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XI Conference of Forte de Copacabana International Security A European-South American Dialogue



# Multilateral Security Governance



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## Introduction

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There is little doubt that the health of global politics is currently faltering. Hopeful aspirations regarding the achievement of a stable and prosperous global society of states have floated in the international community from its inception. Today, in ever more parts of the world, such hopes become progressively undermined by surges of war and instability, aggravated by the consequent decline in global trust which inevitably ensues from – and perpetuates – such contexts.

For now, the ship of the global community still sails in fairly calm waters, yet dark clouds gather overhead, heavy with potentially dangerous trials, which, if not countered carefully, might so very easily disrupt the relative peace and stability that so many have strived to build. In the face of such a prospect, it would be desirable were the international community able to work in concert, acting swiftly and decisively. However a glance across the globe reveals a worrisome picture and it remains to be seen whether world leaders are indeed taking appropriate measures in the face of the building storm. The survival of the ship itself is in play – a ship, moreover, in which we all sail.

The hopeful dreams which the Arab Spring inspired have given way to a nightmarish scenario. The vast space from the Maghreb to the Tigris River is now speckled by pockets of conflict; war has become a reality for millions; and government's most fundamental capacity - namely to govern -has been decidedly on the retreat. There are signs, moreover, that we may be witnessing only the beginning, as the agents of war have

entrenched themselves in the region, claiming ever larger swathes of land, expelling and/or killing those who appear not to conform to the ideologies they espouse. Meanwhile, the international community watches uneasily from the side-lines, seemingly reluctant to act, disillusioned as to the merits of intervention – military and non-military alike.

A consensus between global heavyweights on how to engage the crisis is wanting. As a result, the risk of spillover into adjacent regions is a constant – and ever increasing – concern. Stability can only return when the controlled, well-orchestrated commitment to engender and maintain peace trumps the powerful anarchy of war – a prospect which, in light of recent events, seems fairly remote.

Meanwhile, to the North, the spectre of war has also returned to Europe. That which began as a peaceful protest in several parts of the Ukraine soon deteriorated into the proverbial powder keg scenario. The transition from acts of violence between hostile factions to full blown struggle involving a multitude of actors – domestic and international – was less of a stretch than might be desired. Indeed, the perceived large-scale external interference has led to a relative breakdown in relations between regional powers – involving, to a degree, more distant players also. East and West sit once more on opposite sides of the negotiating table, apparently unable to resolve the situation in the Ukraine. And while the impasse remains an impasse, the many challenges with which the international system is faced become just that degree more difficult to solve.

Numerous conflicts beset the world – far beyond those we have attempted to outline; still more are in the making. All, however, contribute to undermine the workings of the interconnected global corpus (The Global) – potentially even threatening the very model of the society of states as an institutionally and politically predominant structure. As such, all members of the international community share a stake in confronting the agents of conflict and political instability, if only in the dispassionately functional interest of ensuring that the good working order of said community remains intact. The tools and means through which this securitisation might be brought about, however, is cause for seemingly ceaseless disagreement. The progressive erosion of political and financial capital that has resulted from recent global engagements has led some of the more active policing states to tone down their commitments to world affairs; to recoil into a posture of relative seclusion. This apparent shift towards disengagement on the part of once vigorously active members of the international arena has, in turn, resulted in a diminished sense of global spirit and leadership. The withdrawal of what was once firm, resolute direction acts, moreover, as both consequence and causation to the above-described surge of global instability: perpetuating the conditions for its expansion and in so doing further reducing previous international leaders' desire (if not ability) to regain their stabilising positions at the helm.

Reversing the impetus of this worrisome loop is no simple endeavour. The underlying Hobbesian wilderness of the international system constantly threatens to overwhelm the potential for cooperation and concerted action within and among the society of states. Yet it is understandable that states should fear to act when all they see before them are perilous paths, ridden with pitfalls and characterised by uncertainty – a scenario in which the potential dangers far outstrip the sparse rewards. Factoring the recent series of revelations pertaining to the cyber sphere into this sorry picture and matters become just that degree bleaker; interstate relations, infused with further mistrust. Overcoming this obstacle in which cyber activities are both the threat and the method of protection constitutes, thus, a key component of an overall global strategy to return the world to a state of comparative tranquillity and order. Only by reaffirming the commitment to negotiation, improving information-sharing and trust-building can progress be made. Exchanging views perspectives, experiences and concerns is – in today’s digitally interconnected-but-mistrustful world – more important than ever.

Promoting dialogue, stimulating debate, and furthering knowledge of world affairs is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s *sine qua non*. The Foundation’s fruitful cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for International Relations and partners is a particularly happy illustration of this fact. It is an undeniable fact that prior knowledge of the field improves one’s chances in battle. It is, thus, desirable that prior to positive concerted action an effort be made to thoroughly comprehend the challenges at hand and the wider contexts in which they are inserted. In other words, it is our view that a full analysis of political and geopolitical considerations ought to precede decisive and targeted cooperation ventures. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and partners aim to here contribute to this effort.

In the present volume writers were invited to ponder the complex and shifting storm-clouds of the world today. This includes analyses of the recent surge in security threats; the emergence of challenges to the international community itself; individual perspectives both from and regarding Brazil and Europe; the continuous rise of new actors, changing the global landscape of influence; the transformation of the international system; and the meaning and role of cyber-related hazards.

We find ourselves at an interesting historical moment - precisely one hundred years since the start of the First World War, two hundred years since that of the Congress of Vienna. 2014 is an anniversary, thus, of both the descent into anarchy and strife, and the restoration of order and balance, in two different cycles of the constant ebb and flow of the tides of power. As such, we consider it to be a good time to reflect upon current challenges taking lessons from both the errors and the solutions of the past.

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## Managing Transnational Border Threats: Brazil as a Global Mentor

Brian Finlay

Johanna Mendelson Forman

On June 19<sup>th</sup> as thousands of football fans streamed out of the Estádio do Maracanã in Rio de Janeiro having cheered their national team to victory in its first World Cup game, nearby a stray bullet from an unidentified gun struck the neck of a small boy. While the source of that bullet was unknown, the origin of the growing armed violence in Brazil was clear: porous borders that allow for the free flow of illicit arms, people, drugs, counterfeit goods and other contraband to traverse freely across national boundaries.

By their very nature unlawfully held guns and other illicit items cannot be counted, but in Brazil it is estimated that between three and ten million illicit guns are in circulation.<sup>1</sup> These weapons help foment one of the region's worst rates of gun violence, foster other illicit trafficking trends, and negatively impact long term economic prosperity. Although a high percentage of these weapons are from Brazilian weapons manufacturers, a national Parliamentary Commission found that many of these guns are actually sold for export to countries like Paraguay, returning to Brazil in the hands of organized criminals via Argentina. Illicit European weapons compound the challenge, tracing a route through the Dutch port of Rotterdam, arriving in Suriname, and entering Brazil through

<sup>1</sup> Dreyfus, Pablo, Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento and Luis Eduardo Guedes. "Small Arms-Related Violence in Brazil: Victims and Weapons." In *Small Arms in Rio de Janeiro: The Guns, the Buyback, and the Victims*, 26-31. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. December 1, 2008. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR09-Rio.pdf>.

an inadequately secured northern border. And finally, American-produced weapons, which flood the Americas in untold numbers annually, also enter Brazil via Panama and Mexico.<sup>2</sup>

With the world's attention focused on Brazil for international soccer's premier event, it was inevitable that the country's struggle with a burgeoning trafficking culture would tragically come to the fore. The incident outside of the Estádio is emblematic of a growing threat posed by porous borders, set in a neighborhood where drugs, traffickers, arms, and cash are able to move seamlessly across international boundaries owing to a toxic combination of a vast geography, vacuums in governance at the frontiers, and ill-equipped and sometimes under-motivated partners on the opposite side of Brazil's border. Beyond the immediate human toll—an estimated 36,000 people are killed in Brazil each year as a result of violent crime<sup>3</sup>—it is further believed that armed violence in Brazil's sprawling cities has potentially dramatic implications for national achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).<sup>4</sup>

Despite the tragic human and economic toll on Brazil, what is clear is that these prerequisites for insecurity and underdevelopment are not isolated to the Brazilian context—or even to that of South America. Across the hemisphere and around the globe, there is a growing convergence of transnational security threats—proliferation, environmental crime, counterfeiting, narcotics, dirty cash, arms and human trafficking, and terrorism—whose roots are linked to an enduring inability of governments to control their borders. The most extreme example is Honduras—the hemisphere's most dangerous country where homicide rates peaked in 2011 at 91.6 per 100,000, according to the Organization of American States (OAS).<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, Honduras remains the second poorest country in Central America, facing significant challenges, with more than two thirds of the population living in poverty and five out of ten suffering from extreme poverty (2012). According to the World Bank, in rural areas 6 out of 10 households live in extreme poverty.<sup>6</sup>

Even more distressing than these individual trafficking threats in isolation is the growing interconnectivity between once isolated criminal or terrorist acts. We now know for instance that the 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people and wounded another 1,800 were financed in part by the Moroccan hashish trade.<sup>7</sup> Likewise, the

<sup>2</sup> Bandeira, Antonio Rangel. "Parliamentary Commission of Investigation (CPI) Denounces the Deviation of Arms in Brazil." Viva Rio media release. Brasília: Viva Rio. November 29, 2006. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/2090>.

<sup>3</sup> **Armed Violence, Urban Spaces and Development in Brazil** By: Sérgio de Lima, R. and Maura Tomesani, A. Unpublished Background Paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 2010.

<sup>4</sup> **More Violence, Less Development: Examining the relationship between armed violence and MDG achievement.** Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, September 2010. Accessed July 24, 2014. [http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG\\_Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf](http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/MDG_Process/MoreViolenceLessDevelopment.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> Organization of American States. "OAS Observatory on Citizen Security--Data Repository." Observatory. SMS. OAS. Last modified 2014. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.oas.org/dsp/Observatorio/database/indicadorsdetails.aspx?lang=en&indicator=17>.

<sup>6</sup> The World Bank. "Honduras Overview." Last modified April 10, 2014. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/honduras/overview>.

<sup>7</sup> Williams, Phil. "In Cold Blood: The Madrid Bombings." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 2, no. 9 (June 2008): 19-24. Accessed

resources Hezbollah uses to fund its attacks—such as the Bulgarian bus bombing in 2012—are derived partly from the Latin American drug trade.<sup>8</sup> In Africa, al Shabaab's attack on the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi was facilitated in part by wildlife trafficking, and the attack on an Algerian gas plant that same year was financed by cigarette smugglers.<sup>9</sup>

These graphic anecdotes demonstrate that a widening gyre of security threats is interwoven in the era of globalization. Continued border transgressions involving a broad mix of contraband around the globe—in some cases escalating to record levels—suggests that current strategies have failed to keep up with the innovations of illicit traders. Consider the following:

- › According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), global illicit financial flows related to drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime activities equated to approximately US\$650 billion per year in the first decade of the new millennium. That figure is equivalent to 1.5% of global GDP in 2009;<sup>10</sup>
- › The current illicit trade in conventional arms is estimated at \$1 billion per year for small arms alone;
- › The European Commission estimates that illicit trade in cigarettes costs the European Union and Member States over 10 billion each year in lost tax and customs revenue and that about 65% of cigarettes seized in the EU are counterfeit. Illicit cigarette consumption in the EU has increased by 30% over the past six years reaching a staggering 11.1% of total consumption in 2012;<sup>11</sup>
- › The illicit drugs trade (also referred to as the illegal drugs trade or drug trafficking) is one of the largest global businesses, estimated to be valued at some \$322 billion annually.<sup>12</sup>

Only by breaking down our own outmoded, stove-piped responses, and developing a workable strategy to combat the menace of illicit transnational border flows, can we sustainably address the insecurity and economic underdevelopment it yields. Regrettably, this has proven to be a greater challenge than this simple observation might suggest, owing in part to our inability to effectively collaborate across the jurisdictional boundaries—geographic, political, and bureaucratic—that define our existing organizational responses.

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July 24, 2014. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/50/103>.

<sup>8</sup> Levitt, Matthew. "South of the Border, A Threat from Hezbollah." *The Journal of International Security Affairs* (Spring 2013):77-82. Accessed July 24, 2014. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Levitt20130515-JISA.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Kalron, Nir and Andrea Crosta. "Africa's White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory." Last modified 2011-2012. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://elephantleague.org/project/africas-white-gold-of-jihad-al-shabaab-and-conflict-ivory/>; and Doward, Jamie. "How cigarette smuggling fuels Africa's Islamist violence." *The Guardian*, January 26, 2013. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/27/cigarette-smuggling-mokhtar-belmokhtar-terrorism>.

<sup>10</sup> **Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes: Research Report.** New York: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2011. Accessed July 24, 2014. [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit\\_financial\\_flows\\_2011\\_web.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> European Parliamentary Research Service. "EU action to reduce illicit trade in tobacco products." Briefing, January 16, 2014. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplibrary/Action-de-l-UE-visant-a-reduire-le-commerce-illicite-du-tabac-EN.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> **World Drug Report 2007.** New York: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007. Accessed July 24, 2014. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2007.html>.

In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. That agreement is the central international instrument in the fight against widening criminal activity around the globe. Responding to a growing recognition of international criminality, many national strategies have subsequently been developed. Countries of the developed North have been especially aggressive as of late, pouring new human and financial resources into combatting the global flow of illicit goods. Quantifying global resources dedicated to combatting border insecurity and transnational criminal activity is an overwhelming task, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the billions spent around the globe is barely having a holding effect on burgeoning trafficking trends. According to one independent study, for instance, over \$100 billion is spent globally each year on enforcing the war on drugs and yet relative trafficking levels continue to fluctuate at unacceptably high levels.<sup>13</sup> In short, as the aforementioned statistics demonstrate, these good efforts seem to have had little impact on disrupting a growing convergence of transnational trafficking threats.

### **Globalization: The Root of Threat Convergence**

Globalization has revolutionized the international system, with global trade, foreign direct investment, and the freer flow of goods, services, information, and money yielding inexorable growth worldwide. Although even the most cursory survey of the human condition today reveals wild geographic disparities in virtually every economic, social, and political measure, at no other point in history have people worldwide lived longer, had greater access to health services, or had more opportunities to acquire a basic education. These unprecedented advances, propelled by the forces of globalization, have markedly improved the quality of life for millions of people around the world, decreasing global poverty rates by 34 percent over the last three decades. By some estimate, in the past five years alone, more than half a billion people have been freed from the grinding poverty associated with living on less than \$1.25 per day.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, while globalization has helped once-isolated communities connect to the outside world in new, profitable, and sometime life-saving ways, with it has come an array of transnational security challenges—from the illicit trafficking of arms, drugs, and humans to the corrosive impact on peace, development, and the rule of law—that threaten to undermine the positive impacts of our growing global interconnectedness. Besides the individual human tragedies they cause, these nefarious activities fuel conflicts and armed violence, ruin labor markets and educational systems, and dim the prospects for foreign direct investments. For instance, according to the UN Development Programme, Latin America remains the most unequal and most insecure region in the world. In addition to the immediate and well documented human impact of violence, insecurity affects the region's economic potential. Without the excess mortality due to

<sup>13</sup> **The Alternative World Drug Report: Counting the Costs of the War on Drugs.** By Rolles, Steve, George Murkin, Martin Powell, Danny Kushlick, and Jane Slater. 2012, Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/alternative-drug-report-20120626.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> **Poverty in Numbers: The Changing State of Global Poverty from 2005 to 2015.** By Chandy, Laurence and Geoffrey Gertz. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, January 2011. Accessed July 24, 2014. [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/1/global%20poverty%20chandy/01\\_global\\_poverty\\_chandy.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/1/global%20poverty%20chandy/01_global_poverty_chandy.pdf).



homicide, the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to have been 0.5 per cent higher, equivalent to a potential gain of more than \$24 billion in 2009 alone.<sup>15</sup>

In many ways, Brazil is a case study in the confluence of licit and illicit trade. When President Rousseff was inaugurated in 2011, she inherited an economy growing at a 7.5 percent annual rate. Unemployment rested at 5.3 percent, the lowest rate seen in over a decade in Brazil. Brazil's Bovespa stock market index rose six-fold during her predecessor, President Lula's, eight-year tenure, as iron ore, soybean and sugar exports flourished.<sup>16</sup> Yet just as Brazil's economy became increasingly (and prosperously) connected to the outside world, so too did it connect with the illicit underbelly of globalization. According to United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, seizures of illicit drugs in Brazil climbed 10-fold between 2005 and 2009 as Brazil's organized-crime syndicates capitalized upon that country's geographic proximity to Africa to establish new transshipment routes. As Brazil's trade with Angola, for example, tripled from \$520 million in 2005 to more than \$1.5 billion in 2009, so too did Brazil's illicit exports of drugs, weapons, people, and counterfeit goods. Globalization help transform Brazil from a simple consumer of illicitly traded goods, into a global turntable state, radiating contraband around the globe along with every other large modern economy.

In 2006 the United Nations recognized that these "borderless threats" constituted a new type of challenge to the international order that would demand a rethinking of collective security as it had been practiced in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>17</sup> Thus, while development specialists rightly celebrate globalization and the economic benefits it helps to engender, security experts more often see the emergence of new threats and the globalization of insecurity. Regrettably, these challenges have become most acute in regions that can manage them the least. Many countries that have benefited from our growing global interconnectedness lack the necessary border controls, customs enforcement, or police and judicial capacity to adequately combat cross border scourges. Indeed, the breadth of these transnational security threats is often so vast that addressing them is beyond the scope of even the most well-intentioned governments. Borders are too long and diverse. Resources are too scarce. Criminals are increasingly innovative and sophisticated, able to turn the benefits of national sovereignty into hindrances on governments' ability to respond quickly to the changing strategies of criminal elements.

As noted, even in regions of the world like Latin America which is considered by many to be a "zone of peace", the new types of security challenges which impact human security have turned the region into one of the most crime ridden and insecure places for anyone to live. The crisis in public security arises precisely from the new types of threats

<sup>15</sup> Summary: Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014. *Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America*. New York: United Nations Development Programme, November 2013. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/docs/Research%20and%20Publications/IDH/IDH-AL-ExecutiveSummary.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Nevaer, Louis E.V. "As Brazil Booms, So Do New Drug Routes," *New American Media: Latin America*, January 9, 2012. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://newamericamedia.org/2012/01/as-brazil-booms-so-do-new-drug-routes.php>.

<sup>17</sup> See *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. New York: High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, December 2004. Accessed July 24, 2014. [http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp\\_more\\_secure\\_world.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf).

that no longer respond to the actions of one nation alone.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, these types of threats demand that government actors work collectively across interagency mandates and security/development stovepipes to identify new ways to protect sovereignty, not to mention illicit activities that undermine economic growth and development.

Although traditional donor governments of the North have played an important role in building responsive border capacity, their conventional approaches are proving increasingly incapable of meeting evolving interconnected threats. For example, the types of threats now confronting nations require inter-agency responses that place national armies and police forces at the forefront of the battle to prevent crimes, but equally necessitate building the fundamentals of a prosperous society in order to ensure long term sustainability to the security established by the rule of law. The same UNDP report that recognized the intimate relationship between security and development also concluded that one of the main lessons drawn from the Americas is that so-called “iron fist” policies do not work: strong police and criminal repression in the region have often coincided with rising, not diminishing rates of violent crime.<sup>19</sup>

In the past twenty years, these statistics and the muddling of military missions with law enforcement activities has further complicated the way we have customarily approached transnational threats. This has given rise to debates across the donor communities and also among civil society groups over whether economic development has been “securitized.” In short, the dictum, ‘without peace there can be no development, and without development there can be no lasting peace’ has driven efforts to disentangle these objectives rather than to seek their mutually effective leveraging. ‘Whole of government’ rhetoric aside, a determined effort to identify pragmatic demonstrations of effective interdisciplinary cooperation across the security and defense mandates of government yields few results that go beyond the anecdotal.<sup>20</sup> The inability of the Northern donors and other international institutions to bridge the divide between traditional “security” and “development” objectives is clearly hampering our ability to effectively and sustainably address either priority.

The current move within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to prevent implementation assistance in support of the newly minted Arms Trade Treaty from being considered Official Development Assistance is indicative of the enduring stove-pipes between these increasingly interdependent policy priorities. As Latin America has ably and tragically demonstrated, the misuse of small arms and light weapons has a significant downward impact on development. According to research by the Small Arms Survey:

<sup>18</sup> Rodrigo Tavares. *Security in South America: The role of states and regional organizations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2014, p. 43.

<sup>19</sup> *Summary: Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014. Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America*. New York: United Nations Development Programme, November 2013. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rblac/docs/Research%20and%20Publications/IDH/IDH-AL-ExecutiveSummary.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> *Greater than the Sum of its Parts?: Assessing 'Whole of Government' Approaches to Fragile States*. By: Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown, International Peace Academy, 2007. Accessed July 24, 2014. [http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weak-states/GREATER\\_THAN\\_THE\\_SUM%20E-Book2.pdf](http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weak-states/GREATER_THAN_THE_SUM%20E-Book2.pdf).

*Armed violence can trigger forced displacement, erode social capital, and destroy infrastructure. It can impede investment in reconstruction and reconciliation. Armed violence can undermine public institutions, facilitate corruption, and be conducive to a climate of impunity. Armed violence contributes to and is sustained by transnational crime, including the trafficking of persons, drugs, and arms. When associated with interpersonal and gender-based violence, it unravels the fabric of families and communities and leaves lasting psychological and physical scars on survivors. Armed violence is not only a cause of underdevelopment, but also a consequence of it.<sup>21</sup>*

Even as security analysts lament the challenges that increasingly networked transnational security threats present, viewed differently, they also present opportunities to meet these challenges in a unified way. By exploiting the nexus between diverse trafficking threats, and applying solution sets that better coordinate across security and development priorities, new opportunities have emerged to engage a wider spectrum of impacted constituencies, to better leverage limited resources, and to meaningfully and sustainably address these interconnected challenges.

Unlike wealthy countries of the North, many governments of the Global South have been active for decades in building these interdisciplinary responses—often based upon the simple need to better leverage scarce resources. Governments around the world should look more closely at the lessons learned from these best practices and seek to actively replicate those that have proven effective. Despite its continued border challenges, perhaps no better example of this policy innovation exists than that presented by the Government of Brazil.

### **Brazil's Borders and the Security/Development Interface**

As the world's sixth largest economy, Brazil has long faced each of these challenges in varying degrees. The government recognized that the same economic expansion and the strength of the *Real* that have brought new prosperity have, in turn, also increased an array of these transnational security challenges. A massive influx of illegal migrants from Haiti and Peru, and cocaine from Colombia, and counterfeit goods from Paraguay forced Brazil to redouble its border protection activities. Motivated by these cross-border challenges, as well as by its global obligations, Brasilia has made significant new domestic investments and provided strategic assistance beyond its own borders designed to prevent trafficking, proliferation and the cross-boundary movement of all manner of contraband—all while helping to promote economic growth and development.

In advance of the World Cup, Brazil undertook six border security operations. The last, operation Agata 6, lasted two weeks and involved 7,500 Brazilian soldiers, backed by fighter jets, combat helicopters, patrol boats, and armored vehicles that were spread over parts of the country's vast border. Their goal was to combat transnational criminal activities in cooperation with local officials and in close coordination with

<sup>21</sup> Small Arms Survey. "Impact on Development." Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/armed-violence/social-and-economic-costs/impact-on-development.html>.

bordering governments in Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay. Throughout the course of the operation, marijuana, cocaine, explosives, humans, arms, wildlife, gold and timber were all identified and at various times, seized at the border. The six border operations also marked a shift in Brazil's disinclination to use military personnel for border security and, especially, counter-narcotics operations. For the military and many civilian defense officials have long opposed this sort of operation, fearing that it would divert resources from more traditional military missions. While exhibiting operational successes against these cross border challenges, the operation also reflects both the scope of the challenge facing Brasilia and the fact that these challenges can no longer be managed in isolation. Owing to its unique geography and complex neighborhood, Brazil has been savvy in designing a border strategy that not only attacks border trafficking threats in a coordinated fashion, but also does so with an acute sensitivity to the needs of border communities from an economic development perspective.

### **Understanding Brazil's National Border Strategy: On Land and By Sea**

Brazil's 10,000 mile frontier traverses the Amazon Basin and shares this space with nine other countries. Along the frontier are cross border cities, communities with indigenous peoples, and vast areas of unexplored and unpopulated terrain. Twenty-seven percent of the country's land mass is at a border and yet only 6 percent of the country's population lives in these frontier regions. In Brazil, borders have evolved from strategic areas for the defense of national sovereignty, to zones where citizen security is constantly imperiled by an array of criminal actors operating at the nation's boundaries. Threats arise not from political differences with neighbors, but from transshipment of weapons, drugs, wood, people, and more. As noted, for Brazil, not only do these borders present a challenge to the state in terms of public safety, but they also represent a serious deterrent to investment, legitimate commerce, and development of sound infrastructure.

For Brasilia, the management of the border is an inter-agency task, but it is the army that has provided for border security, coupled with federal law enforcement entities, and local police forces. Protecting citizens from illicit actors is now part of the national security agenda of both the armed forces and the federal police, as border responsibilities are the shared mandate of the Ministries of Integration, Justice, and Defense.

In 2011 the government of President Dilma Rousseff gave new urgency to Brazil's borders with the unveiling of the Strategic Frontier Plan (PEF). This plan placed new emphasis on prevention, control, and repression of transnational organized crime. It also proposed the integration of public security bodies and the armed forces in the region. "It proposed joint action between federal states, partnerships with neighboring countries and implementation support through the Integrated Frontier Management Unites (GGIFs) and the Joint Operation Center. The plan focused on enhancing state presence in border areas, but also sought to expand strategic international partnerships."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> See *Brazil's South America First" approach to Transnational Organized Crime*. By: Muggah, Robert and Gustavo Diniz. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Igarape Institute, October 2013. Accessed July 24, 2014. [http://pt.igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SP\\_05\\_EN\\_Securing-the-border\\_7th\\_oct.pdf](http://pt.igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/SP_05_EN_Securing-the-border_7th_oct.pdf).

Brazil's land frontier strategy has defined three geographic zones: North, Central and South. Along the border 122 out of 518 cities are actually on the frontier line itself. Each of these zones presents a different type of challenge for the management of transnational or borderless threats. To the North, the Amazon border is a zone of drug trafficking and cross-border incursion of armed guerrillas from Colombia. In Central Brazil, there are drug traffickers, but also large flows of immigrants and individuals who are connected with human trafficking who come down through Peru to reach the Amazon and enter Brazil through this open back door. Meanwhile, the Southern zone is the most heavily populated, but also reflects a haven for contraband – small arms and light weapons, illicit pharmaceuticals, cigarettes and cash transfers to banks who launder money. Although each of these three so-called “arcs” may possess differing characteristics, the fundamentals of the challenge sets share common roots and therefore, common solutions.

Last year Brazil announced the creation of the Sistema Integrado do Monitoramento de Fronteiras (SISRON), to create a virtual border shield along the 10,000 mile land border. This technological attempt to gain control over its territory through the use of satellites, electromagnetic signaling, tactical communications, drones and an increased army presence to monitor the border represent an important investment on the frontier that makes clear Brazil's goal of protecting its territory from transnational threats. Equally important, however, has been building the support of local communities at the frontier in order to both ensure sustainability of effort. This has been accomplished, in part, by focusing not only on citizen security, but also in promoting legitimate trade across the border in support of local and regional economic growth and development.

An even more intimate link between security and development objectives can be identified at Brazil's maritime border. Brazil's borders have expanded beyond the traditional land frontiers and now include the maritime region. In practical terms, Brazil's proximity to Africa has become a new challenge for border management, raising real security and development issues, but also challenging jurisdictional questions. The country's long Atlantic littoral (7,400 km) is gaining increasing importance as its unexploited pre-salt oil resources continue to attract foreign investors. The discovery of vast amounts of oil reserves also focused new attention on the ocean frontier, or Blue Amazon, that has been the focus of new attention in terms of Brazil's security of the ocean. The term Blue Amazon has also been used to mobilize popular support for the idea that Brazil has, “both vital resources and new security responsibilities in the South Atlantic.”<sup>23</sup> The Blue Amazon has increased the government's attention on interpretation of the Law of the Seas Treaty given the length of the Continental Shelf in the South Atlantic. Protection of its ocean resources has resulted in greater investment in naval power, including the joint venture development of a nuclear-powered submarine with the French. Brazil is also conducting joint naval exercises with forces in South Africa.

A national focus on frontiers, on land and on the sea has changed the dynamics of border politics in Brazil. Borders are now more than just delineations of sovereign space; they

<sup>23</sup> *Brazil's Maritime Strategy in the South Atlantic: The Nexus between Security and Resources*. By: Erthal Abensur, Adriana and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. Cape Town, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013, 7. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=67303&type=Document#.U9EyXPldWVN>.

are also areas for potential economic gain, resource development, and need protection so that illicit activities do not overwhelm the potential of growth that awaits Brazil in the years to come. Thus, the borders require not only management at a domestic level, but also have become a challenge internationally as various multilateral bodies have asserted new rules about what nations must do to protect shared spaces. Complying with these mandates may represent another type of dilemma for bordering states whose capacity to control frontiers are more limited by resources or political will.

Upon announcing his country's new strategic border initiative which significantly enhanced military resources at the frontier, Brazil's Minister of Defense took pains to note that the strategy was not aimed at international terrorists, drug cartels or its neighbors in Venezuela, Colombia or Bolivia. Rather, he maintained that the strategy sought to link national defense with national development by protecting and leveraging Brazil's large water, agricultural and energy resources while building economic opportunity for those living at the frontier. This innovative approach has a dual benefit. Not only does it address the immediate scourge presented by transnational traffickers at the border, it begins to build more resilient buy-in of local constituencies by building mutual vested interest in the rule of law and the legitimate economy.

### **Lessons Learned from the Brazilian Approach**

Brazil's approach to its borders is evolving, based on the types of threats it faces in a complex globalized environment. The challenges this rising power has in addressing these threats also provides an important teaching moment for others in the South who would benefit from cooperation and review of what Brazil is encountering today. At the outset of this paper, we noted the new types of borderless threats that really make it difficult for any one state alone to protect its territory. Brazil's approach is to look to its borders as potential areas for increased investment in infrastructure, and even for asserting its interests in capacity building with the development agenda that the country seeks to increase its economic growth in the years ahead.

In managing transnational border threats and experimenting with effective solutions, it is clear that the Brazilian government has determined that coordination must take place with local authorities. Although "local engagement" has become a politically rhetorical and often meaningless turn of phrase, in the Brazilian context, state governments are not yet prepared to take the lead since local mayors possess the preponderance of border resources. Beyond this, however, it is clear that sustainable solutions cannot be levied until local actors become fully vested in their success. Circumventing the corruption that borders often engender, while offering local constituencies economic prosperity through legitimate commerce, has been an effective strategy for success at the Brazilian frontier.

Policy innovation can come from unexpected constituencies. In the case of Brazil, the military has led the policy integration process between security and development objectives through its strategy in the Amazon. In this manner, the military is leading the foreign ministry, which tends not to look at the borders in a more holistic way precisely because it is bound by political calculations over pragmatic needs in the frontier.

Of course, Brazil does continue to face critical challenges at its borders that are compounded by several factors. First, there is no federal mandate to work on development at the borders. Existing efforts to manage border threats are often disjointed and these scattered initiatives along the border do not represent a coherent national policy. Second, in general, multilateral capacity across the Americas to address border policies is still not apparent—a situation unlikely to be resolved in the near future. For instance, the South American Defense Council does not have a mandate to address these issues leaving these transnational border issues to be handled on a country-by-country basis. In turn, this yields suboptimal policy that is often duplicative and occasionally counterproductive. Third, because of economic asymmetries with bordering nations, the Brazilian government is concerned about committing to strategic investments at the borders, especially where Brazil could wind up being solely responsible for capital investments. Fourth, although there is a national integration ministry that manages the inter-agency needs of the border, this department does not always do an effective job, because the three bureaucracies of Defense, Justice, and Development (through Itamaraty) often work on separate trajectories making coordination difficult. And finally, while there is a great need to deepen awareness in Brazil among civil society groups and the private sector, at issue is which agency in the government should take the lead. Beyond its tiny development agency, ABC, Itamaraty is not engaged in the border management issue while Defense and Justice are often working on very different tracks.

### **Brazil as a Replicable Paradigm**

The lessons learned from Brazil's approach to coordinated border management alone make it a prime candidate for partnership among other countries of the South. All too often, governments of the Global South face a dearth of financial and human capacity, and occasionally even political will, when it comes to improving security at the border. In many cases, this situation is derived from a fear that security enhancements at borders will slow the movement of legitimate commerce, negatively impacting global trade competitiveness. Identifying pragmatic opportunities to build sustainability by appealing to interests across the security/development divide can be essential to long term success on both fronts.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> A pragmatic demonstration of this dual-benefit approach has been demonstrated between hard security nonproliferation objectives and softer developmental objectives in five key regions around the globe. Since 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has successfully promoted the global adoption of supply-side controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. The mandate of that resolution reflected growing concern over the widening WMD-proliferation supply chain, which, as a result of globalization, today extends to more countries in more corners of the globe than ever before. Yet despite near-universal appreciation for the Resolution, for many Member States, implementation was and remains a significant burden. While assistance is available to facilitate implementation of Resolution 1540 by States, many States require capacity-building in what they consider to be high-priority areas such as development. The final document of the 2009 Comprehensive Review of the status of implementation of the resolution called upon the 1540 Committee to consider integrating the implementation of Resolution 1540 obligations with the pursuit of relevant broader national objectives. Assistance that can be provided by States and international organizations to implement Resolution 1540 can complement or contribute to capacity building, for example, in border and customs controls, transport safety and security, and public health. Projects for implementing Resolution 1540 can also be built into existing development programs that aim to improve national infrastructure, including in the aftermath of conflicts or natural disasters. This finding prompted the Government of Finland to consider an innovative new approach to proliferation prevention. This strategy—a dual-benefit nonproliferation engagement—necessitated an unprecedented new “whole-of-society” methodology that leveraged a wider spectrum of interests and capabilities. It required a new recognition on the part of the national security community that development and human security interests are equally critical factors in long-term peace and prosperity. And it demanded a willingness to widen the dialogue to include not only a more expansive

When considered alongside the government's predisposition to understanding the links between security and development, Brazil emerges as a potential global role model on innovative approaches to border management. The notion of bridging the divide between security and development, and between international obligations and core domestic interests, has been part of the Brazilian vernacular for decades. In 2011, when it served on the UN Security Council, for instance, Brazil convened a special Council session on the "interdependence between security and development." At that meeting, Brazil stressed the importance of this link for Security Council mission work – asserting that development requires enhanced integration with security when working to achieve Council objectives.

And of course, Brazil's recent experiences also yield more current understandings of effective border management practices in a networked criminal world. This year, Brazil hosted the World Cup, to be followed by the Summer Olympics in 2016. These games require significant obligations to ensure the safety and security of the tens of thousands of visitors expected at these events. Wisely, Brazil has recognized that preparations for game security can yield significant security benefits and economic growth across the country. The ability to institute enhanced security standards as host of the games, and ensure that its neighbors provide likewise, will also have direct knock-on benefits for border security and counter-trafficking.

Finally, Brazil has demonstrated an intention to claim its proper role in global leadership. It not only is working through the UN, but it also has taken a more active role in other arrangements, ranging from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), to the Union of South American states, to IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), to Lusophone Africa, and even in the Middle East as a player in the Arab-American Summit process.

By leveraging these core interests and predilections, Brazil can be a mentor to other governments struggling with border insecurity by demonstrating pragmatic, implementable, and replicable border security solutions and counter-trafficking measures that bridge the security/development divide. This organic approach to a global problem may also resonate with many countries in Africa and Southeast Asia that face similar challenges. It is both nuanced, yet more directed at development solutions to these transnational security threats.

## Conclusions

The use of the armed forces to protect the frontier is not new, but it presents another approach to civil-military relations in the region that requires a more carefully articulated strategy of where the security dimensions end and the development agenda begins. At this time, the army remains the lead agency to support the frontiers, with the Ministry of Justice doing its part to coordinate the crime-fighting dimensions of transnational

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variety of government interests and ministries but also new contributors from outside of government, in the private sector and in civil society. Application of this dual-benefit approach in the Americas turned the hemisphere from a virtual black hole of implementation in 2006, into a global role model today. See: Finlay, Brian D., ed. **Southern Flows: WMD Proliferation in the Developing World**. Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation and Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2014. Accessed July 24, 2014. <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/SouthernFlows314.pdf>.



criminal actors, and the National Integration Ministry performing the thankless task of inter-agency coordination that is required to manage a 10,000 mile long land border. The Navy's role in the protection of the Atlantic littoral also raises another question about the extent to which policies related to the South Atlantic region will be decided and implemented. Will the sea become an area of military training and capacity building for Brazilian and African navies, or will the sea take on a more civilian investment character, making the security role subservient to the development one?

What is becoming clear, however, is that Brazil's frontier with its nine neighbors has a great potential to become a gateway for trade, development of infrastructure, and hubs of coordination of trade, mineral extraction, and migration. Managing these cities along the border will take a national commitment to invest resources in these zones, and also requires a campaign that attracts private sector businesses to become part of the vanguard of border development. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency has only begun to incubate new solutions to help bring capacity to rural parts of Brazil, in part through partnering with private investors. The Brazilian National Development Bank, BNDS, is also actively involved in funding similar capacity building projects across the frontier, but these efforts also remain in their infancy.

If Brazil is able to make the management of cross-border threats a priority for national action, then its new approach of combining both hard and soft power will ultimately provide a model for other nations facing similar transnational challenges. The greatest risk at this time, however, is that with a stagnant economy, Brazil is unlikely to have sufficient resources to create the security needed to foster long term prosperity in the frontiers. What it does offer, however, is an opportunity to experiment with building capacity by working at the local municipalities at the border. Only by strengthening the capacity of mayors, or providing a more consistent approach to justice, and demonstrating the economic development potential of any security initiative will real partnerships emerge.

Brazil faces some difficult policy choices when it comes to implementing its national border policies. As South America's largest country with nine national frontiers, it could lead the way to better integration of a regional security policy that integrates a strong development agenda to its plans to improve infrastructure, trade, and most important regional security. As yet, this has not happened. In fact, the approach to border security is more opportunistic than strategic. This approach may have worked in the past, but the growing complexity of international actors such as China and Iran, and other rising powers, makes border management a serious topic that will require an engaged foreign ministry, coupled with a domestic agenda that brings private investors to value the trade and development opportunities arising from investments at the frontier.

Yet Brazil's effort to address illicit criminal activities at its borders including gun trafficking and the smuggling of goods, people, and narcotics are built on a spirit of innovation that maintains the promise of a success and sustainability. By simultaneously promoting local development and economic prosperity objectives and bringing together all the tools of government—civilian and military—Brasilia's border strategy offers to other governments struggling with the dual priorities of security and economic prosperity.



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## Security Regime Complexity: A New Perspective in Security Studies?

Malte Brosig

There is no doubt most conflicts these days are engaged by the international community collectively. Thereby, even powerful single states have accepted that multilateral action is becoming the norm, while unilateral interventions are often seen as problematic. The widespread acceptance of multilateral response to crisis comes with new challenges. Who is leading or coordinating the international community in a world which is quickly moving from unipolar post-Cold War world of US hegemony into the age of non or multi-polarity? Within the last 25 years regional organizations increasingly became involved in security policies and are now key partners for the UN. There is hardly a conflict or crisis in which international organizations are not involved. What is new is the degree to which these actors intersect, crossing the lines between purely regional, inter-regional and global reactions to conflict. So far we have only few conceptual instruments to properly examine this phenomenon. Therefore, I aim at introducing the notion of a security regime complex for the study of conflicts and the international reaction to them. The notion borrows equally from the literature on security complexes as advanced by Barry Buzan and research on regime complexity. While the former has explicitly focused on regional security as a policy field, the later still refers predominately to trade and environmental regimes. In this article, I will argue that the notion of a security regime complex is a helpful analytical category for a number of reasons which have not been adequately reflected in the mainstream literature today.

First, it takes account of the diversity of institutional actors which are involved in managing and solving conflicts collectively. Second, it is

interested in exploring how security actors (organizations) are inter-linked and how these links are forming a macro regime. Third, it combines various levels of analysis which have often been treated in separation such as regional security and global security actors. This being said, the security regime complex approach also faces substantial challenges, it does not form a theory of its own but is rather an approach which is at the moment fairly descriptive. Thus, its explorative value still needs to be developed and enriched with a more substantive mid-range theoretical orientation. In this article, I suggest that exchange theory as developed by organization theorists and based on rational choice decision-making can be a useful first step in equipping regime complexity with more explanatory power. As research in this sphere is still in an early phase, there is no doubt that more empirical studies and theoretical debate are needed to consolidate knowledge.

### **More Complex and Diverse: how Inter-organizational Security Policies are shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> century**


When it comes to solving imminent security crises, the response of the international community has become significantly more comprehensive and complex. The expectation today is that successful engagement has only been achieved when a country does not relapse into conflict in the long-term. This, however, requires a holistic engagement addressing the root causes of a conflict instead of only treating the symptoms. Ceasefire and border monitoring activities of international peacekeepers are not enough anymore. The nexus in which the international community is expected to operate and perform successfully has expanded significantly and maybe has reached a state of overstretch and is hardly achievable for a single organization or state.<sup>1</sup> Intervention instruments may encompass: preventive diplomacy, conflict mediation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, reconciliation, nation and state building, economic reconstruction, fighting diseases, humanitarian aid, fighting organised crime and terrorist organisations, building democratic institutions or supporting elections. This list may not even be exhaustive but indicates what enormously complex tasks are expected to be performed by the international community. Given the comprehensiveness of the task, it is rather unlikely that a single actor can achieve sustainable progress on its own. Thus, collective response to crises is not limited to states supporting individual international organisations, such as the UN, but also requires more collective coordination between the UN and regional organizations in the region in which conflict occurs but also between different regions.

In order to master these new challenges, international organizations have come up with innovative concepts. For example, the UN applies a so called integrated approach and refers to multi-dimensional peacekeeping in which various UN sub-organizations (WHO, UNICEF etc) are coordinating their activities to a 'system-wide response'.<sup>2</sup> Within Europe the European Union (EU) came up with a similar idea, the 'comprehensive approach', which has been mainstreamed in order to connect political, military, civilian, economic and developmental aid instruments.<sup>3</sup> In Africa, the African Union (AU) aims at integrating its activities by addressing conflicts comprehensively and integrating sub-regional organizations into the AU based African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). There is potentially no other continent which has aimed at integrating so many

principally independent regional organizations into a larger macro structure. In this regard, the African example may be leading the way forward.

When it comes to solving security crises in the 21st century, not only have our expectations grown regarding how to solve a conflict and the instruments diversified with which to address conflicts, but also the number of actors actively involved has increased. For example, a trend to more regional peacekeeping can be observed globally (Figure 1). While during the time of the Cold War the UN Security Council hardly authorised missions, this changed substantially after 1988. Now the majority of peace missions is either deployed by the UN itself or authorised or recognised by the UN.

Figure 1 Global Peace Operations 1946-2009



Source: Calculated with data from: [http://www.polity.co.uk/up2/Past\\_and\\_Present\\_Peacekeeping\\_Missions.asp](http://www.polity.co.uk/up2/Past_and_Present_Peacekeeping_Missions.asp)


Admittedly, the contribution of regional organizations to peacekeeping varies significantly between the continents and is supposed the greatest in Africa where armed conflict is the most persistent and regional organizations can be found in abundance. Due to the high number of states in Africa, the Americas and Europe, these continents are ideal places for the proliferation of regional organisations while Asia and North America have not advanced much on regional integration. The concept of a regime security complex is certainly the most relevant for the African continent but in principle remains applicable to other continents as well.

It is particularly in Africa that we face a unique combination of conditions, such as a high number of regional organisations, persistence of armed conflicts and resource constraints of practically all actors involved in managing security threats to the continent. In Europe we are facing the opposite: few conflicts, few organizations but more resources. In the Americas, the number of regional organizations is much greater, but the kind of conflict differs from Africa, focussing more on social and economic inequality and organised crime. Still, even in the European example, which fundamentally deviates from the African, a security regime complex can be observed, perhaps the best example being Kosovo in which the UN, OSCE, EU and NATO collectively were involved.

Still, the African example stands out. The APSA is possibly the only institutionalised system of collective security in which different international organisations are integrated

into a macro system. While the AU is the main coordinative body of the APSA, many of its sub-organs are mutually shared between the headquarters in Addis Ababa and regional economic communities (RECs). Five different sub-regions are officially recognised as building blocks for the APSA: these are Northern, Western, Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, all hosting at least one organization involved in security policies. They all contribute individually to the security system. For peacekeeping, an African Standby Force (ASF) has been set up which consists of five contingents from different regions. Likewise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) has been established and a Panel of the Wise (POW). Both rely on sub-regional entities and coordination from the AU. In order to better coordinate relations with RECs, a Memorandum of Understanding was adopted in which the AU holds “primary responsibility” to maintain peace, built on the idea of “subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage”.<sup>4</sup>

*Figure 2 The African Security Regime Complex*



At the decision making level, the AU Peace and Security Council has proven to be one of the central institutions in Africa and has established institutionalised links to the EU and UN, with regular meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee and the UN Security Council. These links to external actors are important because the APSA is currently not capable of engaging and solving all conflicts on the African continent. Thus, external financial, political and military support is much needed.

In this way, the APSA constitutes what former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called an ‘interlocking system of regional and global governance’.<sup>5</sup> It essentially forms a security regime complex in which institutional spaces are dense and organizations are so intimately interwoven but remain independent actors, so that it is warranted to analyse this phenomenon in its own right. Or in more scientific language, it is ontologically significant.

## **From Regional Security Complexes and Regime Complexity to Security Regime Complexes**

This article refers to interacting IOs in the area of security policies introducing the term “security regime complex” linking two research streams which so far have developed in isolation from one another: regional security complexes and regime complexity.<sup>6</sup> The concept of regional security complexes is better known in the field of security studies while the regime complexity literature has primarily focused on regulatory regimes in the area of environmental standards and trade.

The literature on regional security complexes has been chiefly influenced by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and their book *Regions and Power*.<sup>7</sup> The term regional security complex which they introduced refers primarily to the interconnected nature of security issues and actors within a geographically confined area. Accordingly, they define a regional security complex as “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”<sup>8</sup> The security complex becomes meaningful through the degree or intensity of interconnectedness between the units. Those actors which show sensitivity to a certain security issue which is beyond their individual capacity to solve are forming part of the regional security complex. In this regard complexes are “socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on *security practice* of the actors.”<sup>9</sup> Region is thus a relative term which might coincide with traditional geographical understandings of regions or it might transcend them. Buzan and Wæver understand regions as “functionally defined” by security practices of actors. Those security complexes identified by Buzan and Wæver are examined in isolation from one another and are seen as “mutually exclusive”; thus, the world is divided into different regions of security with rather minimal connections. While in the definition of regional security complex, reference is made to units or actors implying a more neutral understanding of who constitutes an actor. De facto actors are predominantly states exerting power in a Westphalian inter-state system. Thus, a strong element of inter-power relations is visible in which autonomous states are set up in a multi-polar system of principally non-hierarchic relations which are constituted through practice. In the end, a regional security complex explores inter-state relations shaped by their relative power capabilities and construction of securitisation within the confinement of socially constructed security regions.

The term regime complex has been coined by Kal Raustiala and David Victor in an article published in *International Organization* in 2004 in which they define regime complexes as “collective of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes” whose key character is that they cannot be fully broken down into their elemental units.<sup>10</sup> This definition has been fine-tuned by Orsini, Morin and Young (2013) who refer to regime

complexes as entities which “relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic.”<sup>11</sup> Thus, they expand regime complexity beyond just overlapping regulatory regimes but also assign them operational importance. Between these two schools of research a number of similarities and differences can be observed.

First, both approaches observe a similar trend which is one of growing interdependence between actors. In this regard, they come to the same conclusion, namely that the performance of individual actors need to be contextualised in order to allow a more comprehensive and complete analysis. With regard to who is the actor and to which context actors are aligning, the two schools differ significantly. While the security complex approach refers to states as elemental units, regime complexity explores intersecting regulatory regimes.

Second, both approaches agree on the main character or ordering principle of the security or regime complex. It is primarily driven by non-hierarchical relations in which a degree of anarchy cannot be ignored. While the component units are bound together, they are still operating as independently identifiable units. Thus actors are placed in an antagonistic setting in which they are partially dependent on the wider environment and remain independent actors at the same time. Both schools also agree that neither security complexes nor regime complexes have acquired much independent “actorness” of their own. There is usually no physical centre or institutionalised headquarters in which decisions are taken or from which they are implemented. In any case, a security regime complex remains rather decentralised, emerging around pertinent security issues. It is a system with limited order, minimal centralisation and changing forms, dynamically aligning to different security concerns and resulting from actors’ interaction.

Third, a feature in which the two theoretical schools are diverging to some degree but not necessarily fundamentally, is the focus on either operational action and practice for security complexes and the more regulatory impact of common standards in regime complexes. This, however, does not constitute an insurmountable contradiction but rather emphasises a different empirical focus.

Given the empirical phenomenon outlined above, it makes sense to adapt these two approaches by combining them and introducing the notion of a security regime complex. Thereby both approaches profit from a cross-fertilisation effect. The regional security complex approach would profit from a widening of its analytical scope from security complexes being understood as securitised inter-state relations to also encompassing inter-organisational links. With a stronger emphasis on institutions instead of states, new avenues of analysis can be opened. In particular, it moves focus from a world of state polarity to a focus on mediated-polarity, which can be found in international organizations. This in the end constitutes a major step away from a merely Westphalian understanding of security politics. A major shortcoming so far in the literature on regional security complexes. With a stronger focus on inter-organisational links instead of inter-state connections, regional security complexes can also be freed from their rather narrow focus on regions as core venues for processes of securitisation. As argued above,



security policies today are not confined to activities only within a specific region but cut across various levels from sub-regional to regional, to inter-regional and global. An analytical widening of research is thus very necessary.

From the perspective of regime complexes a broader empirical focus is also desirable. So far security policies have not been researched very much. The traditional emphasis on regulatory regimes only can be extended to organizations as well adding operational activities to the analysis of regime complexes. This would certainly increase the overall attractiveness of the approach which has mainly occupied an academic niche. It would also open new avenues and link up regime complexity with the emergence of another new stream of research on the interplay of international organizations. Two schools of research which explore very similar phenomena but so far do not cross-reference one another. This seems to be highly desirable and not really controversial as, for example, key typological finding of the regime complexity literature, such as the Oran Young's categorisation of overlapping and nested institutions, also applies to international organizations.<sup>12</sup> Overlap between actors can either be found in terms of membership and/or policies. Nested institutions are fully immersed in one another like *Matroyshka dolls*. *Both we can find in abundance within the APSA.*

### **In search for more Theoretical Substance: Exchange Theory**

In the first place, the concept of a security regime complex does not form a theory of its own, but is rather a descriptive but analytical instrument which is characterising an empirical phenomenon of overlapping and intersecting security actors forming a regime complex. The value of the concept rests primarily in its attempt to systematically explore linkages between actors which have so far not been the object of much analysis. It provides new categories and perspectives for research by pointing out a number of key features which are: First, the principally complex nature of security issues, referring to the multiplicity of involved actors and comprehensive tasks they are expected to perform increasing their interdependence. Second, the non-hierarchical nature of actor relations, which limits the chances of centralisation and institutionalisation keeping the security regime complex in a limbo position. Third, the need to contextualise action and performance of individual actors within a regime complex. And finally fourth, the hybrid character of the security regime complex which builds, on the one hand, on actor dependencies and the growing importance of their inter-linkages while at the same time they remain fully independent and the security regime complex only acquires minimal "actorness".

These four conditions on their own provide rigorous analytical instruments with which researchers can systematically explore regime complexity. The advantage of this still fairly open concept of security regime complexity is certainly that it can easily be applied to many cases and does not discriminate against the potentially many different forms a security regime complex can take. But admittedly it is of limited explanatory value if not linked up with more substantial claims about why actors do what they do. Testable hypotheses are difficult to generate on the basis of just a view descriptive observations. Still, the openness of the concept is important in order not to narrow the empirical applicability to only a few special cases. The difference is at the analytical level.

The notion of a security regime complex can best be understood as a macro approach sketching out the wider empirical setting. A narrower analysis bears more potential for theory building in the classical sense by testing hypotheses.

The difficulty of developing a parsimonious theory for security regime complexes certainly rests on the nature of the phenomenon itself. In situations of interconnected actors and dispersed but also collective action in which actors are dependent on one another but also remain independent actors, clear cause and effect relations are difficult to identify.<sup>13</sup> In the end, complexity comes with different consequences for actors and a security regime complex might take different, if not ambiguous forms, including converging but also diverging behavior. The apparent stasis or crisis in which classical grand IR theories<sup>14</sup> are currently in, can at least partly be referred back to their inability to cope with highly complex social phenomena which often prohibit the formulation of ubiquitous conjectures. But still we regard as good theories those that use “few variables...to explain” a given outcome.<sup>15</sup> In the analysis of complex social relations such a perspective is not very helpful but rather appears as reductionist because a parsimonious solution for a complex problem is highly unlikely to emerge.

One method of circumventing the problem of multi-causality and blurred lines of causal relations is to shift the focus of analysis from the macro to the mid-range level. Often in exploring concrete events, it is easier to trace the source and cause of a particular actor and assess the consequences. Within the field of international organization interplay, a few scholars have started using resource exchange approaches based on dependency theory as a promising theoretical starting point.<sup>16</sup>

Within exchange theory, resources are all those factors which organizations need to perform their tasks. Thus, they can take very many different forms: for example, financial means certain competencies or mediation experience in solving conflicts. As a single organization very likely does not have command over endless resources and universal competencies, these resources are exchanged between actors. There are, for example, many capacity building programmes and training courses designed for the AU and supported by the UN or EU. Resource exchange is primarily propelled by their scarcity. Indeed, no resource is limitless: thus, if inner-organizational resources are not sufficient to perform a certain task the organization may well seek to substitute its own deficiency with external sources. Seen from this perspective, the growing inter-linkages between actors are in the first place a function of their degree of external resource dependency.<sup>17</sup> In simple terms, the interaction is based on the assumption of demand and supply of resources between actors which in principal can be levelled out through exchanging resources. In an ideal but certainly overly simplistic manner, resource exchanges could take the form of a quid pro quo exercise in which one organization supplies a certain resource which another demands. However, in the real world we should assume that exchanging resources comes with a number of caveats and is not always straight forward or simple to achieve.

Based on a rational cost-benefit logic, we can formulate a few guiding principles for resource exchange. First, the exchange of resources can be assumed to be equitable between actors.<sup>18</sup> While actors do rarely exchange resources which are of the same kind

(quality and/or quantity), we can assume that resource exchange is not a one way street but is built on the idea of equity. It is hardly imaginable that actors are either only at the receiving or giving end. What constitutes equitable exchange, however, often remains a very individual question with actor and context specific answers.

Second, resource exchange is built on demand by one actor and supply by another one which condition each other. However, demand and supply are unlikely to be fully equal between interacting actors but may often be asymmetrical. Only if gaps in individual resources exist and they are filled by external sources, are resources expected to be exchanged. The greater the demand and supply between actors, the greater the exchange of resources. Demand without supply or supply without demand cannot be expected to thicken relations between actors, as they are missing incentives for interaction. In this regard, the course of resource exchange is directly influenced by the size of demand and supply and one may add the quality and quantity of exchanged resources.<sup>19</sup>

The size of demand and supplied resources can also be a good indicator of existing dependencies. If an actor with demand for certain resources meets an actor which has command over this resource in abundance, then an asymmetrical relationship can be expressed in processes of exchanged resources. Here, the size of the supplied resource as well as the size of the demand, are equally important. Such relationships can easily be discerned between the AU and EU. As the former cannot generate enough funding for its peacekeeping operations, an important part comes from the EU giving the latter some leverage and influence. Although the AU cannot reciprocate with similar resources, this is no major obstacle, as the EU's expenditure for the APSA remains fairly small compared to its annual budget.

Third, a limiting factor is certainly the costs involved in resource exchange. The biggest compromise actors have to accept is that processes of resource exchange increase external dependencies and they do this very visibly.<sup>20</sup> The question here is to what extent is resource exchange leading to unacceptable dependencies substantially compromising actor autonomy. The answer is very likely a relative and individual one which every actor has to answer on his own. In this context, it is important to recognise that resource exchange also generates costs which actors cannot easily off set. Thus, situations are likely to emerge in which a pooling of resources between actors confronting a certain security issue appears as a plausible move, because no single actor is capable of solving the issue alone. However, actors may also refrain from resource exchange in order not to compromise too much of their independence. Indeed, within a security regime complex we should not expect actors to merge fully with one another but rather to cooperate in selected areas fully recognising their individual independence.

Fourth, the effective exchange of resources may also be chiefly influenced not only by expected individual and collective gains, but equally by actors' preferences and interests in a given situation. How actors react to a conflict is, of course, not exclusively defined by the security regime complex but can be assumed to be very case sensitive and resting on individual interest. Here, the question is at what stage are individual preferences overruled by more effective collective action and to what extent are mutually shared

security doctrines, norms and ideas necessary to initiate resource exchange. Again the answer is a relative one. A specific tipping point might be difficult to name, as it is case and actor specific. At a minimum, we can, however, assume that a certain degree of normative or conceptual convergence of security doctrines and approach is helpful for resource exchange. In situations in which these norms, perceptions and preference diverge significantly, even a pooling of resources creating significant collective gains might not offset individual cost. Finally, it should not be underestimated that within larger multi-lateral organizations, it can be fairly difficult to extrapolate specific institutional interests given the broad and heterogeneous membership. Here, the absence of a clear strategic view on security issues might slow down otherwise attractive resource exchange.

In sum, resource exchange is at least guided by four conditions for which one could also formulate testable hypotheses. First, the equitable transfer of resources. Second, the size of demand and supply of resources. Third, exchange costs resulting from autonomy losses. Fourth, the coinciding or diverging preferences of actors. This model can be applied to the deployment of international peacekeeping missions as will be illustrated below.

### **The Multi-Actor Game of International Peacekeeping**

In the majority of deployed peacekeeping missions, a multi-actor game of cooperation has emerged in which various organizations are involved concurrently.<sup>21</sup> In practice, we can at least distinguish between three types of cooperative peacekeeping within the security regime complex. These are sequential, parallel, integrated or hybrid missions.<sup>22</sup> In the first example, deployment follows an order in which actors are cooperating but are separated by time. Usually, one organization or single country operates as first responder while planning to hand over the mission as soon as other organizations are ready to take over. With these timelines, rapid response vs longer-term engagement is a certain functional division of labour. Early response usually engages more in military security aspects preparing the ground for a larger and more comprehensive engagement once the security situation has been made sufficiently stable. This model of deployment is one of the most frequent ones and can be observed on many occasions. In most cases, a regional organization or single state is intervening early and later on aims at handing over to a larger organization. This has happened many times in Western African, where ECOWAS under Nigerian leadership intervened first and later handed over to the UN in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. In Central Africa we can observe similar trends. In the case of Burundi, South Africa deployed a small mission first before it became multilateral as an AU operation which was soon handed over to the UN. In the Central African Republic, we can observe a constant handing over of peacekeeping missions since 1997 which involved a number of sub-regional African organizations. Since the ousting of President Bozize in 2012/13, the existing peacekeeping mission was transferred from ECCAS to the AU and finally the UN.

The sequential mode of peacekeeping can be directly referred back to resource constraints of involved actors. While in many cases, regional actors have been rather quick in responding to crises and could deploy troops fairly quickly, the same cannot be said about

the UN. Thus, a division of labour is visible in which smaller and less resourced organizations acquire the role as military first responder while the UN is continuing but also beginning new tasks which are usually more comprehensive and longer-term oriented. However, it should not be forgotten that mission deployments also have a strong political dimension and are not exclusively guided by available or lacking resources. But the availability or lack of resources is certainly a major factor influencing political decision making.

The second peacekeeping mode associated with cooperative engagement is parallel mission deployments. Here, at least two actors are operating at the same time in a conflict but are often spatially and functionally separated but often complement each other. Co-deployment of peacekeeping missions occurs less frequently but can also be observed on some occasions. Hereby, organizations try to avoid duplication of effort and perform either different tasks or the same tasks in spatial separation. Often junior partners fill in functional gaps of the main deployer. For example, the EU sent five separate missions to the DRC while a large UN mission was on the ground fulfilling very specialised tasks, such as police training or securing presidential elections. In this mode of cooperative peacekeeping, complementary resource exchange is shaping the form of deployments. As actors aim at avoiding wasteful duplication of work, they opt for a complementary approach in which gaps by one organization are filled by another one.

Finally, integrated or hybrid missions have been deployed too but are the least practiced and maybe the most controversial form of cooperative peacekeeping. In a hybrid mission, a minimum of two actors are merged together in joint command structures and mutually shared decision-making and operation. Here, eventual separation of partners becomes increasingly difficult, which may also be the reason why it is the least popular form of cooperative peacekeeping, as it directly impacts on an actor's institutional autonomy. Not surprisingly, there has only been one such mission in Darfur in which the AU and UN joined forces. Thus, the less attractive form of hybrid operations is a good example that cooperative peacekeeping is not exclusively built on complementary resource exchange, but has to consider institutional desires for autonomous action as well. Still, without resource scarcity and the option for complementary resource exchange, none of these three modes of cooperative deployment would exist.


## Conclusion

This chapter aimed at introducing the term security regime complex into the field of security studies, building on the literature of regional security complexes and regime complexity. In essence, a security regime complex is an analytical category which allows one to systematically explore inter-linkages between actors who simultaneously engage in a security crisis. This is particularly relevant in the area of international peacekeeping in which actors are confronted with a growing complexity of tasks and operate in dense institutional spaces with limited resources. The perspective on resource exchange and its basic principles has helped to substantiate the macro theoretical claims of interdependence and could substantiate the cooperative interaction processes using the example of multi-actor peacekeeping.

## Endnotes

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## The Importance of Intelligence in the Maritime Domain

Peter Roell

At the beginning of my article *The Importance of Intelligence in the Maritime Domain* for this year's edition of the publication "Forte de Copacabana", I would like to give two definitions regarding "intelligence" and "maritime domain".

"Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.<sup>1</sup>

"Maritime domain" defines "all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances".<sup>2</sup>

In the maritime domain we are facing several threats: maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, territorial disputes in the regional seas, trafficking of illicit narcotics, trafficking of weapons, human trafficking, environmental degradation, global climate change, just to mention a few.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Plan for Maritime Security: National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, October 2005, <http://www.dhs.gov/national-plan-achieve-maritime-domain-awareness> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Milligan, "Maritime Domain Awareness," (presented at the USCG/CREATE Maritime Risk Symposium, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, November 16-18, 2010).

In my contribution I will focus on maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery and energy security in the maritime domain. At the end of my article I will give some recommendations for decision makers in politics, in the armed forces, and in the business and public sectors, for potential threats in the maritime domain as well as in the field of economic and industrial espionage.

## Maritime Terrorism

Looking at the problem of maritime terrorism I would like to remind you of some incidents:

### *October 2000*

A successful attack was carried out against the U.S. destroyer USS Cole in Yemen. 17 U.S. sailors were killed, 39 wounded.<sup>3</sup>

### *October 2002*

The French oil tanker Limburg was attacked off Ash Shahir by a terrorist group with connections to Al Qaida. One member of the crew was killed and 90,000 tons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Aden. The monthly container traffic in Yemen shrank from 43,000 to 3,000. The economy of the country declined by one per cent of its GDP and 3,000 dockworkers lost their jobs.<sup>4</sup>

### *November 2002*

Arrest of al-Qaeda's chief planner for maritime terrorism, Abd Al Rahman Al Nashiri, also known as the "Prince of the Sea", in the United Arab Emirates.<sup>5</sup>

- › Nashiri had developed a strategy including the following four elements:
- › Ramming or blowing up medium-sized ships in the vicinity of other ships or in harbours;
- › Attacking super tankers from the air with small planes, laden with explosives;
- › Underwater attacks against ships using divers;
- › Attacks against cruise liners and taking hostages.

### *August 2003*

The arrest in Thailand of "Hambali" – real name Riduan Isamuddin – on August 11, 2003 accused of masterminding the attack on a nightclub on the Indonesian island Bali killing 202 people in 2002, was a great success. This joint operation by Thai and U.S. Intelligence and the arrest of the "Prince of the Sea" underlines the importance of good intelligence.<sup>6</sup>

### *February 2004*

The Abu Sayyaf Group attacked a ferry in the Philippines, 116 people lost their lives.<sup>7</sup>

### *August 2005*

Israel's security service Shin Bet warned four Israeli cruise liners – on their passage to Turkey – about a possible terror attack and redirected the ships to Cyprus.<sup>8</sup>

### *July 2010*

A suicide attack was carried out by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade against the Japanese oil tanker M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz, a militant group with connections to al-Qaeda. One member of the crew was injured and the hull severely damaged.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "Attack on the USS Cole," **al-bab.com**, <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Raphael Perl, Ronald O'Rourke, „Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress," The Navy Department Library, CRS Report for Congress, January 30, 2001, [http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole\\_crsreport.htm](http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole_crsreport.htm) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>4</sup> "Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism," **BBC News World Edition**, October 16, 2002, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2334865.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>5</sup> Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd\\_al-Rahim\\_al-Nashiri](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_al-Rahim_al-Nashiri) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>6</sup> Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riduan\\_Isamuddin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riduan_Isamuddin) [accessed July 1, 2014].

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<sup>8</sup> Christine Lagorio, "Israeli Cruise Attack Plot Exposed," **CBSNews.com**, August 11, 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/israeli-cruise-attack-plot-exposed/> [accessed July 1, 2014].

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These cases underline the threat situation and the importance of intelligence in the maritime domain. They also demonstrate the serious consequences a lack of intelligence can have. In my research about the Abdullah Azzam Brigade, however, I found out that Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) regarding the capabilities and intentions of this group is quite limited.

## Piracy and Armed Robbery

Let me turn now to piracy and armed robbery. In this field a lot of open-source information can be found: Reports by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), reports by police and by security services, studies by think tanks all over the world, insurance companies, banks, shipping companies, media etc.

In its annual report of January 2014 on piracy and armed robbery against ships the IMB reported 79 incidents around Africa in 2013. Of these, 15 were attributed to Somali pirates and occurred near Somalia and the Horn of Africa, down from a total of 75 Somali piracy-attributed attacks in 2012 and 237 in 2011.<sup>10</sup>

The IMB attributes this significant drop in the frequency and range of attacks by Somali pirates to actions by international navies, as well as preventive measures by merchant vessels, including the deployment of privately contracted armed security personnel.

Looking at the West-African coast, attacks against ships are on the rise because adequate naval forces are not available, armed security guards on ships are not present and 'best practices' are not observed. For example, Nigeria does not permit armed private security guards on ships. So we can conclude that in combating piracy and armed robbery the presence of navies and private security forces on ships are necessary and showed remarkable results.

In the Gulf of Guinea a worrying trend in the kidnapping of crews from vessels well outside the coastal territorial limits can be observed. Nigerian pirates and armed robbers accounted for 31 of the region's 51 attacks, taking 49 people hostage and kidnapping 36, more than in any year since 2008.<sup>11</sup> The upsurge of piracy in Nigeria may also be connected to the theft of large quantities of crude oil from pipelines in the Niger Delta.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> ICC Commercial Crime Services, "Somali pirate clampdown caused drop in global piracy, IMB reveals," January 15, 2014, <http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/904-somali-pirate-clampdown-caused-drop-in-global-piracy-imb-reveals> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Dr. Peter Roell, "Combating Piracy and Maritime Terrorism – A Common Challenge for Europe and Asia," International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, April 2013, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail?id=163375>

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Steven Beardsley, "For a different African piracy problem, Navy seeks solutions on shore," *Stars and Stripes*, January 21, 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/news/for-a-different-african-piracy-problem-navy-seeks-solutions-on-shore-1.262649> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Dirk Steffen, "Troubled Waters? The Use of Nigerian Navy and Police in Private Maritime Security Roles," ISN ETH Zurich, July 18, 2014, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail?id=181585> [accessed July 19, 2014]. See also: Cristina Barrios, "Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Offshore and onshore," *Brief Issue 20/2013*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris, May 2013, [www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_20.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_20.pdf) [accessed July 1, 2014].

Regarding Indonesia the IMB reports a high number of “low level opportunistic thefts” in Indonesian anchorages and waters, a rise of armed robbery from 46 in 2011 to 106 in 2013.<sup>13</sup>

But with all these figures we should be careful. It is well known that ship owners are very reluctant to report actual or attempted attacks to the IMB Reporting Center because they want to avoid additional costs and unwanted delays while an incident is investigated.

A spectacular incident occurred in January 2014 when the MT Kerala was hijacked in Angolan waters, sailed northwest for more than a week, covering 1,300 nautical miles, during which time three ship-to-ship transfers of the diesel oil cargo were completed, removing 12,270 tonnes. The ship was then abandoned off the coast of Ghana.<sup>14</sup>

The complex nature of the operation indicates a high level of organisation and planning, as well as the intelligence to deliberately target a vessel more than 1,300 nautical miles away and to select it from more than 30 vessels in the area at the time.

The hijacking of a tanker on 22 April 2014 was a clear sign of the continued threat of piracy in the Straits of Malacca despite multinational sea and air patrols. The attack on the tanker MT Naniwa Maru 1 happened off Port Klang in Malaysian territorial waters. At approximately 0055 local time on 22 April 2014, two vessels – one flying a Mongolian flag – came alongside the ship, which was laden with 4,344 metric tons of marine diesel oil and was sailing from Singapore to Yangon, Myanmar.<sup>15</sup>

The tanker was boarded and five people entered the bridge. The crew of 18 Indonesian, Indian and Thai nationals was held while 2,500 tons of fuel was siphoned off. The robbers departed with three hostages: the master, chief officer and chief engineer.<sup>16</sup>

The theft of oil products from vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca has become more common, perhaps inspired by pirates off West Africa.

All these cases I have described underline – also in the field of piracy and armed robbery – the threat situation and the importance of intelligence. In this context I would like to point out that Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) should be complemented by reliable secret information.

I also would like to say a few words about an important political, economic and military

<sup>13</sup> “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2013,” ICC International Maritime Bureau, London, January 2014.

<sup>14</sup> James Bridger, “Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Oil Soaked Pirates,” *USNI News*, March 10, 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/03/10/piracy-gulf-guinea-oil-soaked-pirates> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>15</sup> Maritime Bulletin: Naniwa Maru No.1 pirates attack – Update from ReCAAP, April 24, 2014, <http://www.news.odin.tc/index.php?page=view/article/1398/Naniwa-Mar-No1-pirates-attack--Update-from-ReCAAP> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. See also: IISS Strategic Comments, “Enduring threat of global piracy,” May 2, 2014, <http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2014-a6f5/enduring-threat-of-global-piracy-0fb0> [accessed July 1, 2014]. Regarding maritime security see also: Lutz Feldt, Dr. Peter Roell, Ralph D. Thiele, “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach,” International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, April 2013, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=162756> [accessed July 24, 2014].

player, the People's Republic of China and its intelligence services. I am sure that also after the establishment of China's new leadership, the Chinese intelligence services will play an indispensable role in guaranteeing China's internal and external security, which includes intelligence collection in the maritime domain.

Looking at China's primary objectives, the PRC wants to become the leading economic world power by 2020, maintaining an economic growth rate of approximately 7%;<sup>17</sup>

- › to re-establish its geostrategic importance;
- › to increase R&D-investment: from 1.3% GDP to 2.5% GDP by 2020;<sup>18</sup>
- › to establish an "economic and technological army" to develop China;
- › education and know-how – the key to China's rise.

Although the international media are focusing on the Snowden case and the NSA since June of last year, most foreign intelligence activity against Germany is carried out by the services of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.<sup>19</sup>

According to information released by the Federal Ministry of the Interior in its 2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, two Chinese intelligence services are still very active in Germany: the Ministry of State Security – MSS and the Military Intelligence Department – MID. But we have also to mention the Electronic Interception Department of the PLA. Regarding the structures and missions of Chinese intelligence services the 2013 Annual Report states the following:

### MSS – Ministry of State Security

The scope of the intelligence missions conducted by the non-military MSS is quite comprehensive. Its personnel resources operating worldwide are considerable. Domestically, the MSS exercises police powers. But the service also plays a central role in external intelligence collection. In Germany, the service is collecting information in the fields of economy and politics. Also, the MSS is gathering information on opposition movements and attempting to suppress their activities.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The World Bank, „China Overview,“ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>18</sup> James Wilsdon and James Keeley, „China: The next science superpower?,“ **The Atlas of Ideas: Mapping the new geography of science**, DEMOS, January 7, 2007, <http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/atlaschina> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: "Research in China: Quantity on schedule, quality catching up," Press Release, DECHEMA e.V., February 2013, [www.dechema.de](http://www.dechema.de) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>19</sup> Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution: Facts and Trends, p. 31, Cologne, June 2014, [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/download-manager/\\_annual-report-2013-summary.pdf](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/download-manager/_annual-report-2013-summary.pdf) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>20</sup> Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, p. 324, Cologne, June 2014, [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/download-manager/\\_vsbericht-2013.pdf](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/download-manager/_vsbericht-2013.pdf) [accessed July 1, 2014].

## MID – Military Intelligence Department Second Department (Er Bu) of the PLA

As integral part of the People's Liberation Army, the MID is a worldwide and proactively operating intelligence service. The service is responsible for collecting information relevant to China's internal and external security and its military potential. Its main intelligence targets are, among others, equipment, structure and potentials of foreign military forces. Other major targets lie in the areas of politics, science and technology.<sup>21</sup>

It is well known that the United States is a major target for Chinese industrial espionage, because it is a leader in technology development, particularly in military hardware desired by China's expanding military, and a potential adversary at the forefront of Chinese defense thinking. China has managed to gather a great deal of information on U.S. stealth technology, naval propulsion systems, electronic warfare systems and nuclear weapons.<sup>22</sup>

On May 19, 2014 the United States Department of Justice indicted five Chinese military officers with stealing data from six U.S. companies and unions. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. announced that the United States for the first time would seek to bring officials of a foreign government to the U.S. to face charges of infiltrating American computer networks to steal data beneficial to U.S. trade competitors and the Justice Department even went so far as to print "wanted" posters.<sup>23</sup>

No wonder that the Chinese government rebuked the United States over its claims of cyber-spying by five Chinese military officers. "The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personell have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets", Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang said in a statement "The U.S. accusation against Chinese personnel is purely ungrounded and absurd".<sup>24</sup>

From a reliable source I have learned that Chinese hackers have been capable of infiltrating computers of one of the leading U.S. companies in the defense industry – undetected for three years.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. Regarding Chinese military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China to 2014 see: Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/> [accessed July 19, 2014]. Regarding China's cyber activities see: Mandiant Intelligence Center Report, APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, <http://intelreport.mandiant.com/> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>22</sup> Alex Newman, "China's Growing Spy Threat," *The Diplomat*, September 19, 2011, <http://thediplomat.com/2011/09/chinas-growing-spy-threat/> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>23</sup> Spencer Ackerman and Jonathan Kaiman, "Chinese military officials charged with stealing US data as tensions escalate," *theguardian*, May 20, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/19/us-chinese-military-officials-cyber-espionage> [accessed July 18, 2014].

<sup>24</sup> Timothy M. Phelps, Julie Makinen, "China blasts 'absurd' U.S. charges of cyberespionage," *LA Times*, May 19, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-china-cyber-spying-20140519-story.html> [accessed July 18, 2014]. For more information on China's cyber espionage see: Mandiant APT1 Report: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, <http://intelreport.mandiant.com/>

## Electronic Interception Department (San Bu) of the PLA

While not part of the MID, the Third Department of the PLA is another intelligence organization providing Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). It is actually the third largest SIGINT operation in the world, after those of the United States and Russia, monitoring diplomatic, military and international communications.<sup>25</sup>

Coming back to Germany, in the field of economic espionage the Chinese intelligence services are focusing on the acquisition of sensitive information concerning new research results or cutting-edge technologies. Due to the intricate and obscure links between the state and private business sector, it is quite difficult to distinguish whether these attempted intelligence-gathering activities by the Chinese are state-driven economic espionage operations, competitive business intelligence activities carried out by private companies or the initiative of individuals.<sup>26</sup>

In his publication of January 2014, *China's Growing Spy Threat*, Maxim Worcester discusses the extent to which Chinese intelligence services are involved in corporate espionage. While the current public debate focuses on the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Worcester argues that private companies should spend more time and resources in order to protect themselves from Chinese corporate espionage activities. He also provides specific advice on how private companies can recognize and avert attempts to steal data.<sup>27</sup>

When it comes to the maritime domain, I would like to refer to China's expanding drone program for security and economic reasons. The UAVs are useful for patrolling the East and South China Seas, allowing Beijing to maintain a presence in the disputed waters, and play a role in China's anti-access and area-denial strategy.<sup>28</sup>

Beijing has plans to build 11 coastal drone bases by 2015 to increase its ability to survey the region for possible intrusions or potential threats.<sup>29</sup>

The U.S. in particular is developing maritime drones for missions that will include intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance. Under development are Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and the Persistent Littoral Undersea

<sup>25</sup> Chinese Intelligence Services, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: [http://www.project2049.net/documents/pla\\_third\\_department\\_sigint\\_cyber\\_stokes\\_liin\\_hsiao.pdf](http://www.project2049.net/documents/pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_liin_hsiao.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2012 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, Cologne, September 2013, p. 393, [http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/download-manager/\\_vsbericht-2012.pdf](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/download-manager/_vsbericht-2012.pdf) [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>27</sup> Maxim Worcester, "China's Growing Spy Threat," International Security Network (ISN), ETH Zurich, January 2014, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=176358> [accessed July 1, 2014].

<sup>28</sup> "First Chinese, 'stealth' drone, ready for test flight," *Asiatimes*, May 12, 2013, <http://asiatimes.blogspot.de/2013/05/first-chinese-stealth-drone-ready-for.html> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Christopher Bodeen, "China's Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive," *TheWorldPost*, March 5, 2013, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program\\_n\\_3207392.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program_n_3207392.html) [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Ian M. Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities," [http://www.project2049.net/documents/uav\\_easton\\_hsiao.pdf](http://www.project2049.net/documents/uav_easton_hsiao.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> Jonathan Kaiman and Justin McCurry, "Japan and China step up drone race as tension builds over disputed islands," *The Guardian*, January 9, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/china-japan-drone-race> [accessed July 1, 2014]. See also: Stephan Blancke, "China – The drone and the cyber space. A reading between the lines," *Counterintelligence*, August 16, 2013, <http://stephanblancke.blogspot.de/2013/08/china-drone-and-cyber-space-reading.html> [accessed July 19, 2014].

Surveillance System which includes deep and shallow water “gliders” to increase awareness of the underwater battle space.<sup>30</sup>

During the 13th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2014, convened in Singapore from May 30 – June 1, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel mentioned in his speech, that the U.S. will continue to help nations build their humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities, and upgrade their militaries. For the first time Indonesia will receive Apache helicopters to conduct counter-piracy operations, and control the free flow of shipping through the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore Washington will provide robust assistance to the Philippines’ armed forces, to strengthen their maritime and aviation capabilities.<sup>31</sup>

South Korea will receive “Global Hawk Drones”, which will dramatically enhance its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. South Korea also intends to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In Japan the United States will deploy two additional ballistic missile defense ships and has deployed its most advanced capabilities – including two Global Hawks at Misawa, F-22 fighter aircraft at Kaneda, and MV-22 Ospreys on Okinawa.<sup>32</sup>

Next year the U.S. Navy will introduce the Joint High Speed Vessel in the Pacific and an additional submarine forward station in Guam. As many as four Littoral Combat Ships will be deployed there by 2017. By 2018, the navy’s advanced multi-mission Zumwalt-class destroyer will begin operating out of the Pacific. And by 2020, the U.S. want to achieve its target of operating 60% of both its navy and air force fleets out of the Pacific and also they will fly the Hawkeye early warning and unmanned Triton ISR aircraft in the region.<sup>33</sup> These are clear indications that the U.S. is a Pacific power and will be a Pacific power.

## Maritime Energy Security

Regarding the subject of Maritime Energy Security I would like to quote Hillary Rodham Clinton speaking on the campus of Georgetown University in Washington on October 18, 2012. In her speech the then U.S. Secretary of State remarked that energy will be a growing priority in U.S. foreign policy of the 21st century for three reasons:

- › Energy is at the “core of geopolitics”;
- › Energy is “essential to how we will power our economy and manage our environment in the 21st century” and
- › “Energy is key to economic development and political stability.”<sup>34</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Mark Valencia, “Intelligence Gathering, the South China Sea, and the Law of the Sea,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, August 30, 2011, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/intelligence-gathering-the-south-china-sea-and-the-law-of-the-sea/#axzz37ofQyboW> [accessed July 18, 2014].

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Secretary Hagel’s Remarks to Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2014, IIP Digital, U.S. Department of State, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/05/20140531300639.html#axzz38CcbqpAe> [accessed July 23, 2014].

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 8.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “On Energy Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” Georgetown University, Washington D.C., U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Oct 18, 2012, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/>



Indeed, energy is essential to a nation's security, economic stability, and global trade but it is also particularly vulnerable to attacks and disruption in the maritime environment. Protecting the 11,000 oil and chemical tankers and approximately 1,500 gas tankers, among other vessels that are part of the world merchant fleet, is the maritime energy security challenge.<sup>35</sup>

The amount of energy that travels by water is remarkable and highlights why global energy markets are affected by maritime crime. Oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf provides 40% of global supply, with 15.5 million barrels of oil a day, or 40% of all traded oil, transiting to the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels carrying more than half of the world's oil pass through Southeast Asian waters.<sup>36</sup>

China is the world's second largest oil consumer and the largest oil importer. Oil consumption is expected to grow in China by 5.8% annually until 2015. Oil imported from the Gulf States and Africa comprises 70% of total Chinese oil imports, and remains China's most critical source of energy apart from domestic coal production.<sup>37</sup>

The critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle Eastern oil-producing states traverse the South China Sea, making it a key strategic region, and potential trouble spot for the Chinese government. The PLA Navy regularly patrols the South China Sea and conflicting territorial claims in the region have periodically erupted into naval confrontations.

In a move that could further fuel tensions in the South China Sea, China will step up exploration for methane hydrate, which is drawing attention as a future source of energy. Research in summer 2013 led to the discovery of a high-purity methane hydrate reserve in the northern part of the South China Sea, according to the Ministry of Land and Resources of the PRC. The reserve, sitting off the coast of Guangdong Province, is estimated to span 55 sq. km and amount to the equivalent of 100 to 150 billion cu. meters of natural gas.<sup>38</sup>

As China widens its search for methane hydrate in the South China Sea, it may create more friction with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. In a new official map, unveiled by Chinese state media on June 25, the PRC underlined its claims on the South China Sea showing continental China along with its self-declared sea boundary in the South China Sea stretching down to the coast of Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.<sup>39</sup> China's neighbors will not be amused.

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texttrans/2012/10/20121018137692.html#axzz36lxWCtMm [accessed July 2, 2014]. See also: Charles Emmerson and Paul Stevens, "Maritime Choke Points and the Global Energy System," *Chatham House Briefing Paper*, January 2012, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/181615> [accessed July 19, 2014].

<sup>35</sup> Captain Brian Wilson, U.S. Navy (ret.), "Maritime Energy Security." This Article was originally presented at NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Nov 2012 during the NATO SPS sponsored Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) Advanced Research Workshop (NATO ARW) and published by IOS Press in the ARW Book.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>37</sup> Wikipedia, "String of Pearls (China)," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String\\_of\\_Pearls\\_\(China\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_of_Pearls_(China)) [accessed July 4, 2014].

<sup>38</sup> Gaku Shimada, "Chinese eye methane hydrate reserves in South China Sea," *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 24, 2014, <http://asia.nikkei.com/print/article/27074> [accessed July 4, 2014].

<sup>39</sup> Ben Blanchard and Sui-Lee Wee, "China's Neighbors Are Not Going To Be Happy About This New Map," *Reuters*, June 25,

On May 5, 2014, Bloomberg reported that Vietnam denounced China for setting up an exploration rig in waters off its central coast disputed by the two countries. Vietnam said that the rig's placement is within its exclusive economic zone, citing its proximity to the Vietnamese coast. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying told reporters that the oil rig was erected in Chinese territory.<sup>40</sup>

Previously these kinds of disputes tended to take place over survey ships but this time it is a drilling rig.<sup>41</sup> The dispute escalated very rapidly. At least 21 people were killed and nearly 100 injured in Vietnam on May 15 during violent protests against China. Crowds set fire to industrial parks and factories, hunted down Chinese workers and attacked police during the riots. The protests forced Chinese nationals to leave Vietnam because they didn't feel safe there.<sup>42</sup>

Surprisingly, the Chinese oil rig began moving on July 15. Rear Admiral Ngo Ngoc Thu, Vice Commander of the Vietnamese Coast Guard, said that the Chinese vessels that had been accompanying the rig were also moving. A spokesman of China Oilfield Services Ltd. (COSL) confirmed drilling work has been completed ahead of schedule and the rig's new intended location will be near China's island of Hainan, an area not disputed with other nations.<sup>43</sup>

In my opinion the new deployment of the rig is a tactical step by the Chinese government.

On one hand it could help to ease the tensions between China and Vietnam but on the other hand China will never give up its "right" to explore the contested waters.

On May 14, 2014 the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that it had lodged a formal protest with China on April 4 regarding the construction work at Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys. The protest was rejected by China saying that the "reef is Chinese territory."<sup>44</sup>

In an article titled *China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea*, Joel Guinto argues that artificial islands could help China anchor its claim to waters that host some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, referring to a 2013 report by the U.S. Energy

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2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-new-chinese-map-gives-greater-play-to-south-china-sea-claims-2014-25> [accessed July 16, 2014]. See also: Lutz Feldt, "China's Strategic Maritime Ambitions – A European Perspective," International Relations and Security Network (ISN), Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, May 2013, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=164160> [accessed July 23, 2014].

<sup>40</sup> Bloomberg, "Vietnam Protests Against China's 'Mobile Sovereign Territory' aka Deepwater Drilling Rig," *gCaptain*, May 5, 2014, <http://gcaptain.com/vietnam-protests-chinas-mobile-sovereign-territory-aka-deepwater-drilling-rig/> [accessed July 4, 2014].

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Kate Hodal and Jonathan Kaiman, "At least 21 dead in Vietnam anti-China protests over oil rig," *theguardian*, May 15, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-injured> [accessed July 16, 2014].

<sup>43</sup> Brian Spegele and Vu Trong Khanh, "China Moves Oil Rig From Contested Waters," *The Wall Street Journal World*, July 16, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cosl-moves-oil-rig-from-contested-waters-1405472611> [accessed July 18, 2014].

<sup>44</sup> Trefor Moss, "China begins Construction in Spratly Islands," *World News*, updated May 14, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579561123291666730> [accessed July 16, 2014].

Information Administration (EIA) that the South China Sea may hold as much as 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.<sup>45</sup>

Anyway, it is clear that disputes in the East and South China Seas cannot be solved by a single power or even by a group of small powers. Therefore cooperation between partners is a key to success, not only regarding the protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) but also to provide a stable maritime environment and stability in the production and delivery of energy.

The meeting of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Operations U.S. Navy, in July 2014 with his counterpart Wu Shengli, Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), focused on expanding cooperation and communication between their two navies. Wu called for cooperation in rescue missions and disaster relief, and implementing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was endorsed by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in the Chinese city of Qingdao in April 2014.<sup>46</sup>

In my opinion the meeting will have little impact on strategic issues. The CUES isn't legally binding and Chinese ships will not necessarily observe it in their claims in the South China Sea or East China Sea. Building up person to person relationships, improving confidence building measures, establishing better and clearer communication mechanisms between the two navies and prevent any misunderstandings and miscalculations at sea, and offering China participation in this year's RIMPAC drills are steps in the right direction.

Already in 2002, member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed and implemented the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This agreement provides standardized procedures for evaluating risks. ISPS includes guidance on assessing ship and port facility security plans and monitoring and controlling people's access to such areas.<sup>47</sup>

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) program was developed to heighten container security. Under CSI, shipping containers that pose a terrorist risk are inspected in foreign ports before being transported to the United States. In part, CSI employs intelligence and automated information, pre-screening of cargo, and detection technology.<sup>48</sup>

Along with multinational efforts and international partnering, the private sector plays a pivotal role in maritime energy security. In the United States, the private sector owns

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<sup>45</sup> Joel Guinto, "China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea," *Bloomberg Businessweek – Global Economics*, June 19, 2014, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-19/china-builds-artificial-islands-in-south-china-sea> [accessed July 16, 2014].

<sup>46</sup> Ankit Panda, "US Navy Chief Visits China," *The Diplomat*, July 16, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/us-navy-chief-visits-china/> [accessed July 19, 2014]. Regarding the CUES see: <http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/document-conduct-unplanned-encounters-sea>

<sup>47</sup> International Maritime Organisation (IMO), "ISPS Code," <http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/isp-code.aspx> [accessed July 4, 2014].

<sup>48</sup> Department of Homeland Security, "Container Security Initiative Ports," <http://www.dhs.gov/container-security-initiative-ports> [accessed July 4, 2014].

more than 80% of the energy infrastructure which includes 150 refineries, 4,000 offshore platforms, 160,000 miles of oil pipelines, 10,400 power plants, 410 underground storage fields, and 1.4 million miles of natural gas pipelines.<sup>49</sup>

Threats to maritime energy security aren't solely from illicit activities; natural disasters and aging infrastructures also adversely effect energy security. Remember hurricanes Katrina and Rita shut down 94% of the oil production in the Gulf of Mexico's outer continental shelf, which comprises 7% of U.S. consumption. Or remember typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013 creating destruction and sending a strong message that the world is unprepared for the violence of climate change.

## The European Intelligence Analysis Centre

Finally, some remarks about the European Intelligence Analysis Centre, the EU INTCEN, the intelligence body of the European Union, are appropriate. Since January 2011, the EU INTCEN is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS), under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton.<sup>50</sup> Her mandate will end on October 31, 2014 and the position will be replaced by the end of 2014.

The mission of the EU INTCEN is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative Catherine Ashton and to the European Action Service, to the various EU decision making bodies in the fields of Common Security and Foreign Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy and Counter-Terrorism, as well as to EU Member States.

EU INTCEN does this by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other global threats.

As of 2012, the EU INTCEN is composed of two divisions:

- › The Analysis Division is responsible for providing strategic analyses based on input from foreign and security intelligence services of the Member States. It is composed of various sections, dealing with geographical and thematic topics.
- › The General and External Relations Division looks at all legal and administrative questions, and produces open-source analyses. It is composed of three sections dealing respectively with IT questions, internal and external communication, as well as the open source office responsible for Open Source Analysis.

Inquiries by EU INTCEN concerning topics such as crises, developments in given states and regions and terrorist threats, etc. are sent via the national experts to the foreign

<sup>49</sup> Brian Wilson, "Maritime Energy Security," *SSRN Social Science Research Network*, Nov 1, 2012, p. 9, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2229989](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229989) [accessed July 4, 2014].

<sup>50</sup> Wikipedia, "EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN)," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU\\_Intelligence\\_Analysis\\_Centre\\_\(EU\\_INTCEN\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU_Intelligence_Analysis_Centre_(EU_INTCEN)) [accessed July 23, 2014]. See also: Björn Müller-Wille, "For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community with the EU," *Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers*, no. 50, Paris, January 2004.

intelligence and/or security services, using the form of an official request for information (RFI). The services then have the discretionary power to decide whether and to what extent they wish to or can respond to the EU INTCEN's inquiry. It goes without saying that each service respects the privacy of its sources.

Merging both civilian and military information, these contributions are then used to produce all-source intelligence assessments. This *modus operandi* has the following advantages:

- › Intelligence information from different intelligence and security services, with different capacities, is merged;
- › The overall knowledge basis is extended;
- › The perceived threat is uniformly monitored;
- › The common analysis process is fostered and joint political decisions are supported.

The EU INTCEN maintains also ties with the EU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain,<sup>51</sup> with EUROPOL in The Hague,<sup>52</sup> with the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris,<sup>53</sup> with the Foreign Offices of the Member States, the EU Special Representatives<sup>54</sup> in given regions, as well as experts in the Policy Unit and in the Council Secretariat.

The present Director of the EU INTCEN is Ilkka Salmi, previously Head of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. The center has around 70 employees.

## Conclusions

If we understand security policy in a more comprehensive way, that means the political, economic, social, ecological and military dimensions must be considered together and must be brought together, then maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery and potential threats in the field of maritime energy security can only be fought successfully in cooperation between state institutions and the private sector.

Good intelligence in the maritime domain will be a prerequisite for combating potential threats including the collection of political, economic and military information.

Multinational patrols, increased safety measures adopted by shipping companies and private security guards on board of ships led to a significant drop of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast and off the Horn of Africa in 2013.

West African piracy will remain the most active in terms of the number of attacks in 2014 and in the foreseeable future.

<sup>51</sup> EEAS European Union External Action Service, "European Union Satellite Centre (Torrejón)," [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-agencies-on-csdp/eu-satellite-centre/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-agencies-on-csdp/eu-satellite-centre/index_en.htm) [accessed July 23, 2014].

<sup>52</sup> EUROPOL, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/> [accessed July 23, 2014].

<sup>53</sup> EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/> [accessed July 23, 2014].

<sup>54</sup> EEAS European Union External Action Service, "EU Special Representatives," [http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm) [accessed July 23, 2014].

In Southeast Asia it has to be seen whether oil related attacks on ships will increase, inspired by successful piracy attacks off the West African coast.

In 2014, low level attacks in Southeast Asia will likely continue because attacks against ships in harbours or slow moving vessels in very narrow waters are easy targets for pirates and other criminals.

Also in the future energy will be essential for the security of nations for economic stability and global trade. The critical energy infrastructure has been and will be in the sights of terrorists.

The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), connecting China and other Northeast Asian states to the Middle Eastern oil producing states traverse the South China Sea and are of great strategic importance. Further disputes between China and other claimants regarding islands in the East and South China Sea can be expected because all of them want to profit from the rich energy resources in this strategic region.

## Recommendations

- › States should analyze how the different Intelligence and Security Services and other institutions could improve cooperation.
- › Develop a watch list and establish priorities to analyze present and future threats relevant for the country and the region.
- › Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) could strengthen the knowledge base.
- › Bundling Information could be a key to success.
- › Analyze Internet websites, e-mail traffic and other means of communication of potential terrorists.
- › Improve information sharing between selected countries in Asia, the European Union, the United States, Latin America and Africa, mainly with Foreign Intelligence and Security Services.
- › Use the regional expertise on information regarding the maritime domain and other issues to “trade information” with Foreign Services.
- › Evaluate the proposal of the United States for closer intelligence cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul.
- › Dedicate more resources to counter intelligence.
- › Improve encryption systems.
- › More involvement of the private sector is necessary.
- › Raise the awareness of decision makers in politics, in the armed forces, in the business sector and in public for potential threats in the field of economic and industrial espionage, including threats in the maritime domain.





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## **“Partner Desejado” – Reflections on Brazilian Multilateral Choices in Global Security**

Ralph D. Thiele

This essay takes a look from a German perspective at Brazil's growing stature as a global player and its multilateral choices with respect to global security. Traditional and new challenges to Brazilian security reaffirm its security policy supporting systems of cooperative security and confidence building measures, and getting actively involved in a multitude of international, political and economic fora. Brazil has strategic objectives and policy goals that match well with those of its preferred partners. But Brazil itself has also become a “Partner Desejado” on a global scale due to its strategic objectives, its enormous and ambitious investment programmes and its growing global stature.

### **World outside Brazil**

Big nations tend to focus on internal challenges. Yet, in globalization there is a world outside – a world that may have a dramatic impact on a nation's security and prosperity. In particular the past years have unveiled black swans, i.e. serious challenges to security and prosperity which nobody had thought of and prepared for in advance. Almost every other month a new crisis has erupted. North Korea and Iran haven't gone away. The evolving security situation in Iraq may need military intervention again. Rising tensions with China and Russia have drawn global attention.

Obviously, conflicts and military interventions have been on the rise, as a report by the Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace<sup>1</sup> has identified. “Over the (past) seven years, global peace was negatively affected by a number of international events including major outbreaks of violence in the Middle East; a deterioration of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan; civil wars in Libya and Syria; the escalation of the drug war in Central America; continued deteriorations in peace in Somalia, DRC and Rwanda; and violent demonstrations associated with the economic downturn in a number of European countries.”<sup>2</sup>

From a German perspective, crises and conflicts have drawn closer to home. The environment in which Germany pursues foreign policy has evolved. Important examples are climate change and cyber security. Just as Brazil, Germany is more inter-connected on a global scale than ever before. In fact, globalization is generating new connections between continents. These include growing flows of energy, goods and services as well as greater access to each other’s markets, resources, and talent, new opportunities afforded by education, technology, infrastructure and investment, and, not least, challenges such as crime, violence, human trafficking and drugs.

South American criminal cartels have crossed the Atlantic using West Africa as a logistical base. Governments such as Guinea-Bissau have become organized criminal enterprises facilitating illicit transatlantic flows. The nexus of drugs, guns and terror has been growing. Drug trade, flows of arms and money, human trafficking, piracy, political instability, and terrorist infiltration are in many cases interacting, fuelled by the growing engagement in the region of both traditional and new players while existing governance or enforcement mechanisms are not working effectively. This dynamism creates vulnerabilities that may well lead to the disruption of critical functions of society, the economy and security, requiring comprehensive multinational efforts to promote security and prosperity across the globe. Governments need to develop ways and means to protect their society’s critical infrastructure, the networks that sustain them, and the connections those networks bring with other societies.

Particular attention needs to be given to the global common four domains – maritime, air, outer space, and cyberspace. The “global commons” bind together domains that are indispensable for the free flow of goods, people, resources, and information that are the backbone of a globalized world. Players that are able to influence the quality and the direction of these flows exert strategic influence. Consequently, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, access to the global commons has become of particular importance to the security and prosperity of nations. As nations have a substantial interest in assuring unrestricted access to manoeuvrability within and use of the global commons, this will lead to the development of anti-access and area denial strategies.

<sup>1</sup> Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, Sydney, June 2014, pg. 1. , <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014, Sydney, June 2014, pg. 1. <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

These challenges have to be dealt with in a situation of dynamic strategic change. In the past especially, U.S. primacy on the high seas has guaranteed commercial maritime stability for decades, and has, therefore, been taken for granted, even as globalization has depended on it. Yet given a reduction in U.S. military spending, we may be entering a phase of history in which several nations might share dominance of the high seas. Similar situations have developed in the other global commons and beyond. This has had not only financial and economic effects, but has also narrowed former military gaps between the United States and some of its competitors / potential adversaries. While Washington's defence spending has started to shrink – though it is still at a comfortable level – it has risen in Russia, China, and in the Middle East and Asia.

Among the key strategic developments of the past years, two stand out:

*The U.S. strategic shift to Asia-Pacific*

This 'shift' has become the most important strategic development since the Cold War. The 'shift' is a realization that the nexus of global strategy and commerce has moved from the North Atlantic to the Western Pacific. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the last decade showed "*the fastest rate of change in global economic balance in history*". "*The shift in economic balance toward the East and South is happening with unprecedented speed and scale. We are quite simply witnessing the biggest economic transformation the world has ever seen as the populations of cities in emerging markets expand and enjoy rising incomes*"<sup>4</sup> – with Sao Paulo, by the way, being one of the most prosperous megacities.

Given Europe's growing economic dependence on East Asia and the growing shaky security situation in the region, its interests are massively engaged. The same is true, to varying degrees, of Europe's relationship with South Asia; here the India-Pakistan conflict, a looming "post-American" Afghanistan in 2014, and uncertainty concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf have a direct security impact on the European Union.

With the envisaged significant cuts in the U.S. budget, the 'shift' implicitly is a move away from Europe. This has become a common perception in European capitals. Already in the near future we may see over-stretched and under-resourced U.S. forces leaving much unfinished business to their European partners – in Southeast Europe, North Africa, in the Greater Middle East and beyond. The consequent realignment will profoundly reshape the European Union politically and economically, with major implications for NATO and other elements of the transatlantic partnership.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Dobbs et al. "Urban World and the rising of the consuming class", McKinsey Global Institute June 2013, preface, [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban\\_world\\_cities\\_and\\_the\\_rise\\_of\\_the\\_consuming\\_class](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class) (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>4</sup> Richard Dobbs et al. "Urban World and the rising of in the consuming class", McKinsey Global Institute June 2013, pg. 17, [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban\\_world\\_cities\\_and\\_the\\_rise\\_of\\_the\\_consuming\\_class](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class) (access: 23 July 2014) (access: 23 July 2014)

### *The Ukrainian crisis*

As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former NATO Secretary General stated recently: “*We thought we had established a European order since the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the lifting of the ‘iron curtain’*”.<sup>5</sup> But the truth is: 25 years on from the end of the Cold War, from the collapse of a black and white order that had persisted for decades, the world has found neither a new European nor a new world order. For a long time it appeared to political leaders throughout the world that the “rule of law” had succeeded over the “rule of power particularly in the highly integrated European Union environment and its neighbourhood. Now, the violent developments in the Ukraine – including the “annexation” of the Crimea and Sevastopol – point in the opposite direction. Vladimir Putin observed in his speech of 18 March 2014 to the deputies of the State Duma the “rule of power” to be a key element of the emerging New World Order. In fact, there are developments happening all over the world that might be interpreted in that very way.

This is clearly neither in the Brazilian nor German interest. As the German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has been highlighting recently: Germany, as the largest country in the heart of Europe, cannot ignore what’s going on in the world. The life of its citizens depends on a peaceful and free world that – most importantly – is based on rules. Germany is more interconnected with the world than any other country: its economic prosperity depends on world peace. Germans clearly benefit from world order and the “rule of law”. Consequently it needs to contribute to shaping rules where these have to be developed respectively and adjusted, and ensuring that these are being maintained.

Among the lessons learned by the European Union and NATO in recent crisis management is the urgent requirement to improve their capabilities for crisis management (soft and hard) and defence. Instability and performance deficits of governments create misery and often encourage people to turn to terrorism. As recent large-scale military intervention has had unintended negative consequences, in future the European Union and NATO will need to be more cautious over its use of force. Clearly, there is greater need than ever for soft power – from humanitarian aid to assistance in state and nation building. At the same time, both need to further develop their hard power capabilities. In particular the European Union needs options to contribute more effectively to international security while not being over-reliant on the United States. It needs capabilities to deploy limited military force to trouble spots, especially in Africa. These capabilities will need to deal with a growing variety of threats in future, including cyber warfare and the use of technology such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

The vision of NATO is to turn the organisation into a strategic security hub that can project power, guarantee defence and promote resiliency across the conflict spectrum, preferably in partnership with other nations or institutions such as the UN, EU and OSCE. To that end, it

<sup>5</sup> SDA, „Overhauling transatlantic security thinking“, Report of the Security & Defence Agenda’s annual conference co-organised by Security & Defence Agenda the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Atlantic Council and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Brussels 2014, pg. 7, <http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1299/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3695/Overhauling-transatlantic-security-thinking.aspx> (access: 23 July 2014)

strives to reach out and work with those engaged in stabilisation and reconstruction across the civilian human security community in support of efforts to prevent or react to humanitarian crises. Interested partner nations and organisations will have to define their respective roles, interests and capabilities within such a collaborative framework.

## Global Level of Ambition

Brazil's rise over the past few decades is remarkable – an enormous success story with a quarter century of democracy and political stability and excellent economic performance. In the past decade the nation's poverty rate has been cut by half. Millions of poor people came into jobs with the appropriate, positive effect on the internal market. Rich resource endowments ensure that Brazil will stay one of the world's leading exporters of commodities for years to come. It has enjoyed remarkable economic growth over the past two decades, particularly from 2010-2012. The years 2013 and 2014, however, have been disappointing.

Brazil is a peaceful country. It supports systems of cooperative security and confidence building measures and is actively involved in a multitude of international, political and economic fora. *“It runs its international affairs, among other things, adopting the constitutional principles of non-intervention, defence of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This pacifist trait is part of the national identity....”*<sup>6</sup> To this end Brazil strives for international cooperation on defence issues with a focus on Brazil's participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Unlike its BRIC partners and competitors, Brazil enjoys a much better security situation. Brazil has no perceived threats that require military capabilities. Brazil is geopolitically satisfied. It has no major boundary disputes with its 10 neighbouring countries. Argentina is no longer an issue after a decades long rivalry. This comfortable security situation places Brazil in a unique position internationally. While military spending in China, Russia, and India increased by 170 %, 79 % and 66 % respectively over the past decade, Brazil could afford just a 22 % increase over the same period of time.

Not having any enemies does not mean that there are no Brazilian security concerns at all. Key challenges for Brazilian security – the world's leading exporter of agricultural products – constitute issues such as global warming, drug trafficking and protectionism. Traditional security tasks focus on the Amazon region and the coastal strip of Santos and Rio de Janeiro up to Vitória, where the Brazilian oil reserves are located. Particular threats come from Colombia and other neighbours as they become further involved in the drug trade. As the drug trade has leapfrogged from South America towards Africa, the area for Brazil to engage in has greatly expanded.

Brazilians tend to believe that they are immune to terrorism and that they would be at the bottom of any list of potential targets. That was exactly the Brazilian attitude towards

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Defence, National Strategy of Defence (NSD), Brasilia 2008, pg. 8, [http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia\\_defesa\\_nacional\\_ingles.pdf](http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf) (access: 23 July 2014)

cyber threats before the U.S. interest in listening to Brazil was detected. The 2012 visit of the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Venezuela, which is not too far from Brazilian critical infrastructure, has been an eye-opener for the political and military leadership of Brazil, as it revealed how close terrorism has already come.

Consequently, the strategic ambitions of Brazil have been focused on South America and the South Atlantic Ocean, including the West African coast. Structurally Brazil has supported missions of the United Nations. In addition, an increasingly external energy policy plays an important role – pronounced already in Latin America.

As the seventh largest economy in the world<sup>7</sup>, Brazil wants recognition as a major world power. Brazil has the ambition to play an important role in international security. The National Strategy of Defence and National Strategy of Development leave no doubt about it.<sup>8</sup> A permanent seat at the UN Security Council would reflect this ambition. The implementation of this claim is the leitmotif of Brazilian foreign and security policy.

Brazil has used its soft power well to extend its global relations and develop sustainable political influence.<sup>9</sup> It has become a dynamic force in global politics. It has taken a leadership role in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other international organisations. Increasingly, however, it finds its ability to exercise influence constrained by limitations in its ability to deal with international asymmetries in hard power.<sup>10</sup> A well-balanced mix of soft and hard power capabilities has proven indispensable for Brazilian global aspirations.

For a long time the civilian Brazilian presidents tended to minimize the role of the Armed Forces for the country, and consequently made deep cuts in the defence budget. This process was reversed after 2003, with Brazil aiming to establish a deterrent through strategically and tactically mobile and ready forces with capabilities for monitoring and control of its territory, airspace and territorial waters. The investments were increased again, particularly after the approval of the National Defence Strategy in 2008.

Significantly increased funding has already led to a remarkable improvement in the capability profile of the Brazilian armed forces. The current Defence Equipment and Articulation Plan seeks to diminish a long shortage of investments in defence. Today, Brazil is undertaking serious efforts to modernise and develop its military as well as its defence industrial base. This trend is likely to continue, but there is still a long way to go. A particular advantage of the drive for military modernisation in Brazil is the institutional deepening that it has encouraged. The defence ministry now makes periodic

<sup>7</sup> The World Bank states for Brazil a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$ 2.253 trillion in 2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview> (access 22 August 2014)

<sup>8</sup> NSD pg. 8

<sup>9</sup> Dr Joseph S. Tulchin, MARCH 12, 2014, Brazil aims for closer military ties with United States, <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1394601910389396000> (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>10</sup> Harold Trinkunas, „Brazil's rise seeking influence on Global Governance“, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 26, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

reports to the congress. Its concern for technology puts the military in more frequent dialogue with the executive branch and the university system. It also strengthens ties with the private sector.

Three important documents guide Brazilian national defence:

#### *National Defence Policy*

The *National Defence Policy* (NDP), as the main planning document for the Brazil's defence, provides goals and guidelines for the preparation and use of national training, the involvement of the military and civilian sectors in all spheres of power. In the National Defence objectives since 2005, the tasks, objectives and regional priorities have been clearly defined: South America and the South Atlantic.

#### *National Defence Strategy*

The National Defence Strategy<sup>11</sup> defines how to do what was laid out in the NDP. It is the main legal guide to the understanding of the concepts that base the Brazilian defence structure. The version that was approved in 2008 is still valid and

- › specifies the requirements for equipment and modernization of the armed forces to include reorganization and reorientation of the armed forces, restructuring of the national defence industry with the aim of ensuring the operational autonomy of the armed forces, improved (personnel) forces, in order to better meet relevant challenges and threats to security.
- › emphasizes the need for inter-operability, as well as the effectiveness of joint approaches, operations, planning and logistics
- › stresses for the Brazilian army a role in securing the Amazon region
- › underlines the international role of Brazil in international operations such as the UN mission in Haiti
- › identifies three specific areas of *strategic importance i.e. cyber space, space, and nuclear energy / drives*

A new version was sent to Congress in July 2012, but this reformulation is still in the approval process.<sup>12</sup>

#### *National Defence White Paper*

The *National Defence White Paper* of 2012<sup>13</sup> is the first White Paper of the Brazilian government. It analyses the strategic context of the twenty-first century, looking at medium and long term prospects. It provides editorial context to the new strategy and policy as it increases transparency about the Brazilian defence system to include the enhanced role of cooperation, particularly in South America. All three documents are as

<sup>11</sup> NSD

<sup>12</sup> The Chamber of Deputies has approved the Draft Legislative Decree 818/13, which contains the texts of the National Defence Policy (NDP), the National Defence Strategy (END) and the White Paper National Defence (LBDN). The text, already approved by the Senate, continues its course to be sanctioned. Defence Market Intelligence. Brazil; National defence strategy confirmed. Tuesday, 17 September 2013, [http://dmilt.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=7983:brasil-national-defence-strategy-confirmed-&catid=35:latin-america&Itemid=58](http://dmilt.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7983:brasil-national-defence-strategy-confirmed-&catid=35:latin-america&Itemid=58) (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>13</sup> Janie Hulse, „Brazilian Military's White Paper to Guide Future Defense Priorities“, Dialogo, 17 June 2011, [http://dialogo-americas.com/en\\_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional\\_news/2011/06/17/aa-brazil-white-paper](http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/06/17/aa-brazil-white-paper) (access: 23 July 2014)

of today<sup>14</sup> still in the congressional approval process, but their key contents have been applied in the decision making of the administration since their staffing in 2012.

## Leadership through Partnerships

Brazil has strategic objectives and policy goals that match well with those of its preferred partners. But also Brazil itself has become a “Partner Desejado” on a global scale because of its strategic objectives, its investment programmes and last but not least, its new global stature.

The importance of the U.S. shift to Asia has been highlighted before. Europe has been caught by surprise. Brazil could find itself soon in a similar position to Europe. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington in late November 2013: “*The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over...*”<sup>15</sup> This may also mean less U.S. lead engagement in Latin America and thus more crisis management and security engagement falling on the shoulders of South American nations.

In the emerging new world order, Brazil must do its homework nationally, in the South American and South Atlantic neighbourhood. In addition, it has a growing number of global responsibilities. Prosperity and security of future generations will depend crucially on the fact that key tasks will be completed successfully, including the involvement of the ascending countries such as Brazil, China and India in a future oriented, cooperative world order and the development in South America in the direction of good governance.

At present Chile, Colombia and Peru are Brazil’s preferred partners on the South American continent. The United States is not particularly loved, but is frequently looked to. The European Union – including Germany – are appreciated partners in business and the defence industry. Of course, the other BRICS states are natural partners for Brazil, just as Brazil is an attractive partner for them.

With view to security and prosperity in its neighbourhood, Brazil seeks to promote multilateral governance in the region. Good cooperation with its neighbours and other states is an indispensable foundation. Brazil has been investing particularly in international co-operation aimed at creating a common South Atlantic identity that allows it to actively pursue its own interests within the region. Brazil has diversified its bilateral defence co-operation with countries along the western coast of Africa. Most of these programmes involve training of military staff, collaboration on continental shelf surveys, but also in a growing number of cases the provision of defence equipment and increased exports of Brazilian-made weaponry.

At the same time, Brasilia works to boost multilateral organisations: for instance, it is helping to revive the somewhat fading South Atlantic Peace and Co-operation Zone

<sup>14</sup> July 2014

<sup>15</sup> Zachary Keck, “The US Renounces the Monroe Doctrine?” November 21, 2013, in: *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/the-us-renounces-the-monroe-doctrine/> (access: 23 July 2014)



(ZOPACAS – Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul). The strategic partnership with Venezuela is part of a new, growing self-understanding of Brazil. Particularly close relations have been maintained with the Portuguese speaking countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP)). In this way, Brazil seeks to emphasise the need to create a zone of peace and prosperity, while also stressing that the primary responsibility for the area lies with the countries bordering the South Atlantic.

Brazilian aspirations and security challenges have increasingly informed the structure of key military partnerships and exercises during the past years – joint exercises such as the India-Brazil-South Africa-Maritime (IBSAMAR) activities off the South African coast, as well as initiatives that include South American partners. Further examples are Brazil's participation in the naval exercise ATLASUR with forces from South Africa, Argentina and Uruguay, and in the annual UNITAS multilateral naval exercise with forces from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, as well as the U.S. and the UK. Some of these exercises simulate attacks targeting Brazilian offshore oil platforms in the South Atlantic.

The slight rapprochement with the U.S. under the government of President Dilma Rousseff has been damaged by the Snowden revelations that have disclosed the remarkable interest U.S. intelligence takes in Brazil. Additionally, the United States has so far failed to provide credibly to Brazil, that it respects the country as a strategic partner. In fact, Brazil assesses the quality of strategic partnerships with key global players through their willingness to share sensitive equipment, technology and respective intellectual properties with Brazil.

Nevertheless, the United States is Brazil's prime partner. The US-Brazil Defence Cooperation Dialogue has identified six priority areas for partnership in 2012: science innovation and technology transfer, logistics, communications, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, cooperation in support of African nations, and cyber security. The U.S. is watching the Brazilian market closely and has engaged in long-term commitments. The technology of the sporting events comes from the USA. And also in the field of technology transfer, the U.S. has engaged in numerous MOUs addressing technology transfer and export support in order to get into a better position with respect to major Brazilian investment projects.

Brazil also maintains intense political relations with the other BRICS such as Russia, India, China, and South Africa and some European states, including France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. Between Brazilian and Russian government officials there has been a series of meetings. These include the meeting of President Dilma Rousseff with Russian Prime Minister Medvedev, but also meetings of the foreign ministers of both countries in June 2013. As a result Brazil has considered buying a number of Russian weapon systems in exchange for exports to the Russian consumer market.

China has also been seeking to close ranks with Brazil. There has been Chinese pilot training for the aircraft carrier crews. A task force of three Chinese warships has been deployed to Brazil in October 2013 for manoeuvres with the Brazilian navy, and port

visits in Argentina and Chile. France and Brazil have developed a “privileged partnership” in defence cooperation that is supposed to lift the Brazilian defence industry into international competitiveness.

The Brazilian-German relations have a particular broad foundation – politically, economically, culturally and socially. Brazil is the only German strategic partner in Latin America. An Action Plan of this strategic partnership to further expand the cooperation in bilateral and multilateral area was negotiated between the then Brazilian president Lula and Chancellor Merkel. Brazil sees the strategic partnership with Germany as an opportunity to develop and sustain its ambition as a global player. From this perspective close cooperation in armaments, economic, technological and security-related ventures offers the potential, to improve the Brazilian performance in the region and beyond. Consequently, in November 2013 Brazil and Germany took a leading initiative in the debate on global internet governance and introduced a UN resolution calling for an end to excessive electronic surveillance, data collection and other gross invasions of privacy.

While Brazil actively seeks engagement within the United Nations context, it has remained sceptical to this point with regard to NATO’s interest to build a relationship. In fact, NATO’s role in the South Atlantic has been clearly questioned by the Brazilian government. Brazil’s foreign minister Antonio Patriota stated in a recent speech at the UN Security Council, that: “*We are still concerned that NATO may be seeking to establish partnerships outside of its defensive zone, far beyond the North Atlantic, including in regions of peace, democracy, and social inclusion that do not accept the existence within that space of weapons of mass destruction*”.<sup>16</sup> But in fact, NATO is among the viable multilateral choices of Brazil. As NATO keeps permanently adapting to an altering security environment,<sup>17</sup> this also an option for Brazil to leave its imprint on NATO.

## Shape the Future

Based on desk research, broad observations and discussions in Brazil, further by matching *global challenges* with Brazilian ambitions, matching European *lessons learned* and Brazilian aspirations and last but not least looking at the scope and quality of existing partnerships, this essay suggests a MOSAIC of choices for Brazil in developing its stature as a global security player – MOSAIC standing for M – Maritime, O – (regional and global) Order, S – South America, A – Africa, I – Industry and C – Cyber.

<sup>16</sup> Speech by Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota at the UN Security Council on 6 August 2013. Translation by Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, “Brazil’s Maritime Strategy in the South Atlantic: The Nexus Between Security and Resources”, Johannesburg, November 2013, pg.6APER NUMBER 161

<sup>13</sup> gov.br/11-onu/35-organisacoes-regionais-e-a-onu-trabalhando-pela-paz-e-pela-seguranca-internacionais, accessed 16 August 2013

<sup>17</sup> Harold Trinkunas, “Brazil’s rise seeking influence on Global Governance”, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 26, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

*Maritime – Brazil should develop its maritime options vis-à-vis its neighbours, but also with view to new partners such as the European Union and NATO*

As the South Atlantic region is confronted with the same global threats as the rest of the world, Latin America, Europe and NATO should strive together for common comprehensive capabilities to meet the challenges ahead. The enduring prosperity of the world's industrialised democracies as well as the steady rise of new economic powers, such as Brazil, owes much to the fact that the world's maritime domain has been, by and large, secure and safe. Consequently, crises involving the *maritime domain* have the potential to involve major disruptions to the movement of cargo within the global supply chain. Freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are of significant importance with regard to security and prosperity of nations worldwide. Maritime security issues are among the most pressing questions on the agenda of international foreign and security policy and require political foresight as well as cooperation to resolve.

The South Atlantic Ocean has always been of strategic importance to Brazil. Along the South Atlantic seaboard Brazil possesses the longest coastline. The security of its coastline, its maritime resources, and its sea lines of communication have been of critical importance for Brazil's economic and political development. In addition to the existing resource wealth in Brazil, further gas and oil reserves have been recently discovered in the deep layers of the continental shelf. Brazil has filed a proposal with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) authorities to expand its national waters based on a redefinition of its continental shelf. It has been investing significantly in scientific research programmes that not only allow it to chart its continental shelf with greater precision, but also to map maritime resources. It maintains teams of researchers on its Atlantic islands, thereby boosting Brazil's presence in and claim to this part of the South Atlantic. This way Brazil has been demarcating its space within the South Atlantic as a means of guaranteeing exclusive access to the new maritime resources.

With Brazil's new prioritization of the South Atlantic, the strategic value of Antarctica has also increased<sup>18</sup> – Antarctica as

- › the intersection area between the South Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
- › a site of deepening competition over natural resources
- › an opportunity to enhance cooperation with other South American states
- › part of a broader foreign policy strategy to better integrate Brazil within and beyond its region.

Consequently, Brazil is now seeking to strengthen its naval capabilities and defence industry in order to improve its defensive capabilities against potential state and non-state violence. But Brazil cannot do it alone.

In the past, threats to maritime trade have been related to situations such as search and rescue, water pollution, maritime law enforcement and coastal protection. In the

<sup>18</sup> Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, „Rising powers and Antarctica: Brazil's changing interests“, *The Polar Journal*, 2014, pg. 14, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.913910> (access: 23 July 2014)

recent past asymmetric threats have been added, with sea banditry or robbery, terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking and piracy as the most common situations. Additionally, disputes over maritime resources, climate-induced change and cyber security issues have introduced instability in the maritime domain. While command of the sea by naval superiority in the past used to provide global reach, freedom of movement and secure access, the same command is in modern terms not realistic without an unhindered access to the air, outer space and cyber space domains. Protecting this access has become a cooperative, multilateral venture. Consequently Brazil needs partners – in the region and beyond. And Brazil also needs procedural as well as technological inter-operability with those partners. This needs to be planned for, trained for and exercised.

Brazil has begun modernising and expanding its naval capacity with special attention to maritime power in the South Atlantic. Priority has been placed on enhancing surveillance and patrolling capacity as part of the country's deterrent power. This strategy has entailed a significant increase in arms acquisition and development, including not only the purchase of vessels but also co-operation with France on the development of a nuclear-propulsion attack submarine. Domestically, this modernisation project has been accompanied by 'Blue Amazon', a campaign aimed at mobilising popular support for the idea that Brazil has both vital resources and new security responsibilities in the South Atlantic. All of these activities ask for a cooperative, multilateral Maritime Domain Awareness capability that would

- › support a common understanding of what is going on in the Maritime Domain,
- › would ease the path towards common recommendations of what should be done,
- › would provide for orchestrating common multinational action of civil and military instruments in the Maritime Domain in case common action is required.

A particular point is that U.S. primacy on the high seas has guaranteed commercial maritime stability for decades, and has, therefore, been taken for granted, even as globalization has depended on it. Yet given a reduction in U.S. military spending, we may be entering a phase of history in which several nations might share dominance of the high seas, rather than just one as in the recent past. Brazil's growing attention to the South Atlantic represents an opportunity to assume a leadership role nationally, regionally and beyond. Given Brazilian leadership, why shouldn't the European Union and NATO become welcome partners?

### **Order – Brazil should develop and sustain its role in shaping regional and global order**

Today, the well-being of nations is tied to developments around the globe. The trend towards a more chaotic world is not going to change anytime soon. A world order with Brazil as a global player in a driving position requires multilateral Brazilian engagement. In fact today, Brazil leads peacekeeping troops in Haiti. It has sponsored a web of new regional institutions. It has large-scale economic interests in Africa, having turned, in several countries, into a key investor and donor of both development and humanitarian aid. The BRICS and the G20, both of which Brazil is a member, have turned into fixtures in the international landscape. Brazil has turned into the world's 7th largest economy.

Brazil's international responsibilities are far greater today than they were at any other time in history. In the global security environment it is not major crises that shape the picture. Rather unnoticed arises, step by step, a new world order, while erosion in stability keeps spreading and deepening. The competition for power and influence in this changing world order is taking place in multiple dimensions – in economics & finance, commodities & energy, security & society. Decision-makers in politics and administration must make far-reaching decisions under time pressure and high uncertainty in the future. They need clear objectives and orientation with respect to future development options. Anticipatory and interdepartmental political action is becoming increasingly important under these circumstances, and, at the same time, also more demanding.

Brazil has the potential to shape within the emerging world order, particularly the Atlantic Community<sup>19</sup> by:

- › boosting traditional, unconventional and renewable energy production, facilitating energy access, and building a bridge to a low-carbon future;
- › opening trade and investment;
- › ensuring that people share the benefits of economic growth and opportunity through improved innovation, education, training and mobility;
- › reducing poverty and inequality as a central economic goal, facilitated by inclusive economic growth;
- › contributing to more effective international aid and development efforts;
- › enhancing cooperation in principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- › advancing cultures of lawfulness and effective democratic governance;
- › promoting human security.

To this end, Brazil could facilitate greater cooperation on global issues formulating and implementing shared approaches to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of international rules-based governance mechanisms to include the maritime, air, space and cyber space.

### South America – Brazil should implement its leadership potential in South America

At his inaugural ceremony in 2003 former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated that Brazil aims at contributing to a “*South America that is politically stable, prosperous and united, based on democratic ideas and on social justice. (...) We will also take care of the social, cultural and scientific-technological dimensions in the process of integration. We will encourage joint ventures and stimulate a dynamic intellectual and artistic interchange among South American countries.*”<sup>20</sup> This very statement has become the

<sup>19</sup> CTR, new Atlantic Community – Declaration of the Atlantic Basin Initiative The Atlantic Basin Initiative is spearheaded by CTR Distinguished Fellow and former President of the Government of Spain Jose Maria Aznar and CTR Executive Director Dan Hamilton, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/events/2012/Atlantic%20Basin%20Initiative/EPG%20Call%20to%20Action.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>20</sup> Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, Bureau of Diplomatic Planning, Brazilian Foreign Policy Handbook, Brasilia 2008, Speech by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at his Inaugural Ceremony, National Congress – Brasilia, January 1, 2003, pg. 44

conceptual core of Brazilian policy towards South America, which has been further specified in the 2008 National Defence Strategy: “*This integration (of South America) not only will contribute to the defence of Brazil, but it will also allow the country to promote regional military cooperation and the integration of the defence industrial bases. It will dissipate the spectrum of possible conflict situations in the region.*”<sup>21</sup>

During the past decade, Brazil has worked steadily to limit potential and actual challengers to rise within South America. It has invested significantly to establish itself as the major power in South America. Argentina’s decline and Mexico’s focus on North America have made this path easier.<sup>22</sup> Brazil’s principal vehicle has been regional integration and multilateral diplomacy. To this end it has used a cooperative approach and has built new regional institutions. Yet, Brazil’s historical reluctance to pool sovereignty with other states through international regimes is reflected in the characteristics of the South American multilateral institutions it created. All have limited budgets, personnel, and inconsistent leadership.

The experiences of the European Union with its neighbourhood policy and NATO with its partnership programmes could provide in a closer partnership a wealth of lessons learned and proven instruments to reinforce the effectiveness of Brazilian multilateralism. In particular, crisis management, humanitarian aid and disaster relief could be especially well suited areas to begin with.

In the summer of 2013 Julio Bueno, Secretary of Economic Development, Energy, Industry and Services for the State of Rio de Janeiro pointed out to your author the tremendous Brazilian interest towards building sustainable skills in crisis management. As he stated, “*Rio is not prepared for crisis management good enough*”. This has also been an issue when visiting the Centro de Comando e Integrado Controle (CICC), the operations centre of the city of Rio de Janeiro that serves not only for local and regional contingencies, but if needed also for national contingencies. In crisis management and emergency management of the state, this is the place where integrated operations of police, traffic police, fire service, civil protection, traffic control, regulatory services, etc. are run. A centre of such enormous potential could well develop a function as a crisis management hub for regional contingencies in South America. The European Union could become a sponsor in developing adequate capabilities and skills. At the same time, this would be a perfect preparation for common crisis management engagement in Africa.

### **Africa – Brazil should increase its international cooperation and also increase building institutions for policy dialogue involving governmental representatives, research institutions, business directors, and NGOs**

An increasing co-operation among the countries of the South and regional integration

<sup>21</sup> NSD, pg. 17

<sup>22</sup> Harold Trinkunas, “Brazil’s rise seeking influence on Global Governance”, Brookings, Washington 2014, pg. 1, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/04/24%20brazils%20rise%20trinkunas/trinkunas%20brazils%20rise.pdf> (access: 23 July 2014)

has become an important element towards the emergence of Brazil as a global power. Today, as the lack of legitimacy of global governance mechanisms is obvious, Brazil has been contributing to reform decision-making mechanisms via its commitment to multilateralism striving to alter existing hegemonic structures.

Building institutions is a sine qua non condition for transparency, accountability and sustainability. Consequently Brazil should involve its own research centres and NGOs, but also partners from African and Latin American countries. Again, cooperation with the European Union could improve the effectiveness of any initiatives undertaken. With respect to the role of Brazilian industry such as Odebrecht in Angola and Vale in Mozambique, it would also be important to encourage Brazilian businesses to develop a code of ethics in their partnerships with African countries. Additionally, it would be beneficial to promote national and international research as a means for developing a knowledge base, and defining common criteria with regard to development effectiveness. In this case South Africa could be a preferred partner.

### **Industry – Brazil should shift its focus from protecting local industries to strengthening their competitiveness in global markets**

Brazil has become a particularly attractive place for investment. In 2012 it ranked third in foreign direct investments behind China and the United States.<sup>23</sup> With regards to its exports, Brazil aims globally at all addressable markets and has supported this approach with a number of strategic partnerships. However, Brazil has been experiencing recently the cooling of important markets such as China reinforced by still largely poor competitiveness of Brazilian industry.

Brazilian governments of the past decade have – with a strong social and development-oriented focus – decided to protect local companies and stimulate economic growth mainly by exports of agricultural products and raw materials. Having successfully lifted millions out of extreme poverty, Brazil now has to find ways for accelerating growth in order to deliver on the promise of what a middle-class life really means.<sup>24</sup> Deepening ties with the global economy could provide a promising venue to that end. This would require strengthening the competitiveness of local industries in global markets.

Also with respect to its geopolitical ambitions, Brazil has aimed to achieve a high degree of independence in their own defence technologies. However, the national defence industry and military modernisation is today deeply imbedded in complex global value chains.<sup>25</sup> Brazil's creation of a modern military depends upon participation in the global value chain. But, increasing participation necessarily means leveraging the country's strict course towards autonomy.

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<sup>23</sup> IP, "Brasilien von A-Z", IP July/August 2013. pg. 11

<sup>24</sup> Heinz-Peter Elstrodt James Manyika Jaana Remes Patricia Ellen, César Martins, „Connecting Brazil to the world: A path to inclusive growth“, McKinsey Global Institute, Shasnghai, May 2014 pg. 71

<sup>25</sup> Patrice Franco "The Defense Aquisition Trilemma: The case of Brazil", INSS Strategic Forum, January 2014, pg. 13. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail?lng=en&id=177142> (access: 23 July 2013)

This is quite a challenge and may require advice and cooperation with strategic partners such as Germany. In the recent past this has been hampered by a very demanding Brazilian offset policy and particularly by the difficulties for foreign partners to enter the Brazilian market. Up to now Brazil has shown *Italian* symptoms. One first builds difficulties to overcome these afterwards. Bureaucracy is stifling. Laws are full of requirements. Detailed labour laws and regulations don't allow for flexibility. Creation of enterprises takes twice as long as in other countries, is twice as expensive and ultimately results in a number of harmful consequences, such as unreliable supply chains, bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

An excellent example how to promote Brazilian industry to become a successful global competitor is Embraer, one of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the world. Only a few Brazilian companies have been that successful in international markets. Embraer is fully embedded in the global value chain. The company offers also a wide range of military capabilities, including a light fighter-bomber, skills for airborne counter-insurgency and Airborne Early Warning. With the UK, France and Greece, three NATO countries have Brazilian aircraft for their own training purposes, airlift and airborne early warning in the inventory. A particular seller in the foreseeable future is the KC 390 as the new tactical airlifter and tanker aircraft.

Embraer was created in 1969 as a state-owned company. In 1994 Embraer was privatized. Since then, it has gone head-to-head with global competitors for international contracts – and has thrived as a result. Today the company has offices, subsidiaries, and joint ventures around the world. The Brazilian government ensured the early growth of Embraer by providing production contracts and imposing import tariffs. It also took concerted steps to develop specialized talent and to create R&D infrastructure for continuous innovation. The imperative to become more connected is not solely a question of trade and finance.

Brazil also needs to tap into advanced skills, knowledge, technology, talent, and best practices from around the world. A greater focus on education and vocational training will be crucial to Brazil's competitiveness and its ability to build more sophisticated industries. Brazil needs a skilled and productive workforce that can continuously deliver products that keep pace with a fast-changing marketplace and incorporate the latest generations of technology. The private sector can play a role in expanding training programs as the German KMW has proven with its Brazilian engagement; it can also partner with local education providers to design curricula targeted to the workforce skills that are in demand. A greater emphasis on developing human capital would have the double benefit of making Brazil's industries more competitive while also creating better career pathways and widening economic opportunity for all Brazilians. Here especially, partnerships with European countries can be very beneficial to Brazil, as there has developed a culture of supporting European industrial engagement abroad with educational and training programmes of very capable governmental and private institutions.

### **Cyber – Brazil should understand the cyber domain as an urgent action item**

Among the global commons, cyber holds a *force multiplying* position. This makes the issue of cyber strategically important to the prosperity and security of Brazil. The “Cyber“



domain has become one of the key “power sources” of global prosperity and security. The well-being of modern, sustainable states and societies is inextricably linked with the secure and uninterrupted access to the virtual world. However, in politics, administration and the economy of many countries, the dimension of “cyber” is still dramatically underestimated. In terms of comprehensive security standards it is clear that a State security provision in the context of “cyber” starting with the protection of the personal rights of individuals up to the sustainable prevention of threats to critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is required. In addition to areas in the economy such as the financial sector, and in key industries and energy supply, it includes for example, police, military and society. A failure in providing viable protection could threaten the very existence of governments and societies.

When I wanted to discuss cyber security issues during my last visit to Brazil in July 2013, I didn’t find much interest. A few weeks later this had changed completely. President Dilma Rousseff was not at all amused, when she learned<sup>26</sup> that her personal communications were intercepted by America’s National Security Agency (NSA). She cancelled a long planned state visit to Washington. The visit would have been the first by a Brazilian president in two decades. In the meantime Dilma Rousseff has gained much recognition from international experts for her leading role – in close cooperation with Germany and other countries – in establishing global cyber governance, which is able to guarantee neutrality and privacy.

Her interest in internet governance is more than justified, as Brazil is rapidly becoming a digital nation.<sup>27</sup> Its online population has quadrupled over the past decade, and today almost 50 % of Brazilians have regular Internet access. Roughly a third of the population has been using Facebook. But Brazil is not highly connected to those international data flows, which underpin the cross-border exchange of goods, services, capital, and people. Its international data traffic per inhabitant is only 5 % of what flows through Germany. Yet the intensity of domestic use shows that Brazil has the potential to play a bigger role in the digital economy. This is highlighted by the new role of Brazil as a big player in the Information and Communications Technology sector (ICT) with a market volume of more than U.S. \$ 230 billion. In the Southern Hemisphere Brazil has become number one. It takes 4th place in the global ranking of ICT markets.

In today’s digital world, there is a need for orientation supported by clear rules and instruments. Germany sees international cyber policy as a cross-cutting task and aims to:

- › ensure responsible use of the Internet’s freedom-generating potential,
- › curb cyber threats,
- › expand the economic opportunities the Internet offers, and
- › enlarge the scope for diplomacy and international communication.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, „Spy target Dilma Rousseff takes a lead in global internet reform“, in: Geopolitical Information Service, <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1404967186400449700> (access: 23 July 2014)

<sup>27</sup> James Manyika, Jacques Bughin, Susan Lund, Olivia Nottebohm, David Poulter, Sebastian Jauch, Sree Ramaswamy, „Global flows in a digital age: How trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy“, McKinsey Global Institute Shanghai, April 2014, pg. 1-9

<sup>28</sup> [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/Cyber-Aussenpolitik/KS\\_Cyber-Aussenpolitik.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/Cyber-Aussenpolitik/KS_Cyber-Aussenpolitik.html)

The cyber domain has become a rapidly growing network that needs regulations and standards, as well as institutions that can agree on and implement accepted rules. At this point in time, international rules seem a distant prospect, but the process has to start. Consequently Germany and Brazil have tabled a resolution on the protection of privacy in the UN General Assembly. In November 2013 Brazil and Germany formally presented a resolution to the U.N. General Assembly calling for all countries to extend internationally guaranteed rights to privacy in the Internet and other electronic communications. The resolution also calls for independent oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of states in regard to their surveillance operations.

There is plenty of activity in the cyber domain – private and business, criminal and governmental activity. Besides the known offensive players involved, such as the U.S., Russia, China and Israel, almost all countries of the world have become aware of the possibilities that offensive use of cyber operations offers. In between it has become common knowledge that even with low risks and costs, it is possible to achieve significant strategic gains, to include


- › access to critical infrastructure
- › strategic industrial espionage, economic sabotage and manipulation of financial markets
- › agitation by manipulation of data
- › erosion of competitors by combined espionage and sabotage
- › extension / redevelopment of military and electronic warfare

From the military point of view, the linking of military and civilian networks is a particular risk, given the effects of instabilities and failures of common cyber infrastructure on the readiness of the armed forces. On the other hand, military forces must not only meet cyber threats, but also take advantage of related emerging opportunities. In the armed forces, “cyber” needs to be trained for and designed in both offensive and defensive operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Also the police, the judiciary, and the business sector need to be set up accordingly in the course of their respective tasks, e.g. in the field of cyber forensics. Of note, banks are already far advanced in this regard. Against this background, cooperative ventures are getting increasingly important in the cyber domain.

Obviously, Brazil should have a considerable interest in promoting awareness, skills and governance commensurate with the opportunities and challenges the cyber domain presents. New partnerships have evolved and may impact also on other global governance structures, including the partnerships with Germany and the European Union. Cyber issues have already become part of the bilateral Brazil-EU-agenda.<sup>29</sup> A new policy dialogue has been established in 2014 inspired by Brazil’s impressive performance with regard to internet governance. The NetMundial conference dedicated to internet governance in April 2014 in Sao Paulo has generated remarkable international attention. As the EU and Brazil are trying to shape the cyber debate, this strategic partnership could gain prominence in the coming years. This is a good time for Brazil to shape the future.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Renard, „The rise of cyber-diplomacy: the EU, its strategic partners”, ESP Working Paper 7, June 2014, Madrid 2014, pg. 23, <http://www.frider.org/publication/1202/the-rise-of-cyber-diplomacy-the-eu-its-strategic-partners-and-cyber-security> (access: 23 July 2014)





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## NATO and the South Atlantic: Perspectives from the Global North

Brooke A. Smith-Windsor

In September 2010, just prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Lisbon Summit of Heads of State and Government, then Portuguese Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva publically argued for the South Atlantic to be included in the "lines of fundamental action" of the Alliance.<sup>1</sup> The idea was for NATO to take on a more holistic view of the Atlantic Ocean and leverage cultural and historic links with Africa and South America to address shared trans-border security risks including drugs and human trafficking for example.<sup>2</sup> Brasilia for one was not impressed. Then Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim quickly refuted the idea arguing that the South Atlantic has security questions distinct from those in the North Atlantic, which in any case should be dealt with by the Southern Hemisphere. He went on to argue that a literal interpretation of NATO's role as an "Atlantic Organization" could open the doors for intervention in other parts of the world under different pretexts and that "NATO can't substitute the United Nations."<sup>3</sup> Whatever the reasons for the Brazilian rebuke,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "NATO neglecting South Atlantic in new strategic concept – MoD", The Portugal NewsOnline, 18 September 2010, available at: <http://www.theportugalnews.com/news/view/1079-16> (accessed 15 July 2014).

<sup>2</sup> Pedro Seabra, "South Atlantic crossfire: Portugal in-between Brazil and NATO", IPRIS Viewpoints, November 2010, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> "Brazil rejects any idea of NATO interfering in the South Atlantic", MercoPress, 22 October 2010, available at: <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/10/22/brazil-rejects-any-idea-of-nato-interfering-in-the-south-atlantic> (accessed 15 July 2014.)

<sup>4</sup> Brazilian officials at the time viewed NATO as a means for the United States (US) to pursue alleged designs on Brazil's offshore energy reserves (a.k.a. Blue Amazon). This was purportedly underscored by the US failure to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which provides the legal foundation for Brazilian offshore claims (Seabra, p. 3). Irrespective of the fact that 26 of NATO's

with NATO at the time busy in other places from Afghanistan to countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in the end no mention of the South Atlantic appeared in the Atlantic Alliance's 2010 Strategic Concept agreed at the Lisbon Summit. However, that was four years ago. If, as British Prime Minister Harold Wilson famously remarked, "A week is a long time in politics", then almost half a decade of a variety of international developments can usher even greater changes that may alter policy options and selection; hence the argument to reassess prospects for NATO engagement in the South Atlantic. This paper endeavours to do just that. It considers the evolution of threats emanating from the region as well as other international developments that could warrant a rethink about possible NATO approaches there. It concludes with some thoughts on what they might look like. Before proceeding, however, it is important to clarify what NATO is, and what it is not.

### What NATO is and is not

NATO is a political-military alliance of 28 independent liberal democratic states. Its highest decision-making body located in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), is comprised of diplomats, not Generals. Decisions there are taken by consensus meaning no one state (including powerful ones like the United States) or group of states can force their will on the others. Moreover, it means a member state acting alone does not constitute a NATO action or NATO position. The latter two emerge only with the collective will and sanction of 28 sovereign governments.

In terms of membership, the Alliance is also primarily European in character. 22 of the 28 member countries of the European Union (EU) are members of NATO. For them, as the EU Lisbon Treaty affirms (Article 49.c.7), the Alliance and not the Union is the "foundation for their collective defense and the forum for its implementation."<sup>5</sup> And the primarily European composition of the Alliance will remain. It cannot be otherwise because, as its founding treaty sets forth, NATO membership is only open to European states (Article 10).<sup>6</sup> As with all previous NATO enlargements, the four countries which currently wait to join – Macedonia (a.k.a. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia – do so of their own volition. Brussels is not and never has been the demandeur bent on endless enlargement. And at no time in NATO's history has there been a "land grab" by invasion, proxy forces or otherwise. The Alliance has grown in size since the end of the Cold War because countries committed to safeguarding its liberal democratic values and the stability and security it provides in the European arena have asked to join. Moreover, of the 6 current EU countries that are not Alliance members, all but Cyprus are official NATO partners under the Partnership for Peace program, with many providing significant civil and military contributions to NATO-led crisis management missions. Sweden, for instance, was a key contributor to the Alliance's implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya in 2011.<sup>7</sup>

28 member states had at the time already ratified UNCLOS, the perception was somewhat perplexing given that the question of claims to the Blue Amazon was and remains completely beyond the remit of the NATO Alliance.

<sup>5</sup> European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon", Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/34, 17 December 2007.

<sup>6</sup> NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty", 4 April 1949, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed 16 July 2014).

<sup>7</sup> As part of NATO's Operation Unified Protector, Sweden deployed eight JAS Gripen aircraft to Sigonella Air Base in Sicily, Italy

As regards international crisis management, beginning in the 1990s with the UN Secretary General's seminal document *Agenda for Peace*, NATO's role has at the behest of the universal organization grown in significance.<sup>8</sup> This has occurred alongside retention of its traditional collective defense function, the latter in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. As Koffi Annan, then Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations stated as early as 1993:

*The sheer size and complexity of peacekeeping operations makes it imperative to explore new avenues of cooperation with regional organizations such as NATO. With its existing military structure, resources and political weight, NATO has a lot to contribute to the concept of peacekeeping, particularly in its more muscular form [...] In this context, NATO's willingness to participate in United Nations operations holds promise of a vast qualitative as well as quantitative expansion of the means of collective action that are at the disposal of the United Nations.*<sup>9</sup>

In acknowledging their cooperation on peace support operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan, the two organizations signed a Joint Declaration in 2008:

*welcoming over a decade of cooperation between the United Nations and NATO in support of the work of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, and desiring, in the spirit of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, to provide a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation between their respective Secretariats ... Further cooperation will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges to which the international community is called upon to respond...*<sup>10</sup>

So when it comes to its role in international crisis management – from providing escorts for World Food Program (WFP) vessels and countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden to offering strategic sea and air lift to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions at the request of Addis Ababa<sup>11</sup> – here too NATO cannot remotely be described as the incessant demandeur trying to usurp the UN system of collective security. It has been asked to get involved by the international community in a variety of places in a variety of ways around the world because of its political willingness and multinational capability to effectively contribute.

Similar may be said of its third core task – “cooperative security” or partnerships – as outlined in its 2010 Strategic Concept.<sup>12</sup> Whether in terms of its relationships with states in

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to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya, supported by an air-to-air refueling capable C-130.

<sup>8</sup> Brooke Smith-Windsor, “Misery Makes for Strange Bedfellows: The Future of the UN-NATO Strategic Partnership”, in *The UN and NATO: Forward from the Joint Declaration*, NDC Forum Paper 17, May 2011, pp. 23-25.

<sup>9</sup> Kofi Annan, “UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO”, *NATO Review*, 47.5 available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-1.htm>

<sup>10</sup> Ban Ki-moon and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation*, 23 September 2008.

<sup>11</sup> On the request of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started to provide escorts to WFP vessels transiting through piracy infested waters off the Horn of Africa. NATO continues to contribute to the international community's UN-mandated counter-piracy operations to safeguard international shipping there. On the request of the AU, NATO provided strategic lift in support of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

<sup>12</sup> NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defense*, November 2010, available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/>

North Africa (Mediterranean Dialogue), the Gulf region (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) or the likes of Argentina formerly and Colombia more recently in South America,<sup>13</sup> or Mongolia, Australia, Japan or South Korea in Asia – to name just a few examples – NATO does not impose itself on partner countries. As its Strategic Concept states, “These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.” Or, as the former Director of Regional Security and Cooperation at NATO Headquarters, explains:

*The [Alliance’s] partner community has developed on a voluntary basis according to partners’ willingness, under positive sum logic ...; no patronizing and no primus inter pares aspirations exist amongst its members. The relations between NATO and partners vary in degree of complexity according to the level of ambition of the relation each of them wants to establish with NATO; partners set the terms of the association. There are four basic forms of cooperation that might be combined: political dialogue and co-operation; defense sector reform and modernization of armed forces; preparation of partners’ contingents to contribute to NATO led operations, which in practical terms means interoperability; and preparation of interested and eligible partners for NATO membership on their own free democratic will.*<sup>14</sup>

So with this backdrop, the launch of any discussion about NATO and the South Atlantic should from the outset be clear about the following four points:

- › Any NATO engagement would be in response to the international community’s request whether through the UN or relevant regional actors;
- › 28 nations with equal voice would decide at the political (not military) level how NATO would or would not respond;
- › Any response would reflect predominately European interests and policy orientations;
- › Flexible and varied engagement is conceivable but NATO enlargement with states in the region is definitely not in the cards.

## Southern Threats, Northern Worries

With the nature of the NATO Alliance firmly established, consideration of factors possibly leading to its engagement in the South Atlantic region may begin with a consideration of threats emanating from there; particularly threats of concern to its predominately European membership. Has anything changed in this regard since 2010 when Lisbon last raised the issue of NATO in the region to Brasilia’s displeasure? Well, it is fair to conclude that, yes, it has on several fronts. Narco-trafficking is one.

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2013:

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official\_texts\_17120.htm (accessed 17 July 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Argentina in the past provided troops in support of the UN-mandated NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later the UN-mandated NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) stabilisation mission in Kosovo. In 2013, Colombia and NATO signed an Agreement on the Security of Information which sets the basis for NATO and Colombia to explore future cooperation and consultation in areas of common interest such as anti-terrorism and counter-narcotics trafficking.

<sup>14</sup> Carlos Branco, “Promoting International Peace and Security through NATO’s Partnerships: Identifying Cooperation’s Opportunities beyond Existing Frameworks”, in *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*, NATO Defense College (NDC) Forum Paper 23, forthcoming.



*Cocaine seizures in Colombia indicate that the Atlantic route [for cocaine] may be gaining prominence as compared with the Pacific route in maritime trafficking; linguistic ties appear to play a role in cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe via Brazil, Portugal and lusophone countries in Africa.<sup>15</sup> [Figure 1]*

Europe remains the world's second largest market for the drug after the United States. Notwithstanding the social ills inflicted upon European societies by cocaine increasingly trafficked across the South Atlantic through Africa, the risk of a concomitant narco-terrorist nexus threatening European societies and interests is a concern. As a New York Times article entitled "Narco-States: Africa's Next Menace" recently explained:

*Ominously, Africa's growing drug trade is also amplifying a range of international security threats. Hezbollah and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have become involved in narco-trafficking. They earn millions from Africa's cocaine trade. Much of this money may go to purchasing the sophisticated weaponry that has flooded Africa's black markets following the fall of the Qaddafi regime, including Semtex explosives popular with terrorist groups that were recently seized by Nigerian security units following a battle with Al-Qaeda militants<sup>16</sup>. [Figure 2]*

It should perhaps come as no surprise, therefore, why NATO recently signed the previously mentioned information exchange agreement with Colombia.

Similar to the increase in trafficking across the South Atlantic, piracy, hijackings, armed robbery at sea and illegal oil bunkering has been a growing concern there in recent years as well, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea region. [Figure 3] The increase in piracy and other challenges stems from the inability of the affected states to exercise sovereignty and control over their territory including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The corruption of officials by sophisticated illicit syndicates is a key element in this lack of adequate governance and control. In contrast to the Gulf of Aden, maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is also almost exclusively motivated by oil theft.<sup>17</sup> In a region which already counts for 13 percent of EU oil imports (Portugal receives 20 percent of its oil from Nigeria alone), European interests are at risk. The January 2014 hijacking of the 75,000-ton Greek tanker MT Kerala off the coast of Angola is indicative. Within one week of disappearing its 12,270-ton diesel cargo had been offloaded to other ships off the coast of Nigeria—itsself the focal point of West African piracy.<sup>18</sup> Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Benin, among others, have also been adversely affected.

In addition to identifying the concerns already discussed here, the 2014 EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, adds at least two more to the list: human trafficking and illegal

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, "World Drug Report 2013", Vienna 2013, available at: [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World\\_Drug\\_Report\\_2013.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/secured/wdr/wdr2013/World_Drug_Report_2013.pdf) (accessed 17 July 2014), p. ix.

<sup>16</sup> David O'Regan, "Narco-States: Africa's Next Menace", New York Times, 12 March 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Brooke A. Smith-Windsor and José Francisco Pavia, "From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea: A New Maritime Mission for NATO?", NDC Research Paper No. 100, January 2014, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> James Bridger, "Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Oil Soaked Pirates", USNI News, 10 March 2014, available at: <http://news.usni.org/2014/03/10/piracy-gulf-guinea-oil-soaked-pirates> (accessed 17 July 2014).

migration bound for Europe.<sup>19</sup> [Figure 4] While the reasons for their emergence are many, criminal activity and corrupt or weak governance structures are included among them. Illegal fishing is a case in point. As the EU strategy observes:

*Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU) in the Gulf of Guinea is costing coastal states around USD 350 million a year .... The IUU fishing threat to sustainable fish stock levels not only threatens local trade, markets and jobs but also has wider ramifications for Europe beyond through increasing migration pressures as the development and prosperity of coastal communities decline.*<sup>20</sup>

The fact that the Union has established a Gulf of Guinea strategy to help address the threats outlined above, underscores the observations made in this paper that European security interests would appear increasingly at stake in the South Atlantic region spanning South America and Africa. If that is the case, given the significant confluence of NATO and EU memberships, consideration of some kind of complementary engagement by the Alliance would appear plausible provided non-EU Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States were to agree to it as well. Nevertheless, prior to reflecting on what a NATO contribution to security in the region might look like, it is necessary to next consider whether the international legitimacy for Alliance action would be in place to support it. Since 2010, have there been significant developments in this respect as well? Here too, the answer to the question posed would appear to be a definitive yes.

## International response

As illustrated above, the threats emanating from the South Atlantic region in recent years transcend continents, North and South, and have global implications. Out of necessity and mutual interest, therefore, multiple actors from both the Global North and Global South have become increasingly engaged. The UN has appropriately led the call to action.

Regarding drug trafficking, in December 2013 the Permanent Representative of France to the UN informed the Secretary-General that it would take advantage of its Presidency of the Security Council to initiate deliberations as regards combating drug trafficking and its consequences for peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.<sup>21</sup> The result was the following pronouncement issued on 18 December of that year:

*The Security Council expresses also deep concern over the increasing links, in some cases, between drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime, including arms and human trafficking, in the region, and terrorism, as well as at the growing violence resulting from activities of criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking in the region ... The Security Council stresses the importance of strengthening transregional and international cooperation on a basis of a common and shared responsibility*

<sup>19</sup> Council of the European Union, "EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea", Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 17 March 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>21</sup> UN, "Letter dated 5 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", available at: [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2013\\_728.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_728.pdf) (accessed 17 July 2014).

*to counter the world drug problem and related criminal activities, and underlines that it must be addressed in a comprehensive, balanced and multidisciplinary manner.*<sup>22</sup>

A similar call for international action concerning the rising levels of piracy and other criminal activity in South Atlantic waters was unanimously agreed by the Security Council through Resolution 2018 on the Gulf of Guinea:

*Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to international navigation, security and the economic development of States in the region ... Encourages the international community to assist, upon request, the States concerned in the region, ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], ECCAS [Economic Community of Central African States], GGC [Gulf of Guinea Commission] and other relevant organizations and agencies in strengthening their efforts to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, in the Gulf of Guinea.*<sup>23</sup>

Some months later, the Council reiterated this call to action by unanimously issuing Resolution 2039:

*Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a comprehensive strategy to support national and regional efforts to assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea ... Encourages international partners to provide support to regional States and organizations for the enhancement of their capabilities to counter piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, including their capacity to conduct regional patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint information-sharing centres, and for the effective implementation of the regional strategy ...*<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa agreed in June 2013 by ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GCC, states: “The support of all strategic partners at the international, bilateral and multilateral levels, is envisaged in the implementation of this Memorandum.”<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government formally adopted the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy), during its 22nd Ordinary Session which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 30-31 January 2014. The Strategy, first agreed in principle by African ministers in late 2012, calls for “enhanced collaborative, concerted, cooperative, coordinated, coherent and trust-building multilayered approach among the AU, RECs/RMs [Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution], relevant African organizations,

<sup>22</sup> UN, “Statement by the President of the Security Council”, 18 December 2013, available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2013/22](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2013/22) (accessed 17 July 2014).

<sup>23</sup> UN, “Security Council Resolution 2018(2011)”, available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10430.doc.htm> (accessed 17 July 2014).

<sup>24</sup> UN, “Security Council Resolution 2039(2012)”, available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039\(2012\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2039(2012)) (accessed 18 July 2014).

<sup>25</sup> ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC, “Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa”, 25 June 2013, available at: <http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/MEMORANDUM%20%20VERSION%20ANGLAISE.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2014).

Member States, the private sector as well as international development partners, in order to promote the AU's objectives" which aim to tackle many of the threats in South and West Africa outlined earlier including trafficking and illegal fishing.<sup>26</sup> The Assembly's decision sheet affirmed this approach by stressing: "the need to build strategic partnerships that support initiatives inherent in the implementation of the 2050 AIM Strategy."<sup>27</sup>

A number of states and international organizations have already responded to these requests and calls to action. The EU catalogues many of them in its own 2014 Gulf of Guinea strategy so it is not the purpose to repeat all of them here. A few examples, however, will be mentioned by way of illustration. First, national programmes for policy formulation, coordination and institutional capacity building with states of the Gulf of Guinea region have been established on a bilateral basis by Brazil, China, India, South Africa and the United States. The latter's includes the so-called Africa Partnership Station (APS) launched in 2007 and overseen by US Africa Command's (AFRICOM) subordinate command US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF). APS is NAVAF's flagship maritime security cooperation program with Africa, focused on building maritime safety and security by improving maritime awareness, response capabilities and infrastructure. As its overarching vision states:

*APS and partner nations in Africa, the United States and Europe want to answer African leaders' requests to build a prosperous Africa. We all want to achieve safe borders, stability and prosperity. This project is about enabling African nations' militaries to stand on their own. Our goal is to empower African nations to stop maritime crime and the movement of illegal goods at sea on their own.*<sup>28</sup>

Several European states have contributed assets and personnel to APS on an individual basis over the years, including in the Gulf of Guinea. Second, under the British Presidency of the Group of 8 (G8) in 2013, the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea was formally constituted to improve "coordination between international partners on capacity building initiatives to tackle maritime crime. This includes avoiding duplication of effort, facilitating joint projects and bringing international partners together to collectively discuss political developments ..."<sup>29</sup> In addition to the G8 members, participants include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland, European Union, Interpol, UN Office for West Africa and the International Maritime Bureau (IMO). With respect to international cooperation with South American countries to stem the flow of drugs there, Russia for one has stated its intention to contribute to a new South American anti-drugs program. It proposed the launch of counter-narcotics training courses for agents in Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador in addition to similar ones established with Peru.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> African Union, "2050 AIM Strategy", available at: <http://pages.au.int/maritime/documents/2050-aim-strategy-0> (accessed 18 July 2014).

<sup>27</sup> African Union Assembly, "DECISION ON THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2050 AFRICA'S INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGY (2050 AIM STRATEGY) Doc. Assembly/AU/16(XXII) Add. 1", Assembly/AU/Dec.496(XXII).

<sup>28</sup> Smith-Windsor and Pavia, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Charles Ukeje and Wullson Mvomo Ela, "African approaches to Maritime Security – The Gulf of Guinea", Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, December 2013, pp. 27-28.

<sup>30</sup> Vitakiy Ankov, "Russia looks to Expand Anti-Drug Efforts in South America, RIA Novosti, available at: <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130326/180262004/Russia-Looks-to-Expand-Anti-Drug-Efforts-in-South-America.html> (accessed 18 July 2014).

## Possibilities: What could NATO do?

With all these international activities underway, it is therefore not unreasonable to pose the question as to what NATO – a political-military alliance engaged in crisis management and cooperative security alongside collective defense – could contribute to addressing threats to its members that have a South Atlantic connection? Indeed, in addition to the overarching legitimacy for action outlined in the previous section, specific approaches to the Alliance have already been made. The aforementioned information agreement between the Alliance and Colombia was requested by the latter. As the country's Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno has explained: "What we seek is to learn from NATO and to share our experience in the fight against drug trafficking, terrorist groups and other crimes committed by transnational crime organizations."<sup>31</sup> The remarks preceded a meeting in March 2014 between NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow and Colombia's Vice Minister of Defence, Jorge Enrique Bedoya, to discuss cooperation.<sup>32</sup> While short of a formal partnership, for NATO the agreement falls within the purview of its approach to cooperative security. Elsewhere, representatives of the AU Commission charged with the implementation of the pan-continental AIM Strategy 2050 have recently approached NATO bodies for assistance. This comes at a time when a new military-technical cooperation agreement has been signed between NATO and the AU on May 8, 2014.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the NATO Shipping Centre<sup>34</sup> has already worked with the International Chamber of Commerce and others to develop Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region.<sup>35</sup> Given such developments, the remainder of this paper considers how NATO might build on the precedent of the Colombia agreement and contribute to maritime security in the South Atlantic particularly as regards the Gulf of Guinea region. Once some conceivable options are presented, it concludes with consideration of how likely the 28 member states are to muster the necessary political will to consensually agree to them.

The UNODC World Drug Report 2014 reiterates its predecessor's observation cited earlier of the growing centrality of Brazil to drug trafficking making its way across the South Atlantic to European shores: *Brazil contains approximately one half of the population of South America; it is a country that is vulnerable to both cocaine trafficking, due to its geography (which makes it a convenient staging area for cocaine trafficked to Europe), as well as to cocaine consumption, due to its large urban population.*<sup>36</sup>

<sup>31</sup> "NATO Signs Cooperation Agreement with Colombia", AQOnline, 26 June 2013, available at: <http://www.americasquarterly.org/nato-signs-cooperation-agreement-with-colombia> (accessed 18 July 2014).

<sup>32</sup> NATO, "NATO and Colombia discuss future of cooperation", 19 March 2014, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_108117.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108117.htm) (accessed 18 July 2014).

<sup>33</sup> NATO, "NATO and the African Union boost their cooperation", 8 May 2014, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_109824.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109824.htm) (accessed 18 July 2014).

<sup>34</sup> The NATO Shipping Centre is the link between NATO and the merchant shipping community. Permanently manned by NATO, the NSC is the primary point of contact for the exchange of merchant shipping information between NATO's military authorities and the international shipping community. See: <http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/aboutus.aspx> (accessed 21 July 2014).

<sup>35</sup> International Chamber of Commerce et al., "Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region", 2012, available at: [http://www.bundespolizei.de/DE/02Schutz-und-Vorbeugung/Pirateriepraev/Zusaetzliche-Infos/anlage\\_imo-circ3394\\_file.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](http://www.bundespolizei.de/DE/02Schutz-und-Vorbeugung/Pirateriepraev/Zusaetzliche-Infos/anlage_imo-circ3394_file.pdf?__blob=publicationFile) (accessed 21 July 2014).

<sup>36</sup> "World Drug Report 2014", p. 37.

This arguably explains the already observed involvement of Brazil in initiatives involving the United States, European and African states to cooperatively address the issue. As one notable Portuguese analyst argues, an information sharing agreement between Brazil and the Alliance – in this case practically focussed on addressing the narco-criminal-terrorist threat described earlier – could potentially be a useful addition.<sup>37</sup> As with Colombia, this need not constitute a formal partnership but a useful vehicle for mutual exchange. Should there be lingering doubts in Brasilia about any suggestion of possible NATO engagement on South Atlantic security issues similar to those expressed almost half a decade ago now, they should be left aside. In what this paper makes starkly clear, trafficking and associated threats with an increasingly South Atlantic dimension are global in scope demanding a global response on multiple fronts among multiple actors. Brasilia may rightfully desire to continue to give pride of place to regional solutions to South Atlantic security issues, but that should not mean to the exclusion of the Global North—as its participation in G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea underscores. Pragmatic, positive sum logic based on reciprocity and mutual trust should prevail – especially among the liberal democratic countries involved.

Regarding West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, it is not difficult to envision a number of areas where NATO might support the international community's implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2018 or 2039 or respond to regional requests for assistance.<sup>38</sup> This is particularly so in the context of its Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) agreed in 2011.<sup>39</sup> Like NATO's Strategic Concept, it also emphasizes cooperative security as a core task for Allied maritime forces in promoting safety and security at sea:

*Alliance maritime activities ... offer valuable opportunities to prevent conflicts and develop regional security and stability through dialogue, confidence building, and increased transparency. ... These activities are complementary to what nations conduct themselves and have the added value of demonstrating the Alliance's intention to support partners and of drawing on a wider set of assets and capabilities.*

*The Alliance's maritime operations and activities can strengthen the Alliance's partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation with others through:*

1. *Engaging in diplomatic activities, including through port visits as part of the routine activities of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups.*
2. *Contributing, where appropriate, to partner capacity building by improving the capabilities of our partners to address security threats in the maritime environment and to operate there effectively.*
3. *Conducting joint training, seminars, and exercises with partners.*

<sup>37</sup> José Francisco Pavia, "NATO-Brazil: Cooperative Security Perspectives" in *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*, NATO Defense College (NDC) Forum Paper 23, forthcoming.

<sup>38</sup> Some elements of the remainder of this section are drawn directly from, Smith-Windsor and Pavia, and are reproduced here with the permission of NDC.

<sup>39</sup> NATO, "Alliance Maritime Strategy", 2011, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_75615.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm), (accessed 17 July 2014).

For instance, through NATO's Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) team in Addis Ababa, member states could offer, on a rotating basis, a maritime liaison officer(s) to assist the AU Commission staff working on the implementation of the aforementioned AIM Strategy 2050, including in the South Atlantic. Additionally, greater information exchange with West African partners to improve maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea could be considered. NATO standards and operational evaluation the unmatched enabler of multinational interoperability could also be shared with local maritime forces to build effective regional approaches to security. Consistent with the AMS, joint training, exercises and seminars, could be made available on a case-by-case basis to interested individual Gulf states or relevant regional organizations like ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC. Relevant lessons learned from the Alliance's years of cooperation in the multinational counter-piracy effort in East Africa could also be imparted. Alongside military assistance, the Alliance could also harness its civilian competencies to help secure the Gulf of Guinea region as part of a wider international effort. For example, the member states could consider enlarging the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme from North Africa to the Gulf of Guinea region on a case-by-case basis. The Alliance's long-established use of civil science to forge partners' capacities in areas ranging from counter-terrorism and border and port security, to energy and environmental security, for example, is of direct relevance to combating many of the threats and risks faced in contemporary West Africa as described earlier.<sup>40</sup> To coordinate any such efforts with other actors, NATO could of course likewise consider participation in the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, similar to the approach taken by the EU.

Beyond capacity building, if the level of threat in the Gulf of Guinea region were to escalate to a point where the international and regional communities requested direct intervention by outside forces, the Alliance, with its proven blue water capabilities could also conceivably contribute as underscored by the AMS:

*As part of broader efforts to address security threats arising in the maritime environment, NATO maritime forces can contribute to the maintenance of a secure and safe maritime environment given their unique capabilities and routine blue water activities ... In accordance with international law (including any applicable treaties and customary law), the contribution of Alliance maritime operations and activities to maritime security will entail: Conducting maritime security tasks within the framework of a specific, NAC approved operation either within or beyond the North Atlantic Treaty area. In the latter case, an authority could also be given to conduct additional maritime security tasks beyond surveillance and patrolling.*

A direct UN-sanctioned counter-piracy contribution by NATO, as part of a wider international effort, would of course not be without precedent as already referenced in this paper several times. Beginning in 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously welcomed such a role for NATO out of its immediate treaty area off the coast of East Africa:

*Welcomes initiatives by Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, the Russian*

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<sup>40</sup> See: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78209.htm> (accessed 21 July 2014).

*Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and by regional and international organizations to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia pursuant to resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter piracy off the Somalia coast, including by escorting vessels of the WFP ...*<sup>41</sup>

## Conclusion: What will NATO do?

If the preceding section laid out some possible actions on the part of NATO to contribute to South Atlantic – and by extension European and indeed global – security, this concluding part considers the likely nature of any Alliance engagement beyond those initiatives already launched. At the time of writing, NATO is preparing for its latest summit of Heads of State and Government in Wales where a number of external factors with direct bearing on the level of collective action in the region consensually agreed by the 28 member states will no doubt be discussed. These include:

- › Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea;
- › NATO’s redeployment from Afghanistan;
- › Ongoing budgetary constraints.

Recent events in the Ukraine have understandably refocused attention on the Alliance’s core mission of deterrence and collective defense in the European theatre. This means that reemphasis on the indivisibility of Alliance security, the reassurance of Eastern European member states in particular, and the reassertion of Alliance defensive capabilities will consume more resources compared to those available for direct engagements outside its immediate treaty area. The training and deployment of NATO maritime forces in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Seas, including with partners, will likely supersede any request for similar actions should it emerge from the South Atlantic to address security problems there. Moreover, with the redeployment from Afghanistan, the Alliance had always intended to increasingly move from a “deployed to prepared” posture. After years of operational fatigue, the idea is to reconstitute forces closer to home. For example, the Standing Naval Forces will undergo a major overhaul to become an Immediate Reaction Force available for crisis management, but even this will take time. Furthermore, in a period of ongoing economic austerity in many European countries where defense budgets are for the most part declining, there simply are fewer assets and resources around to meet international demands. NATO’s current counter-piracy mission off the coast of East Africa – Operation Ocean Shield – has just been extended until 2016. Its collective defense counter-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean – Operation Active Endeavour – is expected to be renewed very soon as well. So under prevailing circumstances, it would be fair not to expect NATO flotillas in the Gulf of Guinea or elsewhere in South Atlantic waters any time soon even if the situation there was to elicit a specific call for direct intervention by the international community.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> UN, “Security Council Resolution 1846”, 2 December 2008, available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1846\(2008\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1846(2008)), (accessed 21 July 2014).

<sup>42</sup> Some elements of this section are based on: James Bergeron, “Maritime Security at a Crossroads: Operationalizing the Allied Maritime Strategy”, PowerPoint presentation to the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center (NMIOTC) Annual



In the immediate term then, all the above points to a limited, complementary role for the Alliance in addressing the kinds of security questions with a South Atlantic dimension which are adversely affecting the interests of its primarily European members. Any initiatives are likely to be principally focused on information exchange and capacity building with other implicated international and regional actors. The Alliance would surely be open to the kind of practically-focussed information exchange arrangement with Brazil should the latter also see the value in it. NATO's Deputy Secretary General is on record as stating: "As an Alliance of democracies, we are gratified when countries sharing similar values reach out to us."<sup>43</sup> Again, with NATO's partnership policy in general, any agreement (and, as discussed earlier, it need not necessarily reach the level of formal partnership) would be guided by the tenets of reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

Where support to the implementation of the AIM Strategy 2050 and other related Memoranda in the Gulf of Guinea are concerned, the Alliance will likely focus any efforts on information exchange to improve maritime situational awareness and on identifying opportunities for sharing best practices through training, education and evaluation as well as potentially science—by making available experts to the AU Commission, relevant RECs or on a bilateral basis with affected nations for instance. Irrespective of its form, however, as with the NATO's support to the AU from the very beginning in 2005, Alliance capacity building in the African stretches of the South Atlantic will be guided by the principles of: only on request and with a minimal footprint. Coordination with other interested actors like the EU and Brazil will also be key. NATO already participates in the African Union Partners Group (AUPG) in Addis Ababa so representation in other multi-national coordination fora like the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea seems feasible.<sup>44</sup>

In conclusion, despite past attempts made by some – however well intentioned – to geographically circumscribe threats and responses thereto in the South Atlantic, this paper demonstrates that in late 2014 such an approach is unquestionably antediluvian. The threats there are global in nature, demanding a global response alongside regional ones. The international community has said so. With the security interests of Europeans directly affected, the preferred and extant framework for the expression and development of their collective defense, NATO, necessarily is concerned with what goes on there and must be prepared to act (even if in the near term in only a limited way) as part of a wider international effort.

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Conference, 24-26 June 2014, Souda Bay, Greece.

<sup>43</sup> "NATO and Colombia open channel for future cooperation", available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_101634.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101634.htm), (accessed 22 July 2014).


<sup>44</sup> For an overview of the evolution of NATO's relationship with the AU, see: Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, ed., AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, NATO Defense College (NDC) Forum Paper 22, 2013.

Figure 1 – International Drug Pipelines



Source: CIA, available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal\\_drug\\_trade#mediaviewer/File:Drugroutemap.gif](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_drug_trade#mediaviewer/File:Drugroutemap.gif) (accessed 22 July 2014).

Figure 2 – Trafficking of drugs and weapons as well as piracy activities in the Sahel and Western Africa




Source: État-major des armées (France), available at: <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-720/r12-72010.html> , (accessed 22 July 2014).

Figure 3 – Actual and attempted incidents of piracy/armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, 2012




Source: Chatham House, available at : [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0713pp\\_maritimesecurity\\_0.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0713pp_maritimesecurity_0.pdf) (accessed 22 July 2014).

Figure 4 – Common Migration Routes to Europe



Source: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, available at: <http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Global%20Initiative%20-%20Migration%20from%20Africa%20to%20Europe%20-%20May%202014.pdf>





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## The Strategy of Anonymity in Cyber Conflict: An Analytical Framework

Tim Ridout

In 1993, Barry Buzan published *The Logic of Anarchy* with Charles Jones and Richard Little.<sup>1</sup> In this seminal book, Buzan argued that “interaction capacity” is a key component of the international system. In essence, he posited that the ability of remote peoples to trade, fight, and share ideas affects the nature of global society. If people cannot interact with each other, they exist in different systems, much as Europe and the Americas did before the advent of navigation. Once Europeans arrived in the Americas, human systems that had been completely distinct, merged. In addition to greater exchange of goods and ideas within this new system containing a greater diversity of peoples, conflict and war were among the results.

Buzan was writing when the Internet was in its infancy. The international system’s interaction capacity was already high due to aviation, low trade barriers, existing communications technology, and the proliferation of international institutions since WWII. But world society has gotten much “denser” since 1993. In the last 21 years, the Internet has spread, computing and transmission speeds have increased, and new software has facilitated communication and trade among citizens all over the world. The Internet is now part of the lifeblood of our global system. However, as more people connect and more human activities move online, conflict has as well. Human nature has not changed, so altercations,

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<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993).

theft, criminal enterprises, terrorist activities, espionage, and warfare have all moved to the Internet. Our reliance on computers for the functions of modern life has created vulnerabilities that many seek to exploit. Moreover, our interaction capacity through the Internet has become so high that it is challenging the international patchwork of different territorial norms and legal systems, which often struggle to effectively manage this shared global platform.

The capacity for anonymity in the cyber world is a double-edged sword that simultaneously helps protect the innocent from government abuses and allows nefarious actors to operate with greater freedom. This paper offers a framework for thinking strategically about the role of anonymity, placing it in the context of offense-defense theory and focusing on deterrence. When thinking about how to prevent cyber conflict by shifting the opposing party's cost-benefit analysis, there are many different means of imposing costs to alter undesired behavior. Resolving complex problems in the cyber realm will require a great deal of iterative thought. By serving as a tool for policy makers to conceptualize the challenges posed by anonymity, this framework endeavors to be one piece in the puzzle.

## The Analytical Framework

This paper utilizes the definition of strategy offered by Thomas Schelling in *The Strategy of Conflict*, not the military usage which differentiates between strategy and tactics. Schelling's definition comes from game theory, "in which the best course of action for each player depends on what other players do. The term is intended to focus on the interdependence of the adversaries' decisions on their expectations about each other's behavior."<sup>2</sup> In this sense, the relative potential for anonymity in any given situation plays a role in the strategic calculations of both attackers and defenders about which "moves" to make in order to "win."

In military affairs, there is body of scholarship dealing with the relative advantage of offense vs. defense as technologies and tactics change. Throughout history, new weapons have created new possibilities for warfare that tend to favor either offense or defense, depending on how these weapons are used. Clever new ways to use existing technologies can also catch an attacker or defender by surprise, sometimes tipping the balance in a war that may have otherwise been won by the other side. Of course, war is a significant undertaking that leaves a large footprint. Deception and covert tactics have always been part of warfare, but it immediately becomes clear what is going on as soon as one side starts inflicting death and destruction.

In the physical world, when people take actions that cause harm – from robbing someone to planting a bomb to firing missiles – there is a trail of evidence; there is a good chance that others will observe the behavior and figure out who did it. This fact is central to legal systems and international security frameworks. Digital evidence also exists,

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1960, 1980), 3n1. The title of this paper is in deference to his classic book.



but it is more complex than physical evidence that is observable to the naked eye. It can take much longer to unravel, especially if an actor takes steps to evade detection.

For average people using off-the-shelf technology, any online activity can be traced to specific computers and individuals. However, for those utilizing sophisticated anonymization technologies, attributing actions to them can be quite difficult, which is typically referred to as “the attribution problem.” As David Clark and Susan Landau observe, “Attribution on the Internet can mean the owner of the machine (e.g., the Enron Corporation), the physical location of the machine (e.g., Houston, Estonia, China), or the individual who is actually responsible for the actions.”<sup>3</sup> This paper focuses on the individuals or groups responsible for actions, the human actors.

In the cyber world, it is harder to observe those engaging in conflict because conflict typically takes the form of malicious code unleashed remotely from a computer in a distant building. There is no need to even venture outdoors. It is possible to remotely impact an adversary who might not even realize that an attack is occurring, let alone who the attacker is. Even once the damage becomes known, it may take days, months, or years to figure out who perpetrated the attack. Sophisticated operators can cover their online tracks, making it appear that malicious code was sent by a computer on a different continent, while they casually come and go from their base of operations, perhaps appearing to be harmless software technicians to anyone observing them.

It is important to note the difference between cyber-attacks and cyber-exploitation. The former can be defined as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.”<sup>4</sup> Cyber-exploitation refers to data theft or espionage activities. This paper will use the terms attack and attackers to refer to both interchangeably.

As technology evolves, new ways to electronically attribute certain actions to specific computers are created. Moreover, improved forensic analysis of computers, coding styles, user names, and habits can allow for greater identification of individuals through detective work. However, new operational methods and electronic means to evade detection are also developed. This leads to a cat-and-mouse game where the landscape is ever-changing. The relative advantage of anonymity vs. attribution is continuously shifting along a continuum and is influenced by the steps specific actors take to mask their identities. This means that any actors weighing the costs of engaging in conflict at any given point will have to assess their respective location on this anonymity-attribution spectrum.

The term *anonymity-attribution spectrum* is used here instead of *the attribution problem* to highlight the fact that it is a sliding scale which shifts over time as technology and tactics change, much like in the case of the offense-defense balance.

<sup>3</sup> David Clark and Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” Proceedings of a Workshop on Detering Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (2010), 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> William Owens, Kenneth Dam, and Herbert Lin (eds), “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” National Research Council (2009), 1.

The relative advantage of anonymity vs. attribution is therefore a key subcomponent in assessing the offense-defense balance in the cyber realm. The costs of conducting an attack will vary greatly depending on whether or not – and how quickly – a defender can attribute the attack to a specific actor; since many of the costs of attacking are borne in the form of retaliation, sanction, or arrest, attackers that can avoid detection will only bear the costs of planning and executing a successful attack, not the secondary effects. Thus, the current state of the anonymity-attribution spectrum will enter strategic thinking. Unpacking the complex, multi-faceted nature of cyber conflict requires identifying the different types of people and groups involved, figuring out what their goals are, and analyzing their strategic moves. Examining why and to what degree different actors value anonymity is an important part of assessing overall strategies.

The following sections will describe in greater depth offense-defense theory, the basics of the cyber world, and the anonymity-attribution spectrum before assessing some strategic uses of anonymity.

## Offense-Defense Theory

Technologies are tools. Some tools are explicitly designed to be weapons, but others can have multiple uses. In warfare, matching creative uses of weapons and other technologies with effective doctrines and tactics can be potent means of defeating an enemy on the battlefield. As new weapons or means of defending are developed, it becomes relatively easier to either attack or defend.

Offense-defense theory argues that when offense is superior, war will be more likely. This is because there is an incentive to strike first and conquer territory or neutralize an enemy's forces before a potential adversary does the same to you, making the international system less stable. The contrary situation where defense prevails is theoretically more stable and peaceful because the incentive to strike first is reduced since the costs of attacking are proportionally greater than defending.<sup>5</sup> Of course, this is hard to prove one way or another, especially because *perceptions* among the military and political elite about whether offense or defense prevails at any given point could also have a significant effect on the incidence of war.<sup>6</sup> Even if they turn out to be wrong in hindsight, their confidence in the correctness of their assessments will affect their decision-making.

For example, war planners prior to WWI assumed that they could win quick victories through the strength of their offensive capabilities, which arguably made them more likely to go to war – Kaiser Wilhelm II's remark that German soldiers would be “home before the leaves fall from the trees” in 1914 is perhaps the most famous example of this

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-212, and George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1977). For a useful discussion of the theory, see also, Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201.

<sup>6</sup> Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), p. 221. For another skeptical view, see Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104.

thinking. All sides underestimated the defensive power of machine guns, barbed wire, and trench warfare, leading to numerous instances of suicidal offensive charges where soldiers were cut down like grass. Military commanders were essentially fighting wars past; they had not updated their mental frameworks to match current technology, meaning that although defense prevailed, they continued to act as if offense did.<sup>7</sup> The result was 4 years of slaughter during which the front lines of the conflict barely moved.

This situation was turned on its head in WWII with the advent of the blitzkrieg. French military planners were overconfident in the power of their defenses along the Maginot Line to repel or deter an attack, which may have made French leadership overconfident in the run up to war that Germany could be deterred or defeated. The French and others were caught unprepared for Hitler's use of concentrated mechanized infantry, armored vehicles, and air support to punch holes in defenses and quickly penetrate deep into enemy territory, which led to a string of early victories for Germany.

Both WWI and WWII provide examples of when new technologies, matched with new military tactics, tipped the offense-defense balance from what it was previously assumed to be. In the nuclear era, the Cold War standoff between the United States and Soviet Union was initially seen as highly unstable because there was a strong incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons to destroy the enemy's nuclear arsenal and win a decisive victory. It was believed that offense prevailed. Not until both sides obtained a guaranteed second-strike capability and the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) entered the scene that the situation stabilized. Once it became clear that both sides had redundant nuclear capabilities that would survive any first strike and be used to launch a retaliatory strike, the incentive to strike first diminished. Even though the balance did not tip to favor defense because neither side could actually *defend* against a nuclear attack, MAD involved the mutual exploitation of offensive superiority such that the outcome was to neutralize the offensive advantage.

Regardless of what the theory predicts about how the balance affects the incidence of war in any given situation, the offensive-defense balance is a useful prism through which to analyze war and conflict because an assessment of this balance inevitably enters the calculus of military and political leadership. Strategies are devised, contingency plans are prepared, and decisions are made with this dichotomy in mind. The same logic applies in cyber conflict, although the physics are different.

## The Cyber Realm

In the cyber world, it is widely assumed that offense currently has the advantage over defense, essentially meaning that it is relatively cheap and easy to successfully harm another party with little or no consequence to the attacker. To understand why, a basic technical understanding of computers and cyberspace is necessary.

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

As Joe Nye explains, “The cyber domain includes the Internet of networked computers but also intranets, cellular technologies, fiber-optic cables, and space-based communications. Cyberspace has a physical infrastructure layer that follows the economic laws of rival resources and the political laws of sovereign jurisdiction and control. This aspect of the Internet is not a traditional ‘commons.’ It also has a virtual or informational layer with increasing economic returns to scale and political practices that make jurisdictional control difficult.”<sup>8</sup>

In short, the Internet is a complex web of computer networks that utilizes various mediums to transmit data between them. But not all computers are created equal. There is a hierarchy. Throughout the Internet are powerful computers that are responsible for storing lists of addresses, routing traffic, and hosting websites. To make it all work, there are root servers, autonomous systems, Internet exchange points, networks, and so on. The Internet is open and decentralized, meaning that any computer can connect to it without obtaining permission from an authority, and that it effectively operates via a trust-based relationship between countless Internet service providers and autonomous systems.<sup>9</sup> Most of the physical layer of the Internet is privately owned and does not present any new challenges that are not already manageable through national legal frameworks. The informational layer is the one that poses difficult problems.

For these computers to be able to “talk” to each other, a common language is necessary. This language is known as Internet Protocol. Information sent over the Internet is broken down into data packets that are transmitted at up to the speed of light, routed through networks, and then reassembled at their destination. Peter Singer and Allan Friedman explain that “the Internet uses a dynamic, distributed system that does not maintain a permanent vision of what the network looks like at any given time. The principle of routing is fairly simple: at each point in the network, a router looks at the address of an incoming packet. If the destination is inside the network, it keeps the packet and sends it to the relevant computer. Otherwise, it consults a routing table to determine the best next step to send the packet closer to its destination.”<sup>10</sup>

When accessing a website, a computer fires off a bunch of packets that quickly find the host server and put in the request for access; it then receives a response, establishes a connection, and communicates back and forth with the server, receiving the information that “lives” on the distant server. If any autonomous system or network happens to be down or “broken” at a given point, the data will route around it, always determined to find its destination. The plethora of different networks and connections makes the Internet dynamic and resilient, but also anarchic.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Winter 2011), 19.

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of how the Internet works, see P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 16-25.

<sup>10</sup> Singer and Friedman, 24-25.

## Computer Code

In order to program computers, countless lines of code are necessary. Put simply, code is a set of instructions that tells a computer what to do. Computers can be infinitely programmed and re-programmed, meaning that you can tell them to perform any function that you want. As one might expect, more powerful computers with more sophisticated code can carry out more complex operations.

All computers have operating system code, which tells them how to process information. This is the code that is already installed when you purchase a computer. Software and applications are coded so they can communicate with operating systems, enabling them to “plug in” to the operating systems, whether they are games, graphic design suites, or auxiliary command and control tools. Different versions of the same software need to be coded to run the same program on a PC versus a Mac because the operating systems are different. Software can be added whenever a user chooses, and it is typically purchased and downloaded from the Internet these days, although plenty of software is still installed on computers through physical objects such as CDs or flash drives. Of course, operating systems themselves can be altered but the average user isn’t sophisticated enough to do this. Nor does the average person know how to write software programs, which is why most users never see all of the code that makes computers work; we just see the images, icons, and buttons that the code tells our computers to show to us.

New code is constantly being installed on computers. Many websites install “cookies” on your computer in order to track your browsing habits so that information can be sold to advertisers or to remember basic user information that makes it easier for the website’s server machine because it has to store less data itself. As we browse the Internet, many of us don’t think about how much data is constantly flowing back and forth between our computer and others or how much code is being read and installed because it all happens so fast. Most of it is harmless, or maybe a nuisance.

However, some code can tell computers and systems to do things that the owner really does not want. This malicious code could be written by someone seeking to target specific computers and systems, or it could be designed to generally circulate on the Internet and infect any computer it encounters, constantly re-transmitting itself from each newly infected computer. Malicious code might transmit unauthorized data; steal information from a computer’s hard drive; direct the computer to perform functions that are detrimental to itself or the machines that it controls; or allow an attacker to take control of the computer. For example, “By capturing victims’ systems and coordinating their behavior, attackers can assemble armies of ‘zombie’ computers. Millions of machines can be controlled by a single actor through a range of different command and control mechanisms. These are referred to as ‘botnets,’ and most computer users will never know if they are part of one. Botnets are powerful resources for a host of nefarious activities. Regular access to the victims’ machines allows monitoring to capture valuable data. Botnet controllers can also leverage the network connections of their victims’ systems to send spam, host websites to sell illegal products, or defraud online advertisers. Perhaps

most insidiously, botnets can launch a ‘distributed denial of service’ (DDoS) attack.”<sup>11</sup>

A DDoS attack is designed to overwhelm web servers by simultaneously sending more requests for access than the server can handle with its finite computational and bandwidth resources. To the server, it seems like it happens to be getting an inordinately large number of visitors to the websites that it hosts. In trying to answer all of the requests, it becomes overwhelmed and eventually shuts down. This form of attack does not involve the use of malicious code against the server itself, but it is the malicious code that allows the attacker to control its botnet.

Of course, malicious code can’t just walk into any computer and install itself as it pleases. It first needs to gain access. In the case of legitimate software, a user is prompted to say yes or no to installing it. But with malicious code, numerous deceptions are used to gain access – such as by tricking a system user to click on a link, download an attachment, or hand over passwords. This social engineering strategy is among the most basic ways to gain access.

For more sophisticated defenders, there are still plenty of ways for an attacker to gain access. As Singer and Friedman explain:

*“Another vector is mistakes in the systems themselves—software vulnerabilities—that are exploited by advanced attackers. It is practically impossible to build a modern IT system without some hidden vulnerabilities waiting to be discovered. Modern operating systems have millions of lines of code and have hundreds of sub-components that interact. An attacker’s goal is to find some chink in the armor of this code, where the system does not behave precisely as designed and exploit that weakness. An attack that exploits a previously unknown vulnerability is known as a ‘zero day.’”<sup>12</sup>*

No matter how sophisticated a system and its array of firewalls and other defenses are, there is always a way in.

“Malicious software, or ‘malware,’ is a prepackaged exploitation of a vulnerability. There is often a ‘payload’ of instructions detailing what the system should do after it has been compromised.”<sup>13</sup> One way to think of it is like an army attacking a walled city. The army must first gain access, whether by punching a hole in the wall, climbing over the wall, sneaking in through a hidden tunnel, or destroying the gate. Once inside, the army then carries out its malicious activity, whether it is to capture or kill the inhabitants, loot and steal, or take control of the city itself. Malware is the way into the city, and the payload is what the army does once inside.

The problem is that malicious data packets blend with the rest of the traffic on the Internet like covert agents among the general population, all of it flowing at light speed

<sup>11</sup> Singer and Friedman, 44.

<sup>12</sup> Singer and Friedman, 42.

<sup>13</sup> Singer and Friedman, 43.

in incomprehensible volumes. For computers that are not connected to the Internet or another network, malicious code can still be introduced through a CD, flash drive, or other physical object that contains the code. Because of how complex computer systems have become, with their millions of lines of code, there are countless holes in these proverbial city walls, which are invisible to both attacker and defender until discovered. When a vulnerability is identified in software, apps, or operating systems, administrators and tech companies typically send out “patches” via the Internet to all users in order to plug the hole. If would-be attackers discover holes, they might keep this knowledge secret so they can exploit it at some point. However, since we all use computers, many of which use the same or similar operating systems, any unplugged hole in a defender’s system could also be a hole in the attacker’s own system.

To further complicate things, the intent of malicious computer code might be unknown until long after the damage is done. A system might be performing functions that an attacker directed it to carry out while appearing to operate normally to the system owner. This is where the infinite re-programmability of computers becomes a vulnerability; sophisticated attackers can typically find a way to “spoof” a system’s normal operations so the user is unaware that anything is amiss. From the computer’s perspective, it has simply been given a new set of instructions that it is dutifully carrying out.

Offense is currently presumed to have the advantage in cyber conflict due to the range of vulnerabilities in computers and systems that can be exploited by attackers at relatively low cost, combined with the ease of transmitting malicious code via the anarchic Internet. Moreover, attackers’ ability to remain anonymous makes it harder for defenders to impose costs on attackers.

## The Anonymity-Attribution Spectrum

As mentioned above, the term *anonymity-attribution spectrum* is used here instead of *the attribution problem* to highlight the fact that it is a sliding scale which shifts over time as technology and tactics change. Moreover, different types of actors will find themselves in different locations along the spectrum depending on their size, sophistication, and types of activities. Additionally, even when attribution is possible, the time lapse between action and successful attribution can vary significantly.

For the Internet of the 1990s, electronic attribution was considered difficult based on its architecture and the technology of the time. As the Internet slowly spread around the globe, this led to an increasing number of instances where differing territorial laws came into conflict. One widely cited case involves Nazi paraphernalia that was being sold from a Yahoo auction site. The data was on stored on a server outside France but the paraphernalia itself could be purchased in France, where such trafficking was illegal. A lawsuit was brought against Yahoo in French court to have the information removed. Yahoo argued that the French version of its website complied with French law, and since such auctions were legal under U.S. law, the French court had no jurisdiction. Yahoo further argued that it had no way of knowing where its users were located, so it couldn’t block certain content based on geographical location. However, while the

case was being adjudicated in 2000, a company called Infosploit demonstrated a new IP-identification technology that could reliably find the geographical location of most computers. The technology was able to demonstrate that the Nazi paraphernalia data was stored both on a mirror server in Sweden and a U.S. server, not just in the United States as Yahoo had argued. Based on this new information, the judge ruled that Yahoo had violated French law and ordered Yahoo to make its best effort to block French users from viewing the Nazi paraphernalia content.<sup>14</sup>

Internet geographical location technologies grew more sophisticated throughout the 2000s, making it easier to segment content and target ads via IP addresses. As Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu explain, “IP addresses reveal little about a computer user’s physical location. But the information packets that make up Internet communications travel via giant computers whose locations in real space are easy to identify. A ‘tracing’ packet can report the list of computers through which a communication travels, much as a car driving along a network of highways collects a receipt at each toll. Just as one could determine the origin of the car’s journey by looking at this collection of receipts, computers can trace the path of each information packet to determine the computer node closest to the computer from which it originated.”<sup>15</sup> This was the state of ge-identification technology when they wrote *Who Controls the Internet?* in 2006. Since then, this technology has improved to the point where it can reliably pinpoint specific computers as the source of specific data packets in cases where users are using standard technology. However, the situation is different for sophisticated actors.

As we can see, in the 1990s almost everyone found themselves on the anonymity side of the anonymity-attribution spectrum simply because the technology of the time made it impossible to electronically trace regular users unless they voluntarily identified themselves. But criminals and state actors were not as sophisticated in the 1990s, so cyber conflict was not a major problem. As geo-location technologies became more sophisticated in the 2000s, greater ease of electronic attribution pushed more actors toward the attribution side of the spectrum. However, as this shift occurred for regular Internet users, new technologies and techniques also emerged that made it easier for people actively seeking anonymity to cover their online tracks.

One such anonymization technology is known as TOR (short for “The Onion Router”), which was developed in 2004. Through layers of encryption, “multi-hop” routing through intermediaries, and breaking traffic into chunks, TOR is able “to disguise both the source and the endpoint of a conversation.”<sup>16</sup> Even without TOR, it is possible to route data packets through multiple nodes as a means of disguising their source and destination. As Sandro Gaycken explains, “servers only remember the last server which sent the package and the next server to receive the package. They do not remember the whole chain of addresses. What is even worse is that any information about the connection is usually destroyed after the interaction. This is necessary as connections are

<sup>14</sup> See Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, *Who Controls the Internet?* (New York, NY: Oxford, 2006, 2008), 1-8.

<sup>15</sup> Goldsmith and Wu, 60.

<sup>16</sup> Singer and Friedman, 109.



undertaken millions of times each day, every time someone connects to the web, and it would consume far too much storage space. Service providers in some countries are forced to keep records about connections for a while, but these are still only a few... Cyber criminals are well-known to relay spamming or phishing attacks through African countries because they do not log connections.”<sup>17</sup>

The ability to route traffic to disguise the source computer of specific data packets makes attribution more difficult. Even then, discovering the source computer does not mean you have found the person responsible for those data packets because many people might use the same computer. Moreover, as in the case of botnets, computers can be remotely controlled by someone else without the owner knowing. It is also possible to unleash malicious code through a CD or flash drive that a negligent operator plugs into the system. Infected laptops can spread malicious code from network to network as the unwitting owner goes about her or his daily business.

In short, it is currently easy to remain anonymous in the cyber world if you take steps to mask your identity. If you are a regular user without the intent or know-how to maintain anonymity, it is easy to figure out who you are and attribute specific actions to you. This is different from the 1990s, when Internet users were generally anonymous by default. As technology and methods have changed, so has the distribution of actors along the anonymity-attribution spectrum. Currently, computer security specialists are getting better at differentiating between state actors and criminal groups, even if they cannot always identify the intent of attackers. There have also been recent successes in identifying specific attackers based on forensics and behavioral analysis, catching them through human error.<sup>18</sup> Of course, as attackers become aware of the mistakes that led others to be identified, smart ones could change their behavior to avoid those attribution techniques. And the game will continue, always shifting.

## Strategies of Anonymity

As discussed at the outset, developing a framework for thinking through cyber conflict can help lead to solutions. Understanding the role that anonymity plays in the strategic calculus of various actors is a key piece of the puzzle.

In traditional forms of conflict, covert operations have always played a part, but they have not been as central to strategic calculus because any attack would be quickly discovered. Once you send in troops or launch a missile, it is obvious to the defender that an attack is occurring, and it is usually just as obvious who is attacking.

For example, the story of the Trojan Horse depicts a maneuver that allowed Greek soldiers to gain access to the city of Troy, hiding inside the horse until the Trojans had

<sup>17</sup> Sandro Gaycken, “The Necessity of (Some) Certainty,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 2010), 2-3.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Stewart Baker, “The Attribution Revolution,” *Foreign Policy*, June 17, 2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/17/the\\_attribution\\_revolution\\_plan\\_to\\_stop\\_cyber\\_attacks?wp\\_login\\_redirect=0](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/17/the_attribution_revolution_plan_to_stop_cyber_attacks?wp_login_redirect=0) (accessed August 5, 2014).

brought it inside the city walls, at which point they waited until nightfall to exit the horse and attack. But once the attack commenced, the Trojans would have known immediately that they were being attacked by Greeks. Moreover, the Trojans were already aware that they were at war with the Greeks. In World War II, elaborate “ghost armies” were constructed and fake radio chatter was used by the Allies to deceive the Germans about troop locations and movements, including in support of the D-Day invasion.<sup>19</sup> Again though, once actual attacks began, it immediately became clear what was going on. More recently, when Russian troops seized Crimea in March 2014, there was an effort to mask their true identities, but it quickly became clear that these “little green men” were actually members of the Russian army.<sup>20</sup>

In all of these cases, there was no way for attackers to remain anonymous in spite of elaborate deceptions to gain a temporary advantage. However, in the case of cyber conflict it is possible for an attacker to remain anonymous for long periods, if not forever. In some ways, anonymous cyber-attacks are an extension of the forms of conflict that are manifested in assassinations, covert sabotage, and undercover support for coups. But these still require physical infiltration of the defender’s territory by human agents. In cyber-attacks, since the attack itself is malicious code instead of soldiers, missiles, or spies, attackers can covertly unleash the code, cover their tracks, and disappear with greater ease.

## Costs and Deterrence

To return to the earlier discussion of offense vs. defense, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann define the offense-defense balance as “the ratio of the cost of the forces that the attacker requires to take territory to the cost of the defender’s forces.”<sup>21</sup> Although cyber conflict does not involve conquering territory, the ratio of costs to the attacker versus the defender applies. There will always be direct costs associated with conducting a cyber-attack in the form of time and money spent acquiring sufficient computing resources, doing research, writing malicious code, and then unleashing the code or directing a botnet to attack its target.

More sophisticated defenders will be harder to penetrate than average users, which will raise the costs to the attacker. However, a significant portion of the costs will depend on whether or not the attacker can remain anonymous. If the attack is successfully attributed, the defender could impose greater costs on the attacker in the form of retaliation, sanctions, or arrest depending on whether the attacker is a state actor, terrorist, or criminal group. Given the current distribution of actors on the anonymity-attribution spectrum, defenders often cannot hope to identify sophisticated, small-scale attackers

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, Megan Garber, “Ghost Army: The Inflatable Tanks That Fooled Hitler,” *The Atlantic*, May 22, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/ghost-army-the-inflatable-tanks-that-fooled-hitler/276137/> (accessed August 2, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian Invaders”? *BBC News*, March 11, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154> (accessed August 2, 2014).

<sup>21</sup> Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), p. 46.

with a significant degree of confidence. This makes it harder to deter would-be attackers, but as Joe Nye notes, “Deterrence is complex and involves more than just retaliation.” Entanglement and denial are also components of deterrence.<sup>22</sup>

## Types of Actors and Differing Goals

Cyber-attackers come in many varieties. In order to deter different types of actors in an environment where attribution is uncertain, it is important to understand an attacker’s goals and the role that anonymity plays in the advancement of those goals. Strategies can then be designed to raise costs to the point where attackers are deterred. Boosting defenses will always tend to enhance deterrence through denial. In many cases, this will simply lead an attacker to choose a different target with weaker defenses. However, advanced persistent threats (APTs) will often find a way to penetrate specific targets, willing to pay any cost in terms of resources.

Organized crime groups might seek to steal troves of credit card information or to build a botnet to sell contraband. Terrorists or insurgents could attempt to damage critical infrastructure as a way of furthering their political goals. Some attackers might be anarchists or hacktivists trying to deface or bring down government websites. State actors could steal trade secrets, conduct espionage, damage industrial facilities and infrastructure, or disrupt military hardware. Their relative desires for anonymity will vary.

Criminals will tend to seek a high degree of anonymity because they want to be able to freely enjoy their ill-gotten gains. Their goal is profit for their own benefit. Since attribution could lead to the disruption of their enterprise or arrest, anonymity is crucial for them. They will likely be willing to invest a great deal in anonymization techniques and technologies. Detering them will often depend on strong defenses for the types of systems they view as having some value to them. Detective work and human intelligence to boost the credible threat of punishment are essential. Improving international cooperation among governments and law enforcement agencies is a difficult but necessary task to deter criminals.

Insurgents, terrorists, and anyone engaging in asymmetric conflict for the sake of advancing a political goal will often seek individual anonymity but not necessarily group anonymity. In many cases, they will even proudly claim credit for specific attacks. The logic of terrorism, for example, involves the notion of “propaganda by deed.”<sup>23</sup> By causing harm against an enemy and demonstrating a willingness to engage in conflict in furtherance of a cause, “propaganda by deed” is intended to gain attention and support while also causing the enemy to be fearful, lose support, or overreact in a way that leads to self-inflicted harm. But this type of thinking also applies to many insurgents, hacktivists, and others seeking to further a cause through asymmetric conflict. They will seek to evade detection so they can conduct their operations, but maintaining group

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<sup>22</sup> Nye, 33.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, David Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 78, No. 3 (September 1984), 660.

anonymity is not necessarily part of their logic. Although the specific individuals behind the attacks often seek to hide their identities, the group's desire for publicity changes the nature of the game. There is a greater likelihood that boastful cyber warriors will expose themselves. Moreover, the motives behind attacks will be easier to discern, which can open up new ways to impose costs and deter them. Even if the attacks themselves cannot be halted, some form of retaliation that undermines the goals of the groups responsible could make them rethink their strategy and voluntarily stop. For example, information campaigns to discredit these groups and undermine support for them in the communities where they seek validation and material support could be employed. If these groups see that their mission is actually being harmed by engaging in cyber-attacks because it leads to a reaction by the defender that is effective in reducing their credibility and resources, they may reconsider their strategy. Making cause and effect known to attackers will be important in such a deterrence strategy. By demonstrating how their actions lead to counteractions that impose costs, defenders could convince attackers that costs outweigh benefits.

State actors might not seek complete anonymity either. They may simply want to avoid detection long enough to complete their mission, at which point they care less if an attack is attributed to them. Moreover, different states will view anonymity differently depending on their political cultures. Since the tools and techniques of anonymity, once developed, will tend to spread to all types of actors, anonymity can be viewed as a good or a bad thing depending on the context. Liberal democracies that value freedom from the state in addition to security provided by the state tend to have mixed feelings on anonymity. Anonymity can offer the space necessary for free expression and forms of political protest seen as legitimate, in addition to enabling nefarious behavior. Thus, liberal democracies struggle to balance between the two. This can lead to contradictory behavior by different arms of the same state apparatus, such as the U.S. National Security Agency's efforts to break anonymization technologies like TOR while USAID and the U.S. Department of State provide funding for them.<sup>24</sup> Whereas some agencies view anonymity as a way for terrorists and criminals to operate freely, others may see them as a way for dissidents in authoritarian states to avoid repression. Moreover, authoritarian states tend to view U.S. support for anonymization technologies as a form of conflictual behavior designed to undermine their social order. By contrast, many in the United States see them as benevolent efforts to help promote human dignity and freedom.

State actors appear to utilize anonymity to delay opponents from taking action and to confuse them about what action to take, not to remain permanently anonymous. Although they tend to vigorously deny conducting cyber-attacks, when clear evidence of their involvement is presented they often do not alter their behavior. This suggests that even if they preferred absolute anonymity, knowing that only partial anonymity is likely does not prevent them from conducting attacks and making use of a degree of anonymity.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Andrea Peterson, "The NSA is Trying to Crack Tor. The State Department is Helping Pay for It," *Washington Post*, October 5, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/05/the-nsa-is-trying-to-crack-tor-the-state-department-is-helping-pay-for-it/> (accessed August 7, 2014).

In the case of China's ongoing theft of data from U.S. corporations and government agencies, anonymity does not appear to be essential to Chinese strategic calculus. This is a case of cyber-exploitation rather than cyber-attack, which many Chinese view as a national security issue because they are neutralizing the U.S. technological advantage by stealing valuable trade secrets, weapon designs, etc. In 2013, when the security company Mandiant identified Unit 61398 in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for conducting these cyber-attacks, as well as the building that served as its base of operations, the attacks went briefly silent, but resumed a few weeks later from different locations.<sup>25</sup> This may indicate that the attackers were temporarily unsettled by being identified or that they realized that their operations had been compromised and thought it better to resume elsewhere. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five members of the PLA's Unit 61398 for their theft of corporate secrets.<sup>26</sup> Of course, Chinese authorities are not about to turn over the suspects. It is unclear if these "naming and shaming" exercises will have any effect. They serve to bring more public attention to the issue and signal the degree of U.S. displeasure to Chinese leadership, but anonymity does not appear to be critically important to the attackers since they continue to conduct attacks. Chinese leaders may be seeking to hide behind a certain degree of deniability, but simply being identified has not raised costs to the point of deterring them.

It is hard for perpetrators of significant cyber operations to remain anonymous for extended periods. Moreover, when cyber-attacks are used to support traditional kinetic operations, it will be obvious who the perpetrator is. This was the case when Israeli forces conducted a cyber-attack against Syrian radar installations in 2007 to allow for greater stealth as their jets bombed a hidden nuclear site inside Syria. In the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, DDoS attacks were employed immediately prior to Russia's invasion in order to cripple Georgian websites. In these cases of hybrid warfare where cyber-attacks are one tool in the arsenal, anonymity is employed in the traditional sense of a covert operation to gain a temporary advantage. But once the fighting starts, it becomes obvious who the perpetrator is.

In the cases where the cyber-attack is the only form of attack employed, things get murkier, but advances in distinguishing between state actors and other groups are making successful attribution easier. Highly sophisticated cyber-attacks can only be carried out with substantial resources, which significantly narrows the pool of potential culprits and facilitates attribution. But the degree of separation between "patriotic hackers" and state authorities complicates the situation by making it easier for officials to claim that they are simply unable to control the situation even when it is clear that attacks are originating from inside their borders.

<sup>25</sup> David Sanger and Nicole Perloth, "Hackers From China Resume Attacks on U.S. Targets," *New York Times*, May 19, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/world/asia/chinese-hackers-resume-attacks-on-us-targets.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed August 11, 2014).

<sup>26</sup> Michael Schmidt and David Sanger, "5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks," *New York Times*, May 19, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html> (accessed August 11, 2014).

In the case of the 2007 Russian DDoS attacks on Estonian banking, government, and media systems, it quickly became clear that they were originating from within Russia and that they were well resourced. Definitive proof that they were directed by Russian authorities has not been established, but their size and sophistication indicates that there may be a certain level of complicity by the Russian state in allowing them to proceed. It is debatable how plausible the Russian state's deniability is in this instance. If state authorities were somehow involved, it appears that anonymity was being used as a tactic to confuse and delay. The ambiguity surrounding the attack made it hard to respond in the moment, and by the time enough confidence in attribution was established, it was essentially too late to do anything even if good options were available.

The same is true of the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear plant at Natanz. At this point, there is a high degree of confidence that the United States and Israel directed the attack. But it took several years after the attack was unleashed to reach this point. Potential responses become much less clear due to the time lapse and confusion about appropriate courses of action. Stuxnet is a particularly interesting case study because of the various options contemplated in an effort to set back Iran's nuclear program and convince Iranian leadership that the program was not worth pursuing. Israel was openly contemplating a bombing raid on Iran's nuclear facilities that some estimated would set back Iran's program by about two years. However, U.S. authorities deemed it too risky. It would have been seen as an act war and could have ignited a broader conflict. The potential benefit was not seen as worth the costs. They instead opted for a joint, anonymous cyber-attack to accomplish the same goal. This approach also involved less collateral damage and no deaths, making it more appealing.

Of course, Stuxnet also needed time to accomplish its work without being detected because it was designed to cause centrifuges to break faster than they otherwise would have. It did so by instructing Natanz's control system to speed up and slow down centrifuge rotor speeds while displaying normal activity to those monitoring the system. It did this in 50-minute sequences for an extended period, slowing enrichment progress and wearing through Iran's stock of back-up centrifuges. By disguising itself as reliability problems, it was able to continue operating for longer and to actually destroy more centrifuges. As Ralph Langer explains, "Stuxnet is a low-yield weapon with the overall intention of reducing the lifetime of Iran's centrifuges and making the Iranians' fancy control systems appear beyond their understanding." Langer estimates that "Stuxnet set back the Iranian nuclear program by two years; a simultaneous catastrophic destruction of all operating centrifuges wouldn't have caused nearly as big a delay."<sup>27</sup>

Langer's analysis of Stuxnet also indicates that there were two different versions of the cyber weapon. According to him, the commonly known version was actually developed later than the original and is less sophisticated. The first one accomplished its task by over-pressurizing the centrifuges instead of speeding up and slowing the rotors. Moreover, the first version was significantly less likely to be detected. Langer theorizes

<sup>27</sup> Ralph Langer, "Stuxnet's Secret Twin," *Foreign Policy*, November 19, 2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/19/stuxnets\\_secret\\_twin\\_iran\\_nukes\\_cyber\\_attack?page=0,0a](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/19/stuxnets_secret_twin_iran_nukes_cyber_attack?page=0,0a) (accessed August 7, 2014).

that second version was developed by a different agency than the first. In his words, “The dramatic differences between both versions point to changing priorities that most likely were accompanied by a change in stakeholders. Technical analysis shows that the risk of discovery no longer was the attackers’ primary concern.”<sup>28</sup> If Langer is right, then it would appear that anonymity and remaining undetected were initially a key part of the strategic calculus. The initial goal may have been to permanently infect Natanz, quietly slowing its operations indefinitely without anyone ever knowing what was going on or who was behind it. Once the new agency took over (Langer guesses it was the NSA), the strategy seems to have changed.

One can only speculate about the strategic calculus of policy makers in this instance. It could be that the NSA or whoever developed Stuxnet simply took less care in masking it for lack of interest in doing so. But it could also be that long-term anonymity was not desired. Perhaps the second version of Stuxnet was designed to remain undetected for long enough to do some serious damage and eventually be discovered. If this were an intentional decision, it could have been designed to demonstrate U.S. cyber capabilities to the world and also cause Iranian decision-makers to fear what might come next, thereby altering their assessment of the relative costs and benefits of maintaining their nuclear program. Stuxnet may have been designed to undermine Iranian confidence, as Martin Libicki postulates.<sup>29</sup>

Whatever the actual rationales may have been, Stuxnet is an important case study worth further investigation from many angles. The U.S. goal of convincing Iran to abandon its nuclear program has long been clear. Multiple means of achieving this goal have been contemplated and employed. In addition to economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, force has been utilized. But force in the form of a bombing raid was rejected because the costs were deemed too high, which would have been felt immediately because bombing cannot be done anonymously. Instead, two different versions of an anonymous, undetected cyber-attack set back the program, which gave the other methods more time to have their effects. The second version of Stuxnet all but ensured that it would eventually be detected and attributed, which may have had greater psychological effects on Iranian leadership than if it had remained undetected. Anonymity, in this case, may have been only temporarily desired.

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<sup>28</sup> Langer.

<sup>29</sup> Martin Libicki, “Cyber War as a Confidence Game,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2011), 143.

## Conclusion

The strategic use of anonymity in cyber conflict is complex and warrants further investigation. It is not clear how precise attribution has to be in order to deter certain actions. The nature, goals, and strategies of different types of actors will vary. As laid out above, actors will find themselves on fluctuating locations of the anonymity-attribution spectrum depending on their technical sophistication and the type of attacks they are conducting. The methods employed by defenders to attribute attacks will also affect where different actors find themselves on this sliding scale.

The anonymity-attribution spectrum is a subcomponent of the offense-defense balance, but there is a distinction to be made between the two. Much of the offense-defense balance will depend on the direct costs of successfully conducting cyber-attacks relative to the direct costs of defending against them. Furthermore, some of the offensive-defense balance will depend on the ability of cyber-attackers to remain undetected long enough to complete their mission. But even once detected and neutralized, the defender may not know who conducted the attack. Without confidence in the attacker's identity, defenders will find it difficult or impossible to impose secondary costs in the form of retaliation, which means that attackers' location on the anonymity-attribution spectrum at any given point will significantly affect the overall offense-defense balance. The a priori assumptions of attackers about their potential for anonymity will affect their calculus in weighing the costs of an attack relative to the benefits.

Although warfare and conflict have always utilized covert operations, espionage, and the element of surprise, anonymity in cyber conflict is different in nature because the actual attack comes in the form of malicious code sent over systems and networks. This fact removes it from the physical world that is visible to the naked eye, making it more complex and harder for existing legal structures and international security frameworks to address.

In seeking to deter cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwar, it is worth keeping in mind that even in criminal justice systems people are sent to jail without absolute certainty of their guilt. It is nearly impossible to prove guilt with 100 percent accuracy; the focus is on establishing a degree of confidence in their guilt. Thus, taking proportionate retaliatory measures in order to boost deterrence where confidence of attribution is high may be appropriate, depending on the severity and persistence of the attacks. Boosting defenses and educating the public about good cyber hygiene will be necessary to mitigate risk.

Whatever approaches are taken, it is essential to keep in mind that all of the actors in cyber conflict are humans. They have goals, motives, and strategies that guide their behavior. Understanding the rationale behind their actions will help in identifying ways to reduce the negative elements of the Internet and our computerized world. Now that we all have immense capacity to interact with each other all over the Earth, anytime and anywhere, harmonizing legal structures and enhancing global governance mechanisms that serve all peoples should be long-term goals.







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## Cyber Operations other Than War

Dustin Dehez

Cyberwar is a bit of an enigma, if that pun is allowed as a means of opening. Even though cyberspace is mentioned many times in documents of international organisations and even treated as a potential sphere of warfare by NATO, there is a palpable sense that nobody really knows what full cyber warfare would entail and to what degree the alliance and its member states actually are exposed. This confusion is not for a lack of experience. Over the past ten years, cyber operations have been so commonplace that they hardly ever make front-page news. On various occasions it even looked as if cyber warfare had also become such a regular part of conflicts that it did not even deserve more attention than it received.

On the other hand, the academic debate has started to question whether the prospect of war in cyberspace is actually real. Thomas Rid, for example, has argued that since cyber operations have thus far failed to kill anyone or in fact wreak the sort of havoc that warfare normally could bring about, the issue is more academic than real. But even he acknowledges that cyberspace has created new openings for espionage, sabotage and subversion.<sup>1</sup> Most observers, however, still focus their attention on the dangers of an actual cyberwar and the physical destruction such a war could entail. While certainly correct in anticipating the possibility of such a war, the real danger is in cyber operations other than war. In fact, the recent confrontation between Russia and the Ukraine clearly

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*. London, Hurst and Company, 2013.

demonstrates the full extent to which operations in cyberspace are pivotal in seizing and maintaining the initiative on the battlefield.

In order to fully appreciate the magnitude of the challenge, taking stock systematically seems indispensable. This chapter proceeds as follows. First, incidents of cyber operations and cyber warfare that occurred over the past years, from Estonia in 2007 to the war in Georgia in 2008 are reviewed. Though these attacks were coordinated, they were not always folded neatly into broader strategies. The Russian campaign in Ukraine, however, was different in that regard. Here, the Kremlin initiated an information warfare campaign inside cyberspace to complement its strategies in Ukraine and this is indicative of a wider evolution in cyber-based operations and therefore are reviewed next. Finally, cyber-based operations are first and foremost operations that come in the same vein as intelligence operations and it is here that some attention must be given to the likes of Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning. With all this done, there are some conclusions that are being presented here.

### **Preludes to War: A Review of Cyber Operations Past**

Oddly enough, the first confrontation in cyberspace that made international headlines included one rather old foe. In April and May 2007 the tiny Baltic nation of Estonia came under sustained attack by hackers. Estonia was the first country to fully experience the form of warfare that could be mounted from cyberspace. Long hailed as a pioneer in offering services to its citizens via the internet, the country was singularly exposed to an attack from cyberspace. In a country where nearly all banking transactions are done online, the attack brought the economic activity very nearly to a full halt. Following a rather tedious conflict over a Soviet World War II monument's removal, tensions between the Estonian and Russian governments resulted in a war of words. A Distributed Denial of Server attack then crippled Estonian internet infrastructure for three weeks. In what was clearly a coordinated attack, using thousands of computers, bank and government websites were attacked and brought down. The episode demonstrated the first problem associated with any cyber-attack, the problem of attribution. Though the attacks clearly emanated from Russian soil, it was by no means clear whether they were directed by the Russian government, or whether Russia simply turned a blind eye. In 2009 the Russian youth group Nashi claimed responsibility.<sup>2</sup> Since Nashi is a movement belonging to the party from which Putin hails, it is unlikely that the Kremlin did not at least authorise it. And so too did the Estonian government believe a Kremlin connection, which maintained that the attack's duration, sophistication and coordination makes it rather unlikely that the Russian government had nothing to do with it. A state actor, for all intents and purposes, had likely been instigating and spearheading the campaign. Yet, it was unclear what the attacked was supposed to achieve despite intimidating the Baltic Sea state by disrupting its infrastructure. If intimidation was what the instigators had in mind, they certainly misjudged NATO, to which Estonia belongs since 2004. NATO began to look seriously at cyberspace as a sphere for future

<sup>2</sup> NBC News, A look at Estonia's cyber attack in 2007, in: *NBC News*, 7/8/2009, [[http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31801246/ns/technology\\_and\\_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack/#.U-ebSWNBOQk](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack/#.U-ebSWNBOQk), accessed 8/10/2014, accessed 10. August 2014].

warfare and Estonia's capital Tallinn was chosen as a seat for the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

In the following year, Lithuania was targeted, shortly after the Lithuanian parliament banned the use of Soviet symbols. Three hundred websites were hacked and then defaced with Soviet symbols.<sup>3</sup> Again, a small Baltic nation was being intimidated, its independence questioned. However, a strategic rationale was again difficult to discern as was the instigator of the attack. Yet, the attacks of summer 2008 were only a prelude to another set of attacks, only that this time they would be part of a broader campaign that would include conventional forces as well.

In 2008 cyberwar had already emerged as a staple in academic and foreign policy cycles. Still, few had any idea what warfare in cyberspace would look like should it actually occur and how governments could respond effectively. That changed dramatically, when in 2008 Russia and Georgia went to war. In August 2008 the conflict over the Georgian break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia entered a new stage. For years, the two republics enjoyed some sort of autonomy, even though legally they continued (and continue) to belong to Georgia. Skirmishes between Georgian forces and South Ossetian militias were not infrequent, but it hardly ever escalated into a serious confrontation. In August 2008, however, the fighting did escalate and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili ordered the armed forces to seize the initiative and recapture South Ossetia. The ensuing offensive triggered a Russian intervention, which the Kremlin had prepared in advance as a contingency and reinforced through manoeuvres that usually took place close to the border with Georgia. The Georgian offensive was used as a pretext by the Kremlin to seize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, eventually move towards Tbilisi and, should the opportunity arise, oust the government. Intensive shuttle diplomacy by then French president Nicolas Sarkozy was responsible for putting a hold to Russian advances, but the Georgian government had come close to defeat. Yet, what was largely unreported was the number of losses the Russian military had to suffer in its advance. After all, Georgia had modernised its armed forces in the years leading up to the war. Moreover they had battlefield experience, being deployed to Afghanistan. And while their numeric inferiority made defeat inevitable, the Russian army had to pay a heavy price.

During the August war between Russia and Georgia, cyberspace suddenly turned into a sphere of conflict and Georgian government institutions were exposed to sustained attacks. A detailed study by NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre found that trace route searches for the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Georgian President were blocked, the perpetrators likely coming from Russia, using botnets provided by the so called Russian Business Network (RBN), a shadowy organisation responsible for criminal activities on the internet, including phishing attacks.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules for Cyber Security, in: *Survival*. 533/2011, pp. 119-132, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, Kristel Rünimeri, Mari Kert, Anna-Maria Talihärm, Liis Vihul, *Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified*. Tallinn, Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2009, p. 12.

Georgia, however, turned out to be remarkably resilient due largely to its rather unprofessional online infrastructure. Most ministries did not maintain their own servers and were instead still exchanging emails through hotmail.com and similar email-services. When taken down by Russian hackers, some Georgian institutions changed servers, with Poland offering its governments servers as a safe haven for Georgian government websites. Others institutions quickly changed the entire outline of their internet operations. The Georgian foreign ministry, for instance, moved its internet presence to a blogger.com website. Others followed similar approaches. As a result of that, Russian hackers were facing firewalls of IT giants and not those of a mid-rate government. Without ever intending to do so, Georgia had established an asymmetric defence mechanism that helped limit the damages and allowed it to resume full government services quickly.<sup>5</sup>

All three episodes demonstrate that operations based in cyberspace were expanding. But they also show that they were not from the outset integrated into an overarching strategic approach. The first such attacks in Estonia and Lithuania were certainly coordinated but other than intimidating the Baltic nations, it is difficult to establish a strategic rationale behind them. Disruptive as they were, they did not yield a strategic value. When the war in Georgia commenced in August 2008, cyber-based operations were conducted alongside more conventional attacks. In retrospect, these attacks seemed designed to add a cyber-dimension to the Russian war effort. The cyber-attacks, however, did not appear to be fully integrated into the spectrum of warfare, merely added to it. This was to change six years later, when Russia did mount an operation, in which cyber-based operations were fully folded into its strategic approach.

### Russian Roulette: Implications of Russian Warfare in Ukraine

While most analysts had considered the chances remote, conventional warfare returned to Europe in 2014. In early 2014 the Ukrainian government scrapped the association agreement with the European Union (EU), giving in to unprecedented Russian pressure. Yet, the decision not to sign the agreement in favour of closer ties with Russia brought down the government of Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich, widely regarded as pro-Russian in the first place, fled the country after clashes in Ukraine's capital Kiev left scores of protesters dead and police forces finally turned against the regime. A new more pro-European caretaker government announced its intention to sign the agreement and prosecute the ousted regime. To Moscow the spectre of losing Ukraine to European influence appeared unacceptable, but increasingly inevitable.<sup>6</sup> Instead of cutting its losses, the Kremlin decided to grab the part of the Ukraine it needed the most and to initiate a conflict, which would hand it leverage over the future course of the country. The annexation of Crimea was the opening of a conflict that would ultimately turn to Eastern Ukraine as well.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 14-15.

<sup>6</sup> As early as 2009 the Russian interests in a destabilised Ukraine was clear to see: "Today, Russia is standing tall after a long period of high growth, it is stronger and appears to be getting more aggressive, its leadership is authoritarian, its relations with the West are generally strained, and the world economy is in free fall. Just how Russia would respond to a further weakened and possibly brittle Ukraine is impossible to forecast with any accuracy, but given Russia's regime type and its power today, a nondemocratic Russia might well take advantage of Ukraine's increased weakness." Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, The Key to Kiev. Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability. In: *Foreign Affairs*, 88, 3/2009, pp. 106-120, here p. 113.

In fact, Russia had learned substantial lessons from its 2008 campaign in Georgia. Though its operations against the Georgian army led to a swift success in the public eye, its army had suffered greater losses than expected. Georgia's army had been turned into a modern fighting force and had trained with NATO troops for years and in fact participated in NATO missions. In 2008 the Georgian army could not possibly hope to stop the advance of the Russian army, but it could deal serious blows to the Russian army while it advanced. And that is exactly what the Georgian army did. Moscow drew two conclusions from this confrontation: First, its armed forces needed serious reforms and restructuring. Second, in similar scenarios in the future conventional confrontations had to be avoided so as to minimize casualties.

In 2014 Russia did just that. When Russian soldiers were mobilized to occupy Crimea, the Russian army avoided open battle. Instead, its soldiers, dubbed the little green men, seized government buildings in surprise attacks facing little and, more often, no resistance at all. The soldiers did not bear any insignia on their uniforms and though their only origin could have been Russia, the Kremlin simply denied any involvement, insisting that "local" self-defence forces had sprung up to "secure" Crimea against an allegedly fascist government in Kiev, conveniently in the one region where the Kremlin had the strongest interests. The mockery was complete only when Russian President Putin handed out special medals to Russian soldiers for unifying Crimea with Russia.

While Russian soldiers established control over Crimea and Russian-baked separatists seized control over the South-eastern parts of the Ukraine, Russia mounted an unprecedented effort to mobilize support at home and undermine support for the Ukrainian government in Western countries. While it is not unusual to expect a government trying to rally its people around the flag in case of conflict, seeking to undermine the alliances of an enemy is a far more daring endeavour. Russia managed to seize the initiative here as well. While Western countries were still coming to terms with a major aggression in Eastern Europe, the Kremlin had already begun to shape public perception and debate in Western European nations. This Russian version of information warfare is a variation of a network-based concept of warfare. Whereas mostly Western nations have thus far understood network-centric warfare as a way to dominate the conventional battleground, Russia is clearly approaching cyberspace as a battlefield in itself, which needs to be dominated in order to contextualize its military endeavours for the wider public.<sup>7</sup> However, while this understanding of information warfare is designed to widen the space for Kremlin operations, it also narrows the extent to which the political leadership can compromise. Once the public was whipped into a frenzy of nationalism, believing that Russian speaking citizens in Eastern Ukraine were repressed by fascist junta established with Western help in Kiev, any concession by the Kremlin to Ukraine or the international community would have entailed a substantial loss of legitimacy at home.

But in its operations abroad, it has had incredible success: Germany is a case in point. Instead of debating the effectiveness of sanctions against the Russian elite and the

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<sup>7</sup> Roger McDermott, *Russia's Information Centric Warfare Strategy: Re-defining the Battlespace*, in: *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11, 123/2014.

Russian economy, let alone Germany's national interest in the crisis, Berlin was quickly absorbed in an intense debate about its relations with Moscow and Eastern Europe as a whole. And while Russia was trying to create another frozen conflict in Eastern Europe, the West was debating what influence right wingers would be having in Ukrainian politics. The Kremlin had correctly assumed that Germany would show the least resilience and that Berlin would do its utmost to cast aside the aggression and return to business as usual. The public relations campaign was designed to do this. Creating the spectre of fascists' elements controlling the regime, it turned into a natural impulse to look for some equal distance between Ukraine and Russia, even though Russia clearly was the sole aggressor. Twitter and Facebook accounts were created in the thousands to reinforce the narrative of a fascist junta controlling Kiev and Russia just protecting a besieged Russian minority. The myriad of new accounts that send tweets and Facebook comments created the impression that the debate was tilting and with enough feedback loops thus created it did.

Journalists who worked to uncover Russian propaganda in German news and media were specifically targeted and concerted efforts were made by the Russian security services to corrode their confidence. Boris Reitschuster, a German journalist, who uncovered most of Russia's propaganda lies quickly turned into a target for Russian internet activists. Trolling his stories and sending an avalanche of abusive messages, targeting him and his family, he was exposed to a strategy that was well known to any human rights activist in the Warsaw Pact, where security services constantly tried to corrode the will and determination of people whom they considered a danger to the state.<sup>8</sup> Other journalists who covered the story had the same experience. While attempts to corrode the determination and will of journalists and activists are straight from the repertoire of socialist security services, the concerted efforts of doing so with any critical journalist abroad is in fact new and indicates the extent to which Russian security services are employing new methods opened by social media. In fact, Russia might just have successfully implemented the first swarming operation.

On a strategic level, Russia used its internet-based capability to two different ends. Firstly, the campaign distributed propaganda and disinformation, creating a veneer of deniability to Russia, which flimsy as it was, created enough ambiguity to distract Western policymakers. Secondly, it intimidated Western journalists by proxy and influenced public opinion in key Western countries. The operation aimed at neutralising key players in a Western response, dampening any fallout from its activities in Ukraine. Russia has in fact expanded its intelligence activities in NATO countries for years and has returned them to Cold War levels, sometimes going even beyond those levels. Yet, counterintelligence does not receive the same attention in Western capitals as it has during the heyday of the Cold War.<sup>9</sup> To put it differently, Western allies are still ill-prepared to deal with this sort of challenge. Russia's swarming tactics have allowed it an incredible success.

<sup>8</sup> Reitschuster is one of a number of journalists debunking Russian propaganda, who found himself a target of these concerted efforts. He runs a Facebook page debunking propaganda. In: [<https://www.facebook.com/Putinsstimme?ref=ts&fref=ts>, accessed 10. August 2014].

<sup>9</sup> See for instance the XX Committee, Putin's Espionage Offensive Against France. In: [<http://20committee.com/2014/08/02/putins-espionage-offensive-against-france>, accessed 10. August 2014].



## Propaganda for its own sake: Assad as a Lion

Whereas the Russian government employed the internet to strategically defined goals, the Syrian regime used it largely as a means to garner support for its tactics and goals, sometimes only to show that it could master propaganda on the internet as well. In April 2013 a tweet that emanated from the official Associated Press (AP) account threw the international markets into deep turmoil. It reported two explosions at the White House and said that President Barack Obama had been injured. The tweet was a hoax, of course, sent after the Syrian Electronic Army hacked AP's account. While the tweet was quickly debunked, millions had already changed hands at the stock market because of it. The attack caused little lasting damage, but it offered a glimpse into what sort of damage a more determined enemy could cause by, say, offering a barrage of tweets from hijacked accounts. The Syrian Electronic Army is not usually trying to disrupt globalised economic activity, its focus is directed much more at home. But its activities have targeted not only AP, but also the BBC, the Washington Post and other news outlets.

In the Syrian war, the Assad regime is also using the internet to lionize the efforts of Bashar al-Assad, and here again the Syrian Electronic Army is its most important tool. A foundland art project, conducted in 2011, traced the Facebook propaganda posts back to their origins.<sup>10</sup> The project found numerous pictures used as propaganda tools which were lifted directly from Western sources and then changed to show Bashar Assad in heroic poses. In the most dramatic example, a picture from the movie picture *Inglorious Bastards*, which showed Brad Pitt carrying a knife and his comrade pointing a pistol into the camera was changed to show Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher al-Assad. However, it is difficult to establish what this sort of "hacktivism" is supposed to achieve strategically.

## The Background Noise: The Confrontation between the Intelligence Services

When talking about cyber operations other than war, then clearly the most obvious issue that troubles governments around the world includes intelligence activities. It is in this context that the most damage has been done so far. Revelations by Edward Snowden, a former private contractor working for Booz Hamilton but associated with the National Security Agency (NSA), have triggered a debate on the extent to which governments ought to be able to monitor internet use, store data on their citizens and intrude on their internet habits. But whatever the merits of such a debate – and the debate certainly is overdue – Snowden himself acted more like the classic spy than a citizen activist. His actions and modus operandi indicate that he is more of a Kim Philby, the most famous double agent of the Cambridge Five. Philby, who worked for the British foreign intelligence service MI6, served as a double agent for the KGB and eventually defected to Moscow. The damage he did was not only in the material he forwarded to the KGB, but also to the special relationship between the British and U.S. intelligence services, a

<sup>10</sup> The author attended a presentation of the project in Cairo in April 2013. Lauren Alexander and Ghalia Elsrakbi, Simba, *The Last Prince of Ba'ath Country*. Cairo, 2012. Parts of the project can be accessed online: [<http://cargocollective.com/syrian-propagandaportal>], accessed 10. August 2014].

relationship that was sometimes seen more as a lifeline to the MI6. Though Snowden, through his journalist friend Glenn Greenwald, carefully tried to create the impression of a spy turned activist who simply wants to protect society from an overbearing and overreaching state, his actions actually indicate otherwise.

The material Snowden collected is only partially connected to NSA activities in the domestic realm. U.S. intelligence services reckon that much of what he took and may have eventually given to the KGB includes primarily military material, not at all related to domestic and foreign surveillance activities of the NSA. He has not shared his material, as WikiLeaks had done, with various news agencies, journals and newspapers, but only with a single journalist: Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian, who is now running his own website making a living out of Snowden's revelations. Edward Snowden, meanwhile, has fled to Russia of all places, still arguing that all he wanted to do was to expose an overreaching state, when clearly Russia is cracking down on internet freedoms more than any Western nation cooperating with the NSA or the NSA itself. It is telling that despite his unwillingness to stand trial for his revelations, he still maintains to have sacrificed in the name of public freedom. The merits of this particular case aside, the fact that major revelations, whether WikiLeaks or Snowden, have undermined the confidence in the intelligence services and their practices more than any spy scandal did during the Cold War, is indicative of two major developments. Firstly, the number and sheer size of intelligence agencies have created new vulnerabilities. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, due to the networked nature of intelligence and the amount that is being collected, many more eyes have access to the classified material. As a result of the sheer volume and full availability of data – in contrast to the days when classified material was produced in triplicate and tucked away securely – even a junior officer of an intelligence service can create enormous leaks. Against this background the point is not that Snowden or Manning have divulged classified material, but rather that they could do so in the first place.

The real damage of these episodes is that the activities of other intelligence services are being lost to the attentive observer. The FSB has taken a greater interest in operations abroad than its predecessor KGB and the Snowden affair is a case in point. Till this day it is unclear whether he acted alone or was perhaps working for a foreign service from the start. Yet, such ambiguity has not stopped hundreds of journalists and activists to try to be associated with him, rather than his self-proclaimed cause. This is all the more frightening since the FSB activities do not seem to be under quite the sort of political control under which the KGB had to operate during the Cold War.<sup>11</sup> Though the author of this chapter is not privy to the exact material that Manning has given to WikiLeaks and that Snowden has taken and passed on to third parties, it is safe to assume that such acts of espionage cause graver damage than in decades before. Regarded from a perspective of counterespionage, the WikiLeaks and Snowden episodes certainly have been coordinated efforts to attack the intelligence services. The affairs have demonstrated that non-state actors and individuals, such as WikiLeaks or a journalist like Glenn Greenwald can muster the same power as nation-states, when it comes to cyberspace.

<sup>11</sup> Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, *Russia's New Nobility. The Rise of the Security Services in Putin's Kremlin*. In: *Foreign Affairs*, 89, 5/2010, pp. 80-96, p. 81.

## Geopolitical Implications

Against the background of recent conflicts, it appears rather superfluous to note that cyber operations will be part of any conflict in the future. Whether cyber operations could reach the threshold of full warfare in isolation misses the point entirely. What matters is that conflicts will always extend into cyberspace and from there into more conventional realms. Cyberspace will therefore be a domain of any future conflict. However, it will in all likelihood still be possible to differentiate between those actions in cyberspace that amount to an act of war and those that will not reach that threshold, yet might still do considerable damage. But what can be assumed from the episodes described in this chapter is that the vast majority of cyber-based operations will be operations other than war. And as such they will, like most intelligence operations during the Cold War, constitute a background noise to international relations over decades to come. The damages done through such operations, however, will greatly exceed those of ordinary intelligence operations in the past. Just consider for a moment that a high level spy like Kim Philby never had access to the sort of material that low-level intelligence operatives like Edward Snowden seem to be able to access easily. All the more important, therefore, to draw conclusions from the early experiences with cyberspace outlined in this chapter.

Four conclusions present themselves, some quite straightforward, some less so. All, however, underline a theme that was present throughout this chapter. International players have reacted quite differently to the vulnerabilities created by cyberspace and the opportunities opened by it.

First, any confrontation between conventional armed forces will be preceded by sustained cyber-attacks. The first glimpse of this was offered in 2008, when Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia. When, only three years later, in March 2011 the United Nations authorized military force to protect civilians in Libya, the United States decided against a cyber-attack to take out the Libyan air defences, not wanting to set an international precedent that might come back to haunt it in future confrontations. The United States could afford to do so since the Libyan armed forces did not exactly constitute a capable and strong enemy and the allies in Operation Unified Protector could operate from a position of unquestioned superiority. However, conventional confrontations will, in all likelihood, be carried out on a more level playing field by other military players in the future and none of these might be in a position to forego the combination of conventional armed forces with cyber-based means of neutralising enemy forces or paralysing enemy command and control structures. Since the majority of confrontations do not include NATO forces, the likelihood of cyber being a part of the future battlefield actually increases.

Second, where NATO is concerned, questions related to cyber warfare are still largely treated as a hypothetical subject. There is, of course, a temptation to deal with the issue only once it arises. But since the Estonian episode the question should be front and centre among alliance members. Still, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept deals with the issue in the most abstract terms:

“Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.”<sup>12</sup>

This is certainly the broadest of all possible ways to sum up the threat. The questions NATO needs to answer is whether it regards a cyber-attack as attributable to a state, even if such a link cannot directly be ascertained. There are actions, such as the attack on Estonia in 2007 that would indicate state action even if it is being denied. But since NATO in its Strategic Concept maintains that it wants deterrence in cyberspace, it should be more straightforward in its thinking. NATO has thus far sidestepped the critical question as to whether a sustained, state-orchestrated cyber-attack would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It has also not sufficiently debated what would constitute deterrence in cyberspace. Would the alliance be prepared to respond to a cyber-attack on a NATO member state with conventional military means? When it comes to international law, such a reaction is actually justified, since it does not distinguish between cyber-based government installations and non-cyber-based ones. Deterrence in cyberspace is an attainable goal and even a feasible one, provided NATO is willing to indicate what it means by it.

Third, despite the impact that armed confrontation will have on the development of tactics and strategies that exploit potential vulnerabilities through cyberspace, the most important confrontations in cyberspace will be cyber operations other than war. These will mostly consist of efforts to win public support at home and undermine support for governments abroad. There is a myriad of possibilities to achieve these goals and at least some have been described here and employed by Russia during its conflict with Ukraine. Whether it is undermining alliances, public relations operations or intelligence gathering, cyber operations other than war are a new standard tool in the arsenal of nearly all governments. In this respect it is noteworthy that not all players understand the full implications of this trend.

Whereas Russia has developed strategies that are designed to increase its room for manoeuvre by efforts to corrode public support for governments abroad, the West still seems ill-prepared to face the onslaught of these operations. Its actions seem defensive at best, countering efforts made by Russian hackers with campaigns of its own is outside the realm of possibilities at the moment. That is despite the fact that NATO countries actually do have experience with such efforts. At the height of the Cold War, the CIA first created Radio Free Europe, which countered Soviet disinformation and propaganda in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Given that the political system established by Vladimir Putin heavily relies on disinformation and propaganda, the same vulnerability still exists. It is surprising that the West has thus far not tried to replicate its experiences and successes from the Cold War. So far, only the United States is occasionally trying

<sup>12</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Lisbon, 2010, p. 13.

to do so. Through its development agency USAID, attempts were made to indirectly finance services in Cuba. In Havana, USAID supported a service that replicated the business model of twitter, a service that is banned in Cuba. When it was revealed the United States argued that it was only a tool to help organise and exchange views. Such defences are awkward to say the least. The West would be well-advised not to be too defensive about such efforts. The bottom line is that the spreading information to offset dis-information is even a desirable activity, facilitating it as part of a broader strategy is nothing to be coy about.

Fourth, doctrinal development lags behind in Western states. Rather ironically, the West is suffering from its poor understanding of conventional forms of warfare. It has become quite common amongst European scholars and thinkers – and Germans in particular – to assume that military and politics are realms to be separated strictly. So much so that some scholars have even begun to interpret war exclusively as a sign for the failure of politics and not its continuation or natural extension. Russian and Chinese military thinking, in contrast, has clearly developed in an altogether different direction, conflating political and military spheres wherever feasible. Consider the Chinese three-pronged warfare concept, for instance. In the People's Republic's most recent white books, Chinese planners openly acknowledge that future wars will have to be won not only on the battlefields, but in the courts of public and legal opinion and through psychological warfare as well.<sup>13</sup> To that end, cyberspace is a sphere that China's military leadership wants to dominate through operations that target the popular opinion at home and abroad. It is, to no small extent, a continuation of Mao's understanding of war and warfare. The People's Republic has successfully integrated cyber operations into its approaches. Whereas its capabilities were largely concealed in the past, this is no longer the case. Concurrently, the Chinese military leadership seems more interested in creating uncertainty and ambiguity as to what resources it can employ.<sup>14</sup>

Russian strategic thinking seems to follow similar lines, even more so since in contrast to the Chinese, Russia has already put its thinking into practice. From the experience with Russian cyber operations it clearly emerges that the value of such operations is to be found in its functions outside actual warfare. They do, however, complement more conventional forms of warfare and help neutralising other, potentially, opposing actors if push comes to shove. In its confrontation with Ukraine, Russia was able to delay a coordinated European response to its aggression with its swarming operations in social media. What all these conclusions demonstrate clearly is that strategic thinking surrounding cyber issues has progressed in different directions. There is, to put it differently, a Western and an Eastern way of utilising cyberspace in times of conflict and war. And at the moment, the West seems to be limping.

<sup>13</sup> Sangkuk Lee, China's Three Warfares': Origins, Applications, and Organizations. In: *Strategic Studies*, 37, 2/2014, pp. 198-221, here p. 199.

<sup>14</sup> Jacqueline Newmyer, The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics. In: *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33, 4/2010, pp. 483-504, here p. 500.

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## International cooperation for Ensuring the Safety of Brazil's Land and Maritime Boundaries

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In contrast to much of its history (BARMAN, 1988; FAUSTO, 1998), during the XXI century Brazil has political and economic bases in place that ensure full control of its territory, resulting in substantial alterations to its land and maritime boundaries. A significant period in Brazilian history, between its Independence from colonial rule in 1822 and the early the XX century, may be summarized as an ongoing drive to uphold its physical integrity as a nation (SCHEINA, 2003). Consequently, Brazil's institutional and political structures have been reactive in terms of its national border, with part of its territories and subsequently federative states still serving as buffer areas shielding it from the rest of the continent. However, due to its economic progress since the 1970s, a slow and difficult – but reasonable – process of infrastructure integration has been under way among its various regions, with demographic expansion into its heartlands definitively dismissing the risk of political fragmentation, turning Brazil's land and maritime boundaries into assets fostering its national development and international insertion.

Because of its history, there are still some anachronisms, prompting the need for Brazil to review its border policies. Instead of reactive, static, centralized and exclusionary structures and policies, the nation must develop a pro-active stance towards its national boundaries, viewing them as throughflow areas that must be carefully meshed with its States, in addition to being more collaborative and inclusionary in response to efforts from its South American and South Atlantic neighbors.

Moreover, Brazil's border policies must be tailored to its regional capabilities and interests. Its economic development is already interdependent on several countries in this region, extending to Africa. A similar trend is occurring with the security arrangements proposed by Brazil, mainly the Union of South American Nations and the *Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA)*. Thus, its border policies must be able to respond to Brazil's need to preserve its sovereignty, while also serving as tools for these two foreign policies.

This paper begins with a brief but necessary conceptual discussion of the definition of a national border and its political implications, followed by a synthesis of the main actions undertaken by Brazil in border areas, with the key references being initiatives on its Northern or Amazon borders. Finally, some lessons learned from the implementation of Amazon border projects in Brazil are presented, as recommendations for the design and development of a South Atlantic Surveillance System and the institutional bases required for this initiative.

### **Conceptual Discussion: Reviewing the Understanding of Borders**

Initially, we must define what is understood by a boundary or border. At the moment, the most widely accepted definition of a border is a division between two territorial entities, or demarcating a territorial entity. Thus, borders may be considered as lines of separation and contact not only among human groups, but also territories (POPESCU, 2013).

However, steadily growing transnational flows have been undermining this definition of a border, weakening the classic concepts of the Nation-State, particularly rigid borders, as they are becoming increasingly more porous and dynamic.

Transnational threats have resulted more porous State borders from the horizontal standpoint, diluting the idea of separating domestic and foreign affairs from the vertical standpoint, in terms of different levels of analysis: international security, national security and human security (MEDEIROS FILHO, 2010). Thus, in areas where relationships are firm between two societies, through either the gateway or transnational crimes threatening the stability of the national State, they also develop as a point of contact among different societies, fostering their integration.

Along these lines, Raza (2014) highlights the dual nature of a border zone as an integral part of a national territory and also as a place that transcends this geographical boundary. This is consequently a region where domestic and foreign security problems merge and meld, requiring a specific security framework to address these needs. Following this logic, the author argues that a border security policy must take into account the fact that this zone is characterized by the convergence of four major concerns for States: national security; law enforcement security; economic development and the construction of identity.

A border security policy must also take into account the interdependence patterns of security problems affecting these zones, as rising international circulation and the extension of global interdependence during the closing decades of the XX century also caused feelings of insecurity for societies, especially with regard to border porosity.

Along these lines, it may be argued that new threats to security in an integration process transcend State borders and, on certain occasions outstrip their abilities to react individually, giving rise to a context of interdependence and creating the need for collaborative actions. Nevertheless, national defense frameworks (including that of Brazil) still frequently adopt unilateral steps to preserve their territories, grounded on understandings dating back to the XIX century.

For Raza (2014), the contemporary presence of more players in a geographical area, ranging from State Governments to local communities and transnational groups, creates a different environment that demands an approach no longer based simply on a military presence. Thus, bearing in mind the issue of interdependence within this space, a broader-based approach is needed, taking into account not only the security context, but also political realities found in neighboring nations.

Drawing up border policies requires that threats on outlying borders be clearly identified and demarcated, otherwise resources may be expended unnecessarily. This is particularly valid in terms of Brazil, where outlays on defense must be planned carefully, as resources are scarce in a country with pressing needs to enhance the wellbeing of its population. Nevertheless, the necessary attributes of a border policy must be understood, in order to avoid running the risk of spending even more money continuing to do the same thing while expecting better outcomes.

### **Brazilian Border Policies: Dilemma between Collaborative Actions and Territorial Defense**

When examining how the Brazilian Government has perceived the issue of border security, it is clear that this is not currently ranked as a matter of national security, but rather of public safety, and when this is actually addressed as a matter of national security, it is viewed through old paradigms. This awareness arises from the fact that a border is perceived as a peripheral zone with many problems, where illegals slip across borders and cause public safety problems in coastal areas, as most of the Brazilian population lives in urban areas close to the sea (DORFMAN, 2013).

This situation becomes evident when analyzing security problems in South America, particularly in the Amazon context. As Amazonia is a multinational rainforest, it is crucial to understand border dynamics, as dealing with Amazonia to a large extent means addressing Brazil's Northern border, which is shared with Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela and all three Guianas. It is thus necessary to understand how the security of these borders is handled (MARTINS; MOREIRA, 2011).

Along these lines, the Amazon region is perceived in a security context as a redoubt where drug trafficking networks proliferate, running through the Andean and Amazon nations with the potential to affect Brazil's borders, as they are viewed by the Brazilian State as demographically empty areas that are unstable and easily co-opted by drug dealers (COUTO, 2013).

Brazil's traditional border distinctions have developed in terms of these boundaries, with a unifying impact that extends beyond its geographically combined area of interest, resulting in border policies grounded on deny-deter type measures of persuasion. In other words, the strategy of repelling or denying illegal activities or assaults is added to deterring any potential threats or enemies (RAZA, 2014). In view of this intersection between public safety and international security, a deny-deter strategy seems coherent, as this includes military threats and non-conventional targets, such as drug traffickers, qualified as invasive (RAZA, 2014).

However, the vast areas involved, the type of terrain and rising flows of lawful and unlawful activities in fact leave this type of approach patchy and incomplete, particularly because this strategy requires an efficient surveillance system in order to foresee and respond to border breaches, able to face the challenges imposed the topography of the Amazon region, where current technological resources still leave much to be desired.

Along these lines, the Brazilian Government is striving to set up an efficient surveillance complex with the Amazonia Surveillance System (SIVAM), within a context of greater concern for its Northern border. However, in view of its past performance and weak powers of dissuasion, it could well be argued that this system is subject to many faults, including the absence of a cooperative approach with the other Amazon countries that share Brazil's Northern border.

Looking at the initial stages of the SIVAM Project, it is clear that this was not implemented within a cooperative logic as, between 1990 and 1996 when this Project was launched, no other Amazon nation was invited to participate in its preparation. We cannot fail to stress that, with the rising importance and participation of Brazil in this region, the Brazilian Government is starting to offer possibilities of sharing the information obtained through the SIVAM Project. However, these initiatives are found more at the level of discourse rather than effective actions. As a result, in view of the security problem patterns in Amazonia, it is clear that they present a high level of interdependence for securitization and de-securitization processes, as well as for the networks that run through this region, resulting in the poor effectiveness of unilateral actions and the need for collaborative activities.

Within this logic it is important to stress that surveillance systems must also be designed and developed as important tools for cooperation and the establishment of bonds of trust with neighboring countries. Initially, because electromagnetic waves are invariably likely to trespass on other territories, as they extend throughout the entire area until reflected back, in addition to the fact that effective radar services must detect over-the-border threats (RAZA, 2014).

It is thus important to note that the development of policies for borderlands must be a vector opening up opportunities for regional cooperation initiatives. Along these lines and with regard to border security policies, Brazil's National Defense Strategy (2008) established a goal of creating a nationwide system that would encompass all its land borders and maritime boundaries with the Integrated Boundary Monitoring

System (SISFRON) run by the Brazilian Army, connected to the Brazilian Airspace Defense System (SISDABRA) run by the Brazilian Air Force and the Blue Amazonia Management System (SISGAAZ) run by the Brazilian Navy. These actions would enhance and modernize the surveillance of Brazilian borders, opening up greater possibilities with neighboring nations.

However, although it is acknowledged that, despite Brazil's political willingness to firm up relationships with neighboring nations in order to establish security and defense mechanisms in diplomatic actions, operational cooperation initiatives focused on defense are still incipient, with no institutional backing and lacking support to uphold them. Thus, the fact that security conceived in the form of a State and defense as specific acts, arising from the national security doctrine drawn up by the Superior War College (ESG) is deeply rooted in Brazil's border and defense policies. It is consequently necessary to rethink these concepts, bearing in mind the transnational nature of these threats and the need for collaborative actions.

As a result, when addressing the need to combat transnational threats, border-closing policies have been adopted, within a logic of national introspection, as shown by the Strategic Border Plan.

We may attribute the nature of Brazil's defense policies to the fact that the Armed Forces, being assigned responsibility for drawing up these policies, tend to resist policies pursuing shared security with neighboring nations and innovations in the security and defense framework.

Nevertheless, rising concern in Brazil about its borders is opening up new possibilities for cooperation<sup>1</sup>. Although Brasilia has been striving to cooperate with its Amazon neighbors, this is still limited to joint actions launched against drug trafficking in border regions, mainly involving the Air Forces of Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, including the following operations: BOLBRA, COLBRA, VENBRA and PERBRA. These are designed to establish tighter airspace control and surveillance over border areas, in order to hamper the actions of criminal groups using aircraft to carry drugs, weapons and ammunition.

However, the bilateral, rather than multilateral, nature of Brazil's cross-border cooperation must be stressed, due largely to difficulties in developing a regional border security policy. This would involve complex factors, as dealing with border security requires addressing not only long-standing concerns such as protecting national sovereignty, but must also include the broader implications of this region which are interconnected or even interdependent. With regard to difficulties in implementing collaborative actions in the Andean-Amazon region, we noted that there is a lack of agreement among the countries in this region on the means to be deployed for dealing with problems affecting regional security.

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<sup>1</sup> Brazil's border policy was by far its most important defense policy in 2012 (VAZ; CORTINHAS, 2013).

Nevertheless, we note an ambiguity in Brazilian policies. While engaging in initiatives that foster regional integration, reflecting a project pursued by Brasilia for this region and firming up its leadership in South America, Brazilian leadership is still limping, due partly to its lack of capacity, particularly in the military sector, establishing its status as the mainstay of the integration process in South America, still more in terms of security and defense.

Medeiros Filho (2010) mentions that a stumbling-block hampering regional cooperation is the dissuatory nature of the current defense policies implemented by the countries in the region, as the idea of cooperation is grounded on sincerity and trust, while dissuasion is underpinned by mistrust and fear of potential adversaries (SOARES; OLIVEIRA, 2007, p. 290 apud MEDEIROS FILHOS, 2010). As a result, the military mindset is still strongly rooted in the traditional security and defense values grounded on the primacy of the Nation State, steered by traditional threats where a neighbor is still seen a latent menace, constituting a negative factor for regional integration.

However, an awareness that the security problems proliferating along Brazil's Northern border cannot be resolved unilaterally is gradually changing the stance adopted by the Brazilian Armed Forces towards regional integration. This shift in perception, together with the signature of cooperation treaties, prompted the Brazilian Air Force to invest in bilateral operations intended to establish specific coordination procedures underpinning the Airborne Defense of Amazonia (MARQUES, 2007), as shown above.

Following this logic, the direction indicated by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense to a large extent embodies an awareness of a sub-regional dynamic that is becoming increasingly important. The stress on versatile, integrated and deployment-ready forces reflects an arrangement in which collective security may come into play at any time. This requires the ability to act within the context of a reciprocal sub-regional aid arrangement that is currently under formation (BRIGAGÃO, PROENÇA JR., 2002).

This also means assigning Brazil responsibility for the seamless harmonization of the demands arising from different security commitments. It means finding an even balance between the availability of the Armed Forces as defined by these arrangements, the need for self-defense by the Brazilian State and the resources that are allocated to defense. There is consequently a specific weighting established by the Ministry of Defense in terms of the rapid availability of specific levels of strength, without which State security commitments are meaningless.

From this standpoint, Brazilian leadership in setting up the South American Defense Council (SADC) shows that for the first time Brazil could have a security project for the region, playing the role that has traditionally been held by the United States, now that it is withdrawing from this region due to other strategic priorities. As a result, it may be inferred that Brazil could establish a regional hegemony with the consent of the USA. As a result, the relative disengagement of the USA from South America may offer an opportunity to build up a continent-wide security system that is tailored to specific regional characteristics. This is particularly valid because cross-border cooperation also

fosters regional integration. as it encourages the construction of regional public assets in order to respond to situations where no individual solutions are found (RHI-SAUSI; ODONNE, 2011).

As a result, we stress that cross-border cooperation is important for the interests of governments in fostering regional policies, resulting in the redefinition of government articulation and also national sovereignty. Nevertheless, there are still no institutions in South America or Brazil for putting such cooperation into practice. For Brazil to play a leading role in South America, a variety of political dynamics are needed in which the cooperative attitudes and wishes of Brazil are associated with its predominance in geographic, demographic, economic and technological terms.

Part of the problem is rooted in the mutual mistrust still looming over the South American nations that are wary of Brazil's "imperialistic" stance. Recent events involving Brazil and nearby countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) underscore this feeling and "show that the elites in these countries are still very sensitive to past discourses and images related to Brazil's expansionist intentions" (VILLA; OSTOS, 2005). As a result, it is clear that one of the main pillars underpinning the construction of cooperative systems is trust among the players in the Amazon region, with much still to be done in order to ensure the effectiveness of collaborative strategies.

Cross-border cooperation ranks as a major tool for fostering regional integration, as it underpins the creation of public regional assets in closer contact among peoples. Following this logic, initiatives related to security and defense prove even more valuable as they enhance trust among the Armed Forces of the countries involved in collaborative actions. Nevertheless, we note that in order to ensure the feasibility of these initiatives, Brazil must become more firmly engaged, at least in the initial stage of setting up a regional regime designed for this purpose.

When establishing a multilateral border regime, it is important to acknowledge, as stressed by Salvador Raza (2014), that the border policy must take the specific characteristics into consideration that define relationships among the States involved. This means that it is not possible to work with one-size-fits-all strategies, as no border zones are the same. However, although each border context has its own specific characteristics, there are general principles guiding border security.

Nevertheless, expertise built up through past experiences (such as the SIVAM system) must be taken into account when constructing Brazil's national surveillance system and certainly for the design and development of the Blue Amazonia Monitoring System (SIGAAZ) forming the main vectors ensuring the security of Brazil's land borders and maritime boundaries, as these projects are still in their initial stages, in order to avoid a situation of one-sided benefits, as occurred with the SIVAM project, due to its inward-focused concept.

## ZPCSA and South Atlantic Surveillance

The re-launch of the *Zone of Peace and Cooperation* in the *South Atlantic* (ZPCSA) after the end of the Cold War and subsequent to 9/11 is certainly one of the main accomplishments of Brazil's foreign policy. On the one hand, it legitimizes a self-administered regional security project for the South Atlantic area. On the other, it establishes institutional bases among several Brazilian initiatives that are already under way in South America, and others being implemented in West Africa (VISENTINI, 2013).

In order to achieve its purposes, and in a manner that is even broader than presented above, the control of shipping lines is a challenging activity that requires the greatest possible number of collaborative players and joint resources. Even more strikingly than for land borders, Brazil's South Atlantic boundaries are dynamic, in both political and economic terms. Consequently, there is no possibility of 'closing' these boundaries.

In contrast to the SIVAM system, with a considerable length of time between the construction of the surveillance project and South American security initiatives, the development of the SISGAAZ system took place in a synergetic manner with the consolidation of the ZPCSA Project. Despite difficulties inherent in harmonizing the expectations of a larger number of very different member countries, the wealth and potential of the South Atlantic makes collaborative surveillance actions a collective asset that is worth much more than any other traditional onshore collaboration initiatives in South America.

It is thus important that the development for the SISGAAZ Project is not merely a vector for stepping up the operational and strategic activities of the Brazilian Navy. It should have firm political steering and oversight so that it can become a vector fostering the collaboration of Brazil with other ZPCSA members. Along these lines, the relationship between the Brazilian Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is important.

Another lesson learned from the SIVAM track-record is related to its public counterpart: The Amazonia Protection System (SIPAM). In this case, a problem inherent with its conceptualization is how the data collected by the SIVAM system would generate or provide input for the actions undertaken by the many different agencies related to public policies in the Amazon region, including the Armed Forces, the Federal Police, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) and others. For maritime boundaries there are fewer State agencies involved, but they depend on institutional, procedural and even legal bases, in order to plan and conduct their activities.


Furthermore, the main problem to be avoided is a gap between the data produced and the actions needed, caused by activities during the data analysis stage, ensuring that events identified as relevant or pressing receive a prompt response from the State through a government agency with the necessary actions. This architecture is perhaps the main institutional challenge of any border surveillance system, and is really a major challenge to any multi-state collaborative proposal. This is because it requires constant trade-offs in order to make intelligent use of information, with a status that swings between being a sovereign national resource and a multilateral collaboration asset.



Consequently, it is quite clear that the development of human resources and institutional bases is just as important as the technological apparatus required for border surveillance activities, with all these components necessarily being steered politically in order to ensure that their functions and uses are deployed as fully as possible.

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"L'Afrique nouveau terrain de jeu des émergents".

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## Africa, Brazil, Europe: could a New Trilateralism bring International Stability?

Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky

Brazil and France both have a pro-active African policy. Each country has encouraged its respective European and South American neighbours to join it. Since the 2000 Cairo Summit, European heads of State have met regularly with their African counterparts. South American and African leaders have done likewise since the 2006 Abuja Summit in Nigeria. These exclusive, self-contained international relationships have been evolving in parallel. Up until now, no consideration has been given to interlinking them to create a triangular relationship between these three geopolitical areas.

There are many reasons for this, deriving from previous experience of a triangular relationship that, albeit ancient, has left a deep wound in the African and American consciousness in regard to Europe; that of slavery. Globalisation is creating a system of global interdependence, but its operation is based on competition. Central regulatory control of the world, be it diplomatic, commercial, financial or cultural, generates at least as much, if not more, opposition than cooperation. Historically at the periphery, Africa and South America have an inclination to unite against the old world power decision-makers, routinely branded as “the international community” or “the West”<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> This definition and opposition are denied by Georges Corm, in « Orient-Occident, la fracture imaginaire », Paris La Découverte, 2005

As such, alliances come hand in hand with conflict: The global system that builds them and destroys them is unstable. It is fundamentally orientated around economies of scale. However, ruled by force and by the right of the mightiest, it leads to disputes and wars. Not only Africa, but also Europe and the Americas, suffer from the negative consequences of misruled globalisation. It is evident in the return of wars and national protests in Europe, internal wars in Africa as well as escalating crime and deterioration of public safety on the American continent.

The pursuit of a new, balanced dynamic, able to mitigate the uncertainties generated by disorderly globalisation, is underway. There is nothing particularly revolutionary about this. It is just a question of reviving a strategy of multilateralism and equally shared collective management of the world's affairs and crises. We aren't there yet. But a reinforced cooperation between Africa, South America and Europe, countries that are already involved bilaterally, could be a starting point<sup>2</sup>.

### **Acknowledging the shared history, an uncomfortable but viable option**

The trilateral relationship between Africa, the Ancient and the New World, known historically as "triangular trade", left bitter memories on the African continent and in the Americas, and a sense of shame in Europe<sup>3</sup>.

Key to understanding the difficulty of building this new trilateral relationship is history; the memory of an unequal past. For five centuries, the African, American and European continents had operated a triangular trade. Europeans traded African men and women in the Americas in exchange for sugar, coffee, gold and silver. This was a lucrative business that boosted the economy of Hamburg, Liverpool and Nantes. But this was a trade on unequal terms that led to the forced deportation of millions of African people. Furthermore, colonisation and imperial relations have continued fuelling this ambivalence between trade partners. Brazil and its neighbours, all be they formally independent nations, have depended economically, commercially and culturally on the great European powers. Africa, colonised by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, endured a forced tête-à-tête with its colonisers until independence.

This triangular trade, which started in the 16th century shortly after the Europeans' arrival in America, was definitively suspended in 1888 with the abolition of slavery in Brazil. From the beginning of the 19th Century slavery survived covertly, having been condemned by successive prohibitions in a growing number of European and American countries. This period is often cited to justify bilateral African and South American initiatives. Europe, and in particular its former colonial powers are characterised as the guilty parties to validate their exclusion from new African-Latin American institutional relations. The same reasons have been cited when building other exclusive bilateral

<sup>2</sup> About Brazil, Africa, Europe and the world, see KAS, « X Forte de Copacabana Conference , International Security, A European-South American Dialogue », Rio de Janeiro, KAS, 2013

<sup>3</sup> About guilty feelings in France, read Françoise Vergès, « La mémoire enchainée, Questions sur l'esclavage », paris, Pluriel-Hachette, 2006

associations with China, India, Russia or the United States. Rhetoric and analysis on both sides gave a scientific polish to those new contradictions. In any case, they allow a space in which to express mutual recriminations.

The trauma of slavery made such an enormous impact on consciousness of those involved, that a century after human trafficking terminated, Africa had all but completely disappeared from Brazilian and South American political and commercial radars. The reconstruction of a continual bilateral relationship between Africa and South America is quite recent. It has been founded on the acknowledgement of the past, a shared memory of slave trade. Reminders of those tragic events, the “pilgrimage” of Brazilian president Lula da Silva to the slave trade port Gorée that faces Dakar, have provided moral and political justification to rebuild relationships between South America and Africa on an equal footing. French cooperation with Africa is based on a need to make amends after a history of mercantile and colonial exploitation, a view endorsed by the European community in whose ranks are several member states with a colonial past in Africa and America.

The past is like a toolbox, to be used according to the political needs of the time. History, like economics, is more a political than a scientific issue. A different reading of the same facts can or could open the way for new interpretations<sup>4</sup>. The triangular trade was morally reprehensible and was made illegal. So was slavery, the commodity of that trade. However, paradoxically, slavery was abolished by England and France well before it was in Brazil, in the United States or in Colombia. In 2001, a bill voted in France on a proposal by Christine Taubira, a member of parliament from French Guyana, condemned the Atlantic slave trade as a crime against humanity<sup>5</sup>. Whereas Brazil struggles to recognize its diversity “O mito ideologia da « democracia racial », criou uma falsa identidade nacional, (...) permitindo que o racismo estrutural se instaurasse de maneira permanente »<sup>6</sup>. Here we see evidence of an evolution underway, debates across society that will enable the emergence of healthier relationships. This is especially crucial when we consider how this unequal trade has impacted and intertwined our cultural heritage. Brazil as well as the Caribbean, and less visibly other American States, have an identity strongly influenced by the African population<sup>7</sup>. At the end of the 19th century, West Africa integrated African-Americans in Liberia and African-Brazilians in Benin, Togo and Nigeria. In the last years Europe has also welcomed people from Africa and Latin America. This human element, borne of the triangulation and its myriad of individual decisions, has opened the doors for greater cooperation.

<sup>4</sup> « ...les objets du monde social peuvent être perçus et énoncés de différentes façons (...) liées à la pluralité des points de vue, et à toutes les luttes symboliques pour la production (...) de la vision du monde légitime ». Pierre Bourdieu « langage et pouvoir symbolique », Paris, Fayard-Points461, 2001, pp300/301

<sup>5</sup> See Christiane Taubira, « Egalité pour les exclus », Paris, ed. TempsPrésent, 2009

<sup>6</sup> Carlos Moore, « A Africa que incomoda, sobre a prolematização do legado africano no cotidiano brasileiro », Belo Horizonte, Nandyala, 2010

<sup>7</sup> See Darien J. Davis, « Beyond Slavery, The Multilayered Legacy of Africans in Latin-America and Caribbean », Ianham, Bowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007. And about Brazil, among other references, Mônica Lima, « Heranças Africanas no Brasil », Rio de Janeiro, CEAP, 2009.

## Current global dialogue and trade trends

More than fifty years after African independence and two hundred years after independence in Latin America, the game has changed. Africa and the Americas, and Brazil in Latin America, have rebuilt relationships with many touch-points. The compartmentalisation created by bilateral relationships between Africans and Latin Americans centred on Europe has lost its exclusive nature. The game is now open as Africans and Latin Americans are talking directly independently. Other stakeholders such as the United States, China, India and Russia are interfering with this diplomatic development.

Today everybody is discussing and trading many diverse goods and ideas. In contrast to the relationship that existed from the 16th to the 19th century, the framework is now mostly bilateral. Europeans have set up links with the Americas under different forms and various situations – and have established others with Africa. Since their independence, Africans and Americans have built transatlantic bridges. Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil for the most part, have initiated relationships bilaterally, successively and in parallel with several African countries. Presidential and ministerial visits have been followed by the opening of embassies in the country and the creation of long-term cooperation structures<sup>8</sup>. Brazil is playing a central and dynamic<sup>9</sup> role in this relationship.

At the moment, these exchanges lack global coherence. This despite the fact that Brazil has developed a cooperation policy, the CID<sup>10</sup>, mostly directed towards Africa, inspired by the similar initiatives of Northern countries<sup>11</sup>. Discussions at bilateral meetings between South Americans and Africans, between Europeans and Africans as well as between Latin Americans and Europeans are certainly similar and even sometimes conflicting. There is a temptation to create a global system based on confrontation of opposites parties. The underlying rhetoric of insubordination has mobilised the most radical of the peripheral players in Africa and especially in Latin America. Resorting to moral discourse based on the supremacy of western values has justified interventions and wars. However at the same time, everybody had to take into account a relative but real redistribution of economic and diplomatic power. Coveted and feared at the same time, China is at the centre of those questions<sup>12</sup>. As second world economic power and most likely largest military power, China has shaken the traditional power hierarchy in just a few years. Will China play a rebalancing role for Africans and Latin Americans in their relationship deemed unequal with the West? Or will it take a potential predatory approach, much as the “old” centres did in the past? Does China represent a market to pull out the West from the economic crisis? Or will it prove to be a competitor in the former captive markets in Africa and Latin America? Publications on the topic abound and

<sup>8</sup> Jean Jacques Kourliandsky, *Le rapprochement afro-latino-américain : signe d'un monde en mutation ?*, in Sebastian Santander, « L'Afrique, nouveau terrain de jeu des émergents », Paris, Khartala, 2014

<sup>9</sup> Sebastian Santander, *La coopération brésilienne avec l'Afrique*, Paris, Revue Défense Nationale, n°738, mars 2011 ; Coll., *Le Brésil et l'Afrique*, Paris, Géopolitique africaine, n°35, juillet-septembre 2009 ;

<sup>10</sup> *Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento*

<sup>11</sup> Carlos R.S. Milani, Bianca Suyama, Luana L. Lopes, « Políticas de Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento no Norte e no Sul : que lições e desafios para o Brasil ? », São Paulo, FES, 2013

<sup>12</sup> Guadalupe Paz, Riordan Roett, « La presencia de China en el hemisferio occidental », Buenos Aires, Zorral, 2009. African opinion in, Tidiane N'Diaye, « Le jaune et le noir », Paris, Gallimard-Continents Noirs, 2013

are contradictory, and so are the initiatives taken by governments on all sides, African, Latin American and European.

The intensity of the debate reveals what's at stake. This is also shown in the fact that controlling minds has become critical. Think tanks, political theorists and practitioners impose narratives that support their own interests and vision of the world. From Argentina, Marcelo Gullo<sup>13</sup> defends the end of the centre, moved aside by a conquering periphery. BRICS' emergence is seen from Brazil as an additional element of world power order upheaval<sup>14</sup>. Speaking in Syrte in 2009 to his peers of the African Union, Brazilian president Luiz "Lula" da Silva expressed Brazil's goals: "O Brasil no vem à Africa para expirar a culpa de um passado colonial. Tampouco vemos a Africa como uma imensa reserva de recursos naturais a serem explorados. O Brasil deseja ser parceiro (..) Só assim nos tornaremos atores-e no meras vitimas-, na transformação da atual ordem mundial"<sup>15</sup>.

Since 2008, the G-8 club increased to 20 members. Both the WTO and FAO are led by Brazilian director- generals. When celebrating its 50th anniversary the African Union invited two "external" presidents, the Brazilian and French heads of state. However in the West and in the United States, perception is rather different. The general academic discourse insists on the limited impact of the development of new international powers and tends to highlight their contradictions. This viewpoint was demonstrated in particular by Ruchir Sharma, who talks about the emerging-markets myth<sup>16</sup> and questions BRICS' sustainability and rise.

### **Trilateral cooperation advancing multilateralism to create stability**

Today, the establishment of a trilateral relationship between Africa, Latin America and Europe is still, at best, in draft phase. By some it is considered incongruous, the players incompatible, given the tensions and complex rivalries generated by bilateral initiatives.

At this stage, the question is whether post-Cold War international contradictions and their justifying rhetoric are still relevant. Isn't this topic actually related to the question of the new meaning of the world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall? The competition inherent in bi-polarity, the rivalry between "East" and "West" used to oppose two ideologies, policies, cultures and economies. Today's post-Cold War world is based on the largely shared concept of free market competition. But this free competition has no opposite poles. All manner of alliances on all continents are blending interests and countries.

The attack on the United States on 11th September 2001 created a foundation and a direction to this divide. Since the attack, North America has redefined its world vision based

<sup>13</sup> Marcelo Gullo, « La insubordinación fundante », Buenos Aires, Biblos, 2008

<sup>14</sup> Paulo Visentini, Gabrile Adam, Maíra Vieira, André Silva, Analúcia Pereira, « BRICS, As Potências Emergentes », Petrópolis, Editora Vozes, 2013

<sup>15</sup> In Pedro Escosteguy Cardoso, « A nova arquitetura africana de paz e segurança : implicações para o multilateralismo e as relações do Brasil com a Africa », Brasília, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2011

<sup>16</sup> Ruchir Sharma, « Broken Brics », New York, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2012

on the defence of its own interest. An entire ideology was reactivated to justify this new frontier. It blends the defence of WASP identity, and protection of the US strategic interest to the nobler pursuits of expanding and securing democracy and market economy.

The current “laissez-faire” attitude results in an international community that is at once divided and mobilised by new antagonisms. This wayward trend, that professes to gather people according to a “friend-foe” axis, is tainted by uncertainty and brings conflict. The North, which is the West encompassing to Japan, Australia and New Zealand, is set against the South with its fluctuating borders. This divide progressively replaces the former split between East and West. Meanwhile Africa, Latin America and Europe seem to accept how they have been divided as an outcome of this policy. Over the past ten years, countries of “the centre” have increased the number of international interventions in the name of human rights. Other countries rejected those military interventions as contrary to the respect of national sovereignty. Allegiances were unclear in 2002–2003 during the first great Western-led operations in Iraq. Later crises in Iran, Libya, Syria and Gaza eased differences.

However, in parallel to these crises, Africans, Europeans and Latin Americans developed cooperation partnerships two by two<sup>17</sup>. Three-party initiatives were actually created in the context of specialised forums that were managed multilaterally. At the Rio+20 conference, France, Brazil and Africa laid the foundations of a shared research programme against desertification<sup>18</sup>. It can go further than that. “The enemy is an [intellectual] construct, it must be therefore possible to deconstruct it”<sup>19</sup>. The quest for a new global balance, that seeks to check the many different global contradictions, would require that we recognize the complexity of the international situations, develop interwoven strategies and refuse the alternative of mutual exclusion. Achille Mbembe, historian and political scientist from Cameroon, accurately described the decreasingly linear context of Africa. Nothing is certain anymore, including for Latin America, Europe and their mutual relations. “France is not the centre of the world anymore (...) Chinese, Indian or Brazilian levers should be put in motion. (But) it would be a pity if the former trade on unequal terms would be substituted by a new system in which the continent continues to play the role of raw material provider.”<sup>20</sup>

Could Africa, Latin America and Europe develop parallel bilateral and trilateral policies to meet sector-specific goals, that would oppose or draw the parties closer according to the field? Again, this leads one to ask the more general and fundamental question of the organisation of the world under a multilateral approach, or according to the more uncertain and hazardous rules of a competitive and “complicit”<sup>21</sup> multipolar order.

<sup>17</sup> See in particular World Bank/Ipea, « Le partenariat Afrique Brésil » ; Hubert Védrine, Lionel Zinsou, Tidjane Thiam, Jean-Michel Séverino, Hakim El Karoui, « Un partenariat pour l’avenir, Pluriel-Fayard, 2014 ; Jean-Pierre Dufau, Jean-Luc Reitzer, « France et Amérique latine : de l’amitié au partenariat », Paris, Assemblée nationale, 2010

<sup>18</sup> Three-party conferences of Fortaleza (2010), Mendoza (2011) et Niamey (2011) organised with CGEE (Brazil), IRD (France) and APGMV (Africa) sanctioned by a signed agreement in Marseille in 2012.

<sup>19</sup> Pierre Conesa, in « La fabrication de l’ennemi », Paris, Robert Laffont, 2011

<sup>20</sup> Achille Mbembe, « Sortir de la grande nuit », Essai sur l’Afrique décolonisée », Paris, La Découverte, 2013

<sup>21</sup> Using Bertrand Badie’s phrase, « La diplomatie de connivence », Paris, la Découverte, 2013







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## Brazil – Defence without Threat

Alfredo G. A. Valladão

Throughout history, regardless of the political regime, it has always been difficult to reconcile diplomacy and defence policy. Diplomats by definition must face threats and resolve conflict using dialogue and negotiation. This requires tactical dexterity, cool strategic insight, cunning, empathy and treachery. A conflict that erupts or endures is considered a failure of diplomatic effort. By contrast the military is trained to use force. It's duty is to risk its own existence to protect the community that depends upon it, and if possible to defeat or at least neutralise the violent threats of the enemy. War and military intervention are violent acts that can comprise "blunders", cruelty and crime but they can respond as well to moral necessity and legitimate objectives.

Ideally, these two essential State functions should complement one another. A "spineless" diplomacy can quickly become weak-willed. Military might is blind without guidelines or negotiated political objectives. It is not often we find these two state functions working seamlessly together. More often than not we witness an oscillation between appeasement and hubris. The challenge of managing a precarious balance between these foreign policy mechanisms attests to the difficulty of bringing together different traditions, work methodologies and the rivalries between these two great and powerful State bureaucracies. There is no magic solution; the answer is not to be found not in ideals but in the history and geography of each nation.. "I am me and my circumstance" wrote Ortega y Gasset.

There are, of course, idiosyncrasies when it comes to the complex relationship between diplomats and military in Brazil. Today, the two entities must concede to the fact that re-defining their relationship is increasingly imperative. The Ministry of External Relations (MER) has been increasingly obliged to integrate security and defence dimensions into the diplomatic agenda and has set up a basic organisational structure that enables institutional and “official” dialogue with the military. The military in turn must respond to the recent emergence of security and defence concerns within the Brazilian government and the resultant priority that has been given to establishing an official point of view, as well as the implementation of a Defence Ministry (DM), budgeting tools and arms acquisition. Coordination between defence and foreign policy is, however, only in its early stages. At the moment, despite initial tentative steps, the decision-making process is predominantly focused on the President’s office. Even a simple consultation between MER and DM remains subject to the State’s highest authority’s directives.

### The Security of Isolation

A foreign observer might find it odd that an important sovereign nation such as Brazil waited until the end of the 20th century to create a Defence ministry, considering that the expertise and capability of the Brazilian MER (dubbed Itamaraty) has been well-recognized for a century. Such a discrepancy in the State organisation is due first and foremost to the geographic position of the country. One could argue that for such a vast and rich State, Brazil is in a *sui generis* position: it doesn’t threaten anybody and isn’t threatened by anyone. Located in the Southern Atlantic, far away from the planet’s greatest conflict zones, it has never faced any genuine security threat to its existence. Aside from the colonial era capture of Rio de Janeiro by the French corsair René Duguay-Trouin in 1711, no important town nor essential part of the national territory has ever been occupied or even threatened.

Since its independence in 1822, Brazil has in effect been protected from great powers by the immensity of the Oceans that separates it from Europe and North America. It was also sheltered from potential imperialistic ambitions of other military powers by the implicit guarantee of the British Royal Navy, and later the US Navy. The strategic relationship with England is rooted in the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1373, the oldest military pact in the world, which was renewed and reinforced during the Napoleonic wars. Moreover Brazil was the first country in the American hemisphere to officially welcome President James Monroe’s famous 1823 declaration proclaiming that the United States would consider any attempt of intervention or re-colonisation of European powers in the Americas as an aggression. It is quite significant that even today, despite the Brazilian government’s clear mistrust of “Anglo-Saxons” in general and of the United States and NATO in particular, the United Kingdom and the United States remain the main weapons’ providers to Brazil. Likewise, the traditional annual navy exercise UNITAS in partnership with the US Navy continues to be the main Brazilian Navy military exercise as it has since 1959.

Scale is also an important deterrent factor for its South American neighbours. Brazil is a giant in the subcontinent. As large as the whole Europe until the Ural, its territory is protected by the hostile vastness of the Amazonian forest and wide empty spaces on both sides of its

Western borders. Until very recently, the Brazilian population was practically only inhabiting the Atlantic coast while people in neighbouring countries settled in the Andes or on the Pacific coast. Brazil is simply too enormous and invulnerable for another South American state to envisage a military action. The Plata basin was the only region in which there was permanent contact with another nation and therefore the only source of genuine geopolitical tensions. The war of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay (1864-1870) was the only major conflict in which Brazil took part but it was more of a boundary dispute than a war which threatened the State's national integrity. As for the historical rivalry with Argentina, it never led to serious conflict. Even the nuclear arms development race between the two countries in the 1970-80s was able to be stopped by a bilateral agreement to abandon this type of weapon and the implementation of an exemplary mutual control system. The creation of Mercosur in 1991 changed the historical cycle of dormant rivalry between Buenos Aires and Brasilia into a sustainable cooperation relationship.

### **Internationalist isolationism**

Inevitably the lack of clearly identifiable enemies has had direct consequences on foreign policy and the organisation of the armed forces. Accordingly, Brazil's national sovereignty has been built by diplomats, a group that has evolved since the end of the 19th century into an ordered elite body, prestigious and respected. Brazilian diplomats base their actions on the idea that their mission is to serve the State and not merely passing governments. Almost all of Brazil's borders were established through negotiation or arbitration with the objective of securing recognition *de jure* from neighbouring countries (including the adjacent Amazonian France) as such definitively closing the issue. Faced with the problems affecting the world's major powers, the Itamaraty also developed a strategy of permanent participation in the main international forums (The Hague Peace Conferences, League of Nations, UN...) thereby limiting the possible negative effects on Brazil of major policy-makers' decisions. The objective was primarily to stop all that might subsequently be interpreted as a precedent to justify an armed intervention with damaging potential to the country in the future.

As such, Brazilian diplomacy has focused on the defence of the basic principles of respect of national sovereignty, non-intervention and peaceful conflict resolution. It has conveyed itself as an uncompromising defender of international law and has virtually always opposed the use of force without the international community's explicit accord, to the point of being sceptical even of humanitarian intervention. It's not a question of taking responsibility for direct management of international crises, but rather appearing as a potential "neutral" mediator free from the need to protect self-interests. Brazil has been too absorbed with occupying and managing its own enormous territory to consider expanding further or conquering other markets. Its diplomatic objective has been to prevent outsiders interfering with the country's affairs. This could be described as a kind of internationalist isolationism, possible only because of the existence of domestic natural resources that ensure a satisfactory level of self-sufficiency and a peripheral geographic situation that shelters the nation from the most perilous consequences of major conflicts. As such, Brazilian governments have benefitted from the fortunate situation of not having to face the political and military implications of their moral principles.

## Constabulary armed forces

If diplomats build and defend the nation, what about the military? Brazil's legalist pacifism approach to international politics, which is still such an essential component of its national identity, has stifled internal debate on defence for many years. The issue has been considered secondary and virtually neglected by civilian elites, left to the sole devices of military institutions. The armed forces have primarily played a "constabulary" role. In a country of continental dimensions, free from specific threats, relatively unpopulated, politically decentralised and with a diverse geography, their core mission has been to ensure public order enforcement and internal security. This meant undertaking policing action if required – often by the military leaders themselves- together with an important social welfare role (health services, literacy, infrastructure building) in order to monitor and occupy the national territory and control the main border passages.

It doesn't come as a surprise that with no need to battle external enemies, the military has had an important influence on the internal politics of modern Brazil. During the imperial era of the 19th century, they mainly had to face regional rebellions and fight against other Brazilians. Influenced by Auguste Comte's positivism and the Religion of Humanity, military officers led the movement to overthrow the monarchy and were instrumental in the proclamation of the Republic in 1889. In 1930, it was once again the "lieutenants" who drove the "Vargas revolution", the armed intervention against the State of São Paulo in 1932 and the establishment of the authoritarian Estado Novo, once lured to Mussolini's Italy and Hitlerian Germany before joining the Allies in 1942 and fighting the Italian Campaign with an infantry division. And again, it was the generals who seized the power in 1964 to govern the country for twenty years

Civilian leaders' indifference and lack of interest in the subject has ensured a military monopoly on defence and security issues. It is a rather unfavourable situation for the smooth running of the armed forces as they regularly face "mission crises" and internal rivalries between corporatists and services without any mediation or genuine control by political authorities. This has led to a fragmentation of national strategy, with each service -Army, Air Force and Navy- defining its own doctrine according to its own interest regarding pay, armament, careers and deployment. Moreover, the priority given to internal security missions has created a huge imbalance between the "soldiers" who form the majority of the headcount and get the most of the armed forces infrastructure and budget and the poorly equipped airmen and the highly qualified sailors using dilapidated equipment obviously insufficient even for the most ancillary tasks such as coast guarding. This fragmentation clearly reveals the nature of the institutional framework: absence of a Defence Ministry and existence of three military ministries, one for each service with their own budgets, bureaucracies and administrative policies.

This focus on public order enforcement as well as the enduring temptation to play a "parallel political party" role has prevented a coherent defence policy from emerging. It is worth noting that the only serious attempt to address this shortfall was initiated by supporters of the Brazilian Geopolítica and their leader, General Goubery do Couto e Silva. He was an "ideological borders" theorist, strongly influenced by the

anti-insurgency doctrines developed by the French army in Indochina and Algeria. By dematerialising the geographical boundary and replacing it with an ideological, non-legal conception of the border, this perception disregarded the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of upholding international law and national sovereignty. The Geopolítica legitimized armed interventions in neighbouring countries in close cooperation with other South American military regimes in the name of the fight against the “enemy within”. These geopolitical theorists talked about war but in reality carried on acting as police constables. And while internal security remained the military power’s highest priority, defence issues were still missing from the national debate and even within the armed forces. As for academics, they were paying no attention to International Relations studies, left to Itamaraty’s expertise, and stayed away from defence studies that were inevitably associated with military authoritarianism.

### **Becoming a “global stakeholder”**

This situation would change with democracy’s reinstatement at the end of the 1980s and the coming into office of a new generation, less “provincial” in its vision of the world. At any rate, the armed forces’ legitimacy as a political stakeholder had waned with the end of the military regime and its economic failure. In the 1990s, the country went through major reforms, modernising the economy and national institutions and opening the nation to the wider world. The downturn of the “lost decade” (1983-1993), marked by economic stagnation and hyperinflation, was addressed successfully. At the end of the 20th century, and for the first time in its history, the country started to have a significant economic and diplomatic influence beyond its own region. While the military withdrew to their barracks to search quietly for a mission better suited to the modern world, the new political and corporate elites realized that the success of this national revival depended increasingly on relations with the rest of the world. The idea caught on that Brazil has “offensive” interests to defend beyond its borders.

This new reality has shaken up traditional external policy. It is no longer just a matter of mere participation in international institutions in an attempt to neutralise potential fallout of decisions made by major powers. Now Brazil needs to try to influence those very decisions. Thanks to successful results in economic and social policies under new governments, the country is manifesting increasing aspiration to switch from being a rule-taker to becoming a rule-maker. At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil made public its ambition to be a part of the major global decision-making processes at the highest level. This more proactive diplomacy has been put into practice by G-20 participation, a key role at the WTO Doha Round, the demand for more say at the IMF and the continued demand for a permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Lula administration also decided to prioritise strategic relationships with major emerging countries of the South and in particular with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Lusophone nations, African countries, and those located on the Atlantic coast. Simultaneously, Brasilia sees South America as a power base for its global ambitions. As such, Brazil has become a strong advocate for regional political and economic integration while seeking to take an effective but discreet leadership position.

Such an activist approach to foreign policy could not disregard the military component. Indeed, a desire to become a “global stakeholder” would be difficult to attain without minimal military capability. The decision to take command and supply the main contingent of peacekeeping troops in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was closely related to Brazil’s campaign for UNSC permanent membership. This was a means to demonstrate credibility in international security. In 1999, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration created the first Defence Ministry under the authority of a civilian minister to replace the old three military ministries structure. Under Lula’s administration in 2008, the first “National Defence Strategy” (NDS) of the history of Brazil was published. The document was steered by a civilian “Strategic Affairs” minister linked to the President’s office. This first declaratory version of a Defence policy was followed in 2010 by the establishment of the first combined armed forces Staff reporting directly to the Defence ministry and by the obligation of publishing a National Defence White Paper every four years.

### The unlikely enemy

These modest first steps consolidate a greater civilian control of military institutions with an increased “professionalization” of the armed forces. They also represent a greater legislative power in defence and the necessity to promote civilian expertise in the field. What is still lacking is the articulation of a coherent and credible defence doctrine. The NDS clearly states that “Brazil has no enemy” and that it has therefore no intention to assert any authority on other nations. The logic assumption of this observation is that the armed forces cannot be organised according to a hierarchy of threats, but only on a “capacity” basis. This vision highlights the need to acquire an autonomous military technological capability and a powerful national defence industry – strategic sectors defined by the NDS being space, cyber security and nuclear (excluding arms).

As for military missions, the priority remains monitoring and controlling Brazilian water, soil and airspace and being prepared to defend the country against any form of aggression. Even with no identifiable enemy, it is necessary to identify national assets that could be threatened: the Amazon rainforest and its resources as well as the significant, recently-discovered offshore oil reserves situated under the pre-salt layer of the continental shelf in Brazil’s territorial waters (“Blue Amazon”). This shift from a solely “constabulary” function to a more traditional defence mission has significant implications for the three services and their coordination. The Army will need to acquire the necessary technical, organisational and human resources to undertake combined operations and use cyber warfare tools. The aim is to turn traditionally static ground forces – posted in major urban centres and on the country’s southern border – into mobile and flexible “rapid reaction strategic force” units able to intervene anywhere in national territory and in particular in the vast Amazon region.

Today the constabulary function is far from being abandoned. The military still have a duty to contribute to internal security along with police forces. This mission was also in effect issued to the Air Force, which is chronically under-equipped compared to other services. Airmen are in charge of ensuring local supremacy in the national airspace but their main mission remains territory surveillance, in particular against drug trafficking and



transborder criminal networks. This rather ancillary and routine task may explain why it took twelve years to decide on a new military plane for the Air Force, who were forced for a long time to use obsolete equipment. In fact, the remaining gap between a very concrete internal police mission and a still very abstract outward-looking strategy is at the heart of the tension that exists between police and military prerogatives and on their respective internal security responsibilities. The military's increasingly professionalized and less politicized framework makes it more and more reluctant to undertake police tasks.

In practice, evidence of this new defence policy has materialised in two fields: maritime power and peacekeeping forces. The founding principle for the reorganisation of the Navy is based on the notion of "sea denial" to such a point that even the concept of "display of power" has to defer to it. Assuming a position which depends on undefined hypothetical external threats implies sufficient capability to defend oil platforms, sea trade routes, and islands in territorial waters as well as to take part in peacekeeping missions. It is this vision which is at the heart of the country's most significant military programme: the implementation of a powerful submarine force, whose crown jewel will be a nuclear-powered vessel built with France's help. What we see here is a defensive doctrine employing an asset which has an "out-of-area" offensive capability and which can, in the future, expand the area considered as national security perimeter. As for peacekeeping, the MINUSTAH experience convinced civilian and military leaders of the necessity of creating significant capability in the field in order to establish the credibility of the country's ambition to be recognized as a global stakeholder.

## **The supremacy of the ministry of external relations**

Ultimately, development of Brazilian defence policy remains narrowly subordinate to external policy. The enforcement of internal public order continues to be a major issue whilst the idea of military activation (with the exception of the future nuclear submarine) is seen as one of many possible diplomatic tools – or as a factor that could create issues for this diplomacy. The best illustration of this is the Brazilian uranium enrichment programme. Brazil's constitution formally prohibits nuclear weapons endowment and production, and Brasilia is clearly committed to combat nuclear proliferation. But at the same time, technological expertise in the entire civilian nuclear cycle is considered a major component of the Brazilian leadership's influence in international decision-making arenas. The nuclear programme could therefore become both a diplomatic issue with nuclear power nations and a trick up the sleeve of a country with global ambitions.

The External Relations ministry still enjoys relative although reduced autonomy from the President's office and traditionally defines its own political and military objectives. Its supremacy is further bolstered by the inability to identify a single significant political and military threat to Brazil. With no enemies, negotiators can apply all their skills in the knowledge that diplomatic failure is unlikely to have tragic consequences on national sovereignty. As for military policy, it still lacks clear objectives. In the absence of threat, it focuses on decreasing the country's "vulnerabilities". However, these cannot remain abstract entities. One is only vulnerable to a real enemy with military capability, doctrine and goals. No military structure has the material nor doctrinal means to

cover all conceivable conflict scenarios. This impasse directly impacts equipment purchase programmes, the organisation of the armed forces and the military budget itself. How can military forces be deployed and with which type of weapons if one doesn't know who one will face or in the absence of specific danger? In the NDS text, the implied "enemy", never identified, takes the form of a major power with a "far superior capability". This enemy will need to be fought in an "asymmetric war", theorized as a "national resistance war". For rather more ideological than operational reasons, there are some suggestions that the enemy could be the United States assisted or not by their European NATO allies. But so far no credible conflict scenario has appeared to support such an extravagant picture.

In this situation, the armed forces' budget remains very unclear. Starting from a very low level of funding in the years following the end of the military regime, the budget increased over the course of the two Lula administrations. The Brazilian economic slowdown during Dilma Rousseff's office has however stopped this growth. The truth is that military budgets are always the first to be targeted when the need arises to cut public spending, even more so when the consequences on national security are minimal. It is therefore no surprise that soldiers' remuneration and pensions, which comprise the largest part of the budget and equipment purchase spending are systematically frozen or suspended in difficult economic times. This is an easy decision to make politically as equipment programmes remain very fragmented and controlled by each service individually. The defence industry suffers from this erratic cycle, thriving at times and then subsequently dwindling. In response, the Lula administration has launched military equipment production cooperation programmes with South American partners in order to maintain the Brazilian defence industry and establish it as the sector's continental industrial hub. This was the idea behind the initiative creating the South American Defence Council at UNASUR, but so far it has had limited results.

## Conclusion

Coordination between external policy and defence, between Itamaraty and the Ministry of Defence, is currently only in its infancy. This is primarily due to the fact that the so-called national defence strategy appears to be merely in a declaratory stage. Brazil can afford to keep military power off the national priority agenda thanks to its very comfortable and very unique location. There is not much to coordinate between an External Relations Ministry that monopolises the national strategic thinking and a Ministry of Defence still in its infancy which lacks financial, human and historical resources to develop its own vision and objectives. Besides, the centralisation of decisions within the President's office during the Lula and Dilma Rouseff's administration has limited the two ministries' scope of action – in particular with the “young” DM.

The wide-ranging public debate which has sparked on the issue is undoubtedly the most positive result of these attempts to develop a world vision which encompasses all aspects of the State's external action. Such debate has been traditionally non-existent in Brazil. It is a positive step that Congress and civil organisations are addressing the issue. It is also significant to acknowledge the proliferation in Brazil of university departments and courses on International Relations, the beginning of a few masters and PhD programmes on defence as well as the creation of real career paths for civilian public servants in the DM. Brazil is for the first time in the process of establishing a critical mass of scholars and experts in the field. This new public debate can only strengthen Brazilian democracy, even if defence policy remains underfunded for a long time in a country that is fortunate to be far away from the tragedies of wars in world's history. Sadly the price to pay for this privilege has been a high level of internal violence, as though the impossibility of directing aggression towards the outside world created a relentless backlash against Brazil itself.

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## **Brazilian Marine Corps Transatlantic Cooperation**

### **From the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Angola to the Technical Assistance Groups in Namibia and São Tomé and Príncipe**

Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga

Claudio Lopes de Araujo Leite

In the beginning of 2014, the Brazilian Navy established a Marine Corps Technical Assistance Group (MC-TAG) in São Tomé and Príncipe, a small archipelago country located in the Gulf of Guinea. The Group is already assisting in training and is conducting a soldiers' formation course. The first class of São Tomé and Príncipe marines will graduate before the end of the year.

In the same year, the African country also witnessed the official opening of a civilian Professional Formation Center, implemented and funded under a Brazilian cooperation partnership. The President and the Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary General for Africa, Ambassador Paulo Cordeiro, attended the opening ceremony. The center is already working, offering a variety of courses, ranging from electricity, construction, welding, auto and motorcycle mechanics, and computers (ABC, 2014).

Those civilian and military initiatives, far from representing isolated events, actually reflect a long-term strategy and, consequently, must be understood in such a context. One may argue that engagement and cooperation with African countries, in both civilian and military arena, represent a crucial aspect of the Brazilian National Strategy of Defense (NSD).

The purpose of this article is to discuss and briefly analyze the presence of the Brazilian Marine Corps in Africa and its contribution to Brazil's National Strategy of Defense.

## Preliminary considerations

Brazil's immediate geostrategic setting is constituted by South America and the South Atlantic, reaching Africa's Western coast. In order to create the conditions to ensure the country's security and its progression towards development, it is absolutely necessary to construct with those regions a "goodwill zone" (AMORIM, 2012, p.4). Brazil is conducting different initiatives with the purpose of facilitating the implementation of such a "zone". Among those initiatives, one may find the revitalization of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). The ZOPACAS was created by the United Nations General Assembly, in 1986, congregating coastal countries of both South America and Africa and aiming to enhance cooperation among states and to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the South Atlantic.

During the past several years, there was also a significant increase of Brazilian bilateral initiatives with African partners, including not only commerce, but also technical cooperation and technologic development (AMORIM, 2012, p.8). Those initiatives involve a number of African countries, such as Angola, Cabo Verde, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and São Tomé and Príncipe, among others.

*The cooperation with Cabo Verde, especially in relation to the surveillance of its maritime surroundings, does not represent only an act of solidarity towards a brother nation; it will also meet our own interests in fighting criminality and piracy in areas not very distant from our jurisdictional waters (AMORIM, 2012, p.9) [translation by the authors].*

The events mentioned in the beginning of this article represent only two interesting examples of the initiatives underway. As mentioned, those initiatives are occurring in both civilian and military arenas. This article will concentrate on the military ones and, more specifically, on those involving the Brazilian Marine Corps, an intrinsic component of the Brazilian Navy.

## Brazilian Marine Corps in the national strategy of defense

In terms of defense concerns, as presented in the previous section, Brazil naturally considers the South Atlantic to be one of the most critical and strategic regions (BRAZIL, 2008, p.13). Consequently, permanent "operational readiness" and "power projection in the areas of strategic interest" represent, to Brazilian Armed Forces, critical capacities (p.51-52). "Brazil needs to maintain its focused capacity of power projection" (p.20). In such a scenario, the Brazilian Navy ought to be capable of accomplishing three main strategic tasks: sea denial, sea control, and power projection (p.20).

As an intrinsic part of the Navy, the Brazilian Marine Corps has a prominent role in power projection. Understanding the importance of the Marine Corps' role, the National Strategy of Defense prescribes that: *To ensure its power projection capacity, the Navy will also have Marines available and permanently ready for deployment. The existence of these means is also essential for the defense of naval and port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands within The Brazilian jurisdictional waters, to perform*

*in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian operations anywhere in the world. In the waterways, these means will be fundamental to ensure the control of the banks during riverine operations. The Marine Corps will consolidate itself as the force of expeditionary character par excellence. (BRAZIL, 2008, p.21) [Emphasis added]*

The paragraph above summarizes the main tasks and capabilities of the Brazilian Marine Corps in the conduct of military operations. Naturally, the most singular and distinctive capabilities are those related to power projection and expeditionary operations, for which the unique Navy-Marine Corps combination represents a tremendous advantage.

The National Strategy of Defense also prescribes that the Brazilian Armed Forces should particularly strengthen strategic partnerships with friendly nations, within the Brazilian strategic interest surroundings area and those of the Portuguese-speaking Country Community (BRAZIL, 2008, p.64). Therefore, one should understand initiatives such as the one with São Tomé and Príncipe in view of this NSD prescription.

## Military power and Marine Corps Forces

In order to better understand the potential of those military engagements and cooperation initiatives with African countries, one may resort to the thoughts of Joseph Nye, who is one of the most quoted contemporary theorists of international relations. He famously developed the concepts of “soft power” and “smart power”. While traditional hard power mostly relates to the use of coercion, soft power represents the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction and influence (NYE, 2009, p.1). Smart power, on the other hand, reflects “the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of so-called ‘hard and soft’ power” (NYE, 2011, p.209).

According to Nye, military forces may typically perform four main roles: fighting, coercive diplomacy, protection, and assistance (NYE, 2011, p.40). The table below, adapted from Joseph Nye’s book “The Future of Power” (2011), presents the relationship between the different roles, behaviors, modalities, and, most importantly, the key qualities needed for the performance of each role.

*Table 1 – Roles of Military Forces*

ROLE	Fighting	Coercive Diplomacy	Protection	Assistance
TYPE OF BEHAVIOR	Physical Coercion	Threat of coercion	Protection	Assistance
MODALITIES	Fighting	Coercive Diplomacy	Alliance and Peacekeeping	Aid and Training
KEY QUALITIES	Competence	Capability and Credibility	Capability and trust	Competence and benignity

Source: NYE, 2011, p.42

Throughout history, Marine Corps forces, due to their expeditionary nature, power projection capabilities, credibility, and the ensuing significant deterrent results, have been mostly considered in relation to the first two roles: fighting and coercive diplomacy.

United States Marine Corps landings in the Pacific Campaign, during World War II, certainly represent one of the most impacting examples.

Nevertheless, as the next sections will demonstrate, Marine Corps forces, may also execute, with significant success due to competence, capability, and credibility, tasks which are directly related to the roles of protection (peacekeeping) and assistance (aid and training). While performing those two kinds of tasks, Marine Corps forces also contribute to increase a nation's "soft power", attracting and influencing behaviors and attitudes.

### **United Nations Verification Mission in Angola**

During the last decade, the Brazilian Marine Corps has significantly increased its participation in peacekeeping, especially with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Interim Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Nevertheless, one should notice that the Brazilian Marines participation in UN peacekeeping is not new. Actually, the first significant presence of Brazilian Marines in Africa was registered under the aegis of the United Nations, as part of the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM), which began in 1988. There were in fact three different United Nations Verification Missions in Angola, with distinct mandates and capabilities: UNAVEM I (1988-1991), UNAVEM II (1991-1995), and UNAVEM III (1995-1997).

According to Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, UNAVEM I was a modest UN contribution to a wider peace effort led by Angola. Its task was limited to verifying the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2010, p.99). The assurances of a Cuban withdrawal created the conditions for a more embodied UN role, represented by UNAVEM II. UNAVEM II had a broader mandate of monitoring a ceasefire and assisting in the organization of elections. In terms of military capabilities to perform their tasks, both UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II did not have troops. The two missions had only military observers. UNAVEM II, for instance, had only 350 military observers (p.104). Therefore, those two missions had to rely solely on the cooperation of the opposing parties. The Brazilian Marine Corps sent military observers to both UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II.

When one of the parties lost national elections in 1992, fighting broke out again. Only in 1995 a new ceasefire was reached, and a much more ambitious UNAVEM III replaced UNAVEM II. UNAVEM III had a broad mandate, which included monitoring the ceasefire, verifying the withdrawal, disarming, and demobilizing combatants, establishing a new army, clearing mines, among others. In order to perform its tasks, UNAVEM III had 7,000 troops, including a Brazilian contingent.

Brazilian contingents, composed of soldiers and marines, took part in UNAVEM III from August 1995 to July 1997. Each contingent, which remained in the country for an average period of six months, consisted of an infantry battalion, an engineering company (with the main task of clearing mines), and two medical units (one from the Navy and another from the Army). The final number of Brazilian military personnel which participated in UNAVEM III was 4,174 (FONTOURA, 2009, p.152). In each contingent, Brazilian Marines provided an infantry company and an engineering platoon.



The UNAVEM III mandate was under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, which was a common feature of most peacekeeping missions established at that time. One may argue that the mission was therefore very traditional in terms of the observation of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations: impartiality, consent, and non-use of force, except in self-defense. Nonetheless, UNAVEM III successfully disarmed around 70,000 combatants and managed to integrate 11,000 of them into a new national army (HOWARD, 2008, p.39).

## Namibia and the Technical Assistance Group

Namibia is a young country. The country turned independent only on 21 March 1990, after a very successful UN mission – United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which oversaw the withdrawal of South African forces. Nevertheless, it is already considered one of Africa’s most stable states (BELLAMY; WILLIAMS, 2010, p.99). The country’s economy has long been based on diamond mining. With the depletion of its terrestrial reserves, marine diamond mining is becoming increasingly important. Extracting diamonds is not the only major Namibian activity conducted on the sea. Benefitting from the cold and nutrient-rich waters of the Benguela Current, fishing in the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) represents a major business, attracting Namibian fishermen, as well as companies from overseas. Most of the maritime economy is centered on a deep-water harbor city in the center of its coastline: Walvis Bay. Nowadays, in Walvis Bay one will find the Namibian Navy headquarters as well as the Namibian Marine Corps headquarters.

Shortly after independence, the Namibian government asked for Brazil’s assistance in order to create its own navy. Therefore, since 1992, the Brazilian Navy began cooperating with Namibia. Brazil-Namibia naval cooperation officially began on 4 March 1994, when both nations signed an agreement<sup>1</sup>. The cooperation agreement had the stated purpose of creating and strengthening a naval wing within the Namibian Defense Department. In this first agreement, Brazil and Namibia decided to start the cooperation through the training of Namibian personnel in Brazil. Additionally, the Brazilian Navy agreed to complement the hydrographic survey of the Namibian coastline, as well as assessing the economic resources of its littoral, thus demarcating the Namibian Territorial Sea, EEZ and, furthermore, assisting Namibian representatives in order to have those zones accepted internationally. Finally, the Brazilian Navy would help its Namibian counterpart in planning, ship procurement, and development of the necessary infrastructure for the country’s naval wing.

The creation of the Namibian Navy was certainly the most important outcome of the agreement. In 2000, Brazil established a Navy Technical Assistance Group (N-TAG) in Walvis Bay. In 2001, a new agreement upgraded the Namibian naval wing to Namibian Navy. Shortly after, Brazilian Navy donated the Corvette “Purus” to Namibia. The ship was renamed “Lt Gen Dino Hamaambo” and became Namibian Navy first warship.

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<sup>1</sup> [http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b\\_13/at\\_download/arquivo](http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1994/b_13/at_download/arquivo)

During the whole period, Namibian military personnel were trained by Brazilians, either in their own country or in Brazil. The training of Namibian officers and sailors in Brazil soon became a cooperation success. The numbers of the cooperation are impressive: 1,179 Namibian sailors were trained in Brazil between 2001 and 2011 (BRAZIL, 2012, p.109). Those numbers continue to grow since the cooperation between the two navies remains very active.

In 2008, both navies were ready to take a step further. Understanding the strategic importance of Marine Corps forces and following the steps of its partner, the Namibian Navy decided to have its own Marine Corps. The prospective battalion-sized Namibian Marine Corps would be responsible for providing protection to naval installations, port security, and boarding parties to Namibian patrol boats. The Namibian Navy intended to have a 700-men strong Marine Corps, with an Instruction Center and a Military Band.

In 2009, in order to assist the Namibian Navy in the implementation of such decision, the Brazilian Marine Corps established a Technical Assistance Group (MC-TAG) in Walvis Bay. The purpose was to build from scratch the Namibian Marine Corps. The initial tasks of the TAG were to create a soldier's formation course and to assist in structuring and organizing the new force. The final aim was to form a Marine Infantry Battalion, similar to a Brazilian one. The fourteen-man Brazilian MC-TAG was tasked to assist the Namibian Navy throughout the formation of its Marine Corps Infantry Battalion, in the implementation of an Instruction Center, and in the development of protocol and ceremonial units, including the formation of a Military Music Band and Bugler training.

It was no coincidence that the Brazilian Navy Commander, when visiting Namibia in May 2009, became the first foreign authority to receive full military honors from the Namibian Navy, including Band, Drums, and Bugler through newly established Namibian Protocol. Later in October, another goal of the cooperation was achieved. Namibian Marines started their first boot camp with 168 recruits. Brazilian Marines and their Namibian counterparts, which had been trained in Brazil and acquired drill instructor background by observing the Brazilian Marines Instruction Centre, constituted the instruction cadre. On February 2010, the first class of Namibian Marines graduated the formation course conducted by the Technical Assistance Group (BRAZIL, 2010).

The cooperation developed even further. Presently, the training cooperation between both Marine Corps comprehends a wide variety of courses, including basic training and specialization schools. With new tasks and challenges, the Marine Corps Technical Assistance Group was augmented to 30 Brazilian Marines, including Infantry, Special Operations, and Music Instructors and staff.

By 2013, 655 Namibian Marines had already been trained and formed in Namibia. 184 Namibian Marines were also trained in Brazil, including 47 officers. Strong evidence of the importance of the cooperation, especially in terms of "soft power", is that, according to officers who have recently been in TAG-Marines, all Namibian officers speak good Portuguese. On the other side, as cooperation works both ways, the many Brazilian Marines who have lived in Namibia never forgot the country and

their Namibian friends and cherish the good experiences they had in the Southwestern African country. Furthermore, the long-term cooperation allowed Brazil to actually assist in the formation and sovereignty of the country. Namibia, due mostly to “soft power”, constitutes today a very important transatlantic Brazilian friend and ally.

## São Tomé and Príncipe

With 964 sq. km and a population of just 190,428 (July 2014 estimate), São Tomé and Príncipe is a very different country in comparison to Namibia. Its importance relies much more on its location than on its physical size or economy. Composed by two oceanic islands and located less than 120 nautical miles from the Western African coast, this archipelago state is placed well within the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea constitutes one of the world’s top oil exploration sites and, in recent years, became an active area of piracy. Major South Atlantic lines of communication stand very close to the São Tomé and Príncipe coastline.

A former Portuguese colony, São Tomé and Príncipe is presently a member of the Portuguese-speaking Countries Community. The country became independent in 1975. Although it is a democratic state since the 1980’s, one cannot say it is a stable one. There were two failed attempted military coups, in 1995 and 2003. The government is constantly shifting between different political parties. Its economy is based on cocoa production and its US\$ 421 million GCP is the 217th among 229 countries in the world. With such small population and scarce resources, the nation’s armed forces are composed by a little Army and a tiny Coast Guard, an uncomfortable situation for a country sitting on such an important and troubled spot.

Recognizing the geostrategic importance of São Tomé and Príncipe and Minister Celso Amorim’s belief in building, through cooperation, a “goodwill zone” in the South Atlantic, the Brazilian Navy undertook, during the last few years, a number of initiatives. The Ocean Patrol Vessel (OPV) “Amazonas”, during her maiden cruise, in August 2012, performed anti-piracy training exercises with four African countries, including São Tomé and Príncipe. “Araguari”, the third OPV of the “Amazonas” class, also spent weeks visiting and practicing with São Tomé and Príncipe and other African countries in 2013 (COELHO, 2014).

The Commander of the São Tomé and Príncipe Coast Guard, learning about the successful creation of the Namibian Marine Corps, decided to ask Brazil for a similar program. Understanding the strategic importance of the proposed partnership, the Brazilian Navy, after consulting with the Ministry of Defense, decided to establish a Marine Corps Technical Assistance Group in São Tomé and Príncipe.

From January to March 2014, nine Brazilian Marines landed on the Island of São Tomé with the task of establishing a Basic Training School for the STP Coast Guard. Later, in May 2014, OPV “Apa” visited São Tomé, bringing the material and equipment needed for the implementation of the course, as well as other donations, attending a request from the Commander of the country’s Coast Guard. A Brazilian-made patrol boat was also donated and would arrive a little later, in order to bolster the Coast Guard enforcement capabilities.

The Basic Training for the San Tomean recruits started on 21, July 2014. It may be too early to predict the outcome of the program. Nonetheless, all parties involved are confident and the graduation is already set for December 3 of the same year. Despite the obvious differences between this archipelago nation and Namibia, the Brazilian Marine Corps goal is about the same: through cooperation and the strengthening of the friendly nation's defense capabilities, to promote a belt of security, stabilization and progress around the strategically and economically important South Atlantic.

### **Final thoughts**

The most traditional, important, and unique role of Marine Corps forces is unquestionably related to power projection. Therefore, as presented in the beginning of this brief article, the main role of the Brazilian Marine Corps, according to Brazil's National Strategy of Defense, is to ensure the power projection capacity of the Brazilian Navy. Conventionally, throughout history, such a capability has been inherently related, in Joseph Nye's terms, to a nation's "hard power". The presence of Brazilian Marine Corps Technical Assistance Groups in Western Africa represents yet another, probably unexpected, possibility in terms of Marine Corps capabilities: "soft power" projection, again in Joseph Nye's terms.

The longtime duration of the Marine Corps Technical Assistance Group in Namibia, the recent implementation of a new one in São Tomé and Príncipe, and the prospective extension to other countries, such as Angola (BRAZIL, 2014) and Cabo Verde, among others, reflect the success of the initiative. One should also notice that the presence of those groups also contributes to the achievement of other goals of the National Strategy of Defense. Besides strengthening strategic partnerships with friendly nations, within the areas of Brazilian strategic interest and in the Portuguese-speaking Country Community, the Marine Corps Technical Assistance Groups represent Brazilian presence and influence in areas which are most relevant in terms of South Atlantic security, such as the Gulf of Guinea.

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## Internet Governance and Cybersecurity in Brazil

Daniel Oppermann

Since the beginning of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 2006, cybersecurity has been one of the central topics debated by a variety of stakeholders from different countries. But in current literature this phenomenon is hardly analysed in a South American context. The majority of contributions is oriented towards the developments in North America, Europe and Asia, while the problems and challenges within South America (and especially Brazil) are widely overlooked. Besides the little attention that is given to cybersecurity in South America, the few inputs to the debate (especially in the local media) often depict the situation in a less objective but more lurid way which is counterproductive for a debate which in fact needs explanations rather than exaggerations. Without any doubt, cybersecurity, as well as other topics of Internet governance, are scarcely discussed within the South American political science community and also within the population as a whole. The idea of this chapter is to present a constructive contribution to inform the interested reader about current cybersecurity developments in Brazil and also to stimulate a debate in the region which in the second decade of the 21st century, over 20 years after the Internet became a commercial network, is very necessary.

### Internet Governance

Since the beginning of the Internet governance process, Brazil has been constantly involved in the global debates and meetings concerning the information society and the development of the Internet. In November

2007 the second meeting of the IGF was held in Rio de Janeiro. The IGF was founded during the second meeting of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis in 2005 (WSIS 2005, par. 72). Its foundation was based on a recommendation of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which itself was set up by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to discuss and develop strategies to strengthen the debate on Internet governance on a global scale (WSIS 2003, C6 13b). The first mandate of the IGF occurred between 2006 and 2010 when an annual meeting was held to bring together all stakeholder groups to discuss the several issues that had developed around the Internet in the years and decades before, as well as the latest topics and challenges of the World Wide Web (WWW).<sup>1</sup> The IGF, as most Internet governance meetings and processes, was set up on a multi-stakeholder governance approach, including players from the public sector, the private sector and civil society. The basic idea of this approach is to recognize the diversity of interest groups and to offer opportunities for all of them to meet each other in an environment where discussions and debates between all players are possible on a horizontal, rather than a hierarchical level.

## The multi-stakeholder approach

The Internet governance process is one of the few areas in which the multi-stakeholder approach was successfully applied in the beginning of the 21st century. Because of the important role of non-governmental players from both the private sector and civil society during the WSIS process, multi-stakeholderism became the crucial form of organisation, and also in the follow-up process known as the IGF. The reasons why this approach became popular in this context can be found in the historical development of the Internet and also in the changing constellations of global politics.

The Internet started as a network of computers set up by researchers in the US at different universities and research institutes in the 1960s (Kleinrock 2008, p. 10ff). Although the project was financed by the US Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which was founded in 1958, the motivation of the developing researchers was not of a military nature. At a time when knowledge was kept secret by governments and secret services, which feared an advantage accruing to an adversary government, the early IT-engineers realized that sharing knowledge was of greater importance than hiding it. For this reason, they set up a network which gave instant access to information free of cost (except for the technical equipment). The idea of knowledge sharing was spread on a non-commercial level in several countries supported basically by academic institutions. In 1987 researchers at the University of São Paulo (USP) decided to foster the connection of Brazilian academic institutions to the international network which at that time was already known as the Internet. After a first connection to BITNET<sup>2</sup> had been established in 1988 at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação Científica (LNCC) in Rio de Janeiro, the first connection to the Internet occurred in 1991 at the foundation Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa no Estado de São Paulo

<sup>1</sup> The meetings of the first mandate took place in Greece (2006), Brazil (2007), India (2008), Egypt (2009) and Lithuania (2010). So far, the meetings of the second mandate happened in Kenya (2011), Azerbaijan (2012) and Indonesia (2013). The 2014 meeting will take place in Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> BITNET was a network between a limited number of institutions in different countries in the 1980s and 1990s.



(FAPESP) (Stanton 1998). At the time when Brazil became connected to the Internet, the non-commercial idea of knowledge sharing was still the predominant conception of the developers involved. However, at the same time, the first commercial players entered the scenario in the US. After Tim Berners-Lee had developed the programming language HTML, enabling the development of a user-friendly environment, a growing number of companies recognized the economic potential that the Internet was going to generate in the coming years. Providers like Network Solutions Inc (NSI) started to make growing profits with an increasing quantity of services (Mueller 2002, p. 105ff). This development caused disaffection, especially among the developers of the Internet who saw its function as providing services on a non-commercial basis rather than as a profitable business (Goldsmith; Wu 2006, p. 35f).

During the 1990s, the conflict between the different interest groups increased when the public sector also joined the scenario. Since at that time most crucial discussions regarding the function and the administration of the Internet happened in the US, it was also the government in Washington that became the most actively involved among the representatives of the public sector. This early influence facilitated its dominant position in the technical administration of the Internet which was later criticized by numerous other players involved in the Internet governance process (Klein 2002, p. 201; Mueller 2005, p.3). Especially in the second half of the 1990s, more governments became interested in the Internet, strengthening the position of the public sector in the Internet governance environment. The constellation of players in this context is exemplary for the multi-stakeholder environment in general. The coexistence of governments (as representatives of states), private companies (providing innovation and investment capital) and civil society (bringing in specialized knowledge and representing user interests) could be observed also in other governance processes like the UN Conference on Financing Development (Monterrey, Mexico) or the UN Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, South Africa), both of which took place in 2002.

Independently of the Internet governance process, the changing of global constellations, especially after the end of the Cold War, favored the proliferation of the multi-stakeholder model. While during the decades of the East-West conflict, security was dominating international debates and negotiations, the end of the bloc confrontation in the 1990s enabled the emergence of those issues that had mostly been ignored by governments in the years before. Among them were topics like minority rights, environmental issues or sustainable development, mostly areas in which civil society players had already been engaged for years and in which they had gained a high level of expertise (Fues; Hamm 2001, p. 54). During the UN Conference on Environment and Development which took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a large number of civil society players was for the first time invited to participate in an international process which a few years before was basically dominated by national governments (Dodds 2002, p. 28). Also, the participation of the private sector increased over the years, driven by the necessity of financial support for a variety of new programs that had become part of the international agenda. By setting up the Global Compact in the year 2000, a cooperation program between the UN and private companies, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan managed to bring the private sector into a variety of issues on the international agenda (Kell; Ruggie

1999, p. 103). In this context, the convergence of different interest groups in the Internet governance process in the beginning of the 21st century reflected a development that was, at the same time, happening on a global scale in a number of governance processes.

## Cybersecurity

The Internet governance process related to the IGF was, from the beginning, organised in a clear structure of topics which were: access, diversity, openness and security. In the following years critical internet resources and development issues were added to the annual agenda (Kleinwächter 2007, p. 16ff). When taking a closer look at the different topics being worked on, it becomes clear that a certain part of the debate on the protection of critical internet resources overlaps with the debate on cybersecurity. Critical internet resources are often defined as those parts of the network's infrastructure that keep the Internet working, especially the technical parts like the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and the Domain Name System (DNS) or the root server system itself. Others also include the Regional Internet Registries (RIR) (Mueller 2010). WGIG's definition of critical Internet resources is: *"resources, including administration of the domain name system and Internet protocol addresses (IP addresses), administration of the root server system, technical standards, peering and interconnection, telecommunications infrastructure, including innovate and convergent technologies, as well as multilingualization."* (WGIG 2005, p. 5)

However, according to Vint Cerf, TCP/IP developer, former chairman of ICANN's board of directors and now vice president of Google, there are also other important components that belong to the list of critical internet resources which are knowledge and people: *"... people play a critical role in the well-being and evolution of the Internet. Without skilled programmers, engineers, operators, equipment makers, application designers, enlightened governmental policymakers, thoughtful legal practitioners, effective and innovative business leaders, researchers, teachers and knowledgeable users, the Internet would not be the remarkable global engine of innovation and utility that it has become. Any consideration of critical Internet resources must take into account the wide range of people resources that are needed to keep the Internet operating and evolving in productive directions."* (Cerf 2007, p. 209).

And Geoff Huston of the Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) brought it to the ultimate point when he stated in a CircleID article that the most critical Internet resources are simply "users like you and me" (Huston 2007).

Looking at the technical level, there is a number of critical Internet resources in Brazil whose functioning needs to be guaranteed to maintain the working of the network. Among them are the root servers which are located in cities like Brasília, Curitiba, Florianópolis, São Paulo and others. The root servers are the top servers of the hierarchical DNS which enable the communication between different computers and networks. Although all 13 root server operators are located outside of Brazil, they maintain a number of servers in the country to facilitate the access to their services. Besides that, Brazil's country code top level domain (ccTLD) .br administered by the Comitê Gestor

da Internet no Brasil (CGI) is a critical Internet resource. CGI, a multi-stakeholder organised entity which was founded by the government in 1995 to administer and investigate the development of the Internet in Brazil, is responsible for the coordination of IP numbers in Brazil and the distribution of domain names under the national ccTLD (Ministério das Comunicações 1995). It is registered at IANA as Brazil's official ccTLD managing organisation.

Other important critical Internet resources are the Internet Exchange Points (ponto de troca de tráfego, PTT). PTTs are data centers in which network providers connect to other networks to exchange data. This way users have access to all servers and networks connected to the Internet at a lower cost. Alternatively, networks could connect to each other via third networks which is more cost intensive for the users. PTTs are very important for the functioning of the Internet, as their absence not only causes higher costs for providers and users but also interferes with the speed of data flow. The lack of PTTs often forces network providers to send their data to other countries to exchange data with other networks. In 2012 the PTTMetro project of CGI was supporting PTTs in 20 major cities of Brazil. Another 40 locations were being analysed to establish additional PTTs.<sup>3</sup> A 2012 study of the Internet Society has shown the positive effects of PTTs regarding the development of emerging Internet markets (Kende; Hurpy 2012).

Besides the technical resources, there are also people as a critical resource for the development and functioning of the Internet. Ordinary users play an especially major role, also with respect to security issues. The Internet, as it exists today, is the result of millions of contributions made by individuals. Next to data centers and service providers, the protection of every home or work computer is, therefore, a central aspect of cybersecurity on a national and international level. In 2011 about 400,000 cybersecurity incidents were reported to the Brazilian Centro de Estudos, Resposta e Tratamento de Incidentes de Segurança no Brasil (CERT). Compared to the data of 2006, this represented an increase of more than 100% in five years (CERT 2012). As the notifications happen on a volunteer basis, it is very likely that the real number of incidents is much higher. Cyber incidents directed against users are mostly related to malware of various kinds to commit fraud, identity theft, password theft (also known as phishing), but intrusion into networks or computers is also a frequent occurrence. While all of these acts are turning the users into victims of cyberattacks, which mostly fall into the category of cybercrime, the users themselves can also become co-perpetrators in other attacks without even realizing it. Although obstructions and damages as they occurred during the intensive cyberattacks in Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008) are geographically far away from South America, it is obvious that Brazilian computers and networks were also involved in those or similar incidents. Cyberattacks like those happen as massive distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) that need a large quantity of computers to succeed.

DDoS attacks are a common means to deactivate a chosen network for a certain time frame. In Georgia it happened parallel to a military invasion by Russia in the conflict over South Ossetia. In Estonia it happened during political tensions between Estonians

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<sup>3</sup> The latest information regarding PTTs in Brazil can be found at <http://www.ptt.br>.

and Russians caused by nationalist conflicts (Oppermann 2010). The objective of a DDoS attack is to send out an enormous amount of requests to a network at the same point in time, which consequently causes a breakdown of the network or server. To reach this goal, thousands or more requests must be bundled which happens via botnets (Feily; Ramadass; Shahrestani 2009). Botnets are illegitimately connected computers that are operated by a single person known as a bot herder. By sending out malicious codes (for example by spam mail) the bot herder gets access to computers all over the world which are then forming his botnet. Over the years a lucrative business has developed around botnets. Cybercriminals or politically motivated cyberattackers that are in need of a large botnet at a certain point in time to launch an attack or conduct criminal activities in cyberspace are renting botnets which are offered on the internet by professional bot herders. These bot herders are also using weakly protected networks and computers in Brazil to conduct cyberattacks or cybercriminal activities in Brazil and in other countries. The fact that Brazilian networks are involved in these activities does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the bot herders themselves are located in Brazil. A bot herder can operate his botnet from any place in the world. The crucial aspect for Brazil is that it is among the most affected countries in the world regarding botnets. Following IT security analysts from Symantec, Microsoft and Trend Micro, Brazilian networks had one of the highest malware infection rates in 2010 and 2011 (Microsoft 2011; Symantec 2011; Trend Micro 2010). As a consequence, the country had the second highest concentration of botnet infections in the world (Symantec 2011). In the following years Brazil remained among the most infected countries worldwide. One important reason for this can be found in the high growth rates of Internet users in the past years combined with a low level of user protection.

## Internet Growth and Cyberthreats

Brazil's economic growth in the past years came along with a constant increase with respect to the quantity of Internet users and Internet speed. Following an analysis of CGI, 46% of all households in Brazil had a computer in 2012 (CGI 2013, p. 457). The largest part of them (40% of all households) also had an Internet connection. 51% of the Brazilian population was considered to be Internet users.

### *Percentage of households in Brazil with computer*


Year	%
2008	25
2009	32
2010	35
2011	45
2012	46

Source: CGI

*Percentage of households in Brazil with computer (per region)*

	North	Northeast	Central-West	Southeast	South
2008	15	11	30	33	30
2009	19	14	34	43	40
2010	23	14	40	45	42
2011	32	25	47	57	56
2012	30	31	46	54	55

Source: CGI

*Percentage of households in Brazil with computer (per region)*

Source: CGI

*Percentage of households in Brazil with Internet access*

Year	%
2008	18
2009	24
2010	27
2011	38
2012	40

Source: CGI

Since CGI started publishing its research data in 2005, a steady increase of Internet connections and Internet users can be observed. To support this development and especially to bring those with a lower purchasing power online, the government developed a number of programs to facilitate the acquisition of ICT equipment, to connect schools and to extend access to broadband connections. By implementing the National Broadband


Program Plano Nacional de Banda Larga (PNBL), the government planned to bring up to 40 million broadband connections to private households and small companies by 2014 (Presidência da República 2010; Senado Federal 2011). Especially in rural areas where Internet access is more expensive than in the urban centers, and where the average income is lower than in the urban centers, the PNBL can improve the situation of digital exclusion and expand the number of Internet users in Brazil. At the same time, these 40 million new Internet connections are very likely to endanger the security of Brazilian networks, since, among those more than 40 million new users, only a very small percentage will be prepared to protect itself from the variety of cyberthreats that are already spreading within the country's networks. The high level of infiltrated computers that put Brazil into the league of the most affected countries of malicious activities is caused by the high velocity of new computers connected to the Internet combined with an insufficiently prepared user community. Although most frequent Internet users are aware of the existence of malware (in Brazil often misleadingly summarized as "virus") there is hardly any deeper knowledge regarding the problem that these programs can affect the functionality of the Internet. A simple click in a social network or in an email can turn a computer at home, at work or at school over to a bot herder or other type of cybercriminal and end up as a component in a nation wide system of online banking fraud or in an international conflict in any part of the world.

Besides the risks for the average user, the private and the public sectors are also suffering from the large dimensions of insecurity in Brazilian cyberspace. As the problem has been largely ignored so far, there is no data available regarding, for example, financial losses through cyberthreats in the private economy in Brazil. In fact, few companies publish such data simply for the reason of not exposing their own vulnerability to the rest of the world, causing a loss of confidence and therefore also avoiding a further financial loss. However, data from the USA show that insecurity in cyberspace is a concrete problem for the private economy and causes worldwide annual losses of several hundred billion US dollars (CSIS 2014, p. 6). The Brazilian economy is investing millions of reais every year to protect businesses from online intruders. And it is not only large companies which are being troubled by cyberthreats. Small and medium enterprises are also suffering online attacks, especially those companies which are having problems putting up a budget sufficient to protect their networks and computers.


The degree to which the public sector was affected by cyberattacks was concealed (or ignored) by the government in past years until a series of events made clear that cybersecurity was a serious issue that needed to be considered more carefully. In 2011 a wave of cyberattacks caused massive web defacements on a number of crucial Brazilian websites, among them ministries, the senate, universities and the National Tax Authority Receita Federal (Oppermann 2011).



Screenshot of the hacked website of the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics IBGE, taken by Daniel Oppermann on 24 June 2011.



Screenshot of the hacked website of the Brazilian Transportation Department DETRAN in the state of Acre, taken by Daniel Oppermann on 25 June 2011.



Screenshot of the hacked website of the Municipal Council of Conselheiro Lafaiete (Minas Gerais), taken by Daniel Oppermann on 25 June 2011.

In previous years, occasional remarks by political analysts regarding the possibility of cyberattacks being responsible for a number of blackouts between 2005 and 2009 (which government representatives denied) and attempts of hackers to extort public institutions in Brazil (which government representatives confirmed) coincided with the beginning of a more or less public discourse on cybersecurity in Brazil and supported the proponents of a national cybersecurity strategy, which subsequently got off the ground and was published as a first draft in 2010 (Rodrigues 2009; Soares 2009).

## National Cybersecurity Strategy

In December 2010 the Brazilian Department of Information and Communication Security (Departamento de Segurança da Informação e Comunicações, DSIC) within the Office of Institutional Security (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência da República, GSI/PR) published the Green Book on Cybersecurity in Brazil (Mandarino 2010). By doing so, Brazil took a first step on an important path to protect its national computer networks against different forms of cyberthreats. The objective of the Green Book was to present an initial concept of what later should become a complete strategy called Política Nacional de Segurança Cibernética. Following international recommendations, the DSIC understands cybersecurity as a transborder and international challenge instead of a purely national issue. Therefore, the Green Book refers to a number of international strategies and references, mainly from international organisations



such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and others (*idem*, p. 20ff). Besides that, the DSIC also follows the multi-stakeholder approach by underlining the importance of players from different parts of society, whose inclusion in the process is crucial to achieving the most effective results. In this context, the Green Book makes special reference to five principal players: the government, the private sector, academia, the third sector and society (*idem* p. 14). Cooperation among these players is aspired to in the sub-fields of political and strategic decision-making, economy, social aspects, science, technology and innovation, education, legal problems, international cooperation and the security of critical infrastructure. Here it is important to differentiate between critical infrastructure as mentioned in the Green Book and critical Internet resources as mentioned above. Critical infrastructure has a broader meaning than critical Internet resources, including energy, transport, water, telecommunication, finance, information and more. It is defined in the Green Book as “installations, services, goods and systems whose complete or partial interruption or destruction cause a serious social, economic, political, environmental or international impact, or implications on the security of state and society“ (*idem* p.19; translation by the author). When comparing the previously mentioned definition on critical Internet resources (especially the definition of the technical parts) with the definition of critical infrastructure, it becomes clear that critical internet resources are part of the critical infrastructure of every country. Within strategies on cybersecurity they play a central part. On the other hand, it is clear that there is much more to cybersecurity than the protection of technical infrastructure.

It is not without reason that the human factor is considered the weakest part in any cybersecurity environment (Tech Journal 2011). As mentioned before, botnets and their results (like DDoS attacks) are closely related to security gaps caused by average users. As Brazil has one of the highest botnet concentrations in the world, it is obvious that security approaches including user behaviour have to be a central part of the Brazilian cybersecurity strategy. In the Green Book the human factor is taken up directly and indirectly in several places. Directly, it occurs in the section on education which mentions the challenges of including cybersecurity issues in regular education plans, from basic to higher education. In addition, the Green Book introduces the idea of a cybersecurity culture and the development of a national consciousness of cybersecurity among users of all ages and income groups (Mandarino 2010, p. 45). This idea is very important, as cybersecurity is not achievable by simply training IT security professionals to protect strategic points in the national infrastructure, although this is doubtlessly an important aspect as well. However, a large number of cyberattacks (including cybercriminal activities) are happening at the private user level. In fact, a variety of cyberattacks on strategic points in the national telecommunication infrastructure and other parts of the critical infrastructure are logical consequences of cyberattacks that occurred before in the private sector. The temporary closedown of public or private services by DDoS attacks are only possible because thousands of private networks and computers have been previously infiltrated. For this reason, the development of an awareness raising strategy is of crucial importance, especially in light of an expected continued increase in user numbers.

The human factor is also taken up indirectly in other subfields of the Green Book, in addition to education. In fact, in all subfields mentioned, there are directives that refer to the need for professionally trained individuals to set up coordinating organisms, as in the area of strategic decision making, the preparation of representatives of the private sector economy to develop safe e-commerce business environments, the specialization of researchers to investigate cybersecurity and to develop solutions, the formation of professionals to monitor and respond to cyberattacks and more (*idem* p. 43ff). This widely mentioned need for professionally prepared individuals and education of the user community underlines a critical problem: the lack of knowledge regarding cybersecurity.

After the Green Book was published, the DSIC opened up a public discussion and invited several stakeholder groups to comment on the draft before it was to become a national strategy. By doing so, they followed the basic necessities of a multi-stakeholder approach to develop a stable environment in which all players could find their own interests considered, especially in the public sector, the private economy and civil society. However, it has to be mentioned that so far, the debate on cybersecurity is dominated by the public sector. In Brazil, civil society especially is still lacking strong representation in this area. There are few organisations from this sector of society actively involved in the debates. While the private sector naturally has a strong interest in cybersecurity to protect its own business and financial structures, most civil society organisations in Brazil are more reluctant to include cybersecurity in their agendas. However, there is a growing necessity to have these third sector players participating in the debates. Especially as cybersecurity regulations usually affect user rights, freedom of speech, privacy and other topics whose protection also fall within the purview of civil society (Deibert 2011). As the campaigns regarding the US regulations PIPA and SOPA have shown in January 2012, decisions made in other countries are very likely to influence user rights in Brazil as well. The participation of a large number of individuals in Brazil in the PIPA/SOPA protests (mainly via social media like Facebook and Twitter) has shown that there is a growing awareness among Brazilian Internet users regarding Internet policy issues. Although PIPA/SOPA are not typical cybersecurity topics, they definitely marked an important step for Brazilian civil society participation in global Internet issues, which includes cybersecurity. The (re-)foundation of the Brazilian chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC) which had its first official meeting (*assembleia geral ordinária*) in February 2012 in São Paulo is also a crucial step towards strengthening Internet civil society in Brazil which needs to (and most probably will) consider cybersecurity issues as well.<sup>4</sup> In the end, cybersecurity is not a problem that can be left to the public sector and traditional security players like the military, which in August 2010 established its Cybersecurity Defense Center (*Centro de Defesa Cibernética do Exército, CDCiber*) based on Decree 666, dated August 4, 2010. Similar to all topics in the sphere of Internet governance, cybersecurity requires input from all sectors of society.

<sup>4</sup> The first ISOC chapter in Brazil was founded in 1998 but later became inactive.

## Conclusion

Since the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) put cybersecurity as one of the central topics of Internet governance on its agenda in 2006, increasing attention has been drawn to this phenomenon in several countries. Also, Brazil is starting to become aware of the necessity to discuss the problems of insecure information networks and to take the required steps to protect its networks. One important aspect is to realize that cybersecurity is not a purely technical problem and therefore cannot be solved by IT engineers alone. It is also not a question that could be solved by governments or security forces but needs efforts from several players in society. It is a question of public awareness building within the user community which has been growing in Brazil at an impressive rate over the last few years. By encouraging large parts of the population to get online, the Brazilian government is improving the development of the information society and at the same time is watching the formation of millions of insufficiently protected new access points used by millions of inadequately prepared users who might easily become victims of, but also participants in, cybercrimes or other malicious activities on the Internet. The development of a national cybersecurity strategy, as it has been initiated by the Department of Information and Communication Security, is an important step towards the protection of information networks and Internet users. It is also necessary to emphasize that the governmental strategy cannot be reduced to purely technical protection of critical infrastructure, but also needs to consider the users as an essential part of it. And in fact, there are a number of passages in the Green Book that consider the necessity of developing educational programs for users of all ages and income groups. In this context, special importance needs to be given to the development of a national consciousness of cybersecurity which could contribute to the awareness building among the population and especially among Internet users. Besides that, a number of suggestions are made to improve the situation of professional users, which means developing training and instructional programs for IT specialists, focusing on issues of cybersecurity. Following the multi-stakeholder approach, the Green Book was also open to comments from any interest group. However, after this process of discussion, the final strategy on cybersecurity has not yet been published (July 2014). On the other side, as Brazil is among the most malware-infected countries in the world and has a serious problem with botnets, the government strongly needs to continue the process of recapturing those parts of the national networks that cybercriminals have already taken control of. But civil society, not just the public sector, needs to recognize its importance in this context and start to expand its activities regarding cybersecurity issues. Especially, organised civil society groups need to take strong positions to defend user rights against possible restrictions that are likely to come from the government in the coming years. Critical awareness among the population must not be reduced to foreign cyber restrictions like SOPA/PIPA but also needs to consider developments within the country. The public debate concerning the Brazilian Internet Law Marco Civil was a good example.

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## Atlantic Energy and the Changing Global Energy Flow Map

Paul Isbell

### The Atlantic Energy Renaissance

A new Atlantic Basin is emerging, and energy is one of its principal driving vectors.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, an Atlantic energy renaissance has already been underway – unobtrusively-- for nearly a generation. Only in the past few years, however, has the full potential force of such an underlying structural strategic change become perceptible. (Isbell 2012, 2013)

New players and technologies have recently emerged to notably alter both the Atlantic Basin and global energy maps, as new conventional and ‘unconventional’ fossil fuel sources and new alternative ‘low carbon’ energies come online -- and as opportunities for ‘pan-Atlantic’ energy cooperation begin to emerge. This transformation of the Atlantic energy space is now unfolding across sectors and segments, among public and private actors, and all along the energy value chain. Most importantly, this Atlantic energy renaissance is emanating from both the old ‘North’ and ‘South’ Atlantics – not just from the United States, where it has been most loudly trumpeted for its assumed potential to finally secure ‘national energy independence.’

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<sup>1</sup> Along with economic (trade, investment and finance), human security, sustainable development, ocean/ marine, and other cultural and governance dynamics. For more on these other ‘Atlantic drivers,’ see the Eminent Persons Group of the Atlantic Basin Initiative, “A New Atlantic Community: Generating Growth, Human Development and Security of the Atlantic Hemisphere: A Declaration and Call to Action,” a White Paper of the Atlantic Basin Initiative, Center for Transatlantic Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, March 2014.

In the Northern Atlantic, the ‘shale revolution’ is indeed radiating out from an increasingly less import dependent North America. (CNAS 2014, CSIS 2014) As recently as early 2013, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expected the United States to overtake Russia in 2015 as the leading producer of natural gas and to overtake Saudi Arabia in 2017 as the world’s leading producer of oil. However, the latter is happening this year, in 2014, and the former is about to occur. By 2019, the IEA projects the US will be producing over 13.1mbd.<sup>2</sup> Already the United States has become a net exporter of refined petroleum products for the first time since 1949. (EIA 2012b) Meanwhile, natural gas production is up 40% in the US since 2005. In 2012 shale gas accounted for 37% of US natural gas supply, up from only 2% in 2000.<sup>3</sup> By 2040, upwards of 50% of US natural gas production will be unconventional. (CSIS 2014)

The implications have quickly rippled across the Atlantic energy space to Europe, where displaced US coal has been backing out renewable energy and competing downward, to some extent, the price of Russian gas for Europeans. (Mufson 2012) The paradoxical result, at least so far, has been a relative undermining of Europe’s vital role in the parallel ‘low carbon revolution’ which it has led for two decades from its position in the northern Atlantic. This recent Atlantic Basin dynamic has intensified the energy dilemmas perceived by the EU – whose member states are, on the one hand, relatively import-dependent (particularly on Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East; EC 2011, BP 2013a) but also, on the other hand, relatively environmentally conscious (particularly of climate change but also of the potential dangers of ‘fracking’).

However impressive has been the ‘shale revolution’ in the Northern Atlantic, the deep-water offshore boom in the Southern Atlantic preceded this North American contribution to the Atlantic energy renaissance and continues to rival it. Catalyzed by the pre-salt discoveries in Brazil (by themselves as potentially as high as 50 to 200 bn bbl) and the development of the deep offshore in Angola and elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea and along the West Africa Transform Margin, the ‘offshore revolution’ has embraced nearly all of Africa and most of Atlantic Latin America. (Isbell 2012) Over the last decade, investment in offshore oil exploration and production (E&P) has generated something akin to a ‘Southern Atlantic oil ring’ with offshore E&P on the rise from Namibia to Morocco in the East, and from Argentina to the Gulf of Mexico in the West. Of the US\$210bn in expected capex investment in global offshore hydrocarbons between 2011 and 2015, over 80% will take place in the Atlantic, and over two-thirds of that in the Southern Atlantic. Already Southern Atlantic offshore oil reserves (130bn barrels) dwarf those of the Arctic (90bn barrels). (IFP Energie Nouvelle 2012). In fact, the Southern Atlantic could become the key new region at the margin for increases in global oil production, as well as the most critical regional supplier of oil at the margin to Asia-Pacific.

At the same time, through its myriad public, private and civic actors, the Atlantic Basin is currently spearheading, however insufficiently still, the global technological and

<sup>2</sup> Grant Smith, “US seen as biggest oil producer after overtaking Saudi Arabia,” Bloomberg, July 4, 2014 (<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-04/u-s-seen-as-biggest-oil-producer-after-overtaking-saudi.html>)

<sup>3</sup> Steven Mufson, “Shale gas reshaping the U.S. industrial landscape,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2012.



governance efforts to provide sustainable, ‘low emissions energy access for all’ (as in the UN’s SE4All Initiative) and to avoid the worst aspects of climate change (as in the UNFCCC’s goal of defending the ‘2-degree guardrail’). The first full blooming of the low carbon revolution has unfolded within the Atlantic Basin, where two-thirds of renewable energy generation now takes place and where a similar share of global installed renewable capacity is currently located. Although much of this has been deployed in the Northern Atlantic, renewable energy is now finding more fertile terrain in Latin America and Africa, where global institutions and the regional development banks are now placing the priority for their low carbon, energy access and sustainable development goals. Nevertheless, the continued growth of low carbon energy has been at least partially undermined by the recent boom in unconventional fossil fuels. Indeed, business-as-usual projections see the Atlantic Basin oil accounting for nearly two-thirds of the growth in global oil production to 2030, even as the Atlantic is now projected to ‘de-carbonize’ its energy mix at a slower rate than the rest of the world, particularly Asia-Pacific. (BP 2013b)

### The Shifting Global Energy Flow Map and the New Atlantic Center of Gravity

These competing energy ‘revolutions’ in the Atlantic have contributed to a redrawing of the global energy map. In stark contrast to the expectations of the reigning conventional wisdom -- still adhering to a once valid, but now increasingly obsolete, global energy map of the past -- the Atlantic energy renaissance is now beginning to challenge the long-held assumption that the global center of gravity for energy supply, particularly in the fossil fuel realm, would remain firmly rooted for the foreseeable future in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia -- what we call the ‘Great Crescent’ on our new global geopolitical, governance and energy maps.<sup>4</sup> As Atlantic hydrocarbons reserves and production continue to increase over the coming decades, and as Asian energy demand continues to grow, the respective centers of gravity for global energy supply and demand are shifting, such that global energy flows will continue to be significantly altered.

But the Atlantic energy renaissance is not occurring in a vacuum; nor is it completely free of counterpoising tendencies. Rather, it is emblematic – even part and parcel – of a number of deeper, globally-reaching tectonic shifts now convulsing the ‘global energy flow map.’ These global – but also ‘Atlantic shaped’ and ‘Atlantic shaping’ – trends include:

- ▷ *A westward shift in the global center of gravity for energy supply* into the Atlantic Basin, driven by recent, significant expansion in Atlantic energy resources – in particular, shale in the Northern Atlantic and offshore oil and gas in the Southern Atlantic. Already the

<sup>4</sup> This paper ‘re-projects’ the world map into three major regions: (1) the ‘Atlantic Basin’ (which includes the four Atlantic continents in their entirety, along with their islands): Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America and Europe); (2) the ‘Great Crescent’ (which groups together the traditional 20th century suppliers of hydrocarbons: Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East – a region which arcs in a ‘great crescent’ from Southwest Asia all across the northern half of the Asian ‘continent’); and (3) ‘Asia-Pacific’ (already a standard regional categorization -- in contrast to the two new ‘units of analysis’ introduced above – this region is comprised of what are commonly referred to as the sub-regions of ‘South Asia,’ ‘Southeast Asia’ and ‘East Asia’, together with the islands of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, including Australia and New Zealand). In an attempt to reveal new strategic trends which cannot be identified on the currently dominant versions of global geopolitical and energy maps, this ‘Atlantic Basin projection’ re-cuts existing national and regional energy data into these new regional categories, or ‘units of analysis,’ and then concentrates the analysis of the implications of changing global flows.

Atlantic world holds over 40% of global ‘proven reserves’ of petroleum and upwards of two thirds of broader (not yet ‘economical’) oil resources (including ‘unconventional’ oil and the ‘deep offshore’). The Atlantic also contributes 44% to daily oil production; by 2030, this share is projected to rise to 47% -- as nearly two-thirds of the projected growth in global oil production will take place in the Atlantic Basin. (BP 2013b) Beyond 2030, gas will begin to replace oil within the global energy mix and upon the global ‘energy seascape’ -- and by 2050 gas will have nearly completely displaced oil to account for 80% of globally traded energy, with most of it transported across the global ‘energy seascape.’ (IIASA 2013) Because the Atlantic Basin is potentially even more central on the future gas map than in the case of oil – with two-thirds of the world’s estimated shale gas reserves and nearly half of all ‘technically recoverable gas resources’ (TRR) – future Atlantic gas production will extend and reinforce the supply-side of the currently emerging ‘West-to-East’ global energy ‘flow circuits.’ (EIA 2013)

- › *An eastward shift in the global center of gravity for energy demand* into Asia-Pacific (but also into the ‘Great Crescent’). This trend has -- and continues to be -- driven by: (1) *structural declines in Atlantic Basin energy demand* (from reduced energy intensity and enhanced energy efficiency stemming from economic ‘maturity’ and technological change); and (2) *structural increases in Great Crescent and Asia-Pacific demand*, (in part the product of an ongoing, decades-long, eastward shift in the center of gravity for manufacturing output from the northern Atlantic to Asia-Pacific). Global energy demand is projected to more than double by 2050. The Atlantic Basin will slip from contributing 45% of global energy demand in 2010 to only 39% by 2050. Meanwhile, the relatively ‘energy short’ extra-Atlantic region, particularly Asia-Pacific, is set to increase its contribution to global energy demand from 55% in 2010 to 61% in 2050. (IIASA 2013)
- › *A continual ‘drying up’ of the traditional post-World War II pattern of ‘net westward global energy flows’ and their subsequent reversal to become ‘net eastward – or ‘Asia-bound’ -- global energy flows’* (or ‘West-to-East’ flows). As the traditional historical pattern of ‘Atlantic Basin demand’ depending on surplus ‘Great Crescent supply’ continues to evaporate, the Atlantic Basin will become increasingly energy ‘autonomous’ – in net terms – and Atlantic energy exports, at the margin, will increasingly flow ‘east,’ bound for Asia-Pacific.

These shifts in global energy flows represent a transformation of the ‘Traditional-Cold War’ global energy map into the ‘newly emerging global energy flow map’ of the first half of the 21st century. On the ‘Cold War’ map of the past, for nearly half a century the Northern Atlantic was highly dependent on the ‘Great Crescent’ for ‘westward’ energy flows -- both land-based and seaborne, but principally and increasingly the latter – with the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal representing the key chokepoints on the map, although with time a growing flow moved out of the Persian Gulf ‘eastward’ to a beginning to emerge Asia-Pacific, lending the Straits of Malacca their increasing relative strategic significance.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> More than 17mbd of oil pass through the Straits of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf – meaning 17 million barrels of oil every day. This is equivalent to 35% of all seaborne oil trade, and nearly 20% of globally produced oil. (BP2013a, EIA 2012) More than 85% of it is now going to Asia (India, China, Japan and South Korea), and by 2035 nearly all of it will be Asia-bound. Well over 75% of the oil moving through Hormuz daily also passes through the Strait of Malacca in Southeast

In stark contrast, on the ‘newly emerging global energy flow map,’ Asia-Pacific is increasingly dependent, at the margin, on ‘eastward’ (or at least ‘Asia-Pacific bound’) seaborne oil and gas flows out of the Atlantic Basin -- and increasingly out of the Southern Atlantic. The majority of these growing energy flows follow a ‘flow circuit’ out of the Southern Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean Basin to India, through Southeast Asia and its multiple straits, to the contested ‘rim land’ seas of the Pacific (ie, the South and East China Seas). While the ‘Hormuz-Malacca energy flow circuit’ remains crucial, so too now becomes the Cape Passage and the East African sea lanes (while the Suez Canal loses in relative global strategic importance).

Furthermore, the ‘initial’ and ‘intermediate corridors’ of all such seaborne flows following ‘flow circuits’ out of the Atlantic Basin to Asia-Pacific will also increasingly shift with time from their current East-West orientation -- through the ‘low latitude’ canals -- to a North-South flow following longer stretches of Atlantic sea lanes -- before turning towards Asia-Pacific to move through the ‘high latitude’ ‘inter-basin’ passages.

This will occur because of a confluence of now-shifting ‘flow circuit constraints’ and ‘enablers.’ First, even the enlarged and/or refitted Panama and Suez canals will increasingly come to represent ‘bottlenecked chokepoints’ -- once the enlarged ‘Asia-Pacific bound’ capacity of Panama and the still spare ‘eastward’ capacity of Suez are absorbed over the years to 2030 by increasing Atlantic Basin energy flows to Asia-Pacific. Second, there is the expected continued upward push in international shipping traffic -- which has grown 400-fold since the mid-19 century and tripled in the last ten years, and which is expected to double again by 2030, and to triple by 2050. (UNCTAD 2012, Stopford 2010). Third, shipping and marine-related technology have and will continue to evolve such that the largest seaborne vessels -- which already cannot pass through the canals and which tend to carry bulk and dry cargoes (i.e., raw materials) -- will increasingly be pushed to the ‘high-latitude’ passages to reach Asia-Pacific from the Atlantic, particularly through the Cape Passage in the South, but also even through the Arctic’s ‘Northern Route’ (as the latest ‘enhanced weatherization’ technology allows more and more ships to effectively use this Arctic route, even in its current state). (Marques Guedes, 2012; Käpylä & Mikkola, 2013)

The first of these ‘high-latitude’ ‘inter-basin’ passages -- the rising Southern Passage -- flows south out of the Southern Atlantic and through the Cape Passage, along the northern reaches of the Southern Ocean, and into the Indian Ocean -- the traditional ‘mediating’ basin between markets and destinations in the Atlantic and Asia-Pacific (given the enormous breadth of the Pacific Basin). The other is the emerging Northern Route, which flows north from the northeast Atlantic and into the Arctic Ocean -- which, as climate change melts the Arctic icecap, becomes a potential new rival, or complement, to the Indian Ocean as a ‘mediating’ basin between the Atlantic world and Asia.<sup>6</sup>

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Asia. Approximately 15mbd pass through Malacca daily -- including the bulk of the Hormuz oil and some additional flows coming from West Africa around the Cape Passage on their way to the Far East. The shut-down of either of these straits -- or both -- would take more oil off the market than is currently produced by Saudi Arabia (perennially around 9mbd-10mbd). The pipeline links between the Gulf countries and the Mediterranean or Red Sea are minimal -- at most 4mbd of spare capacity (EIA 2012) -- and would take years and many billions of dollars to build new sufficient excess pipeline capacity capable of fully backing up the Strait of Hormuz.

<sup>6</sup> For an optimistic appraisal of the future potentials of the Arctic, see Scott Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic

In addition to the future erosion of the strategic significance of the canals vis-à-vis the 'high latitude passages' into the Indian Ocean and the Arctic, the canals will suffer further relative loss of importance as a result of the emergence of a new rival, strategic 'eastward' energy flow to Asia-Pacific from Arctic Russia (where most of the projected, if limited, hydrocarbons production in the Arctic are expected to take place). Therefore, the Bering Strait, long a strategic 'hard power' passage, could become for the first time a strategic energy 'chokepoint.' Nevertheless, it is not likely to ever rival the other 'straits' for strategic significance (represented, in part, by the relative volume of the flow), particularly those of the 'Hormuz-Malacca' energy flow circuit. At least in the near-to-mid-term -- even with ongoing climate change -- the ultimate, inherent limitations of the Arctic on most economic activities, together with the likelihood that most Arctic oil and gas will be economically marginalized by the Southern Atlantic 'offshore revolution,' will prevent 'Arctic Basin' global energy flows -- both those originating from Arctic production and those potentially passing through from the Atlantic Basin to Asia-Pacific -- from ever contributing more than marginally to the total of global seaborne energy flows.<sup>7</sup>

As a result of all of the factors analyzed above, maritime traffic of all types, but particularly of Atlantic Basin global energy flows (both 'intra-' and 'extra-basin' bound), will become increasingly dense, particularly along the 'western' and 'eastern' seaboard of the Atlantic, as the 'low latitude' canals -- while continuing to accommodate their newly expanded maximum capacity throughputs -- come to represent a shrinking share of global energy flows over time; and as Atlantic energy flows rely increasingly on maritime 'flow circuits' through the 'high latitude' passages to reach growing markets in Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, these trends also point to a rapidly growing relative strategic significance for the 'Southern Atlantic' -- and for the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. Such trends serve as harbingers, then, for rising future investments in transportation, communications, and port facilities, in addition to energy, in the southern reaches of the Atlantic.

The bottom line, in strategic terms, is that seaborne oil and gas flows will increasingly reverse their overall net direction (Emerson 2014) -- from Cold War East-to-West flows to the new 21st century West-to-East flows. As a result, the 'Atlantic Basin' (with the Southern Atlantic potentially playing a key role) becomes the strategic hydrocarbons supplier-region at the margin for growing energy consumption in Asia-Pacific. In this regard, it is striking to note that only a decade ago, nearly all projections of global energy supply and demand (whether from the IEA, the EIA, OPEC or the World Energy Council) foresaw increasing global energy demand at the margin being met entirely by the Middle East (and in particular by Saudi Arabia).


Yet today, in stark contrast, the Atlantic Basin already supplies nearly one-third of that same total, global 'energy demand call' at the margin, now increasingly concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region -- and by 2030 the Atlantic Basin is projected to provide nearly half. (See Figure 1) Nothing could more synthetically and emblematically reflect the

Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013, pp. 76-89.

<sup>7</sup> For a more circumspect analysis of the near and mid-term future of the Arctic, see Juha Käpylä & Harri Mikkola, "Arctic Conflict Potential: Towards an extra-Arctic perspective," Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Briefing Paper 138 (2013).

reality of the ‘Atlantic energy renaissance’ – both its causes and its effects -- than this singular and dramatic (if long-building and then recently abrupt) shift in the global energy flow map.

Figure 1 – Absorption of the ‘Asian Call’ on Global Energy, Atlantic vs Great Crescent, 2000-2030



Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030, January 2013 and own-elaboration. Note: this refers to all traded energy, including oil, gas and coal, in million tons of oil equivalent annually. 50 million tons of oil (equivalent) annually is equal to approximately one million barrels a day of flow (or 1mdoe). 500mntoe = 10mbdoe, roughly.

If nothing else, this ongoing transformation of the global energy flow map begins to call into question the ascendant notion that the center of gravity of ‘global power’ has clearly and irrevocably shifted from the ‘West’ to the ‘East’ -- and that we are now in the ‘Asian Century.’ Most ‘global power indexes’ – which form part of the ostensible intellectual support for the consensus notion of the ‘Asian Century’ – do not even include a distinct energy variable. But it still cannot be denied that *without the real tangible variable of the oil* in play in the equation defining the broader Eurasian ‘heartland’ -- even if not so crudely over-weighted, as in the more simplistic versions of the ‘blood-for-oil’ thesis -- the ‘Gulf and Central Asian Wars’ would have made little strategic sense at all.

Even when evaluated on their own supposed accumulated tactical merits -- simplifying, but basically, to stop the Ayatollahs *et al*, (or the radical Shiites), or to stop Saddam *et al*, (the radical post-Nasserite Arab socialists), or to stop Bin Laden *et al*, (the radical Sunnis), without the oil being located in the greater Eurasian heartland and the Middle East, our post-Cold War incursions into Eurasia would have signified – in a strategic sense -- nothing more and nothing less than another obsessive drive of the ‘Midland Ocean’ countries to continually ‘contain’ the heartland of Eurasia -- or one of the many ‘rim-lands’ deemed ‘critical. Without the oil, the West would have had little need to stop Saddam or to stop Bin Laden; indeed, without the oil in the ‘heartland’/Middle East,

the trajectory of history would have been completely different, and probably would not have even produced Saddam and Bin Laden (and the movements they led) as distinct agents of history. At the very least, history would not have ‘radicalized’ them as it did.

Without the variable of oil, laid out across the map as it was, even the Cold War would not have made the strategic sense that it seemed to make. Even if it would have begun in any event, it would have been a Cold War that ended quickly. For how could it have been any other way if the Soviet Union, and later the Middle East, had always been dependent on ‘Western’ or ‘Atlantic’ oil, rather than oil independent and, later, the strategic energy suppliers at the margin to that very Northern Atlantic ‘West’? But even though history on the ground produced the Cold War and the violent Islamic radicalization that it did, history on the ground is changing again, as energy balances shift toward the Atlantic world.

Even today, as the ‘pivot to Asia’ unfolds, the ‘Carter Doctrine’ has not been formally rescinded and re-born. Makerinderists of multiple stripes rise up with new imperatives to ‘deal with Putin’ --or, alternatively, they inevitably cry for an inevitable war, always, in the Middle East – and yes, we agree, the short term reasons they argue are, always, impeccable, and the emergencies they present can never be ignored. However, this new global energy flow map changes things -- it problematizes the geo-economic and geo-political rationale behind the proclaimed ‘pivot to Asia’, which strategically responds to the notion of the ‘Asian Century’ – and the notion of ‘global power’ that supports it. At the very least this new perspective – or ‘Atlantic Basin projection’ – of the global energy flow map offers to more deeply inform the strategic calculations behind the pivot (whether it becomes ‘transatlantic’ or remains a strictly US strategic posture) and provides another chance to be clear headed, at least – even if in the end we insist on defining the Russians as our enemies.<sup>8</sup> At the very least, the ‘Atlantic Basin projection’ provides an interesting opportunity for geopolitical re-assessments on all sides.

In the final analysis, whatever position or weighting current administrations or regimes might assign, within their own strategic equations, to the variables shaped by shifting energy dependency balances between countries and regions – or to the changing global ‘flow circuits’ that generate and articulate such shifting dependencies upon the global ‘energy land- and seascapes’ -- global energy balances will continue to move, over the course of the foreseeable future, in favor of the Atlantic Basin and, at least in relative terms, against the rest of the world (i.e., the traditional fossil fuel suppliers of the ‘Great Crescent’ and the increasingly dominant consumers of the future in Asia-Pacific).

<sup>8</sup> For a serious, if Eurasian-centric, discussion of the ‘pivot to Asia,’ and its motivations, rationales, contours and potentials to become the basis of a ‘transatlantic’ strategic posture, see Hans Binnendijk, ed., *A Transatlantic Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2014. At least one of the notable exceptions to the book’s traditional ‘Eurasian’ focus is the contribution from Daniel S. Hamilton (“Asia’s Pivot to the Atlantic: Implications for the United States and Europe”) which charts the recent (inter)penetration of Asia-Pacific (with) in the Atlantic Basin – and particularly with/in the Southern Atlantic (which we ‘tend to forget’ given our seemingly ‘fixed focus’ on Eurasia).

## The Paradoxes, Challenges and Opportunities of the Atlantic Energy Renaissance

### The Shale Revolution in the Northern Atlantic

Paradoxically, much of the above has passed by largely unnoticed, even in North America, where the drum-beat focus on the ‘shale revolution’ and its supposed promise to deliver ‘national energy independence’ has tended to obscure from view the broader Atlantic energy renaissance, along with its own unique implications, risks and opportunities. While the shale revolution has conceptually overrun former concerns of ‘peak oil,’ it has also been cast through an overly rigid strategic focus – or ‘geopolitical projection’ -- that frames the potential of shale resources almost exclusively as a means to regain previously eroded economic competitiveness and global geopolitical influence, conceived of nearly entirely in ‘national’ terms.

At best, the potential of the ‘shale revolution’ has been thought of in ‘bilateral’ or ‘transatlantic’ terms. If North America is now on track to become a significant net energy exporter over the next two decades, its ‘transatlantic’ partners in Europe remain, by and large, highly dependent on the ‘Great Crescent.’ Over half of the hydrocarbons consumed in the EU are supplied by Russia and the Middle East (EC 2011, BP 2012). More than 21% of all the EU’s oil imports (or 15% of its total oil consumption) came from the Middle East in 2011, and some 50% of imports (4mbd), or around 35% of total EU oil consumption (13 mbd) came from the Russia (BP, 2012). In 2011, the EU imported three-quarters (75%, or 335 bcm annually, BP 2012) of the gas it consumed that year (448 bcm). Around 35% of these imports (or 26% of total European gas consumption) was supplied by Russia (around 117 bcm).<sup>9</sup> (EC, 2011).

Although in the years since 2011 Europe’s oil dependence on the Middle East has declined somewhat (mainly due to the imposition of trade sanctions on Iran), more recently cited levels of Russian gas imports into the EU, reported in the context of the Ukrainian crises of 2014, have them as high as 130 bcm in 2012 and 162 bcm in 2013, reaching 30% of total EU gas consumption. (Clingendael 2014, based on Gazprom data).<sup>10</sup>

However, these levels of dependence on Russian gas *for the ‘EU as a whole’* are relatively modest enough to obscure the fact that in Central and Eastern Europe this external dependence on Russia is far higher (given that the northwestern and southwestern flanks of Europe basically do not consume Russian gas). Eastern European dependence on Russian gas is currently around 70% on average as a sub-region – *double the overall all EU dependence ratio on Russian gas, and more or less the current level of Asia’s external dependence on Middle East oil*. In the case of some of the smaller Eastern European and Baltic countries – typically (although not always) with economies in which gas makes up a relatively high share of the primary energy mix, and/or where

<sup>9</sup> This last figure corresponds to 2011 levels.

<sup>10</sup> In addition, the EU is also dependent on Russia for 30% of its coal imports, while half of all Russian coal exports go to the EU.

fear of, and antipathy toward, Russia can still be palpably felt -- the relationship is one of near 'total dependence' on Russia. As a result, Europe tends to perceive an energy security risk as nearly inherent in its relationship with its eastern neighbor, even in the face of the traditional counter-argument that Russia is even more dependent on the EU as an essential export market for its gas.<sup>11</sup>

Despite all of this, the 'shale revolution' remains stalled in Europe as a number of economic (e.g., basin cost structures), legal (e.g., property rights), environmental (e.g., local pollution and water contamination) and political obstacles (e.g., environmental and low carbon opposition) will continue to stand in its way over the near-to-midterm.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, in light of the aging and increasingly compromised traditional infrastructure links across the 'energy landscape' of Central and Eastern Europe which continue to tie Europe to the Great Crescent energy suppliers -- and driven principally by the current crisis in the Ukraine -- there has recently been much renewed 'transatlantic' debate over the potential to reduce Europe's dependence on the Great Crescent, and particularly Russia, by imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States, the gas to be provided mainly through increased shale production.

The idea has been seized upon by many as a political project with which to renovate the strategic relevance of the 'transatlantic' relationship. Typically, there have been calls for more collaborative action from the US-EU Energy Council. On the other hand, US LNG exports to Europe face opposition from a strange bedfellow alliance of large industrial and chemical companies (that would like to keep gas prices in the US as low as possible) together with environmentalists (intent on stymying the development of hydrocarbons).

Perhaps more importantly, a number of Northern Atlantic energy analysts have also recently questioned the underlying economic rationale of US LNG exports to Europe. (Boersma and Greving, 2014) (Goldthau and Boersma, 2014). The cost structure of Russian gas is low enough to at least limit the potential for diversifying Europe's gas imports away from Russia in the near-term. Nor is it entirely clear that US LNG exports (even if from relatively cheap shale gas) will ultimately ever be able to compete on cost with Russian gas in Europe, given the large up-front capital costs that would be required, both in the US (for liquefaction) and in Europe (for regasification and for more European gas interconnections, particularly between Spain and France).

Despite these uncertainties, however, a number efforts are afoot to boost US gas exports to Europe. Indeed, a huge re-directional infrastructure shift is underway in the US, as regasification (import) plants are being reconverted into liquefaction (export) plants. In 2007, 30 US projects were waiting for 'import' approval; today, 30 are waiting for 'export' approval, mainly along the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coasts of North

<sup>11</sup> Almost all Russian gas goes West in pipes; 50% to 70% to EU; the rest to Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkans.

<sup>12</sup> The same could be said of the southern Atlantic, where the potential in unconventional hydrocarbons is large. This is particularly true in Mexico, Argentina and South Africa -- Atlantic countries where low carbon, environmental and other local interests are beginning to resist the spread of shale gas but where also energy reforms would also be required to generate more sustainable increases in gas production.



America. Cheniere plans to export LNG to Europe from its Sabine Pass facility by the end of next year, while export approval has been granted to five other LNG export projects to begin production after 2016.

This first wave of projects alone could allow for some 9bcm a day of exports by the end of the decade, making the US an overall net natural gas exporter by 2021. By 2025, the US could be exporting as much as 40bcm of LNG a day (nearly 30% of current production levels) -- if the entire application pipeline is eventually approved and executed. Although the US is still importing about 8% of its gas consumption (mainly from Canada), by 2040 net export capacity will be about 12%. (CSIS 2014)

Successful conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (or TTIP) would facilitate this process, as US legislation grants automatic export approval of gas to countries that have signed a free trade agreement with the US. (Otherwise, gas exports must obtain government approval, while crude exports remain banned.) But the crisis in the Ukraine has even provoked discussions over the possibility of including specific energy chapters in the currently-under-negotiation TTIP, and debates over their potential contents.

It is unlikely, however, that any rapidly conceived, 'transatlantic' effort to reduce European dependence on the Great Crescent (but concretely Russia) will make progress very rapidly -- at least not in the short run -- even if it could, and *particularly if such an effort remains exclusively 'northern Atlantic.'* However, over the middle-run of 10 to 15 years out (between 2025 and 2030) the EU's dependencies on the Great Crescent could be strategically reoriented, even if not completely eliminated. However, for such a strategic thrust to have any chance at sustainable success, even in the long run, it will require a deep inclusion of Atlantic partners from the Southern Atlantic.

A 'pan-Atlantic vision' of a strategy to reduce European dependence on Russia based upon the broader possibilities of replacing these 'land-based' energy import flows into Europe with seaborne flows from other parts of the Atlantic Basin -- including the Mediterranean and broader Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as North America -- would have a greater chance of making a difference more quickly on the ground than would a purely Northern Atlantic crisis response. Although much African oil is already heading east to Asia, and a large portion -- although not all-- of US gas exports will eventually go there as well, in the future much of Europe's flattening hydrocarbons demand could be met more cheaply and politically sustainably by imports from Atlantic partners in Africa, Latin America and North America.

If the shale revolution remains limited to North America -- with or without US LNG exports to Europe -- it still implies grave risks to the environment and human health, as well as, paradoxically, to the global climate itself. Chief among the obstacles to -- and risks associated with -- further shale gas expansion will be the potential impact of 'fugitive emissions' of methane on the ultimate carbon footprint of gas, which conventional wisdom assumes is

50% that of coal and 67% that of oil.<sup>13</sup> Methane, the principal component of natural gas, is also a greenhouse gas which is potentially, if not typically, released with shale gas production (depending on geology and local regulation and safety controls). Because methane has approximately 34-times more heat-trapping capacity than carbon dioxide, the issue of ‘fugitive emissions’ is the pivot upon which turns at least half of the shale revolution’s ultimate rationale – to serve as a ‘lower-carbon bridge fuel.’ (Isbell, 2012)

But should the ‘shale revolution’ finally manage to spread beyond North America, it would contribute even more than it already has to the market and political undermining of the state policies and business models previously put into place and developed by Northern Atlantic public and private sectors to accelerate the deployment of low carbon technologies. This ‘breaking effect’ on the trajectory of renewable energy, particularly in the Northern Atlantic, has actually begun to occur as the result of the downward pressure not just on the structure of global gas prices, but also, in ‘market-linked’ fashion (via the ‘substitution effect’), on the price of coal – the very fuel that gas is supposed to be a ‘bridge’ away from.

A supreme expression of the contradictions generated by the ‘shale revolution’ has been the recent paradoxical reversal of the respective trends in the so-called ‘emissions gap’ to 2020 on both sides of the Northern Atlantic. On the one hand, the US can now claim that it will achieve the (admittedly weak) goal of reducing US greenhouse gas emissions to 17% below the 2005 level by 2020 (even though it never formally committed, in a binding way, to these goals at the Copenhagen Climate Summit, given that the Senate had not, and would not, adopt the House’s Waxman-Markey Bill which incorporated these national commitments). However, Europe now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of burning more and cheaper coal, which raises emissions – placing the EU’s 20-20-20 objectives in danger, across the board – and placing downward pressure on the price of Russian gas sold to Europe, which constrains the pace of renewables deployment and reinforces, again paradoxically, Europe’s most notably extra-Atlantic energy dependency.

### The Offshore Revolution in the Southern Atlantic

In the Southern Atlantic, where over half the population lives beyond the reach of the energy grid, and where ‘distributed’ forms of solar energy are already competitive with other off-grid electricity sources – even without subsidies or further public support -- the marginal superiority of the low carbon revolution over its hydrocarbon contemporaries with respect to the post-Millennium ‘sustainable development’ goals is most apparent. Under the auspices of the UN’s ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ initiative, Africa faces an opportunity – more likely to be realized if embraced by ‘pan-Atlantic’ energy cooperation – to leap-frog a generation of (possibly inappropriate) technological development by pursuing a more flexible sustainable development model based on ‘distributed’ energy ‘services’ provided by local ‘energy services companies’ through smaller-scale off-grid and mini-grid solar electricity technologies and through the provision of improved biomass technologies. (Thorne and Felten 2014)

<sup>13</sup> For a fuller discussion of the risks and opportunities posed by the shale gas ‘revolution,’ see Isbell 2012, pp. 76-98.

At the same time, however, the ‘offshore revolution’ has presented the countries of the South with at least a new tempting opportunity to attempt to transform projected increases in hydrocarbons revenue into the longed-for authentic ‘seeds’ of both ‘sustainable development’ and the ‘low carbon revolution.’ The potential financial, economic and political distortions within Southern Atlantic macro economies (e.g., Dutch Disease and the corruption of state institutions and enterprises) -- and the potentially corrosive effects on the very body politic itself (e.g., the multi-faceted ‘oil curse’) -- that potentially could be reinforced or unleashed afresh by the Southern Atlantic hydrocarbons boom could easily make the political and economic culture of potential beneficiary countries, particularly in Africa, unfit to receive global green and climate funds -- even if the ‘developed’ countries of the Northern Atlantic and Asia-Pacific make good on their current pledges (US\$100bn a year from 2020 to ‘developing countries’). Inevitably, then, this same ‘offshore boom’ grows within itself the ‘seeds’ of a premature abortion of the ‘low carbon revolution’ in the Southern Atlantic -- at least for a period of time, and perhaps a crucial one.

The ultimate effect of the latter scenario would be to shipwreck the UN’s SE4All Initiative, along with its objectives (extensions of the Millennium Goals), at least in the Southern Atlantic. Certain hydrocarbons exporters in the Southern Atlantic – Mexico, Brazil, and Angola (along with other potential energy exporters, like Morocco) -- must take the lead, reforming their energy policies, regulatory regimes and even their political economies, so as to make them compatible with the ‘managed avoidance’ of ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘oil curse’ and a successful policy integration of the hydrocarbons boom with the pressing imperative (theirs and ours) of sustainably achieving ‘low emissions energy access for all.’


Indeed, the Southern Atlantic is globally unique in that agriculture, energy, climate and land-use constraints and possibilities, all tend to converge and intersect in Africa and Latin America, unlike in any other region in the world. (Isbell 2012) This uniqueness generates large risks stemming from incompatible land-use strategies, but also significant opportunities to integrate energy, climate, agriculture, water, forestry and land-use policies in the Southern Atlantic. Such factors recommend that Southern Atlantic countries consider formulas for transnational ‘pan-Atlantic’ energy cooperation, broadly conceived.

### **The Recent Retreat of the Atlantic Basin Low Carbon Revolution**

Renewable energy is even more highly concentrated in the Atlantic Basin than are the traditional fossil fuels. Considering the basin’s collective installed capacities for solar (77% of the world total), wind (64%) and geothermal (59%), Atlantic renewables (also known as NRETs, or ‘non-conventional renewable energy technologies’) constitute roughly two-thirds of the world’s total installed ‘renewable’ electricity capacity. In terms of generation and consumption, the Atlantic accounts for more than 75% of total global modern renewable energies. (BP 2013a). Despite this apparent, impressive Atlantic dominance in ‘non-conventional renewable energy technologies (or NRETs), the Atlantic Basin’s current lead in the roll-out of modern renewables remains either insufficient, irrelevant or unsustainable. A number of difficult challenges and mounting barriers continue to undermine the strength of future renewable energy deployment.

Chief of among these challenges, lagging investment in renewable energy in the Atlantic Basin is now at its lowest level (US\$104bn in 2013) since 2006, when such Atlantic investment was US\$75bn a year -- and 75% of the global total. Today, Asia-Pacific renewable energy investment accounts for more than 49% of the global total compared with only 48% in the Atlantic Basin. Nevertheless, over the same period renewable energy investment in the Southern Atlantic remained steady, at approximately US\$20bn a year (see Figure 2). (REN21 2014)

Figure 2 – Atlantic Basin Renewable Energy Investment, Northern vs Southern, US\$ bn, 2004-2013




Source: Renewable Energy Status Report 2014, REN21 (2014) and own-elaboration.

Lingering, if rapidly disappearing, ‘headline’ cost differentials between renewable energies and fossil fuels – along with a lopsided public subsidy advantage for fossil fuels – continue to tilt the playing field against renewable energy. Such ‘levelized cost differentials’ have recently all but evaporated in the Northern Atlantic, while in the Southern Atlantic they have fallen to only US\$0.12/kWh and US\$0.06/kWh for grid-connected solar and wind power, respectively. (Vergara et al, 2014; Fraunhofer ISE, 2013). At the same time, recent studies suggest that the ‘societal benefits’ of NRETs in the Southern Atlantic (including the avoided costs of carbon emissions and particulate pollution and the additional economic benefits in terms of improved balance of payments and net job creation) could be as high as double – or even four times as much as – these ‘levelized cost differentials.’ (Vergara et al, 2014)

Meanwhile, post-tax public subsidies to fossil fuels worldwide came to US\$1.7trillion last year (IMF, 2013), while just the ‘direct’ subsidies to fossil fuels (not including ‘indirect’ support from tax breaks and exemptions) alone came to US\$544bn in 2012 -- more than five times the level of state support for renewable energies worldwide (US\$101bn). (IEA, 2013) Figure 3 reveals the level of fossil fuel subsidies in the Atlantic Basin (compared with other major regions) in 2011.

Figure 3 – Global Fossil Fuel Energy Subsidies, by fuel and by major region, 2011



Source: International Monetary Fund, Energy Subsidy Reform – Lessons and Implications, 2013 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf>. Note: These are ‘post-tax’ fossil fuel subsidies, including both direct subsidies and indirect tax expenditures and exemptions, represented in US\$ value.

The Atlantic Basin provides 58% of all (‘post-tax’) subsidies to oil (US\$513bn of US\$807bn globally) and 47% of all fossil subsidies worldwide (US\$806bn of US\$1.7tn). The Great Crescent is the largest subsidizer of gas (42% -- US\$126bn of US\$299bn -- and 20% of all fossil subsidies), while Asia-Pacific accounts for 63% of global coal subsidies (US\$338bn of US\$539bn) and for 33% of all fossil fuel subsidies globally. Only three Atlantic Basin countries – the US, Venezuela and Mexico -- figure in the top ten (with the US at the top), and only six in the top fifteen (including Egypt, Canada and Algeria). Given the outsized share of the US in total global fossil fuel subsidies (US\$502bn of US\$1.7tn), it is clear that the ‘fossil’ character of the Atlantic Basin – in relative global terms – is being sustained by the Northern Atlantic, and by North America in particular.


Recent changes in the energy policy environment have been unfavorable to renewable energy, contributing to a ‘re-carbonization’ of the Atlantic Basin energy trajectory. The energy policy environment of the northern Atlantic, in particular, has recently been turned on its head. For the two decades preceding the financial crisis of 2008, renewable energies faced an increasingly favorable policy and commercial landscape. But a combination of abrupt pressures and constraints coming from shifting global trends colliding with the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression has generated a political backlash against renewable energy and climate change policies that has significantly undermined NRET rollout.

First, there was the so-called ‘death’ of US ‘cap-and-trade’ legislation in the fall of 2009 and winter of 2010. Then came an inundation of Chinese solar panels onto the global solar market, just as Northern Atlantic investment community made a risk-averse turn with respect to renewable energy. After that, came the ‘Euro crisis’ and the reversal of

much European state support for renewables (the dramatic, retroactive reduction of support in Spain being perhaps the most significant and emblematic European case). And then the full effects of the ‘shale revolution’ in the US were felt across the Atlantic Basin.

Furthermore, while the Atlantic Basin remains the leader in most relevant low carbon categories, modern renewable energy continues to contribute only a small share of the Atlantic Basin energy mix. Although the share of NRETs (solar, wind, geothermal, etc) is expected to rise in the future, BP’s business as usual projection foresees their contribution to the basin’s energy mix – nearly 3.5% today – to be only 7.3% by 2030 (although it is true that NRETs will grow faster than any other energy source). ‘Traditional, conventional renewable energies’ (nuclear, hydro, biofuels) will maintain their share of around 16% of the total Atlantic Basin energy mix to 2030; over the same period, the share of fossil fuels will fall, but only from 81% today to 77% by 2030 (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 – Atlantic Basin Primary Energy Mix, Historical and Projections, 1990-2030




Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030, January 2013.

Although the Atlantic Basin energy mix was slightly less fossil fuel-intensive (82%) in 2010 than the world’s, by 2030, according to the business as usual projection, the fossil fuel intensity of the world’s energy mix will have fallen six percentage points (to 81%), compared with a decline of only five percentage points in the Atlantic, implying that the Atlantic Basin is now expected to de-carbonize its energy mix at a slower rate to 2030 than the rest of the world. So much for the Atlantic Basin’s low carbon leadership – at least according to ‘business as usual’ for another 15 years.

It is also to be expected that Asia-Pacific will continue to erode Atlantic Basin predominance in the basic categories of renewable energy consumption and production capacity

– as low carbon technologies logically, and necessarily, expand across Asia to provide increasingly cheap renewable energy more closely to the rising centers of global demand. Already Asia-Pacific has increased its share of global renewable energy production from less than one-fifth in 1990 to more than one-third today; by 2030, according to our business as usual projection, Asia-Pacific will contribute 41% of all renewable energy production, cutting much of the Atlantic Basin’s prior lead (54% in 2030, down from 79% in 1990; see Figure 5). Although this follows BP business as usual projection, it does reveal that under current configurations and conditions, low carbon roll-out is now far more intensive in Asia-Pacific than in the Atlantic Basin.

*Figure 5 – Renewable Energy Production, by Region, Historical and Projections, 1990-2030*



Source: BP Energy Outlook 2030, January 2013.

### **The ‘Carbon Constraint’ and Atlantic Carbon Feedbacks upon the Global Energy Flow Map**

Nevertheless, independent of whatever geopolitical implications one might gather from the Atlantic energy renaissance and the change in the global energy flow map, of which it is both cause and effect, there are other considerations that certainly must modify anyone’s geo-economic and geopolitical conclusions.

If the world were still more like it was a generation ago, the reach of this Atlantic ‘fossil revolution’ and its implications would begin to unfold across the global energy and geopolitical maps within a strategic context devoid of any ‘climate’ or ‘carbon constraint.’ This was indeed the situation the last time hydrocarbons unexpectedly undercut low carbon energy development in the 1980s, when non-OPEC oil production (principally from the Atlantic Basin) surged, Saudi Arabia stopped building spare capacity to compensate for the over-production of its cartel associates, and oil prices collapsed.

But today, in 2014, the mounting realities of precisely such a ‘carbon constraint’ – in its real material form (i.e., rising temperatures and sea levels, shifting biomes and ecosystems, etc.), if not yet in its necessary economic monetary expression (i.e., carbon’s ‘market price’) -- now generate profound uncertainties with respect to the ultimate implications and potentials of the most recent, multi-faceted resurgence of hydrocarbons in the Atlantic Basin.

Climate change – whether conveniently denied or clearly perceived and prepared for with awe-inspiring prudence – will continue to problematize any and all of the strategic conclusions possibly drawn from the maps mentioned above -- be they the geopolitical maps used to articulate and mount the ‘pivot to Asia,’ or the newly emerging global energy flow map identified above that would at least challenge many of the pivot’s assumptions -- or even the many other geopolitical and energy maps that might be perceived through different strategic lenses in Asia-Pacific or the Great Crescent – or those that might be now forming within the Southern Atlantic.

At a bare minimum, the global reserve maps that underpin current hydrocarbons production and guide the future investments of the world’s oil and gas companies will come under closer scrutiny. Hydrocarbons companies – be they the private companies we call IOCs, or the state companies we call NOCs – will see both the strategic relevance and the market value of their declared reserves increasingly called into question. For any ultimate embodiment of the real, material ‘carbon constraint’ in an effective monetary form (i.e., a globally-applicable ‘price’ of carbon) would imply that a significant amount of currently booked global oil and gas reserves (upwards of one trillion barrels) would need to remain unburned -- ‘stranded assets’ cut off from any conventionally-conceived form of future stream of income. (Grantham Research Institute, 2013) Based on business as usual projects of future growth rates, we estimate that the world’s ‘carbon budget’ (consistent with a successful defense of the ‘2-degree guardrail’) will be exhausted as early as 2030 but likely before 2040. (BP2013b)

Furthermore, ongoing technological development in the energy and energy-related realms will certainly continue to roil the ‘flow circuits’ of the global energy flow map, shifting the sources of supply and demand across national, regional, continental and maritime borders -- and even beyond, into the high seas of the ocean basins, into the open realm of the bulk of the remaining planetary commons. Innovation and climate change will now interact to continue to tip the scales: sometimes against traditional fossil fuels (as might occur in the case of a significant breakthrough in energy storage technology), sometimes against renewable energy (as has recently occurred as a result of the Atlantic Basin hydrocarbons ‘revolutions’). In other instances, these technological ‘scales’ – mediated by physical and human geography -- will tip against, or in favor of, a particular country, a region, a basin.

## The Rise of the Seascapes

Beyond the paradoxes and dilemmas generated by the recent interactions between fossil fuels, climate change, low carbon energy and sustainable development within the Atlantic space, there are at least two other increasingly significant strategic dynamics which are bound up with the Atlantic energy renaissance. The first is the rise of the



‘seascape’ and the emergence of the ‘blue economy’ (including but certainly not limited to marine-based energy). Driven by an increasingly rapid rate, and intensifying reach, of technological innovation which has opened the sea depths and allowed for the mapping of their unique and largely unknown spaces, systems and topographies, the ongoing emergence of the global ‘seascape’ reflects a long-term shift in relative geo-economic and geopolitical significance (and transnational governance potential), away from the traditional geopolitical and energy ‘landscapes’ and increasingly into the sea -- the next great resource frontier.

Over time, technological innovation has deepened the division of labor, pushing the dividing line of economic specialization beyond the household, then beyond the locally-confined market of the village, then past the boundaries of the regional and national economies, and finally, now, even beyond the terrestrial/land frontiers of the global political economy to stretch more exhaustively across -- and more penetratingly into -- the ‘global seascape.’ As the center of economic and geopolitical gravity continues its ‘modern’ shift from the land to the sea – dating back to Atlantic Europe’s first ‘emergence’ in the late 15th century -- our actual energy, geo-economic, geopolitical and governance maps are increasingly ‘marine-centered’ and ‘ocean basin-based.’ Only now the long-building strategic shift to the seascape is approaching an inflection point, as both global geopolitics and the global political economy begin to enter their respective ‘post-modernities.’

Although few are aware of it, three-quarters of the planet’s surface is covered by water. “How inappropriate to call this planet Earth,” wrote the British writer, Arthur C. Clarke, “when it is quite clearly Ocean.”<sup>14</sup> After all, this same salt water constitutes 99% of the planet’s ‘living space’ by volume. Largely as a result, transportation and commerce are typically more efficiently undertaken by sea. As such, over 90% of physical merchandise trade (by volume, and nearly three-quarters by value) takes place via marine transport along the world’s sea lanes (including two-thirds of the global oil trade, one-third of the gas trade, and the large majority of other ‘global material flows’, expected to triple by mid-century).<sup>15</sup>

Already some 5% of global GDP – or US\$3 trillion annually – is generated from marine and coastal industries, while some 40% of the world’s population directly depends upon marine and coastal biodiversity.<sup>16</sup> (GOC 2014) Furthermore, the role of the oceans in the maintenance of species diversity and of coastal ecosystem services, and in the absorption of carbon dioxide, is also critical, and – given the deplorable state of oceans in general and their rapid rate of deterioration -- it will demand more and more intensive transnational collaboration. (Holthus 2012a, 2012b)

<sup>14</sup> “How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is clearly Ocean,” quoted in James E. Lovelock

“stands Up for the Gaia Hypothesis,” *Nature*, Volume 344, Number 6262, 8 March 1990 (p. 102); also: “... As science-fiction author Arthur C. Clarke noted, it is ‘inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is quite clearly Ocean’,” as quoted in “Oceans: The blue frontier,” *Nature*, 469, 12 January 2011 (pp. 158-159).

<sup>15</sup> Total global seaborne trade has increased since 1970 at an average annual rate of 3.1% and is expected to double yet again by 2030 (UNCTAD 2012). Since the mid-19th century, it has increased 400-fold in cargo volume terms, reaching nearly 1.5 trillion tons of seaborne cargo per capita annually (Stopford 2010).

<sup>16</sup> See Marcia Stanton, “The Worth of the Deep Blue,” *Namib Times*, April 27, 2013 (<http://www.namibtimes.net/forum/topics/the-worth-of-the-deep-blue>) (Stanton 2013)

The strategic emergence of the ‘global seascape’ is at once shaping the Atlantic energy renaissance and being driven by it. Nearly one-third of the global total of tradable energy and three-quarters of globally traded energy is transported via the seascape. Based on annual national bilateral trade data from UNCOMTRADE, we estimate that total ‘Atlantic Basin global energy flows’ (including both intra- and extra-Atlantic energy trade) constitute over three-quarters of the total use of the global ‘seascape’ for the transportation of ‘global energy flows.’ Furthermore, ‘intra-Atlantic’ (or ‘Atlantic Basin’) energy flows -- 75% of all ‘Atlantic Basin global energy flows (of which only 25% are ‘extra-Atlantic’) -- make up around two-thirds of total maritime energy transportation on the global seascape.

In addition to the increasing significance of the ‘seascape’ for the transportation of global energy flows – along with the consequent risks to traditional and human security along the sea lanes and maritime ‘rim lands’ -- one-third (28mbd) of global oil production (87mbd) already takes place in the ‘offshore’ and 60% of this (18mbd) is produced in the Atlantic Basin seascape. The ‘offshore’ is the fastest growing category within global oil production, with the ‘ultra-deep offshore’ the fastest growing sub-category – and both are set to continue to grow in absolute and relative terms. As such, Atlantic Basin dominance in the maritime transport of ‘global energy flows’ along the global ‘seascape’ is complemented and buttressed by the Atlantic’s clear lead along the burgeoning frontier of offshore oil and gas E&P. This is particularly true in the so-called ‘deep offshore’ (i.e., more than 1000m), one of the defining features of the nascent Southern Atlantic ‘oil ring.’

Meanwhile, a growing share of wind production is also taking place ‘offshore,’ while other forms of marine energy (wave, tidal, current etc.) are now on the midterm horizon. (Holthus, 2012b; IPCC 2011) According to the IEA: “Current world electricity demand is 17 500 TWh. There is the potential to develop 20 00080 000 TWh of electricity generated by changes in ocean temperatures, salt content, and the movement of tides, currents, waves and swells. These technologies are proven.” Furthermore, as more energy comes out of the ‘Atlantic energy seascape,’ more energy will also be transported along the seaborne ‘flow circuits’ of the Atlantic Basin, underlining its rising relative strategic significance as a ‘seascape,’ both compared to the ‘energy landscape’ and to the other ‘ocean-basin energy seascapes.’ However, the IEA goes on to point out that “. . . there are siting and environmental issues. Ports, coastal waters, and the open sea are divided into fishing permit areas and shipping routes. To capitalize on this energy source, international collaboration is necessary.”<sup>17</sup> In the end, energy offers just one central justification to consider the prospect of ‘pan-Atlantic’ transnational cooperation.

As it is, therefore, the Atlantic Basin increasingly dominates the global ‘energy seascape,’ accounting for about two-thirds of all global maritime energy stocks and flows. Because of the Atlantic Basin’s outsized role in the ‘global energy seascape,’ in the short- and medium run much of the world’s sea, ground and air transportation (which rely nearly completely on oil and gas) will depend directly upon – more than any other strategic region or realm -- the efficiency, productivity and security of the Atlantic ‘energy seascape’ – and, increasingly into the future, the Southern Atlantic ‘seascape.’

<sup>17</sup> Both for IEA quotes on ocean energy, see: <http://www.iea.org/technitiatives/renewableenergy/ocean/>

The rise of the ‘global seascape’ – along with its multidimensional coalescence into distinct (but related and interlocking) ‘ocean basins’ -- is the most central, dimension-deepening and space-sculpting dynamic on the emerging geopolitical and global energy flow maps to be revealed by our nascent ‘Atlantic Basin projection.’ This centrality on the global energy flow map also makes the Atlantic Basin and its ‘seascape’ the key regional pivot for defining and seizing the challenges and opportunities presented by global energy, climate change and transnational governance.

With the continued development of satellite, communications, information, computing and a new wide range of ‘marine’ technologies, the ocean basins and their ‘seascapes’ are now emerging into technical -- and even public -- consciousness. A conscious ‘energy, geopolitical and governance’ mapping of the ‘seascapes’ of the world’s ocean basins would go a long way toward transforming the dominant but obsolete ‘Traditional-Cold War’ geopolitical and global energy flow maps into a more multi-dimensional, fully-rendered ‘ocean basin projection.’ While the physical, geographic, ecological ‘mapping’ effort has already been underway for a generation, propelled into a much more rapid dynamic by recent breakthroughs in marine and information technologies, the geo-economic, geopolitical and governance ‘mapping’ task has only begun.

Nevertheless, there are already broad ocean basin approaches emerging now in the form of a number of nascent attempts in the Atlantic, the Arctic, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean Basins to theorize and articulate a new kind of regionalism – relevant for scientific, social and geopolitical analysis, and for transnational collaboration and governance -- framed around the particular ocean-basin in question. The APEC and TTP in the Pacific Basin and the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IOR-ARC) in the Indian Basin have prefigured the recent emergence of the Arctic Council and an ‘Atlantic Basin Initiative’. While the latter remains a private, civil society initiative, it does engage and catalyze broader public/state participation. The recent appearance of the ‘Atlantic Basin Initiative’ now means that there are significant movements afoot in all the world’s ocean basins that frame all the basins themselves as relevant units of analysis and as increasingly ‘mutually-interested’ communities for transnational collaboration across sectors.

### **The Future of ‘intra-Atlantic’ Energy Flows and ‘Pan-Atlantic’ Energy Cooperation**

One final dynamic – the evolution of ‘intra-Atlantic’ energy trade -- is intimately linked with the rise of the global seascape and interacts with the other shifting trends mentioned above that are transforming the ‘Traditional-Cold War’ global energy flow map. Although the Atlantic Basin was once highly energy dependent on the ‘extra-Atlantic’ – and in particular on the Middle East -- the international energy trade and investment patterns of Atlantic countries have become, since the ‘oil shocks’ of the 1970s, overwhelmingly ‘intra-basin.’ Of the total collective energy exports from the countries of the Atlantic Basin, nearly 90% have as their destination another ‘Atlantic Basin’ country, while two-thirds of the collective energy imports of Atlantic countries is sourced from within the basin. (UNCOMTRADE, 2014)

For four decades, beginning with the OPEC oil crisis of 1973-74, most (although certainly not all) Atlantic countries engaged in a strategic effort – in the very least, ‘rhetorical’ -- to diversify their pronounced levels of energy import dependency away from Eurasia (in general, and the Middle East, in particular) – and toward growing alternative sources in the Atlantic Basin. This objective has now palpably materialized on the strategic horizon for North America (in the form of the ‘shale revolution’ of the US and the ‘oil sands’ boom in Canada) and even for much of the Southern Atlantic (in the form of biofuels, renewable energy and the ‘offshore revolution’). However, Europe remains strongly tied to the ‘land-based’ energy corridors of Eurasia – as opposed to the ‘seascape’ of a nascent ‘Atlantic Basin energy system.’ Furthermore, Europe’s extra-Atlantic dependency on the ‘energy landscape’ of its terrestrial frontier with the old Eurasian ‘heartland’ has recently deepened still further, even despite the troubled (or at least confused) relationship with Russia and the ongoing – and heightening -- instability in the Middle East.

Furthermore, over the course of the last decade, as the ‘unipolar moment’ gave way to a new historical present (which some have called a ‘zero polar moment’), renewed global ‘south-south’ gravities -- not felt in such force since the 1970s -- have coalesced across the Southern Atlantic, injecting centrifugal forces within the Atlantic energy space. The result has been a recent ‘extra-Atlantic’ erosion of intra-basin energy linkages, particularly with regard to energy exports and imports.

However, this recent south-south dispersal of certain Atlantic energy dynamics into the extra-Atlantic should not yet be regarded as the permanent reversal of a decades-long deepening ‘intra-Atlantic’ trend. These ‘extra-Atlantic’ tendencies have been driven mainly by ‘transitory adjustments’, including a sudden, rapid and unexpected reduction in US demand for Southern Atlantic oil (as US shale oil production grows and US import demand falls) and by increasing Asia-Pacific energy demand and Asia ‘oil diplomacy’ in the Southern Atlantic (often within the geopolitical context of an emerging Global South consciousness). Nor should extra-Atlantic flows from the Southern Atlantic to Asia be considered a trend incompatible with further ‘intra-Atlantic’ development. Indeed, even these centrifugal tendencies could be constructively transformed and rechanneled by pan-Atlantic energy cooperation. As Atlantic Basin energy investment, resources and production continue to expand faster than Atlantic demand, the basin’s remaining pockets of extra-Atlantic dependencies will have an opportunity to either attempt to reduce such dependencies directly, or nudge them toward new or deepening ‘intra-Atlantic’ energy relationships.

These two counterpoised ‘flow circuits’ – ‘intra-Atlantic’ versus ‘extra-Atlantic’ energy trade flows – represent important poles of possibility and incentive for deepening pan-Atlantic energy cooperation upon the coalescing foundations of a nascent Atlantic Basin energy system. Indeed, the energy renaissance currently unfolding across the Atlantic Basin -- along with the new ‘global energy flow map’ it is now helping to shape -- holds out the promise of facilitating a new experimental form of ‘transnational energy cooperation’ which might serve as the foundation for a ‘second best’ Atlantic Basin alternative to a now long foundering, or at least elusive, international attempt at ‘global governance’ – and as a model for other experiments in ‘second best’ transnational governance in the realm of energy, or beyond.

Even with the recent loss of intra-Atlantic energy trade to Southern Atlantic exports to Asia-Pacific, the Atlantic Basin energy space is still especially propitious for transnational energy cooperation. Given its concrete and specific ‘Atlantic configuration,’ more than any other region in the world the Atlantic Basin is something of a ‘microcosm’ of the energy world, reflecting in Atlantic form the dynamics of the global energy sector. In contrast to the ‘Eurasian space’ of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) – currently the world’s only multilateral, rules-based energy governance regime – the Atlantic incorporates a relative balance between net importers and net exporters, between developed and developing/emerging countries, between international private oil and gas companies (IOCs) and state hydrocarbons firms, and between fossil fuel and low carbon industries.

The nascent Atlantic Basin energy system also includes countries that were once highly dependent on energy imports but which have recently transformed such energy dependence into net energy exporter status -- or are on that trajectory now (e.g., Brazil and the US), along with others that have lost net exporter status (the UK), those moving in the same direction (Venezuela), and even others that still might recapture or rejuvenate such net exporter status, given sufficient policy reforms (Argentina, Mexico and Nigeria). This makes the Atlantic Basin a space of numerous different energy experiences, enriching the possibilities for cross-fertilization of ‘best practices’ and the interlocking of mutually beneficial commitments to transnational energy cooperation. In contrast, although the ECT process flourished in the 1990s – during the honeymoon glow of the Velvet Revolutions and the collapse of communism -- only to founder during the following decade as relations soured between the large majority of net-importing-consumer countries in Europe, on the one hand, and Russia, by far the ECT’s single largest producer, on the other (among only a handful of net-exporting-producing countries from the ex-Soviet Union).

Furthermore, it is in the Atlantic Basin where the competitive and often adversarial relations between the ‘traditional’ energy world -- rooted in fossil fuels and the energy policy and business models created around them -- and the ‘emerging’ world of renewable energies and other new low-carbon technologies -- typically compatible with more flexible and decentralized policy models – face the best prospects of being practically resolved – in legislatures, in regulatory bodies and on the ground. At stake in a potential pan-Atlantic energy cooperation initiative could be a future of competition, or of cooperation, between the fossil fuel industries and those of the emerging low carbon world.

The ‘Luanda Declaration’ of the Eminent Leaders Group of the Atlantic Basin Initiative (June 2013) has already called for transnational energy cooperation in the Atlantic Basin and the adoption of an Atlantic Charter for Sustainable Energy. The Atlantic Basin Initiative has responded by convoking the first meeting (in Cancun, Mexico in November 2014) of a newly forming Atlantic Energy Forum (AEF).

## **Tentative Conclusions and Other Provisional Reflections**

Perhaps against pre-conceived expectations, an ‘Atlantic Basin projection’ of the emerging global energy flow map presents us with a very different view of the strategic horizon than that to which we have long become accustomed. Energy, along with its drivers

and implications, is not necessarily a source of strategic Atlantic vulnerability – as many of us have always assumed -- but rather one of potential resilience, integrative unity and strength, and transnational governance possibilities.

The standard, optimistic ‘North American’ depiction of the ‘national’ US energy resurgence captures only a fraction of the strategic potential of the ‘Atlantic energy renaissance.’ At the basin level, the energy realm now offers Atlantic actors a potential margin of strategic flexibility. However, much of the potential benefit of such enhanced Atlantic strategic flexibility would be, by its very nature, ‘collective’ and, as such, dependent on the binding dynamics of effective, pan-Atlantic energy cooperation.

Projecting the global energy flow map through the Atlantic Basin framing ultimately suggests, however, that if Atlantic Basin countries were to engage in pan-Atlantic, transnational energy cooperation, they might capitalize on the geopolitical and/or governance opportunities of the Atlantic energy renaissance. Pan-Atlantic energy cooperation, however, will not necessarily resolve the central ‘paradox’ of the Atlantic energy renaissance, given the dominance of Atlantic fossil fuels -- although it could contribute to the transformation of this potentially chronic contradiction at its heart into a new strategic horizon of possibilities for transnational governance.

The opportunity to free Atlantic actors of the geopolitical limitations, real or perceived, of external energy dependence on the Middle East and other parts of the Great Crescent is what now appears on the strategic horizon of Atlantic energy. Or, at least, it is this ‘opportunity’ which appears on what is now an increasingly illusory strategic horizon, particularly when its potentials and risks are viewed, as they so often are, in isolation from the ‘carbon constraint.’ Many recent strategic evaluations of the economic and geopolitical implications of the ‘revolution’ in US shale oil and gas do not even mention climate change (or do so only in an obligatory passing), let alone refer to the ‘carbon budget constraint’.<sup>18</sup> Yet, certainly any future geopolitical scenario must consider the implications of this constraint.

The potential strategic value of an ongoing Atlantic hydrocarbons boom, including the possibility of becoming the energy supplier at the margin to Asia-Pacific, is at least somewhat muted by the economic and political discount that must be applied to the production and consumption of carbon-intensive fossil fuels, particularly as the fossil fuel ‘carbon constraint’ -- at least in its ‘physical,’ if not its ‘economic’ or ‘regulatory’ form -- continues to tighten. So while an energy vise no longer faces the Atlantic Basin along the strategic horizon, a climate vise still does. Indeed, a disturbing paradox resides at the motivating heart of the Atlantic ‘hydrocarbons revolutions’ -- the Atlantic Basin’s future may become more and more awash in seaborne fossil fuels, but it will be awash with oil, gas and coal that it cannot, should not, dare not burn -- or sell to others in Asia-Pacific who will.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, CNAS 2014, and CSIS 2014. In the US, however, the absence of the climate change angle from discussions of the ‘shale revolution’ could be the product of consensus attempts to avoid the ideological and political division that has developed over the ‘validity’ of the current international consensus on climate change science, so as to feasibly produce strategic analysis and recommendations within a ‘bipartisan’ context for highly ‘partisan’ audiences.

If the ongoing shifts in the global geopolitical and energy flow maps do not sufficiently integrate the budding, but imperiled, 'low carbon revolution,' future global scenarios will become increasingly volatile and unpredictable as a result of the distorting and complicating feedback mechanisms – ecological, economic, geopolitical – produced by fossil fuel induced climate change. This potential vulnerability will be acute even for those for countries that project large increases in oil and gas production (and income) in the future, particularly if they have NOCs that are, or can be, used 'strategically' -- or at least with some autonomy from immediate 'market pressures' -- a perceived margin of strategic flexibility that often boomerangs in the form of the 'oil curse', but which still holds out the theoretical possibility of a potential cure. Nevertheless, another bottom line: Countries that continue to entertain potential strategic horizons that are only consistent – or realizable -- with both significant increases in hydrocarbons production and a sudden absence of further climate change are likely to have a higher chance of unexpected encounters with 'negative Black Swans.'). So the stakes are high, given that most Atlantic Basin hydrocarbons producers – current or potential -- could easily fall into either of these categories.

At this stage, the 'Atlantic Basin projection' is nothing more than an attempt to nudge our currently reigning geopolitical and energy maps away from their 'national,' 'continental' and 'land' biases, and towards a more universally-applicable and more fully-fledged 'ocean basin projection' of our global maps. Yet, in the end, even this partial, 'modified' projection of our dominant global maps problematizes not only the notion of the 'Asian century' and the foreign policy formulations of the 'pivot', but also the strategic horizon of the very industry – hydrocarbons -- upon which rests the currently emerging global energy flow map.

The 'Atlantic Basin projection' also problematizes the widespread idea that 'governance' must now always be 'global,' if not also immediate in its effective manifestations, if it is to be successful – at least for a whole host of issues that are now considered by the 'global' consensus to be 'global' (energy and the environment being two relevant cases in point). In order for the Atlantic energy renaissance to be sustainable in its effective contribution to global energy, climate, development and governance goals, pan-Atlantic energy cooperation will likely be required. Atlantic Basin efforts to build effective transnational cooperation and governance frameworks – or even to create an 'Atlantic Community' – are therefore justified, and to be welcomed by all, even in the supposed age of 'globalization' and even in a supposedly 'Pacific Century.'

Acknowledging the full 'pan-Atlantic' nature and potential of the current energy resurgence in the Atlantic space, however, makes it very clear that the Atlantic Basin is contributing to significant changes in the global energy flow map – and to the global geopolitical map which overlays it. Now that such shifts can be identified and increasingly delineated through the new 'Atlantic Basin projection' of the world's energy and geopolitical mappings, a subsequent re-weighting of the crucial energy variables within strategic calculations becomes essential.

The Atlantic energy renaissance now demands a constructive reappraisal of the various energy and foreign policy patterns that -- while remaining rooted in the increasingly obsolete global energy map of the past -- have provided the impetus for many of our

recent and often costly ‘strategic navigations’ of the globe – the many opportunity costs of which have included insufficient public and private support for low carbon energy -- particularly relative to currently high levels of public and private support for fossil fuels -- and potentially even the world’s ‘2-degree guardrail.’

For Europeans looking to diversify their external energy dependence away from the ‘Great Crescent’; for Africans looking to square the potential hydrocarbon bonanza with the imperative for ‘sustainable low emissions energy access for all’; and for Americans, north and south, looking for new forms of transnational energy cooperation to overcome the diminishing marginal returns of traditional formulas – indeed, for all ‘Atlantics’ -- the pan-Atlantic energy renaissance and the Atlantic Basin energy space now beckon. And for anyone seeking a strategic framing capable of superseding the mental maps of the past, the ‘Atlantic Basin projection’ offers this possibility, opening as it does the way forward to an entirely new ‘ocean basin projection’ of our global geopolitical and energy maps.

Perhaps we will never be ‘all Atlantics now’ – to ‘de-familiarize’ the old cliché yet again – but more and more of us are.

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## Ten Lessons for Peace in Europe: From the Congress of Vienna and WWI, to the Failure of the G8

Stella Gervas

On March 24, 2014, the G8 put the participation of the Russian Federation on hold. Shortly after, on 10 April 2014, the Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended its voting rights. While those two acts were far from momentous in their immediate effects, they may well stand out in the future as a symbolic watershed.

The reason is that, from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 up to 2013, there had apparently been a functioning pan-European order from the Atlantic to the Urals: its two largest members – the EU and the Federation of Russia – had been connected by a network of agreements and active cooperation, particularly on trade. NATO (a transatlantic alliance born to counteract the USSR) had managed to keep friendly relations with Russia, and even to develop avenues of military cooperation. While unavoidable dissensions were argued behind the scenes, sometimes bitterly, political leaders made it a policy to keep a united front in their public appearances. All that was to change in the first four months of 2014.

On a more global perspective, a transatlantic coalition composed of the United States, Canada and Japan, together with Britain, France, Germany and Italy met regularly in the aftermath of the oil shocks of the early 1970s, in conferences under the informal umbrella of the G7. With the entry of their former foe Russia in 1997, the G8 (as it now was) could lay a good claim that it had finally evolved from an alliance of US-aligned countries to a non-partisan platform, a steering group for the world economy. Arguably, the absence of the other BRICs from this

syndicate made this assertion relative. But today the bridge with Russia is evidently broken, dashing the hopes of those who had anticipated the “end of history”,<sup>1</sup> the aspiration that an American-led alliance could expand into a planetary order.<sup>2</sup>

This overturning of political thinking provides an opportunity to turn back to historical experience, and to reflect on the “lessons” of the bicentenary of the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) and the centenary of the outbreak of WWI (1914). Even if the selection of these two events was largely suggested by the current calendar of commemorations, yet it is clear that there is a strong connection between the two and that both may have relevance for today’s crisis.

This essay will consider these two events as endpoints of an era: 1814 as the *start* of what came to be known as the “Concert of Europe”, and 1914 as its tail *end*. The Congress of Vienna took place after a long series of wars (revolutionary and Napoleonic). It established an innovative European system between the great powers, based on cooperation instead of competition. After an initial period of glory, the system was compromised by the Crimean War in the 1850s; by the early twentieth century, it was in serious disrepair and it crumbled at the outbreak of WWI. We can use both to reappraise the present time (2014). Obviously, the contexts of these three moments are very different; they determine a wholly different set of attitudes, expectancies and plans from the political, diplomatic and military actors of the time.

The task of a historian at a gathering like this is to put our contemporary challenges in perspective, using “the wide-angle, long-range perspectives only historians can provide.”<sup>3</sup> This is an application of the heuristic tool expressed by George Pólya, when facing a complex situation: “Do you know of a related problem?”<sup>4</sup> With the benefit of hindsight, this paper will attempt to outline ten “lessons” (results, methods, or experience) that might have some application to the current political affairs in Europe. It is also an opportunity to reflect on the political role of Russia in Europe in the *longue durée* (long term).

## The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815)

The practice of the G8 meetings does present some interesting analogies with the “Congress System” that lasted from 1815 to 1823. In those days, representatives of Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia met every year or so in European cities such as Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), Laibach (Ljubljana), Vienna and Verona. On those occasions, they discussed matters of common interest, mostly security and trade. This was a particular moment when the powers of the continent succeeded in achieving multilateral

<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

<sup>2</sup> On this subject, see Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Jo Guldi and David Armitage, *The History Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> George Pólya, *How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 98.

cooperation.<sup>5</sup> That endeavor was served by an exceptional cast of statesmen and diplomats such as Metternich (Austria), Castlereagh and Canning (Britain), Tsar Alexander I and Capodistrias (Russia), as well as Talleyrand (France). There was, of course, a strong initial motivation for their international solidarity: they had been forced to band together to avert the military threat posed by Napoleon I. After victory, they wanted to ensure that war could not break out again.

### Lesson One: Do Not Brave the Russian Winter

*How far is St Helena from the Berezina ice?  
An ill way – a chill way – the ice begins to crack.  
But not so far for gentlemen who never took advice.  
(Rudyard Kipling, “A St Helena Lullaby”,  
in reference to Emperor Napoleon’s life)*

Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned emperor in 1804, had acquired for himself a continental empire *par excellence*, ranging from the Atlantic Ocean to the Russian border, and from Poland to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. For over a decade, his army had been virtually invincible on land, leaving only two powers standing: Britain (thanks to its position as an island and maritime power), and Russia in the East (thanks to its sheer immensity). For the rest of Europe, the hegemony of France meant that states were easily redrawn or erased from the map, political institutions were altered and social changes became irreversible.

Unfortunately for Napoleon, he engaged in one war too many: his Russian campaign of 1812 ended in a dismal debacle. This mortal threat (the *Great Patriotic War*), galvanized Russian spirits and spurred them to draw abundantly from their nearly inexhaustible human and material resources. In a dramatic reversal of military fortunes, the Russian army led a furious counter-offensive across Eastern Europe that brought it from the Niemen River to Berlin in three months – a Blitzkrieg faster than the Soviet advance in WWII, but conducted with cavalry regiments instead of tank divisions.

It was a testament to the instrumental role of the Russian Army in the Allied victory, that in March 1814, only one year after the liberation of Berlin, Cossack cavalymen were the first to enter Paris through the Champs-Élysées. When Napoleon was defeated again in June 1815 after a brief return to power (the episode called the *Hundred Days*), it was again the Russian army that was tasked with occupying the Paris region. When the French Eagle fell, Russia was at its historical highest as a “superpower”.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Among recent works, see Stella Ghervas, *Réinventer la tradition: Alexandre Stourdza et l’Europe de la Sainte-Alliance* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008); Jacques-Alain de Sédouy, *Le concert européen: Aux origines de l’Europe, 1814-1914* (Paris: Fayard, 2009); Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> Stella Ghervas, “The Congress of Vienna: A Peace for the Strong”, *History Today* 64, no. 9 (2014): pp. 30-32.

## Lesson Two: A System of War Leads to War, A System of Peace Leads to Peace

*According to the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider themselves as brothers, the three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of true and unbreakable brotherhood; and considering each other as compatriots, they will lend each other assistance, help and support, at all times and in any place.*  
(“The Treaty of the Holy Alliance”, Art. 1, Paris, 26 September 1815)

Shortly after the first occupation of Paris, delegations from the great powers, as well as several minor countries, congregated in the Austrian capital, inaugurating the Congress of Vienna. Taking place from September 1814 to June 1815, it was in this venue that the Allied powers (Austria, Prussia, Britain and Russia) sought to create a new European order. Their main task at hand was to reorganize the map of Europe – an activity that involved some land grabbing for their own profit. The French Revolution and the French Empire had not only upset states and borders, particularly in Germany and Italy, but they had also introduced changes in political institutions that were difficult to ignore. Prussia, Austria and Russia nearly came to blows over the question of Poland, but a new conflict was averted thanks to skillful diplomatic maneuvering.<sup>7</sup> Eventually, the Final Act of 9 June 1815 defined the territorial settlement, as well as providing clauses on trade.

With the territorial redistribution now complete, the European powers wanted to go further to guarantee the new *status quo*. Tsar Alexander I proposed the treaty of the Holy Alliance to Austria and Prussia, which was signed in Paris in September 1815. This declaration of intentions was not a peace treaty in the traditional sense, for *making peace* in Europe: it aimed to *maintain peace* among sovereign European states by banning war among them.<sup>8</sup> By doing so, it rejected the traditional bipolar system based on two opposed military alliances (then known as the “balance of power of Europe”)<sup>9</sup> and it contributed to create the momentum for the Congress System.

How could such an innovation come about? In the early nineteenth century, the idea that the great powers should engage in more profitable occupations than threatening each other with large armies was not entirely new. In fact, Tsar Alexander drew part of his inspiration from a doctrine developed by several authors and philosophers of the Enlightenment. In 1713 (the same year as the Peace of Utrecht), a French abbot by the name of Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre had published a book entitled *A Plan for Making Peace Perpetual in Europe*.<sup>10</sup> He argued that the “balance of power” just

<sup>7</sup> Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 96-110.

<sup>8</sup> Ghervas, *Réinventer la tradition*, pp. 180-91.

<sup>9</sup> The early eighteenth century concept of the **balance of power** was the metaphor of an object, the weighing scale with two plates. It referred to a bipolar reality, the two alliances formed around French House of Bourbon and the Austrian House of Habsburg. See Stella Ghervas, “Balance of Power vs. Perpetual Peace: Paradigms of European Order from Utrecht to Vienna, 1713-1815”, in *The Art of Peace Making: Lessons learned from Peace Treaties*, ed. A. H. A. Soons (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Brill, 2014).

<sup>10</sup> Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (Utrecht: A. Schouten, 1713–1717), 3 vol. See also Stella Ghervas, “Peace perpetually reconsidered”, transl. by Victoria Lazar Graham, *Books & ideas*, 12 November 2012 <<http://www.booksandideas.net/Peace-perpetually-reconsidered.html>>.



negotiated between the powers was not a peace, but an *armed truce*. He objected that if the stability of the political order was founded on the relative forces of the military coalitions, it would not only fail to prevent new wars in Europe, but it would be conducive to war. He thus called it a *system of war*.

As an alternative, Saint-Pierre advocated the creation of a *system of peace* based on the respect of territorial integrity and arbitration. In his conception, there should be a “European Society” of states (which he also termed “Federation” or “Union”) providing a court. A common army was to be used only at last resort, as a police force against any recalcitrant state that refused to accept its adjudications.<sup>11</sup>

### Lesson Three: Strong Political Leaders Will Sometimes Accept a System of Peace

A key assumption held by Saint-Pierre was that he would have to appeal to the rationality of rulers in order make his plan a reality: they would not fail to appreciate the advantages of general peace over war for their own security, industry, commerce and general prosperity. Conversely, they would see that large armies were a burden to their treasuries, increasing public debt and the risk of state bankruptcy.

Naturally, this conjecture was immediately greeted with skepticism: Leibniz, a German philosopher, pointed out that men fight as a matter of course, and that the most powerful of them do not respect tribunals at all.<sup>12</sup> In that Leibniz was mistaken, since there is ample evidence that Tsar Alexander I, arguably one of the most powerful autocrats of the nineteenth century, knew about the plan of Abbé de Saint-Pierre and drew inspiration from it for his foreign policy (though he did not follow the abbé blindly).<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, it became commonplace in those years to represent the Holy Alliance as the fulfillment of the plan of Saint-Pierre.

In truth, the covenant of the Holy Alliance fell far short of the ambitious scheme of the French abbot. Additionally, the Congress System was far from an egalitarian system: it was a *directoriate* (syndicate) of four powers that took into their own hands most of the key decisions regarding the continent;<sup>14</sup> it left little choice for smaller countries as well as for defeated France, except to follow the direction set out for them. By ideal or by necessity, all European states of some significance ratified the Holy Alliance, except for Britain, the Holy See and the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>11</sup> Stella Gervas, “La paix par le droit, ciment de la civilisation en Europe? La perspective du Siècle des Lumières”, in *Penser l’Europe au XVIIIe siècle: Commerce, Civilisation, Empire*, ed. Antoine Lilti and Céline Spector (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2014), pp. 47-70.

<sup>12</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau shared the same disagreement, but he nevertheless published in 1761 a well-written **Excerpt of the Project of Perpetual Peace of Saint-Pierre** (of his own composition) where he warmly pleaded in its favor of the ideas of his predecessor. Kant later took this argumentation further and systematized it in his work **Toward Perpetual Peace** – in his version, the court was maintained, but the common army was dropped. The cosmopolitan model of Kant was reflected in the League of Nations. See Stella Gervas, “La paix par le droit, ciment de la civilisation en Europe?”, pp. 55-62.

<sup>13</sup> This is described in further detail in Stella Gervas, “Antidotes to Empire: From the Congress System to the European Union”, in **EUtROPEs. The Paradox of European Empire** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

<sup>14</sup> This **directorial** type of peace system prefigures the Security Council of the UN, which would be established 140 years later by the three Allied powers (US, Britain and USSR) that defeated Germany in WWI, as well as the G8 in the early twenty-first century.

## Lesson Four: Silence Popular Representation at Your Own Risk

This period left two distinct impressions in collective memories, which are eminently contradictory: in many books on international relations, it is hailed as the start of modernity, but for writers of national or social history it is often portrayed as the epitome of political arrogance and social regression – indeed, this period is known as the “Reaction”.

Reproaches against the Reaction are far from baseless. Russia, Austria and Prussia were technically “empires”: their monarchs distrusted parliaments and their aristocracies tried to reconquer some of the ground lost in the previous decades. Following the exclusion of many voices from the Congress System, insurrections broke out left and right in Europe, from Germany to Italy and Spain. Some of the worst anti-G8 riots might give us a good idea of the violence of the revolutions of the post-Napoleonic era, though these more recent unrests were far less murderous (a progress that can probably be ascribed to the improvement of anti-riot techniques and the absence of death penalty for the arrested insurgents). Another parallel is that the European powers routinely borrowed large police forces from each other, in order to restore order in the streets.

In practice, the great powers had little time left available for squabbling during the years of the Congress System, since their most pressing concern was to keep at bay the popular aspirations of their subjects to political representation (the Holy Alliance itself stated that kings derived their power from God, and not from the people).<sup>15</sup> Tsar Alexander I, joining the conservative positions of Prince Metternich for Austria, slid gradually into more autocratic policies – his brother and successor Nicolas I (from 1826) was aptly called the *policeman of Europe*. A good deal of international cooperation was focused on “keeping the peace”, silencing the press, curbing parliaments, and putting down popular insurrections. Yet far from abating, popular resentment continued to swell and culminated in the revolutions of 1848. It is thus perfectly understandable that the *esprit de corps* between autocratic sovereigns and their close aristocratic circles left behind a bad memory in the minds of the populations who most suffered from it.

## The Eastern Question

### Lesson Five: Peace is for the Strong, War is for the Weak

The order created by the Great Powers in Vienna had another flaw: the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire had not participated in the negotiations and, as a Muslim, he had also been barred from the Christian Holy Alliance.<sup>16</sup> This attitude of the Great Powers left South-Eastern Europe as a gray area for international law and a potential threat for European security. The reason was rather obvious: Russia, Austria and Britain all had unspoken ambitions over it. This gave birth, from the 1820s onwards, to the Eastern Question, the contest over who would get the spoils of the Ottoman Empire after it

<sup>15</sup> Ghervas, “The Congress of Vienna: A Peace for the Strong”; Ghervas, *Réinventer la tradition*, pp. 180-91.

<sup>16</sup> See Miroslav Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (Pilsen: University of East Bohemia, 2013).

collapsed. Furthermore, Tsar Nicholas I did not share the qualms and precautions of his predecessor: Russia resumed its historical progression in the direction of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Straits.

In the case of the Greek insurrection of the 1820s against the Sultan, Britain and Russia were both vying for control of continental Greece. After their victory against the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers avoided confrontation once again, by applying the obvious expedient when none of the parties is willing to give up a disputed property claim: *if it can't be mine and it can't be yours, then it should be nobody's*. This is how they came to agree on the full independence of Greece in 1828.

Despite that momentary respite, the Eastern Question became the core issue from which competition finally overcame cooperation in Europe. When Russia declared yet another war on the Ottoman Empire and threatened Constantinople in 1853, Britain and France came to the rescue, starting the Crimean War.

The consequences were two-fold. Tsar Alexander's dream of perpetual peace in Europe was shattered at the siege of Sebastopol. As for his belligerent successor Nicolas I, he died heartbroken in 1855, after seeing the former "superpower" of the continent suspended from the Concert of Europe and defeated on its own soil. A lesson from Nicolas' defeat in the Crimean War, compared to the splendid victories of Alexander and his later pacifism, might be summarized under the following: "peace is the recourse of the strong, and war is the recourse of the weak".

The Concert of Europe survived despite the Crimean War, for better or worse. Indeed, some remarkable organizations saw the light, like the Monetary Union founded in 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. In its heyday, it defined a common system of currency for a significant part of Europe, including Russia. The unity of the continent was most severely compromised when militaristic nationalisms acquired the reins of government after 1870, completely contradicting the initial spirit of Vienna.

### **Lesson Six: No Durable Peace with a Tacit Reservation for a Future War**

A second stark lesson from the omission of the Eastern Question from the Vienna settlement of 1815, harks back to a principle that Kant had already evoked in his essay on perpetual peace: "*No Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War.*" The hidden expansionistic agendas of the great powers in South-Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea region were a key reason why the political situation progressively festered (turning into "Balkanization"). It spiraled out of control in the late nineteenth century, leading to endless and repetitive Balkan Wars, as well as deportations of populations. The fateful assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 is one of the far offshoots of that omission.

## The Outbreak of World War I

### Lesson Seven: Alter Course before You Reach the Rapids

The recent rift over Ukraine cannot help but bring to mind the division of Europe into two blocs in 1914. That situation arose precisely on August 31, 1907, when the Triple Entente composed of Russia, France and Great Britain was founded to counteract the preexisting Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. This bipolar “balance of power” was however not immediately synonymous with war: it took seven years before Austrian guns opened fire on Belgrade, on 29 July 1914.

It is commonplace to discuss the particular circumstances and diplomatic errors in the last weeks that preceded the outbreak of the conflict – particularly the circumstances surrounding the ultimatum addressed by Austria to the Serbian government after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. Yet it seems obvious that the conflicting ambitions of the great powers over the Eastern Question, together with the rise of extreme nationalisms (with the attendant jingoism and glorification of war sacrifice), were two factors responsible for the build-up of pressure that eventually ended in a conflagration.<sup>17</sup> Effective diplomatic action to diffuse tensions might still have been possible in the first decade of the twentieth century; but stalling war in 1914, when most vectors were already pointing in that direction, had become increasingly difficult. In any case, the statesmen had already succumbed to the ambient frenzy.

To use a metaphor, a wise captain of a riverboat, when on a dangerous course, should take action long before it reaches the rapids. Better for him to have avoided that course in the first place.

### Lesson Eight: Never Underestimate the Cost of a War

A further observation about 1914 is that political governments and general military staff grossly underestimated the potential costs and the duration of a full-scale conflict, an error all the easier to make in that there had been no comparable conflict in recent decades. (The last European war had been the Franco-German war of 1870-71). The art of war changes continuously, from static to mobile and vice-versa, according to the available technologies. As early as September of that year, the tremendous increase of destructive power by machine guns and fixed artillery had inflicted such devastating losses to infantry and cavalry, that front lines in the Western theater came to a grinding halt. The fact that evidently took everyone by surprise in World War I was that mobile warfare turned, within a few weeks, into entrenched warfare – a circumstance that transformed a conflict “to be ended by Christmas” into a multi-year war of attrition. This obliged the belligerents to reorganize themselves durably for “total war.”

<sup>17</sup> Among recent works, see Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2013); Margaret MacMillan, *The War that Ended Peace: How Europe abandoned peace for the First World War* (London: Profile Books, 2013).

Indeed, with the wisdom of hindsight, the Great War proved to be a bad deal across the board: no European victorious power in 1918 could reasonably claim that it had obtained enough benefits from the war to offset its losses, and some (notably Italy) came out of it disgruntled – not to mention the sullenness and despair of the defeated countries, seed for future discords. This disillusion is to be compared with the initial confidence in victory of the general staffs on both sides. In public opinions, the nationalistic eagerness of the beginning of the conflict found itself at odds with the grim reality of the trenches.

More generally, the outbreak of the war provides an opportunity to reflect on the fact that the “bipolar order” of 1914 established by two opposing alliances, not only failed to keep the peace, but led once again to war. This seems to support Saint-Pierre’s assertion that the system of war is indeed *conducive* to war.

In contrast, the proposal of President Wilson in 1919 to create a League of Nations (leading to the “spirit of Geneva”) aimed at providing an international order that would avoid a repetition of the Great War. It strongly echoed the spirit that had animated the Great Powers in 1814 (the “spirit of Vienna”): a *system of peace*.<sup>18</sup> The circumstances were also similar: allied countries in Europe had just emerged from an “apocalyptic” war in which they had nearly seen the traditional order of Europe replaced by a hegemonic one. In both cases, political leaders and their states were exhausted by the war that had just ended, and were convinced that little profit could be gained from another one.<sup>19</sup>

## From World War I to Today

From the foregoing, the standoff that has recently evolved in Europe in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis constitutes neither peace nor war. It re-establishes the bipolar situation of *balance of power*, best described in the terms of Abbé de Saint-Pierre as an *armed truce*, hence a *system of war*. As mentioned, modern European history suggests that such situations tend to end in war, or at least in a frozen conflict.

## Lesson Nine: To Achieve Durable Peace, Defuse Antagonisms First

Beneath the contrasting conceptions between the balance of power (bipolar order) and perpetual peace (active cooperation under a single umbrella) lies a profound divergence between two contrasting conceptions about peace in Europe: *legal pacifism* (prevalent in 1814-15) versus *securitarianism* (prevalent in 1914 and 2014).<sup>20</sup>

In its most radical form, securitarianism could be summarized in the Latin motto *ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem* (“seek by the sword a safe quiet under freedom”): in that view, security is the means to achieve peace; the establishment of peace may

<sup>18</sup> Stella Gervas, *Conquering Peace: From the Enlightenment to the European Union* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), forthcoming.

<sup>19</sup> See Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation”, *World Politics* 38/1 (1985), pp. 58-62; Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 360-63.

<sup>20</sup> These two terms should be used with the proviso that those are modern labels used to describe historical phenomena.

justify the military incapacitation of a perceived threat, including by preventive action against a formerly allied state; this was indeed the justification of Napoleon for invading Russia in 1812.

Conversely, legal pacifism (the opposition to war as a means to settle disputes) considers that states obeying common values and formally respecting the territorial integrity are more or less constrained to respecting an international framework of arbitration, once it has been formally established.

Both views, taken to the extreme, are fraught with problems. On one hand, it is readily observable that in a *system of war*, even states that do not really seek to conquer or harm each other, will find themselves continuously trapped in military standoff, as a mechanical result of their mutual distrust – as happened between the two opposed Alliances at the outbreak of World War I, between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, and today in the Ukrainian crisis.

Conversely, the relative success achieved by the European trust-building after World War II, first with the Franco-German reconciliation, then with the pacification of the Balkans, brings a convincing case that security is best achieved by *first* dismantling long-standing feuds between opponents and *then* by establishing a durable peace. Achieving peace requires more than trusting chance: one would have to work at it.

### Lesson Ten: States and Populations are Not Property

Certainly, building a successful political *system of peace* linking competing powers, which would respect legality and ban war (even though the *status quo ante* has become woefully inadequate) is bound to be a difficult exercise in diplomacy. It does not ban armies, but redefines their doctrine of use. In order for such a system to last, it seems essential to prevent local crises in Europe from degenerating into insurrections or wars. Hence, institutions and negotiation processes should allow for political changes for populations that have become unhappy with their lot, long before it becomes a threat for their state and regional security.

As shown at the Congress of Vienna, territorial changes (independence or reunion with another country) may sometimes be unavoidable, with the proviso that they follow the second article of Perpetual Peace formulated by Kant: *No independent states, large or small, shall come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.*<sup>21</sup> A number of the clauses of the Final Act of Vienna, such as the new dismemberment of Poland and the occupation of Northern Italy by the Austrians, clearly violated that principle. Similarly, the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty of 1939 went against it by defining “spheres of influence” to be shared between the German Reich and the USSR. Finally, the agreements concluded in 1945 between US and Britain on one hand and the USSR on the other, were both a bargain over the heads of the populations

<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, “First Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace”, *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, in “*Toward Perpetual Peace*” and *Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, transl. David L. Colclasure (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 77.

and an armed truce, which ushered in the Cold War and the division of Europe into two blocs. From the perspective of occupied Eastern Europe, World War II and the Cold War could be regarded as the *Fifty Years' War* (1939-1989).<sup>22</sup>

An ideal solution to a crisis such as the Ukrainian one would thus have to satisfy two conditions: preserving its territorial integrity *and* respecting the will of the populations concerned. Failing this, any settlement might well prove contentious; it could be either short-lived or the source of future conflicts (whether frozen or open). Such has been, at least, the experience in that region over the last two centuries.

## Which Way Forward for the EU?

### Hypothesis One: A European Defense Community Might Preserve European Security

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the two opposed military blocs (NATO on one hand, Russia on the other) may be considered as boats entering into dangerous rapids along a river. This poses an intriguing hypothesis that may be worth submitting for examination, which questions the essence of the EU itself.

In the view of the experiences at Vienna in 1814 and in Central Europe in 1914, rearming and redeploying NATO in the context of the Ukrainian crisis might re-confirm the bipolar situation of two antagonistic military alliances – in the same fashion as the signing of the Triple Alliance to counter the Central Empires in 1907. Pursuing that course would be establishing the *system of war*, i.e. a relationship based on mutual distrust and military equilibrium. A consequence would be an arms race by both parties (and indeed there are calls in that direction). In that context, a frozen or open conflict should be considered as a likeliest outcome. It stands to reason that boosting the military power of the NATO alliance under those conditions would have to be an extreme last resort. In that event, the EU would be entangled in the colliding American and Russian hard powers policies, both of which would be alien to its own rationale of soft-power and peacebuilding.

As a preliminary step, a middle ground could be found by establishing a relationship between at least *three* powers in order to defuse the tensions, as in the Polish crisis of 1814-15. To achieve that aim, a project proposed by the French René Pleven in 1950 could be re-proposed in a new form: the European Defense Community, whose task would be to progressively supplant both NATO and American forces in Europe. The current bipolar European order with NATO on one side and Russia on the other, would thus be replaced in time by a *tri-polar* order in Europe, with the EU acting as a buffer between the US and Russia.

In the particular context of the Ukrainian Crisis, it would defuse tensions by removing from the equation the mutual suspicions of imperialism or military threat between the

<sup>22</sup> Stella Ghervas, "L'Europe élargie' d'après 1989: comment se réorienter dans la pensée?", *Questions Internationales* 68 (2014): pp. 94-101.

US and Russia (undoubtedly strong in national imaginations, particularly in nationalistic political circles and media). It might also answer the criticism that European countries are affording US military protection without being willing to pay for it, while they are hindering the American plan of redeploying their forces to the Pacific theater.

### Hypothesis Two: Neutrality Could Be in the Interest of Europe

*The Powers [...] hereby recognize in due form that the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland and its independence from any foreign influence are in the true interests of politics in the whole of Europe.*

*(“Declaration of the Powers”, Paris, 20 November 1815)*

This raises a curious paradox: why should a political entity whose foreign policy is essentially based on peacebuilding and soft-power, such as the EU, raise an army, and why would that action be expected to contribute to a *system of peace*? Much thought had already been given to this question at the time of the Congress of Vienna, particularly around the doctrine of neutrality for Switzerland. In Paris, on November 20, 1815, the Powers recognized the perpetual neutrality of that country as a buffer state, on the tacit understanding that it would defend the Alpine paths against *any* military aggression. Since then, that mutual understanding, together with a credible army and a defensible position, has been instrumental in keeping Switzerland out of conflicts, including both world wars.

It appears that the EU is facing a similar position in 2014, by being wedged between the US and Russia. The elegant method of resolution used by the powers in 1815 for Switzerland might serve – with necessary modifications – as an inspiration. Experience shows that neutrality, as a status under international law, has worked for smaller states; this does not mean, however, that it could not also work for a bloc of half a billion inhabitants. In that hypothesis, the conjunction of the following three principles might be in the interest of global security and peace:

1. Neutrality of the EU
2. Inviolability of its territory
3. Independence from any foreign influence (non-interference)

An analogous way to achieve an international guarantee for Europe would be to propose a joint declaration by the EU, the US as well as Russia, recognizing the above terms; it would be better if it was sanctioned by the United Nations. In parallel, the European Defense Community, maintained exclusively by its own means would replace NATO, so as to reassure both the Eastern European populations and their most immediate neighbor, Russia.

In return, the EU would have to provide reassurance to its neighbors (particularly Russia) on the strictly pacific nature of its “great ambitions”: its army would be defensive only, i.e. that the bloc would not entertain imperialistic or hegemonic plans whatsoever, either in the present or in the future. For the sake of its own member states and its citizens, this principle of neutrality would also have to be enshrined in the Treaty of the EU.



To raise and maintain a credible defensive army requires, however, the financial capability to do so. This may oblige the EU members to lay down the foundations for a common fiscal policy, an obvious move that has not been attempted so far. Both the internal financial crisis and the external risk of a war over the Ukrainian crisis might together provide the momentum for such a move.

Clearly, EU member states should first be willing to sacrifice both their absolute fiscal sovereignty and the military protection from the US, two core tenets they had held close to their hearts up to now. In compensation, the EU might have the opportunity, much like Switzerland, to conduct a policy in favor of international peace and (if a modest amount of hope is allowed) to broker a long-overdue reconciliation between Russia and the US, or to improve the effectiveness of its diplomacy in the Middle East. Another positive side effect would be that the long-awaited harmonization of national tax systems would remove significant stumbling blocks toward the creation a single financial market, and hence the consolidation of the EU as a global economic power.<sup>23</sup>

### **Conclusion: Systems of Peace, from Utopian to Pragmatic**

*Those conclusions might appear mostly academic and pedantic to those who consider that a state finds its glory in territorial expansion, by whatever means. (Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace)*

This essay may not appeal to the believers in securitarian theories predicated on the upkeep of large armies, the refusal of international arbitration, and the balance of power as a condition for peace.

This poses the question of utopianism versus pragmatism. A fundamental evolution has occurred from the uncomfortable position of supporters of *systems of peace* in the Enlightenment, because the horizon of experience of mankind has considerably broadened since the eighteenth century.


1. Most, if not all *systems of war* applied in Europe since 1713 (based on the upkeep of two opposing alliances) have actually led to an arms race and eventually to war – cold or open, even though they had purported to preserve peace.
2. Each attempt at hegemonic control over the whole or part of Europe (Napoleon's, the Central Empires in WWI, the Axis in WWII and the Soviet Union in the Cold War) have failed. In each case, the state that attempted it eventually prompted unanimity against it (politically and militarily), eventually suffering sudden, catastrophic and humiliating collapse.
3. The argument of Leibniz that no political leader would willingly abide a system that would potentially reduce his or her nation's freedom of movement, has repeatedly proven incorrect: the thirteen American colonies, the monarchs of the Holy Alliance, the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as the founding members of the European communities, have all proved the opposite. The explanation is readily

<sup>23</sup> For the structural barriers due to lack of tax harmonization, see the first report of the Giovannini Group, "Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union", Section 5, II: "Barriers related to taxation", pp. 50-53, <[http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/first\\_giovannini\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/first_giovannini_report_en.pdf)>

available: in situations in which political leaders have already witnessed the horrors and devastation of a prolonged war, or can foresee them, they might be induced to consider the preservation of peace among themselves as the highest priority. Indeed, Article 3 of the Treaty of the EU states that its *purpose* is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples, making it the cornerstone of the intellectual edifice of all European institutions.

While it has not yet been demonstrated that a *system of peace* could actually work on a global scale, it appears that the burden of proof has been reversed – since the issue is no longer about the feasibility of such a system, but about its *ability to scale up* and its *longevity*. In view of the repeated failures of hegemonic and securitarian doctrines over the last two centuries, it should be up to their supporters to contend now with the accusation of being too utopian.





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## Brazil and Cybersecurity in the Aftermath of the Snowden Revelations

Adriana Erthal Abdenur

In 2013, revelations of electronic espionage by the US National Security Administration (NSA) made by former contractor Edward Snowden indicated that Brazil had become a prime target for cyber espionage. However, the leaks were not Brazil's first brush with cybersecurity issues. In 2012, Brazil's CERT had documented 466,029 computer attacks, with a 23% increase in fraud attempts and a 44% rise in phishing cases compared to the previous year<sup>2</sup>. Although later discredited, speculation that a major electrical blackout in 2009 had been caused by hackers also raised the level of anxiety among Brazilian stakeholders about the country's ability to deal with cybersecurity issues. Finally, cyber-attacks abroad, such as the 2010 Stuxnet computer worm—which had incapacitated nearly one-fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges—and the use of cyber-attacks within the context of violent conflict have prompted new questions about Brazil's ability to respond to a rapidly changing domain in which the interconnectedness of the digital realm and critical infrastructure presented new challenges to national defense.

Even prior to the Snowden revelations, the Brazilian government had launched a new policy framework for boosting and coordinating efforts related to cybersecurity. However, the leaks—which showed that electronic espionage by the US targeted not only Brazilian government divisions but also companies and individual citizens, including President Dilma Rousseff—added a new level of urgency to discussions about Brazil's capacity to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of cyber-attacks.

This chapter examines how Brazil's understanding of cybersecurity, and efforts in this area, have changed over the past decade. I argue that, although new efforts have been launched targeting both "network security" and "individual security," the institutional architecture and related efforts remain highly fragmented. Not only does this structure present challenges for creating an effective "hub" agency within the Armed Forces, it also creates potential political dilemmas at home. Namely, the development of certain cybersecurity tools and practices, even if carried out in the name of countering clandestine surveillance by external actors, can also be used in ways that impinge upon the privacy and rights of Brazilian citizens, for which an effective system of checks and balances must be developed so as to prevent internal abuses of the cybersecurity apparatus.

The text is structured as follows. The first part of the chapter offers a brief overview of how cyber security has been defined and treated within the academic literature on international relations, and links this framework to the case of Brazil as a rising power with ambitions within international security. Next, three aspects of Brazil's evolving approach to cyber security are examined: its evolving policy framework, the repercussions of the Snowden revelations, and the role of non-state actors. The conclusion examines some of the implications of this approach and notes some directions for future research.

## **Cyberspace, Security, and International Relations**

Cybersecurity may be thought of as part of a broader trend: the expansion of the meaning of international security over the past three decades, and especially in the post-Cold War era (Tickner 1995). Frequently pigeonholed within the category of "non-traditional security threats," cybersecurity has emerged, as Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) put it, "as a distinct sector with a specific constellation of threats and referent objects," especially "network security" and "individual security." There is no single definition of cybersecurity within the international relations literature, nor any consensus about its transformative potential; some scholars arguing that cyber threats are overstated, while others contend that networked technologies, including those that link into non-digital infrastructure and systems, present revolutionary challenges (Kello 2013).

Within this chapter, cyberspace refers to the domain, centered on networked computers, in which information is stored, shared, and communicated. This domain is further characterized by a current governance system that relies heavily on networked, nonhierarchical processes of voluntary negotiation (Mueller, Schmidt and Kuerbis 2013), but in which states have not lost their significance. As Singer and Friedman (2014) note, cyberspace is neither totally stateless nor inert; on the contrary, it is marked by a rapidly shifting geography that includes not only computers and related devices, but also the users who adopt these technologies, the institutions that seek to regulate their use, and the infrastructures that are linked to it.

Cybersecurity refers to the constellation of threats centered on this realm, as well as the practices and norms that state and non-state actors rely upon to avoid, respond to, and mitigate the effects of targeted cybernetic attacks (in this paper, cyber-defense refers to cybersecurity within the context of military planning, with the goal of protecting

national information systems and developing offensive capabilities for targeting an opponent's information systems). Attacks undertaken through cyberspace can be constrained to the cybernetic realm or can affect related infrastructures—such as energy grids, banking systems, and transportation networks—that are plugged into cyberspace. Nye (2011) relies on a four-category typology of cybersecurity issues: cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-warfare between states. In most of these categories, cybersecurity challenges are not entirely novel, but rather add new networked dimensions to existing challenges—correspondingly, crime, espionage, terrorism, and war—requiring approaches that are well-adapted to rapidly shifting technologies.

The growing number and increasing sophistication of cyber-attacks prompt new questions not only in terms of defense capabilities, but also regarding the governance of cyberspace. While governments have long been concerned with the flow and control of information, especially when facilitated through technological innovations providing mass access, the expansion of the Internet in the post-Cold War era has greatly accelerated the speed at which information travels, as well as broadened access to networked exchanges. In turn, this has weakened the control that governments have over much of that information, although authoritarian governments in particular go to great lengths to control such flows through mechanisms such as censorship and firewalls.

The field of international relations has only recently begun to grapple with issues of power that are raised by cybersecurity (see, for instance, Kremer and Muller 2014). Yet the domain provides ample room for new analysis, in part due to the sharp asymmetries that have appeared within this field. For rising powers, which seek to become global players, cybersecurity poses not only defense challenges, but also foreign policy ones, particularly with respect to governance issues within an area in which international regulation is still scarce.

Often identified within the international relations literature as a rising power, Brazil has long sought to play a bigger role in the international order. As far back as the League of Nations, and later during the formation of the United Nations, Brazil has aspired to a seat among the key global players within the realm of international security—an aspiration that is still evident in the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. The desire to play a more direct role in international security manifests itself in terms of concrete initiatives, as reflected in Brazil's growing contributions towards UN peacekeeping. Over the past decades, Brazilian forces have been at the helm of military components of specific missions, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNIFIL in Lebanon, and MONUSCO in the Democratic of Congo.

At the same time, Brazil has sought to participate more in the rules-setting within international debates. For instance, Brazil has long called for a rebalancing of security initiatives at the UN with more attention towards development, including in peacebuilding efforts, and it has tried to influence the global debate about interventions by proposing the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), which tempers the justifications for humanitarian intervention provided by the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Brazil has also been a vocal critic of military interventions that it views as excessively

self-interested or as bypassing the UN security mechanisms, as in the case of recent US-led proposals to intervene in Libya and Syria. In several instances, Brazil has sought to play a bigger role in conflict mediation, both within its own region and elsewhere in the world, as in the case of the 2010 Tehran Accord, meant to ease tensions over Iran's nuclear program.

Brazil's call for global governance reform is not limited to the realm of international security, however. In addition to pressing for greater representativeness in the field of development, especially through transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions, Brazil has long called for reform of the Internet governance architecture. Since the mid-2000s, the Brazilian government argued that an international, multi-institutional structure—that is, a multi-stakeholder model—is needed with wider representation of different groups, and that democratization of this architecture also entails reorganizing the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and placing it under the oversight of a truly global forum (this would include relocating the organization, which is subject to US law and US government intervention because it is located in California) (Drake 2005). The importance placed by Brazilian foreign policy on Internet governance issues, including reform of this architecture, is reflected not only in its active participation in the World Summits on Information Society meetings, but also in the 2010 creation within the Ministry of External Relations of the Division of Information Society, set up under the Department of Science and Technology (Fontenelle 2011).

However, as a developing country with high levels of poverty and social inequality, Brazil has to contend with constraints on its capacity as an international actor. These limitations stem not only from financial considerations, which restrict Brazil's ability to project itself abroad and its defense initiatives at home. Brazil's efforts to accelerate the reform of the global governance architecture, including within the realm of international security, reflect the desire to overcome some of these constraints by making more space for itself within the international order. However, this limited capacity means that that cybersecurity concerns compete with other non-traditional as well as traditional issues relevant to Brazilian defense, including growing concerns with transnational organized crime and with maritime security in the South Atlantic. Even before the Snowden revelations, there was widespread consensus that Brazil lacked investment and a coherent policy to address cybersecurity (Cruz Jr 2013).

With the 2013 Snowden revelations, it became clear that Brazil—not only a large rising power, but also a country whose Workers Party governments under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present) had prioritized South-South relations, including with the other BRICS, over ties to the North—had become a prime target for cyberespionage by the US and its allies. The leaks provoked a strong reaction on the part of the Brazilian government, which then distanced itself from the United States (the main perpetrator of this espionage, according the leaked documents). In addition, the Brazilian government scrambled to launch new cybersecurity initiatives domestically, covering not only network security but also individual security. The Snowden revelations hastened debates and initiatives undertaken by the Brazilian government as well as non-state actors.



## Brazil and Cybersecurity

Brazil's cyber-defense efforts have taken place within the broader context of broader initiatives to reorganize and strengthen national defense capacity, starting with the 1999 creation of the Ministry of Defense, placing all three branches of the Armed Forces—which until then were located within their own ministries—under centralized civilian control. In addition to this reorganization, changes within the field of national defense have included a revamping of national defense policy meant to upgrade the three branches and bring capacity up to date with the changed regional and global contexts. More than simple bureaucratic organization and military build-up, these efforts can be viewed as part of a broader effort to find new meaning for the Brazilian Armed Forces within the context of a re-democratized Brazil. This initiative has included efforts to transform and improve relations between civilians and the military, which—from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s—conducted 27 years of military rule which led to deep mutual distrust, especially due to the repression and surveillance carried out under the military regime. Another aspect of this restructuring has involved revamping the national intelligence system, which has been not only highly fragmented, but also highly contested due to the history of surveillance by the Brazilian government for purposes of repressing political opposition.

Against this backdrop of defense sector overhaul, Brazil's defense priorities have focused on building up capacity to meet cyber threats by formulating a national policy for cyber defense; creating a hub agency within the Armed Forces for overseeing and tackling cyber-defense issues; increasing coordination among the many government divisions tasked with different aspects of cyberspace; improving the articulation between that system and non-state actors; and fostering capacity in the area through a combination of homegrown efforts and international cooperation. These efforts are motivated not only out of a perception that Brazil is still ill-equipped to deal with emerging cyber-threats, but that it also significantly lags behind many other states, especially global powers, in its ability to tackle cybersecurity issues.

Although Brazil has been trying to develop legislation designed to address Internet crimes since 1989, it was only in the 2000s that the main concerns with cyberspace have broadened from issues of Internet access to security issues. This shift came about in part due to the surge in hacker attacks on Brazilian sites and systems, but it was also a result of growing awareness on the part of state and non-state actors of the vulnerability of Brazilian cyberspace to attacks initiative within as well as outside Brazil. According to CERT, the vast majority of the 352,925 cyber-attacks reported to the agency were carried out by sources in Brazil (61.36%), followed by the United States (11.53%) and China (6.84)<sup>3</sup>. Figures like these prompted the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, attached to the President's office, to hold a major strategic discussion of cybersecurity (Barros, Gomes and Freitas 2011).

Brazil suffered its largest known cyber-attacks in June 2011, when black hat hackers associated with the group LulzSec closed down several Brazilian government sites, including the federal government portal ([brasil.gov.br](http://brasil.gov.br)), and the Presidency webpage

(presidencia.gov.br). The group also attacked the website of Brazilian energy company Petrobras, attempted to bring down that of the Federal Police<sup>4</sup>, and made public personal data from President Rousseff as well as São Paulo mayor Gilberto Kassab<sup>5</sup>.

Attacks on private sector companies had also been increasing, and there was speculation that hackers were behind blackouts in Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo states, which left millions of people in the dark. Leaked diplomatic cables later rebuked those claims<sup>6</sup>, but the speculation ended up raising new concerns about the potential of cyber-attacks to disrupt the country's critical infrastructure and to directly affect the lives of large numbers of Brazilian citizens.

Individuals have also increasingly been the targets of phishing and other attacks. Brazilian society is reasonably networked, with over half (51%) of the population over 10 years old using the Internet, totaling some 85.9 million people in 2013<sup>7</sup>. The proportion of Brazilians using the Internet has grown exponentially over the past decade, especially with the spread of mobile devices and other portable equipment, such as notebooks and tablets.

In addition to sites and individuals, there is growing concern with defending critical infrastructure—not only tangible infrastructure such as hydroelectric dams, transportation systems, and nuclear reactors, but also government information networks. There are separate networks in place at federal and sub-federal levels with varying degrees of interconnectivity. One of the largest is the Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados (SERPRO), a large, government-owned IT corporation that is in charge modernizing strategic sectors of Brazil's public administration. Among other responsibilities, SERPRO develops key government software, such as systems for processing citizen identification numbers, driving licenses, and income tax returns.

Since Brazilians began winning bids to most major international mega-events, such as the World Cup and the Olympics, an additional layer of urgency has been added to the effort to boost Brazil's capacity to prevent and deal with cyber-attacks, since these events bring large numbers of people to host cities and are often perceived as potential targets for major attacks.

## Policy Framework and Institution- Building

Brazil's new defense policy—whose cornerstone document is the 2008 National Defense Strategy—clearly establishes cybersecurity, along with space and nuclear energy, as one of three strategic areas for development. Other related documents, included the White Paper to Guide Future Defense Priorities and the 2010 Green Book on Brazil Cybersecurity, also establish guidelines for how to organize the country's cybersecurity sector (Canabarro and Borne 2013). Yet the most important policy document specific to the area is the 2012 Cyber-defense Policy, which seeks to assure the effective use of cyberspace by the Armed Forces and to strengthen Brazilian cyberspace more broadly, for instance by fostering capacity-building, knowledge production, and intelligence; by defining the basic principles for the drafting of more specific legislation and norms

through the creation of a Military System of Cyber-defense (SMDC). After the policy was released, the government also announced it intended to invest around US\$200 million over the following four years to protect Brazilian cyberspace. Like other recent defense documents, the policy justifies investment in this area not only in terms of meeting cyber-threats, but also of fostering development through contributions towards education, industry, and science and technology innovation.

Many of the initiatives undertaken since then have focused on the establishment of an agency meant to function as the hub for cyber-defense initiatives. The Center for Cybernetic Defense, known as CDCiber, was formally launched in 2012 after two years of preliminary activities and with an initial government allocation of US\$45 million<sup>8</sup>. The center, scheduled to be fully operational by 2016, was set up at Army headquarters in Brasília and is tasked with coordinating related efforts undertaken by different divisions of the Armed Forces that deal with technology and intelligence<sup>9</sup>. It is intended to protect not only Armed Forces systems but also those of Federal Public Administration, as well as to contribute more broadly to cybersecurity in Brazil<sup>10</sup>.

This restructuring is relevant to civil-military relations in that CDCiber is meant to integrate cyber-defense activities under the umbrella of the civilian Ministry of Defense, which oversees all branches of the Armed Forces. The Center's mandate includes a variety of activities that the government terms "structuring projects"—strategic measures meant to catalyze broader change within the sector through key institutional initiatives. These tasks include creation of a structure for capacity-building; preparation and operational employment of cyber-tools; a structure for the provision of technological support for systems development; the systematization of planning and execution of cybersecurity; facilitation of the launch of a research structure for cybersecurity; the development of personnel management in cybersecurity; the development of a doctrinal framework for the area; a platform for related knowledge production; the implementation of the CDCiber; the development of Software-Defined Radio (SDR); and the administration of the National Network of Information and Cryptographic Security, known as RENASIC.

Since its launch, CDCiber has worked to boost capacity-building in both software creation and cryptography, and in the training of military personnel in the use of such devices in cyber-defense. In early 2012, for instance, the Armed Forces completed the purchase (at a cost of US\$3.3 million) of an antivirus program for simulating cyber-attacks. The software is meant to train Army officials in twenty-five scenarios of cyber-attacks on networks similar to those used by the Brazilian Army. CDCiber is also involved in the development of a national antivirus software for Army use, as well as the creation of a cyberwar simulation used to train those enrolled at the Cyberwar course and personnel involved in cyber-defense teams.

Although most of these initiatives are still being implemented, the high number of international mega-events that Brazil has scheduled and is scheduled to host since the establishment of CDCiber has served as an opportunity to test Brazil's emerging cybersecurity system. An August 2012 law authorized the government to temporarily

use the Armed Forces to act on several security fronts, including cybersecurity and cyber-defense, in all Brazilian host cities of major international mega-events. CDCiber monitored event networks and sites during the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), the 2013 Catholic World Youth Day, the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, and the 2014 FIFA World Cup, collaborating with network administrators to resolve issues as they arose (the center is set to play a similar role during the 2016 Summer Olympics and Para-Olympics, both to be held in Rio de Janeiro).

Although cyber-defense initiatives are spearheaded by the Army, other military branches are also undertaking their own efforts. The Air Force has started discussing this area through a working group established under its command. This diversification reflects a move by the Ministry of Defense to diversify stakeholders involved in cybersecurity, tapping into the knowledge bases outside of the Army even as CDCiber maintains its function of coordination. These efforts also reflect the recognition that cybersecurity issues may become increasingly intertwined with other strategic areas that are spearheaded by military branches other than the Army—as is the case with Brazil’s space program, which is headed by the Air Force.

So as to boost capacity-building and knowledge production in cybersecurity within military and civilian circles, the Ministry of Defense has also proposed the creation of a National School of Cyber-defense, while the Ministry of Science and Technology has launched a project to create funding pools specifically for new ventures specializing in cybersecurity. Since Brazil already has a reasonably well-developed IT sector, policy-makers hope that new institutions and mechanisms will tap into (and expand) this pre-existing capacity in order to create a large pool of cybersecurity specialists. However, such projects have run into budgetary constraints that are in part the result of decelerating economic growth since 2013; the approximately US\$20 million allocated to the new cyber-defense institution, for example, are not considered as sufficient for sustaining the school in the long run and reinforcements are contingent upon decisions by the Ministry of Finance.

There is recognition within the Brazilian leadership that, despite the existence of a substantial IT industry within Brazil that can help foster indigenous capacity, international cooperation is necessary not only in order to build up local capacity, but also to deal with certain transnational cybersecurity issues. The Ministry of External Relations, which has direct institutional ties with the Ministry of Defense, instructed Brazilian embassies abroad to collect information on the approaches and policy models adopted by other countries, so that a comparative perspective could inform the decisions being made domestically. CDCiber itself has become a focal point for knowledge exchanges on cyber-defense. From 2012 to 2013, more than 50 foreign delegations visited the center. With respect to capacity-building, the Armed Forces have also encouraged its members to participate in international initiatives meant to foster innovation in cybersecurity. For instance, Army members competed in the 2nd Global Cyberlympics, an international cyber-defense competition, winning the South American phase and participating in the finals, held in Miami<sup>11</sup>.

State-to-state cooperation has been more subject to bureaucratic hurdles as well as the oscillations of foreign relations. As a result, many of these efforts have concentrated in South America, which has become a focal point of Brazilian foreign policy, with Mercosur and UNASUR being priority projects for Brazilian multilateralism and regionalism. In November 2011, when the Argentine defense minister visited CDCiber, Brazil signed a cyber-defense agreement with Argentina. Brazil also invited Argentina to send Armed Forces members to take cybersecurity courses scheduled to take place in Brazil during 2014 and 2015. At the multilateral level, there are initiatives within the scope of the South-American Defense Council to reinforce cyber security at a regional level. In 2014, when member states announced their intention to create a South American Defense School, collaboration on cyber-defense was cited as one of the key reasons behind the initiative<sup>2</sup>.

### **The Impact of the Snowden Revelations**

The 2013 revelations of US cyberespionage by Edward Snowden provoked strong reactions on the part of the Brazilian government. The most immediate effect was on Brazil-US relations, with Brazilian government officials expressing outrage at the data interceptions carried out on Brazilian citizens and institutions. Rousseff cancelled a long-awaited state visit to Washington and, shortly afterwards, used her inaugural speech at that year's UN 68th General Assembly meeting to publicly decry US cyberespionage and to call for the international regulation of electronic espionage. Rousseff's speech framed cyberespionage not only as an issue of security, but also one of human rights, calling attention to the breach of privacy of individual citizens through both targeted data collection and "big data" gathering and analysis. The official Brazilian discourse on cyberespionage blamed not only the leadership of the US and its allies, but also the current Internet governance and the lack of regulation of electronic espionage for creating opportunities for the abuse of cyberspace. Its stance was based on the hopes that, even if electronic espionage will remain a tool of states, international regulation would at least raise the costs of undertaking this activity, not only in terms of loss of legitimacy before the international community but also before that state's own domestic population.

Rousseff herself took on the task of pressuring for reform of ICANN—which, despite being a non-profit corporation, is located in California and therefore subject to US laws and vulnerable to US interference (including through backdoor maneuvers). Since then, Brazil's role in these discussions has shifted away from the initial heavy focus on human rights (although the theme of privacy has become a leitmotif in Brazilian calls for governance reform and regulation) and back to the original stance of stressing the need for a democratized yet multi-stakeholder Internet governance. In addition, although Rousseff's UN General Assembly speech insisted that international regulation had to be negotiated through the United Nations, whose mechanisms are predominantly state-centric, more recently the official Brazilian discourse on Internet governance reform has returned to its earlier stress upon the need for a multi-stakeholder approach. This reflects not only the trajectory of positions taken by the Ministry of External Relations even before the Snowden leaks, but also the pluralistic nature of Brazil's own Internet governance architecture.

To maintain momentum within its push for international regulation of cyberespionage, Brazil also organized the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance conference (also known as NETMundial), in hopes that the event—held in São Paulo in April 2014—would yield a progressive roadmap for Internet governance reform. The conference produced a non-binding outcome statement reflecting the participatory concept around which the event was organized, and covering Internet governance principles as well as providing a roadmap for the future Internet governance architecture. The US suggested it might give up its supervision of ICANN by 2015 as long as there is a multi-stakeholder model rather than government control of the Internet, but the statement has been met with some skepticism and interpreted as a largely symbolic gesture<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, the outcome statement made no reference to surveillance and net neutrality, which had been major priorities for the Brazilian government since the Snowden revelations.

At home, the revelations sparked deeper debates about cyberspace and prompted the Brazilian government to scramble to launch new initiatives meant to safeguard the human, network, and infrastructure components of this domain. Some of these steps reflected a strong resentment of US espionage in particular, even though other governments (especially those of the “Five Eyes”) were also implicated. Although Brazil had launched a defense cooperation dialogue with the United States, covering cybersecurity among other topics, these discussions—along with other defense cooperation initiatives—have stalled with the fallout of the Snowden revelations, described in greater detail below. Instead, Brazil began pursue cyber-defense agreements within South America, as well as greater alignment with Germany on foreign policy issues related to Internet use. Although there have been some cybersecurity discussions among the BRICS, the presence of two non-democratic states, both of which call for narrowly state-centric governance of the Internet, has highlighted some of the limitations of the coalition in collaborating on cyberspace issues.

The Office of Strategic Affairs (SAE), which has the status of a ministry, announced it would work on an overarching strategic plan aimed at boosting cybersecurity and defense by organizing sectorial and plenary meetings to gather suggestions on how to improve the existing architecture and related policies within Brazil. At the same time, the government announced several specific measures, among them the creation by SERPRO of an anti-snooping email system. The government also expressed heightened concern over the fact that the data storage and processing of Brazilian users of major internet social networks and other services are mostly abroad, and that foreign transnational companies control a significant portion of Brazil’s infrastructure. However, initial proposals that international companies operating in Brazil companies store data locally met with significant resistance on the part of the private sector.

Another effect of the Snowden revelations was to speed up of the approval of the Marco Civil da Internet, frequently referred to as Brazil’s “Internet Constitution,” and which seeks to guarantee civil liberties and civil rights in the use of the Internet in Brazil. The project had begun as a partnership between the Ministry of Justice and the Center for Technology and Society at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in 2009. In 2014, after lengthy

debates, the Brazilian Congress approved a draft bill (law 12965). The legislation was then submitted to the Senate, which approved it in April 2014, and Rousseff officially sanctioned the Marco Civil at the 2014 NETMundial conference.

One final effect of the Snowden leaks was to reinvigorate discussions within Brazil about the need to diversify the physical infrastructure through which data flows in and out of the country. There were already discussions underway within the BRICS coalition for a series of undersea cables linking together nodes in those five states. In early 2014, at the annual EU-Brazil summit in Brussels, Rousseff also announced plans to link Brazil to Europe via an undersea telecommunications cable that would bypass the United States, through which most of Brazilian communications are routed.

### **The Role of Non-State Actors**

Although the 2012 policy framework makes the Army, and specifically the CDCiber, the coordinating agency for cyber-defense in Brazil, it also recognizes the importance of cross-pollination with academia, the public sector, the private sector, and the defense industry. Indeed, the surveillance, problem identification and troubleshooting carried out by CDCiber during international mega-events in Brazil has required it to form partnerships not only with federal, municipal, and state-level government agencies, but also with private sector actors, such as FIFA's Local Organizing Committee<sup>14</sup>.

The interplay between state and non-state is also present in knowledge and capacity-building partnerships. By 2013, CDCiber had installed research laboratories in Armed Forces institutions as well as in several partner civilian institutions, the University of Brasilia, the Renato Archer Center for Information Technology, in Campinas, and the University of Campina Grande<sup>15</sup>.

There is growing interest on the part of the private sector in boosting cybersecurity, especially since many Brazilian companies have often been targeted by hackers as well as by electronic espionage, used (knowingly or not) as hubs for intercepting and gathering user data. Among the most concerned companies are those in the telecommunications sector, which is composed of a mix of private and domestic companies. In addition to individual investments in boosting cybersecurity, such firms have gathered together through events focusing on threats and solutions in cyberspace. For instance, the Industry Federation of São Paulo (FIESP) held a conference on "Cyber security in Brazil- the impact on confidentiality and the reputation of corporations", which included talks by cybersecurity representatives from state agencies and companies, including Anatel and Vale.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, the peak in concern with cybersecurity is viewed as part of the private sector as a lucrative opportunity. Security and IT companies in Brazil and abroad have begun scoping out new business opportunities.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to the private sector, civil society has also played a key role in how cyberspace is regulated in Brazil. The Comitê Gestor da Internet (CGI.br) began as a

multi-stakeholder governance model in 1995. One of the CGI.br's two key working groups is devoted to the prevention of spam, fraud, and other cyber-attacks on Internet users. The CGI.br is frequently cited as an innovative decision-making model precisely because it brings together representatives from the federal government, the private sector, civil society, and the country's science and technology community. It has formulated "10 Principles for the governance and use of the Internet," which include defense of liberty, of privacy and of human rights, as well as efforts to guarantee the functioning, security and stability of the Internet in Brazil. CGI.br and its associated entities have helped to ensure that discussions of cyberspace take into account net neutrality and freedom of Internet use, and they have helped to make sure that Brazilian foreign policy positions on cyberspace and cybersecurity are not excessively state-centric.

At the same time that civil society entities, especially those dedicated to cyberspace themes, participate directly in the formulation of norms for cyberspace in Brazil, the sector has also been an important source of contestation for certain initiatives. For instance, NGOs have challenged what they view as the use of new cyber-defense tools for monitoring public protests. In 2013, CDCiber used the software *Guardião*, made by a Brazilian company, to monitor social networking activity during the widespread protests that took place in major Brazilian cities that year. The Armed Forces invoked threats to national security in carrying out this surveillance, but civil societies questioned the practice, as well as the sharing of information with the Federal Police<sup>18</sup>. Civil society thus plays a crucial role in ensuring that the development of new tools to tackle cybersecurity issues does not result in the kinds of systemic abuses committed by other governments, although the effectiveness of this mechanism will also depend on proper legislation designed to prevent the cybersecurity and intelligence mechanisms from exploring technical and regulatory loopholes.

## Conclusion

Although Brazilian stakeholders have long been affected by, and expressed concern for cyber-threats, the 2013 Snowden revelations provoked a series of reactions, debates, and initiatives, in effect accelerating the attempt to formulate a more coherent and effective approach to cybersecurity. Domestically, the government's main challenge has been to integrate the fragmented architecture through a new umbrella policy as well as the creation of a hub agency in the form of CDCiber. The location of the center within the Army facilitates coordination with other groups within the military and partner institutions, but also prompts questions—already raised by some civil society groups—about the potential use of new cybersecurity tools to carry out internal surveillance, particularly if cyberspace legislation fails to keep pace with technological change.

With respect to its role in international cybersecurity debates, Brazil's positions on the topic are structured in part by its position within the international order: a rising power attempting to strike a balance between its aspirations to play a bigger role in international security and, on the other hand, facing significant limitations to its capacity to act abroad. As a result, Brazil has attempted to carve out a niche for itself within cybersecurity debates by influencing normative discussions, not only on the specific topic of



cyberespionage but also, more broadly, in debates about Internet governance reform. In its calls for change to the current governance architecture, Brazilian foreign policy has insisted that Internet governance must be democratized—entailing, among other steps, wresting it away from excessive US control. However, statements made in 2013 in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks that privileged a mostly inter-state governance system were later tempered, especially due to pressures on the part of Brazil's well-established multi-stakeholder Internet governance community. This subtle shift reflects the importance of formulating foreign policy stances that are aligned with Brazil's domestic experiences with, and normative attitudes towards, cyberspace in general.

Future research on cybersecurity in Brazil should not only track and analyze the attempts to overcome the current fragmentation of its cybersecurity architecture and initiatives, but also the regulatory frameworks that develop, particularly around sensitive areas such as the articulation between the military mechanisms for dealing with cybersecurity and the intelligence apparatus located outside of the Armed Forces. As for Brazil's international stance on cybersecurity issues, studies should seek to clarify the extent to which Brazil's ongoing attempts to launch debates about international relation of cyberespionage, as well as its efforts to inject new vitality into discussions about Internet governance reform, will bear fruit over the next few years.

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## Endnotes

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## Reassessing the Impact of the First World War on Brazilian Views for the Multilateral Order

Alexandre L. Moreli Rocha

In the decade preceding the Great War of 1914, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs operated at the Itamaraty Palace in a similar way to many of his contemporary regional counterparts. While much energy was dedicated to inter-American relations and to the consolidation of sovereignty, there was an expectation that global affairs at the opening of the new century would remain profoundly influenced by the imperial diplomacy of the past or, if anything, that it would adapt itself to emerging powers like Japan or the United States.

The monarchist José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, mostly known as the baron of Rio Branco, led Itamaraty under four different presidents from 1902 to 1912, at a time when the young republic struggled to establish itself as the new political system in Brazil<sup>1</sup>. Mainly because of his resolving complex boundary disputes with other South American states, his reputation is maintained today, that is, of being one of the most prominent statesmen the country has ever had and the very symbol of Brazilian diplomacy.

His legacy of defending strict respect for international law and the principles of non-intervention and of peaceful settlement of disputes, continues to be carried on by the most different tendencies within the Brazilian diplomatic establishment<sup>2</sup>. Rio Branco, however, despite working to cir-

<sup>1</sup> After declaring independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil did not become a republic until 1889.

<sup>2</sup> For a different perspective on Rio Branco's legacy, see : Matias Spektor, « Usos e abusos do Barão »,

cumvent Brazilian vulnerabilities as an international player, was a man of his time and built his heritage while focusing on regional affairs with very little room to act differently. Also, whereas the economy continued the primary focus and society remained extremely unequal at home, Rio Branco's idea of international politics considered sovereignty as an absolute right. In such a context, the Minister simply had no choice other than to support arbitration in the settling of international conflicts and to avoid exposing the country, while paying discreet attention to a rising United States and to traditional European powers.

At that moment, while managing with remarkable success peaceful resolutions to territorial disputes with Brazilian neighbors, he left very little guidance which the country could use to interpret and seize the unprecedented turn the Great War would provoke when enabling a Wilsonian peace. Furthermore, aggravating the country's international position, not even the influence which the previous inter-American experience had in the shaping of the new world order, was enough for global decision makers to take Brazil more into account in 1919<sup>3</sup>. In such a context, after a very marginal contribution to the war effort, and in a quandary over the future of international relations and with delayed global ambitions, Brazil entered the new multilateral system in a very weak position. Similar consequences would also be felt decades later, during other crucial episodes such as the new Wilsonian moment of 1944-1945 or the aftermath of the USSR debacle.

Considering that the history of the relations between Latin America and the First World War belligerents remains a topic mostly unexplored by scholarship<sup>4</sup> and also by keeping the focus on the political consequences of the 1919 peace talks for Brazil over the long term, this paper will try to identify and compare the national ruling elite's view of the multilateral system both in the post-Versailles, post-San Francisco and post-Cold War international order, and assess its consequences today, while the country lives the BRICS experience.

### Neither countering war nor embracing peace

The most direct cause of Brazilian entry in the Great War was the resumption of the German U-Boat campaign in 1917. While Americans were preparing their declaration of war, a submarine sank the Brazilian merchant ship *Paraná* as it sailed off the coast of France. Due to the killing of Brazilian sailors and the absence of assistance on the part of the Germans, the most-pro-entente component of national public opinion, despite the fact that the country had a sizeable German community, became louder and pressured the government to revoke its previous neutrality and sever its diplomatic relations with the Reich. At that point, after refraining from showing any partiality in the European

Folha de S. Paulo, 22/07/2012, available on-line at [<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/ilustrissima/55782-usos-e-abusos-do-barao.shtml>] consulted 20/06/2014. See also : Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos. *O Dia em que adiaram o carnaval: Política externa e a construção do Brasil*. São Paulo, Editora UNESP, 2010 and Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos. *O Evangelho do Barão*. São Paulo, Editora Unesp, 2012.

<sup>3</sup> Greg Grandin, « The Liberal Traditions in the Americas : Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism », *American Historical Review*, 117/1 (2012), 86.

<sup>4</sup> Olivier Compagnon, « Neutralité et engagement de l'Amérique latine entre 1914 et 1918 », *Relations Internationales*, n. 137/1 (2009), 31-33.

conflict, the successor to Rio Branco and pro-neutrality Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lauro Müller, himself the son of German immigrants, was forced to resign. A few months later, with the continuation of torpedoing, Brazil declared war on the German Empire and even prepared to engage its military in the conflict<sup>5</sup>.

The question of American entry in the conflict cannot be avoided when one tries to understand why thirteen Latin American countries stand neutral until Wilson declared war and only changed their position after that<sup>6</sup>.

With the South American countries showing extreme hesitation over the issue, and with only Brazil declaring war, one must also add internal ruptures and disputes over regional hegemony to understand the scenarios the ruling elite in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were envisaging for the future international order<sup>7</sup>.

The combination of these two more indirect causes of Brazilian participation in the Great War, together with the choice of arbitration as the only formula to settle international conflicts (lessons from Rio Branco clearly evoked by President Venceslau Bras when declaring war<sup>8</sup>), are essential for understanding Brazilian behavior at Versailles and during the initial years of the League of Nations. The new political framework for multilateral diplomacy advocated by Wilson seemed distant and of limited interest to Rio de Janeiro.

Despite its very modest contribution in military terms<sup>9</sup>, with the support of the United States, Brazil's participation was rewarded with a seat at the peace talks in Paris. Then, on June 28, 1919, Brazil became one of the 27 nations to sign the Versailles Treaty.

Mostly preoccupied with economic issues, the Brazilian delegation showed aloofness vis-à-vis the changes promoted by the creation of the League of Nations and the changes Wilson wanted for the former European international system.

The newly elected president, Epitacio Pessoa, accompanied by Raul Fernandes and Pandia Calogeras, personally conducted the Brazilian delegation, but remained essentially preoccupied with immediate and practical questions, such as those concerning national assets deposited in German banks and the issue of German ships seized in Brazil during war. In terms of international politics, for Brazilians, Realpolitik and

<sup>5</sup> Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno. *Historia da politica exterior do Brasil*. 4th ed., Brasilia, Editora UnB, 2012, p. 207-217.

<sup>6</sup> There were also those only breaking diplomatic relations with the central empires. In any case, neutrality was the absolute rule within the Americas until April 1917.

<sup>7</sup> Olivier Compagnon, *L'adieu à l'Europe. L'Amérique latine et la Grande Guerre (Argentine et Brésil, 1914-1939)*. Paris, Fayard, 2013, 133-146.

<sup>8</sup> CPDOC/FGV. Venceslau Bras Papers. VB pr 15.01.20 III. Venceslau to State Governors, official dispatch, 29 Oct. 1917.

<sup>9</sup> The Brazilian military contribution to the war effort was limited to one medical unit sent to France and formed by one hundred doctors, some medical assistants and soldiers to protect the installations. Also, thirteen airmen officials served with the British Royal Air Force and a Navy Fleet with two cruisers, four destroyers and two auxiliary ships was dispatched to Europe crossing Gibraltar, however, only at the eve of armistice (See: Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno. *Historia da politica exterior do Brasil*. 4th ed., Brasilia, Editora UnB, 2012, p. 209-210).

Machiavellian principles still ruled. In such a context, and also due to the belief in the complete maintenance of the hierarchical nature of international politics, Brazilians continued to project a 19th century image of diplomacy into their future and, in consequence, turned their attention away from Geneva.

Because it was a collection of small and medium sized powers, which did not strive to forge a common identity and cohesion, which could have enabled the region to exert some influence, Latin America stayed marginalized in the new political multilateral order. By not acting as a group to counterbalance the great powers, very little could actually be done to turn the brand new Parliament of Man to the advantage of the region. In the case of Brazil, despite voicing proud comments on how prestigious the country became by being a member of the League and by sitting at its Council, parochialism, isolationism and asymmetry of power eliminated most of the capacity of Rio de Janeiro to matter in global terms<sup>10</sup>.

While at Paris in 1919, Epitacio Pessoa actually spoke up against the discriminatory and abrupt treatment offered to Brazil by its counterparts, but offered no alternatives. His colleague Pandia Calogeras, later Minister of War, actually gave the tone of Brazilian views of the post-war order when contesting the disarmament plans, being debated at the time, by affirming that “nobody respects or seeks the solidarity of the weak”<sup>11</sup>. Interpreting the new multilateral arena and the related initiatives like the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 as moves to “leave weaker countries practically at the mercy of the stronger”<sup>12</sup>, skepticism dominated Brazilian thinking and moved the country not to follow or strive to contribute much with liberalism to govern the world. Amongst the ideas on post-imperial diplomacy being articulated since the 19th century (discussed by Mark Mazower in his recent *Governing the World*<sup>13</sup>), Brazilians seemed to prefer formulas more attached to international law and arbitration, but not to supranational political structures<sup>14</sup>.

If imperial diplomacy appeared severely affected by the multilateral formula of the League<sup>15</sup>, the Brazilian ruling elite seemed not to comprehend the degree of change, despite claiming to be the representative of all Americans and intending to occupy the permanent seat at the Executive Council previously dedicated to Washington. Actually,

<sup>10</sup> Eugênio Vargas Garcia, *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919-1926)*. Brasília, FUNAG, 2000, 36-43 and Stanley Hilton, « Brazil and the Post-Versailles World : Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919-1929 », *Journal of Latin American Studies*, v. 12, n. 2 (1980), 352.

<sup>11</sup> Pandia Calogeras. *Relatorio do ano de 1919 apresentado ao Presidente da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro, 1920, 7.

<sup>12</sup> Stanley Hilton, « Brazil and the Post-Versailles World : Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919-1929 », *Journal of Latin American Studies*, v. 12, n. 2 (1980), 343.

<sup>13</sup> Mark Mazower. *Governing the World. The History of an Idea*. London, Penguin, 2012. On the ruling out of imperial diplomacy, see: Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism. The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*. Chicago, Imprint Publications, 1994, 1-22.

<sup>14</sup> Also, public manifestations supporting the limitation of sovereignty thought “the respect of the obligations the League imposes”, as proclaimed the prominent jurist Clóvis Beviláqua, coexisted at the time. However, more studies on the matter are still necessary to understand more accurately the Brazilian position and internal debate (Clóvis Beviláqua, “A Liga das Nações e a soberania dos Estados”, *Jornal do Commercio*, 6/5/19, apud Eugênio Vargas Garcia, *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919-1926)*. Brasília, FUNAG, 2000, 47).

<sup>15</sup> Akira Iriye. *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002, 33-34.



years before threatening to veto the German entry into the League and finally leaving the organization, the Brazilian vision already indicated that Rio de Janeiro was not yet ready to play the new rules in its favor and to assume a regional or a global role.

Preoccupied with national politics, economic issues and the coffee trade, the administration of Epitacio Pessoa, inaugurated in 1919, concentrated its efforts to counter internal opposition and to avoid disputes with Argentina. Taking into account the historical regional tensions<sup>16</sup> and their neighbor's maneuvers during war to take advantage of neutrality as long as possible<sup>17</sup>, officials at Rio considered Argentinian neutrality as proof of future dangerous behavior. At that time, a military approach appeared to be necessary for maintaining the status quo of the regional balance of power.

In such a context, despite the warnings coming from the Brazilian delegation at Geneva, Rio de Janeiro forsook the claims for a more prominent international role. The definitive departure from Geneva occurred in 1926 after Brazil, despite making every effort, lost the campaign for a permanent seat at the Council and for keeping Germany out of the League<sup>18</sup>.

## Lost in Cold War

In spite of the Argentinian factor being lessened and the reformulation of the League of Nations being in sight at the end of the Second World War, Brazil took a long time to realize that isolationism would no longer be an option, neither for itself nor other Latin Americans. Involved, however, in a different national context from that of the 1910's and 1920's, internal forces pushed the diplomatic service not to withdraw from international politics and to forge a foreign policy which would help modernization and industrialization. At that moment, at least part of the Brazilian ruling elite seemed finally disposed to be a factor in the renewed multilateral forum. The question then was to create a strategy to overcome insularity and its vulnerabilities as a medium sized power.

While realizing that the idea of easily becoming a protagonist and of having its own permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council was definitely unlikely<sup>19</sup>, Brazil faced numerous difficulties in setting an alternative agenda for the post-Second World War order. At that time, several factors actually disrupted post-war planning as, for instance, the instability caused by the changing of three presidents and four different administrations at Itamaraty between 1944 and 1946, but also the internal disruption caused by a coup d'état and the national mobilization for the 1945 presidential election, the first in fifteen years. National politics caused the country to experience real turmoil at a very decisive moment in its future international relations. A long term strategy would only begin to be

<sup>16</sup> L. A. Moniz Bandeira. *Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do Sul. Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul*. Rio de Janeiro, Revan, 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Buenos Aires remained neutral and even used neutral countries in Europe to keep trading with Berlin (Olivier Compagnon, « Neutralité et engagement de l'Amérique latine entre 1914 et 1918 », *Relations Internationales*, n. 137/1 (2009), 40).

<sup>18</sup> Norma Breda dos Santos, "Diplomacia e fiasco: repensando a participação brasileira na Liga das Nações", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, v. 46, n. 1 (2003), 87-112.

<sup>19</sup> Eugênio Vargas Garcia. *O Sexto membro permanente: O Brasil e a criação da ONU*. Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto, 2011, 194-206.

conceived in early 1946, when the first President to take office since 1926, Eurico Gaspar Dutra<sup>20</sup>, appointed João Neves da Fontoura as his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

However, because engaging with international politics in the aftermath of the Axis defeat and not evoking the unfortunate experience of Brazil at Versailles and at the League of Nations, Fontoura adopted the same misleading premises of Eitacio Pessoa. By considering an isolationist plan of action for the country, the new Minister found himself exposed to the same risks as in 1919 and 1926. His first direct experience with the new multilateral system occurred from July to October 1946 during an official excursion to Western Europe to take part in the peace talks.

Even if again offering only a modest contribution to the war effort when compared to the major powers, Brazilians engaged in the conflict with much greater forces than Mexico, the only other Latin American country in the fighting<sup>21</sup>. Accordingly and for the second time, the country was the only representative of the region to have a seat during the peace conferences of Paris. If Brazilians engaged one more time in the talks with the hope to be heard as a sovereign and important nation, they did not reject multilateralism, nor the renewed Parliament of Man, when the delegation became disappointed with the behavior of the United States and European States. Actually, multilateral diplomacy, despite the problems it would soon begin to experience, was finally recognized as paving a viable way for small and medium sized nations to once and for all rise in importance in international politics.

Having this prospect in mind, after several days fighting obstacles to voice their opinions at Paris due to the control of procedures and decisions by the “Big Five” as much as in 1919<sup>22</sup>, Brazilians actually reverted to a very common strategy of parliamentary politics, which they knew very well at home, in order to make their position considered and to provoke negotiation. Counting on several recently elected deputies and being led by a former and experienced one, Fontoura himself, the Brazilian delegation took advantage of the background of its national politics to promote a strategy of association with other delegations, in order to be counted as a significant power.

“It is curious”, Fontoura confessed during the Conference, “to follow a plenary session”. “The soviet delegates”, he continued, “and their associated caucus (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Byelorussia) raise an infinite number of procedure motions like those weak minorities at the Tiradentes Palace<sup>23</sup> during the Old Republic.

<sup>20</sup> Julio Prestes, elected in 1930, never took office due to a *coup d'état* before his inauguration.

<sup>21</sup> While Mexicans sent a squadron to fight in the Philippines, Brazil dispatched about 25000 men and women together with a Fighter Plane Aviation Group to help Americans in Italy. Furthermore, its Navy engaged in the Atlantic campaign (For more information on Brazilian participation in the Second World War, see: Ricardo Seitenfus. *O Brasil vai à Guerra. O processo de envolvimento brasileiro na Segunda Guerra Mundial*. 3rd ed., São Paulo, Manole, 2003).

<sup>22</sup> Oddly, both Eitacio Pessoa and João Neves da Fontoura used the very same expression (“the Big Five”) to designate those powers struggling to monopolize international politics when dealing with the foundation or re-foundation of the multilateral system. While the first meant the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, the second meant the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China (Eitacio Pessoa. *Obras completas de Eitacio Pessoa*. V. 14 (“Conferência da Paz, Diplomacia e Direito Internacional”), Rio de Janeiro, Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1961, 8 and Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul. João Neves da Fontoura Papers. João Neves da Fontoura, *Relatório da Delegação Brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro, MRE (1947), 23).

<sup>23</sup> The Brazilian National Congress Palace at Rio de Janeiro.

That is, the dilatory tactics so well known in our national congress”<sup>24</sup>. A few days later, by recognizing this method as the only viable way to create an alternative bloc, the Brazilian Minister asked for the constitution of a “front”. His idea was to create his own “caucus”<sup>25</sup>.

At that very moment, the continuation of the 1930’s plans to build industrialization became essential, so that the country representatives kept up the pressure and did not retreat from international politics, as had done the national and ruralist ruling elite of the 1920’s. More than capital, the country then needed general foreign assistance for technical cooperation, access to capital goods and for the renovation of its transportation network. Development should then be promoted by national and international resources.

Therefore, considering the formula of parliamentary politics, the only piece lacking in order to make Brazilian strategy emerge, was the consistency and the solidity of the envisaged “front” or “caucus” inside the multilateral system. But how then create a solid group of nations to check not just the Soviet but also the American bloc?

Despite some advances of the plan in the following years, it was in the solution of this very problem that the elusive plan of Brazil to become a protagonist in the multilateral order, resided.

Actually, taking into account the potential of associating 21 Latin American states with others discontented with the Big Five, influenced by his literary activities, and by his anticommunist, Christian, and conservative upbringing, João Neves da Fontoura, when looking at the group of sovereign states existing in the aftermath of the Second World War, only foresaw one possibility: to create a “Latin” union of nations.

For him, by promoting such formula, Rio de Janeiro could aspire to lead not just Latin Americans (21 out of 51 members of the United Nations Organization), but also France and Belgium, which could give him 23 out of 51 UN members, and also 3 out of 9 Security Council seats, including a veto power.

Despite initial enthusiasm with the idea and the creation of the Latin Union in 1948, the organization ended up dissolving after its second summit in 1954 at Madrid, considered a fiasco due to internal disputes<sup>26</sup>. Actually, beyond being affected by the most immediate effects of the Cold War<sup>27</sup>, “Latinity” itself was absolutely not recognized as an identity strong enough to give solidarity to a political bloc in the multilateral system. Even if many officials at Rio seemed not yet to realize that there was a post-colonialist and interracial world emerging, the third force in international relations did emerge few years

<sup>24</sup> CPDOC/FGV. Oswaldo Aranha Papers. AO 46.08.12. Letter from Fontoura to Aranha of 12 August 1946.

<sup>25</sup> A.M. “La Diplomatie Mondiale à Paris. Un entretien avec M. Neves da Fontoura chef de la délégation brésilienne à la conférence de la paix qui travaille à la reconstitution d’un ‘front latin’”, *Le Monde*, 3rd year, n. 525, 30/08/1946, 3.

<sup>26</sup> J. Chonchol and G. Martinière. *L’Amérique latine et le latino-américanisme en France*. Paris, L’Harmattan, 1985, 125-127

<sup>27</sup> Even countries like Portugal and Spain, which were previously keen to join the Latin Union and recover some legitimacy in the international order, later found more profitable agreements guaranteeing alignment with Washington within the Western bloc (See: Antonio Telo. *Portugal e a NATO, o reencontro da tradição atlântica*. Lisbon, Cosmos, 1996, 113-134 and Angel Viñas. *En las garras del águila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe Gonzalez (1945-1995)*. Barcelona, Crítica, 2003, 198).

later, in Bandung, due to the joint efforts of Nehru, Nasser and Suharto to overcome imperialism and avoid alignment with either Washington or Moscow.

Conservatism, disconnection with civil society, an anachronistic vision of colonialism and the beginning of the Cold War, were all factors which combined to take away the possibility for Rio de Janeiro to become a protagonist in multilateral diplomacy, and which even troubled the dialogue Brazilians would have with the non-alignment movement in the following years.

### **Which multilateralism for the 21<sup>st</sup> century?**

The following equally promising opportunity for Brazil to project itself into the political multilateral system, and to have dialogue again with the Wilsonianism era inaugurated after the First World War, would come only with the end of the bipolar conflict.

At the time, national politics and the economy once again established not just the framework whereby Itamaraty should try to forge a new foreign policy for the post-Cold War regime, but also the obstacles in reaching such an objective. On November 15th 1989, only six days after the Berlin wall began to be torn down, Brazilians voted in a presidential election for the first time since 1960. The president elected, Fernando Collor, had as a mission not only the consolidation of democracy after the military regime, but also the control of hyperinflation, which had reached an annual rate of 2,000% and was affecting State capacities and governability.

Despite the general mobilization inside the administration to achieve these highly challenging goals (and the consequent deadlock for the rest of the political agenda), a debate within the diplomatic corps on how to envisage Brazil in the renewed multilateral order, did happen.

After a Cold War of intercalating rapprochements and aloofness vis-à-vis Washington, even if never swinging the country towards Moscow, Brazilian diplomats started to debate the eventuality of structural changes while the multilateral system was thawing out.

Historical interdependence with the United States still marked the spirit at Brasilia, the new capital. However, despite the apparent triumph of the Western bloc, part of Itamaraty did not take American unipolarity as the certain future scenario, especially when considering the long term.

Despite the need for more studies on the period and for the declassification of documents, scholarship has already identified views from two foreign ministers who could symbolize the debate of ideas inside the Ministry during the 1990's and the early 21st century on the future multilateral order: Celso Lafer (Minister in 1992 and then in 2001 and 2002) and Celso Amorim (Minister from 1993 to 1995 and later from 2003 until 2011)<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Matias Spektor, "Brazilian assessment of the end of the Cold War", in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (eds.), *The End of the Cold War and the Third World. New perspectives on regional conflict*. London, Routledge, 2011, 229.

According to the first mentioned minister, economics and international political structure seemed to be dictating Brazilian international action. For Celso Lafer, after the dynamics of the Cold War created opportunities to place economic development as a priority in the international agenda, the new international order appeared not yet suitable to accept profound changes conducted or demanded by the “Third World”<sup>29</sup>. In that sense, multipolarity seemed limited to the international economic circle while a stratified political multilateralism, after the fall of the East-West confrontation, would aggravate the defective and unfriendly international environment to Brazil<sup>30</sup>.

Yet Celso Amorim, envisaging the world after the Cold War era and seeing the multilateral system operative again during the successful United Nations collective intervention in the Iraq-Kwait crisis, saw the 1990’s as a time of change, which could not be opposed by the United States, despite its being a superpower. For Amorim, neither Washington nor the American way of life could offer answers to all the questions a multilateral and diverse world was just about to ask. American unipolarity, then, would not be able to counter a new and reforming multilateral order. Even if not yet very clear concerning its final format, this order seemed at least to offer a place where emerging powers could project a different existence<sup>31</sup>.

Both images of future multilateral order would come under discussion during the 1990’s while the country stabilized its economy and consolidated its democracy. Then, in 2003, when for the second time he followed Lafer at Itamaraty<sup>32</sup>, Amorim finally could frame a strategy not just to fit Brazil in the multilateral order but also to participate in the changing from one kind of international structure to another<sup>33</sup>. In that sense, neither resignation, neither alignment nor independent action would distinguish Brasilia’s position, but mostly the construction of developing country coalitions, such as the G-20 or even the BRICS<sup>34</sup>. In some way, a similar strategy to that of 1946 and different from what was seen during the 1920’s.

Despite the existing pressure on international analysts during the 2014 election season in Brazil to pronounce final judgment about the last two decades in terms of international achievements, it is still early to measure definitive results of the country’s long term strategy of South-South cooperation. Prudence is in order, especially when one considers that the world may be experiencing, for the first time in the hundred years of Wilsonianism, its least hierarchical and most ambiguous moment. While, for instance, the BRICS bank has announced its structure, principles and purposes, the inspiration from the Anglo-American ideas presented at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, during July 1944, are significant. Finally, it seems that there is no anxiety to strive for a replacement of the actual multilateral structure, even if more extensive and inclusive reforms, as those proposed by the emerging countries for the International Monetary Fund or the UN Security Council, seems still beyond the horizon.

<sup>29</sup> Celso Lafer, “Reflexões sobre a inserção do Brasil no contexto internacional”, *Contexto Internacional*, v. 11 (1990), 38.


<sup>30</sup> Celso Lafer, “Reflexões sobre a inserção do Brasil no contexto internacional”, *Contexto Internacional*, v. 11 (1990), 39.

<sup>31</sup> Celso Amorim, “O Brasil e a ordem internacional pós-Golfo”, *Contexto Internacional*, v. 13, (1991), 28-29.

<sup>32</sup> In 1993, Celso Amorim assumed the Ministry only few months after Lafer had left the post.

<sup>33</sup> Celso Amorim, “O Brasil e a ordem internacional pós-Golfo”, *Contexto Internacional*, v. 13, (1991), 31.

<sup>34</sup> Matias Spektor, “Brazilian assessment of the end of the Cold War”, in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (eds.), *The End of the Cold War and the Third World. New perspectives on regional conflict*. London, Routledge, 2011, 240.



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## Cybersecurity from a German Perspective: Between Crime and Cooperation

Julian Voje

To grasp the importance of the Internet for our globalized world, one does not have to look very far. When living in a fairly large city, it is sufficient to visit a nearby café: laptops, smartphones and tablets dominate the scene. Not a minute passes without somebody staring at one of their devices, often hidden behind the well-known fruit. Aside from the question of how much the Internet and the ever-connectedness change our societies, it is obvious how reliant we have become on our net.

Looking at the number of people involved, this trend becomes even more obvious. Already two billion people are globally connected via the internet. In Germany, close to 80 percent of all households currently have access to the Internet and the smartphones and tablets mentioned before allow permanent network access at any time and from any place. A doubling of the current number of devices with Internet-connectivity is predicted by the year 2016. Roughly 50 percent of all German companies are already dependent on the Internet. Not having access to the net or not having a fast enough connection to the cyberspace may well mean the end for a company, especially in the rural areas of the country. The newly published “digital agenda” by the German Government focuses exactly on this problem – by planning to provide an Internet connection of at least 50 Mbit per second in the whole country to ensure that no parts will be left behind.

The availability of the cyber space and its integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data contained therein have become an existential question of the 21st century. And going hand in hand with that, ensuring

the availability and integrity of cyber security becomes a central common challenge for governments, businesses and society in a national and international context. This becomes ever more complicated if we look at the cyberspace as one of the “global commons”, a part of common goods that cannot be controlled by one single actor. Just like the open sea, the Internet cannot be “patrolled” or even be controlled. There is no absolute safety. In this state of anarchy, attacks by cyber-pirates – be it terrorists or plain criminals – or state actors, can always occur.

How much opportunities there are to make use of the net’s loopholes has been proven just recently. The safety of private data has emerged in the limelight of the seemingly never-ending debate concerning the activity of the US-National Security Agency (NSA) and its spying on partners, one of them being Germany. Connected to the possible consequences of US-cyber spying, the question arises of how intensively private companies like Google and Facebook collaborated with the American government and if they transmitted private data to the NSA. In the wake of the NSA scandal, the question remains of how much can and should each user trust these platforms. Since the beginning of 2014, one of the biggest German newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, kept publishing a series of articles criticizing Google and the use of its monopoly position, trying to initiate a debate on how to reduce the influence of big social media companies.

But besides this debate in Germany about the influence of internet-monopolists and the angst of being spied on by the US government, the threat of old-school online buglers remains: On a daily basis more than 20,000 websites are infected with malware and between 5 to 10 espionage attacks on the federal government are registered. As a consequence of these attacks, German companies annually lose more than € 4.8 million due to cybercrime.

This paper will discuss the impact that questions of cybersecurity have on the private, the governmental and the economic sectors. Thereby two *assumptions form* the basis of this analysis:

1. The German cyber security strategy is the right approach, to connect all relevant stakeholders in the field of cyber security – governmental as well as private.
2. Cyber security can only be guaranteed by an international approach, as national borders in cyberspace have no meaning. This networking should be encouraged not only by countries but also across corporate boundaries.

To prove these assumptions, the following pages are subdivided into three parts: The first part of this paper will examine the different types of actors relevant for cyber-security. Following an analysis of low-level threats, conducted by, for example, criminals and (political) activists, light will be shed on high-level attackers, e.g. organized crime syndicates or state actors. The second part of this paper will then focus on German counter measures to combat cyber threats. In this context the German Cyber-Security strategy will be closely examined. By not only looking at the theoretical side of the German Cyber-strategy but also at practical threats and possible answers by the government, the whole scale of cyber-threats will become obvious. The third and final part will end with a conclusion, which will try to validate the two underlying assumptions of the paper.



## Actors And threats in the Field of Cyber Security

Before taking a look at possible counter measures against cyber security, it is worthwhile to sort out which type of threats actually exist and which actors are involved in cyber-attacks. In principle, one can differentiate between low-level and high-level threat scenarios. Especially the first mentioned low-threat scenarios seem to occur more often, though their impact remains relatively low. Contrary to high-level threats, which are (the NSA scandal is the one big exception) not that common in everyday life, but can ultimately do more harm.

### Low-Level Threats: Annoying, but not Dangerous

In the realm of low-level threats Cyber-petty criminals are the most notorious ones. As the Internet becomes more and more part of everyday life, “everyday-criminals” also migrate into the cyberspace. But looking at the impact, it becomes obvious that cybercriminals really just resemble pickpockets: Annoying but not life-threateningly dangerous. Cyber-crime usually only occurs as a small, globally distributed, Internet-based fraud.

Another kind of actor can be found in the form of online-activists. The Internet created by the quantum leap in communications and networking finds its expression – “hack-tivism” – in this group of actors. Modern applications make it easy to publish foreign content which would otherwise never be published. The same application even enables private hackers to launch target actions against “opponents”. But these actions mainly include web defacements, i.e. changing the contents of a site. Activists can be politically motivated but do not necessarily have to be.

Even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was not spared from a hacker-attack. The main page of the agency was chopped and for a period of three days visitors were welcomed by the title “Central Idiots Agency”, a so called defacement. Surely annoying, but again not life-threatening. Another type of attack used by activists is called DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service = denial of service). This attack is carried out mainly by so-called botnets. The hijacking with viruses/trojans by infecting remote (private) PCs that can be remotely controlled, has increased dramatically in the last 5 years. Unnoticed by its users, thousands of PCs sometimes work for just one hijacker. Hacked networks of ready-to-use botnets are already sold at the darker corner of the Internet. A botnet with 10,000 PCs momentarily is sold for 200USD and networks of several million PCs have already been uncovered.

Next in the list of low-level threats come *cyber terrorists*. While it is technically possible to cause great damage by terrorist activity –having in mind the opening of dams, or the damaging of power stations – such attacks require high qualifications, not easy to attain. High and varying specialist expertise, test laboratories and access to intelligence capabilities are necessary prerequisites for the preparation and implementation of powerful attacks to critical structures. In most cases, however, terrorist organizations do not have the necessary organizational skills for such attacks. In addition, cyber-attacks in this format are very expensive (several million USD) and the preparations are harder to disguise than any use of explosives. Thus, the classical terrorist would rather use faster to acquire and easier to use means.

When looking at different actors in the field of low-level-threats, we have to do some myth-busting: Even though these types of actors are indeed often clearly visible, contrary to popular opinion, they are hardly dangerous. Petty criminals have scarcely ever been able to capture large amounts of money per attack, even if they can capture large amounts in total (“De Minimis” problem: Too small to care). Activists cannot endanger critical structures in any serious way. Furthermore, they have never achieved this, not even in popular cases such as in Estonia in 2007. Predominantly, they temporarily paralyze systems with little relevance, such as web pages. This corresponds directly to the capabilities of these types of actors. Although they can organize themselves within the scope of swarm intelligence, their overall access to high offensive expertise is limited. They can only use the most common attack vectors (read: ways to attack) such as the Internet. In particular, they usually lack any knowledge to cause any lasting damages after their first attack. This strongly limits their ability and thus the potential threats of these actors. The low risk of all of these actors should be highly relevant for the allocation of resources for counter measures.

### High-Level Threats: Persistent and Dangerous

On the other hand, we can find cyber-attacks with a high threat level. The term “Advanced Persistent Threats” (APTs), once invented by the U.S. military, has established itself as a generic term for one type of these new threats. They are “advanced” because the attack vectors are constructed and applied in a very goal oriented way. Even worse: they are barely comprehensible and traceable. They are “persistent” because they follow a very passive behavior (“spying”); thus, they can hardly be found and can persist over a long period of time. The Stuxnet Trojan gathered, for example, until its discovery in July 2010, secret information during a whole year— in a targeted effort to sabotage the later used (among others in Iran’s nuclear facilities) Siemens Simatic Step 7 control systems. The Stuxnet Trojan already appeared in the networks of electricity, gas and water utilities in Germany. “Sleep and destroy” could be the APTs lemma.

Another example shows the long, strategic thinking which drives these well-organized actors. In 2011 a hacker attacked the prestigious U.S. security company RSA. The goal was the widespread authentication system “SecurID”, which is used worldwide by many large enterprises – including defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin. Users wear a keychain – a so-called token – around with them, which constantly generates a changing code. With this number sequence and an additional password, you can log in from the outside into the infiltrated corporate network. Thus, by gaining access to “SecurID”, one holds the master-key for many prestigious locks.

Second in row of high-level threats, comes Organized Crime (OC). In contrast to the small cyber-criminals, the OC element is a highly efficient, professionally organized team of aggressors and disposes of additional intelligence capabilities. Instead of building classic fraud models for individual users, the OC will pursue more profitable activities such as industrial espionage, industrial sabotage, espionage of financial markets and financial market manipulation. These activities are nothing new and have been observed many times. Financial markets are a particularly vulnerable target because they

are not secure against highly efficient attackers due to their high demands on IT and data. For the OC players, financial market manipulation is already fully possible in the medium term and cannot be blocked – a harsh truth.

Also as part of the OC, professional industrial spies play a role. In the meantime, they have also developed high skills, but focus their work more locally for various clients in different contexts. Some experts estimate that at least 30 computers of the top DAX companies are infected at board level with spy-trojans. The “Symantec Cybercrime Report 2011” estimated the damage suffered by German companies per year through cybercrime to be a whopping 24.3 billion Euros.

Most recently, the undercover actions of the NSA shed a light on Military-intelligence (state) attackers: With the exception of established actors such as Russia, China and the US, this attacker segment is currently only still emerging and will be fully operational in about one to five years. Then, however, offensive cyber troops will exist worldwide, even in emerging and developing countries, as the cost of entry into the offensive cyberwar is comparatively low and so are the requirements. For this type of attacker also applies the paradigm that he has access to any IT structure (whether on the Internet or not) and that he is virtually undetectable and completely unidentifiable. Real state-sponsored cyber-attacks are possible only in a few scenarios. Reason to worry give preventive field tests of cyber weapons to critical infrastructures, propaganda-manipulative Information Operations in the Web 2.0 or the hitherto neglected field of Economic Operations. The cyber access to entire economies will open completely new – devastating – options. Western societies that are strongly dependent on their information nets will be hit even more intensely. Germany in particular could be a rewarding target, due to its various research centers. Research and development is carried out on a broad scale in the private as in the economic sector.

Finally, *cyber mercenaries* will play a bigger role in the coming years. Mercenary companies apparently already aim at the tactical field hacker as a business model. This “soldier-hacker” would be specifically dedicated to cyber-attacks on military equipment in the field. The soldier-hacker could stop or manipulate technical advantages in high-tech armies at a decisive moment. As high-tech armies disconnected from their network can be easily defeated by battle-tested low-tech armies, there is a profitable business model for cyber mercenaries. They could be rented in asymmetric conflicts by the technically inferior parties.

Looking at the whole range of actors, it becomes obvious that these actors are better prepared, better equipped, and ultimately more dangerous. They can reach their targets more efficiently and – even more important – can better exploit the aftermath of their attacks. They are also not solely dependent on the Internet as an attack vector, since they can build on insiders or just smuggle some USB-devices into their target-zone (as was done in Iran). As shown, these high-threat actors move also very “silently”. In contrast to low-threat attackers, they are barely visible, since they want and can avoid detection with high efficiency over a long period of time. Concerning the outcome of their actions, they also tend to aim for longer periods of catastrophic accumulation rather

than to smaller and insignificant individual effects. The currently debated measures for defense, reconnaissance and identification will not help against this type of actor. In this case, the recognition of activities and sought interests make it very difficult and tedious to generate sufficient political attention and consequently create a conception of counter measures. This again makes offensive activities in this area even more attractive for attackers.

## Strategic Objectives and Measures of the Cyber Security Strategy for Germany

After taking a look at different actors involved in cybersecurity-related issues, this paper will now examine the German Cyber Security Strategy (CSS, 2011). The strategy tries to give an answer to the perceived threats coming from the Internet and thus sheds light on where the German Government sees the most prevailing areas where it should act. It also shows where practical threats did already occur (as e.g. with critical infrastructure) and therefore gives insight into the practical side of cyber-threats. In the following pages, the strategic objectives and actions of the CSS will be analyzed.

Among the concrete measures currently being implemented are:

- › the expansion of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), working with the owners of critical infrastructure in the “Implementation Plan National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)”
- › the intensification of security management in the Federal Administration,
- › the redesign of the networks of the government
- › the expansion of invitations to raise awareness as “BSI for citizens”
- › the establishment of the Task Force “IT Security in the Economy” within the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi)
- › on a low level scale, the support of initiatives such as “Germany safe on the Net e. V.” and the promotion of anti-botnet initiative of the Association of the German Internet Industry e. V.

### The Core: Protection of Critical Infrastructure

At the core of the CSS lies the protection of critical-information-infrastructures. The “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection” (CIP Strategy, 2009) defines those critical structures as follows:

*“Critical infrastructures are organizations and institutions with important significance for the nation’s community, whose failure or impairment would result in sustained shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to public order or other dramatic consequences.”*

The concern for critical infrastructure also does not come out of thin air. In 2013, IT professionals needed just a few clicks to show how vulnerable those structures really are. They proved that it is not only relatively easy to gain access to the control units of assets such as factories, prisons and thermal power stations, but that the next step – the

access to proprietary administration rights – is also within reach for a sophisticated Hacker. So, as they showed, it was theoretically possible to manipulate the locking of a football stadium with approximately 40,000 seats and turn off the alarm system. They also proved their ability to gain access to the controlling-unit of a heating system of a German prison in the federal state of Hessen. Finally, they showed that privately operated cogeneration plants were just as accessible as the controls of the district heating supply of an entire region.

Another practical example of the vulnerability of critical structures was given when the company Vaillant advised the buyers of their small heating systems to – literally – pull the network plug. Vaillant customers who signed a full maintenance contract were contractually obligated to make the system accessible via the Internet. But then the company discovered a security breach which made the intrusion into their heating systems possible. The BSI confirmed more than 500 affected plants in Germany, all equipped with the online available control modules, which were classified as a critical security breach. Vaillant's call for disconnection from the net thus showed where the limits of so called smart grid systems can be found – It's great to be able to control your heating system from work, but once outsiders can hijack your house, the trouble starts. But the main problem remains: Protecting entire networks is not a solution for the future. Critical data should rather be backed up and encrypted individually in order to make it harder for attacks or tapping. Sophisticated access rights and a permanently monitored network could also be helpful to ward off attacks.

It is not just the end-user himself or the government who have an interest in securing critical infrastructure. The information and communication industry (ICT) itself is also keen to safeguard their companies. And since about four-fifths of the critical infrastructure in Germany lies in the hands of the private sector, the personal responsibility of the operators is a key factor. Since 2005, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is cooperating within the "CIP implementation plan" with about 40 large German infrastructure companies and their interest groups in the field of IT security. They are all highly dependent on IT systems and commit themselves on a voluntary basis to maintain a minimum level of IT security. Furthermore, the addition of new sectors to the CIP Strategy will be examined in close cooperation with the government and the introduction of new relevant technologies ("Industry 4.0") will be taken into account when looking for new critical infrastructure. In this regard, it will also be examined in which fields of IT security technology Germany is particularly strong and where development and research in new, national based ICTs makes sense.

### **The National Cyber Security Council and Cyber Defense Center**

Another key element of the CSS is the convening of a *German National Cyber Security Council (Cyber-SR)*, which is supposed to combine different government branches to combat Internet-related threats. The Cyber-SR meets at state level under the chairmanship of the Federal Government Commissioner for Information Technology three times a year and beyond that on an ad hoc basis. To improve the understanding of cyber-threats and raise an overall awareness, the Council aims to contribute to a political-strategic

level to improve networking and coordination of existing structures and approaches in the field of cyber security. The members of the Cyber-SR include a range of governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Defense, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. Moreover, the President of the Federal Office for Security in Information Technology, as well as representatives of the federal-state secretaries from Berlin and Hessen, participate.

In order to optimize the operational cooperation of all government agencies in the Cyber-SR and to improve the coordination of protective and defensive measures against IT-incidents, the National Cyber Defense Centre (NCDC) was established. Where the Cyber-SR works as the head in the fight against cyber-threats, the NCDC is the body. It operates under the auspices of a whole load of different institutions: The before mentioned BSI, the direct involvement of the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Federal Police (BPOL), the Customs Criminal Office (CCC) and Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Even the German Federal Armed Forces and the supervisory bodies of the operators of critical infrastructures take part in the NCDC, of course in compliance with their statutory duties and powers. A fast and close exchange of information in the National Cyber Defense Centre on vulnerabilities in IT products, upcoming threats and perpetrators enables all respective actors to analyze IT-incidents. By bundling all the information, the NCDN will be able to provide tailored guidance for the private and governmental sectors.

Each contributing actor can then derive the measures to be taken by him from the jointly developed guidance which the NCDN gives. Depending on the type of the cyber-threat, for example, either the BPOL or the BND have to become active and the relevant agency has to attune the measures with the competent authorities and also with partners from industry and academia. The bridge the NCDN builds between government, industry and academia is especially relevant, since only a holistic approach can actually protect against cyber-threats. By communicating with all actors, the self-interest of the economic sector to guard their companies against crime and espionage in cyber-space is accommodated. To take a look at some numbers: In its first two years in the period between April 2011 and March 2013, the NCDC has counted around 900 national and international IT security incidents. The majority of incidents were criminally motivated and had a profit motive as background. However, an increasing number of cases in the field of “hacktivism” were recorded. As described in the section about Internet-activists, this is a fairly new phenomenon with unclassifiable, unclear and often divergent objectives. As the NCDC stated, these actors aim to lead an attack on businesses and government agencies, expose their data holdings and subsequently release their data. The same *modus operandi* became famous in the last month when iCloud accounts of celebrities were hacked and their private data published.

The observation of security incidents and the resulting threat situation is becoming more and more an essential requirement of IT security design. A close cooperation

between security authorities is mandatory in this case, and early exchange of information between stakeholders is a fundamental precondition for a consistent and – by using the respective competencies in preventive and repressive areas – effective action in the event of a loss. To guard their own networks, the CSS initiated the project “Federal Network” (“Netz des Bundes”). Two central interagency government networks IVBB and IFMGA / BVN therefore will be reorganized into an efficient and secure shared network infrastructure – also taking into account the increased threat. Based on this common infrastructure, the authorities can then link their property and network with each other securely, according to the requirements. They will be able to communicate across governmental agencies and, for example, offer IT-processes or use other government-networks by themselves, without stepping out of the safe “Federal Network”. The aim is thus to create a common infrastructure for the federal administration on a long-term basis which will be secure and guard off cyber-threats.

### Strengthening IT-Security on all Levels

The protection of infrastructures requires additional security on the IT systems – for citizens and companies alike. The CSS thus also focuses on secure IT-systems in Germany: End-users as well as companies need responsive and consistent information about risks associated with IT systems and guidance for their own security measures. Comparable to a cyber-security-education, they need to know how to act for a safety-conscious behavior in cyber-space. With joint initiatives such as the Task Force “IT Security for Business” the information and counseling services are to be bundled – in this case, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. Many providers are already active in this field and protect their devices. But the main problem – and loop-hole for attackers – remains the end-device which is not sufficiently protected. Business-owners, as well as private end-users, oftentimes are just too lazy (who updates his computer-software regularly?) or fear the extra costs for the users, which some unfortunately are often not willing to pay. From the perspective of some experts, it should be examined whether it is possible, or desirable, for the provider to be granted greater access rights to infected user systems. Once infected with malware, one device could compromise an entire network.

*Strengthening of IT security in public administrations* is an even more important task the CSS has on its agenda. The aim is to enhance the protection of public administration IT systems. Proof of this necessity occurred when it became public that data from customs and other authorities and organizations with security tasks were leaked. Some federal-state agencies were even proven to be affected by malware. Even more obvious became the security-breach in public IT-Systems through the NSA spying. However, it should be noted that most of the incidents, especially when public data was leaked from the customs authorities, came about through employee misconduct. But – and that is the critical point – at the same time the affected systems containing sensitive information were only minimally protected. As stated in the CSS, when talking about IT-security public authorities in particular must set an example in terms of data security, but also – as the discussion about the used malware by authorities at the country level shows – in the use of IT-solutions to fulfill their given tasks. As the discussion about the so-called “Federal-Trojan” (which is a governmental produced virus able to spy on chosen targets

by the Federal Police) shows, these tools may only be used within the framework of the valid jurisdiction and must be designed in such a safe manner that a leakage of data outside of the investigative work is excluded. As a basis for the electronic voice and data communication the previously mentioned secure network infrastructure of the Federal Administration is to be used (Federal Network).

After looking at the more passive aspects of cyber-protection, the CSS also defines German efforts for an *effective fight against crime in cyber-space*. The ability of law enforcement agencies, the Federal Office for Security in Information Technology and the economic sector in the context of combating ICT crime becomes more important. Even though many of the conducted cyber-crimes fall into the category of low-level-threats, other offenses and actors, e.g. organized crime and industrial espionage, need to be fought actively. If the government wants to provide protection for its industry, actions against espionage and sabotage must be strengthened. In order to improve the exchange of know-how in this field, the federal government is seeking joint facilities in close cooperation with the economic sector and the relevant law enforcement authorities as consultative partners. The resulting public-private partnerships present a useful opportunity to exchange knowledge. There is no other way for the investigating authorities to gain access to experts, inside-information and threat-scenarios from industry. At the same time (especially when one keeps in mind the “Federal-Trojan”, which could be deployed anywhere) the framework and authorizations for both investigative agencies and private sector partners must be clearly and unambiguously defined. To counter the growing challenges of global cyber-crime, the federal government also aims to promote global harmonization in the area of criminal law on the basis of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

Another point in the lists of instruments to combat cyber-attacks can be found in the cooperation with the private sector on an informational level. The government guaranteed ensured safety for the private sector obligates the relevant state agencies to create a coordinated and complete toolkit for the defense against attacks in cyber-space. To enable the private sector to complement possible weaknesses identified the government should reveal the current state of knowledge and research in the Cyber Security Council. If necessary, the need for the creation of necessary additional legal powers for the federal and the state level should be evaluated. It should also be discussed to what extent certain (legal) powers and privileges should and can be transferred to operators of critical information infrastructures or to companies of the private sector. In addition, it is important to solidify the goals, mechanisms and institutions mentioned above in a steady process in exchange with the agencies involved both in federal, state and commercial enterprises.

### Cyberspace: A “global common”

A next level of planning aims at supranational level by looking at effective interaction for cyber security in Europe and worldwide. As the previously mentioned holistic approaches – in the field of a private-governmental cooperation – have shown, the same counts for national and international interaction. In the globalized cyberspace, safety



can only be achieved through coordinated instruments at both levels. Thus, the German government strongly supports measures of the European Union (EU) which try to build an action plan for the protection of critical information infrastructures. Taking the changed threat situation in the ICT sector into account, the prolongation and moderate extension of the mandate of the European Agency for Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), as well as the bundling of IT competencies in EU institutions, should be supported. The EU Internal Security Strategy and the Digital Agenda are signposts for further activities.

A German cyber foreign policy should be designed in such a way that national interests and ideas in relation to the coordination of cyber security are coordinated and specifically followed up in international organizations like the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, the OECD and NATO. But – before being able to articulate an exact strategy – an explanation of German interests in cyberspace would be desirable in order to adjust them to the interests and the performance of the industry. A clear commitment, as the United States, for example, submitted in their International Strategy on Cyberspace, is currently lacking on the part of the German Federal Government. But besides lacking an overall strategy, the German government does have an ambition for the future conduct in cyberspace. It aims at cyber space as a part of the “global commons” which must be governed by a global set of rules. One objective of the Federal Government is the establishment of a signed “Code for State Behavior in Cyberspace” (Cyber-Code) for as many as possible number of states, which includes confidence- and security-building measures.

NATO, as the foundation of transatlantic security, also takes cyber security into consideration and has made the topic one of three pillars of future threat scenarios. Since Germany is part of the alliance, the statement of all NATO countries in Lisbon also binds the government to act when prompted in the future:

*“Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In order to ensure NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO’s doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber-attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance.”*

In the future, the member countries will use NATO’s defense planning processes to accelerate the development of the member countries cyber defense capabilities. When requested, the alliance will also assist individual allies and will aim at optimizing information sharing between the countries, collaboration and – especially important in the field of IT-networking – interoperability. As discussed in the German CSS, NATO also plans on addressing the security risks stemming from cyberspace in close cooperation with other actors, such as the EU and UN.

After discussing the international dimension of cyber security, the *use of reliable and trustworthy Information Technology* is an issue also broached by the CSS. For a future protection against cyber-threats, the availability of reliable IT-systems and components

must be permanently maintained. Thereby, the development of innovative security concepts for enhanced security – always taking the social and economic dimensions into account – should be promoted. Those concepts must be thought from bottom up and be adjusted for the end-user. The best technology does not serve its purpose if the user will not apply it. One of the examples is encrypted mail: The technology is available, but seldom used, because it is rather complicated or inconvenient to install the necessary programs.

For this purpose, the relevant research on IT security and the protection of critical infrastructures should be continued and expanded. In addition, the Federal Government wants to strengthen the technological sovereignty and scientific capacity in Germany over the entire range of strategic IT core competencies, incorporate them into their political strategies and continue to develop them. To this end, consideration should be given as to which core capabilities are currently lacking in the area of IT security, and what capacity building is essential. Furthermore, it should be evaluated where Germany is already well positioned and where an investment does not make sense – that way, scarce resources in research and development will not be wasted.

Besides the technical side of a strengthened cybersecurity, the human resources development of the Federal Agencies plays an important role for Germany. Based on the future strategic importance of cyber security for foreign and domestic politics, the development of human resource capacity on the state level is to be examined. Cyber security must be given priority. In addition, an increased exchange of personnel between the federal authorities and appropriate training will strengthen interagency cooperation. It should also be examined, how the cooperation and the transition of specialists from the private sector to the federal agencies (with career- or job shadowing models) could be improved.

## Conclusion

After taking a close look at the theoretical – presented in the CSS – as well as practical side – by looking at known threats emerging from the Internet – of cybersecurity from a German perspective, the two assumptions, stated at the beginning, can be validated:

1. The German cyber security strategy to connect all relevant stakeholders, governmental as well as private, in the field of cyber security, is the right approach.

As shown, the CSS works in a holistic way and tries to incorporate not only state agencies but also relevant private and economic actors. Especially the “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection” aims at a cooperation with relevant companies in the field of information and communication industry. The other presented concepts also try to exchange information between state and private agencies. By bringing together all relevant actors future cyber-threats can be identified and – at best – be contained just in time.

2. Cyber security can only be guaranteed by an international approach, as national borders in cyberspace have no meaning. This networking should be encouraged not only by countries but also across corporate boundaries.

Just as cyber-threats at a national level can only be contained when acting in a holistic way, incorporating all relevant parties, the same is true at the international level. Especially when looking at the cyberspace as a “global common”, it becomes obvious that acting alone on a national level cannot be the right answer for threats emanating from the Internet. Not only in the smaller frame of NATO – which also considers cybersecurity as an important aspect of its overall security policy – but also on a wide, global level a common approach to new types of threats is necessary. Thus, the German approach to work for a common cyberspace, which should be governed by a global set of rules, should be further pursued. The objective of the Federal Government to establish a signed Code for State Behavior in Cyberspace (Cyber-Code) for as many as possible number of states, including confidence and security-building measures, thus aims in the right direction.

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## Are the Brazilian Military Industrial Ambitions at Risk?

Yannick Quéau

In the second quarter of 2014, the Brazilian economy entered into recession for the second time since 2008. The public holidays proclaimed in June and July 2014 for the World Cup are cited as playing a role in this poor performance<sup>1</sup>. Indeed, chances are the next quarter will show more positive results<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless, the current economic climate should not be overlooked, as it underlines the difficulties of South America's leading regional power to face the aftermath of the financial crisis. Like Europe, the consequences of the economic slowdown have not been thoroughly assessed. It has had enduring impacts on public budgets, more so than expected until quite recently. Faced with other significant challenges including social protests, the burden of investments, such as the ones for buying defense equipment, while organizing two of the most important global events<sup>3</sup>, and a high rate of inflation (6.50% in July 2014), the government may decide to revise its priorities, regardless of the result of the general elections to be held on 5 October 2014.

This dynamic could affect the defense budget in various ways. Backed by significant growth in national wealth, the Brazilian forces entered into a cycle of modernization of their equipment through vigorous acquisition programs in 2005<sup>4</sup>. The last decade has also seen the implementation of

<sup>1</sup> AFP, "Economía de Brasil entra en recesión técnica", *La Nación*, 30th August 2014.

<sup>2</sup> The growth rate should be 0,7% according the international financial sector, Brasilia expects better results with 1,8%.

<sup>3</sup> The 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games.

<sup>4</sup> M. Bromley, et I. Guevara, "Arms modernization in Latin America", in Tan, A. T. H. (ed.) *The Global Arms*

an ambitious public policy intended to support the development of a modern defense industrial base within the country. This goal led Brasilia to increase its demand for new weapons systems, notably the most technologically advanced (mainly, arms designed in Western Europe and in North America, but also in Israel) to make the national market attractive enough for foreign military companies, despite knowing they would have to fulfil significant offsets and technology transfer requirements<sup>5</sup>. The idea is to use the acquisition programs as a vector of development of the local arms suppliers' production and design capabilities.

This strategy is now beginning to show results, but the process remains fragile since it still relies on a quite a high level of the domestic demand. Any shift in the government's priorities and decisions to use the budget of the Ministry of Defense to adjust to the difficult economic conditions may put some of the efforts towards creating a defense industry in jeopardy. Since the country does not face immediate external threats calling for a military response, this scenario remains a concrete option for the government. Moreover, considering the present Brazilian social climate, such a decision would also be quite easy to defend to the population.

The purpose of this paper is to draw a portrait of the Brazilian defense industrial base in the current domestic and international environment. It sheds light on the major drivers of the development of Brazilian endogenous arms production capabilities and puts it into perspective with the actual circumstances prevailing on the global defense and security markets. This leads to identifying the underlying trends that could threaten the acquisition plans and the strengthening and upgrading of the military industries. The demonstration uncovers the dependency of the local suppliers on the domestic market and their relative weakness in the international markets, with the notable exception of Embraer. It also exposes the limits of a mode of acquisition of know-how mainly based on international partnerships. Brasilia's project to become again a top arms exporter in the medium term may encounter the same fate as its previous effort in the mid-1980's, which in fact failed.

The paper proceeds in four steps. First, it identifies the political motivations behind the defense procurement plans. Second, it describes the main acquisition programs per sector (land, naval, air, C4ISR<sup>6</sup>). Third, it presents the key players of the Brazilian defense industrial and technological base (DITB). Fourth, it points out the main weaknesses of this industry.

## Think Big: The Brazilian Defense Master Plan

The Brazilian defense strategy published in 2008 under Lula's presidency reflects an analysis of the regional security environment dominated by the necessity to 1) preserve the national sovereignty and to strengthen territorial surveillance capabilities to fight against

Trade: A Handbook, Routledge, UK: London, 2010, p. 166-177; Carina Solmirano et Sam Perlo-Freeman, "Is South America on the brink of an arms race?", SIPRI Fact Sheet, January 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Brazil, ministry of Defense, *Estrategia Defesa Nacional*, 2008. See also Yannick Quéau, "L'Amérique du Sud sur la voie d'une autonomie stratégique renforcée", in Dorval Brunel (ed.) *Repenser l'Atlantique : commerce, immigration, sécurité*, Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2012, p. 325-343.

<sup>6</sup> Computerized Command, Control, Communications Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

various forms of trafficking and illegal activities (drugs, wood, metals, oil, people, etc.), 2) to protect national waters, in particular offshore oil reserves which should eventually make the country an exporter, given the knowledge that it is already self-sufficient, 3) to modernize an aging inventory of weapons. Six years later, despite Rousseff's accession to the presidency of the country in 2010, the core of this strategy remains untouched. Indeed, the change at the head of the country mostly impacted the type of platforms prioritized (the French Rafale giving way to the Swedish Gripen for the F-X2 multirole aircraft program, for instance). The timing of the planned acquisitions was also revised, but more because of the 2008 financial crisis and the recession of 2009. Currently, the economic downturn and the general elections may lead to similar results.

The first point of the Brazilian defense strategy, i.e. the need to preserve sovereignty and regional surveillance, deserves a closer look. First, the possibility that some of these acquisitions may be meant to be used in case of major domestic social disorders seems valid, and must not be overlooked. Some of the military equipment choices made (light armored vehicles, helicopters and mass surveillance systems, for instance) seem to be in part motivated by this hypothesis, as does the redeployment of troops and military bases close to the country's three major urban eras (*São Paulo*, Rio de Janeiro and Brasília), which are somewhat remote from the borders. Second, the deepening of the regional integration, now covering defense issues including arms trade and production, must also be taken into account. In 2009, the creation of the Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), established the foundation of a military collaboration aiming to strengthen the links between partners from both an operational and an industrial perspective<sup>7</sup>. If it is still a bit too early to talk about a South American common defense and security policy (European countries should understand that these things can take time), this proposal is symptomatic of the existence of a climate of trust rather than distrust between the countries of the region<sup>8</sup>. Thus, the 2008 strategy is primarily worried by civil unrest and potential international rivals (NATO members, Russia, China and a few other ambitious emerging countries like India) in the race for critical resources within the region or in the rest of the world.

The second point – protecting national waters – is insufficient to justify in itself the heavy investments being made in naval and air forces. One can understand the need to patrol the coast and have a presence in some maritime areas, but so far, issues about Brazil's authority in its territorial waters and the reserves contained underground, like the one now observed in the South China Sea, do not exist. The justification for these investments, therefore, lies elsewhere. The country has the ambition to strengthen its

<sup>7</sup> The defense of UNASUR component also contributes to the marginalization of the Organization of American States (OAS) and therefore Washington's influence. See Juliana Bertazzo. "Brazilian Security and Defence Policy under President Dilma Rousseff: Transition and Initial Challenges", *Critical Sociology*, November 2012 vol. 38, no. 6, p. 809-821.

<sup>8</sup> In the regional context, the notion of "tensions" must indeed be significantly expanded to find points of disagreement between the States. One could name the territorial disputes between Chile, Peru and Bolivia since the Pacific War (1878-1884), the problems of non-respect for the territorial integrity between Venezuela and Colombia due to the fight against drug traffickers, race of indigenous autonomy movements questioning the territorial unity of some states (Bolivia, among others) or Argentina's claims over the Malvinas, but since the disaster of the war waged by the colonels' regime against the UK (April-June 1982), Buenos Aires prefers to assert its interests through diplomatic channels. Thus, none of these elements seems to call for military actions.

response and force projection capabilities, notably, overseas. In other words, Brazil is pursuing a policy of power in the medium term. It intends to play a more significant role in international security affairs and have some influence on the agenda. In addition to sheltering its natural resources, mining, oil and gas reserves from foreign predation, the idea is also to position itself as a major interlocutor in the extraction and commercialization of these resources, not only in South America, but also, at least, in the South Atlantic (Africa), and so why not more globally too.

Finally, the third point about the need of equipment modernization cannot really be contested. Weapons bought in 1970s and 1980s (if not before) have obviously aged and are being replaced by a new generation of arms, incorporating the lessons learned from the post- Cold War developments and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) at the doctrinal, the operational and technological levels (counterinsurgency context, revolution in military affairs, concept of network-centric warfare, C4ISR centrality, stealth, energy efficiency, etc.). Sustained by its strong economic growth, Brazil considers itself as being able to fill, in large part, if not completely, the traditional qualitative gap between its armed forces equipment and those of the most advanced military powers (NATO members, in particular).

Nevertheless, the mechanism implemented to modernize the fleets of the military force reveals ambitions far greater than simply upgrading the armaments. Brasilia is simultaneously pursuing two closely linked objectives. First, it aims to develop a national DITB able to support in the medium term the role that Brazil intends to play on the international stage in the future. Second, once the first stage of modernization is accomplished, it aims to conquer significant portions of the international arms market or, in other words, to become again a top weapons exporter, as was the case before the end of both the Cold War and the conflict between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988).

To achieve its defense industrial goals, the Brazilian government has significantly increased its defense procurement budget. This was in part necessary to afford the current generation of armaments, but also to attract bids from foreign companies from all over the world, especially from those producing the most technologically advanced systems; i.e., mainly American, European, Russian and, depending on the segment, the Israelis and even the Chinese defense firms. The hefty procurement spending plans also helped sweeten the direct offset requirements that came with the major programs. Therefore, the acquisition budget doubled between 2007 and 2008 (from \$ 2.4 billion to \$ 5 billion).

Prior to 2005, the offsets rules were tailored to each program. They are now framed by a public policy and a law<sup>9</sup>, which evolve at the margins on a regular basis, with the main guidelines remaining stable (see table 1). We will see if the situation stays that way, as in 2013 President Rousseff<sup>10</sup> decided to form a special committee in charge of revis-

<sup>9</sup> Law 12.598 voted in 2012.

<sup>10</sup> The authority in charge of coordinating the offsets policy is theoretically the Ministry of Defense. However, since the major military programs are sensitive political and legal issues, they are often administered directly by the Presidency, which delegates Minister of Defense to an advisory role.



ing them. Depending on the results of the general election, they may soon take another direction.


Considering its goals (Table1), Brasilia favors the implementation of a competition as fierce as possible between the foreign suppliers for awarding major programs. The budgetary situations prevailing in Europe and, to some extent, in the USA play a key role in this regard. The level of public debt in Western nations puts their defense companies under pressure, since many of their client (NATO members) have reduced their orders or postponed them due to difficult economic conditions. The conquest of export markets has therefore become a necessity for European firms, and a really good option for American firms trying to compensate for shrinking domestic markets. In several cases, mainly in Europe, the issue is even the preservation of some of the national production capabilities. In this context, many European arms suppliers agree with the states to transfer part of their technological advantage through offsets obligations.

*Table 1 – Main guidelines of offsets obligations in Brazil*

<b>R&amp;D</b>	The Brazilian government expects a substantial proportion of R&D related to the purchase of defense equipment to make in Brazil.
<b>Value of the contract = 100 %</b>	The amount of benefits must be equal to 100% of the contract value when it exceeds \$ 5 million, possibly even more, and applied over a 12 months period.
<b>Direct off-sets first</b>	The direct offsets (those directly linked to the acquisition program) are prioritized although occasionally Brasilia may accept indirect offsets (linked to other programs or civilian activities). In this case, Brasilia would favor fallout in adjacent sectors to defense (public security, dual technologies, etc.).
<b>Priorities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› Aerospace (composites, combat aircraft and drones, for example),</li> <li>› Missile systems</li> <li>› Security systems required for the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the Rio 2016 Olympic Games,</li> <li>› Subsystems including command and control, optical and electro-optical sensors and electronic warfare.</li> <li>› Significant gains are expected and in some cases already been made in the naval sector (conventional submarines, nuclear propulsion or surface ships).</li> <li>› The country also aims to address a weakness in the segment of armored land vehicles and equipment of the soldier (in network communications, etc.).</li> <li>› Concerning space systems, Avibras negotiated partnerships to strengthen or develop expertise in launch systems, orbital systems and training.</li> </ul>
<b>Time-frame</b>	The benefits must correspond to the duration of the supply contract (possibly, including MCO).
<b>Avoid banking offsets</b>	Brasilia expects to avoid the mechanism of banking offsets, whereby a player generates and accumulates excess credit in order to compensate the customer in the case he is unable to meet its offsets obligations to Brasilia. However, the army used this mechanism in the past.


Source : Brazilian Ministry of Defense

Figure 1 – Military expenditures in Brazil and in South America\*, 2000-2013 (constants USD of 2011)



\*Guyana and Surinam are not taken into account  
 Source : From SIPRI 2014

Figure 2 – Brazil Military Expenditures in Percentages, Base 100, 2000-2014




Source : From SIPRI 2014

## Buy What You Want: A Decade of Modernization

The recent major defense acquisitions of the Brazilian armed forces for the future are in line with the 2008 reference document and meet the dual objectives of 1) domestic and border stabilization and 2) development of the attributes of power through targeted purchases authorizing a projection of force beyond the South American region. The overview of major purchases of the Army, Navy and the Brazilian aviation and surveillance program (like Sisfron managed by the Army) bears this out.

Figure 3 – Defense Procurement Budgets in Brazil, 2010-2017 (Constant \$ Billion of 2013 and Percentages)



\* this category is mainly about C4ISR, especially surveillance systems.

Source : From Jane's, 2013

## The Brazilian Army Acquisitions

The priorities of the Army are the renewal of the main battle tank (MBTs) fleet, the modernization of light, medium and heavy armored vehicles, the purchase of land and air radar surveillance systems, command and control and electronic warfare capabilities, night vision equipment, anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, as well as UAVs. Many of these goals have already been achieved or are about to be. The last 39 Leopard 1A5 tanks from Germany's KMW, out of a total order of 220, were delivered in February 2012. The modernization of the American M113 armored vehicles should also come to an end relatively soon, as these platforms were part of the security apparatus to be deployed as part of the World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic Games. Beyond 2016, the priorities of the Army will involve the light armored Guarani (Puma version of the Italian firm Iveco), ASTROS II rocket systems from Brazil's Avibras (contracts 28 million USD), the air defense systems and equipment of the modern infantryman (assault rifle special forces, night vision, etc.) which contracts have yet to be awarded. Other Brazilian companies supplying the Army are CTEX (a laboratory of the Army) with an anti-aircraft radar system, Orbisat (Embraer group) with central command and control systems, Mectron (Odebrecht group) with the antitank MSS-1.2 system, the armor-piercing system ALAC and Imbel with its assault rifles. Helibras, a subsidiary of Eurocopter manufactures locally the ground forces of EC 725 Super Cougar and ensures the modernization of the AH-1 attack / AMX (originally developed by Embraer and Aermachi in the 1970s) light aircraft.

## The Brazilian Navy Acquisitions

The analysis of the list of major platforms that Brazil plans to purchase under the plan to modernize the Navy (Plano Articulação Equipamento e da Marinha do Brasil – PAEMB) echoes to the country’s ambitions of monitoring its coasts and of projecting the force. The PAEMB anticipates the purchase of 2 aircraft carriers, 4 helicopter carriers, 30 escort vessels, 15 diesel-electric submarines, 6 nuclear submarines and 62 patrol ships of various types. If the modernization of the Brazilian Navy were to be completed, the country would end up with one of the best-equipped naval forces in world. Given the nature of the vessels purchased (aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers and nuclear submarines, in particular), it is clear that the missions foreseen for the Brazilian Navy fall into a very much broader context than the monitoring of the coastal and offshore national zones. The PAEMB is extremely ambitious and needs to spread the acquisitions over almost three decades (from 2006 to 2034). In the meantime, a large portion of the fleet currently deployed has to be modernized in order to continue accomplishing its various missions (presence on the river system of the Amazon, coastal and offshore patrols). Several types of ships in service, but also the aircraft and equipment which the Marines use also have to be upgraded. Thus, modernization and MCO occupy an important place in the naval strategy of the country. In addition, the rapid expansion of the fleet will require the development of a modern control command structure of communications, surveillance and threat detection.

Several programs deserve a closer look:

- › The PROSUB program (PROgrama de desenvolvimento de SUBmarinos) aims to acquire a fleet of 15 diesel-electric submarines (designated S-BR) and six nuclear powered submarines (SN-BR) by 2034. The French company DCNS was awarded the bulk of the contracts for this program in 2008. Platforms currently in use, namely the Tupi Type 209 (designed by the German firm TKMS) and Tikuma classes (209 type modified) will be modernized by Lockheed Martin and gradually retired.
- › The PRONAE program (Programa Navio-Aerodrom), which is dedicated to the acquisition of two aircraft carriers. The program is still in the research phase, but in principle, it plans the commissioning of the first ship in 2025 and second in 2040. DCNS (France) and Navantia (Spain) have expressed interest.
- › The PROSUPER program (Programa de Obtenção of Meios of Superfície) which is dedicated to ocean-going ships other than aircraft carriers and was eventually offered in two programs: one dedicated to 5 frigates and a supply ship and the other, the OPV (Offshore Patrol Vessels). The latter program is currently designated under the name NapaoC (Navio Patrulha Oceanico).

In addition, the Brazilian Navy also plans to acquire various types of coastal and river patrol boats (Amazonas class, class Macaé, class Marlim and LPR-40). The NaPa-500 program, for example, provides for the purchase of 46 coastal vessels, and the credits have already been released for 18 of them.

It is also worth mentioning that the Brazilian Navy wants to acquire between 20 and 24 aircraft as part of the F-X2 program by 2020. In total, the Brazilian Navy will be

buying 40 of these aircraft, which will replace the A-12 4KU currently in service. The problem at this stage is that the naval version of the Gripen, produced by Saab, does not exist yet. This difficulty explains why several analysts (including this author)<sup>11</sup> have been surprised by Brasilia's decision to enter into exclusive negotiations with the Swedish company<sup>12</sup>.

## The Brazilian Air Force Acquisitions

The FX-2 issue leads to the Brazilian Air Force (BAF) modernization plans. The BAF is one of most advanced in the region and it is supported by a relatively strong local aviation industry<sup>13</sup>. It is also worth noting that the long-term acquisition plans for the Brazilian aviation defense have not changed significantly since 2008 and the publication of the national security strategy. However, there are currently many delays, due to 1) lack of funds (due to the recession of 2009) 2) a shift in government priorities for security systems and 3) a change at the head of the state in 2010, with Rousseff replacing Lula.

It is the case for the FX-2 program, undoubtedly the cornerstone of the future structure of the BAF, since it must allow the purchase of 120 multi-role fourth generation combat aircraft by 2025. Current planes, namely 12 Mirage 2000, 57 F-5, A-53 1 / AMX have reached the end of their useful lives (especially the two last platforms mentioned) and must be replaced. They are also ill suited to the contemporary operating environment and outdated compared to the latest equipment. Therefore, they do not support Brazil's ambition to compare itself with NATO military capabilities.

Under President Lula, the French Rafale, made by Dassault, was considered the favorite in the competition for a contract worth approximately \$ 4 billion for 36 aircraft. This advantageous position was at that time explained by the quality of technology transfer made by France as part of the program, the Hexagon also taking advantage of some of its competitors main weaknesses: the restrictions imposed by United States export regulations on some arms sales regarding Boeing's F-18 Super Hornet and the Swedish Saab's difficulties to ensure a future for a Gripen NG, for which a naval version does not exist. But the FX-2 program has been delayed and the economic situation changed under Rousseff. Boeing, with the support of the American administration, was gaining ground before the revelations of US spying on Brasilia through the Snowden/PRISM affair. Finally, it is now the underdog, and Saab has made it... for now. Since the announcement in December 2013, it is very difficult to observe any progress in the negotiations between Brasilia and Saab. Now, considering the present gloomy economic climate and the political campaigns for the presidential election, the program could be delayed yet again.

<sup>11</sup> "Brazil Picks Sweden's Gripen For Its Air Force", Defense News, 18th December 2013. See also Yannick Quéau, "L'appétit mesuré d'Embraer pour la défense", *Lettre de l'IRSEM*, n°7, October 2013.

<sup>12</sup> There's no agreement yet, but Saab and Embraer have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Gripen production. According to Defense Industry Daily, "Embraer will be the Brazilian industrial lead, performing its own assigned work while managing all local sub-contractors in the program. They'll also work with Saab on systems development, integration, flight tests, final assembly and deliveries, with full joint responsibility for the 2-seat JAS-39F Gripen NG". "F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab's JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet", *Defense Industry Daily*, 14th July 2014.

<sup>13</sup> In fact, the Brazilian aviation company performs extremely well in the commercial market, the military capabilities are more limited.

The other major program in the BAF's modernization strategy is the tactical carrier KC-390 designed by Embraer. Brazil should buy 28 of these aircraft and become the first military force to test the equipment. The national aviation firm Embraer relies heavily on the KC-390 to strengthen its position in international markets, uses it to develop its capabilities as a systems integrator of military platforms and also to become the leader of an international network of industrial partners in both Latin America and beyond (Europe, mainly). Risks for the company also appear limited. Embraer is taking a position on a segment close to its core business (regional civilian jets). Moreover, this niche has not seen new platforms for a long time. Competitors (the Lockheed C-130, in particular) are therefore likely to suffer from the innovations of the KC-390 in design and energy efficiency, for example. The first delivery of this plane is expected by the end 2015 or the beginning of 2016.

Other notable programs of the BAF are the Russian attack helicopters Mil Mi-35. The multi-role helicopters EC 725 Super Cougar supplied by Helibras/Airbus Helicopter, the US Black Hawk UH 60 L from Sikorsky and the Israeli drones Hermes 450 Elbit Systems. One must also consider the missile air-to-air A-Darter, the product of a collaboration between the South African firm Denel Dynamics and the Brazilian industrial Mectron (Odebrecht group).

### Focus on Major Surveillance Systems


The SISFRON program (Sistema Integrado of Monitoramento of fronteiras) is conducted by the Army and is dedicated to the monitoring of borders. Sisfron is actually a network of radars and other sensors, drones and communications systems and control systems, allowing the coordination of military and civilian operations to ensure border security. In August 2012, the first part of a contract (total value estimated at \$ 6 billion) was attributed to the Terpo consortium, which is formed by two entities controlled by Embraer: Savis Tecnologia e Systemas and Orbisat. The foreign competition was quite confident it would take part in this project, with, on one side, the French firm Thales associated for the occasion with the American Northrop Flight Technologies and, on the other side, Cassidian (Airbus Defense), which teamed with Odebrecht Defesa e Tecnologia. Sisfron is a centerpiece in the surveillance of Brazilian territory (and population). This may explain why local suppliers have been preferred to foreign manufacturers. The government may have had some misgivings about its sovereignty that led it to prefer a national solution, thus keeping the necessary tools to implement Sisfron under the control of Brazilian interests. However, it is doubtful that Embraer's technological expertise in the integration of such complex surveillance, command and control systems matches the know-how of Western companies. Despite an apparent willingness to support domestic players, Sisfron program managers have had to resort to foreign players like the Israeli company Elbit Systems to supply the electro-optical systems.

Another territory monitoring program is on track and expected to be launched on November 2014: the Sistema de da Amazônia Azul Gerenciamento (SisGAAz), a \$ 4.4 billion contract. Managed by the Navy, it is perhaps best known internationally as the Amazonia Azul or Blue Amazon. Similarly to Sisfron, it is a system for monitoring territorial waters satellite-based networked with airborne sensors, naval and land.

### Know yourself: Brazil's DITB Who's Who

The limited capabilities of the Brazilian DITB make foreign firms a central component of Brasilia's defense industry strategy. It is quite logical and coherent with the imposition of transfers of technology through offsets obligations which in turn explains the use of offsets and techno transfers. However, as figure 3 shows, most of the military equipment bought by the Brazilian forces are produced domestically. According to Jane's, for about 75% of the systems it buys, Brazil is already the location for final assembly of about 75% of the equipment, the remaining 25% being shared mainly between the United States (11%), France, China, Germany, India, Israel and Russia. The suppliers agree to install modern production lines and establish joint-ventures and partnerships with Brazilian firms. Thus, to some extent, it makes it difficult to make the distinction between what is imported and what is made locally.

Figure 4 – Country of Production of the Brazilian Military Acquisitions, 2010-2015 (in Percentages\* of the Total of Brazilian Military Acquisitions)



\*Total superior to 100 % because of rounded numbers.

Source: Jane's 2010

As of 2014, the policies implemented by the Brazilian government to rebuild its defense production capabilities show some positive results. Thanks to technology transfers negotiated as part of a multitude of bilateral partnerships and equipment contracts, Brasilia was also able to lay the foundations of industrial clusters in technological segments sustaining defense production (electronics and submarines, for example).

However, the current economic environment, on both domestic and international levels, makes the ambition to become a major arms exporter increasingly more elusive at the moment. This goal will probably suffer from severe delays except in the segments where the Brazilian industries are already performing quite well, such as aeronautics, and possibly the land and missiles systems with low and medium cost items. This section introduces several of the key players of the Brazilian DITB, looking at the land, the naval and the aerospace sectors.

Table 2 – Main Brazilian Defense Groups

Companies	sectors	Main products
Agrale	Land systems	4x4 Light vehicles (Marruá)
Atech (Embraer Group)	Command, Control, Communications and intelligence (C3I)	SIVA-SIPAM (Sistema de Vigilância e Proteção da Amazônia)
Avibras	Command, Control, Communications and intelligence (C3I), missiles technologies, simulators, drones, land systems	A-Darter, ASTROS, Exocet MM 40, Skyfire, Fogtrein, EDT-FILA, MANSUP (Exocet MM40), drone Falcao, AV BL Guara
Embraer	Airplanes (fighter and logistic), Defense and surveillance systems	SuperTucano, KC 390, EMB 145 AEW&C
Emgepron	Naval systems, shipyards, MCO, ammunition, Brazilian navy studies	Niteroi, Barroso, Macae, Roraima, Grajau, Marlim, Rio, Lancha Parulha de Porto, LAR, LAM, LTE
Helibras (Eurocopter subsidiary)	Helicopters	AS 550 C3, EC 635, EC 645, AS 565, AS 532, EC 725 Super Cougar, NH 90, Tigre
Imbel	Light and small weapons, ammunitions, powders and explosives	9 GC Imbel, 0.45 GC Imbel, 9 M973, FAL M 963, MD 97, Imbel .380 AGLC Sniper Rifle
Inace	Naval shipyard	Macaé, Grajau, Marlim, EDVM 25
Mectron (Groupe Odebrecht)	Missiles	A-Darter, Exocet MM 40, Marlin, MSS 1.2.
Odebrecht	Naval shipyard (Odebrecht Defesa), missiles (Mectron), nuclear propulsion	PROSUB, A-Darter, MSS-1.2, MANSUP (Exocet MM 40)
Orbisat (Groupe Embraer)	Satellite surveillance, radar	Sisfron, SENTIR M20, SABER M60, COAAe
Savis tecnologia e Systemas (Groupe Embraer)	Command, Control, Communications and intelligence (C3I)	Sisfron
Forjas Taurus	Small arms, ammunitions	SMT 9, SMT-40

Source : Companies websites

## Land Systems

The Engesa bankruptcy (Engenheiros Especializados SA) in 1993 left a void in the domestic DITB which has not yet been filled. The group had developed notable capabilities for wheeled armored vehicles, including the amphibious troop carrier Urutu EE-11, reconnaissance vehicles EE-3 Jararac and EE-9 Cascavel and the anti-tank vehicle EE-17



Sucuri. The catalog included other models like 4x4 and 6x6 Alant transportation vehicles and the EE-T4 Ogum. All these platforms were designed locally by Engesa, even if the weapons and vetronics systems were supplied by foreign firms<sup>14</sup>. The products were exported to developing countries, mainly in South America, the Middle East and Africa. At its peak, in the mid-1980s, Engesa employed 5,000 people and was operating twelve subsidiaries in Brazil and around the world. The company's demise was due to a combination of factors. The changing geo-strategic environment at the end of the 1980s precipitated the decline of the firm, precisely at the time Engesa hoped to start selling on the international markets its MBTs Osório, in which the company had invested over \$ 100 million.

After this major industrial collapse, Brazilian land forces were equipped almost exclusively by foreign platforms. Since 2003, however, there has been some revival in domestic production. Agrale, for instance, offers 4x4 light commercial/military vehicles and the Marruá, developed between 2003 and 2005. This last one, the Marrua, is a family of logistical tracked vehicles and cars. Avibras is also developing a light armored 4x4 vehicle based on the Guará. The firm, best known for its missiles and aerospace activities, works on C4ISR solutions and drones (Falcao program). However, the country still depends on foreign suppliers (Iveco and KMW, in particular) for purchasing, maintaining, and upgrading most of its land platforms.

The picture is different with respect to small arms, ammunition and explosives. In these segments, firms like Taurus and Imbel are able to cover a large portion of the domestic needs. Taurus is primarily a manufacturer of small caliber handguns and submachine guns (SMT 9 and SMT 40) while Imbel, which is managed by the Brazilian Army, produces assault rifles. The latter also designs anti-tank weapons (ALAC), vetronics<sup>15</sup> and communication systems (for the Guarani armored vehicles, for example). Regarding artillery and large caliber ammunition, Brazil almost totally relies on foreign manufacturers. The country offers very few solutions in this domain, except for Avibras, for instance, with the rocket fire systems ASTROS Skifire I and II and 70.

### Naval Systems Producers

Brazil has several shipyards (in Rio de Janeiro and in Fortaleza, in particular). They can produce most surface warships, and soon will also be able to produce submarines. At least, it is one of the objectives of the PROSUB program which relies on a partnership signed with DCNS in 2008. In this regard, it may be noted that the construction of conventional and nuclear submarines should monopolize much of the naval infrastructure of the country in the coming years. The technological expertise required to integrate the various advanced subsystems of a submarine does not exist domestically. Brazil almost totally depends on foreign suppliers for the design of the fleet which it intends to build by 2034 under the modernization plan of the Navy (Plano Articulação Equipamento e da Marinha do Brasil – PAEMB).

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<sup>14</sup> Like the Italian company Oto Melara, for example, for the cannon system of the EE-17 Sucuri

<sup>15</sup> Vetronics is the electronic system of a vehicle, like avionics for airplanes.

The foreign companies must meet two essential conditions in order to access the Brazilian market. First, most of the production has to be done locally. Second, transfers of technology have to be significant enough to allow national industries to become the Brazilian Navy's main suppliers in the future. The idea is to build research infrastructure ensuring the maintenance and modernization of the ships bought through the PAEMB and to design domestically all the next generation naval equipment (beyond 2035). Activities in the naval sector are organized around three main players: Odebrecht Defesa and Tecnologia (Odebrecht group) and the shipyards Emgepron and Inace.

Odebrecht Defesa and Tecnologia manages the construction of 4 Scorpene diesel-electric submarines and a nuclear powered submarine (nuclear propulsion being designed and produced by Brazil) under guidance of the French company DCNS. These two firms are also involved in the construction of the Brazilian Navy complex close Rio de Janeiro. It includes the building of the submersibles operational base. DCNS and Odebrecht formed two joint ventures to carry out their task. The first, Consórcio Baía de Sepetiba, manages the PROSUB Program and is in charge of the construction in Brazil of the rear part of the Scorpene; the front part is being built in Cherbourg, France. The final assembly will take place in Brazil. The second joint venture, Itaguaí Construções Navais, is constructing the naval complex. The contract is worth a total value approximating \$ 7 billion. The transfer of technology includes assistance to Odebrecht by DCNS for the design and implementation of the non-nuclear part of what will be the first Brazilian nuclear powered submarine. Its construction is planned for 2016 and the commissioning of the ship for 2025.

Emgepron in Rio de Janeiro and Inace in Fortaleza are the two most important shipyards in the country. The PROSUPER programs (surface vessels) and possibly the PRONAE program (aircraft carrier) ensure that both sites will see sustained activity in the coming years with the necessary modernization of some of the Brazilian fleet. The two players are relatively similar, the main differences being 1) Inace also builds civilian vessels while Emgepron is exclusively dedicated to the needs of the Navy and 2) Emgepron has capabilities in navigation systems, weapons and artillery ammunition, logistical support, training and scientific oceanographic studies for the Navy.

### Air Systems Producers

Aeronautics is probably the sector where the defense industry of Brazil is the most effective. This is largely the result of the aircraft manufacturer Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica), although it does most of its activities in the civil sector (regional and business jets). Embraer has had impressive success with its Super Tucano model (a training/light-attack turboprop aircraft exported to 11 countries including the United States). The military represents on average 19% of the turnover of the group, but the increase of the defense and security activities in the annual revenue is impressive (+25% between 2012 and 2013)<sup>16</sup>. In addition to the success of the Super Tucano on the export market, Embraer obtained major contracts in Brazil for surveillance systems (Sisfron) and can rely on the positive perspective offered by the tactical transporter KC-390. The aircraft manufacturer

<sup>16</sup> Embraer Annual Report 2013.

also offers military transport planes derived from its civilian products, some of them being advanced, early warning and communication aircraft (EMB 145 AEW & C).

Essentially, the Embraer platforms are niche products, offered in the low and medium cost market segments. Despite its success in the international markets, the group relies on the growth of domestic demand in order to acquire the skills that it lacks. Partnerships with foreign suppliers and several purchases of specific local firms (in C4ISR, with Atech and Orbisat, for instance) are currently the chosen ways of developing those lacking capabilities. The selection of Embraer for the Sisfron program, its success in export markets, its ambitions regarding drones (in partnership with Elbit Systems and Avibras), the key roles played in the FX-2 and KC-390 programs are signs the Brazilian government sees the aircraft manufacturer as its national champion in defense industry affairs. Embraer may indeed be considered the only Brazilian company with the critical size and technological and commercial expertise required to drain local smaller units in order to develop the national DITB. This logic does not concern only aeronautics; Embraer also trying to position itself as a factor in electronics defense.

Apart from Embraer, it is worth mentioning Helibras (Helicópteros do Brasil SA). Because the firm is a subsidiary of Airbus Helicopter, however, it is misleading to consider this company among Brazilian domestic capabilities. The production is local but not the know-how, at least most of it. Helibras is the bridgehead of the European group in South America that builds in the country Airbus Helicopter's models and provides support services for regional clients.

### **Have no Doubt About Your Weaknesses: Why Exports and R&D matter**

It is clear the Brazilian defense firms strongly benefited from the acquisition plans over the last decade. Looking at the picture that has just been drawn up, it is tempting to conclude that the future of the Brazilian defense and security industry looks promising. Overall, in the medium term, this is probably the case. However, many shadows loom in both the short and long term time horizons. The global economic downturn continues to take its toll. The social protests during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and again during the 2014 FIFA World Cup<sup>17</sup> are symptoms of deeper problems in the socio-economic structure of the country. It could (and probably will) lead the government to revise its priorities and make budgetary decisions unfavorable to investments in defense. This scenario is more plausible knowing that Brazil faces no serious military threat. Faced with social unrest, leaders of the Brazilian democracy would struggle to justify expensive investments (a modern air fighter fleet, numerous warships including 2 aircraft carriers, for instance). The usual nationalist rhetoric used so far by the Brazilian establishment may no longer be enough to convince voters that military projects are more important than social and economic development programs.

Brazilian defense firms suffer from two major structural weaknesses, making them heavily dependent on domestic demand: an insufficient footprint in the export markets and low in-house R&D budgets.

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
<sup>17</sup> Waiting for the 2016 Rio Olympic Games.

## Export markets

With the notable exception of Embraer, Brazilian defense firms have a limited presence in the international markets, compared to the players they aim to compete with in the long term. Embraer's products are actually the only ones to lastingly conquer new markets. More specifically, the EMB-314 Super Tucano represents most of the Brazilian presence in foreign markets. This aircraft answers perfectly to the current needs of many countries in South America, in Africa and in the Asia-Pacific region which have heavily armed traffickers (drug, wood, metal, people hold sway, etc.) or rebel troops, and where the risk of rebellion is present. The Brazilian airplane was even preferred by the Pentagon to the American model T-6 Texan II produced by Hawker-Beechcraft in a \$ 355 million contract for 20 aircraft.

Apart from that, the hopes of the Brazilian DITB on the export markets rely mainly on the KC-390 also produced by Embraer and a future competitor of the CASA / IPTN CN-135/300 made by Airbus and the C-130 offered by Lockheed Martin. This \$ 3 billion program was launched in 2009 and the first delivery is scheduled for 2016. It targets a segment where the potential market is estimated at 700 units in 15 years and which has surprisingly been neglected by the giants of the industry. As previously mentioned, apart from the A400M, no new air tactical transport platform has appeared for many years apart from modernized previous versions, and yet, the relatively versatile four-engine Airbus, is mostly a strategic carrier. The Brazilian forces plan to purchase 28 KC-390, Argentina (5 units), Chile (6), Colombia (12), Czech Republic (2) and Portugal (6); public authorities and industries are partners in the program and, of course, buyers of this system. South Africa, which has also developed several partnerships with Brazil in other sectors (missiles, in particular, with the A-Darter), is also investigating the KC-390.

Figure 5 – Value of Global Offset Obligations to be Accrued from 2012 to 2022 (Current \$ Million)<sup>18</sup>



Source: IHS Jane's, 2013

<sup>18</sup> Data collected and presented here are conservative assessments based on existing proprietary data-sets. The study is based on the procurement programs of 23 defense markets: Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UAE.

Embraer's actual and anticipated export successes are not enough to reduce the costs of the various military acquisition programs. Despite technology transfers and the local implementation of modern production capabilities, Brasilia cannot seriously expect to become a major arms exporter for a long time. Moreover, it will necessitate a massive investment in R&D, since the Brazilian products will also have to deal with the offsets obligations imposed by the prospective clients (see figure 4).


### Low R&D budgets

To date, the modernization of the Brazilian forces' military equipment efficiently served the implementation of the development of local production capability but the degree of mastery of advanced technologies by domestic players is still limited. Technology transfers are useful, but they have a limit: foreign suppliers may refuse to put their technological advantage over the competition into jeopardy, even if it means losing the market. Defense is still primarily driven by political/strategic considerations, economic considerations being a secondary issue in some instances. It means the Brazilian competitiveness will depend on local investments in R&D, which means public budgets, since in-house corporate R&D is extremely limited.

To face this challenge, Rousseff launched in March 2013 the Inova Empresa plan, an investment of \$ 16.7 billion in the development of new technologies. The plan includes four modes of financing: 1) \$ 609 million in grants to industries, 2) \$ 2.1 billion for research partnerships between private firms and research institutes, 3) \$ 1.1 billion for companies with high technological intensity and 4) \$ 10.6 billion in loans at preferential rates of between 2.5% and 5%. Inova Empresa covers several areas identified by the government as strategic for the future. Besides defense and aerospace, projects related to telecommunications, health and the environment are also eligible. As part of a subdivision named Inova Aerodefesa, \$ 1.43 billion, should be reserved for innovations in command and control systems, satellites and space propulsion.

If the effort is significant for an emerging country, it nevertheless shows how far Brazil is distanced from the world leaders of the defense market. R&D is a serious challenge for Brazil, its investments in this regard being really modest compared to the resources which a country like France, for example, puts into military R&D (see figure 5). In 2013, the Brazilian government spent \$ 272 million in R&D, while France spent \$ 3.933 billion.

Figure 6 – Defense R&D Budgets in Brazil and France, 2010-2017 (Constant \$ Billion of 2013)



Source: From Jane's 2013

The evolution of the KC-390 program illustrates the difficulties inherent in constraining the foreign influence on locally designed and produced systems. The technological limitations of Embraer and its various partners allowed other European manufacturers<sup>19</sup> to position themselves in the Embraer supply chain. This is case for the French firms Thales and Sagem, the Spanish company Hispano-Suiza (as subsidiary of Sagem/Safran), the British groups BAE Systems and Cobham or the Italian subsidiary of *Finmeccanica*, Selex Galileo. More surprisingly, considering the initial ITAR free<sup>20</sup> orientation of the platform, many American firms such as Rockwell Collins, Eaton, Esterline, Goodrich or Jabil are now part of the program. This clearly marks a deviation from the original wish of Brazil to provide a product in all respects free from Washington interference. It also demonstrates the kind of political limitations that can result from an industrial weakness.

## Conclusion: Think Twice

Until very recently, the political will to support the defense industrialization project was both constant and strong. In May 2012, Brazilian Defense Minister Celso Amorim confirmed the goal of increasing Brazil's defense effort to about 2% of GDP (against 1.6% during the previous years), but without specifying a timetable. Its means that the curve of defense budgets would grow much faster than national wealth. If the country is to keep all its scheduled purchases over the next two decades, this scenario is based on an impressive additional effort for the defense.

However, despite the wishes expressed by the military sector and decision makers, this scenario no longer seems likely. In two years, the economic and the social context has changed significantly. Both the recession of 2014 and the number of protests all over the country may force the Ministry of Defense to revise its expectations. This should actually be the case if the popular will and the wealth of the citizenry matter more in

<sup>19</sup> Portugal and the Czech Republic were already involved,


<sup>20</sup> The International Traffic in Arms Regulations are US regulations controlling the export (and re-export) and import of defense-related articles, services and related technical data. To avoid the US interference on export markets the best way is to not use US components on the weapons systems.

a democracy than a defense strategy designed in the absence of immediate military threats. The Brazilian government has to make budget trade-offs between its departments in order to foot the bills for the successive organizations of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympic Games. Other needs, such as modern infrastructure, also are becoming increasingly urgent (transport, energy, telecommunications, etc.). It is also the case in education, possibly the most beneficial public investment for the national economy along with health. Resources available for the Brazilian forces for the next few years are at the moment quite uncertain.

Thus, after a decade of continuous growth, the Brazilian defense industry is at a crossroads and may face a more challenging environment, one similar to some extent to the one prevailing in several European countries. A scenario implying delays, adjustments and declining orders would mean at least a temporary reduction of the size of the domestic market, the essential source of revenue of the Brazilian DITB. Also, if the slow economic growth at the international level were to persist for several years, difficulties in export markets must be expected with, for instance, a reduced number of orders for the KC-390 or the Super Tucano. The choice to target segments where competition is reduced and dual use sectors such as surveillance and space systems should limit the impacts for a company like Embraer. But what about the others? Most of them will be at risk.

Actually, it is probably time for Brazil to revise its defense strategy and military procurement plan. The developments of the last decade, domestically and globally, drastically changed the economic context and the support Brasilia could provide to its DITB. The Brazilian government is also more experienced now than it was 10 years ago in negotiation processes and in the management of offsets obligations, for instance. Money is an issue. In its quest to save funding for the defense strategy, the Brazilian government should probably redefine its understanding of “strategic autonomy”. Its intention to diversify as much as possible its suppliers could possibly help it preserve its independence and implement strong competition in its market, but it also has a cost for the Brazilian forces. They have to integrate numerous technologies from a variety of suppliers. It is uncertain if the cost of this would be balanced by the effect of the competition on the suppliers’ bids.

Considering the cost of the next generation of armaments (F-35, DDG 1000 in the USA, for instance) and economic conditions, most European countries now have to be more selective in how they support their industry, and may be inclined to accept reliance on foreign partners for some of their armaments. This could lead them to seek enduring partnerships with emerging countries. For the moment, they are in most cases the only markets. This is an opportunity for Brazil, because let’s be clear, if countries like Germany, France, Italy or Spain cannot afford and develop by themselves the full spectrum of modern military armaments, it will be surprising to see Brazil succeeding in this matter considering its structural weaknesses.



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## Thoughts about the Global Governance Architecture – towards a Conversation between Europe and Brazil

Roland Schäfer

A reflection on the global governance architecture usually starts with a look at the maps of geopolitics: Five continents, several zones of influence or cooperation, hot-spots of conflict. Where are the raw materials, the most competitive production sites, trade flows, the highest and the lowest GDP levels, the biggest and the smallest countries?

We all know that the distribution of power and wealth is important for any design of institutions which are supposed to establish and maintain peace and security, to combat global diseases and solicit global commitments on climate change, trade rules, financial services and human rights. A reasonable and effective global governance structure needs to be built on the map which shows the real world.

Which map, which world, however? Today's, tomorrow's, yesterday's, or the one which was there fifty years ago, or even earlier? It is tempting to use just one of them, for simplicity or arguments sake. I have serious doubts that this would be possible or even desirable. It would be like building a city according to one human being's concept. Renaissance artists relished painting ideal, Utopian cities, and some real cities were built according to one single, overpowering plan: for example, Brasilia, and small Karlsruhe in Germany.

Unfortunately for all admirers of ideal cities, the current and future global governance architecture rather looks like one of those cities which have been long lived in, under very different circumstances, a city with a long

history. Look at Split, at Croatia's Mediterranean coast. If you climb the highest tower there, you can still perceive the perfect square on which the Roman imperial army's camp was erected when the city was founded. But you also see that the whole city, almost every building, has been transformed, used differently, built in and built on. This is the case in Rome, Mexico City, Cuzco – many of these examples come to mind.

The maps according to which the institutions of the global governance architecture were erected have changed repeatedly. The map of the Anti-Hitler-Alliance, which created the Security Council, quickly gave way to the map of the Cold War and the decolonisation era, which saw that same Security Council debilitated. The conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union was so overpowering that it divided Europe and had the decolonising world calling itself the "Non-Aligned". Between NATO and the Warsaw pact, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE") emerged as an important platform for conflict management in Europe.

Later, the fall of the Berlin wall created another map, in which the accumulated attraction of NATO and the EU, as well as reasoned restraint from the Soviet Union, later Russia, helped re-unite most of Europe. This new map, however, still carried the imbalance, on the same continent, between numerous small and medium sized European states on one side, and the Russian giant on the other.

Later again, Islamist terrorism, often in collusion with organised crime, introduced a new form of warfare: another change in the rules of the game. Instead of states having conflicts among each other, these actors destroy or take over authority in fragile states. The other members of the international community were thus deprived of the very partners they would have needed to work with, in order to establish a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. In this context, not NATO, but the European Union emerged as an actor, combining its huge soft powers with small military means in order to address the root causes of state failure in a comprehensive approach. It has also become a well accepted policing force in critical hot-spots, as with Atalanta in the waters around the Horn of Africa, it keeps pirates off international trade routes. The EU is gratified to see that Chile and Colombia now have signed framework agreements with the EU in order to be able to participate more easily in future EU missions of that kind.

Finally, most recently, the big imbalance in Europe – giant Russia versus the small and medium sized European states – has shown its ugly effects. The principle of attraction and cooperation, on which Europe's re-unification hinged, is being countered by a ruthless projection of military power to change borders and grab land.

Ideal city or layers and layers of civilisation? Renaissance artist or archaeologist? Which model, which attitude is the right one for those who deal with global governance? Probably some elements of both. Ideal institutions of world government are beautiful, attractive, and to some extent necessary. But if we adhere too much, too exclusively to their design and past glory, we might lose the capacity to deal with the real world. The question probably is to find the right balance, each and every time peace and security are challenged.

The beauty of the United Nations, for instance, the hope it created, they are just as important today as they were in 1945. And it is vital to support the UN's daily work on development, human rights and, of course, international peace and security. But it would be dangerous to neglect the fact that the UN almost never worked exactly under the conditions it was created for, often not performing or performing only partly. The UN was able to adapt its Charter and its activities to changing challenges in the past, but among the UN membership, a real need is felt for a frank and results-oriented debate on a reform of the whole system. Meanwhile, the G20 and the BRICS were created as inter-governmental consultation groups for global cooperation, but they are growing more and more into fixed institutional set-ups. Do they complement the UN or compete with it? Each time an essential issue of global governance arises, the jury on this question is out.

The OSCE platform in Europe was a courageous invention at times of confrontation, when dialogue and negotiation between the two big blocs of the Cold War still seemed useless or treason. The fact that, after a long time of reduced importance, the OSCE is now back "in business" in Ukraine should not bring us to believe, however, that we are really back in Cold War times. Something of the OSCE experience might be needed in the likely long and tedious confrontation with Russia the start of which we might just be seeing – but not exactly in the same form and function.

The European Union was perhaps the most idealistic and most pragmatic invention in the history of politics. It created an institution whose work would almost mechanically take away economic incentives to go to war among the European nations whose rivalry, coupled with Nazi racism, had just wrought the havoc of two World Wars on the world. But its creation and life depended also on the deep involvement of the USA, defending European democracy (and its allies) against a Soviet Union's territorial outreach. Today, the European Union is confronted again with the same problem, but it is a different Union than that of thirty years ago.

But not only Europe is characterised by layers and layers of changing institutions. Latin America and the Caribbean, too, can point to some examples of institutional layering produced among themselves, apart, of course, from partaking in the United Nations' changing fortune. Witness the various regional and sub-regional groups and platforms – from the OAS to CELAC and UNASUR, from Mercosur to the Pacific Alliance, which constantly evolve, changing, but do not superseding each others' remit.

Although both regions' experiences with global governance structures seem to differ a lot, they are not so far apart. They both live in a world of superimposed ideal city maps which, put together, do not automatically deliver an answer on what to do next. Conversation between Brazil and EU can do a lot to clarify our mutual knowledge about the different layers which form our respective political maps, and which will keep conditioning our perspectives and our reflexes. But in order to deliver what the peoples of our continents want most – a peaceful and prosperous land to live and work in – in order to deliver results, a good dose of pragmatism will be needed, too. There is ample need and room for a principled debate on the ideal design of past and future governance

institutions. But it should not prevent pragmatic cooperation on actual threats, where such cooperation is beneficial to Brazil and its neighbourhood on the one side, to Europe on the other.

Common challenges abound. But they are of different nature, and each of the fora in which to address them tends to impose its own rules of the game. Will it be possible to take on practical responsibilities in these different fora in a truly consistent way?

On the principles of international law, it will always be important to stick to the essential rules of the legitimate global institution, the UN, even if the UN is only part of a more complex institutional landscape. If a country annexes parts of another through military means, as Russia has just done with the Crimean peninsula, in clear contravention to international law – how will an important player like Brazil react? Will it be able to uphold the principles which guide our commonwealth in the UN, taking a clear stand against annexation, visible to all, while at the same time being able to play a pragmatic role in the fora of cooperation it chooses to develop outside the UN, like the BRICS group? At the moment of writing, the answer is still pending.

On what we call global challenges, Brazil and Europe are both engaged and prominent actors – be it on a strategy against climate change, a sustainable strategy for development, the fight for the principles of human rights, fair trade rules or on the future governance of a free Internet. Most of them have found forms of multilateral engagement, in which Brazil and the European Union coordinate positions and cooperate with a common sense of purpose. Conversation and commitments to political action take place in these fora.

There is room for a debate on whether the system of the UN, which is the basis for treating global challenges, needs reform. This should remain an important point on the agenda of dialogue between the EU and Brazil. However, just as important will be practical cooperation to achieve results. The EU follows up by mainstreaming these issues in her cooperation activities. Brazil will graduate from bilateral development cooperation projects with the EU to more business oriented ones, like, for instance, the project of a common optic fibre cable which would change the landscape of Internet communication between our two continents. The EU also looks forward to working with Brazil as providers of development cooperation in other countries on these issues.

One might also explore, however, other forms of regional cooperation. How do we deal with organised crime, based on drug smuggling and money laundering which combines its forces with Islamist terrorists in Africa? European and Latin American police forces already combine their forces along the cocaine route – AMERIPOL and COPOLAD are cooperation projects which both regions are eager to continue. Is this all? What about those states which can no longer effectively defend their own populations, because crime, smuggling and terrorism sap already weakened structures of legitimate government? These small and weakened transit states are located on both sides of the Atlantic – in Central America and the Caribbean just as in Western and Central Africa.

The EU is working with the concerned states on developing a comprehensive approach to strengthening legitimate governance. It is interesting to note that the latest White Book of the Brazilian defence ministry analyses the security implications of governance weaknesses as a comprehensive problem, involving economic, social, and institutional aspects, and it proposes to formulate possible action in just as comprehensive a way. Is there a way of combining forces – both political and technical? How can the EU and Brazil be active on both sides of the Atlantic?

The EU's strategy on citizen security in Central America and the Caribbean is a response to strategies developed by both the Central American and Caribbean states – an offer to develop responses together. Brazil's input will be vital in these areas, as the EU sees its own action as only part of a regional action scheme. But Brazil also has legitimate interests and huge influence in Africa, where the tail of the cocaine route leads, with devastating effects on states' governance and capacity to protect their citizens from organised crime. Is there a way of making our strengths meet, there, too? Can our global stand on disarmament, sustainable development, fight against corruption and good governance have practical applications in areas where they are needed, through concerted political action?

Surely, more questions, and more refined ones, can be asked. It is to be hoped that the excellent relations between the EU and Brazil will enable common work to answer – at least – some of them.

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## Constructing New Geopolitics in Europe

Delano Teixeira Menezes

Understanding the reordering of World Power will become much clearer as you interpret the interaction of the values, politics, geography and history of the European continent, and see that these are inseparable parts of global geopolitics. The moment there is the sense that the economic crisis on the European continent deepens, it becomes indispensable an insightful reflection of the plethora of interests of constituent Union states that are intertwined, and circumstantially cause tensions. States that share the continent establish and legitimize the application of power on the geographical space they occupy, in the traditions, the past conquests, the ethnic groups their inhabitants comprise, and in the particularities that characterize each “nation”. Driven by special interests, for centuries, all have shifted in the most diverse directions, particularizing the geopolitics of each. Yet, as Norbert Elias points out, “civilization” is not, any more than rationalization, a product of human “ratio” or the result of calculated long term planning calculated... It happened by and large unplanned; but it did not happen, nevertheless, without a specific type of order “1”, it is precisely such order that has been created over many centuries, and it is still being created, that will be impacted by the economic crisis unfolding.

The whole of European civilization was subject to periodic reorganizations of national relations, concomitant to internal changes in systems of

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<sup>1</sup> Elias, Norbert – O Processo Civilizador, Vol.2, p.193

government, which resulted in significant changes to their respective power structures, reflected in the region of influence of each state. The continent as a whole, while experiencing internal power struggles, still managed to influence almost every other continent. In 1800 Europeans controlled 35% of the land of the globe, in 1878 about 67% and in 1914 84%<sup>2</sup>. This projection of power of European civilization to act in strategic geographic areas of the globe outlined the global geopolitics that only began to be dismantled at the end of World War II. The negative impact the devastation caused from the War on the continent was more enduring on its social structures than on the economies. The Marshall Plan and various cooperation mechanisms managed to recover most of the continent's economies with modern and efficient bases, but the generations that were lost in this process and the consequent social breakdowns produced effects that have been felt until very recently. The disarray of the existing order favored particularly two poles of world power that made Europe the arena for the final fight, a sacred field where they would spill the last drop of blood of Western civilization: The United States, the only real winner economically and geopolitically of the Western world, and the Soviet Union. They both for a long time vied for the sphere of influence on the continent, and even a wall was built so that the lifestyles could not intermingle, dividing families, friends, customs, and altering the social fabric of large communities by adopting new bureaucratic systems. The confrontation of these two powers resulted in the permanence of large military contingents in Europe that, in some measure, injected considerable resources into the economy and influenced public policies, customs, economies and social relations in the countries where they were hosted. The United States still keeps more than 70 000 men and women in uniform in Europe<sup>3</sup>. But national feelings and old fears did not disappear and the end of bipolarity surfaced together with other geopolitical questions of order that had been repressed. All the uncertainties stemming from this reality represent the ink that is being used to sketch the new framework of European reality and should be resolved, even if partially, before the economic crisis becomes more deeply rooted and protracted.

The economic crisis, that is now dissipating, may still be the fragments from the vices created on one side by the Marshall Plan and on the other by heavy subsidies given by the former Soviet Union to the countries of their block. Currently the countries that knew how to constructively harness the aid received back then to promote the modernization of their economies and social reforms necessary for the new reality are best placed to overcome the crisis.

### **Continental Security and Economic Crisis in Europe**

At the end of the twentieth century it seemed clear and imminent the European integration process of Europe into a transnational state that started in the 50s would take shape. The political, cultural and economic maturity of the continent would be almost fully achieved. It seemed possible that the signatories of the Treaty of Maastricht had drowned the old grievances and struggles for power in the waters of the new era of

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy, Paul – *Ascensão e Queda das Grandes Potências*, pag. 149

<sup>3</sup> NBC News.com de 16/02/2012.



modernity and were now taking more realistic positions on the necessity of building a political configuration that would go beyond economic. This task was considered indispensable for not being left behind in the new century at a time with new major players arriving on the world stage. The speed with which the new currency was accepted (with the exception of Britain) allowed the leaders of the European community to nurture a more ambitious political project.

The euro has facilitated effective control of the money supply in the hands of European central banks, proving beneficial in the tracking and homogenizing of the continental economy. This has reinforced the idea that it would be possible to have a European currency without a European state and introduced positive action across Europe's economy. The social benefits, albeit modest, were also positive, as they have facilitated the population's mobility and access to employment. However, even if most of Europe has accepted the euro with relative ease, leaders have lacked sufficient political strength to raise the perception that the success of this ambitious economic-financial project should be followed up by a structuring document – a Constitution. Everything indicates that the advantages attributed to the euro in the economic integration process led to the acceleration of the political process. However, important aspects such as the question of nationalities, besides others of a social nature, have not been sufficiently considered. Without taking into account that the euro itself had not yet been well assimilated by some countries, particularly the younger ones in the community and Britain.

From the moment that the possibility of a constitution materialized in 1992, when the Economic Community became the European Union, until the referendum in France, the positive economic conditions created by the euro were no longer the same. In other words, the idea was born in relatively prosperous times and the referendum was held in more arduous ones, particularly for the urban populations that began to feel some disarray with the loss of jobs, and in the rural populations with the looming loss of agricultural subsidies that had supported them. In this context, the euro acted as a catalyst and accelerator for the process of liberalizing and globalizing the economy within Europe, but it was still lacking a structuring document to harmonize the economic misalignments of the EU countries. This seems to be the major dilemma of the European political system – things that are accepted when the economy is healthy become intolerable when the economy is not doing well. Ironically the text of the proposed Constitution (but not passed) had a decidedly liberal bias; the word “bank” for example, appeared 176 times, “market” 78 times, “competition” 174 times and “social program” only three times. The term “public service” appears only once to address aid in the coordination of transport (Art III -. 238). The preferred term being “services of general economic interest” that may be public or private (Art II. – 96) and, crowning the liberal exaggeration, the states would be left with the burden to prevent the market was affected in case of war! (Art III -. 131) But it does not appear that the primary question is just economic.

In France, the main actor in Europe along with Germany, but also affected by the economic crisis, the greatest obstacle to reforms that prove necessary for its economy, among others, is social and political – French nationalist pride resists giving up its sovereignty. This feeling has always been present at all times in the history of France, but

especially in this case it was triggered when the political ambitions of the new proposal coincided with the difficult economic times. This is doubly the case when the population believes that the solution to their own problems is in their hands and the votes approving reforms mean not having any control of the actions or policies of the new system. The common French person is still aware that their country has grown and changed under the direction and planning of the state (*dirigisme, étatsisme*) and demonstrates difficulty accepting the new liberal market values. The other possibility for failure of the proposed reform in France is its boggling complexity for the ordinary citizen. It is embodied in a grueling bureaucratic web that distances citizens from an authority that is not clear. The complete project for reforms in the economy leaves the impression that the European Union would be governed by a bureaucracy that may not be well understood by all its citizens. These uncertainties have been generating widespread insecurity and distrust.

Collective defense system is another open issue to be dealt with, and it is not expected to be resolved with the economic crisis underway. Core provisions considered were aborted with the failure of the proposed European Constitution. Of course, anywhere, during times that other social issues are more strained, defense does not attract attention – it is left for later! Furthermore in Europe, at least in the West, NATO's existence under the powerful “umbrella” of the United States military, with the end of contention with the east and the peaceful relations of traditional adversaries on the continent, France and Germany, it is expected defense issues will be mitigated, as in fact they are. But to freeze in time, an anachronistic status quo is another matter. Especially since the central state and one of the Europe's main engines, France, has always maintained a distant indifference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even being one of the founding countries of the Treaty, it was never a member of the Integrated Military Command and placed conditions for the employment of its armed forces in defense of the continent contingent to security conditions of the French territory, before anything, and never allowed foreign troops to be stationed in the country.

This treaty for mutual military assistance came into being on April 4, 1949 when France, Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Italy and Norway, of Europe, Canada and the United States of America signed a protocol of cooperation in Washington. The consensus of the Organization was polarized with Article 5 of the Protocol – “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Later, other countries began integrating the Treaty, such as Greece (joined in 1952, left in 1974 and rejoined in 1979), Spain (1982), Turkey (1952) and Germany (1955). More recently, after the dismantling of the former Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia, after a long period of negotiations, were integrated as new partners between 2004 and in 2005.

Although this defense system, which in the geopolitical logic of the Cold War, has brought substantial contributions to the economic recovery process, by creating a safe environment for Europe and bolstering the economy with a vast military stationed on the continent (which in a certain way constituted a considerable number of consumers), it still hosts today within the continent Canada and the United States. Currently it

seems that the agenda for military defense have been replaced with a political agenda. Thus, the American geopolitical goals have been maintained since 1947 when it began to sew its military hegemony by remaining in Europe through NATO and across the American continent with the creation, in the same year, of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, (the Rio Treaty), whose principles are similar on the grounds that external aggression to any of the signatory countries is considered an attack on all of them.

The invasion of Iraq has created a crisis from which NATO is still struggling to recover. The clash between the Anglo-American and Franco-German politics paralyzed an institution whose very decisions are dependent on consensus. Incidentally, this crisis has unveiled a curious, if not ambiguous fact in the existence of the Treaty; the countries of central Europe (the east minus Russia) aligned themselves with Washington, which seems to have facilitated their ascension as full members of the military organization. Leaving Moscow's sphere, these countries have not yet felt secure next to Germany, but understood that their security depended on France, for being the traditional counterpoint of Germany or England, who along with NATO would be able to deal with Russia. And the Iraq crisis established this preference in the current balance of European power. Yet while Russia has not recovered economically and militarily and returns to fight for its national interests, there will be no major threats to the security of Central Europe. The countries of this region appear focused on achieving two crucial objectives, that is, to be part of an extremely prosperous block and economic success and participate in the creation of a transnational European state that can permanently contain the expansionist German nationalism<sup>4</sup>, at the same time seeking a shift away from Russia, a situation that recently emerged with the Russian-Ukrainian-EU crisis.

In this context, NATO is part of the game of geopolitical interests in that it relies on the United States as a valuable mediator for the balance of power in the region. However the American role of military superpower with powers of unilateral action around the world seems to inevitably depend on trusted alliances, or at least, has limited capacity, because to invade Iraq, the United States had in the Persian Gulf 75% of its tactical aircraft in service, 42% of its modern heavy tanks, 46% of its aircraft carriers, 37% of the actual army and 46% of its marines. Such a magnitude of military was necessary precisely because its major player European allies demonstrated political consternation at the prospect of supporting them with military means in an initiative that the United Nations was reluctant to approve. So, evidence indicates that NATO has not yet collapsed as European allies are indispensable allies to the United States in the exercise of "world police". But it does appear inefficient at performing its primary function of continental defense. At any rate, this is a question not yet resolved by the member states of the European Union.

<sup>4</sup> To better understand the historical reasons for the fear of these countries toward Germany see **Os Alemães de Norbert Elias** The German expansionism origin begins in 1848 in the German National Assembly in Frankfurt after the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire as it is well described in "Roots of German expansionism" by Professor Joan Castro Pereira. Thus expansionism referred herein does not relate to theories of "vital space" that supported the Nazi expansionism. The latter is contained by the treaties in the end of World War II and by the own U.S. presence in Europe, but the fear may be still in the collective unconscious of the Czechs, Poles and other Slavs.

The European Union remains Europe's center of gravity, dominating one of the most sophisticated and modern economic regions in the world, but behaves differently when it accepts, in a single political entity, a military institution that serves the purposes of the past. The entire structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built upon a real visible enemy, with defined borders, and thus it was easy to arrange the divisions, tanks and aircraft in a particular geographic area. Not now, the adversary is not given, you may need to create it, unify it, and give it a coherence that naturally does not exist. Today the threats to European security are more hostile, dispersed, unstable and impenetrable than ever. The origin of these new threats are also more numerous and dispersed in remote geographical areas. Today European societies are faced with a threat that lives next door, with the same rights of citizenship, disputing the same opportunities and camouflaged by the same complexity of a bureaucratic structure that is increasingly more difficult to provide security to citizens without restricting their individual rights. Other developments in the world look to divide even further the various religions and cultures that coexist within Europe, feeding a growing sense of repulsion towards foreigners from outside the EU and encouraging the emergence of racist extremism which once had seemed already overcome.

The greatest threats to the continent's security were in the past – the European wars, but today a new threat that is more clearly perceived is immigration. Immigration from countries from outside the European community causes tension to arise in two areas: Economic – increasing competition for labor and social security; and social – increasing cultural and religious diversity. On the economic front, the abundance of available skilled labor is a desired state in a capitalist society, given that the condition of full employment or near full employment, as occurred in many European countries, makes labor and consequently the cost of living more expensive. But the unpredictable nature of the world economy creates a persistent unemployment rate and the arrival of large numbers of immigrants inflates the labor market and generates social crisis. When immigration was supplying the least qualified sectors of labor the problem was not very visible, but while India alone annually puts on the world labor market a huge population of high-quality professionals, it messes with people's lives and the feeling of a xenophobic nationalism arises intensely, and racial and religious radicalism assumes more hostile and threatening tones. It is important to also consider that the generation of Europeans in the range of 50 – 70 years, the boomers<sup>5</sup> as they are called, born in the late 40s until 1960, which today could be at the top of the social scale, was a lost generation in relation to opportunities for social mobility and is highly frustrated because at the peak of their economically active lives, Europe was going through a long period of post-war economic austerity, which kept them only marginally in the limited job market.

People who cannot get a satisfactory job between twenty and forty years of age lose their way in life and their frustrations cause them to become displaced in the social structure and skeptical of the state's capacity to support them. The timing of human life does not concatenate with the timing of economic theories. This situation has created

<sup>5</sup> For more information about the problems of this generation see Schirmacher, Frank – *A Revolução dos Idosos*.

competition between this generation and the next, which that has been assuming significant positions in the labor market, and pushed the former into an early retirement, burdening in this way the social welfare. The introduction of immigrants into this dispute becomes the catalysis of the problem and driven by a flourishing sense of nationalism, the inflow of immigrants is seen as a disturbing fact in the labor market.

Nationalism is an expression of identity, and along with it, of dignity and self-esteem that already had been shaken, and when the space of each person gets smaller in one's own country the "self" of each one also gets smaller. Add to this the colonial vestiges that still seem ingrained into the culture of core European countries. France is very happy to go to Algeria and scream "France", but its people are much less happy when an Algerian arrives in Paris and yells "Algeria". The irony here is that the populations of France and other European countries are changing racial and cultural diversity; with inevitable results for many French (I use France, merely as a reference!) that do not want their country to change<sup>6</sup>.

Europe, ex-metropolis, does not feel very comfortable with ethnic diversity like in the ex-colonies, where they live with cultural differences more naturally. "The motherland did not contemplate a fusion of old and new, although this could happen and, in fact, happens, as in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the New and Old World."<sup>6</sup> The average European gets the feeling that he is losing control of the country to immigrants. Further complicating this picture, the practice institutionalizes this loss of control when it ensures an immigrant in one country the right to circulate through the rest of the Union. This may make sense for economists who see the market as a great trump card for the success of the economy, but to the French it sounds like a loss of control, a dilution of sovereignty. And the biggest fear comes from the possibility of Turkey joining the EU which would produce a flood of Muslim immigrants, adding to the economic and social component the complicated religious and cultural components.

In this context that arises the question of sovereignty in some countries, including France; not only in defense issues, but also in political issues and principally in social policies. It is in these policies that the economic crisis touches a unique feeling, one that was built with a lot of fighting and blood by most countries on the continent – the feeling of nationality. A feeling that this is embedded in the smaller communities around the entire European Union, which has strengthened the bonds of solidarity in the midst of major social struggles, from which emerged the benefits they enjoy today and that have been threatened by a struggling economy with little likelihood of imputation of responsibilities if the reforms presented by the leaders of each nation go wrong.

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<sup>6</sup> Landes, David S. – *Riqueza e a Pobreza das Nações*, p. 477

## Conclusion

The European Union was founded on principles of economic convenience, but now with the attempted incorporation of political and social components, it is quickly becoming inconvenient as strong sentiments of nationality are aggregated to those of sovereignty. Perhaps the acceleration of the political integration process has created frustration in regard to unequal outcomes of the economy. Because if the economic integration which involved more technical and bureaucratic issues than actually political ones did not affect in a direct way issues sensitive to people, it instead introduced beneficial practices in trade, and even then it took fifty years to consolidate. So it is not to be expected that ongoing emergency economic reform, apparently dissociated from the previous integration process, that errs more by default than by inclusion, be assimilated in such a short time.

There are many things which have become crystallized through practice with incomplete assimilation, that have not yet fully gained the trust of the population, as was the case of the movement of migrants between countries, whose consequences remain to be fully evaluated, which are added to the question of collective security, incorporating the anachronistic North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) to the defense system.

We also have to consider that the current economic crisis could undermine the presence of Central Europe in the European Union because of the misalignment of their economies in relation to those of other countries and that they are pieces of a new, yet still undefined, geopolitical game. For the time being, the countries of this region are not yet convinced that Russia, as the dominant regional power, has given up its geopolitical pretensions, which were shattered with the demise of the Soviet empire. In fact, do not expect a sudden resurgence of Russian dominance in the short term, but no one is sufficiently convinced that at any moment, a policy change in Moscow cannot create new geopolitical realities. Incidentally, this also seems to be the fear of the United States, expressed in statements from various American officials, and could be the reason for their silence as to relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time the population of Central Europe, for reasons that are rooted in the long history of its international relations, still don't have strong reasons to trust Germany. Especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which for Eastern Europe meant reunified Germany emerged as a dominant power in Europe.

From a broader perspective, the only winner in this story is the United States. They continue to maintain a presence on the continent, on grounds that Russia has not settled and claiming the protection of the countries that left Moscow's orbit, a task that a Europe without political unity cannot fulfill.


The indifference of France regarding the subsequent invasion of Iraq due to its internal problems, and also, the events in Germany, where the frustration of social democracy produced significant internal political changes, suddenly may have changed the idea that Europe was a critical problem for the United States, reducing it to the fact that it is France and Germany that are critical. In fact, the United States should not want a Europe with defense policies and integrated foreign relations. With this power Europe

could become disruptive to the global preeminence of the United States. Geopolitically, it is difficult to envision two continental powers with similar interests to remain in balance for long. While Europe is engrossed with its problems of political unification, and because of it, remains fragmented, it could be manipulated by the United States to serve American interests.

Europe as a unit, as a transnational entity, may yet take time to come into existence, although the concept is still credible. France and Germany can only contain the United States if they are in fact leaders of a united Europe. Alone, each is no more than a secondary power in the international arena. French and German politicians know this, and perhaps that's why they have tried to accelerate the process of political unification and are seeking consensus on the current economic crisis. The arrival on the scene of China, as a respectable counterweight to the United States, also anguishes European politicians. The process of rebalancing global power is still in the gestation phase and Europe may miss the opportunity to take the place it desires on the global stage if does not know how to handle wisely the current economic crisis.

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## Reflections on Multilateral Security Governance

### 200 Years after the Congress of Vienna and 100 Years after the Great War

Eiiti Sato

In the quarter of a century since the end of the Cold War, the world perception regarding the existing collective security arrangements has moved from a fully optimistic view to one of increasing skepticism. Just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, pundits and decision makers were indeed almost unanimous in saying that world politics were on the edge of an orderly and peaceful era. It is not necessary to list and describe the events by which such optimistic perceptions were transformed into an increasingly worrisome world. Recently, in various parts of the world, there are rising tensions, instability and conflicts. Even territorial, ethnical, and religious disputes, which were relatively less prominent in world politics, have returned to the international agenda with restless strength. History shows that these are the worst forms of disputes to be settled without war. As a consequence, tolerance has been viewed as weakness, and nationalism has been recommended as a recipe with an increasing popular appeal, even in countries with a longstanding tradition of liberal institutions in politics and economics. Armed conflicts are back on the front pages of the newspapers, while issues related to environment, trade, and cooperation for development are more and more restricted to specialized pages. Against such a political scenario, existing security regimes and institutions have been under stress, and analysts and decision makers reveal that there are many more questions and uncertainties than political will to join in efforts to cope with regional or global problems. Perhaps it is time to turn one's eyes to essential concepts and to historical experience considering that, in periods of turbulence and of rapid change, everything seems to be blurred, and reviewing concepts and revisiting

historical experience seems to be a quite helpful way to shed some light on figuring out a more accurate perception of the current problems and concerns.

In the current year, the world is celebrating the jubilee of two events remarkably meaningful in the history of international relations: the two hundred years since the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), and the hundred years since World War I, which broke out in 1914. These two events brought to light some developments which changed substantially the European politics of the time, and perhaps can help us to illuminate the discussion of the problems on which this essay is focused. In the Congress of Vienna, the concepts of great power and of balance of power were turned into historical realities as part of the international system, intelligible enough to shape perceptions and policies for most kings and decision makers. One hundred years later, World War I and the Conference of Versailles brought to the realm of diplomacy the concept of collective security, and the idea that such a concept could be transformed into institutional arrangements, was formally established. These developments were essential to bring about the idea that world politics can be managed, including in regional terms, to handle problems derived from clashes of interests and competing goals.

## Governance in world politics

Currently international regimes and governance in world politics are terms used to designate a set of institutions and arrangements designed to handle the problems, and to make the outcomes more predictable for the various issues in the area of the international relations.<sup>1</sup> In security matters, when we talk about governance or international regimes, we are usually referring to building arrangements in order to keep peace and stability, and to providing peaceful means to solve controversies on conflicting interests. In terms of effectiveness, there are remarkable differences between international regimes driven to distinct areas such as commerce and environment, for example. In commerce, the process of building an international regime can be considered quite effective, if compared to environment protection. Existing institutions, rules and international practices aiming at environment protection are not as binding as they are in trade, meaning that in trade many more rules and practices are viewed as beneficial, or at least not harmful, to the interests of most states and other participants in world trade. It is particularly important to any international regime to have the compliance of the great powers; otherwise, the unsatisfied great power will act on its own, and it will be more likely that the unsatisfied great power will use its influence to undermine the regime.

As a matter of fact, the world of international relations is far from being homogeneous. Regarding security and preventing armed conflicts, the process of building an effective governance system continues to be a difficult task, in spite of the fact that solving

<sup>1</sup> Governance is understood as all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, and whether taken over a family or a society or even over the whole world through laws, norms, power or informal practices. In the studies of international relations, the concept of international regimes has been created to give a more precise meaning to governance. The book *International Regimes* organized by Stephen Krasner in 1982 became a classical reference in defining and discussing the concept of international regimes and its applicability. (S. D. Krasner, *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press, 1982)

conflicts by peaceful means has always been a central issue in the studies of international relations since the emergence of the modern world.<sup>2</sup> After World War II, most politicians and analysts used to explain conflicts and international tensions as being sourced from the disputes derived from the Cold War between the Western alliance and the USSR and other communist powers. The Cold War ended, but armed conflicts continued to occur in different parts of the world, tensions continued to be present in usually problematic regions, such as the Middle East, and new focuses of international tensions continued to emerge in other regions such as East Asia, Africa, the Balkans, and more recently in the Black Sea region, challenging the capacity of existing institutions and peace keeping mechanisms to provide effective responses. A way of approaching the problem is to consider international relations as a product of matching structural elements to institutions and regimes. In the present essay, such an approach will be taken as a starting point for examining to what extent current tensions and relatively contained armed conflicts potentially can make international relations more unstable and less manageable.

Resource differences in wealth and power are inherent in individuals and in social groups. Wide ranging historical accounts offered by thinkers from Herodotus to Toynbee, from Max Gallo to Gibbon, and from Burckhardt to Paul Kennedy, to a large extent tell us the history of great powers. In modern times, the role played by great powers is relevant to any society in its quest for any kind of purpose to be achieved. Peace, wealth, progress, and even protection of cultural legacy, are goals which depend largely on the patterns of relationships among nations, and in this regard inevitably great powers are at the core. Theoretical approaches are controversial when the discussion is about to what extent the existence of dominant power is important to bring peace and stability to the system, but there is no disagreement regarding the fact that there will be no stability and enduring peace in the system, if dominant powers are not active participants and deeply committed to putting institutions to work in favor of the shared goals of peace and prosperity.

## The concept of great power in the European world

For a long time, nations and kingdoms customarily established alliances, made war, or developed policies, in order to enhance their power and wealth without having a structured view of the international scene. The objectives of the rulers were rather specific: such as to face immediate or potential threats, to defend or promote their religious faith, or to give way to friendship feelings. During the Congress of Vienna, the perception that international relations constituted a distinct environment and a distinct category of phenomena became quite clear to most statesmen. Indeed, the Congress of Vienna brought to light the idea that politics among nations should not be seen as a phenomenon which depended only on the will and interests of kings and other rulers. Policies and initiatives should consider that the international environment has become a structure, though loosely crafted, with an underpinning logic of its own. In the words of the international

<sup>2</sup> The term modernity is controversial and generally refers to a post-traditional, post-medieval historical period marked by the move from feudalism and agrarianism toward capitalism and industrialization. The historian Paul Johnson suggests that modern times actually break out basically between 1815-1830 when for the first time after the medieval times the European world has lived a whole generation in peace. (P. Johnson, *The Birth of the Modern. World Society 1815-1830*. Harper Collins Pub. 1991).

relations scholars, such an order should be viewed as a combination of a defined hierarchy with some implicit purposes.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence, the efforts to promote their interests, the kings and diplomats should consider a certain order underpinning the international environment. Questions related to borders and to any kind of rights of kings and states could not be treated as affecting only those powers directly involved in the disputes; and more important, in most of them great powers to some extent were involved.

In the negotiations of the Congress, the existence of a hierarchy among states were clearly expressed and transformed into selective diplomatic initiatives. “*The main criteria for co-opting a party into the day-to-day negotiation process of the Congress of Vienna were two-fold: did the party belong to the anti-Napoleonic alliance and was it so powerful that a peace treaty could only be implemented if that power participated fully in the central negotiation process?*” Asks Paul Meerts in his assessment of the negotiation process in the Congress of Vienna.<sup>4</sup> Harold Nicolson, in discussing the procedures of the Congress of Vienna, argues that any diplomatic conference starts with a crucial problem of protocol: “Who is to issue the invitation?”, and “Who is to be invited?”, and at the Congress of Vienna it was not different, and the recognition of the existence of a hierarchical order among the two hundred “crowned heads” was clearly apparent to most of them.<sup>5</sup> Even the Treaty of Paris, which was signed just before the Congress of Vienna, shows that the perception that there was a compelling hierarchy among European powers was sufficiently clear.

Conceptually, the term *great power* is used to designate a sovereign state that is recognized as having the ability to exert influence on a large scale, even globally at the present time. Great powers characteristically possess military and economic strength, as well as diplomatic and soft power influence, which may cause minor powers to consider the great powers’ opinions before taking actions of their own. The reasons why small powers would consider the great powers’ opinions do not derive from a supposed fear of being attacked by any great power, but mainly because the great powers have the means either to create hurdles or to help in the process of implementing any policy, not only internationally but domestically as well.

The existence of a hierarchy among nations and societies due to territorial size, population, military capabilities, and wealth has been perceived since ancient times. Empires such as Rome and Egypt were great powers in the sense that they were on top of a pyramid of powers in the world of their times. Surrounding powers were unable to check the will and the influence of Rome ruled by the Caesars, and the same had happened to Egypt by the time of Ramses II. For centuries, the recognition of the fact that some nations and kingdoms were more powerful than others were only a motive for fear or envy; but it has

<sup>3</sup> H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. Columbia University Press, 1977. There is a Brazilian edition published in 2002 by the University of Brasilia Press together with the Institute for Research in International Relations/FUNAG.

<sup>4</sup> P. Meerts, *Persuasion through Negotiation at the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815*. In Jovan Kurbalija (ed.) “*Persuasion. The Essence of Diplomacy*”, DiploFoundation, Geneva, 2013 (p. 23)

<sup>5</sup> Actually the perception that to settle wide international disputes a certain “order” was needed emerged even in the Congress of Westphalia (1644-48). The historian Veronica Wedgwood tells that the participants took six months from the opening discussing protocol “where the delegates were to sit”, and “who were to enter into the rooms first”, etc. (C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, Pimlico, London, 1992, p. 475)

transpired that it was only in modern times that the concept of “great power” became clearly expressed as a distinctive condition for establishing international arrangements to bring order to the anarchical world of international relations. In the Congress of Vienna, such a perception became clear enough to orient negotiations and to formally sign treaties among the powers, bringing to light a broader concept: the concept of *order*.

Order in international relations means that any war, trade, alliance, or cooperation agreement, and other events and practices, are not random phenomena, but rather part of an order. There is a wide collection of treaties, institutions, and informal procedures which establish conditions for actions and initiatives taken by governments and by other agents in the international arena, and such a wide set of arrangements is largely bound to follow some kind of command and shared purposes. Hedley Bull, in his classical book *The Anarchical Society*, argues that order means purpose and command which are implicit in institutions and procedures. According to Bull, in the international community states are equal only as a juridical category, but completely different and remarkably hierarchical as a historical and political category. In the 19th century under the leadership of the UK, the purposes of order in trade and in politics to a great extent was built according to characteristics and interests of the UK, which needed among other things to import large quantities of cotton and other raw materials to feed her industries, and to keep stability in European politics. Actually, for Britain order and stability were essential to provide an appropriate environment for her businesses which had expanded worldwide. If the composition of the hierarchy changes, says Bull, institutions and practices, i.e. order, will change also because command and most likely the purposes will change as well. Nowadays, the emergence of China is an instructive example of changing interests in the world order.

The concept of order nevertheless embodies a paradox: if one admits that the international environment is *anarchical*, it could not be at the same time a *society*. This is a classical and well known dialectical trade-off between order and anarchy, between the concept of *state of nature* and the concept of *state of society*.<sup>6</sup> Bull argues that a more accurate observation of the nature and behavior of human beings will show that, in essential matters, human beings are indeed paradoxical most of the time. Usually, every individual is educated and prepared having in mind the prospects of a future to come, even though to bring about any desired future, the individual has to face and overcome many moments and situations in which he has to put the desired future at risk. When we talk about heroic deeds, in fact we are referring to situations in which someone had faced challenges and difficulties which demanded from him resolve and courage to put his future at risk: if he fails, there will be no future for him at all, but at the same time there will be no future either, if he fails to show resolve and courage to deliberately put his future (sometimes his life) at risk. In a large sense, the very existence of a human being is a paradox, since his life is unique, even though to grow and become a great leader or even to become a great artist, such a unique individual will depend on his family, on his clan, on his country, and broadly speaking will depend on the world he lives in.

<sup>6</sup> In political philosophy Hobbes and Rousseau are well known by using the concepts of *state of nature* and of *state of society* in their rather opposing views regarding social order. While for Rousseau the *state of nature* was something desirable, for Hobbes the state of nature meant the rule of the stronger, uncertainty, and war.

What Bull says is that the concept of order captures more appropriately the nature of world politics in which elements of anarchy and of the state of society live together. The very title of the book “*The Anarchical Society*” of Hedley Bull suggests that world politics move in such a paradoxical environment.

Currently, it is quite difficult to clearly identify those nations which can be considered as effective great powers, and to what extent a particular state is really relevant and able to establish a reliable political arrangement regarding an issue or a region. In the world, criticism has been raised regarding the composition and functioning of the United Nations Security Council. At the regional level, new countries have emerged as relevant actors in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America, while globalization has not affected only the way of doing trade and financial business; globalization has also brought new dimensions for security matters in many ways. Changes have been too rapid to be absorbed by institutions and existing regimes. Actually, social and political rigidities are always present, representing hurdles hampering the process of changes of regimes and institutions. Sometimes when rigidities are too strong involving social values and well established political forces, institutional changes may mean increasing levels of violence. Mancur Olson argues that in some countries growth and development have been strongly hampered by social rigidities.<sup>7</sup> A similar argument can be made about institutions and regimes at the international level: diplomats and authorities tend to represent prevailing forces of their own countries and may not be able to agree and commit their governments with proposed changes and initiatives. To overcome such a difficulty is not an easy task. In this regard, Woodrow Wilson demonstrated the most remarkable case of a leading authority who failed to convince his countrymen to support an important initiative approved by an international conference. History has shown that his proposal creating the League of Nations was decades ahead of the main political leaders of his time; nevertheless, he did not have favorable conditions at home to make his own nation to join the collective arrangement.

### **The concept of great power and the balance of power as a basis for order**

The agreements which came out of the Congress of Vienna recognized that Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and France were great powers, and as such, these five powers should play a distinctive role in handling European politics. Apart from the general agreements among the participants, which restored changed borders and ruling families that were dethroned by the Napoleonic wars, two main arrangements were established, reflecting the perception that there was a hierarchical order in international relations among European powers: the Concert of Europe, and the Holy Alliance. In both cases, the idea that there was a distinct category of power was formally recognized, and that shared purposes were implicit in their actions on the international scene. The perception was that order depended on achieving a proper balance of power among the great powers.

<sup>7</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (Yale University Press, 1982).

Indeed, in modern times the perception that the balance of power mechanism should be viewed as essential for peace and stability did not emerge at Vienna. A century before the Congress of Vienna, Abbé de Saint-Pierre in his book presents his proposal for a “perpetual peace for Europe” based on an association of the European powers to the balance of power policies.<sup>8</sup> As the historian Paul Schroeder writes, at Vienna the peacemakers were convinced that the concept of balance of power was at the very core of achieving a lasting peace arrangement. “In everything from official treaties to private letters and diaries – writes Schroeder – they (the peacemakers at Vienna) spoke of peace and stability in terms of a proper balance (*juste équilibre*) achieved by a redistribution of forces (*répartition des forces*), or in similar balance of power phrases”.<sup>9</sup> The peace settlements should restore the *juste équilibre* by reviewing the borders and other changes brought about by Napoleon, and stability would be attained by an agreement in which great powers would act permanently to check any initiative to establish a hegemony by France or by any other power. In fact, authors like Harold Nicolson, show that, to a large extent, the diplomatic moves of Talleyrand were to show that France could not be set apart from any power balance among the great powers, if it was to keep peace and stability in the system.<sup>10</sup>

Most international relations theorists have recognized the importance of great powers to capture the main features of the international system in certain historical moments. Paul Kennedy traces a broad account of the history of the international system from the Renaissance, when modern nation states were being formed, to the end of the 20th century. Great power is the central concept used by P. Kennedy to explain “the interaction between economics and strategy, as each of the leading states in the international system strove to enhance its wealth and its power to become (or to remain) both rich and strong”.<sup>11</sup> In his account, war was an important part of the process, not because the great powers wanted to go to war as part of the process of their ascension, which included expanding their influence, but because a great power needed to be always ready to go to war and to come out victorious in the conflict. As a matter of fact, P. Kennedy argues that war is always an undesired event, since it consumes all kinds of resources; nevertheless, a great power is always under pressure due to its large commitments in the international system, especially with security, requiring an ever increasing amount of resources to promote its interests which are widespread, and to support its many allies.

In a more pessimistic view, John Mearsheimer argues that the great powers inevitably are bound to develop policies oriented or conditioned by regional or worldwide competition for power. “There are no status quo powers in the international system ... Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions,

<sup>8</sup> Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projeto para Tornar Perpétua a Paz na Europa*. Editora UnB/FUNAG-IPRI, Brasília 2003 (First edition was issued in 1713).

<sup>9</sup> Paul W. Schroeder, *Did the Vienna Settlement Restore a Balance of Power?*, *American Historical Review*, vol 97, June, 1992, p. 683.

<sup>10</sup> Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity 1814-1822*. Grove Press, N. York, 2000 (1946). See specially the Chapter 6 in which Nicolson the First Peace of Paris.

<sup>11</sup> P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. Fontana Press, 1989, London (p. xv)

and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price”, says Mearsheimer explaining what he calls “offensive realism”.<sup>12</sup> In his view, such behavior is due to feelings of insecurity deriving from the anarchic nature of the international system. Under anarchy, every participant tends to bid for more power and for more resources, which means that potentially every power is a rival, since distribution of power is always typically a zero-sum game, i.e., the gain of power by any country is inevitably made at the expense of the power of other countries, and in such a permanent game the great powers are inevitably those which have more to lose.

The relationship between the balance of power and the behavior of the international system was analyzed under a very interesting perspective by Ian Clark in his book *The Hierarchy of States*.<sup>13</sup> Clark argues that peace and stability in world politics depend on the existence of an effective balance between the great powers, and to what extent current order reflects such a balance. In fact, Ian Clark sees international order as a product of a sort of dialectical trade-off between the pursuit of reform and the inherent propensities towards hierarchy and dominance within the system. Great powers are bound to have a more relevant role in the process and are also those powers which are inevitably influenced by such a paradoxical interplay of forces. Clark’s book describes the long-term behavior of the international system since the Congress of Vienna. In his view, over the years the international system was shown to be more stable when a balance among the powers effectively existed, and, formally or informally, such an existing balance was recognized and it supported the main institutions and practices in world politics (currency, trade, security arrangements, etc.).

Up to the 19th century the interplay among the powers was conducted basically as a prerogative of sovereign states independently. Treaties, informal arrangements, and secret clauses were the means by which politics among nations was accomplished by kings and other rulers. Historians point out the period in which Bismarck was the chancellor of the unified Germany as the heyday of the policies issued by sovereign states independently under the inspiration of balance of power politics. To a large extent, it reflected the liberal world which accepted informal and loose arrangements, like the Concert, but was quite reluctant to accept any kind of binding commitment to other sovereigns. In this way, World War I and the Conference of Versailles are remarkable landmarks, in that they brought to international diplomacy the concept of collective security and multilateral organizations.

### **The concept of collective security: foundations and prospects**

Collective security can be understood as a principle which underpins security arrangements at regional or global levels, whereby every state in the system accepts that the security of each one of the participants is a concern of all the others. As a consequence, each nation which participates in the arrangement, commits itself to a collective response to threats to peace and to stability of institutions. Collective security is different

<sup>12</sup> J. J. Mearsheimer, *The tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton Co. 2001, N. York (p. 2)

<sup>13</sup> Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States. Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. Cambridge University press, 1989.



from systems of security alliance or collective defense in the sense that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within a region or indeed globally, and seeks also to address a wide range of possible threats. In terms of purpose in a collective security arrangement, there is the assumption that every participant is interested in peace and stability rather than in protecting individually or collectively against threats coming from outside. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact are instructive examples of security alliance systems. During the Cold War years, each arrangement was committed to providing the means and instruments to defend its member states against possible threats arising from the opposite security alliance. The League of Nations and the United Nations are typically collective security systems.

As a concept, collective security is quite new, since it started to be shaped by political philosophers in the 18th century, while security alliance and collective defense are concepts well known and have been practiced since ancient times. The famous book of Thucydides tells us the history of the Peloponnesian War (430-404 B.C.) which opposed the Athenian league against Sparta and her allies. At the very outset of his book, Thucydides explains that the overall justification for making war by the league led by Sparta was the fear that the growth in power and the increasing wealth of the Athenians were inevitably bound to transform Athens into a threat for the freedom of Sparta and her allies.<sup>14</sup>

Security alliance systems are primarily based on the concept of balance of power while collective security is based essentially on moral philosophy about what is right and what is wrong, and about what is just and desirable, and what is unjust and thus undesirable. One can say that the concept of collective security has a meaning quite similar to the motto "*un pour tous, tous pour un*" of the *Three Musketeers* from the novel created by the French writer Alexandre Dumas. Conceptually, the idea of collective security seems to be rather simple, but the problem of building a system of collective security has proven to be quite problematic. While a security alliance is easily understandable for all the participants, and the design of a common policy will depend basically on the perception of threat, the effectiveness of a collective security system will depend on various factors which are sometimes contradictory. Actually, the main problems which are associated with collective security systems derive from the fact that, in any collective security arrangement, all the paradoxes, dilemmas, and problems of the anarchical character of the international environment become manifest. A system of collective security such as the United Nations, which is composed of almost 200 member states, includes nations with interests and with international perspectives as different as in the cases of the U.S., China, Russia, Germany, Iran, and Uruguay. In other words, within a collective security system the anarchical nature of the international environment and the problems of hegemony and distribution of power among the member states are always present, creating problems every time a critical decision has to be made. It does not matter if the decision

<sup>14</sup> In the Book 1 Thucydides explains why and how the war began. In the famous dialogue between the Athenians and the Melian chieftains, the Athenians argue that the Melians should submit to them: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do" (Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 5, 105)

to be made is about budgets, cost distribution, or even about threats, each member state tends to see the problem mainly according to its individual perspective, rather than considering the collective wellbeing of the group as a whole. The reasons why each member state tends to have a distinct view and perception of the decision to be made are various. It begins with the fact that any threat does not affect equally the interests of all the member states and gives rise to a wide variety of problems derived from cultural and social values. Furthermore, in the era of globalization and widespread dissemination of sophisticated technologies, security issues cannot be defined only in terms of specific military capabilities. Most technologies have a dual character, i.e. they can be used either for civil and military purposes, and sometimes can be used also for political purposes, as recently has happened to governments of countries such as Germany, Mexico, and Brazil, which without their permission were monitored by the National Security Agency of the U.S. government. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of a collective system is the fact that any possible threat is born within the system, i.e. it comes from policies proposed or developed by a member state.

World War I and the Versailles Conference formally brought to light the League of Nations as the first formal collective security arrangement, mostly because of the idea that war was to be avoided and traditional diplomacy, which been based strongly on individual initiatives, should be replaced with multilateralism as a new system of diplomacy. Actually, the development of increasingly lethal weapons since the last quarter of the 19th century was a decisive factor in turning the collective security mechanisms into an inescapable ingredient of modern diplomacy. Even before the emergence of the nuclear age, various initiatives to limit military buildup did happen, such as the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22), which led to an agreement among the major powers limiting the building of new battleship fleets, and those few ships that were to be built should be limited in size and installed armaments. The emergence of widespread pacifism movements particularly after World War I, shows also that the perception that war was to be avoided was becoming a priority for most societies in international relations. The idea that the First World War should be viewed as a “war to end all wars” became widespread among public opinion as well as among rulers. These facts help us to explain why when president Woodrow Wilson went to Europe to attend the Versailles Conference he was welcomed in Paris much more as a sort of “prophet of peace” rather than as a head of state of a great power.<sup>15</sup>

Today, the existence of collective security systems is a remarkable feature of present diplomacy and of world politics. Until the 19th century, the relationship among nations were based on bilateral and sometimes regional treaties generally designed to check expanding powers or to settle the outcomes of ending armed conflicts. For centuries, the political philosophy had been concerned basically with the concept of just and unjust

<sup>15</sup> Thomas J. Knock in his book *To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Oxford University Press, 1992) discusses President Wilson and his visionary perception of the peace diplomacy. J. M. Keynes wrote his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1920) heavily disappointed with the Versailles agreement and in the chapter 3 outlines a remarkable portrait of President Wilson who arrived Paris for the Versailles Conference as a mixture of hero and prophet of peace, and after the conference returned to Washington as a mixture of Presbyterian preacher and university professor.

war, implying that war was a sort of natural phenomenon which the human race was bound to live with. Since medieval times, thinkers such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and later Francisco de Vitoria discussed the subject and proposed their philosophical views concerning which were the causes and circumstances that would determine whether a war should be considered as just or unjust. Actually, the practice of war or the use of force to settle conflicting interests between societies and nations has not been banished yet, and discussions about just and unjust wars still continue. Michael Walzer wrote his book on just and unjust war in 1977, and in a new edition almost three decades later, he starts his preface saying that very little had changed about going to war in world politics to justify updating his book.<sup>16</sup> At this very moment, the news on TV shows images of the Gaza strip, of Syria, of Iraq, and of Ukraine where armed conflicts are raging even without any formal declaration of war. Nevertheless, over the long term many things have changed substantially.

### **Assessment and prospects for governance in security issues**

To address properly the questions posed at the outset of the present essay, it seems necessary to consider the institutional evolution of the concepts of order and of collective security in a changing international system. The process of transforming these concepts into institutions was neither homogeneous nor perfectly coherent. Why does it seem so difficult to establish regimes in security matters? To what extent has a collective security regime centered in the UN system been effective? Why are peace and stability conditions so different in the various regions of the world? These are questions which frequently appear to anyone who starts thinking about security arrangements.

A general account of recent history shows that lots of small and limited armed conflicts have occurred in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and even on the periphery of Europe. Nevertheless, in global and overall terms, though tensions have been present here and there most of the time, one can say that peace and stability have been achieved since the World War II, considering that over such a relatively long period of time there was no war between opposing great powers. As was already stated, perhaps a good starting point to address the question of building a collective security system is to accept that in the world of politics at any level there are no clear-cut answers and complete solutions. As a matter of fact, terms as ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, and competing interests are most of the time more applicable to describe situations in international politics rather than shared views, common purposes, and joint efforts. The observation of these facts suggests that: 1) peace should not be viewed as something absolute and perpetual; and 2) peace should be viewed as something to be built case by case and step by step, and a partial solution is better than none.

If we consider such an approach which seems to be more humane, and we look at the awful destruction produced by the two World Wars of the 20th century, it seems inevitable to think that the collective security system centered on the United Nations has

<sup>16</sup> Michael Walzer wrote his book in mid 1970s and by that time the U.S. and himself were pretty much concerned with the Vietnam War (M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Basic Books, 1977).

been quite successful in global terms. Tensions continued to appear, but no wide conflict has occurred directly between opposing great powers. In security matters, limiting the range and the number of powers involved is very important. Though any war is undesirable, wars which are limited and contained in range, in time, and in scope are much less destructive than wide and generalized wars, as history has shown, particularly in the two great wars of the 20th century.

It is not uncommon to hear that in every armed conflict there are interests of great powers underpinning every local and regional conflict, but history shows that in most cases, there is evidence that local governments and local politics generally play a major role in the process of transforming local disputes into armed conflicts. A common characteristic present in the great powers political institutions is the prevalence of the pragmatic approach, centered on business rather than on ideologies of any kind, i.e., in most cases, the prevailing interests of great powers have primarily to do with trade, financial flows, and with any kind of business for which keeping order and stability tend to be much more important than destabilizing current political orders. Indeed, to well established interests, which usually are those of great powers, conservative forces tend to prevail with respect to change, since change inevitably means uncertainty, and uncertainty is the worst perspective for businessmen and for anyone who depends on ongoing trade. In consequence, only in very few cases order and stability are not more important than change. To address the question, perhaps it is important to consider some difficulties inherent in collective security arrangements.

The first difficulty that any multilateral arrangement has to deal with is the apparent contradictory goals which influence most multilateral negotiations: on the one hand, every representative member states has the duty of defending and promoting its individual interests, but on the other hand, the effectiveness of any collective initiative will depend on how each participant commits itself to act jointly. Most of the time, the trade-off between the two goals means different things for the participants, and in security matters choices tend to be more difficult, since the issues involved are generally more critical. To each participant, the gains and losses concerning each goal may be different, the costs are not equally shared, and the perspectives are sometimes dramatically different. A quite instructive example is the case of nuclear weapons. At the very outset of the United Nations, UN Resolution No.1 established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (January, 1946) to propose measures to limit the development of nuclear energy. The tragic memories and effects of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were fresh, and most leaders were deeply concerned with the prospect that atomic weapons would spread among the powers. The Commission was asked to discuss the issue and to propose international measures to keep atomic technology under control. The plan which was presented to the Commission was drafted by the U.S. Government and was rejected, despite the fact that delegates were in principle very much in favor of controlling the process of the development and spread of atomic weapons by the powers. The USSR was against it, due to its concern that not having nuclear weapons meant unacceptable vulnerability, while countries like Brazil did not accept the plan because it hampered their scientific and

technological progress in a crucial and strategic area.<sup>17</sup> In recent years, the efforts to build a regime driven to avoiding environmental deterioration is another good example. On the one hand, there is wide agreement on the idea that environmental conditions have to be protected and even improved, but crafting an agreement establishing specific clauses regarding the subject, has proved to be a quite difficult task.

The second source of difficulty is the fact that behind every multilateral negotiation, the participants are pushed by forces driven to stability and to change, which are rather contradictory and difficult to be fulfilled at the same time. Ideologically rulers and diplomats can be either conservative or liberal. Needless to say, these two ideological orientations make the participants act in different directions, either supporting or rejecting change. In security matters, such differences are very important. Those who are strong and powerful tend to be much more conservative than the weaker, for whom most of the time the *status quo* may represent vulnerability and even threat. In the case of small powers, such feelings of vulnerability can be partly offset by alliances with great powers, but at the same time for most small powers changes can hardly make them strong enough to overcome their own vulnerabilities. As a consequence, it seems misleading to think that any small power is always ready to support change. Nevertheless, in the case of the great powers, changes may represent substantial additions or losses to their condition. What took place at the Congress of Vienna seems instructive. The agreement establishing the Concert of Europe was very much driven by the idea that international relations should move to a level to solve disputes in a way very close to the concept of collective security. The long Napoleonic wars had clearly shown to governments and to decision makers in general the differences and conditions which made Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France great powers. A hundred years later, despite the fact that a collective security arrangement has been formally established, in practical terms the Versailles settlements virtually excluded Germany from the arrangement. In his book, Ian Clark calls the Versailles settlements as “a concert without balance” opposing the Vienna settlements when a concert was achieved based on a real ongoing balance of power. Ian Clark argues that balance of power and collective security should not be viewed as opposing or even competing concepts, but rather as complementary. In his account, a concert without balance tends to unstable. Most historians of the period agree that the seeds of revisionism embedded in the Versailles agreements hampered any prospect of stability for the international system. Currently, the international relations scenario faces a different perspective: emerging powers became a third relevant category in world politics. If the small powers are limited in their aspirations in terms of autonomy and self defense policies, the emerging powers are characteristically a changing force in world politics. In recent years, proposals to change have been coming basically from emerging powers. Pressures for change have been visible in every multilateral arrangement, and in security matters the pressures are increasingly present, and tend to be more difficult to be absorbed by the system. To a large extent, one can say that the agreements at the Congress of Vienna were quite successful, due to the fact that there was no category of emerging power but rather a quite polarized trade-off between great and small powers. One can say that in Vienna the main powers

<sup>17</sup> E. Sato, *Almirante Alvaro Alberto: a Busca do Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico Nacional*. In J. V. Pimentel (org.) *Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro*, Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), Brasília, 2013 (Vol. 3, pp. 799-842)

were convinced that there was an overall perception that apart from specific divergences on Christian faith, Christian values were shared; nevertheless, what was emerging to be problematic were the distinct views of the great powers regarding political order. Austria, Prussia, and Russia were much more conservative than Britain and in France, since their domestic situations were putting pressure on the legitimacy of the ruling families and institutions, so that the main concern was domestic politics.

A third difficulty in establishing workable arrangements for international security matters derives from the previous difficulty pointed out, which has to do with technological development. In the modern world, wealth and economic development have been universal goals recommended and accepted by both great and small powers, but development and wealth are increasingly dependent on technology, and ambiguities have been present in most issues which have needed international negotiation, since technologies in most cases are closely linked to security matters. In areas such as nuclear energy, satellites, and aviation, technologies are effectively of dual character, i.e. it is very difficult to separate civil uses from military purposes, but, as a matter of fact, to a certain extent any technology has a dual character. At the very outset of the nuclear age, countries such as Brazil were very much interested in the development of their nuclear industry, not only because it represented the maturity of their national security system but perhaps more important because at the same time research and development in nuclear energy meant being close to the edge of the frontiers of science.<sup>18</sup> At the time the Cold War was on the rise, and it made everything difficult with respect to any technological development program which depended on the cooperation of the U.S. Later, technology has also been associated with undesirable changes in environmental conditions and in the labor market. These are facts which frequently tend to put at bay negotiations involving technological development.

David Landes, in the introduction to his book, which gives a remarkable account of the industrial revolution, says that to have a rough idea of the meaning of the industrial revolution as a process of social transformation, it is sufficient to consider that the needs and the way of life of an Englishman in the mid 18th century were much more similar to the way of life and needs of a Roman at the time of Caesar than of his grandson.<sup>19</sup> The purpose of Landes' statement is to say that technology as a source of pressure towards change became critical and increasingly intense since the first stages of the industrial revolution. Other authors have stressed the remarkable changes brought to modern society influencing education, social standards, and political developments over the last century. As a consequence, technology has been recognized as essential to any society if it is to change the quality of life, but inevitably technological progress is associated with its dual character and with undesirable developments. A striking characteristic of the emerging countries is to go through rapid and sometimes radical change in technological standards which reinforces the category of emerging countries as a source of pressure for change in world politics, and their potential trend to clash with the current world order over issues on security and other areas in which technological development is an important factor.

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*

<sup>19</sup> D. Landes *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. Cambridge University Press, 1969.

## Democracy and peace

Building and managing international regimes for peace and security continues to be an everyday task; it has been relatively successful at the global level, while at the regional level there are different realities and situations. Tensions in the Middle East continue to be quite high and authoritarian governments and unstable regimes continue to threaten peace and security in many parts of the world. A reflection from a long term perspective seems useful to help us to identify and to address some of the relevant questions and dilemmas facing the current efforts and initiatives for peace and security within existing international regimes.

What has happened to peace and security in the world over the two centuries since the Congress of Vienna? Today, the worldwide perception regarding Europe is that most of the Continent symbolizes peace and progress. Nevertheless, if one considers the period from the Congress of Vienna to the Second World War, periods of peace alternated with armed conflicts in Europe. In addition to the two World Wars in the 20th century, European powers in fact got involved in many other limited armed conflicts inside and outside Europe. According to Evan Luard's account, in the fifty years before 1914, there were seven inter-state wars in Europe, and between 1918 and 1945 a similar number of wars or conflicts with the use of military force occurred in Europe.<sup>20</sup> So what has happened in Europe which made it a predominantly peaceful region?<sup>21</sup> According to most analysts, the main European powers had lived peacefully since 1945 due to a set of many reasons, which began with the harsh lessons left by the World War II, but it seems also that structurally new patterns of doing politics, based on democracy and tolerance combined with international cooperation rather than on nationalistic approaches, has played a crucial role in the process.

Armed conflicts are not in fact a product of a single cause; nevertheless there are factors which play a more important role than others. Intolerance in most cases is associated with religious and territorial disputes. When religious faith and territorial interests are at stake, a typical "zero-sum-game" dispute arises, and generally in regions such as the Middle East the two factors appear together to make things worse. There are other regions which are rich in oil, gas, and other resources needed by the great powers and by the world economy; nonetheless these resources are traded peacefully and conflicts are unlikely. This explains much of the fact that in the Middle East armed conflicts based on intolerance continue to dominate politics, while Europeans and other great democracies have been living relatively peacefully with each other. For centuries religion and territorial disputes plagued European politics and war was frequent. For example, the Thirty Years War, at the dawn of the modern nation state system, produced a level of destruction in Europe only comparable to the First World War.<sup>22</sup> The lesson was hard even though Europe went through successive wars for three more centuries. An important part of the explanation is the relationship between the political system and the effectiveness of collective security arrangements.

<sup>20</sup> Evan Luard, *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System*. Macmillan Press, 1988 (pp. 35-38)

<sup>21</sup> Since 1945 to the end of the cold war only two military interventions have occurred in Europe: Hungary in 1956 and the occupation without resistance of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (idem p. 38). The end of the Soviet Union brought about other conflicts in Europe (former Yugoslavia and Chechnya).

<sup>22</sup> Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War*. Allen Lane, 2009.

Thinkers such as Montesquieu and Kant have developed the argument that trade should be viewed as a factor which fosters peaceful relations. Theory says that trade (in a larger sense economic relations) facilitates understanding and stimulates cooperation since any gains and advantages can always be mutually interchanged and difficulties can be offset by many forms of compensation.<sup>23</sup> Politics, for its part, has to do basically with power and influence. One can say that in a trade relation the questions asked are: how can we both benefit from trade, and what can you give me in return for what you want from me? For politics, the questions asked are: who is going to command, and to what extent can your influence and what you are doing become a threat to me and to my allies? Obviously, the world of trade and the world of politics cannot be separated from each other, but to a certain extent it is not very far from the reality to say that religion, property, prestige, and authority have to do mainly with politics while wealth, cooperation, and tolerance are more likely to be found in the world of trade. In other words, one can talk about cooperation policies but essentially trade unites while politics divides.

Most evidence shows that Europe and other regions where economic integration and democracy have progressed, the concept of collective security has been more effective and the region has been living peacefully. Paul Johnson, in his book *The Birth of the Modern*, says that the matrix of modern times was largely formed between 1815 and 1830, which was a period of peace long enough to allow the benefits of “the immense new resources of finance, management, science and technology which were now available could be put to constructive purposes”.<sup>24</sup> His assumption is that modernity was essentially a European phenomenon. Scientific revolution had brought about a new way of looking at science as part of the human life on Earth rather than something attached to religious faith, and industrial revolution became the way by which a great deal of scientific knowledge could be transformed into goods and machines to produce wealth and to ameliorate the conditions of human life. Paul Johnson argues that 1814-1815 ended the Napoleonic Wars and the Anglo-American War which had started in 1812, and more than ever the benefits of peace could be fully enjoyed by the European societies. What Paul Johnson says in a wider sense is that democratic regimes are conducive to progress because they are driven to peace and cooperation rather than to expansionism (religious or territorial). To a large extent after the Second World War, democracy became a dominant regime in Europe, choosing peace and progress as the main objective for political institutions.

Democracy is a central concept in the study of political science, but there is not yet a consensual definition of it. However, most political scientists agree about the main values supporting democratic regimes: the government elected by the people, the freedom of speech and information, the rule of law, the equality of individuals before the laws, and the transparency of public affairs. Benjamin Constant, in his *The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns*, considers that the liberties of the moderns are those concerned with individuals rights against – or at least related to – the State, that is, the civil and political liberties that enable all citizens to be able to, potentially, occupy official

<sup>23</sup> Albert O. Hirschman, *L'économie comme science sociale et politique*, Paris, Seuil, 1984.

<sup>24</sup> Paul Johnson, *The Birth of the Modern. World Society 1815-1830* (Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. xvii



positions including political representation offices, and that the individuals have their rights and their duties related to the State duly established in laws.<sup>25</sup>

In this sense, one cannot understand democracy as a particular form of government, although many forms of government may influence the exercise of democracy. There are countries which formally adopt some kind of republican form of government including popular vote, but the citizens are not respected in their rights and the state apparatus may treat the people in a very discretionary and uneven way. Furthermore, at any time individual rights and established institutions can be suspended. On the other hand, most of the modern monarchies are essentially democracies in the sense that individual and institutions are subject to laws, the right to freedom of speech is widely assured, and their citizens are awarded with equality before the law. Put differently, a possible generalization would be that suggested by the *Dictionary of Politics*, written by Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino, “democracy is understood as all forms of government opposed to all forms of despotism”,<sup>26</sup> regardless of the government being republican or monarchic, whether the political system is a unicameral or bicameral parliament, or still if the State is Unitarian or constituted as a federation. In any hypothesis, the democratic system depends upon the existence of many cultural and social conditions forming a very complex, delicate, and well balanced combination to harbor political institutions able to assure complementary, concurrent and even contradictory rights and liberties. Authors as Norberto Bobbio and Benjamin Constant argue that social and political history is largely the history of the establishment of a non-despotic State, representative and respectful to the individuals’ rights.

A central aspect related to the concept of democracy, which has to do with the relationship between domestic political order and peace, is the fact that a religious or non-democratic State tends to have difficulty living with differences and disagreements. It is inherent in human nature to disagree over religion, and interests and preferences of all types. Hence, rejecting the institutions and the laws that regulate divergences and disagreements over interests and over world views, means, in the last instance, rejecting the possibility of living peacefully with other peoples, once people worship different religions, aim at different aspirations and establish different priorities for themselves.

In modern world countries, cultures and civilizations have to share under many circumstances the international space which makes individual and social liberties, as well as the acceptance of plurality upon existence, an essential ingredient for peace. In this regard, States based on democratic institutions are better equipped to live peacefully with other people and other cultures. Furthermore, from time to time, the international community has to face crises, and every crisis inevitably means shortage, and shortage tends to stress differences and competition. When the philosopher wrote *Emile*<sup>27</sup> as an extreme individualistic character, it was supposed that *Emile* would live peacefully in his natural world, but to do so, everything to which

<sup>25</sup> *De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes* – lecture given by Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebecque, in 1819. The issue is discussed from several perspectives by Benjamin Constant in the work *Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments* (translated and published in Brazil, in 2007).

<sup>26</sup> N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci & G. Pasquino. *Dicionário de Política*. Editora Universidade de Brasília. 1986. (p. 323)

<sup>27</sup> J.-J. Rousseau, *Émile, ou de l’Éducation*, 1762.

he and other *Emiles* aspired, would need to exist in abundance in nature. However, this is not what occurs in the real world. Shortage is man's natural condition and everything that exists in abundance is despised or simply goes unnoticed. When two men desire the same woman or that woman does not want the company of any of them, conflict is inevitable and, in the absence of customs, institutions and sociability rules to manage disagreements, there will be no solution but Hobbesian, that is, the will of the stronger would prevail.

Economic crises are, typically, situations in which shortages increase, fomenting dispute among individuals and organized groups in the form of businesses, trade unions or even countries. In such an environment, individuals, governments, and economic actors are compelled to seek solutions for their wants and the natural consequence will be the upsurge of attempts to "push" the costs of the problem onto others, thus putting pressure on the existing institutions domestically and internationally. In addition to that, economic crises appear with different intensity and characteristics affecting differently each country putting pressure upon the political system and provoking reactions domestically as well as internationally. Governments of societies where the institutions are fragile will be more likely to react by taking initiatives primarily based on the concern for stability and control of the political forces, rather than on economic policies which in periods of crisis generally require tough and unpopular measures. On the other hand, in great democracies which have more mature political institutions, economic crises, though undesirable, are seen as a natural event and the shortage problems, unemployment and unexpected changes in the economic and social costs, are managed by the existing institutions.

### Final remarks

As we look at the world today and see to what extent information, goods, and even people coming from different cultures are present in our daily life, inevitably our attention is drawn to the fact that the world has become amazingly integrated, both in terms of the flow of information and the movements of people and goods. Nevertheless, politics among nations continues to be a muddy terrain to walk on. Since the end of the World War II, cooperation on trade and related matters progressed substantially, but cooperation on politics still is a ground full of hurdles and difficulties, particularly when security issues are involved. Theories have showed that the world of trade is more likely to be cooperative, while in politics cooperation tends to be more difficult, and to a large extent, trade cooperation has been a factor to make the world of politics less conflictive. Perhaps the European Union can be pointed out as the most instructive example of such a trend.

Specifically in security matters, the anarchical and even paradoxical nature of the international environment is seen to be as strong as ever. One can think that there is a widespread and genuine desire for peace, but distrust continues to be a sentiment which does not depend only on rational reasons of the everyday logic, i.e., on considerations about short term gains and losses. In the efforts to build regimes the principle of collective security continues to be challenged and constrained by distrust, which underpins old concepts as autonomy, hegemony, and balance of power. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the perception that a system of collective security has advanced as a pattern inherent in our international institutions as well as a concept present in our moral and theoretical thinking.

The present essay does not intend to respond to these complex questions. The purpose of the article is more modest; the purpose is just to address some relevant issues regarding the advancement of cooperation among nation states in matters of promoting peace and security. The main arguments made by the present essay are basically the following: 1) history shows that international cooperation in security matters, as is the case in other areas, is not an homogeneous process; 2) great power is a category essential to any arrangement aiming at creating international peace and stability; 3) balance of power should be seen as complementary, rather than as an alternative to collective security; 4) great powers and small powers tend to be conservative, while emerging powers tend to be supportive of change.

The arguments and reflections made throughout this essay have come basically from the celebration of the jubilee of two events, which are remarkably meaningful to international relations' studies: the two hundred years after the Congress of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic wars, and the outbreak of the First World War, which effectively showed that the old world order was gone and which brought about new concepts in diplomacy and international security.

The Congress of Vienna was very important, in that it transformed the concept of great power into a category intelligible enough for diplomats and rulers to bring to light the perception that there was an order underpinning European politics, which by that time was equivalent to world politics. Since ancient times, kings and everyone who looked beyond borders had the perception that there were kingdoms stronger than others, but it happens that it was at the Congress of Vienna that such a perception became a rational starting point for designing initiatives and policies. By doing that, the concept of balance of power became essential to building any international security arrangement. Today, not only in security matters, but in any area of international relations, the participation of power is required under various forms, either because the absence of great powers weakens the legitimacy of the system or because without the participation of the great powers chances of effectiveness of the system are meager. A remarkable example was the absence of the United States in the League of Nations. Historians agree that the failure of the League was due to a variety of reasons, but they also agree that the absence of the US played quite an important role in the process.

The First World War and the Versailles Conference brought to light the concept of collective security as a particular dimension of the concept of multilateralism in world diplomacy. Security alliances continued to exist, but a more integrated world demanded that most issues in international relations required a new approach to diplomacy. The Concert of Europe was an informal arrangement very much in accordance with the liberal world which developed from the fading order of the *ancien régime*. In the 19th century the "gentleman's agreement" was quite enough of a formula to settle commitments among rulers and diplomats, as, for example, was practiced in the gold standard monetary system where debts and loans were largely managed without having formal agreements. The First World War has shown that world politics became a much more complex network of relationships. International commitments and goals of the powers should be put on a broader basis. Collective security came out as a response, even though the anarchical nature of the international environment was shown to be much more resistant than many decision makers and pundits supposed it

to be, and old concepts such as great power, sovereignty, and balance of power continued to be essential for understanding the emerging order.

An important factor in moving to another concept of diplomacy has to do with technological development. The world became much more integrated, not only due to the remarkable development of the means of communication, but also because in many ways international implications are more and more inherent in technological developments. Weapons became much more efficient and their range wide enough to reach long distances, sometimes to other continents. Furthermore, most of the modern technologies have a dual character inherent in them. They can serve a variety of civil purposes, from health to leisure, but at the same time can serve to develop weapons and monitoring systems which may represent a threat or become instruments of violation of the sovereignty of other nations. An inevitable consequence is that what scientists and engineers are doing domestically can be a reason for concern for other governments and security systems, and many aspects of and achievements in the field of scientific and technological development become part of the international agenda.

If we look at recent history, an overall assessment is that the collective security system, which has been designed since the end of the World War II, has been quite effective in global terms, but in regional terms there are different results for each region. Since World War II, no armed conflicts between opposing great powers was observed. If one considers the extension of the losses and destruction of the two world wars of the 20th century, inevitably the conclusion is that collective security system has worked quite effectively in global terms. Nevertheless, when we look at the regional level the scenario and the assessment is tragically different. Even if the collapse of the USSR did not provoke a confrontation involving other great powers, there was an upsurge of local conflicts in powers formerly under the influence of the USSR. Regions such as the Middle East and some African countries have been plagued by war, instability and constant tensions. What seems to offer a promising clue to approach the problem is to look at other regions, where in spite of being resource rich regions, armed conflicts rarely happen. In regions such as the Middle East, the conflicting interests tend to concentrate on factors as religious faith and territorial claims, which are more likely to produce what analysts call as “zero-sum-game” in which diplomatic negotiations are hard, if not impossible, to reach a long standing agreement, since none of the participants are prepared to accept losses which mean gains to the rivals.

A final comment which seems relevant for the purpose of the present essay is the fact that the concept of great power and the need to keep a fair balance among such powers, continue to be relevant for peace and stability. Formally it can be said that at the Congress of Vienna the condition of great power was fully recognized for the first time in the Vienna settlements. A hundred years later when the League of Nations was created, the U.K., France, Italy, and Japan, as great powers, were integrated into the Council of the League as permanent members (the U.S. did not ratify the Charter of the League of Nations). In 1926, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations and was immediately recognized as a great power and became also a permanent member of the Council. When the Second World War was ending, in the negotiations to create the United Nations, a similar

structure was designed and a Security Council was established based on the assumption that the “four policemen” (the U.S., the U.K., China, and the USSR) were to keep order within their corresponding areas of influence, and to these four France was added.

The concept of great power is inevitably linked to the idea of balance of power. A century before the Congress of Vienna, as an advisor to the king Louis XIV, Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, wrote a proposal for a “perpetual peace” in Europe.<sup>28</sup> His conception of the “European Union” was very much a collective security system and to a large extent such a collective security system was to Abbé de Saint-Pierre an alternative to a balance of power mechanism which he thought expensive and too unstable to keep peace and stability. Nevertheless, history has shown that balance of power should be seen as complementary to a collective security system, even necessary to assure stability and effectiveness of the system. As a matter of fact, at the Congress of Vienna, the general objective was to provide a long-term peace for Europe by settling critical issues left by the war which came after the French revolution. The Napoleonic War had changed frontiers, rulers were deposed, and new ones enthroned by marriage and other means, and the goal was not simply to restore old boundaries, but also to resize the main powers. The concept of balance of power was a key concept in the view of the participants to assure a long lasting peace among the powers. The leaders were monarchists and conservatives in their creeds. As the Congress negotiations proceeded, France lost all its recent conquests, while Prussia, Austria and Russia made major territorial gains. Prussia added smaller German states in the west and 40% of the Kingdom of Saxony; Austria gained Venice and much of northern Italy. Russia gained parts of Poland. The new kingdom of the Netherlands had been created just months before, and included formerly Austrian territory that in 1830 became Belgium.

Ian Clark in his analysis argues that a concert with balance has greater chances to produce long standing peace and stability.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, at the present time, a serious problem for institutions and arrangements mainly concerned with security issues, is how to accommodate the remarkable changes which have developed in the international system during the last decades. China is already member of the Security Council, but there are many other arrangements in which her power is under represented. The emergence of the BRICS and other groups shows that the institutions and arrangements of the international system are not well balanced with the real world. As history shows, emerging powers are always sources of change, but in order to be effective, institutions have to be stable. Such a contradictory nature of the international system was present at the Congress of Vienna, and later in the Versailles settlements, and now the relevant question seems to be to what extent current regimes of the international system will be able to accommodate emerging (and declining) forces without going through worldwide crises.

<sup>28</sup> Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe*. Utrecht: A. Schouten, 1713

<sup>29</sup> See note nr. 14

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## The EU Security Strategy: Internal and External Multilateral Security Governance

Ana Paula Tostes

For more than two decades, new queries have been emerging about the dimensions, role and scope of security, accompanied by novel theoretical and conceptual approaches to this topic. The emergence of governance focused on security appears as an alternative strategy for countries that are less powerful in military terms, or that do not intend to step up their hard power intervention capacities. This could allow them to accept legitimate leading roles through characteristics grounded on flexibility and coalition capabilities, in order to serve as peace makers. Deploying influence on the international stage, in addition to the use of coalition mechanisms, are means of action that are not completely new, but more specifically the concept of *security governance* is relatively recent. This appears within the context of reviews of the concept of security, spotlighting complex forms of intervention in power relationships in response to State interests in a globalized universe of economic interdependence. For example, the European States, Canada and Japan have been moving steadily ahead towards a standpoint that rates human security as a top priority. That is a new view in a world where deaths by violence or the extension and durability of insecurity for human beings, as a function of cruel actions undertaken by their own governments or resulting from inter-State wars, nowadays outstrips the number of deaths currently resulting from wars between States.

Since the 1990s, discussions have become even more heated over the demilitarization of threats and considerations on the social dimension of security. But it was during the 1980s that contributions such as that of

Barry Buzan led to the establishment of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, with the publication of the book entitled “People, States and Fear”.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, new visions were consolidated together with a new epistemology, while at the same time the subjects of security studies were changing, in ontological terms. Security and environmental sustainability, power shortages, protection and support for minorities, violence against groups or individuals or the absence of decent living conditions have triggered discussions over widening borders and the demilitarization of new threats. The concept of human security arises in this context, as an approach focused not on military threats or conflicts between States over borders and sovereignty, but rather on the risks to individual security and safety within States.

During the past few decades, the concept of human security has been firming up its position, and some States have started to develop attitudes towards security in this broader sense, converging on two types of approach. One relates to the concept of human security, construed as a type of “freedom from fear” (supported mainly by Canada and Norway) while the other focuses on “freedom from want” (Japan and Third World countries). A noteworthy event focused on this topic took place in 1994, when the Human Development Report was presented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), focusing specifically on human security; it has consolidated the concept relating the status of security within civil society not only to armed threats, but also threats to the dignity of human life. This will be achieved through a complex cluster of objectives to be pursued: guaranteed minimum economic conditions, food, healthcare, a wholesome environment and political security among other aspects, discussed in the literature on this topic (Cf. e.g. KALDOR, K., 2008; KING & MURRAY, 2001).

## Security Governance

A theoretical framework that extends beyond the traditional concepts of security, involving different players, cooperation and coordination strategies between and among the interests of a wide variety of States, requires multilateralism to support institutional and regulatory arrangements. As a way of overcoming the traditional concepts of threat and security, broadening these ideas to focus on civil societies and individuals (Krattmann, 2006), a standpoint on governance was adopted in order to describe the development of a steadily more fragmented security system with complex structures, thus requiring multilateral and diverse actions. Adopting here the *security governance* concept developed by Kirchner & Sperling, we explore “an intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues” as well as conflict and disputes through actions taken by different authorities, with the intervention of public and private players. This standpoint allows the inclusion of the topic of security since formal and informal arrangements focused on specific policy outcomes (Kirchner & Sperling, 2004).

With a hazier line between objects and methods of ensuring security, as well as between national and global responsibilities for protecting human life, it may be said that the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BUZAN, Barry. (1981, 1st Edition) *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf. (other editions in 1991 and 2008).



convergence of agendas focused on global governance, development and human security was driven by the complexity of world order that became even more evident after the collapse of the bipolar system. Expectations increased for international cooperation in greater depth within a new multipolar context, with less ideological asymmetries offset by different types of uncertainties. The appearance of new kinds of violence and new interstate wars also prompted reflections on the need to review the concept of security, alongside new economic development projects in the less developed countries. As a result, 'security' was added to domestic and foreign policy agendas, also extending to encompass the protection of individuals, in terms of the need for multilateral cooperation and global governance.

Discussions over non-traditional concepts of security became more sophisticated during the 1990s, due to the appearance of theoretical contributions on governance (for example, Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Rosenau, 1997; Young, 1999; Keohane, 2001; Webber, 2002, among others). A start was made on defining security governance as a system of rules and behaviors that was generally accepted, at least by most of the players in the international system and largely compatible with the appearance of new topics and players in international affairs. More specifically, the steady and innovative development of the institutional architecture of the European Union, with the need to extend coordination and cooperation zones in a new international order, slotted perfectly into these new expectations of rethinking objects and methods for addressing the topic of security.

Multilateralism is part of the security governance strategy and mechanism although, according to Kirchner & Sperling (2008), due to the level of multilateralism adopted, it is possible to identify at least three types of security governance systems: collective security, Westphalian community security, and post-Westphalian community security. According to these authors, the last type encompasses the European Union.

## **Multilateral Security Governance in the European Union**

The European Union brings together the armed forces of its Member States (even those without their own armed forces), civil forces and diplomatic corps, in addition to instruments based on trade and economic clout, in order to ensure regional security (Kirchner & Sperling, 2004, pages 29-30). However, the historical, institutional and thematic development of the EU security and defense policies initially prompts an acknowledgment of the predominance of NATO as the main player in regional security regulations after World War II, thus allowing most European nations to enjoy a "free ride" for almost half a century. This comfortable situation faded away from the 1990s onwards, when the EU and NATO institutions began to reorganize in terms of objectives and strategies in a globalized multipolar world (Missiroli, 2002). Advanced and highly institutionalized integration also ushered in political novelties at the domestic and regional levels, together with new dimensions for reflecting on a regional foreign policy. In other words, after the end of the Cold War, the world opened up to a new era of universal problems and, in the security field, with new aspects in terms of military and civil threats, through either the appearance of "new wars", or new action strategies and international terrorism.

Partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations focused on keeping the peace became a core characteristic of contemporary security governance. Since the early years of the XXI century, the relationship between the UN and the EU has developed into one of the most institutionalized partnerships for this purpose. However, although both organizations are pursuing similar peace keeping goals, cooperation has never been that simple. An in-depth analysis of the historical progress of the partnership between the UN and the EU, the key elements in its institutionalization, and the successes and stresses that have appeared in the course of joint operations, warrant separate investigation.

In brief, it may be said that the relationship between the UN and the EU has passed through at least five phases, according to Novosseloff (2012): i) an inertia phase (1999 -2002); ii) an experimental phase (2002 - 2003); iii) an institutional convergence phase (2003 - 2006); iv) an active phase (2006 - 2009); and finally, v) an apathy phase (2009 - today). This final phase resulted from new developments in the CSDP after the Treaty of Lisbon. These periods also correspond to the different roles played in attempts to foster their own interests through internal dynamics and the rising complexity of the international crisis management.

### **Current challenges and internal institutionalization of security governance mechanism.**

Although living through a critical moment when instruments are being reviewed, together with the scope of competences under the support of monetary integration, there are no indications that the European Union will yield ground on its institutional format and its supremacy in terms of taking decisions on community policies. Similarly, there are no signs of backing away from its governance model, but rather revisions, reformulations and adjustments, as has already occurred at other times of crisis and adjustment in the course of its existence. Institutional innovations and sweeping changes not only in the behavior of its Member States, but also in its own understanding of the importance and the role of coordinated actions and regional integration in terms of finding solutions for common problems, will not be dashed away by a crisis reflecting the limits of European supra-nationality. In other words, as the EU is a new governance model with hybrid supra-national and intra-governmental functions, viewing the maintenance of the autonomy of its Member States and the preservation of inter-governmentalism as a “weakness” indicates a failure to acknowledge that this hybrid status is the core characteristic of the EU.

No radical progress has been made in terms of endowing the EU institutions with extreme powers in the fields of security and foreign policies, although there has also been no backsliding in this convergence of interests pursuing solid regional governance in Europe. To the contrary, crisis situations have already prompted the EU Member States to overturn barriers to cooperation in the field of international affairs, including defense and security matters. With the limitations of the EU to act as a stabilizing player in this region having been demonstrated during crises such as that of former Yugoslavia, for example, whose break-up began in 1989; the war in Bosnia (1992 - 1995) with massacres

and violation of human rights; and other major international conflicts such as the Gulf War (August 1990 - February 1991), this has prompted the EU institutions to address their own lack of effectiveness through institutional reforms. At the same time, this means surmounting differences between powerful Member States, such as France and the UK, for example.

Although the Treaty of Maastricht (which entered into effect in 1993) established the objectives of the CFSP, it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon that its goals became clear.<sup>2</sup> Since 1993, the EU foreign policy has been assigned to the second dimension in its policy ranking, frankly inter-governmental, with EU Government leaders expected - at most - to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation prompted by the global importance of conflicts such as those mentioned above. While still upholding the autonomy of governments to decide on their own foreign policies, cooperation among its Member States grew increasingly closer from the Treaty of Lisbon onwards, entering into effect in 2009. This did away with the division into three pillars, introducing terminologies, strategies, functions and commitments that fine-tune and increase the EU tools and competences in the field of security and foreign policy.

More specifically, the Treaty of Lisbon brought together two important positions already in place for the establishment of the EU foreign policy into just one: the High Representation (HR) office of the EU, with voices and tools that are effectively more powerful than their predecessors. In other words, there was a merger of functions of the High Representation for the CFSP and the Commissioner in charge of Foreign Affairs, both now represented by a single person with more extensive and significant diplomatic functions in the heart of the EU bureaucracy. At the moment, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) is appointed by the European Council, as nominated by the Chair of the Commission and with the approval of the European Parliament. The HR plays a key role as the CFSP Coordinator in the EU. This position is basically comparable to that of an actual Minister of Foreign Affairs, having its own diplomatic service - the European External Action Service (EEAS) - and a four-year term of office.<sup>3</sup>

Particularly noteworthy among the sweeping foreign policy reforms ushered in by the Treaty of Lisbon is the fact that the European Council (formerly an international summit gathering together Heads of State and Government and the Chair of the EU Commission at some four meetings a year in order to define the general guidelines for international affairs in the region) became an EU institution. As a typically international entity, it was co-opted by the internal institutional structure of the EU and is now included in EU governmental policymaking, making what which was previously deemed beyond its purview, although closely related. Looking even closer, set up in 1974, the European Council was initially intended to serve as an informal arena for discussions of international affairs in the region, as well as a forum for discussing and

<sup>2</sup> The objectives of the EU Foreign and Security Policy are: preserving peace, and upholding international security, fostering international cooperation, developing and/or consolidating democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights and freedoms.

<sup>3</sup> From 2010 to 2014, the HR position was held by Catherine Ashton, who is currently being replaced.

establishing objectives for the European Union, defining strategies and fostering integration. Strengthened by the Treaty of Maastricht, since 1993 it has been defining political guidelines in greater detail and establishing the goals required to steadily strengthen the EU to an increasingly greater extent. Since 2009, with the Treaty of Lisbon, it became part of the EU institutional structure, with a permanent Chair elected to represent the EU externally on foreign policy and common security, without adversely affecting the duties and responsibilities assigned to the HR.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, a bipolar world that was characterized by centralized threats, weapons and players, has been replaced by a complexed reality in which national and regional security systems look for their own shape. Decentralized systems and fragmented defense and security policy structures begin to adopt security governance initiatives within a multipolar context. Some of the changes that are taking place in the EU can be explained by the global shift in security regimes, no longer satisfied with traditional models and not even facing similar problems. For the EU, the shift from an internal “governmental” security model to one based on “governance”, internally (within the integration region) and externally (in terms of other States and regions), does not mean that governments are ceasing to play key roles, nor that the problems of asymmetry among Member States have been resolved, in terms of international affairs, but rather that they are now calling for closer coordination of interests and actions, as well as the participation of non-governmental private players and international organizations, seeking more complex cooperation in the defense and security fields.

After Maastricht, at a bilateral meeting held at St Malo in 1998, France and the UK agreed to move ahead with European integration, setting up a CSDP as part of the CFSP. During the subsequent years, the EU introduced procedures and provided resources, actions and crisis management operations at the civil and military levels. The first three missions were dispatched in 2003, with rapid expansion since then being quite clear in the scope of EU policies and institutional capabilities. At the moment, more than twenty crisis management operations have already taken place, with around ten more still under way. In contrast with Different fromly than wewhat we canmight conclude since from a preliminary assessment, however,when the EU government or its institutions are criticized infor their limits or it isedthe “capability-expectation gap”,<sup>5</sup> is highlighted, this reveals that much havesis enexpected from the EU’s governance actions and capabilityies for solving problems and crises in the European region and elsewhere in the world. The EU intervention is expected even in policy areas where integration continues to respect domestic autonomy, sovereignty and multilateralism. In other words, the EU has firmed up its position in this way, starting to generate expectations of such great efficiency that more criticisms are heard about the “lack of Europe” rather than its excesses.

The institutional response to the construction of Multilateral Security Governance (MSG), through non-traditional perceptions of security and new threats may be identified through some categories of actions that depend on the implementation of strategies:

<sup>4</sup> Currently in a second term of office, chaired by Herman Van Rompuy.

<sup>5</sup> In the sense given in the classic article by Christopher Hill (1993)

*i) actions focused on conflict prevention; ii) peace enforcement; iii) peacekeeping; and iv) peace building.*<sup>6</sup> These strategies depend on technical and financial aid as well as economic cooperation, meaning that the construction of long-term links may be expected. On the other hand, peace keeping and peace enforcement processes refer to situations of aid designed to curb surging violence and conflicts, implying immediate short-term measures may be more important and necessary in such cases than long-term commitments. Still according to this author, peace keeping processes are largely related to economic and political efforts undertaken in parallel, with strategies varying from economic sanctions to political negotiations or mediation among the sides involved in the conflict. In this case, as coercion is necessary, military intervention may be decisive. This is because peacekeeping refers to the engagement of troops in order to “uphold” possible peace agreements signed during the process of re-establishing order and peace (Commission on Conflict Prevention, 2001; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/Conflict Prevention Network, 1999; van Tongeren, van de Veen, and Verhoeven, 2002; Hill, 2001; Howell, 2003).

An EU organization that is important in this context is the European Platform for Conflict Prevention<sup>7</sup>. Set up in 1997, it is currently a network of more than 150 organizations working in the field of preventing violence and settling disputes, providing information and support for activities focused on preventing and transforming conflicts.

A noteworthy new aspect is that the EU dispatched its first five missions under the new CSDP (after the Treaty of Lisbon), between 2012 and 2013, in parallel to UN operations focused on peace.<sup>8</sup> More specifically, the number of European missions has increased, in addition to the participation of Europeans in peace missions, perhaps because the topic of peace missions has been definitively included on the EU Council agenda, through the bases of the Action Plan launched in 2012. The purpose of fostering peace has become more solidly materialized through the growth of aid tools, higher investments and EU involvement in international conflicts, as may be noted in the data set released by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin.<sup>9</sup>

Another strategy for constructing a security community with long-term stabilization guarantees, as well as preventing risks and threats in the integration region, is related to the guideline expanding the EU eastwards. In terms of the Central and Eastern European nations, the EU is in a unique position to link structural reforms to interest in democratization and security for the East as well as the West. This is because, as it opens up to the East, it gets closer to Russia and the energy dependence region, which is crucial for security. This goal of drawing closer to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region is clear in Commission documents on strategies focused on natural resources, security and expansion.

<sup>6</sup> These actions naturally overlap and not deployed as stand-alone or alternate strategies.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. <[http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict\\_prevention/index\\_pt.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/index_pt.htm)> Accessed on: July 8, 2014.

<sup>8</sup> In South Sudan, the Sahel, Libya and Somalia

<sup>9</sup> Cf. <<https://www2.zif-berlin.org/About.aspx>> Accessed on: July 7, 2014. On this topic, see also: PIETZ, T., 2013.

For example, the 2006 Green Book (COM, 2006, page 16) explicitly stresses the importance of expanding eastwards in order to draw closer to the Caspian Sea region. Since 2000, dependence on Middle Eastern oil (45%) and Russian natural gas (around 40%) was already tagged as a matter of concern (for example, see the COM Green Book - 2000). On the one hand, the EU is striving to foster democratic principles and human rights, while also transiting to a market economy throughout the surrounding region, while on the other it is eager to ensure security through reducing asymmetric energy dependence. Due to the prevailing high levels of instability in Central Asia, both NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are joining forces to offer significant contributions for preventing conflicts through security and political dialogue. For NATO, this involves mainly the Partnership for Peace Program, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and other pacts in the region that have been encouraging the full and potential Members of the international organization to respect minorities in relative terms, striving to settle disputes peacefully and ensure civil control of their military establishments (Talbot, 2002, 47).

Among the tools wielded by the OSCE to prevent conflicts, there is the *Conflict Prevention* Centre, with more than a hundred long-term field missions; the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM); and the Office for Democratic Institutions and *Human Rights* (ODIHR) (Zellner, 2002). Some of these entities are also involved in post-conflict crisis management and peace building activities. The OSCE cooperates (mainly through the *Charter for European Security*) with a vast range of other inter-governmental organizations, together with local and international NGOs.

In terms of the public commitment accepted by the EU as a player intervening in the global order to prevent conflicts and contribute to peace as one of its main foreign policy objectives, mechanisms designed to protect human rights and democracy permeate its cooperation, coordination and international aid policies. There is a EU fund for aiding underdeveloped nations threatened by bankruptcy through Association Agreements, since the poverty zones are becoming fertile fields for abuse and violence, goaded by desperation and feelings of injustice. As an example, between 1993 and 2000, the EU and its individual Member States were the largest donors of funds and technical assistance to the Palestine Authority, as well as to the peace process initiatives in general throughout the Middle East (Asseburg, 2003). More recently, in June 2014, a new Association Agreement was signed by the EU and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, three former Soviet Republics eager to build closer links with Europe, despite pressures from Russia.

## Conclusion

From September 11, 2001 onwards, in addition to the new focus on threats to the States and civil society, the topic of State limits has underscored the need for interaction and cooperation among different actors and States in order to ensure security societies. Keeping pace with new threats are new demands for empirical research into the functioning, scope, reasons and impacts of action strategies focused on guaranteeing security. Within the context of intensive reflection on new security formats and roles, new threats and new wars, a view has been adopted that extends the focus of domestic and

foreign security, while also expanding eastwards, which may also be viewed as a multi-lateral strategy for strengthening security governance in the EU.

The necessary institutions and functions, together with the decision-making structures for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were established more recently (1999-2002), for example, including the High Representative for the CFSP, the Policy Unit, the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Committee; all have been regrouped or linked to the EU Council of Ministers. However, there is still no Council of Ministers of Defense, no specific budget for defense; and, in addition, a unanimous decision is required in this matter. Unless structural reforms in the security and defense area are introduced, the governance mechanism will remain more powerful than the legal tools available to governments and the EU law, ensuring its competence in the supranational and community fields.

The EU is different because it maintains “multilevel governance” (Marks, 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2001), as it does not consider traditional dimensions of security as the only necessary aspects, not merely overlaying activities but rather coordinating supra-national actions and intergovernmental actions – particularly in terms of foreign policy, security and defense – while also upholding the absolute autonomy of its Member States to build preferences and strategies in their own national interests. At the same time, it ensures that its Member States comply with the regulatory principles of democracy, respect for human rights and multilateralism - which are the European precepts assured through integration agreements.

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## The Imperatives and Hazards of Humanitarian Intervention

Marcelo M. Valença

International intervention motivated by humanitarian reasons represents an important part of the international political agendas since the end of the Cold War. The demise of the bipolar world order is considered by political analysts, academics, and pundits alike as a milestone in the international community's commitment to prevent armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. Ever since, the term "humanitarian intervention" recurrently appears in documents and political discourse, in addition to the constant exposure it receives in the media.

Nevertheless, the political practice and the academic debate over humanitarian intervention is still a gray area. For various reasons that pervade the economic, social, and political spheres, academics and political analysts cannot establish a consensus on the motivations, conditions, and requirements of when and why to intervene. The absence of an objective definition of humanitarian intervention involving verifiable criteria for action affects its political and normative structure, both already highly politicized. Motivation for intervention loses steam due to competing political interests as the limits of intervention become nebulous, affecting its implementation. Along similar lines, strategies to ensure success following the intervention are also compromised on the account of the political and economic costs of intervening.

Even with this apparent paradox, international intervention for humanitarian purposes is still considered the most effective tool for resolving armed conflict and preventing humanitarian crises currently available to the international community.

This chapter discusses humanitarian intervention under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) from a markedly normative and solidaristic perspective<sup>1</sup>, as well as its imperatives and some of the challenges it faces. For this purpose I develop my argument in three parts.

Firstly I introduce humanitarian intervention and describe its goals and guiding principles. I briefly explore its historical development and presuppositions to propose an operational definition based on a solidarist approach.

Secondly I discuss the politics of humanitarian intervention and its constraints at two different stages. The first refers to the decision making process for authorizing a humanitarian intervention. The second, to the assessment of its success (or failure).

In the third part I put forward the claim that it is possible to develop alternatives to overcome such constraints and gray areas. Based on the debate on complex emergencies, I point out that *the expertise* in the humanitarian practice foster the use of objective criteria to intervene as well as to assess the success of interventions without reliance on political criteria.

## Humanitarian Interventions: definition, characteristics, and historical context

Humanitarian intervention is the most visible part of the international community's efforts to prevent and resolve international conflicts and humanitarian crises (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 300) and it has undergone multiple changes throughout the 20th century.

Despite a historical record that highlights, at different levels, the international involvement in humanitarian crises and international conflicts (Knudsen, 2009), the issue is still politically controversial (Weiss, 2001). Intervention directly impacts one of the fundamental principles of international relations – the principle of non-intervention – and undermines the sovereignty of the host state (Bellamy, 2004, p. 28; Lechner, 2010, p. 437). It is thus important to define the conceptual bases and political expectations that guide humanitarian interventions, as they assume a different motivation from other forms of intervention.<sup>2</sup>

Conceptually, intervention is a broad and confusing term, mostly “because the world is both descriptive and normative” (Nye Jr, 2007, p. 161). It is used both by academics and operators of international politics to refer to any type of interaction between a state

<sup>1</sup> The solidarist stance argues that the promotion of human rights should be promoted as opposed to the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. In that sense, justice should prevail over order. On the other side, the pluralists understand that order should prevail over justice, so the maintenance of the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty is critical for the preservation of the international society. On the debate between pluralists and solidarists, please refer to Almeida (2003), Jackson (2000), Valença (2009b), and Wheeler (2000).

<sup>2</sup> The use of the term “motivation” is an attempt to distinguish humanitarian interventions from “other” interventions. According to Sylvia Lechner (2010), the difference between humanitarian interventions and broadly conceived interventions rests in the ethical dimension that humanitarian action presupposes. Interventions for humanitarian purposes are not motivated by a duty to intervene, but as a moral obligation of the state as a member of the international society (Evans and Newnham, 1998 p. 231).

and external parties - especially other states and international organizations - with the aim to promote changes (Nye Jr, 2007, p. 162). In that sense, “intervention” refers to an extensive range of different actions and initiatives ranging from the use of military force and economic sanctions to political support (Paquin and Saideman, 2010).

This inclusive and comprehensive definition is problematic because it allows multiple interpretations, both from a political and operational perspective. What would constitute an intervention and what would be considered normal interactions in international politics based on this definition?

In order to develop my argument in this chapter, I will only discuss international interventions conducted under UN auspices. This choice allows me to extrapolate the limits of the pluralist vs. solidarist debate that affect several international documents (Valença, 2009b, p. 321), as well as differentiate humanitarian interventions from other similar international initiatives such as humanitarian assistance<sup>3</sup>. It is also analytically consistent with the connection between humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping as a multilateral tool for addressing humanitarian crises and massive human rights violations.

The literature on international intervention provides a precise conceptual blueprint to specify criteria that should be present in interventions. R. J. Vincent (1974, p. 13) argues that interventions should involve a combination of activities carried out by states, international groups and/or organizations within a host state. In this fashion, interventions would coercively affect the host state’s domestic affairs. According to Vincent, interventions are also clearly identified, i.e., it is possible to point out each intervention’s beginning and end.

As they were considered a violation of state sovereignty, interventions during the Cold War – the traditional peacekeeping - were unusual and very limited, both in scope and dimension. Between 1945 and 1989 there were only 18 peacekeeping authorized by the UN Security Council (UN, 2014a). During that time, the humanitarian claim was not considered a legitimate justification to intervene in a state. Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which provides the legal basis of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, were the principal legal-normative obstacles to international interventions (Bellamy, 2003b, p. 506).

Traditional peacekeeping missions were deployed at the end of conflicts to monitor the success of ceasefires and peace agreements in international conflicts. Peacekeepers act merely as a buffer between the belligerent groups (Valença, 2009a, p. 99th). International conflicts during the Cold War involved predominantly states, so the international presence was the byproduct of a reconciliation of American and Soviet interests in order to ensure order and international stability.

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<sup>3</sup> Humanitarian assistance occurs mostly in response to temporary disasters that demand quick and immediate action of the international community, such as environmental crises. On the subject, please refer to Alex Bellamy (2003a) and Raimo Väyrynen (1999).

The 1990s marked the beginning of an increasing international engagement in humanitarian issues. On the political side, international relations have changed significantly due to the increased cooperation among the major powers, the new international responses to humanitarian crises (Ramsbotham et al., 2011), and the quantitative and qualitative change in armed conflicts (Mello, 2000; Messari, 2006; Valença, 2009a).

A wave of optimism swept the international community (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 288-289). Optimism was also buoyed by a series of major documents produced within the UN - such as *An Agenda for Peace*, its supplement, and the Brahimi Report - which offered a political, normative, and legal basis for the development of a new international stance towards humanitarian situations and the violation of international peace.

As a consequence, conflict resolution initiatives achieved greater visibility and appeal as multilateral efforts were promoted to prevent humanitarian crises. The so-called "CNN effect" (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 293; Jakobsen, 2000) also influenced public opinion, gathering the necessary support for international intervention in places such as Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.

Given this favorable scenario and the existing expectations, the interventionist stance noticed a significant growth. Without the rivalry between the USA and USSR to prevent the performance of the UN and the «rediscovery» of new forms of armed conflict (Kaldor, 2012, p. 1), it was also clear that traditional peacekeeping was no longer adequate to deal with contemporary challenges. Peacekeeping should reinvent itself in order to be effective.<sup>4</sup>

These new forms of armed conflicts had an intra-state dimension and involved groups defined and organized by patterns that defied the traditional concept of wars. As a consequence, these conflicts provoked the erosion of the state and its institutions (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 124; Kaldor, 2012). International intervention was necessary not only to resolve the armed conflict, but also to restore the social conditions to the return of normal politics. Changes in warfare affected local economies and civilians, leading to waves of refugees as a consequence of ethnic cleansing and collapse of state institutions. It was necessary to promote changes in the very political and social structures of the state to ensure the non-violent coexistence between parties at the end of the intervention. In other words, peacekeepers could no longer act merely as a shield between the belligerent parties. Thus, international interventions took on new and more comprehensive forms, increasing significantly in numbers.<sup>5</sup> The humanitarian component of the interventions has become a part of international concerns and prompted a more active stance from the states. Between 1991 and 2014, 51 peacekeeping missions have been deployed (UN, 2014a).

<sup>4</sup> The literature on the evolution of UN peacekeeping is extensive. On traditional peacekeeping, Paul Diehl (1994), despite being written more than two decades ago, is a key contribution. On the evolution of the field, Kenkel (2013) offers solid reading that may be used as a guide to understand the field of conflict resolution. For a more comprehensive discussion, please refer to Ramsbotham et al. (2011).

<sup>5</sup> According to UN data, in 1988 there were 9,950 soldiers serving in five peacekeeping. In October 2011 this number was 122 thousand soldiers and police officers in 16 operations (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 101). In June 2014, the number of soldiers and military officers in the service of the UN in 16 missions totaled 98,635 officers (UN, 2014b).



International interventions for humanitarian purposes are based on the same premises that define the broader international interventions. They are interventions of a state or group of states in the territory of another state through the use of military force to achieve humanitarian ends (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p 231; Lechner, 2010, p 437.). The definition of J. R. Vincent has enough flexibility in its scope for the inclusion of the humanitarian component in the international interventions. According to the author, intervention constitutes a discrete, i.e., the interveners are not already implicated with the causes of the crisis, and coercive event, which strengthens, but does not make explicit, the military dimension. (Bellamy, 2003a, p 329-330).

However, it is important to note that this type of intervention highlights two specific humanitarian objectives that differentiate humanitarian intervention from other forms of intervention. The first is the explicit mandate to guarantee the protection of fundamental human rights and the second, the provision of emergency assistance (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 287).

The political changes since the end of the Cold War also affected the normative dimension of humanitarian interventions. In that fashion, protection of individuals against illegitimate violence legitimates deployment of a humanitarian intervention. (Lechner, 2010; Pugh, 1997; Whitman, 1994). It is worth mentioning that although humanitarian intervention is currently associated with the use of military force (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 287), it can yet be undertaken without the occurrence of an armed conflict.

This normative stance is close to the UN understanding of humanitarian intervention and reflects the organization's political practice over the past three decades. Bercovitch and Jackson (2012, p. 102) refer to the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) to note that humanitarian interventions are similar to the multidimensional peacekeeping, as both involve aspects of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building<sup>6</sup>. According to them, humanitarian intervention may also include peace-enforcement mechanisms, i.e., the use of force to achieve political or humanitarian objectives, reinforcing its coercive nature.

Such changes fostered the expansion of the peacekeeping mandates, which are defined by the Security Council. The scope of Chapters VI and VII was expanded to allow a broader performance of peacekeepers. The basic premise is that a broader scope of tasks carried out by multidimensional interventions would guarantee more effective responses to the challenges faced by international forces, particularly in the political and humanitarian spheres.

Similarly, the involvement of other UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has become more common, affecting the operational scale of interventions as well as the political rhetoric that supported international intervention. Initiatives

<sup>6</sup> By and large, peacemaking is the use of tools such as diplomacy and mediation to guide the belligerent groups to the end of the conflict. Peacekeeping is the incorporation of both military and civilian elements to create the environment for ceasefire agreements and the encouragement of peace building efforts after the resolution of the armed conflicts. Peace building refers to activities for the construction and consolidation of a positive and lasting peace in a post-conflict society.

connected both to the military and the socio-political dimensions, such as the monitoring and assistance with elections, as well as the strengthening of local political institutions, have become part of peacekeeping agendas (UN, 2014b). The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group's (UNTAG) intervention in Namibia in the 1980s and 1990s is considered the first multidimensional UN humanitarian intervention.

In a process of convergence, peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions became to be conveniently considered as synonyms and constitute, ever since, the most common international instrument for the resolution of international conflicts. This terminological convergence was also facilitated by the premise that guides international efforts, i.e., that functioning states constitute the foundation of a stable international order (Valença, 2011, p. 637).

The foregoing discussion suggests that "humanitarian intervention" refers to multidimensional peacekeeping, and not those deployed during the Cold War. In general, humanitarian intervention differs from traditional peacekeeping through four characteristics related to policy and normative changes that took place at the end of the Cold War. These differences reflect: (i) the activities performed by the peacekeepers, (ii) the actors involved in the intervention, (iii) the motivation and the context of the intervention, and (iv) the guiding principles of international action (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 103, Greitens and Farrell, 2013).

Firstly, the multidimensional nature of humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War implies a broader range of political and humanitarian activities performed by international forces that goes beyond the military dimension. The development of programs to overcome the causes of the conflict became an important part of the intervention. In this regard, the promotion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as the monitoring of elections and the development of strategies to stimulate economic development programs became part of the new mandates of UN peacekeeping.

The broadening of the activities performed by the UN missions also affected the actors involved in international interventions. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, when only - or predominantly - military personnel were involved, including military observers, post-Cold War peacekeeping involves the participation of civil, humanitarian, and economic components.

The context and the motivation of the humanitarian intervention also experienced changes due to the presence of new international actors performing new activities. The strategies developed by international forces during humanitarian interventions aim to overcome the conflict and humanitarian crisis, assuming sociopolitical dimensions. Rather than being limited to military matters and the resolution of conflicts, the scope of humanitarian interventions also includes the prevention of human rights violations, the provision of humanitarian and economic assistance, the strengthening of political institutions and ensuring of fair elections, the rebuilding of police force and judiciary system, among others (Greitens and Farrell, 2013; Kenkel, 2013; Ramsbotham et al, 2011.).

The timing of the intervention has also changed. Humanitarian intervention now is undertaken during conflict, preferably in the early stages of the conflict in order to avoid the escalation of the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the driving factors for new interventions should reflect this pattern.

It is important to discuss briefly the principles that guide UN peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions. If, on the one hand, they are still the same as those of traditional peacekeeping - consent, impartiality, and non-violence, on the other, the way they operate has changed. In the post-Cold War they became more flexible, which made international action less dependent on the hosting state and highlighted the coercive nature of the intervention.

The principle of consent is markedly affected by this loosening. As conflicts are no longer of an interstate nature and also due to the difficulty in identifying legitimate political authorities, UN peacekeeping no longer considers consent a precondition for intervention. Consent is still recommended, but its absence no longer serves as an impediment to obstruct international action.

Impartiality has been transformed into neutrality. International forces continue not to take sides, but are concerned with the protection of civilians and non-combatants. It is not a matter of supporting one side over the other, but rather ensuring the respect for human rights and political commitments of every part involved.

Finally, the principle of non-use of violence currently reflects the understanding that force should be limited to the extent necessary for fulfilling the intervention's mandate. In multi-dimensional peacekeeping, international troops are fully armed and may use force, if needed, unlike in traditional peacekeeping, when they were unarmed or lightly armed.

These principles affect the definition and interpretation of humanitarian intervention to the extent that they place the imperative of protecting human rights as an element hierarchically above that of the very sovereignty of the state. Unlike other forms of intervention, humanitarian intervention is supposedly guided by an ethical motivation for preventing the massive violation of human rights of a population from unjustified violence. It is not a matter of a set of ethical principles and values that universally guide states internationally, but the preservation of human rights as a humanitarian standard that unite people.

Based on the political and normative changes described and discussed in this section, I suggest that humanitarian intervention should be understood as the deployment of military and political resources in a host state by the international community with the motivation for ending genocide or massive violation of human rights of its population.

This definition highlights three important aspects for the argument I develop in this chapter. Firstly, it highlights the international dimension of humanitarian intervention as well as its political-military aspects. Humanitarian intervention is, therefore, a state action that interferes in fact in the domestic dimension of the hosting state to overcome

a crisis situation. Secondly, and regarding its coercive elements, this definition points out more restricted conceptual limits, differentiating between humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance. This is fundamental in the process of humanitarian intervention, as the two initiatives cannot be confused. Finally, this definition deals with motivations, not goals, emphasizing the ethical dimension of humanitarian interventions. Ultimately, it allows aspiring to the reaching of conditions that would characterize a moral imperative for intervention.

### **The politics of humanitarian intervention**

The optimism that gripped the international community in the early 1990s was not enough to break away from political constraints imposed on the decision-making process involving humanitarian interventions. Despite the impressive number of humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War, asymmetric responses to humanitarian crises in different parts of the globe have shown selectivity in the response from the international community. Even with the easing of the principles of operation, the absence of objective grounds for intervention brings into focus the politicization of the issue by placing the political debate on humanitarian intervention in a gray area.

The decision-making process for authorizing the deployment for humanitarian intervention to a given region is a competence of the UN Security Council. Operationally, interventions are authorized with the approval vote of at least three fifths of its members, without opposition - or veto - from any one of the five permanent members. The Security Council is also the authority to establish the mandate of the intervention, authorize any renewals and seek economic, logistic and personnel input from the member states for implementation.

This process corresponds to the same one traditional peacekeeping missions were subjected to during the Cold War. The legal grounds fall within Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, in articles geared towards the pacific settlement of disputes and international actions directed at threats to peace and aggression.

With the normative and political changes since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian crisis situations and international conflicts began to be understood as cases that threaten peace beyond state borders with impacts both in the regional and international dimensions. Until then, the sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention obstructed humanitarian concern and only - or overwhelmingly - cases of aggression were addressed in this endeavor and, even then, subject to political discretion (Morris, 2013).

However, the tension between the protection of human rights and the respect for sovereignty makes the debate on humanitarian intervention highly politically charged. Political rhetoric and international policy making practices highlight humanitarian intervention as an appropriate instrument to resolve and prevent international instability regarding these threats. On the one hand, human rights are a reality that states cannot ignore (Valença, 2009a, p. 330) and there is a consensus that sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention cannot serve as a veil to hide massive violations of human

rights (Godoy Jr, 2013, p. 42; Jentleson, 2012, p. 405-407). The legitimacy of humanitarian action lies in the responsibility of states to ensure respect for the human rights of their citizens and a responsibility of the international community to react in the event of noncompliance with these presuppositions (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 231). These principles should serve as guidance for the conduct of humanitarian interventions, as mentioned in the previous section, maintaining the ethical dimension of this type of action. On the other hand, the political and economic interests and costs arising from intervention affect humanitarian action, generating a perception of political selectivity that renders some responses to crisis more politically urgent than others, even if the magnitude of that crisis is not reflected in humanitarian terms in the political choices made (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 293). As a consequence, the decision-making process to authorize humanitarian intervention becomes highly politicized and subject to non-objective criteria in its deliberations.

This tension highlights the political constraints in humanitarian interventions. As much as official deliberations on the willingness to intervene (or not) take place among the Security Council's fifteen members, the power of decision-making is restricted to its permanent members, the so-called P5 – the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. In case of disagreement, for any reason and without the need for justification, one P5 can veto the discussion and the subject is off the agenda. Abstentions, on the other hand, do not constitute veto and the deliberative process is allowed to continue.

The prerogative of veto by the P5 paralyzed the Security Council during the Cold War. The USA and USSR were opposed to international intervention in conflicts located within their own domains for fear of having their respective rivals influencing within their own spheres of influence. As the Cold War came to an end, it was expected that this scenario would change. In the early years there was actually a change in the way the UN acted. However, permanent members' self interests (or those of their allies) soon became obstacles to the deployment of new interventions. Four problems may summarize the politicized decisions on humanitarian intervention (Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 293).

The first concerns the problem of special interests that are in play, even if indirectly. In this case, the P5 may identify what interests, whether their own or their allies', are at risk if an intervention is authorized and may openly use the threat of veto in order to prevent actions which displease them. This situation is analog to what happened in the Cold War. The example most recurrent is the experience of Kosovo, in 1998. At the time Russia threatened to veto any proposal for an international intervention if the topic were raised for discussion in the Security Council. Eventually an intervention was carried out under the aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the basis of a supposed moral imperative. This initiative is questioned since then (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 142; Egan, 2001; Wheeler, 2004, p. 197).

A second problem of the politicization of the decision-making process involves the actions of other Permanent Members of the Security Council to ensure the delaying of deliberations over humanitarian interventions in the expectation of receiving authorization for their own actions. Greitens and Farrell (2013, p. 293) characterize this situation

as a problem of logrolling and exemplify it referring to the Sino-Russian collaboration to block an intervention in Haiti during the 1990s, while the Security Council did not allow Russia to intervene in Georgia.

The third problem is the rhetorical support for humanitarian postures, but without actually providing foundations to solve the crisis. This situation is intended to simulate an image of cooperation to mitigate the crisis, but without providing the necessary commitment. A recurrent example is the case of Darfur, where a humanitarian crisis exposes the genocide of a significant portion of the population. However, there is obstruction from China, which threatens to veto the intervention, already authorized, if it is not done in the mold as desired by the local government, its ally (Jentleson, 2007, p. 286-290). Aware of the inability of the African Union to act in the region, humanitarian intervention is delayed repeatedly and indefinitely.

Finally, there is the issue of lack of coordination between states over who should bear the costs and risks of participating and leading humanitarian intervention. This, in turn, threatens the success or even the deployment of an intervention. The domestic political costs are sensitive for the leaders of the countries involved in the intervention, which may be what ultimately shape the international responses. In this sense, and considering that the multidimensional humanitarian interventions are treated by some as “wars of choice” and not “wars of necessity” (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2005), political leaders believe that a negative backlash from participating in the humanitarian action can generate bad publicity. So the buck-passing game between leaders and countries aims to transfer responsibility for an intervention with questionable chances of success.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s, showed the incompatibility of desires and allocation of responsibilities for action between the USA and Europe. The stalemate was resolved only years later when there was a division of labor (Valença, 2006, p. 65). The same refers to the American operations in Kosovo, which abandoned the employment of ground forces and promoted humanitarian intervention throughout the use of aerial bombardments and relief flights for the dispatch of humanitarian aid (Allen and Vincent, 2011; Egan, 2001; Greitens and Farrell, 2013, p. 293-294).

From these problems it is possible to infer that intervention for humanitarian purposes is, in practice, conditioned to political interests as well as to the convenience on the part of the states. These elements seem to have more relevance to the decision making process of whether intervene or not than the severity of the humanitarian crisis that the intervention should be addressing. That ethical value shared by the states is put on the sidelines in the politics of humanitarian intervention even when the obligation to prevent – or to react, under the Responsibility to Protect – is provided for in international documents.

Experiences from the post-Cold War indicate that the characterization of a humanitarian crisis and/or internal armed conflict does not necessarily imply authorization for the international community to intervene. In other words, the right to intervene is not bound by the obligation to intervene (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 111), even when the intervention is motivated from a moral and humanitarian standpoint - as in the case

of Kosovo. "Prevention of all mass killings is unrealistic. But prevention of more than what has happened in the past is not" (Jentleson, 2007, p. 290).

This disconnection between the right and the obligation to intervene is presented as a major obstacle to humanitarian intervention, which ends up being dependent on the convenience and availability of the interests of the parties involved. The motivation to intervene, which I pointed out as a key aspect in the characterization of humanitarian intervention, is subject to political criteria as well as to the convenience of the states involved.

Similar political constraints can be pointed out in the assessment processes employed to verify the success of humanitarian interventions. The criterion used to evaluate the success or failure is dependent on the political assessment of the UN, under the provisions of the mandate of the intervention and corresponds to whether or not it carried out of the authorized tasks.

The complicating factor in this equation is that the same body – the Security Council – is responsible for shaping and updating the mission's mandate as the operation moves forward and evaluating the results at the end of the intervention. The assessment process of the results of the intervention lacks clear criteria to determine its success or failure. As a result, the asymmetry between reality and political discourse reinforces the gray zone and the politicized nature found in humanitarian intervention, undermining its credibility and recurrently frustrating the international community's expectations.

It is possible to identify two problems with this assessment process of success and failure. The first is the possibility to manipulate criteria of success of the intervention simply by reducing expectations and the scope of the mandate. Humanitarian intervention, when authorized, is given a unique mandate designating its composition, responsibilities and expectations. This mandate is periodically reviewed and redesigned, if necessary. This means that the list of peacekeepers' duties can be reduced and the mission considered successful without having tackled the causes of the crisis, but simply because the Security Council lowered its expectations.

The second problem relates to the attribution of responsibility for the failure or difficulties faced by international forces. Multidimensional peacekeeping involves, as the very expression characterizes, humanitarian actions in different dimensions roughly divided into military and non-military. The non-military components are not necessarily linked or coordinated by the UN. In this case, these actors performance may be considered independent from the UN efforts, which can lead to problems with the coordination and/or provision of humanitarian assistance and may compromise the intervention. The scapegoating would exempt the UN and intervention forces from their own incapacity (Downs and Stedman, 2002, p. 45-47).

Both cases highlight the risk of evaluating success or failure based only on the interpretation and political assessment of the Security Council. The politics of humanitarian intervention impacts not only the authorization for the deployment of an intervention and its mandate, but also the very criteria to evaluate its effectiveness. The experience

from the past three decades reveals cases of success and failure. The promotion of more transparent strategies and initiatives can mitigate the problems raised here.

### **The challenges of humanitarian operations: complex emergency, moral imperatives to intervene, and objective criteria for evaluating international interventions**

In this section, I offer two alternative proposals to the political constraints of humanitarian operations presented in the previous section. The former addresses the decision-making process and the possibility of a moral imperative to intervene. Based on the concept of complex emergency, I suggest a set of criteria to support the interventionist stance in order to highlight the urgency of a response to humanitarian crises. The later addresses the criteria to evaluate success in humanitarian interventions as I propose an objective and less politicized elements of analysis. Faced with a history of self-reported outcomes in recent decades alternating between success and failure (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012; Greitens and Farrell, 2013), the literature in the field suggests two objective criteria to verify, in short, medium and long term, the success of humanitarian intervention and the effectiveness of its strategies to overcome a crisis situation.

The definition I proposed earlier points out that humanitarian intervention is the deployment of military and political resources in a host state by the international community with the motivation for ending genocide or massive violation of human rights of its population. This concept (i) highlights the multidimensional nature of international operations, (ii) emphasizes their coercive aspects, and (iii) indicates that the humanitarian motive is consistent with ethical principles that distinguish this form of intervention from others, suggesting the possibility to think of the moral imperatives for intervention.

Nevertheless, political constraints that affect the decision-making process in authorizing humanitarian intervention clashes with such ethical expectations and suggest that it is selectivity and convenience that act in accordance with the interests and priorities of states, primarily the P5. Given the politicization of this process, Roland Dannreuther (2007, p. 143) summarizes the pragmatism that marks the pessimistic view of intervention: “the core problem with the concept of humanitarian intervention is that it promotes an essentially false dichotomy between the amoral world of politics and the apolitical world of humanitarianism”.

On the one hand, it is necessary to develop an objective basis to serve as a criterion to characterize the humanitarian crisis. On the other, there is already a set of good practices and expertise available in the humanitarian practice. This basis and criteria can be sought in the operations of humanitarian non-state actors such as NGOs and development agencies. The characterization of a humanitarian crisis as a complex emergency offers objective conditions to overcome – or at least mitigate – the politics of humanitarian operations and promote greater credibility in the process.

Complex emergencies are characterized by socio-political situations arising from deliberate violence against groups of individuals who put the humanitarian issue in the



spotlight and motivate the interventionist posture (Valença, 2009b, p. 345-346). The term complex indicates that violence is not limited to just one source (Väyrynem, 1999, p. 175.) The good practices of humanitarian assistance show that complex emergencies reveal humanitarian crises connected to violent conflict on a large scale - such as civil wars, genocides and ethnic cleansing (Keen, 2008, p. 1; WHO, 2002; IFRCRCS, 2014; Väyrynem, 1999, p. 175). They include, but are not limited to, situations of internal armed conflict, massive displacement of individuals, large-scale famine or food shortages, as well as the collapse of political, economic, and social institutions, aggravated or not by natural disasters.

The assessment of complex emergencies is not carried out from quantitative criteria alone. Complex emergencies are characterized by an absence of alternatives to save lives in danger other than by means of an intervention (Wheeler, 2000, p. 34). Given the severity and urgency of the crisis, complex emergencies are considered in the practice of humanitarian assistance as immediate and justifiable causes for action.

Thus, the shared ethics suggest that the definition of humanitarian intervention takes on an operational dimension, opening space for the consideration of the moral imperatives for intervention (Väyrynem, 1999, p. 173). Taking complex emergencies as moral imperatives, therefore, brings a humanitarian dimension to international politics and helps to mitigate the political constraints imposed on the decision-making process for authorizing an intervention.

Firstly, the selectivity that can be noticed in the decision process can be reduced or eliminated. I do not intend to suggest that the interventionist claims from the international community will wane, but I put forward the claim that humanitarian interventions motivated from the occurrence of complex emergencies distinguishes these ordinary events from “ordinary” human rights violations that don’t require extraordinary actions (Wheeler, 2000 p. 34). Thus, humanitarian interventions would be employed in cases where the need is most urgent.

Secondly, establishing imperatives for intervention would help remove the politics of humanitarian intervention. If one considers that humanitarian interventions are not an obligation, but rather expectations that are derived from the membership of the international community (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 231), the characterization of the right to intervene would be linked to the obligation to intervene.

Finally, the characterization of a moral imperative for intervening provides criterion for peacekeeping. Since the end of World War II, the most widely used criterion used for humanitarian intervention is genocide - which refers to acts and postures “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group” (Pape, 2012, p. 41). Yet, as recent experiences show, recognizing the occurrence of genocide is still essentially a political choice.

Nevertheless, post-Cold War interventions reveal trends on humanitarian interventions. They indicate motivations for intervening based on a scenario of humanitarian crisis

caused mainly by (i) massive abuses of human rights by the state, (ii) the failure or collapse of the state, and (iii) the illegitimacy of the state (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 104). These motivations suggest a trend, but not the obligation to intervene, in cases where there is a partially functional state – such as Haiti and Somalia – or when there is genocide. Somehow these situations seem to facilitate the decision on intervening, as violations of the principle of non-intervention would be less disturbing.

The use of complex emergencies as a moral imperative for intervening also affects the criteria used to assess the success of humanitarian interventions. The literature in the field of conflict resolution suggests that humanitarian action should meet two purposes: (i) the protection of fundamental human rights and (ii) the provision of emergency assistance.

Both objectives are consistent with the conceptualization and operationalization of complex emergencies and could reveal criteria for evaluating success. The first is the protection of individuals and the reduction of the humanitarian impact of armed conflict. The second is through the development of the conditions that will lead to stable and lasting peace (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 108; Downs and Stedman, 2002, p. 50-51).

However, despite the possibility of addressing the success assessment separately, little can be done to contain the complex emergency without tackling the causes of crisis. A successful intervention is supposed to effectively deal with the circumstances that gave rise to the complex emergency while at the same time provide the conditions to the development of political, economic, and social institutions. As a result, the conditions for the return of normal politics would be guaranteed (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 108).

By relying on these criteria it is possible to evaluate the success or failure of a mission in different stages. In the short term, one may evaluate the strategies of the international forces for the protection of human rights in a scenario of violence and armed conflict. Despite the changes in the form of conflicts in the post-Cold War and the mixed responses to them, the UN has gradually learned to deal with other types of belligerents beyond the state.

In the medium term, one may note the promotion and provision of DDR programs, economic stimulus, and the strengthening of the society's political foundations. In the long term, success criteria can be perceived in the peaceful succession of power through elections or other mechanisms for political participation, overcoming intergroup tensions and improving the level of public confidence towards political institutions.

Also in the long term, but as a collective learning outcome, the promotion of objective and verifiable criteria of socio-economic opportunities by forces involved in intervention would strengthen the standards for human rights preservation and signal to belligerent parties and political communities in distress that international efforts seek to meet the necessary conditions for the promotion of human dignity (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2012, p. 110). In this sense, the termination of humanitarian intervention does not depend on the characterization of its success, but rather on the accomplishment of tasks and competences as set out in the mandate.

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## **CREDN and the Formulation and Implementation of Foreign, Defense, and Intelligence Policy**

Marcelo Rech

Over several decades, many lies have been imposed on Brazilian society and eventually accepted as truth. One concerns the formulation and implementation of foreign, defense, and intelligence policy. They would be exclusively controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN in Portuguese).

Society has always been sold the idea that beyond diplomats and military, no one understands such themes. So, having this repeated hundreds of thousands of times has served to distance all those who may have or had a vocation or affinity for such themes.

However, according to the Brazilian Constitution, parliament through the respective Foreign Relations and National Defense committees of the House of Representatives, and of the Senate, has the prerogative to ratify international treaties, approve agreements, as well as summon ambassadors for committee hearings, and discuss policies of defense, foreign relations and Intelligence.

It must be recognized that few know the nature of the work done by these committees. Foreign policy and defense are relatively new topics on the national agenda, and for a long time belonged to the scope of the Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces - remembering that the Ministry of Defense exists for just over 15 years. Intelligence, in turn, is still something surrounded by shadows as if it were part of a film plot.

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<sup>1</sup> Committee of Foreign Relations and National Defense

On the other hand, it is nothing new, especially in regard to foreign policy, that the National Congress has such prerogatives.

The Committee of Foreign Relations and National Defense of the House of Representatives (CREDN in Portuguese), for example, was established September 15, 1936 by means of a House of Representatives resolution. It was originally called the Committee for Diplomacy and Treaties. In September 1947, it was given the new designation of Commission for Diplomacy. It was changed to Committee on Foreign Relations on November 12, 1957 and only in 1996 was transformed into Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense. One year before the Ministry for Defense was created.

Prior to this, matters of defense and intelligence were kept far from Parliament and were not at all pertaining to a representative democracy.

According to the Bylaws of the House of Representatives, CREDN assesses matters relating to the following: diplomatic and consular, economic and trade, cultural and scientific relations with other countries; multilateral and regional relations with international entities; Brazilian foreign policy; Brazilian foreign service; treaties, agreements and international conventions and other instruments for foreign policy; public international law; international legal order; nationality; citizenship and naturalization; legal status of foreigners; emigration and immigration; authorization for the President or the Vice-President of the Republic to be absent from the national territory; national defense policy; strategic studies and information and counter-information activities; armed and auxiliary forces; military public administration; military service and alternative civilian service; passage of foreign forces and their stay in the country; employment of troops abroad; border issues and areas considered essential for national defense matters; military law and legislation for national defense; maritime, aeronautical and space law; international disputes; declarations of war; conditions for armistice or peace; and civil and military requisitions in case of imminent danger and in times of war.

As you can see, CREDN is not limited to approving requests or holding public hearings, although a great deal of its members believe that this is its primary function.

To be fair: for many years, CREDN served for nothing more than to accommodate politicians keen to travel and see the world. Until the mid-1990s, the Committee on Foreign Relations was more of a travel agency than anything else, which somehow appealed to both the Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces, at this time represented by the military ministries.

While deputies and senators are busy with tourism, nobody upsets the professionals; this was the logic for many years among diplomats and military, despite the rhetoric that the participation of Parliament was something essential for both.

The changes since the late 90's are only now beginning to bear fruit. First, the creation of the Ministry of Defense represented a paradigm shift. Brazil was one of the last



countries in the region to abolish the military ministries and submit the military to civil authority, even if in its early years, it was just a front.

The creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD) and the disposition of the Command Forces preserved practically all the status and autonomy of the military. It has, and it hasn't changed! The military have always resisted fiercely this modernist wave, strengthened following the failure of dictatorial regimes in Latin America.

The former defense minister, then Senator Élcio Álvarez, of the now extinct PFL party of Espírito Santo, was undoubtedly the one who least ran the show. Counsel responsible for the defense of numerous criminals; he would not be the one to wake the military up to a new reality of a democratic country that had reached puberty.

He was soon replaced during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, by the former Attorney-General of the Union, Geraldo Quintão, another alien in relation to military affairs

Com a chegada da esquerda ao poder em 2002, Lula cometeu um erro de principiante ao indicar o embaixador José Viegas Filho para chefiar o MD. Não demorou para o governo do PT ser cobrado em relação aos reparos e à verdade do que ocorrera durante o regime militar. Viegas bateu de frente com o Comandante do Exército, general Albuquerque, um linha-dura que não economizava nos adjetivos quando se referia aos novos detentores do poder nacional, dentre eles, o ex-guerrilheiro José Dirceu, homem-forte de Lula e do PT, treinado na Cuba de Fidel e Raúl Castro. Uma heresia para as Forças Armadas.

With the arrival of the left to power in 2002, Lula made a rookie mistake by appointing the ambassador José Viegas Filho to head the MD. It didn't take long until the government of PT was called upon to act in relation to compensations and to investigate the truth about what had happened during the military regime. Viegas clashed with the Army Commander, General Albuquerque, a hardliner who did not spare the adjectives when referring to the new holders of national power, among them former guerrilla José Dirceu, strongman for Lula and the PT, trained in Cuba by Fidel and Raúl Castro. A heresy for the Armed Forces.

It was only under Nelson Jobim, a burly jurist with greater ambitions than his own ego, that the MD began to tread a more pragmatic and less ideological path. Jobim was able to impose changes and gradually earned the respect, fear and sympathy of the military. All in millimetrically calculated doses.

Military submission to civil authority became a reality. There was no way any longer to swim against the tide. It was necessary, first, to adapt. It was a way to get some qualitative gain.

In the case of foreign policy, the changes were much less traumatic because the Foreign Ministry did not lose its prominence. What its integrants did not accept was the change that permeated society. Gradually, the various sectors of the national economy realized

they could grow wings and fly solo without mediation, interference, or anything else, from the Foreign Ministry.

Municipal departments of International Relations began to be created in large, medium and small municipalities. Companies began to look at the world with different eyes and sought in universities, internationalists who would help them to open doors to new markets. All this was done without the need of the Foreign Ministry.

Even in the 90s, foreign policy was no longer the monopoly of the Foreign Ministry, even though its integrants have never accepted this, a reality that in practice endures.

In the early 2000s, Brazil implemented a policy of diplomatic expansion, increasing its presence in the world through embassies, consulates and representative offices. Currently, we are one of only eleven countries that maintain relations with all members of the United Nations (UN).

But one must keep in mind that this expansion did not occur in order to increase exports and diversify our export basket, but simply a political ambition to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. It is a goal that was set there in the arid times of the military who survived the regime, the strengthening of democracy and the elected governments since then. All, in greater or lesser degree, embraced the cause.

As I said, more down to ambition than really thinking that Brazil could be a distinguished global player. It does not matter. The objective fact is that this expansion paid off. Brazil has to be taken seriously on the international stage. Including, for not threatening the status quo in anything cemented since the end of World War II.

But what has CREDN got to do with all this? It too had to reinvent itself. It was from 2002 that the Commission came to have a prominent role in discussions of foreign policy, defense and intelligence. In that year, as an international advisor and chaired by Deputy Aldo Rebelo, PCdoB-SP (Communist Party of Brazil-SP), organized and held three seminars on foreign policy, defense and intelligence for the XXI Century

Never before, had CREDN held discussions on these issues and brought civilian and military experts together around the needs and priorities of Brazil for the century that was approaching. Although the events have encountered strong resistance from diplomacy and the military and the intelligence community, the three events brought together an eclectic crowd of over a thousand people. Three publications were circulated that summarized the proposals, suggestions, and criticisms.

Also in 2002, the Commission carried out in an unprecedented manner, debates with the leading presidential candidates on their proposals for foreign policy and defense of Brazil

.Just ten years later, in 2012, CREDN under the new presidency of PCdoB, with federal Deputy Perpetua Almeida (Acre), returned to discuss in public lectures and seminars foreign policy, defense and intelligence. Despite the advances and achievements, the

proposed events also faced strong resistance from the diplomatic, military and intelligence channels.

One of the practical results of these events was the creation of the Standing Subcommittee on Strategic Projects of the Armed Forces, in full effect, as a proper mechanism for fostering debate concerning the defense we want.

Last year, aware of international concerns about Brazil's capabilities in organizing and securing big events such as the Confederations Cup and the World Cup, CREDN organized an international seminar to discuss the terrorism phenomenon. We brought in experts from several countries including Argentina (who had to deal with two terrorist attacks in 1992 and 1994), Chile, Spain and the United States, in addition to Brazilian participants, civilian and military, directly involved with the issue, with field experience in the areas of counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

The event brought together more than 80 foreign ambassadors of a total of 126, military attachés, academics and intelligence professionals from Brazil and abroad.

By way of illustration, in 2012, CREDN examined 87 committee member applications/requests. This number jumped to 156 last year. The number of average weekly visits by foreign ambassadors has always remained above five, and at times we had true "bottlenecks" of diplomats at the Commission.

Moreover, it was in CREDN that we created a favorable environment for the adoption of the revised proposals of the National Policy on Defense, National Defense Strategy White Paper and the National Strategy, the three principal documents that take Brazil from the gray area of international understanding on this topic and on its pretensions in the world. They were unanimously approved in the House of Representatives.

It was also through CREDN that we managed to adopt after 11 years, that's right, 11 years, the regulations of the Joint Commission for the Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI), external control agency created in the 90s to monitor and supervise the activities within the framework of the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN in Portuguese). And several sessions were necessary because regulation has never of any interest to the military that currently command intelligence activities.

Regulated, the CCAI becomes a standing committee, with its own staff and legal conditions to request documents, summon individuals and discuss issues, including its classified/secret spending/expenses. In 2015, the presidency of the CCAI returns to CREDN. After the elections, it will be the right moment to discuss its strengthening as an organ for external control and a fundamental element in the recovery of State Intelligence, ending the ostracism the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has been subjected to due to political disputes and power struggles.

The sixth biggest economy in the world cannot afford the luxury to have such inefficient and inoperable Intelligence. It cannot behave like a minor team that spends the entire

game just kicking the ball around when it could focus on a positive agenda mapped out in the larger interests of the country.

The Snowden case is a demonstration of this strategy that puts national interests in second place. Brazil was not spied on because others are evil, it was spied on because it did not do its homework. I failed to protect its information and strategic data, It failed to demonstrate clearly to adversaries its capacity to protect itself. Brazil neglected its intelligence in a dumb way!

Likewise, defense has received from CREDN the support and assistance necessary so that the process of modernization and re-equipment of the Armed Forces is based on proper foundations. Projects have been included in Growth Acceleration Program (PAC in Portuguese) as a way to protect them from cuts and contingencies. The nonpartisan form of CREDN made its contribution and even the defense budget recorded an increase.

It is in the small details that confirm that CREDN is an essential mechanism in the formulation and implementation of Brazil's foreign policy, defense and intelligence. It is a reality of which there is no getting away from.

Still, there are many problems. Acceptance of this fact is something much more rhetorical than practical. Even having produced positive events for foreign policy, defense policy as well as for intelligence, CREDN continues to be seen and perceived by the main heads of these areas with great suspicion.

Not infrequently, the initiatives are objects of attempted sabotage or imposition by both the MRE such as from the MD and the Cabinet of Institutional Security (GSI), head of intelligence, which do not accept any initiatives without having absolute control. This is something that completely clashes with the period in which we live and which we assume to have democratic maturity.

Despite numerous efforts towards implementing the integration of efforts, considering that such policies - foreign, defense and Intelligence - are state policies, not government, CREDN still suffers from past feelings where the military and diplomats did not get on with each other and where politicians were viewed as enemies rather than potential allies.







