the “democratization” of diplomacy. This “democratization” of diplomacy has several implications. First, ordinary citizens of today can influence the direction of diplomacy much more than before. Second, governments need to communicate with and consult its people as well as other governmental officials. Third, more transparency and accountability are needed to enlighten people on diplomacy. Fourth, non-governmental actors and civil society organizations now play a much larger role in diplomacy.

The Japanese government has responded to this new development in several ways. In 2004, Japan’s MOFA established a new Public Diplomacy Department (PDD), integrating the unit of external public relations and that of cultural exchange. The Japanese government came to realize the importance of “public diplomacy”. On the other hand, the Japan Foundation, which was established in 1972, has promoted “arts


and cultural exchange”, “Japanese language education overseas” and “Japanese studies overseas and intellectual exchange” for many decades.\textsuperscript{25) However, strategic “public diplomacy” is now a necessary part of effectively enlightening public opinion.

Public opinion matters to contemporary diplomacy. In 2005, an unprecedented scale of anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in Chinese cities.\textsuperscript{26) Chinese nationalism was on the rise, and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine caused anger in many parts of China and Korea. As nationalism in the East Asian countries could ignite serious tensions, Japanese government had to therefore heed Chinese public opinion.

The collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard vessels on 7 September 2010 caused serious tensions between the Japanese and the Chinese. Both Japanese and Chinese people were influenced by the public opinion on the internet. This trend, whereby public opinion on the internet influences the views of the citizens, renders traditional diplomatic negotiation between governments increasingly difficult.

On the other hand, the electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) closed the era of the diplomacy under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DPJ’s radical changes in some areas of Japanese diplomacy bewildered American officials. This democratic change of government reminded many Japanese people of the difficult relationship between diplomacy and democracy.\textsuperscript{27) After damaging the US-Japanese relationship due to the mishandling of the Okinawa bases issue, the DPJ Cabinet slowly came back to the traditional policy.

\textsuperscript{25) Ibid., p. 272.}
\textsuperscript{26) Iokibe, “Japanese diplomacy after the Cold War”, pp. 202-3.}
\textsuperscript{27) Yuichi Hosoya, “Minshuteki gaiko koukaisi setsumei wo”, The Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 2010.}
orientation.\textsuperscript{28)}

One more important change under the new DPJ government is the establishment of the Diplomatic Records Declassification Promotion Committee in June 2010.\textsuperscript{29)} Following the first meeting of the Committee on 18 June 2010, Okada said at the Press Conference that “there are approximately 22,000 volumes (of diplomatic records) that are more than 30 years old,” on which the MOFA “will work on (declassifying) sequentially in order of precedence.”\textsuperscript{30)} The Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada repeatedly stressed the importance of transparency in the government’s diplomatic activities. According to Foreign Minister Okada, “diplomacy is based upon the understanding and trust of the people.”\textsuperscript{31)} Okada regarded this to be part of “the infrastructure of diplomacy”.

\section*{Conclusion}

Democracy does not always bring wise diplomacy. Due to the rise of nationalism, democratic opinion is sometimes accompanied by a tougher diplomatic stance. However, in the present time of “diffused diplomacy” and “global civil society”, it is obvious that governments cannot monopolize diplomacy. Thus, the “democratization” of Japanese diplomacy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28)} On the problems of Hatoyama’s diplomacy, see, for example, Yuichi Hosoya, “What was wrong with Hatoyama’s diplomacy?”, \textit{Japan Analysis: la lettre du Japon}, No. 19, June 2010, pp. 2 - 5.
\item \textsuperscript{29)} The author is a member of this Committee.
\item \textsuperscript{30)} Press Conference by Minister Kasuya Okada, 18 June 2010, MOFA Press Conference Room.
\end{itemize}
is necessary, especially in light of the historical election of August 2009 which heralded a dynamic new democracy.

Along with the “democratization” of Japanese diplomacy, there is also the “globalization” and “normalization” of Japanese diplomacy. Both these other processes are still ongoing. Richard Langhorne accurately remarked, “There can be no doubt that we are witnessing the development of a new layer in the global diplomatic system, evolving from major changes in the machinery of global politics”.32) He continued to assert: “the balance of power among the entities involved has shifted away from state governments and associations of states and towards private actors”. The Japanese government cannot ignore this evolution.

At the same time, Japanese diplomacy needs to have a humanitarian and international cooperation dimension. Simply put, Japan should also play a part in international peace and security. This need became obvious when the Gulf War broke out in 1991. The “Yoshida Doctrine” which exclusively emphasizes the importance of economic growth did not anticipate these new forms of security challenges. Japanese diplomacy has to be more comprehensive and further “normalized” if it is to undertake more military roles.

These three dimensions of diplomacy, namely “globalization”, “normalization”, and “democratization”, might possibly be relevant to diplomacy of many other countries. As there are many new challenges and crises emerging after the Cold War, major states should share common understanding on the transformation of diplomacy. In this way, countries would be able to effectively respond to these challenges and crises.

Has Japan adopted a “New Thinking” in its Diplomacy?
A Southeast Asian Perspective

LAM Peng Er
With the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) displacing the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had held power for 54 years, it is pertinent to ask: Has Japan adopted a “New Thinking” in its diplomacy?\(^1\)

\(^1\) The LDP was the perennial party in power at the national level between 1955 and 2009, except for ten months between 1993 and 1994. Its mode of governance was a tight nexus between the ruling party, the powerful bureaucracy, big businesses and interest groups in policy formulation and implementation. At the grassroots, the LDP built political machines based on patronage. Being the political steward of the Japanese “miracle”, the LDP garnered considerable political support despite its money politics and corruption. But its political support was severely eroded after two “lost decades” due to the bursting of Japan’s “bubble” economy in 1991, and the enervation of its traditional support groups especially the farming and construction industries. In international affairs, the LDP adopted the Yoshida Doctrine which committed Japan to adhere to the US-Japan Alliance for its security in exchange for US bases in Japan especially Okinawa, while adopting a “defensive” defence posture in line with its interpretation of the no-war clause (Article 9) of the Japanese constitution.
There are at least four areas in which the new DPJ national government has sought to make a fresh start in Japan’s foreign policy:

1. the mitigation of climate change;
2. the promotion of an East Asian Community;
3. a more equal relationship with its ally, the US; and
4. politicians rather than bureaucrats taking the lead in policy-making in a democratic polity.

At issue is the DPJ’s “New Thinking” and the impediments to implementing a fresh approach to Japan’s diplomacy. I argue that the DPJ’s inexperience as a ruling party, its weak leadership, and the persistence of traditional power politics in East Asia make it difficult for the DPJ’s “New Thinking” to come to fruition. However, in non-traditional security issues such as global warming, biodiversity and peace-building, the DPJ government has the latitude and opportunity to play a larger global role. Indeed, in issues which are not entwined with traditional interstate security and conflict, NGOs and civil society can become more active players in Japan’s New Diplomacy.

**East Asian Community: An Elusive Dream?**

According to the DPJ’s manifesto, the party seeks to build an East Asian Community (EAC). This is indeed an ambitious and lofty goal but is obviously a difficult one given the fact that many East Asian states, like states in other regions, are driven by nationalism and national interests. Unlike the EU, countries in East Asia have different regime types including totalitarianism (North Korea), communism (China, Vietnam and Laos), military junta (Myanmar), absolute monarchy (Brunei), soft-authoritarian regimes (arguably Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and
Cambodia) and democracies (Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines), Simply put, these regimes do not share common values. Indeed, armed conflict and war between neighbours in this region are not unthinkable. The divided Korean peninsula remains heavily militarized and perhaps more “nuclearized”. A rising China may become more assertive towards Taiwan, and in relation to its other territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. An East Asia that is transformed from an arena of power politics to a community of shared values where war is inconceivable among members – as in the case of the European Community – would be revolutionary indeed.

In an article in Voice magazine, Hatoyama Yukio, who became the first DPJ Prime Minister, argued that Japan is caught between two great powers, the US and China.\(^2\) On the one hand, the US (according to Hatoyama) is mired in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its “market fundamentalism” had given rise to the global financial crisis. On the other hand, China is rising but problems of history continue to bedevil bilateral Sino-Japanese relations. Japan should, therefore, anchor Sino-Japanese relations within a broader EAC which can help to mitigate bilateral differences. Better relations with China and an insipient EAC, Hatoyama implies, can create some space to manoeuvre and balance in Japan’s foreign policy by avoiding an over dependence on its US ally.

Hatoyama’s New Thinking deserves to be quoted at length:

The recent financial crisis has suggested to many people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbour doubts about the permanence of the dollar as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of the US-led globalism is coming to an

end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world led by the US towards an era of multipolarity. ....

Although the influence of the US is declining, the US will remain the world’s leading military and economic power for the next two to three decades. Current developments show clearly that China, which has by far the world’s largest population, will become one of the world’s leading economic nations, while also continuing to expand its military power. The size of China’s economy will surpass that of Japan in the not too distant future. How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence and protect its national interest when caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its position as the world’s dominant power, and China which is seeking ways to become one? The future international environment surrounding Japan does not seem to be easy. This is a question of concern not only to Japan but also to the small and medium-sized nations in Asia. They want the military power of the US to function effectively for the stability of the region but want to restrain US political and economic excesses. They also want to reduce the militarily threat posed by our neighbour China while ensuring that China’s expanding economy develops in an orderly fashion. I believe these are the instinctive demands of the various nations in the region. This is also a major factor accelerating regional integration.

ASEAN, Japan, China (including Hong Kong), South Korea and Taiwan now account for one quarter of the world’s gross domestic product. The economic power of the East Asian region and the mutually independent relationships within the region have grown wider and deeper, which is unprecedented. As such, the underlying structures required for the formation of a regional economic bloc are already in place. On the other hand, due to the historical and cultural conflicts existing between the countries of this region, in addition to their conflicting national security interests, we must recognize that there are numerous difficult political issues. The problems of increased militarization and territorial disputes, which stand in the way of regional
integration, cannot be resolved by bilateral negotiations between, for example, Japan and South Korea or Japan and China. The more these problems are discussed bilaterally, the greater the risk that citizens’ emotions in each country will become inflamed and nationalism will be intensified. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, I would suggest that the issues which stand in the way of regional integration can only really be resolved through the process of moving towards greater regional integration. For example, the experience of the EU shows us how regional integration can defuse territorial disputes.\textsuperscript{3)}

However, Hatoyama’s grand strategy and “New Thinking” to recalibrate Japanese foreign policy soon ran into trouble. After recklessly promising the relocation of the US marine base from Futenma during the November 2009 Lower House Elections, Hatoyama encountered opposition from both the US and the Okinawans. Washington believed that an agreement to relocate the US marine base from Futenma to Henoko in Okinawa had already been forged between the US and Japan and could not be unilaterally scrapped by the Hatoyama Administration. Many Okinawans remained insistent that US military bases including Futenma be transferred out of their prefecture given the problems of noise, civilian safety from military exercises and operations, and crimes by American servicemen. Hatoyama also failed to adequately consult the Okinawans about the alternative sites to the marine base in Futenma. Following his failure to meet his self-imposed deadline to resolve the Futenma impasse and the resultant plunging public opinion support, Hatoyama resigned after being in office for less than a year.

The Futenma fiasco revealed at least three painful truths: Japan remains very much subordinated to the strategic preferences of its superpower ally; the top DPJ leadership was improvising a way out of

\textsuperscript{3)} Ibid.
the Futenma impasse without a well thought out plan and sufficient domestic political support; and the Hatoyama Administration apparently failed to tap the bureaucratic expertise of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with the base relocation issue. Simply put, Hatoyama’s approach to Futenma was cavalier, amateurish, and lacking in proper consultation with the relevant parties.

Another example of “New Thinking” of the Hatoyama Administration, as stated earlier, was its foreign policy centrepiece of an EAC. To be sure, the idea of an EAC has found resonance within East Asia and Japan. When its antecedent, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), was first proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in 1990, there was considerable interest in Japan. According to Mahathir, the EAEC is meant for Asian countries only; after all, the Europeans have their EU and the Americans their North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, Japan did not pursue the EAEC after its US ally expressed opposition to it. In the aftermath of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, East Asian countries launched the Chiangmai Initiative with a mechanism for currency swaps to deal with future financial crises. This was the genesis of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT: the three are Japan, China and South Korea).

Subsequently, insipient East Asian regionalism with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as its core has moved along several parallel tracks including the APT, the East Asian Summit (EAS) and regional FTAs (Free Trade Arrangements) between China and ASEAN, and a comprehensive economic partnership between Japan and ASEAN. Besides intra-East Asia regionalism, there are overlapping Asia Pacific institutions and processes such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic

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4) There is the joke that EAEC also stands for “East Asia Except Caucasians”.

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CHAPTER 3. Has Japan adopted a “New Thinking” in its Diplomacy? A Southeast Asian Perspective 49
Cooperation) and the Trans Pacific Partnership. When Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio attended the APEC meeting in Singapore in November 2010, he delivered a speech on Japan and an EAC. Hatoyama declared:

The new government of Japan has declared that it attaches great importance to Asian diplomacy. The main pillar of this policy is the initiative for an ‘East Asian community’. ... Europe had the disastrous experience of two world wars. But Germany and France, once bitter foes, have increased their cooperation dramatically. This started with the establishment of a common market for coal and steel production. Then, through further exchanges among people, they succeeded in establishing a de facto community. Now, wars against one another are unimaginable. These efforts were initially centred on Germany and France. But, they continued through twists and turns over the years, and they finally resulted in the creation of the European Union. The central idea of my ‘East Asian community’ initiative is based upon reconciliation and cooperation in Europe.5)

However, it is sanguine to think that China and Japan can play the integrative role of France and Germany given the historical problems and territorial dispute in the East China Sea between the two Northeast Asian neighbours. Indeed, Hatoyama’s East Asian Community was big on intent but small on details. There were vague references to “fraternity” (a concept advocated by his grandfather, former Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro). But the geographical boundaries, membership, values, roles and functions of this community were left undefined. It was also unclear whether Australia, New Zealand, India and the US were welcomed in Hatoyama’s EAC. Hatoyama had aspirations for an

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5) Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, “Japan’s New Commitment to Asia: Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community”, Singapore, 15 November 2009.
EAC but lacked a roadmap to achieve such a scheme.

Other than articulating an EAC, Hatoyama did not seriously pursue talks with other East Asian countries to canvas their views about its desirability. Such an ambitious scheme to remap the international relations of East Asia can only take place with the support of and inputs from Japan’s neighbours. Again, just like the Futenma fiasco, the Hatoyama Administration did not pursue any serious consultation with the relevant parties. In this regard, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not translate the centrepiece of his “New Thinking” into action.

**Senkaku (Diaoyu) Incident and the US as an indispensable ally**

Kan Naoto succeeded Hatoyama as Prime Minister in June 2010. Given his background as a civic activist, Kan was more interested in domestic reforms and had little interest and experience in international relations. Indeed, he had no “New Thinking” about diplomacy. His policy goal was the hiking of the consumption tax to pay for Japan’s insolvent pension system and the DPJ’s electoral promise to provide financial child support to families. Kan raised the spectre of a tax hike without proper discussion within the DPJ, the opposition parties and the general public just before the 2010 Upper House Election. This angered the public and the DPJ lost the Upper House Election. This may lead to a parliamentary gridlock in policymaking because the DPJ controls the Lower House while the opposition now dominates the Upper House.

One wonders whether the DPJ government can conduct a “New Diplomacy” with a divided parliament. However, the US has experienced divided government on many occasions (where the Presidency and
Congress were controlled by different political parties) without a disruption in its foreign policy. Hopefully, the leadership of the ruling DPJ and opposition LDP and their parliamentary committees can be skilful enough to forge compromises and adopt a bi-partisan approach to international relations with space for “New Thinking”.

Although the Kan Administration had not officially dropped the DPJ manifesto to promote an EAC, it has not talked about it either. Prime Minister Kan also did not have the luxury of engaging in new visions of diplomacy when he was confronted by traditional power politics in East Asia. There were at least three reality checks on the DPJ government’s “New Thinking” in diplomacy. The first, as stated earlier, was the US veto over the relocation of the marine base from Futenma when a viable alternative site was not offered. The second was the Sino-Japanese spat over Tokyo’s arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat which collided with two Japanese coastguard vessels in the waters of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands administered by Japan. The third was Russian President Medvedev’s unprecedented visit to the disputed Southern Kuriles (Northern Territories to Japan) administered by Russia in November 2010, much to the chagrin of Tokyo.

Arguably, the 2010 Sino-Japanese fracas over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) serves as a stark reminder that the EAC is probably a pipe dream in the foreseeable future. Unlike France and Germany, which took the lead to build the EU and have remained at its core, China and Japan are unable to play this pivotal role by burying their historical hatchet and transcending their narrow national interests. It is also a sharp reminder to the DPJ that Japan still needs the US as a strategic ally in the wake of a rising and more assertive China. The Chinese were furious that Japan wanted to persecute the Chinese fishing captain under Japanese law, as this would underpin Tokyo’s claims of sovereignty to the Senkaku (Diaoyu).
In contrast, the Koizumi Administration simply released Chinese “intruders” to the disputed islands without charging them under Japanese law.

The foreign policy inexperience of the DPJ government was painfully exposed by the spat between Beijing and Tokyo over the incident. Indeed, it was unclear who was in charge of foreign policy and crisis management in Tokyo. Then Transport Minister Maehara Seiji (who headed the Japanese Coast Guard) claimed that he ordered the arrest of the Chinese fishing crew. But this was a delicate foreign relations issue which should have immediately involved the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Foreign Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If Maehara’s claim is accurate, how could the DPJ government permit him to make a decision which has grave consequences for Sino-Japanese relations? Apparently, then Foreign Minister Okada was busy catching a train in Berlin and was out of the crisis management loop for a time.

Even more bizarre was the DPJ government’s claim that the prosecutor’s office in Naha, Okinawa, decided to release the Chinese captain on its own accord. Moreover, the prosecutor’s office in Naha intimated that the Chinese detainee was released with the consideration of Sino-Japanese relations in mind. This is odd because the job of the prosecutor is to adhere to the Japanese legal process while the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet should decide on important foreign policy issues. It appears that in this crisis with China, people who should not be making decisions were making decisions and those who should did not. The ruling DPJ’s crisis management, therefore, appears to be in shambles. It also raises doubts about the DPJ’s pet notion that politicians will lead and that the wings of bureaucrats must be clipped in policymaking.
Unfortunately, the dispute regarding jurisdiction over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) inflamed nationalism and provoked mass demonstrations in both countries. Not only did China demand an apology from Japan, it also, for a time, vindictively stopped the sale of rare earth minerals to its neighbour. Japan then forged deals with Vietnam and India to mine these minerals in the event that China played this card again. The US assured Japan that the scope of the US-Japan Alliance does extend to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) and offered trilateral talks with China and Japan to discuss the Senkaku (Diaoyu) issue much to China’s annoyance. Washington, therefore, has seized the opportunities provided by Beijing’s disputes with its neighbours in the East and South China Seas to become more assertive in East Asia. This can be interpreted thus: the US is sending a strong signal to East Asia that it is here to stay despite its preoccupation in Iraq and Afghanistan; it is a great power to be reckoned with, and the only power who can really stand up to a rising China.

The Kan Administration’s poor handling of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Incident led to a sharp drop in its popularity according to public opinion polls. Dogged by low public opinion support, and a weak and divided leadership, it is doubtful whether the Kan Administration can engage in visionary “New Thinking”. Its first year in office with two Prime Ministers taught the ruling party a painful lesson — that it is unwise for Japan to seek equidistance between the US and China given the problems with all its neighbours including China, Russia and the two Koreas. Moreover, the EAC is likely to be quietly shelved by the DPJ government given the unpropitious conditions for regional solidarity in Northeast Asia.
New Thinking in New Diplomacy

Climate Change and Biodiversity

Arguably, the DPJ government had more success in adopting “New Thinking” in non-traditional diplomacy. Unlike the pro-business LDP government, the new ruling party has a more ambitious approach to take the lead in reducing carbon emissions to mitigate global warming. Prime Minister Hatoyama committed Japan to a 25 percent reduction to its 1990 levels of carbon emissions even though this measure was opposed by Japanese Big Businesses. However, this commitment is contingent on significant reductions by other major carbon emitters. Noteworthy is the presence of around 50 Japanese NGOs at the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. In issues of non-conventional security including climate change, there is space for NGOs to play a larger and positive role in tapping the enthusiasm and participation of citizens.

Japan under the new DPJ government also organized the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity (COP10) in Nagoya in 2010. COP10 had at least two key features. First are legally binding international rules for sharing benefits from genetic resources used in food, pharmaceuticals and other products. Second is an Aichi Target which seeks biodiversity protection including the expansion of protected areas to 17 percent of the world’s land and 10 percent of its waters. Another important goal is to halve the rate at which natural habitats are lost.

According to the Japanese media:

After last-minute manoeuvring by host nation Japan to ensure substantive results from two weeks of fraught talks and eight years of prior negotiations, Environment Minister Ryu Matsumoto declared the
meeting closed around 3 a.m. following the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, which governs the sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources, and the Aichi Target, which sets objectives for protecting biodiversity through 2020. The protocol will take effect 90 days after at least 50 nations have ratified the agreement. Japan will have to seek ratification in the Diet, as well as the passage of laws required to implement the protocol. Japan will fund the creation of a system to support developing nations trying to implement the new rules.6)

A feature of New Diplomacy is that it is not contingent merely on policy shifts or a fresh mentality by the state, but also the roles and dynamism of NGOs and civil society. Japanese NGOs concerned about biodiversity are also active like those interested in the mitigation of climate change. Apparently, the Japan Civil Network for the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), representing over ninety environmental groups and hundreds of thousands of members, has sent a formal letter of appeal to President Obama and all members of the US Senate urging the United States to join all the world’s other nations and finally ratify the Convention on Biological Diversity Treaty. The letter noted that 193 countries have ratified the CBD Treaty and the US is the only nation that has not.

Peace-building

The DPJ government has also affirmed its commitment to peace-building or addressing civil wars in the international system. Addressing intra-state conflict through diplomacy is a non-traditional approach in diplomacy. Traditionally, diplomacy has been primarily concerned with inter-state relations and conflict. However, it was the Koizumi

6) “COP10: Nagoya meet OKs historic genetic deal”, Asahi Shimbun, 1 November 2010.
Administration which first emphasized peace building as a new pillar in Japanese diplomacy. In this sense, Japan’s commitment to peace-building is marked by continuity rather than change despite the advent of a DPJ government. Even if there is no “New Thinking” by the DPJ on the issue of peace-building, it is not necessarily a bad thing if the new government can stay the course on peace-building. For example, Japan is now building peace in Muslim Mindanao, the Southern Philippines, where more than 120,000 people, mostly civilians, have perished in a long running war of separatism.

Japan is a member of the International Monitoring Team with Malaysia, Libya and Brunei (all Organization of Islamic Conference countries) to facilitate peace in Mindanao. During the tenure of Okada as Foreign Minister, Japan joined the International Contact Group with the UK and Turkey to act as advisors to the peace process in Mindanao. Unfortunately, there is no “New Thinking” on the part of the DPJ government to publicize to its citizens and to the world what Japan is doing to enhance peace in the region.

**Diminution of Japan’s role in the World?**

Unfortunately, the new DPJ government has undermined Japan’s diplomacy and image in the world. Because of its insistence on cutting so-called “wasteful” projects instead of raising taxes to pay for its welfare policies like subsidies to child rearing, the DPJ’s axe had fallen on publications such as *Gaiko Forum* and *Japan Echo* which are important for the country’s public diplomacy and presence.

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The DPJ’s cost cutting may also impact on important pillars of Japanese public diplomacy and “soft power” such as the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Japan Foundation. Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), one of the few instruments of foreign policy for a pacifistic Japanese state, will also not be spared the axe. If indiscriminate cost-cutting is a feature of the DPJ’s “New Thinking”, it may be a matter of “penny wise, pound foolish” because Japan’s image and voice in the world may diminish. It would be naive to think that manga, anime, J-pop and Japanese cuisine are sufficient for Japan’s “soft” power and a good image in the world. Independent think tanks with fresh ideas are also sorely missing in Japan.

**Japan’s Problems with China, Russia and North Korea**

I would argue that the malaise in Japan’s diplomacy may run deeper than a lack of “New Thinking”. Perhaps a deeper problem is a lack of national confidence (sapped by two lost decades) among its political leaders and citizens. A big question is now that China’s GDP has overtaken Japan’s in nominal terms in the 2nd quarter of 2010, can Japan regain its confidence and creativity to pursue an effective diplomacy, both traditional and non-traditional, for a useful and honoured role in international society? Simply put, Japan is no longer the number two economy in the world. What role can Japan possibly play now that its ODA budget is reduced due to fiscal constraints?

Arguably, a problem in East Asia today is the lack of confidence among the Japanese and overconfidence among the Chinese. Lifted by its successes in the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Exposition in front of a global audience, China seems to have been overcome with
hubris and views itself a great power. Beijing has also adopted a more assertive stance towards its neighbours in territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas. A case can be made that China has over played its hand by banning the sale of rare earth minerals to Japan as punishment over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands dispute. This blatant use of trade as a political weapon has simply given Japan the incentive to broker new deals with India and Vietnam to buy rare earth minerals. This may well be a blessing in disguise to alert Japan to the importance of reducing its dependence on China for these minerals as soon as possible.

That Sino-Japanese relations have sunk to a new low over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) dispute poignantly reveals that the DPJ’s New Thinking is rather romantic if not naive. The apogee of the DPJ government’s romance with China was when Ozawa Ichiro, the party’s bigwig and former Secretary General, led a 600 member delegation including many MPs to China to have their photographs taken with President Hu Jintao in 2009. But such gestures of friendship and the hope that Japan and China can spearhead an EAC came to nothing.

New Thinking by the DPJ government towards Russia and North Korea is also not evident. In order to bolster his nationalistic credentials, President Medvedev visited the Russian administered Southern Kuriles in 2010. An enraged Tokyo recalled its ambassador from Moscow but there is nothing very much it could do to retaliate against the Russians. Japan seemed to have locked itself in an uncompromising “all or nothing” formula with Russia over the four islands north of Hokkaido. Moreover, any politicians, intellectuals or journalists who have the audacity to propose a 2 Plus 2 Formula (two islands each to Japan and Russia), dual sovereignty over the disputed islands or any other compromise solution are in danger of being branded as traitors and perhaps becoming
a target for extremist rightwing nationalists in Japan.

Benefiting from high energy prices and recovering from the “big bang” from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has less need for an “Alaskan” deal — money for territory — today. The Japanese political elite seem unable to grasp the fact that Japan had lost the war against the Soviet Union in 1945 and is highly unlikely to regain its lost territories from Russia. In contrast, post-war Germany had given up some of its traditional territories to Russia and Poland. One wonders why Germany can accept its Second World War defeat but not Japan.

It is unthinkable for Japan to go to war for its “Northern Territories”. There is no reason why Russia would return the four islands since it defeated Japan in 1945. There is also no incentive for Russia to do so today. To harp on Russia for unfairly attacking Japan despite a non-aggression treaty is not going to change anything. Japan’s failure to sign a peace treaty with Russia could mean that China may be the main beneficiary of oil and gas pipelines in the Russian Far East. It is also conceivable that Chinese and not Japanese money may develop energy resources in the Russian Far East in the future. If there is no breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations, it is not unthinkable for Russia and China to cooperate tacitly and pressure Japan simultaneously in the East China Sea and the Southern Kuriles in the future.

Another problem for Japanese diplomacy is North Korea. Since the Abe Administration, Japan seemed to have placed greater priority on the “hostage” issue (Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea) than the “nuclearization” of North Korea. But Tokyo has no leverage over Pyongyang. Japan had established diplomatic relations with communist regimes in Russia, China and Vietnam before. One wonders whether it is possible for Tokyo to engage in New Thinking towards Pyongyang and establish
diplomatic relations with its ex-colony and Korean neighbour like many European democracies today.

Undoubtedly, North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens is wrong and should be condemned. But Japan should not suffer from amnesia and must acknowledge that it had abducted thousands of Koreans for slave labour in the previous century. Simply put, two wrongs do not make a right. Unfortunately, the new DPJ government is bereft of any ideas towards the hostage issue, “nuclearization” of North Korea and the normalization of relations. Regarding relations with South Korea, the Kan Administration has done better. To mark and close the chapter on the 100th anniversary of Imperial Japan’s forceful annexation of Korea, Japan made an apology and agreed to return Korean artefacts kept by the Japanese Imperial Household Agency.

Whither New Thinking in Japanese Diplomacy?

Arguably, the instinct of the new DPJ government for a more equal relationship with the US, better relations with China within an EAC framework, and greater support for climate change initiatives is not a bad one. But the realities of power politics and national interests make it difficult for the Hatoyama Administration to attain New Thinking in its foreign policy.

According to the Pacific Command’s official website, the US has around 85 military bases and installations in Japan. The website notes:

U.S. military strength in Japan is about 36,000 ashore and 11,000 afloat, and U.S. forces are dispersed among 85 facilities located on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa. Total acreage of U.S. bases is approximately 77,000 acres. USFJ bases and facilities range in size from
a several thousand acre training area to a single antenna site.8)

Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, one wonders why an independent country like Japan needs to support so many US military facilities. Is it possible for Japan to remain a good strategic partner and ally of the US, and to play a larger role in international security (especially UNPKO and peace-building) while gradually reducing the number of US bases and facilities in the country?

What then should Japan’s new diplomatic role in the 21st century be? Rather than a junior Cold War warrior, it should pursue a more autonomous foreign policy to mitigate climate change and to promote biodiversity, support peace-building and UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and nuclear disarmament. Despite the rocky nature of Sino-Japanese relations, it is premature to write off an insipient EAC. Are the Chinese and Japanese less wise than the French and Germans in patching up their historical differences and embed their relations within a wider framework of regionalism? One is tempted to say that thus far Chinese and Japanese leaders have shown less wisdom than their European counterparts but it is too early to tell.

Notwithstanding the lingering messiness of power politics and virulent nationalism in Northeast Asia, a Japan which pursues environmental protection, UNPKO, peace-building and nuclear non-proliferation would be a good and honoured member of international society. Being a rich, democratic and Asian country, Japan should also not forget the democratic movement led by Nobel Laureate Aung San Su Kyi in Myanmar and must actively engage its military junta and help in the development of that country. It would be good if Japan does not turn

inwards and wallow in its domestic problems and misery, but conduct its diplomacy with confidence and purpose to build a better and safer world.
Reflections on Japanese think tanks: Roles, Relevance and Limitations

Haruko Satoh
Introduction

Foreign and security policy think tanks and research institutes are as yet fully developed tools in Japanese diplomacy. Very few would disagree with this observation. Foreign researchers and diplomats often find it perplexing (and undoubtedly, frustrating) that there are so few functioning research institutes in Japan, which could be a counterpart to theirs. They find the situation perplexing because they naturally expect that a country the size of Japan should have institutions — both independent and government-affiliated — for foreign and security policy research. However, reality stands in stark contrast to these expectations. Even the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), established in 1960 with the aim of becoming Japan’s hub of foreign and security policy research, has been struggling to establish itself as the Japanese
equivalent of Chatham House and the Council of Foreign Relations — the two models that the founders of JIIA, including Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, had in mind.

JIIA is by no means the only institution that has failed to develop a relevant role in Japanese diplomacy or foreign and security policy. The Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS; founded in 1978), the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR; 1987) and the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS; 1988) are similar research institutes based in Tokyo with similar objectives. But like JIIA, they have failed live up to those objectives and aims. None can boast to have approximated the roles played by institutions often cited as their models, such as the Brookings Institution, Rand Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Chatham House, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) or the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

There is no simple explanation for this chronic underperformance of Japan’s policy think tanks. In the past, it was because the bureaucracy-led policymaking in Japan focused only on economic growth and did not generate enough demand for independent policy research institutes and think tanks. Indeed, there is some truth in the claim, “Kasumigaseki, the location of the powerful central bureaucracy, is one big think tank. Thus, Japan does not need a think tank culture.” Moreover, foreign and security policies during the Cold War sought to manage the alliance with the United States. As a result, there was little room (i.e., political demand) for alternative thinking to broaden strategic options in Japan’s foreign relations. Yet, calls for the development of think tanks to enhance Japan’s engagement with the international policy community and
opinion circles have also been constant. Accordingly, efforts to promote their need and to strengthen them (by the few who recognized their importance) have never abated.

In fact, a great number of people engaged in public policy discourse recognize the need for institutions other than the bureaucracy (such as a policy research section with the political party, independent policy research institutions and think tanks or university-affiliated policy study programmes and institutions) to participate in the policy analysis and policy formulation process. Terashima Jitsuro, formerly of the Mitsui Corporation and present head of the Japan Research Institute (JRI), for example, orchestrated the establishment of an independent and international think tank, the Asia Pacific Institute (API), in Osaka this year. API would be devoted to Asia-Pacific issues, and receive financial backing from the Kansai business association. Other initiatives, such as the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA), founded in 1993 in Niigata, are devoted to promoting research on the economic development of the regions surrounding the Japan Sea.

While these initiatives are important in themselves, they are as yet powerless to stop the other on-going phenomenon: the rapid decline of Japan’s presence in international meeting and conferences in the last decade. Presently, Japan has a constellation of think tanks and research institutions, including older institutions, such as JIIA, IIPS or RIPS. Each of these think tanks and institutions are too small or ineffective to carve a distinct international profile and be policy-relevant. This paper examines whether this situation could change.

To do so, we must first take a brief look at the evolution of public diplomacy and “track-II” dialogues in Japan.
The Unchanging Challenges: Cold War decades

—the 1970s

In 1978, Yamamoto Tadashi, head of the Japan Center of International Exchange (JCIE), arguably Japan’s best known independent organization facilitating dialogue between Japan’s policy elites and opinion leaders as well as the international policy community, wrote on the necessity of enhancing private-sector level international exchange in *Kokusai Mondai*, JIIA’s monthly journal on international affairs. In it, he remarked:

“There are only a handful of Japanese who can actively participate in international projects on policy research. These few Japanese are constantly flying around the world, taking part in multiple international conferences... On the other hand, research institutions capable of engaging in international activities are limited in Japan, and there is perhaps no institution with capable staff to carry out international projects on policy research. Moreover, there are no private foundations in Japan to fund non-official international exchange activities. These private institutions spend most of their time and energy on fund-raising when they ought to be preparing and running actual projects.”1]

Unfortunately (and embarrassingly), Yamamoto’s observation still applies to the state of affairs with Japan’s policy think tanks and public diplomacy 33 years later. There is not much to add to or subtract from Yamamoto’s article; the challenges of which he spoke are still there.

Lack of policy researchers and specialists capable of engaging with international counterparts, lack of infrastructure such as institutions and staff to support international policy research, and lack of funding from the state, private foundations and corporate philanthropy still plague Japan’s policy think tanks. Furthermore, mainstream politics is focused on domestic issues, which do not generate demand for think tanks promoting international exchange activities. There is also limited understanding and recognition of the importance of policy research and analysis and the utility of public (or informal) diplomacy aside from the purpose of nurturing “friendship” between Japan and other countries.

The paucity of understanding toward policy think tanks can partially be explained by the particular political regime that governed Japan since the advent of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. The so-called 1955-regime of single-party rule by the LDP was neither dynamic nor open in terms of policy formulation. There was little room for policy debates let alone policy research with the view to offering alternatives. Moreover, when Yamamoto wrote the article for Kokusai Mondai, traditional diplomacy, that is diplomacy at the official level, was still the dominant form of conducting foreign relations and policy dialogue between states. “Track II” dialogues were not as well established then as they are today. In fact, track II dialogues were conceived in the 1970s out of necessity.

Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s focused on the growing economic and diplomatic interactions with the US and Europe, and sought to carve a place for the country amongst the world’s powerful economic nations. Aside from key events defining post-war Japan’s improving position in the international community, such as its inclusion in the United Nations
(UN) and related international organizations in 1956 and the hosting of the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964, the establishment of the Trilateral Commission in 1973 was arguably the moment when Japan was recognized by the West as a legitimate power since its defeat in World War II in 1945. It was upon Henry Kissinger’s suggestion that the hitherto Atlantic community-dominated international policy groups included Japan, the rising economic force from Asia.

Although the Trilateral Commission was a non-official forum, Japan regarded its inclusion in an exclusive group of Western leaders to be a symbolic step forward in two respects. First, being part of the Western alliance gave Japan a sense of stronger identification. Second, it restored Japan’s status and reputation in the international community. Inclusion in the Trilateral Commission meant that Japan was the sole Asian representative in a Western dominated world. Further strengthening the perception that Japan now stood on par with the major Western powers was the establishment of the G-7 Economic Summit in 1975. In just 30 years since its defeat in the Second World War, Japan became an economic juggernaut in the free world, indispensable to international economic co-ordination and co-operation. Thus, Japan took the G-7 Summit seriously. In the turn, the G-7 Summit became the most important official event in the Japanese diplomatic calendar.

Aside from the positive ego boosts to Japanese elites, these meetings became occasions where Japanese leaders were exposed to different modes of decision-making and leadership. Japan saw that the G-7 was a tight-knit Atlantic community where the leaders communicated regularly and shared a sense of camaraderie. The fact that the Western leaders, with the exception of Italy, stayed in power for a longer period,
did not enhance their impression of Japanese leaders. This is because Japanese leaders changed every other year and tended to be less powerful domestically than their Western counterparts. The Japanese premiers also sat at the top of a very different policy formulation and decision-making mechanism. Political leadership was not centred on the head of the government but in a system run by bureaucrats. It was a fact of which the West was remotely aware at the time.

RIPS was established during this period in 1978 by the then Defence Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a view to playing a bridging role between the government and outside specialists on foreign and security policy research. It aimed to “provide the Japanese government with policy recommendations from an independent and objective viewpoint, while also serving to deepen international exchange and inform other nations of Japan’s standpoint and position in international affairs.”\(^2\) Its stated objective reflects the growing recognition in parts of the government machinery for the need to engage in policy dialogue with other countries. So doing would not only strengthen Japan’s policy positions, but enable Japan to explain the changes in its policies that have emerged as a result of the country’s diversifying international engagement, such as the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 laid the foundation for Japan’s present relationship with Southeast Asia wherein the country built “heart-to-heart” ties with its partners. It also introduced the concept of “comprehensive security”, which stated that Japan’s security policy (such as the deployment of Overseas Development Assistance) was motivated

by the peaceful maintenance of economic security rather than military considerations. In the face of the growing inevitability to increase Japan’s military burden in the Western alliance, this was an important domestic political message to the military-allergic Japanese public.

—1980s

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 and the deployment of SS-20 missiles also broadened Japan’s policy dialogue landscape. As both Japan and Europe shared for a recognizable, common security concern for the first time, Japan sought policy dialogue with European states. Britain, in particular, shared similar positions with Japan, as it too regards the United States as a “close” ally. Thus, Japan established its first track-II forum with Britain in 1984. In fact, the UK–Japan 2000 Group was formed with the blessings of Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Nakasone Yasuhiro. The Group aimed to strengthen ties between the two nations’ mainstream leaders in politics, business, media and academia so as to broaden the scope of exchanges between the two nations by the year 2000. Unique for its time, the Group reported their recommendations to the prime minister of both countries after their annual plenary meeting. These annual plenary meetings took place alternately in Japan and the UK. The Group is credited with launching the original model of the JET programme wherein native English speakers teach English in Japanese high schools. It also set up the UK–Japan high-tech forum to promote technological exchanges between the two countries.

The UK–Japan 2000 Group is a model that is hard to copy. Against this backdrop, there were also demands in the late 1980s for Japan to develop independent think tanks as its economic status in the world
soared. These demands took the form of political pressure from the US (and Europe) for Japan to share the security burden and become an active player in international political and security issues as the main Asian member of the Western alliance. In order for Japan to assume the international political responsibilities concomitant with its economic power, it had to cease being a political dwarf. Japan needed to participate with its own ideas in the wider international policy discourse as the second largest economy in the world. Japan could no longer maintain its low profile position on various issues at official-level forums, such as the G-7 summit, quietly concentrating on economic growth.

The aforementioned JFIR and IIPS were established around the same time by those who clearly sensed the need for Japan to broaden its scope of international engagement. The founders of JFIR and IIPS also believed Japan should conduct policy research and analysis-level interaction with American and European counterparts. JFIR was founded in 1987 by Dr. Okita Saburo (a former foreign minister) and like-minded “citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan.”

Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro created IIPS in 1988 for “research and study, international exchange, and other activities conducive to examining critical issues facing the world and Japan.”

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3) See http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/about_us.htm (accessed 2 April 2011).
However, the bubble economy money in the 1980s only managed to give a temporary facelift to Japan’s public diplomacy organizations and policy research institutions. It did not lay down a solid financial base for sustainable public diplomacy and policy research activities for these organizations. Enhancing public diplomacy, such as track-II dialogue, policy research and analysis capabilities were not government priorities as too few in the policymaking apparatus recognized their importance. Moreover, companies tended to have their own internal research institutions and did not see the need to be part of the wider public policy discourse. For example, the aforementioned UK-Japan 2000 Group demonstrates this Japanese situation vividly. When the Group was set up in 1984, the secretariat for the UK side was established in Chatham House under its research director, William Wallace, so as to provide the Group with policy-analysis capability. Japan did not have set up an institution for its secretariat for the first two years. In fact, the foreign ministry coordinated the Japanese side of the UK-Japan 2000 Group until JCIE took over the function in 1986. The UK side was also established as a charitable company with an executive board, corporate members who paid membership fees, and working sub-committees launching projects or presenting issues for discussion at the Group’s plenary meetings. More importantly, the UK side had an independent financial base, which enabled it to support its own activities. The Japanese side, in contrast, was scarcely aware of this. Additionally, the Japanese side was less organized, less purposeful and largely dependent on foreign ministry subsidies. For Japanese members, the UK-2000 Group was basically a useful talk shop and a place where they could exchange views with their British leader friends once a year. While the Group functioned as a track-II channel for the UK government and had an impact on the British perception of Japan, it is
hard to say if the Group functioned in the same way for the Japanese government.

Japanese universities were also part of the problem, as very few reached out to the field of strategic or policy studies with a view to contributing to the active worldwide debates and discussions on international thought. Although there were many first-class scholars on specific issues or regions, such as regional specialists on Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia and experts on environmental protection and technology, they often could not speak English. This, in turn, limited their opportunities of participating in international gatherings. Japanese scholars and officials attending international conferences also tended to be silent in sessions pertaining to issues outside their particular field of interest or speciality. Interaction between participants from different parts of the world makes conferences interesting and meaningful, and establishing networks with other participants is one of the important purposes of international gatherings. However, Japanese participants tend to be either too shy or modest to speak their minds, or have yet to grasp the idea that personal networks and institutional ties (i.e., track-II activities) are indispensable to fruitful policy-relevant dialogue.

**Unchanging Challenges: Post-Cold War era**

In 1993, former US Secretary for Defense, Robert McNamara, wrote in the preface of the Urban Institute study on Japanese think tanks:

Japan is the only superpower today that lacks independent think tanks to provide nonpartial analysis, judgment, and recommendations to
government and the business community. Independent think tanks could inform the Japanese government and the public not only about actions that would be beneficial to Japan, but also about the country’s enormous opportunities to effect change on the world stage.

Japan must determine what roles it wants to play in international security issues, the global economy, and the environment. It must determine how those roles interact and how the nation will relate to the other superpowers, particularly the United States and Europe...

The mission to strengthen existing Japanese think tanks and to create new, independent research institutions is an urgent one.5)

By this time, the international situation had changed with the end of the Cold War. The need for independent public policy think tanks in Japan is as pressing as ever. The report, *A Japanese Think Tank: Exploring Alternative Models*, was jointly published by the Urban Institute and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the Urban Institute’s decision to work together in 1990 to “explore the feasibility of introducing a think tank in Japan.” The report is not so much about creating foreign and security policy think tanks, but the advocating the creation of independent think tanks so as to improve the bureaucracy-led public policy formulation process. Social values had been changing and diversifying since the 1980s, where nearly 90 percent of Japanese identified themselves as “middle class.” The political system and the bureaucracy, on the other hand, were increasingly unable to keep apace with the speed of social transformation — the result of which was not

apparent in the 1990s but glaringly obvious by the 2000s, when the LDP lost its grip on national politics and needed Koizumi Junichiro to give it a lifeline so as to remain politically relevant to Japanese society. The writers of the report argued, Japan needed think tanks to “illustrate to Japanese society that pluralistic views and policy debates are welcomed in a democratic society”.6) Unfortunately, their views were ahead of mainstream views.

On the point of think tanks with an international dimension, the report succinctly points out, “A policy research institute cannot afford to have a domestic agenda alone. A Japanese think tank must make Japan understandable to the world while creating for Japan an independent voice in the world community.”7) Even today, the report is by far the best reference point on this issue, reflecting the unacknowledged but important trials and tribulations experienced by the concerned parties, such as JCIE’s Yamamoto Tadashi, who have been actively promoting a think tank culture in Japan for decades.

The authors were still mindful that “the standard Western model” would need some adjustment to work effectively in the unique Japanese institutional and cultural environment.”8) It identified two obstacles to establishing new think tanks: Japanese law on non-profit organizations and limited public access to government information. At the time, non-profit organizations could only be established with the approval of the relevant ministries, such as the foreign ministry. The degree of supervision of these organizations was not specified and was left to the

6) Ibid. p. 58.
7) Ibid. p. 59.
8) Ibid. xviii.
discretion of their authorities. In other words, “the agendas of such organizations are limited to the interests of the relevant bureaucracy and their independence and flexibility are explicitly undermined.”9) On the point of information access, transparency and accountability were not important to the political process at the time. There was no freedom of information law and the Japanese bureaucracy in principle did not share information, data and statistics with outside specialists and researchers: “These obstacles are particularly difficult to overcome in longstanding, traditional regulatory ministries, which regulate practically all areas of domestic policy. This presents a problem for new, independent institutions aiming to present alternative policy options.”10)

Fortunately, the two obstacles are no longer as strong as they were when the report was written. But it is hard to change old habits, and the ministries have been unable to shake off their tendency to meddle, censor, and regulate the activities and intellectual independence of research institutions and think tanks. Indeed, think tanks with particularly close to the foreign ministry, like JIIA, had traditionally been headed by retired diplomats with staff on secondment from the foreign ministry. Yet, a new difficulty emerged in the 1990s, just as existing think tanks were beginning reach out internationally. This new difficulty was the post-bubble economic recession. Lack of funding, either from the state or through corporate giving, has been a salient and chronic problem for think tanks and research institutions. Decades of zero-interest rate policy since have not helped, as the size of funds available for foundations financing policy research projects, such as the Japan Foundation or the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, are limited. Institutionalization of public

9) Ibid., p. 61.
10) Ibid., p. 62.
diplomacy organizations and foreign and security policy think tanks as part of the broader public policymaking process still requires proper public and political recognition.

**Getting the model right**

One salient and chronic problem impeding the development of research institutions for foreign and security policy is lack of funding. Needless to say, very few countries, even in industrialized democracies, can match the scope of funds buttressing the American “industry” of foreign and security policy studies institutions and think tanks. Those who advocate the need of think tanks in Japan lament the disparities between the Japanese and American attitudes towards foreign and security policy studies institutions. This is not surprising given the fact that the US has been Japan’s closest and most important policy dialogue partner for decades, and many so-called “policy analysts”, pundits, political leaders and officials in Japan are only acquainted with the cluster of institutions in Washington, such as the Brooking Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Wilson Center.

But these Japanese advocates of think tanks often miss the point that America is an exceptional case. The US is a superpower with global strategic interests, and has a longstanding powerful culture of corporate philanthropy and private donations capable of supporting a wide range of organizations, foundations, and institutions, on top of foreign policy institutions. It would be senseless for any country to replicate the American example, save for growing powers like China or India vying to challenge US supremacy.
Countries comparable to Japan in size, power, and political system, such as the European states, also face the chronic problem of inadequate funding. Most countries traditionally have one or two research institutions of international repute that often receive government support. The foreign policy formulation process is much more dynamic in these European countries. Moreover, their foreign policy offices are more receptive to discourses and exchanges of ideas with experts in research institutions as well as other actors, such as universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties. In these European countries, information analyses are not necessarily monopolized by the foreign office. This is because foreign and security policy experts outside the official realm are part of the foreign policy community.

Conclusion

Think tanks in Japan today are still plagued by lack of funds for public policy research. Likewise, those who should be supporting the activities of policy think tanks have a poor understanding of them. If money (public or private) usually follows where there is demand (as official policy or commercial interest), demand for foreign and security policy think tanks had been quite low in Japan in the past. The economic recession and zero-interest rate have exacerbated the financial situation of think tanks as well as foundations.

On the 50th anniversary year of JIIA in 2010, it was subjected to the process of shiwake, administrative sorting-out and downsizing by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government. The DPJ replaced the

11) The Japan Foundation was another public diplomacy organization baptized by shiwake.
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as Japan’s ruling party in 2009. This effectively ended the LDP’s nearly uninterrupted dominance of Japanese politics since it came to power in 1955. Shiwake symbolized the change of power, as part of the DPJ’s plan to clean up and slim down the corrupt and inefficient government machinery left behind by the LDP. It was part of the DPJ’s effort to smoke out wasteful projects and a plethora of sub-governmental level regulatory agencies and affiliated organizations (many of them destinations for retired bureaucrats in the notorious practice known as amakudari) deemed to be wasting taxpayers’ money.\textsuperscript{12)

The DPJ arguably wasted its time over JIIA. In contrast to the other organizations under shiwake scrutiny, JIIA is small fish budget-wise, with an annual budget of 700 million yen or 7 million US dollars.\textsuperscript{13)} Additionally, JIIA had been subjected to budget cuts by its main benefactor, the foreign ministry, since 2003. It was also conducting downsizing activities on its own at the time, unknown to the DPJ. Moreover, JIIA ranked as the top of the 108 think tanks in Japan and was in the 19th place amongst the top 50 non-US think tanks (of

\textsuperscript{12) The shiwake process was partly a spectacle as it took the form of a public hearing between the cabinet-appointed shiwake members (comprised of members from the government and the private sector) and those organizations and agencies brought in for questioning about their activities. It was a brutal experience for heads of various organizations receiving government support, as they had to explain their worth concisely and convincingly in layman’s term. It was a form of communication with which many Japanese officials are unaccustomed. That said, it was a much-needed process, at least for the Japanese public, as it publicly showcased the many obscure organizations the bureaucracy had created over decades to secure positions for amakudari bureaucrats or whose bookkeeping can hardly stand the test in the private sector.

\textsuperscript{13) Government funds make up 4 million of the 7 million dollars. Half of these government funds goes towards the payment of rent.}
which Chatham House was first) in a study of think tanks conducted by the University of Pennsylvania in 2009. Both the foreign ministry and the DPJ were unaware of this ranking. This demonstrated that JIIA’s cost performance was not problematic.

However, a closer examination of JIIA and the two other ‘bigger’ fish among foreign ministry-affiliated organizations subjected to *shiwake*, the Japan Foundation and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), reveal that there are wasteful overlaps in their functions. This is more so in light of the fact that JIIA was originally meant to be an “all-Japan” effort to establish a national security policy institution. The Japan Foundation does not fund JIIA activities even though it would be perfectly legitimate to do so. Instead, the Japan Foundation chooses to run its own international conferences. Similarly, some of the functions of JICA’s research institute can be merged with JIIA.

An examination of other ministry-affiliated institutions with international programmes, policy-research missions and think tank functions, such as the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) overseen by the Ministry of Education, the Institute of Developing Economies-JETRO overseen by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and the National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS), a part of the defence ministry reveals that there is room for combining resources and crossing over bureaucratic sectionalism. So doing could save taxpayers money. However, the different think tanks and institutions are

presently competing for a slice of the shrinking pie called the government budget.

The rise of China has resulted in its strategic placement of researchers and funds in various track-II initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. As an upshot, Japan is losing comparatively to China on agenda-setting power. According to the aforementioned University of Pennsylvania study on think tanks, China has 428 think tanks and the US 1815. While government coffers are unlikely to increase in the coming years, Japanese companies are in a better position to support think tanks. It would be in their interest to do so. The Japanese government and companies should also be aware that the combined budgets of JIIA, RIPS, IIPS, and JFIR is only 11 million dollars, 2 million dollars less than South Korea’s foreign ministry think tank.15) Japanese companies have tended to be conservative in the past, and are only willing to provide funds where they know the government has funded an institution or a think tank. This situation has been a poor reflection on a country regarding itself a major, rich power with a global presence. Many readers of this paper would have had some experience in discovering just how poorly endowed think tanks in Japan, both intellectually and financially. If such a situation continues in the long run, it would be detrimental not only to Japan’s national interest but also to the interest of Japanese companies and society. Thus, more companies should support think tanks and by donating whatever sum they can. In so doing, they would be doing their part in transforming foreign and security policy think tanks into viable platforms for Japanese diplomacy.

China’s Provincial Approaches to ASEAN

Li Mingjiang
After over 30 years of reform and opening up, the Chinese political system has experienced profound changes. However, many observers would agree that its authoritarian nature has not been significantly transformed. It has been argued that the Chinese polity resembles a “fragmented authoritarianism,” where the omnipotent and omnipresent government still plays an important centralizing role in all aspects of governance and where the increasingly centrifugal forces within the polity and at the societal level impact the decision-making process. This “fragmented authoritarianism” paradigm would help us to improve our understanding of the new reality in Chinese politics. Unfortunately, this perspective has not been sufficiently applied to the study of Chinese foreign policy and China’s international relations. Very often, many

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1) The author thanks Irene Chan for her research assistance.
international relations scholars still tend to regard China as a “black box” by believing that all major policy initiatives come from Beijing.

Other scholars exploring alternative explanations for various puzzles in China’s international relations have found it very useful to look inside China. These scholars have examined including Chinese leadership division,\(^2\) domestic political instability,\(^3\) the perceptions of the elite,\(^4\) public opinion,\(^5\) Chinese culture,\(^6\) and bureaucratic politics and pluralism in foreign policy-making.\(^7\) But such efforts are far from sufficient, and


our understanding of the domestic sources of China’s foreign policy
needs to be substantially and substantively improved. What is almost
totally missing in this body of literature is a systematic study of the role
played by provincial governments in China’s foreign relations in recent years.

This paper attempts to fill in the gap by examining China’s relations
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the past
decade or so. The questions posed are: Whether sub-national political
entities—in this case, the Chinese border provinces adjacent to Southeast
Asia—have played any role in shaping China’s relations with its
neighbouring countries. If there is any significant role at all, what has it
been? What could we infer from this case study about China’s foreign
policy and diplomacy?

A New Phase in China-ASEAN Relations

Compared to the situation ten or fifteen years ago, the current state of
China-ASEAN relations is beyond the imagination of many observers in
the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. China began to
seriously develop its relations with individual Southeast Asian countries
in the early 1990s when it was diplomatically isolated by the West due
to the Tiananmen incident. At the same time, Beijing took many
initiatives to engage with ASEAN as a collective. China soon became a
dialogue partner of ASEAN and a full member of all ASEAN-related
regional multilateral institutions and forums. The Asian financial crisis in
1997 and 1998 significantly boosted China-ASEAN relations. Beijing
gained much trust from ASEAN countries because China resisted the
temptation to depreciate its currency during the times of daunting
economic challenges. The Asian financial crisis generated considerable
political will on the part of the ASEAN and the Northeast Asian powers—China, South Korea and Japan—for closer regional economic cooperation as evidenced in the emergence of the 10+3 mechanism. China’s engagement with ASEAN became more notable in the first decade of the 21st century. In the past decade, the two sides signed numerous agreements and dozens of official mechanisms of cooperation were set up, covering a wide range of issue-areas.8)

Economic cooperation has played a very significant role in transforming China-ASEAN relations. This is particularly the case with the launching of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). CAFTA has significantly boosted China-ASEAN trade. By November 2010, less than a year after the official launch of CAFTA, China and ASEAN have become each other’s third largest trade partner. From January to October 2010, China’s export to ASEAN amounted to US$111.14 billion and China’s import from ASEAN countries reached US$124.3 billion, increasing 34.9 percent and 49 percent respectively over the same period last year. The two growth rates are 2.2 percent and 8.5 percent higher than those of China’s total export and import from January to October. From January to November, the trade flow between Guangxi and ASEAN and between Yunnan and ASEAN reached US$5.4 billion and US$3.99 billion, up by 29.4 percent and 42.3 percent respectively over the same period last year.9)

In the existing literature, many observers focused on the central government in Beijing to describe China’s policy towards Southeast Asia. What has emerged from these analyses is an apparently consistent and unified Chinese approach to the ASEAN countries in the past decade.

8) For some of the major documents, see http://www.aseansec.org/4979.htm.
To many of these scholars, China has basically pursued a continuous and proactive engagement policy that has been largely a reflection of Beijing’s strategic calculations in East Asia.\(^{10}\) As a result of China’s proactive engagement, China-ASEAN relations have reached a completely new phase as compared to the 1990s. China’s participation in various ASEAN-centred multilateral institutions, the deepening economic integration between China and ASEAN, and China’s involvement in various cooperative schemes in non-traditional security have been frequently identified as positive changes within China-ASEAN relations. The ever increasing economic, political, and social engagements between the two sides have enabled China to behave like a strategic heavyweight.\(^{11}\) Some public surveys clearly show that now China has become one of the most important regional actors in Southeast Asia.\(^{12}\) The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, for instance, concluded in a soft power influence poll that even though China’s influence still lags behind the United States’, Beijing has nevertheless become a formidable challenger for regional influence.\(^{13}\) The Asian barometer survey, conducted in a few

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consecutive years, demonstrates that China’s image in many Southeast Asian countries is better than the United States’ but falls short of Japan.\textsuperscript{14)}

In recent years, concerns about China becoming the dominant power in Southeast Asia have notably grown. Some analysts in the region are concerned that China is gradually splitting ASEAN, with the mainland ASEAN countries falling increasingly into the Chinese orbit of political clout while the maritime ASEAN members are still uncertain about their future relations with China. In the past few years, much has been said about China surpassing the United States as the most influential power in the region. This led some Southeast Asian leaders to warn that Washington had neglected Southeast Asia, and if this trend continued China would become the predominant power in the region. As a result, the United States has initiated a “coming back” to East Asia campaign in the mid-2009 to counter China’s influence.

On the other hand, many scholars, treating China as a unitary actor, have identified the weaknesses in China’s relations with ASEAN countries. They note that there has been some limited progress in the military and security arenas.\textsuperscript{15)} The lingering strategic distrust in some ASEAN countries towards China, the paucity of security interactions between China and many ASEAN members, and the tensions in the


South China Sea have often been cited as evidence of constraints for the further development of China-ASEAN relations.

These descriptions certainly reflect quite well what has happened in China-ASEAN relations. But the mainstream approach to the study of China-ASEAN relations has been state-centric. Interestingly, in the real world, we frequently hear proposals coming from various Chinese sub-national players. We also see close interactions between various Chinese provinces and many Southeast Asian countries. Missing from our understanding of China’s policy towards ASEAN is the role of various Chinese provinces geographically close to ASEAN, for these provinces add to the substance and shape the trajectory of the China-ASEAN relations. The next section will detail some of the major local initiatives coming from Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan.

**Provincial Approaches to ASEAN**

In fact, some of the provincial units in China, such as Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Hainan have played a very important role in steering China-ASEAN relations. These border provinces have been the implementers of various policies and programs agreed upon by the Chinese and ASEAN leaders. Not only that, provincial governments in China have put forth and, in many cases, quite strongly pushed for various projects between these provinces and ASEAN (or the different ASEAN member states). As these provinces have their own local interests, they compete among themselves to reach out to ASEAN or some ASEAN member states. Owing to various provincial approaches and their competition for engagement with ASEAN, there has been a
flurry of different proposals and strategies with regard to regional and sub-regional cooperation between China and ASEAN.

**Yunnan: the Pioneer and Active Player**

As the province bordering the ASEAN member countries of Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, Yunnan was the pioneer in China-ASEAN engagement. As a representative of China, the Yunnan provincial government became the first official participant in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) cooperation, covering transportation, energy, telecommunications, human resource development, tourism, environmental protection, trade and investment, anti-drug operations and other fields. Prior to the 2001 landmark agreement to build the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the GMS platform was the most important sub-regional economic cooperation mechanism between China and ASEAN. As the GMS was the priority for Yunnan’s interactions with the Indo-China countries, Yunnan took the lead in pushing for transport connectivity between China and ASEAN countries by proposing railway, highway, airport, and river projects. For instance, the Yunnan government played an important role in dredging the Lancang-Mekong River and managing commercial navigation of the river. Yunnan Province, on behalf of the central government in Beijing, has invested over 1 billion RMB in helping the poppy growers in northern parts of Myanmar and Laos to plant other crops, such as rubber, sugar cane, tea, fruits and corn. So far, a total area of 3.1 million mu (one mu equals to 0.067 hectare) of previous poppy planting area has been replaced with other crops.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) Xinhua News Agency, “Yunnan kaizhan jing wai tidai zhongzhi mianji chao 310 mu” [Yunnan engaged in replacement planting in a total area of over 310 mu], 10 December 2010.
In 1998, Yunnan began to actively push for the sub-regional economic cooperation between India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. In 1999, government officials and scholars from the four countries assembled to discuss this policy idea. They eventually publicized the “Kunming initiative,” which provided a blueprint for the economic cooperation among the four parties. While the “Kunming initiative” has not witnessed substantive results, nine forums on the initiative have been convened. The idea is still very much alive among policy analysts and government officials in Yunnan.

Despite the fact that the “Kunming initiative” had not taken off successfully, Yunnan has scored well in engaging some of China’s Southeast Asian neighbours. As a result of its strenuous efforts in setting up the various sub-regional multilateral cooperation platforms with countries at its borders over the years, Yunnan is now a proud member of various multilateral ventures in the GMS, such as the Joint Coordination Committee of Lancang-Mekong Commercial Vessels and Sailing among China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand; the Yunnan-North Thailand Cooperation Working Group; the Economic Cooperation Consultation of Yunnan and Four Provinces of Vietnam; the Yunnan-North Laos Cooperation Working Group; and the Yunnan-Myanmar Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum. Yunnan also played an active part in constructing the Kunming-Bangkok highway and in enhancing telecommunications cooperation between China and ASEAN. It should be noted that Yunnan and other GMS members had pushed for trade facilitation measures years before the official launching of the CAFTA in January 2010. This is underscored by the seventeen annexes and three protocols of the Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross-border Flow of Goods and People in the Greater Mekong Sub-region signed in March
2007. As a result of these policies, trade between Yunnan and other GMS participants has increased substantially. Likewise, China-ASEAN cooperation has resulted in achievements in agriculture, energy, tourism, human resources, environmental protection and anti-drug operations.

Yunnan has successfully pushed for many of its provincial initiatives under the China-ASEAN cooperation framework. A notable example underscoring this success is the oil and gas pipeline connecting Myanmar and Yunnan, which was officially approved by China’s central government and is currently under construction. This project was initiated by the local government in Yunnan when it realized there was much to be gained economically to be gained if such a plan materialized. Yunnan adopted a variety of strategies to push for this initiative. First, it effectively exploited the “Malacca Strait Syndrome”, a widespread Chinese concern of China’s energy transport security through the Malacca Strait. Proponents of the China-Myanmar pipeline made a strong case for themselves by arguing that the pipeline to Myanmar’s coast would necessarily ensure China’s energy security. Apart from strenuously lobbying various ministries in Beijing for support, Yunnan also launched a media offensive by mobilizing some of China’s most influential media outlets and prominent scholars to support its plan. This strategy eventually helped to convince many, including top Chinese leaders, that the pipeline was for national energy security and should be regarded as part of China’s international strategy. Lastly, the Yunnan government’s initiative coincided with the China National Petroleum Corporation’s plan to expand its business in China’s vast Southwestern market, much contended amongst the oil giants in China.

For many years, local leaders in Yunnan had hoped to transform
Yunnan into a “da tongdao” (a massive transport hub) between China’s vast Western region and Southeast/South Asia. Some progress has been made in this regard, but the achievements have been far from satisfactory. Furthermore, local leaders in Yunnan are beginning to feel strong competition from Guangxi, an autonomous ethnic Zhuang region in China’s southwest, in reaching out to China’s neighbouring countries. Local leaders have been exploring a new grand strategy to further highlight the importance of Yunnan in China’s relations with its neighbouring countries. When this new opportunity came, the Yunnan government was quick to seize it.

In July 2009, President and CCP head, Hu Jintao, made an inspection tour of Yunnan Province, during which he suggested that Yunnan should take full advantage of its geopolitical location to strive to become the “bridgehead” between China and its neighbouring sub-regions in the southwest. Hu concluded his visit to Yunnan by referring to the area as a “bridgehead” in a speech. His reference to the term “bridgehead” was very short and very marginal in the context of the whole speech. Since then however, the word “bridgehead” has become the most fashionable political term in Yunnan. Almost all the local government agencies and government-related enterprises were mobilized to “thoroughly” study the spirit of Hu Jintao’s remarks. Such campaign partly has to do with the political fact that local government leaders wanted to take this opportunity to show loyalty to top leaders in Beijing. More profoundly perhaps, it is the intention of local Yunnan government to utilize Hu’s remarks for political public relations purposes. They realized that the term “bridgehead” could be a very useful political

tool. Since Hu made the reference of “bridgehead”, local Yunnan government officials rationalized that this meant they could legitimately ask for preferential policies and financial support from various ministries in Beijing. “Constructing the bridgehead” has become a central policy guideline for Yunnan Government in its foreign affairs. The local government in Yunnan has described the “bridgehead” initiative as China’s national strategy of further opening to China’s western and southeastern frontier.

This occurred the following year where local leaders promoted the idea of the “bridgehead” as a national strategy, and they lobbied various political organs in Beijing to sell the idea. For instance, on 4 March 2010, Wang Xueren, chairman of Yunnan Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference, briefed a special session of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC), a semi-parliamentary organ and a united front outlet in the Chinese political system, on Yunnan’s emerging “bridgehead” initiative. Wang suggested that the central government provide major support for the infrastructure projects, industrial restructuring, international cooperation, and key investments in relations to the “bridgehead” policy. He Guoqiang, a CCP Politburo Standing Committee member, commented at the end of the session that the “bridgehead” proposal concerns not only Yunnan, but also the whole southwestern region of China, and China’s international strategy. At the third session of the eleventh NPPCC, 33 members proposed that the Yunnan “bridgehead” initiative should be one of the five most important policy proposals for further consideration.

18) Yunnan Xinxi Bao [Yunnan information newspaper], “Yunnan jian ‘qiaotoubao’ ye shi guojia de shi” [Yunnan building a “bridgehead” is also a national task], 5 March 2010.

19) Kunming ribao [Kunming daily], “quanguo zhengxie: Kunming yao dang ‘qiaotoubao’ jianshe ‘longtou’” [Kunming should strive to play the leading role in the “bridgehead” initiative], 18 June 2010.
Yunnan’s public relations efforts have paid off. On 2 July 2010, the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), a central government agency responsible for managing China’s overall national economic and social policies, convened a special meeting among 39 ministry-level agencies to discuss Yunnan’s “bridgehead” initiative. Du Ying, deputy head of the SDRC, noted that the “bridgehead” initiative should be a national strategy and urged all other agencies to work together to draft a guideline supporting the initiative.20)

There have also been tangible results. It is reported that the construction of the railway between Kunming (the capital city of Yunnan), Laos, and Thailand will commence in 2011. The railway project between Kunming and Yangon will shortly commence. While China is prepared to provide the technology and much of the financial resources, the Xiaoxiang Fanya Investment Company, a local private company in Yunnan, will take the lead in implementing the railway projects. It is expected that Chinese investments in the manufacturing sector will follow along the railway lines as soon as the projects are complete.21)

Since 1993, Yunnan has effectively utilized the annual Kunming Fair, co-hosted with the Ministry of Commerce and six other southwestern Chinese provinces, to engage Southeast Asian and South Asian countries. So far, eighteen such trade fairs have been held in Kunming, providing an important platform for Yunnan’s economic cooperation, including

20) Yunnan ribao [Yunnan daily], “guojia fa gai wei zhichi Yunnan sheng jiakuai jianshe qiaotoubao,” [SDRC supports Yunnan province to speed up the “bridgehead” initiative], 4 July 2010.
trade, exhibition, investment, and sub-regional cooperation, with China’s neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia. More recently, in March 2010, Yunnan succeeded in relocating the South Asian Countries Commodities Fair, which had been previously held in Beijing twice, to Kunming so that it would run parallel to the Kunming Fair. Now the South Asian Countries Commodities Fair is to be permanently located in Kunming. The Yunnan government expects to use this new platform to further engage with South Asian countries economically. Not only that, the Yunnan government places much premium on the two trade fairs to “transform Yunnan into a transport hub connecting Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, a pioneer for China’s efforts in participating in the economic activities of the South Asian continent and implementing the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, and an important industrial and manufacturing base for countries surrounding the Indian Ocean.”

There are also many other notable follow-up actions on the part of the Yunnan government. In June 2010, Yunnan Government sponsored the 8th promotion fair of investment opportunities in Southeast China for ASEAN Overseas Chinese Businesses and Asia-Pacific Forum for overseas Chinese businesspeople. Local government officials made strenuous efforts to invite overseas Chinese businesses to participate in Yunnan’s bridgehead strategy. They identified eight key areas for their investments: (I) regional infrastructure connectivity, including transport, communications and power supply network; (II) regional logistics chain; (III) the energy sector, (IV) export-oriented industries; (V) regional tourism cooperation; (VI) financial support for regional economic

22) Yunnan Daily, “Qiaotoubao jianshe de zhongyao pingtai” [An important platform for the construction of a bridgehead], 6 June 2010.
cooperation; (Ⅶ) further promotion of sub-regional economic cooperation, such as India-Bangladesh-Myanmar-China regional economic cooperation, the GMS, trans-border economic cooperation zone; and, (Ⅷ) transnational cooperation in culture and education. In November 2010, the Yunnan government and China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation signed an agreement in which the latter pledged to provide financial risk insurance, investment promotion, and consultancy services for the specific purpose of building the “bridgehead”. This initiative is expected to further boost the competitiveness and incentives for local Yunnan companies to extend their businesses overseas.

The “bridgehead” initiative has just gotten off the ground. Local leaders in Yunnan have put much premium on this strategic proposal in order to better position the province in China’s regional neighbourhood policy as well as reap the parochial economic benefits that would result from the central government’s preferential policies and the province’s own closer economic interactions with neighbouring countries. The central government in Beijing is still in the process of formulating specific policies in support of Yunnan’s “bridgehead” initiative. The way in which the central government systematically consider the initiative in relation to China’s grand western development project and its foreign policy towards its neighbourhood remains crucial in the coming years.

23) Yunnan Daily, “Jianshe qiaotoubao huashang da you ke wei” [Overseas Chinese businesses to play a major role in constructing the bridgehead], 7 June 2010.
Guangxi: the Latecomer but Strong Competitor

As Guangxi only borders Vietnam and has several ports in the Beibu or Tonkin Gulf, it is a latecomer in China-ASEAN relations. In the early years of the 2000s, Guangxi stepped up efforts to compete with Yunnan in getting more attention, support and preferential policies from the central government in Beijing under the framework of China-ASEAN business ties. A notable successful outcome of Guangxi’s increased efforts is the decision to have the annual China-ASEAN Expo permanently held in its capital city, Nanning. In 2004, the Vietnamese proposed to build “two corridors and one circle” economic cooperation zones with China. The “two corridors and one circle” zone refers to the Kunming-Lao Cai-Hanoi-Hai Phone-Quang Ninh corridor, the Nanning-Lang Son-Hanoi-Hai Phone corridor and the Beibu Gulf economic circle. China agreed to the Vietnamese proposal. As a result, the Beibu Gulf economic circle would also include China’s Guangdong and Hainan Provinces and five provinces in Northern Vietnam. This economic circle covers a total land area of nearly 870,000 square kilometres and a population of 184 million. Despite joining the GMS as an official member in 2005, the local government discovered that Guangxi did not have substantial advantage in participating solely in the GMS.

Therefore, starting from early 2006, Guangxi proposed a Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation Zone to include parts of China’s southwest and southeast, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei.25) Under the proposed Pan-Beibu Gulf Zone, China and

ASEAN would pursue a physically M-shaped economic cooperation structure: Mekong sub-region, Nanning-Singapore economic corridor (Mainland economic cooperation), and the Pan-Beibu Gulf zone (Maritime economic cooperation). Guangxi also proposed that this Pan-Beibu Gulf regional economic zone be officially incorporated as part of the ASEAN-China cooperation framework. Guangxi has since organized five large-scale forums on the Pan-Beibu proposal and invited various policy-makers in Southeast Asia, officials from the Chinese central government, and experts to participate in the forums so as to obtain their support.

Much of the initial attention for the Pan-Beibu scheme focused on cooperation in the maritime domain, such as maritime connectivity through ports cooperation, maritime tourism, joint exploitation of maritime energy, and marine industries. Over the years, policy-makers in Guangxi realized that the disputes between China and some ASEAN-member countries in the South China Sea posed a huge challenge for effective maritime cooperation. Therefore, the focus of the Pan-Beibu scheme has since shifted to the land, particularly the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor. Besides in-depth discussions with experts of relevant Southeast Asian think tanks, extensive research on the condition of the corridor’s infrastructure has also been conducted by scholars at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences. Held in August 2010, the recent Pan-Beibu Forum in Nanning highlighted the feasibility and usefulness of the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor. Senior Chinese officials have indicated China’s willingness to provide finance and technology for the construction as well as renovation of high-speed railways and highways between Nanning and Singapore. It is hoped that the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor would promote China-ASEAN cooperation in tourism,
logistics, trade, investment and the formation of industrial chains. Guangxi is simultaneously pushing for cooperation among major ports surrounding the South China Sea, with the obvious ambition of becoming a regional hub connecting China’s vast middle and Western provinces and almost all the Southeast Asian countries.

As Guangxi’s ultimate goal is to transform the Pan-Beibu scheme into an official program in the ASEAN Plus China (10+1) cooperation framework, it has urged the Chinese Foreign Ministry and central government in Beijing to submit the scheme to meetings of senior officials and even ministers between China and ASEAN. It is hoped that Guangxi can help to shape China-ASEAN relations under the “one axis and two wings” strategy. The “one axis” refers to the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor and the “two wings” refer to the GMS on the one hand and the Pan-Beibu scheme on the other. Local leaders in Guangxi hope that the “one axis and two wings” strategic plan could be accepted by both China and ASEAN as the official blueprint for China-ASEAN cooperation for the long run.

The Guangxi government has not been simply waiting for a final decision by top Chinese and ASEAN leaders. Local leaders in Guangxi have been keen to utilize the province’s geographical location to push for cooperation with ASEAN countries. Provincial leaders have visited the capitals of many neighbouring states so as to persuade them to support Guangxi’s proposals. Local government officials are very confident that the province’s land and sea connections with Southeast Asia render Guangxi ideal for China to further engage with its neighbours. Their confidence was further boosted in 2008 when the central government in Beijing finally approved the blueprint of the Beibu
Bay Economic Zone plan. Since then, Guangxi has stepped up efforts in constructing the port facilities at Beihai, Qinzhou, and Huangchenggang, three coastal cities along the Beibu Gulf. In light of the official initiation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the Guangxi government has made opening up to Southeast Asia its priority in developing its local economy. Guangxi has set up the Qinzhou bonded area, the Pingxiang comprehensive bonded area, the Nanning bonded and logistics centre, and the Beihai export-oriented manufacturing area. From January to October, 2010, Guangxi’s trade with ASEAN countries reached US$4.6 billion, an increase of 27.2 percent over the same period in the previous year. With improved connectivity between China and ASEAN (due to many local Guangxi initiatives) and the increased manufacturing capabilities in Guangxi, China-ASEAN relations will inevitably experience some changes.

**Other Provincial Players: Hainan and Guangdong**

The fear of being marginalized by other economic cooperation schemes drove Hainan to conceptualize alternative proposals. Several years ago, the Institute for the South China Sea Studies, based in Hainan, put forth a grand proposal to set up a Pan-South China Sea regional economic cooperation organization which included China’s Pan-Pearl River delta region, Taiwan, and six other neighbouring states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei. When this proposal was forwarded, Hainan was still in search of an overall long-term development strategy and the central government in Beijing was

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also in the midst of considering a grand design for Hainan’s future development. Furthermore, Hainan did not have much industry and was economically weak. This meant that the proposal did not garner much support or attention. Therefore, the Institute’s proposal did not manage to reach the level of official discussion. Currently, the central government and Hainan provincial government have jointly decided to focus on tourism as the long-term development strategy for the island province, with the goal of building it into a world-class tourist island. While it is unlikely that Hainan feature as an important participant in the Pan-Beibu economic zone, it continues to be enthusiastic about cooperation in tourism with ASEAN countries.

Being one of China’s most important economic centres, Guangdong Province has always been an important participant in China-ASEAN economic relations. In the recent years, Guangdong is gradually undertaking a strategy of upgrading its industrial structure. By aiming to relocate many of its labour intensive manufacturing facilities elsewhere, the provincial government is shifting its focus to promote more value-added and hi-tech industries. How this new industrial policy in Guangdong will affect China-ASEAN relations, especially the economic relations, remains to be seen.

Conclusions

With the constant evolution of its domestic politics and international relations in the past decades, China’s diplomacy has also undergone tremendous transformations. A notable feature in China’s foreign policy has been the diversification of actors and factors. The scholarly
community is just beginning to take serious notice of these changes. It is reported that the international economic and technological cooperation corporations operated by local governments play an important role in shaping China’s external relations.27) But our understanding of the functions of local governments in China’s international relations is far from sufficient.

This paper briefly discussed and analyzed the roles of a few border provinces in China-ASEAN relations. It is clear from this discussion that local governments do indeed play a very important role in shaping China’s relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours. The cases of Yunnan and Guangxi are particularly notable. Yunnan officials often boast that their province’s participation in the GMS served as the precursor which laid the foundation for China’s relations with ASEAN and contributed to the idea of the CAFTA.28) Although this may be an exaggeration, there is some truth in their assertion. Yunnan and Guangxi served as the policy implementers for the central government in Beijing. In addition to carrying out the central government’s socio-economic programs by cooperating with neighbouring countries, the border provinces also proactively reached out to those countries.

Others have argued that “through the development of economic and cultural ties, local governments have tended to push Chinese foreign policy towards increased international integration.”29) This is certainly the

28) Author’s interviews with Yunnan officials in 2009 and 2010.
case of Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan in China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries. However, the role of local governments is more than that of a passive reactor to the policy initiatives from the central government. As this paper has demonstrated, local governments do take very significant initiatives and make big proposals. They also actively lobby the central government for consent and support. The Yunnan government’s “bridgehead” strategy, Guangxi government’s Pan-Beibu scheme and the Nanning-Singapore economic corridor, and the impact of Guangdong’s industrial restructuring are likely to have major impacts on China-ASEAN relations unforeseen by the decision-makers in Beijing. Local government leaders frequently travel to the capitals of other regional states to sell their cooperation proposals and urge foreign national leaders to support and accept their proposals. In these respects, local governments have acted as semi-independent actors in China’s foreign relations.

The local provincial governments have played an active role in China’s relations with neighbouring countries largely due to three factors. First of all, the policy preferences and proposals originating from local governments have to conform to the strategic considerations of the central government. In the case of Yunnan and Guangxi, Beijing’s rhetoric of pursuing a “good-neighbourly” policy provided the framework and the political room for them to manoeuvre. This enabled local leaders to easily justify their policy proposals. Second, local activism took place in the large context of the central government’s decision to further open up the borderland. China’s borders have, for historical reasons, remained much poorer than other provinces for many years. In the past decade, Beijing has urged the border provinces to expand their horizons by opening up to the neighbouring countries. So doing accelerated the
economic development in those provinces. This central policy provided a convenient condition for local governments to play a role in China’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring sub-regions. Third, since the late 1990s, the central government has had a strong desire to push for the grand Western development plan. Furthering the opening up of the border provinces was regarded as an important step in helping the mid-western regions to develop their economies. Both Yunnan and Guangxi have achieved substantial success when they played this card in campaigning for their policy proposals. In the coming years, Sino-ASEAN relations will continue to hinge on that which Beijing says and does. But increasingly and perhaps equally importantly, the policy advocates and behaviours of local border provinces should also be taken into account.
CHAPTER 6

Digital Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Pavin Chachavalpongpun
This short essay examines diplomatic approaches in Southeast Asia, with a special focus on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its primary aim is to explore the evolution of diplomatic practices among states, their positive and negative consequences on regionalism and the states’ recent efforts to modernise the way in which diplomacy has been traditionally operated. The essay asks: What is the nature of an old diplomatic approach? What is the new mode of diplomacy and who support it? Who are its enemies? And is it effective? The essay argues that diplomacy in the Southeast Asian context had been closely intertwined with the success of ASEAN. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has provided its members with a platform

1) The author would like to express his thanks to Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Seoul Office) and the Japan Foundation for the invitation to present this paper in Tokyo, Japan, on 31 August 2010.
to sharpen their diplomatic skills, and use those skills to protect their national interests. But such skills were not always translated into powerful actions, especially in dealing with sovereignty-related issues. Critics often criticise ASEAN diplomacy as a mechanism designed to display harmony at the expense of real issues at hand. Some believe that the ASEAN mindset is trapped in the Cold War. It was convenient for leaders to exploit experiences during the tumultuous years of the Cold War to justify certain ways in which diplomacy was conducted, as well as their own domestic and foreign policy. It allowed leaders to keep defining statecraft based strictly on the concept of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This explained why ASEAN members agreed with the principle of non-intervention, which was applied not only among themselves but also to the organization’s foreign counterparts. Internal politics is largely responsible for this attitude. It also influences the way diplomacy is practiced. In other words, in the context of ASEAN, the primary role of diplomacy may not be so much about forging international alliance but more about accomplishing political purposes at home.

However, ASEAN has changed significantly since the launch of its first charter in 2008. ASEAN leaders have attempted to water down the concept of sovereignty and hold less rigidly onto the principle of non-interference. For the first time, ASEAN declared that the organization would practice more public diplomacy, or as some leaders dubbed it, the people’s diplomacy. Basically, diplomacy will operate to respond to the people’s needs. It will be “localised” and no longer purely dominated by the state. To achieve this goal, leaders will have to decrease the degree of traditional diplomacy and inject a new kind of “modern” diplomacy. Therefore, the real adjustment is turning this organization from a state-
led forum into a people-centric platform. Young diplomats from Southeast Asia now see themselves moving further from the traditional ways of conducting diplomacy. They may still be boxed into the world of communiqués, diplomatic cables and slow government-to-government negotiations of: “Diplomats wearing expensive suits, talking to each other with their national flags in the background, determining their countries’ relationships.” But they are also using new technology to enhance their diplomatic works, and improve their response to the demands of the population, interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It represents a shift in form and strategy — a way to amplify traditional diplomatic efforts, develop tech-based policy solutions and encourage cyberactivism. Diplomacy now includes open-ended efforts as the short-message-service (SMS) and social-networking programme. The ASEAN Secretariat opened a Twitter account to inform the public of its activities. Some personalities in the governments of ASEAN, such as the Philippines’ President Benigno Aquino III, have been using their Facebook page to communicate with the public and elaborate state policy. Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo has regularly chatted online with his supporters through his Facebook; the topics cover both domestic and foreign policy. While traditional diplomacy concentrates on formality, face-to-face negotiations, communiqués and treaties, it also gives room for some kind of informal interactions among leaders and diplomats. This has been put forward in the name of promoting regionalism. In other words, leaders use diplomacy to get to know each other on a personal basis so as to display their affinity of regionalism.

ASEAN is the master of informal diplomacy. Although the term “informal diplomacy” has never been clearly defined, it usually means conducting diplomacy at a high comfort level where participants are acquainted with each other and discuss positive approaches to potential areas of cooperation. ASEAN leaders project the organization as a forum that creates synergy within Southeast Asia, offering a stress-free venue encouraging positive cooperation and expression of views on how to consolidate organizational strengths. Hence, there are two tiers in the domain of diplomacy in ASEAN. When leaders encounter difficult or sensitive issues, they tend to deal with them through informal channels so as to avoid direct confrontation. Formal diplomacy is often conducted to administer everyday affairs.

Digital diplomacy, as this essay terms it, acts to reduce the traditional manner in which diplomacy is conducted in Southeast Asia. This phenomenon effectively responds to the emergence of track two (including scholars and experts who are not diplomats) and track three (including NGOs and global citizens) diplomacy in multilateral forums, by allowing the actors to use new-age media to communicate with each other more directly and less formally. The open space and the informal nature of this kind of diplomacy allows diplomats and non-state actors to discuss a wide range of issues, including non-traditional challenges such as environmental protection, humanitarian disaster relief, terrorism and epidemics. The speed of the digital diplomacy enables diplomats to react quickly to crises and get a feel as to public opinion, thus improving efficiency on the part of the government. But there are negative aspects subsumed within digital diplomacy. While it is used to promote accountability in policy formulation and to build good ties with neighbours, it can also be employed to discredit enemies. Cambodian
Prime Minister Hun Sen used his website to attack Thailand’s Abhisit Vejjajiva at the height of their conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple. Likewise, Abhisit conversed with the Thais through his Facebook page, explaining his country’s position vis-à-vis Cambodia. Moreover, some “old guards” within the Foreign Ministry may still not be ready to free themselves from the traditional mode of thinking vis-à-vis diplomacy. They worry that “privatising” diplomacy would diminish their control over foreign policy. This essay examines such dilemmas as well as tradition versus modernity in the conduct of digital diplomacy in ASEAN.

Defining Digital Diplomacy

This essay is inspired by Jesse Lichtenstein’s article, “Digital Diplomacy”, published in the New York Times on August 2010. It outlines the story of two American diplomats assigned to modernise the way in which the State Department has operated its diplomacy for decades. Jared Cohen and Alec Ross, as the article illustrates, helped direct the State Department to the digital age by using widely available technologies to reach out to American citizens, companies and other non-state actors. Their Twitter posts became part of a new State Department effort to transform itself to cope with a new political environment. Lichtenstein reported that Ross’s and Cohen’s Twitter accounts were useful as they provided up-to-date news on international events and allowed the State Department to respond to them promptly. Lichtenstein wrote:

3) Ibid.
A few days later, they did. On 12 January, the Haiti earthquake struck, and within two hours, Eberhard, working with the State Department, set up the Text Haiti 90999 program, which raised more than US$40 million for the Red Cross in US$10 donations. 12 January was significant for supporters of 21st-century statecraft for another reason. It was also the day Google announced that Chinese hackers tried to break into the Gmail accounts of dissidents. In response, Google said that it would no longer comply with China’s censorship laws and for a few months redirected Chinese users to its Hong Kong search engine. The dispute rose to a high-level diplomatic conflict, but it also gave added resonance to the 45-minute “Internet freedom” speech Secretary Clinton delivered a little more than a week later, in which she placed “the freedom to connect” squarely within the U.S. human rights and foreign policy agenda.4)

The United States is not alone in digitalising its diplomatic practice. Europe, too, has been modernising its art of diplomacy. In the United Kingdom, there are now more than twenty bloggers listed on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) blogroll - from the Foreign Secretary to a Second Secretary in Zimbabwe. The UK Foreign Office is also embracing other social media tools like Twitter and YouTube. The British Ambassador to Vietnam, Mark Kent, blogs in Vietnamese and on an English-language site. Reportedly, Kent said, “Part of the purpose is just to show that using the internet is a good thing. It gives a little bit of support to the blogging community out there.”5) Indeed, the FCO even elaborates its definition of digital diplomacy in its website thusly:

4) Ibid.
What is digital diplomacy? Digital diplomacy is solving foreign policy problems using the internet. It is conventional diplomacy through a different medium. Through the web we can listen, publish, engage and evaluate in new and interesting ways. Crucially, we can also widen our reach and communicate directly with civil society as well as governments and influential individuals. Why are we doing it? Because we have to... Those whose ideals and objectives we oppose are active and highly effective at using the web. If we don’t take up the digital debate, we lose our argument by default. Many of our partners, particularly those outside government, have an established digital presence, engaged audiences and expertise in achieving goals online. If we don’t work with them, we’re missing a huge opportunity. Our shift from one-way web publishing into active digital diplomacy reflects the changing way we all use the web - as a multi-way social medium as well as a source of information. We lose credibility and cannot claim to be an open organization if we don’t take part.

How do we do digital diplomacy? The broad steps we follow in any digital diplomacy activity are: 1) Listen: find out which blogs, groups and forums are already discussing the issue, gauge their attitudes, figure out our angle and tone 2) Publish: creatively push out our messages in news, blogs, videos, pictures, across our global web presence 3) Engage: encourage questions, take part where the debate is happening, form partnerships with relevant organizations and online groups, and 4) Evaluate: explore how far we achieved

What do we set out to do? What could we do better next time? And what did our target audience, colleagues and partners think? We have specific objectives to achieve to improve the effectiveness and take-up of digital diplomacy across the Foreign Office: Setting digital objectives. Your digital objectives should be developed to help achieve your post’s broader policy or business objectives. Attempts are made to answer these questions: Which of your priorities can be best addressed digitally and which not? Who is your audience? What do you want to achieve? 6)

Thus, this essay seeks to examine how ASEAN countries are adjusting to the realities of the information age. As Wilson Dizard argues, “Electronic communications and information resources are influencing foreign policy, not only by raising a new set of strategic issues but also by altering the ways in which we deal with them. The result is a distinctly different type of relations between nations — one that calls for a responsive digital diplomacy.”\(^7\) In ASEAN, young diplomats who have entered the Foreign Service are usually at ease with computers and other digital resources. They have an essential role to play in this transformation process. But the first hurdle seems to be how to downplay the traditional ASEAN way and pave the way for a more modern way of diplomatic communications.

### The ASEAN Way

ASEAN has been proud of its own unique way of interactions among members. ASEAN often claimed that its unique style of diplomacy assisted in securing peace and prevented its members from engaging in war. But what is exactly the ASEAN way? Michael Antolik stated that ASEAN invented a number of codes of diplomatic conduct dictating the way members talked to each other, spoke with one voice and stood together in order to display solidarity.\(^8\) The organization paid special attention to the importance of personal familiarity which reflected years of good faith in their dealings. Personal familiarity reinforced the image of ASEAN as an organization thriving on informal relationship among


ASEAN leaders. This relationship developed through ASEAN meetings, which as of today, amount to more than 700 a year. Additionally, ASEAN adopted a consensus principle which was carefully practiced to manage sensitive issues. But as Donald Weatherbee put it, “ASEAN consensus has handled difficult choices by postponing difficult decisions to the future, leaving and living with the unsettled issue for the present.”9) Juxtaposed with the consensus rule was the practice of “quiet diplomacy” which helped sustain ASEAN decision making. The New Straits Times once entertained the headline, “We should not hang out our washing in public”.10) Antolik said that contentious issues would not be discussed in public, certainly not in the press.11) But is it realistic for ASEAN not to discuss sensitive issues in public in an increasingly globalised world?

Antolik went on to argue that ASEAN members maintained the image of a successful organization by not having any failures. “ASEAN worked because it was not asked to do anything”, said Antolik.12) It thus appears that ASEAN traditionally operated on the basis of ambiguity. Guy Sacerdoti asserted that ASEAN had the ability to indicate something without saying it, to identify the boundaries of acceptable political activity without committing itself to uphold them, thus leaving room for flexibility by keeping definitions murky and interpretations variable.13)

11) Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 100.
By the end of the Cold War and the advent of the new millennium, ASEAN’s unique style of diplomacy came under strain. This traditional conduct of diplomacy was criticised for acting as a hindrance to organizational progress because of its over-emphasis on sovereignty instead of building real regionalism. Most importantly, it prevented ASEAN citizens from participating in the ASEAN process. ASEAN remained a state-led organization and refused to accept bottom-up inputs, such as from the NGOs and civil society bodies. Its outlook was very much traditional, looking at the region and the world through an old perspective of the Cold War where the state had the ultimate power in decision making and where sovereignty and territorial integrity eclipsed other emerging issues, especially non-traditional issues. The new generation of ASEAN leaders recognise these shortcomings. They believe that it was time ASEAN diplomacy changed.

Why is Change Needed?

In recent years, ASEAN has made a number of bold moves. This is because the ASEAN leaders wanted to prove that they were serious about building an ASEAN community. The world in the post-Cold War brought with it a new order in which new powerful actors such as China and India, have emerged in the regional scene. ASEAN would stand to lose if it did not readjust itself to such shift. To ensure that the world community would take it seriously, ASEAN launched its first-ever Charter in 2008, thus giving itself a legal personality 40 years after its establishment. The ASEAN Charter clearly indicates the goal of working toward creating a real regionalism for ASEAN citizens through the establishment of political, economic and socio-cultural communities.
The need to open itself up and compete with other powers in the region compelled ASEAN to water down its traditional principle of non-interference and gradually moderate its sovereignty-centric mindset. The ASEAN Charter has been dubbed by some as the people’s charter. For the first time, ASEAN demonstrated its willingness to discuss sensitive issues, albeit with certain limits. The creation of the Human Right Commissions exemplifies a certain willingness of ASEAN to talk about issue of human rights.

At the same time, ASEAN had been feeling the pressure from the forces of globalization. Local and regional businesses urged the ASEAN governments to discard their obsolete worldview and open up borders for free flow of capitals, human resources, technological transfer and information. They wanted ASEAN to pay attention to the needs of businesspeople (after all they are also taxpayers) and respond to the needs of the businesspeople through a “people-centric diplomacy”. This “people-centric diplomacy” is not about the fulfilment of the people’s needs alone; rather, it also seeks to invite people’s participation in foreign policy formulation.

So doing would improve diplomatic efficiency and serve the interests of the ASEAN citizens. Service has to be speedy, and be able to cope with the people’s immediate needs, especially in times when natural disaster strikes. Relying on traditional modes of communication, such as telegrams or third-party notes, only widens the perception gap between the state and the people. This is where “digital diplomacy” comes into play.
ASEAN Goes Digital

Earlier this year, I had the opportunity to organise a project on how to use Information Communication Technology (ICT) to enhance ASEAN integration. We travelled to all ten capitals of ASEAN to determine if ICT could play a role in strengthening ASEAN regionalism. In order to harness the power of ICT for ASEAN goals, ASEAN should consider:

• Adopting an appropriate, robust, cost efficient common conferencing and/or collaborative software to be used by various ASEAN bodies/meetings;
• Developing appropriate e-Participation applications/initiatives to deepen engagement with ASEAN stakeholders;
• Using policy blogs and wikis as part of ASEAN’s knowledge management and information dissemination strategy; and
• Implementing a Social Networking Strategy aimed at the ASEAN youths.

ASEAN’s successful use of ICT is not dependent on correct technology choices alone. ICT, as a tool for enhanced governance through more effective policy making and intensified community building effort in Southeast Asia, must be embraced by ASEAN officials in all levels of the organization.14) This could help them reduce the workloads from attending more than 700 meeting a year.

The ASEAN Secretariat has already embarked on using new-age media as part of strengthening its public diplomacy; thus reaching out to young generation of ASEAN citizens in the cyberspace. The ASEAN Secretariat keeps the ASEAN people informed through its Twitter

account. Its Twitter posts have become an integral part of ASEAN whereby it brings diplomacy into the digital age, by using widely available technologies to reach out to citizens, companies and other non-state actors. Its Twitter posts are also a cross between social-networking culture and foreign-policy arena. Here is a way to use technology to address diplomacy, development and security concerns at once. ASEAN has now realised that the networked world in the 21st century “exists above the state, below the state and through the state”.15)

At a national level, more ASEAN leaders are now making use of the available new-age media to seek the people’s approval of state policies and to better respond to their needs. More importantly, it shows that the governments now understand the need to exercise diplomacy to win the people’s hearts and minds, or soft power. The US-ASEAN Business Council has a Facebook account <http://www.facebook.com/pages/US-ASEAN-Business-Council/246367487365>. Businesses can now directly send enquiries to the Council without going through traditional channels. Statistically speaking, there are an estimated 200,000,000 active Facebook users. Half of whom (100,000,000) log on to Facebook at least once each day. Users hail from 170 countries/territories and use 35 different languages. There are a total of 59.6 million Facebook users in Asia, or 15% of the global Facebook population. Therefore, Facebook is a good channel for ASEAN leaders to conduct their public diplomacy. Almost all ASEAN leaders now have a Facebook account. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva communicates with his supporters through Facebook, discussing contentious issues like the conflict over the Preah Vihear with Cambodia. Philippines President Benigno Aquino, Indonesian President

15) Lichtenstien, “Digital Diplomacy”. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Cambodian Premier Hun Sen, or even the military supremo General Than Shwe from Myanmar, all are members of Facebook.

**Evaluation**

There are still a number of hurdles that stand in the way of this new form of diplomacy. Some old guards in ASEAN disagree with the way in which diplomacy has now become “privatised”. They often argue diplomacy is one element of ASEAN that should not be subject to the demands of “organizational openness government”; whenever it works, it is usually because it is done behind closed doors. But they also acknowledge that this may be increasingly hard to achieve in an age where bureaucrats have Twitter accounts. Thus, the first hurdle is changing the mindset of ASEAN traditionalists.

It is increasingly accepted that ASEAN should move away from acting as a tool of the governments of its member states to an institution truly serving the interests of the public, as stipulated in the ASEAN Charter. One way for ASEAN to close the perception gap and demonstrate its openness is to institute a new kind of diplomacy as part of its identity. It will be a difficult task. But if ASEAN wants to become one of the main players in the region, something needs to be done to ensure that old diplomatic practices harping on sovereignty must be kept at minimum.

Luke Allnutt’s report pointed out some of the obstacles confronting digital diplomacy. He recently wrote in his blog, *The Problem with Digital Diplomacy*: 

First, digital diplomacy is still relatively new and diplomats and companies are still feeling their way, finding out what works and what doesn’t. Those relationships are still evolving and are likely to receive more scrutiny in the future. Second, in the media, the notions of Internet freedom and digital diplomacy are still seen as essentially benign. In the popular imagination, when people think of Halliburton they might think of shady backroom deals in war-torn African countries; when they think of Twitter they think of people in California wearing cargo pants and buzzing around the office on scooters.\textsuperscript{16}

On a positive note, this new kind of diplomacy helps render ASEAN livelihood seem healthier, in the sense that it allows competing groups in society, pressure groups, interest groups, NGOs, civil society organizations, to put across their views and demands. These views and demands would, in turn, divert the government’s attention away from traditional issues to more diverse, non-traditional issues. Their pressure, expressed through the public and in cyberspace, would enhance ASEAN’s level of accountability and responsibility.

The Evolution of Germany’s and the EU’s (Common) Foreign and Security Policies: The Role of Soft Power and Multilateralism versus Hard Power

Frank Umbach
Introduction

Germany’s geostrategic location in the heart of Europe and its economic-political weight mean that it has been the linchpin of European and US security policies in Europe since 1945. After the end of the Cold War and the “cheque-book diplomacy” during the Gulf War in 1990/91, Germany’s foreign and security policies underwent major changes. These changes were more of an evolutionary rather than revolutionary character. Germany’s foreign and security policies are embedded in the EU’s evolving common foreign and security policies (CFSP). Its peaceful and successful enlargement process to the EU-27 since the 1990s has often been cited as the clearest illustration of its newfound soft power, and is defined by the leading US political scientist and diplomat, Joseph Nye, as the combination of attraction and persuasion.
of others to adopt your goals. Although the EU’s enlargement process is one of “exporting stability”, most of the countries seeking to join the European Union (EU) were already more or less functioning democracies with both strong political and economic interests to join the EU and “return to Europe”. Since then, a question has arisen: whether and to what extent Germany and the EU can use the newly found potential of its soft power to promote reform policies and movements outside the EU (in the new European Neighbourhood Policy or ENP for example) as well as shape global developments instead of just reacting to them.

Meanwhile, France has contributed to NATO’s military structures through a stronger alliance with the USA, whilst the EU launched its first naval operation, Atalanta, to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean along the Somalia coast. While it reflects a new European security and defence policy capable of contributing to international efforts to cope with the growing challenges of the “globalization of security policies”, the EU has been accused of lacking a successful and sustainable state-building concept infused with the civilian capacities for long-term institutional stabilization efforts vis-à-vis new conflicts that cannot be solved solely with military peacekeeping or peacemaking means. A French analyst mirrored this view when he concluded in November 2009: “Today, the credibility of international organizations is judged not only on their power-projection capabilities, but on their ability to use appropriate instruments, whether civilian, military or both, with precision, to achieve maximum political results.”


Thus the EU’s soft power capabilities, supported by military means, may become even more important in the future. This is especially so in light of the dramatic rise of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and peacemaking missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations as well as conflict-prevention and humanitarian missions. During the last 20 years, almost 80% of these missions and operations (authorized by the United Nations since 1948) were initiated between 1988 and 2007. In 2007, more than 160,000 troops were deployed worldwide for crisis management missions through the United Nations (UN) and other security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) and the EU. According to some estimates, more than 200,000 personnel are needed each year to sustain current levels of global deployment.\(^3\)

In this regard, the EU’s civilian capabilities of a “soft power” may become ever more important as a military instrument. It also supports the assumption made at the beginning of the 1990s that Germany and Japan may increase their worldwide influence as “civilian powers” against the diminishing importance of traditional power politics and military means. Indeed, German expert, Hanns W. Maull, who conceptualised the civilian power theory, stated, like many others at the time:

“Military power seems to have become a residual, rather than a central, element in international politics. This is not to deny the continued relevance of the security dimension for international relations; nuclear deterrence and conventional force still play a role in

guaranteeing the state centred character of the international system, and war and civil war have, if anything, become more, rather than less, frequent and destructive in the Third World. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missile technology in the Third World adds to such concerns. *Nevertheless, military force is likely to be largely irrelevant in confronting such new challenges as political instability and crisis in Eastern Europe or the Third World, terrorism, drugs or environmental dangers.*”

Furthermore, the rise of China and its objective of creating a “harmonious world” and “stable security environment” have been linked with the “soft power” of its rising economic and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Indeed, there is hardly a question today that can be solved without China’s involvement, participation and cooperation. However, the creation of new and often asymmetrical economic interdependencies, China appears to use its soft power approach for its perceived increasingly assertive foreign and security policies. In this light, China’s soft power approach may be a threat to

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the security interests of other nations. The most striking example for this lay in China’s deliberate use of its export monopoly of the so-called “rare earth metals” in a diplomatic conflict with Japan in November 2010. By exerting its export monopoly, China temporarily ceased all its exports to Japan in order to maximize its conflict positions and to remind Japan of its vulnerability vis-à-vis Beijing. In this context, China can also be said to be increasingly facing the constraints and limits of its soft power foreign policy approach.7)

The following analysis will focus on the role of soft power versus hard power in Germany’s and the EU’s evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defence Policies (CSDP, previously called the European Security and Defence Policies). This paper will outline the gradual shift of Germany’s traditional strategic culture of reticence and a civilian power to the normalization of

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Germany’s foreign, security and defence policies during the 1990s. It will further analyze the German and European military capability gap and the efforts to overcome it, as well as the framework and problems in the design and implementation of the CFSP and CSDP.

**Germany’s Strategic Culture of “Reticence” and “Restraint” as a “Civilian Power”**

With the end of World War II, the victors’ wanted to ensure that Germany’s (and Japan's) militaristic expansionism would never again pose a threat to the international status quo. As part of the US’s double containment strategy, Germany was embraced as a junior ally so as to contain the Soviet Union and firmly anchored in the western alliance system by a web of security, political and economic ties. Lord Ismay succinctly summed up this strategy thus: “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.” Moreover, Germany also accepted a renunciation of an autonomous security policy. Another German “Sonderweg” and all of its implications was rejected in favour of a “never again” mentality of pacifism, moralism and democracy. In other words, the renunciation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons as well as the renunciation of military means was the only real political choice available to Germany in the immediate post-war years.

But the European vision and the integration policies of the 1950s presented the idea of a new international order based on the reciprocal acceptance of political and economic dependence. This new post-war settlement enabled Japan and Germany to turn their national energies toward economic resurgence. Furthermore, NATO provided Germany with a relatively cheap solution for its defence problems, and gave Germany
new international respectability as an economic superpower. Thus, for more than 50 years, Germany had defined its national interests and objectives in the context of a European and transatlantic integration and interdependencies by engaging in close multilateral cooperation and negotiations with its Western partners.

When Western commentators and experts speculated on the formation of a new *Pax Teutonica* or a nuclear weapon state, they overlooked a number of domestic factors (including strong pacifistic roots) and Germany’s new strategic culture of restraint which sought to prevent those worst-case scenarios. Therefore, the importance of European integration in this context can hardly be overestimated. This makes a return to old neo-imperial and militaristic policies nearly impossible.

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<th>Domestic Factors Shaping Germany’s Security Culture of “Restraint”</th>
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<td><strong>1. Strategic Culture:</strong></td>
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<td>democracies implies both the integration of Germany into western</td>
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<td>security institutions (NATO, OSCE, WEU/EU) and foreign policy</td>
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<td>support for fundamental democratic values;</td>
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<td>• A determination to make amends for Germany’s Nazi past;</td>
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<td>• A generally sceptical attitude towards the use of use force</td>
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<td>and the rejection of any unilateral power projection or a</td>
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<td>nationalisation of defence policy for the pursuit of national</td>
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<td>German foreign and security interests.</td>
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<td><strong>1. Historical Experiences and Lessons:</strong></td>
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<td>democratic government;</td>
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<td>• The Nazi experience of the military as a compliant follower</td>
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<td>aggressive foreign policy designs;</td>
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• The horrendous crimes and suffering during the Second World War;

• The experience of complete defeat and catastrophe; and

• The cold war experience, with its mixture of successful military deterrence and the threat of complete annihilation should war major between the two blocks ever break out in Europe. Germany could not have been defended, and an eventual western victory would still have left the country in ruins. Since war can hardly be won, it was to be avoided at all costs.

1. America’s leadership and NATO’s determination have resulted in Germany’s positive historical experiences in integration and in the transfer of its sovereignty as well as authority of national security on to multilateral western security organizations (i.e. NATO). NATO has provided Germany with a stable security framework for internal democratization and economic reconstruction and prosperity after 1945. As a result, Germany’s integration into western security institutions received unquestioning political support at home and abroad. Through the historical strategy of importing stability, Germany has recognized both the need for regional stability and regional integration eastwards. This explains Germany’s firm support of an export stability strategy vis-à-vis NATO’s and EU’s extension to the east.

2. Constitutional Constraints: The legitimization of any use of force is vitally important in German security policy. The German Grundgesetz (Basic Law or Constitutional Law) outlaws any war of aggression but stipulates that Germany can participate in collective security systems if such participation contributes to world peace. The deployment of German troops beyond NATO’s traditional defence territories was discussed after the Gulf War in 1991 in the Constitutional Court. In its ruling of July 1994, the Court permitted German participation in multilateral military operations under these conditions:
   • They ultimately served peaceful purposes;

   • They were conducted by collective security organizations such as the UN, organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the Western European Union (WEU);

   • They were approved by a simple majority of the German parliament (Bundestag);
The Court, however, did not stipulate a UN Security Council mandate as a necessary precondition for German participation in military actions. This was despite the fact that German governments preferred such a mandate for domestically legitimizing the use of German troops abroad. On 22 November 2001, the Constitutional Court also confirmed the government’s legitimate right to sign NATO’s new Strategic Concept of 1999 without the consent of the parliament.

Prior to 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany had never deployed Bundeswehr units in any out-of-area operations. During the Gulf War, Germany (like Japan) conducted a form of cheque-book diplomacy and was reluctant to contemplate any use of force outside traditional NATO missions of collective defence. This policy resulted in considerable tensions between the US and its European allies. Thus, it was necessary to reassess Germany’s policies towards Bundeswehr participation in peacekeeping missions outside NATO. Germany came to realize that it could no longer cleave to traditional diplomatic policies and its use of soft power. Instead, Germany had to live up to all obligations of the UN charter.

2. The Gradual Changes to Germany’s Foreign and Security Policies in the 1990s

Fears that Germany’s economic power would dominate the rest of Europe to the point where the other main European powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and others) would be forced to counterbalance the new German weight, were identified during the re-unification of Germany, the Yugoslav wars and the European responses to the Yugoslav conflicts. The Yugoslav wars of 1991-1995/96 were a major stimulus for changes to both German and European security and defence policies in the 1990s.
After much hesitation over the matter of exerting stronger diplomatic and military intervention into Yugoslavia, NATO’s Cooperation Council (NACC) confirmed in January 1993 that the alliance was willingness to undertake operations beyond its traditional defence area. NATO forces had to monitor and to enforce the no-fly zones over Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was also the first time that German Bundeswehr soldiers contributed 162 out of 620 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) crew members for these out-of-area missions. Until 1990, the Federal Republic had never deployed Bundeswehr units in any out-of-area military operations.

In summer 1993, the Bundeswehr units’ tasks were broadened by the UN. As a result, the Bundeswehr units gradually shifted from peacekeeping missions (in accordance to chapter VI of the UN charter) to peacemaking operations (chapter VII) which allowed NATO air-strikes. A medical unit of 150 doctors and nurses serving under the UN umbrella in Cambodia were also sent to the former Yugoslavia in 1992-93.

Thus one of the most important lessons in the first half of the 1990s for the West, and particularly, Europe, was that the military still mattered. NATO’s successful air-strikes served as a broader containment strategy and policy as well as the successful offensive by the Croatian and Bosnian armed forces shattered the myth of Serbian invincibility by demonstrating that Serbia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic, was reluctant to jeopardize Serbia’s own interests and chances of early escape from internationally imposed economic sanctions.  

The reluctance of Great Britain, France, the United States and others to act when ethnic fighting began lay in their fears that they would open the Pandora’s box of border disputes. Should these border disputes following hard on the heels of the coup d’etat in the former Soviet Union, the situation would have been exacerbated. While this fear was understandable against the background of a disintegrating USSR and the spreading of nuclear weapons, a question arose for both Germany and the EU: should they do something and participate in a military intervention? The failing Western policy in 1991-1994 and the EU’s reluctance to deploy troops in the conflict emphasized the lack of real political leadership in the EU as well as the inadequacy of its soft power policies in Bosnia. When these soft power policies of “wishful thinking” in Bosnia were shattered by the aggressive militaristic Serbian policies, it became clear that a responsible leader was needed to define the problem and take the initiative of doing something about it. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations tried and failed to convince its European allies in NATO to take over leadership of Europe until 1994/95.

After years of frustration and internal quarrelling (which led to disorientation and discussions on out-dated threat assessments and best-case scenarios), NATO finally took the initiative to adjust itself so as to secure its future and cope with the new security needs of an undivided Europe. The reluctance to deploy a stronger military force was replaced by the use of a military force within a broader containment and deterrence strategy. This strategy, in turn, became a political design. However, in 1995, the German government was still reluctant to send German Tornado airfighters as part of the first combat mission in NATO’s aerial attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. Eventually, the German
government relented. With the participation of the German Bundeswehr in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), Germany’s attitudes towards the use of force underwent significant changes in the years leading up to 1998.

The lesson Germany had learnt at the end the World War II contrasts starkly with the lessons of the new Yugoslav wars, Kosovo, the Afghanistan war and other violent conflicts around the world. These other conflicts highlighted the existence of an international system, characterized by more instability, ethnic-nationalistic conflicts, international terrorism (linked with the use of ABC-weapons), drug smuggling, rising piracy and many other new forms of transnational security challenges. In this light, it may be concluded that the forecasts at the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 1990s were too optimistic. Consequently, the continued relevance of the traditional security dimension and the instrument as well as the use of military power to cope with the new transnational security dimensions were underestimated.

Due to the security challenges presented by the Yugoslav wars, Germany gradually adopted a new security posture and accepted the need for German participation in military interventions outside the traditional NATO context of collective defence.

The Kosovo crisis at the end of the 1990s was another major challenge for Germany’s foreign and security policies in two respects. Firstly, the new SPD/Green coalition with its strong pacifist roots accepted the need for Bundeswehr involvement in NATO air strikes. As a result, German soldiers were seriously involved in protracted combat missions for the first time since the Second World War. Secondly, the leftist government agreed to do so in the absence of a mandate from the
UN Security Council, which would have granted Germany unambiguous legitimacy to deploy troops under international law. Furthermore, like other European allies and the US government, Germany was reluctant to include ground troops in large-scale combat operations due to the greater risks to German soldiers. In the end, the idea of “Bündnisfähigkeit”, self-isolation and regional stability expounded by Germany’s Foreign and Defence ministries were shunted aside, and military intervention in Kosovo was legitimazed for humanitarian reasons.

**The German Bundeswehr between Old and New Missions**

The German Bundeswehr has been at crossroads since the mid-1990s. The new security challenges within and outside Europe led Germany’s allies in NATO and the EU to call for a well-trained and equipped projection force ready for international crisis management tasks in Europe and elsewhere. As the Bundeswehr was a bloated force structure with declining defence budgets (amounting to 1.5% of GNP) throughout the 1990s, it risked becoming a hollow force, ill-suited for the wider out-of-area security missions outside Europe. It was also incapable of preserving its interoperability with US and other major European NATO allies. Only a fundamental military reform could transform the Bundeswehr into a force of the 21st century.  

Although the new coalition government has launched numerous reform initiatives since 1998, all efficiency enhancing measures could not hide the fact that a shrinking defence budget inevitably signalled limited positive results from the reforms and modernisation programmes. Thus, it was almost impossible for Germany to reach the headline target of both NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) of 1999 and the Helsinki headline goal of the EU. Germany had limited capabilities and resources for its multinational commitments in the fields of strategic intelligence, and strategic mobility. Germany also lacked the means to ensure the survivability, sustainability and protection of forces in peace support operations. Germany had always been a strong political supporter of NATO and the EU, and was consequently often the strategic actor behind ambitious multinational security and defence plans. Since the end of the 1990s, Germany has neither lived up to its potential as the economically strongest power in the EU-27 vis-à-vis its obligations to NATO, CFSP and CSDP nor the expectations of its major European allies (such as Great Britain and France) and the US. However, Germany had temporarily deployed almost up to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere during the last years – more than France, Great Britain or any other EU member state.

On 21 May 2003, the German Defence Minister, Peter Struck, issued

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11) See also F. Umbach, “The Future of the ESDP,” paper delivered at the international conference titled, New Europe, Old Europe and the Transatlantic Agenda, organized by the Center for International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland. 6 September, 2003,
the first ministerial guidelines (known as the Defence Policy Guidelines)\textsuperscript{12} and later justified the need to defend Germany at the Hindu Kush. These Defence Policy Guidelines marked a significant departure from past restructuring efforts. The guidelines consistently steered the Bundeswehr to global conflict prevention and crisis management missions, including the fight against international terrorism and the containment of attempts to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most significant capability requirements are seen in command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) and network-centric warfare (NCW) as a key to interoperability in joint efforts. But ultimately, this new re-structuring is a solution of the poor man. It would have been much better if both the Response Forces and the Stabilization Forces possessed the same degree of readiness and had the same equipment. This is because it is highly risky to send peacekeeping forces to a country without giving them capabilities for peace enforcement. As long as Germany has no comparable intervention forces and less political than its allies to use these forces in conflict situations of escalating crisis and violence, it will be kept out of the decision-making process and be unable to make any political input.

Instead of instituting professional armed forces and giving up conscription, new radical structural reforms were adopted in January 2004 according to the Defence Policy Guidelines. These reforms envisioned a reduction of the German Bundeswehr (which then had 280,000 personnel) by 30,000 personnel so that there would be 250,000

service personnel by 2010. The Bundeswehr would also be divided into three categories:

- **Reaction Forces** (35,000 service personnel): An intervention force deployed in peace enforcement operations. Personnel would have standoff capabilities, precision, rapid mobility as well as the capacity to carry out high-intensity joint and combined network-centric operations.

- **Stabilization Forces** (70,000 personnel): These men and women would be equipped with modern weaponry and adept in leadership skills, logistics, staying power and self-protection so as to confront asymmetric warfare as well as efficiently carry out peacekeeping and stabilization operations. They will be deployed to separate parties to aid in conflict resolution and monitor ceasefires.

- **Support Forces** (137,000 service personnel): They made up the remaining institutions and units of the German Bundeswehr.

These restructuring plans redirected resources away from the traditional national and territorial defence, and also led to the closure of 100 military bases. Despite some positive progress in the reform of the Bundeswehr, the present and past coalition governments have not recognized the political impact of the inadequate defence budget vis-à-vis the preservation of Germany’s strategic interests and political influence in NATO, the EU and the international arena. The European integration processes which increased EU member countries to 27, have not only increased Germany’s national security, but have also pushed the EU borders closer to crisis zones. The planned official transition from a
capabilities oriented to a affordable mission-oriented force structure of the German Bundeswehr\textsuperscript{13} has confirmed the lack of the political will of the coalition governments of the last years to allocate more financial resources to the defence budget. This transition also overlooks the role of the German armed forces as an important instrument in Germany’s future foreign policies with the potential for diplomatic leverage in international relations. In sum, Germany strategic culture still favoured territorial-defence posture over force projection in external crisis management missions even when those missions were authorized by the UN.

In 2010, the Merkel coalition government decided on further defence budget cuts between 2011 and 2014. It also elected to shorten the time of conscription from nine months to six, thereby undermining the conscript system of the Bundeswehr. A mandated commission has been set up to review the organizational structures of and processes in the Bundeswehr to increase efficiency. The subsequent Wieker report called for a more effective, flexible and deployable force through a fundamental reform policy that included the end of the conscription army and a temporary acceptance of capability gaps. After the implementation of the reforms, the Bundeswehr would have a sustainable force of 10,000 troops across several simultaneous operations. The transition from a total of 251,000 personnel of the Bundeswehr today (including 50,000 conscripts) to 156,000 professional soldiers and 7,500 voluntary conscripts, making a total of 163,500 personnel was enacted in 2010 as the absolute minimum for Germany and its obligations for national

defence as well as of its alliance and CSDP commitments. Despite heated debates within the coalition government, the new German Defence Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, largely followed the recommendations of the government commission and the Wieker report of the former defence minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. With 6,700 soldiers currently deployed in missions abroad, it remains to be seen whether the doubling of personnel to external crisis management missions. It is also unknown whether a leaner, more effective and cheaper armed forces is sustainable in the face of an insufficient defence budget and government plans to save 8.3 billion Euro by 2015.

These reforms of the Bundeswehr, as well as modifications of the German foreign and security policy and the traditional strategic culture of restraint, will be important prerequisites for a more active mission of the German armed forces in East Asia. These reforms could also promote closer military-political relationships with relevant regional states. At present however, neither Germany nor Europe has permanent military forces deployed in East Asia since the return of Hong Kong to China. In contrast, Great Britain is still a member of the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) — a military consultation agreement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore and the most important hard security network involving a major EU power. Moreover, France has an operational military presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, totalling some 16,000 troops which may be deployed in East Asia on short notice. Since 2005 however, the German Defence Ministry has become more interested in East Asia and has started to expand and deepen its military-political relationships with Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. It has also institutionalized an annual military seminar with the People’s Liberation Army of China at the German Federal Academy of Security Policies.
The Evolution of the European Security and Defence Policies

At first glance, the EU has a potentially impressive range of policy instruments, ranging from political and civilian soft power to economic and military hard power tools. In theory, the combination of soft and hard power instruments could create a “smart power-status”, determined by a benign multi-lateralist orientation of the CFSP. It would be based on a comprehensive security concept and the recognition that the traditional categorization of “internal” and “external” as well as “civilian” and “military” security challenges are outdated and do not reflect the new realities of the international relations in the 21st century. According to Robert Kagan and other commentators, European military shortcomings such as insufficient defence budgets, military capabilities and political will often render the EU unable to respond to major global challenges. While the European Security Strategy of 2003 recognizes the new security environment and threats, and downgrades large-scale aggression against the EU (as the Warsaw pact did in the past), the new complex security threats have been perceived very differently by the EU’s 27 member states.

The evolution of the CFSP has been further complicated by the rapid changes in the distribution of power within the international system. While the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China (collectively known as BRIC) may have been temporarily stymied by the global financial-economic crisis since 2008 and they may not catch up with the economies of the EU member states or the West vis-à-vis per capita GDP by 2030, the case is not so for China. China has become the second largest trading nation, the world’s largest export nation and
energy consuming country (surpassing the US) and the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter since 2006. China also has the second largest defence budget in the world. By rapidly modernising its armed forces, China is re-shaping the regional military power balances in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Additionally, the EU’s population is decreasing. In contrast, the world’s total population will increase by another 50% so that there will be more than 9 billion people by 2035. The median age of the EU member states is 41 years compared with the worldwide average of 29 years. Furthermore, the relative power of non-state actors such as terrorist groups, business, religious organizations, tribes and transnational crime networks will increase in the future and cause many uncertainties and new security threats.

While the US and its European allies had determined the rules, regimes and organizations of the international system for the past 50 years, the next 50 years will be more complex and multipolar owing to the declining influence of the EU in the international arena. It is uncertain whether future international behaviour will be still based on a rule-based system and whether the West would be able to continue governing. This is because the EU may not successfully maintain its


traditional self-image as a shaper of global rules and standards. The EU’s inability and reluctance to back up its soft power instruments and bolster its insufficient hard power tools have shaped the perceptions of other great and rising powers such as Russia, China and India, whose foreign and security policies are overwhelmingly state-centred and shaped by realist notions of power politics. Moreover, the EU’s ability is also hampered by its rivalries with the other two organizations for European security, NATO and OSCE. Its member states still have no basic political consensus on their overlapping functions, geographical scope and strategies. In the absence of a unified threat, the original theoretic concept of “interlocking institutions” has resulted in the formation of “interblocking institutions” in the 1990s.\(^\text{16}\)

Furthermore, the EU’s ability or inability to act and speak with one voice and thus exercise influence towards its goals demonstrates how the union’s decisions are always dependent on the agreement among its members. Thus, the CFSP and ESDP are dependent on the collective political will as well as soft power and hard power instruments of the 27 EU member states. The EU has to overcome the fact that the CFSP and ESDP have had a more rapid growth than its soft and hard power capabilities as well as military capabilities. The slow growth of its military capabilities may be attributed to the shrinking defence expenditures, inertia, a strategic culture of restraint and different threat perceptions as well as the poor coordination of its defence policies. In 2006, the EU member states spent some €204 billion on defence, but that amount varied significantly between the different member states in terms of percentage of GDP and in the way in which the money was

spent in their respective defence sectors. Likewise, only a few EU member states possess adequate capabilities for the full range of external crisis-management missions. Although Germany is the biggest economic powerhouse in Europe, it is still in the lower ranks of EU member states in terms of the percentage of GDP it spends on defence. In turn, this has given rise to the questions as to whether Germany is fully committed to the CSDP as the most economically powerful European country and why economically weaker member states should carry a larger burden of CSDP expenditure than Germany.

Some EU member states with capabilities necessary for the growth of CSDP do not offer their assistance directly available to the EU. While the voluntary cooperation process outlined in the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) of 2001 did not produce the necessary output, it created the European Defence Agency for the promotion of industrial cooperation. Through the European Defence Agency, the core capability gaps of strategic and tactical airlift, intelligence and reconnaissance as well as force projection for the EU’s Rapid Reaction Forces and civilian and military crisis management missions have been rendered more obvious. However, these capability gaps still have not been bridged. These capability gaps are further exacerbated by further uncoordinated defence cuts in the EU. During 2000-2009, NATO’s European allies decreased the percentage of GDP allocated to their defence budgets from 2% to 1.74%.

To mitigate the effects of these defence cuts, Germany and other European countries could pool the defence budgets of its 27 member

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states (which amount to some 200 billion Euros). By merging the resources of all the member states, the EU would be able to efficiently implement research and development programmes and joint capabilities to cut costs and create new capabilities. The last decade has shown that the EU’s priorities need to be systematically defined so as to improve the way in which it conducts missions abroad and preserve the interoperability of its NATO and EU allies. Sharing resources, capabilities, roles and task specializations is a pragmatic way of compensating the shrinking European defence budgets and insufficient military capabilities. Positive examples are the Joint Investment Programmes (JIPs) of the European Defence Agency, the Franco-German coordination group, the UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty of November 2010, and the proposed plans to develop a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for crisis scenarios and high-intensity operations.

As civilian instruments, capabilities and development of crisis scenarios often develop independently from the military, the biggest challenge of civilian capabilities is bridging the gap between “existing, pledged and deployed personnel” for its police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection missions. The potential strength of the EU’s civilian capabilities lies in the union’s ability to coordinate the civilian resources of its 27 member states. However, the lack of professional civilian personnel and the military personnel’s inexperience in commanding civilian co-workers in difficult and dangerous international missions could pose a problem. Thus, civilian volunteers must receive sufficient training before they are sent on missions.

These problems notwithstanding, the EU has initiated 24 missions through ESDP and CSDP between 2003 and 2010. These civilian and military missions drew mixed results, further highlighting the fact that civilian operations had no competitive advantage vis-à-vis military missions. A 2010 IISS study lamented the increasing operational demands and costs faced by civilian-military operations:

“Given the strength of the narrative that depicts the EU as a civilian power, albeit with a military capability, it is more disturbing that general assessments of civilian operations seem to come to the conclusion that the EU’s civilian efforts are even less successful than their military counterparts. ... But by and large operations so far have been of limited strategic value – in terms of having a lasting impact – and truly integrated civilian-military operations have not even been attempted at this point.”

These shortcomings are due to the great unresolved paradox of the CSDP: “... European defence is not, strictly speaking, about defending Europe; it is not based on a defensive alliance but on projecting stabilization forces outside – and sometimes far outside – its borders.”

Thus the emergence of a true European CSDP has to be based on present and future European strategic interests; interests that must be in line with the globalization of security policies, as well as the globalization of its economic and external trade interests, particularly in the Asia-Pacific.

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19) Ibid., p. 54 f.
6. Conclusions and Perspectives

“... the EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never get the ability to shape world events that most of them say want unless they are prepared to pay the extra cost, either in financial terms, or in terms of institutional and political reforms that will give them the kind of hard power enabling the EU to act entirely independent of the US security umbrella.”21)

In the light of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the resultant US military intervention into Afghanistan, Germany has declared its willingness to expand the military component of its foreign policies. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared Germany’s “unconditional solidarity” with the US military campaign against terrorism, by stating the country’s willingness “to participate in military operations in defence of freedom and human rights.” Despite these strong words, moves to revamp Germany’s foreign and security policies have been fairly been limited. Moreover, German constitutional law requires parliamentary approval before any German troops can be deployed in support of the anti-terrorist campaign. This, in turn, indicates the limited political Handlungsfähigkeit (or capacity to act) of present and future German governments. Moreover, increasing military constraints such as financial cutbacks and overstretching the conscription base must also be taken into consideration.

Despite significant changes in German foreign and security policies vis-à-vis the use of Bundeswehr outside traditional NATO defence missions of collective defence, Germany’s leftwing SPD/Green coalition has initiated collective security policies that favour political negotiations over military coercion. While the use of military power is often seen as the *ultimo ratio* of politics, the government coalitions persist in framing their security policies on idealist conceptions of international relations by focusing on soft power instruments and underestimating the military instrument’s potential in crisis and conflict management strategies. It has also overestimated the political strategy of preventive diplomacy, which is further hampered by a high number of inherent constraints, contradictions and willingness of most of the states in the world to transfer part of their national sovereignty to supranational structures. As a result, preventive diplomacy in political strategy often degenerates into half-hearted symbolic approaches devoid of real political and financial commitment. The problem of preventive diplomacy lies not in the lack of information and the knowledge about specific conflicts; rather, it lies in the political willingness of governments to put aside their hopes for “best case scenarios” and respond in a timely manner according to the preventive political and military strategies they have outlined. This is not a dilemma unique to Germany.

Since the end of the Cold War, new security questions have risen from the existing asymmetries between Germany’s economic and political weight as well as military roles within NATO, the EU and the UN. Due to these new security questions, alliance politics and Germany’s role within the western alliance must be redefined. Germany has a strong institutional bond with its allies, as evinced by the fact that its fundamental interests continue to be closely aligned with that of the US and Western Europe.
However, Germany has to develop international identities explicitly recognizing and accepting its interdependence with other countries. For example, Germany’s total export volume is second to the US’s and its export quota per capita is greater than the US’s. With the exception of China, it is clear that Germany is dependent on foreign markets more than any other country in the world. In other words, Germany’s economy is dependent on the national and regional stability of foreign countries to which it exports. Accordingly, Germany’s foreign and security policy must look beyond Europe and acknowledge the fact that global interdependence entails the “globalization of security policies”. However, demonstrated by the Kosovo conflict of 1999 and the ongoing military intervention in Afghanistan, German public opinion continues to be divided between West and East. Public opinion polls conducted after 2001 indicate East Germans have a sceptical view of NATO and the United States, especially when those bodies call for the deployment of the Bundeswehr in missions that do not involve territorial defence.

Up to 2010, Bundeswehr reforms prioritized territorial defence rather than the formation of an interventionist force or power-projection. These reforms have financially encumbered the Bundeswehr and prevented Germany from pulling its weight in ESDP as the UK and France have done. The success of the CSDP rests primarily on the ability of the UK, France and Germany to pull their respective weights. Although the German government is aware of the need to redress these tasks, inadequate funding and the traditional political emphasis on “territorial defence” have limited the progress of the CSDP. As a result, the UK and France have come to dominate the CSDP and Germany is left at the sidelines. While there have been undeniable improvements in the years following their missions to Afghanistan, the German armed forces
remain the least deployable, mobile and sustainable amongst NATO’s and the EU’s armed forces. Thus, Germany has to overcome its traditional security culture by realizing that the core elements of its foreign and security policies – multilateralism and the culture of restraint – no longer overlap and reinforce each other.\(^{22}\)

These problems came to the fore when Germany (along with China and Russia) abstained from the United Nations Security Council vote last March. In contrast, the Arab states were firmly behind the resolution and agreed to participate in military actions to protect the Libyan civilian population. Germany’s abstention shocked the UK, France, the US and its other EU and NATO partners. Germany was accused of siding with dictators and autocratic, non-democratic regimes and turning its back on its EU and NATO allies by “pulling up the anchor that secures it to the West.”\(^{23}\) While Germany’s decision to abstain is unsurprising in light of its strategic culture of restraint, this abstention has widely been interpreted and criticised as German abandonment of its traditional pro-European and pro-transatlantic orientation. By dissociating itself from its closest allies and opting not to participate in policing a no-fly-zone in Libya, Germany contradicted its past policies wherein it was willingness to share the burden with its EU and NATO allies. Germanys abstention


in the UN Security Council was criticised as promulgating isolationist stubbornness, self-righteousness and strategic confusion.

The strategic failure of opting out and electing to oppose the UK and France in particular has greatly damaged and limited the EU’s ability to play a leading role in addressing those challenges in its direct neighbourhood. Consequently, the core elements of the German foreign and security policies – trust, credibility and reliability – are now in doubt. This abstention also considerably damaged Germany’s long coveted ambition for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, France announced that it would strengthen its military cooperation with United Kingdom and reduce the cooperation it had with Germany. This would leave Germany in the sidelines, without any real influence in the future of the CSDP. Devastated by German’s abstention, the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, stated: “The common security and defence policy of Europe? It is dead.” The British historian and political commentator, Timothy Garton Ash, criticised Germany in harsher terms:

“While French and British pilots risk their lives in action, the German foreign minister is virtually encouraging the Arab League to make further criticism. A word that springs unbidden to my mind is Dolchstoss (stab in the back). ... German opinion seems to have sunk back into an attitude of ‘leave us alone’. Let Germany be a Greater Switzerland! And the dynamism of its extraordinary growth is increasingly outside the old west, in trade with countries like Brazil, Russia, India and China – the very BRICs with which is sided at the UN.”

The CSFP and CSDP cannot evolve without Germany, as Germany is the largest and most economically powerful member of 27 EU states. The Merkel government needs to repair the damage wrought by Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council vote not only for the sake of the CSFP and CSDP but for German and EU strategic interests as well. However, this will be an uphill struggle as Germany’s foreign and security policies have lost the trust of its allies. Indeed, it would be easier for Germany to raise its defence budget than to win back the trust of its allies.

While the CSFP has made undeniable progress in the last decade, insufficient political will, lack of equally insufficient civilian as well as military capabilities for external international crisis management and the absence of strategic guidance have all condemned the CSDP to a series of reactive security policies. While the defence budgets in the rest of the world (particularly, the Asia-Pacific region) are increasing, the defence budgets in the 27 EU member states are shrinking. The reduced defence budgets have led to inadequate civilian capabilities, which in turn hamper sustainable political results in joint EU-US military operations. This led the former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to remark that the “demilitarization of Europe” is the major impediment preventing the EU from achieving real security and lasting peace in many parts of the world.25) Similarly, the civilian instruments of an international crisis

management lack capabilities and close coordination between its member states. This is due to different threat perceptions and the various priorities defined in the CSFP.

While the CSDP lacks a permanent European armed forces and permanent strategic headquarters, it has become a full security player alongside the UN and NATO. However, both the EU and NATO lack much needed political consensus on strategic priorities. This would in turn hamper the EU and NATO’s future external crisis management missions. Furthermore, the high hopes pinned on the Lisbon treaties, the establishment of the European External Action Service as a new diplomatic service and the appointment of the previous EU trade commissioner Catherine Ashton to the High Representative for the CFSP and the former Belgian Prime Minister Herman van Rompuy to the President of the European Council have been misplaced due to their inexperience in security policies and the existing command of the member states in foreign, security and defence policies. The EU has a long way to go in reforming its institutions. To do so, it needs strategic thinking and a common political vision as well as common political will and leadership, particularly among the three leading EU powers of Germany, France and United Kingdom.
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Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Korea & Japan Office 2011

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Edited by: Dr. Lam Peng Er, Dr. Colin Duerkop

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