KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/ RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea
KAS Korea
KAS Korea
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea/ RINSA
KAS Korea/RINSA
KAS Korea
KAS Korea
KAS Korea
The 2016 RINSA-KAS Joint International Conference started off with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Resident Representative Mr. Stefan SAMSE’s opening remarks by putting the “common interests of Germany and South Korea” at the forefront as a way to most effectively address the old and new transnational risks in Europe and Asia. This opening speech was followed by a number of speeches by RINSA’s Director-General, Lt Gen Seung-Ho WEE, the German Amb to Korea H. E. Rolf MAFAEL and lastly Prof. Byeong Moo HWANG. All of them offered repeated hints at the importance of mutual understanding and cooperation in an era of rapid technological development that has further complicated the question of peace and security in the face of intensifying transnational threats.
Three key aspects appeared to contribute most to the somber mood centered around Europe and East Asia today. First, there was the increasing encroachment of Russian cyber espionage against Europe’s cyberspace and the intensifying North Korean cyberattacks against South Korea. Second, there was the issue of the refugee crisis in Europe as perpetrated by the Islamic State and destabilization of the Middle East. Lastly, palpable in the air was a sense of nervousness about the recent Zika virus and MERS outbreaks across the globe. German, let alone South Korean, foreign policy reorientation now seemed unmistakable. Given the intensifying cyber, migration, and epidemic risks—not to mention their transnational character—the panels were asked to discuss the joint moves that would enhance security in each of these three domains.
The first session on cyber risk assessment and responses had Prof. Chung-Min LEE as moderator. Amid a wide diversity of discussants and presentations, the view from Dr. SCHERF—Head of Cyber Command Implementation Staff in the German Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg)—framed what could be seen as an important narrative on the importance of cross-domain collaboration and connection. “It’s a holistic approach and not just the Cyber Command,” added Dr. SCHERF. For each point he made, listeners grew attuned to how the German Armed Forces was experimenting with its military organization. Dr. SCHERF introduced the idea of combining J2 (Intelligence) and J6 (Communication and Information Systems), and repositioning the BMVg for a “leap-frog” development in an attempt to catch up with the frontrunners of this movement.
The next presentation by Prof. LIM Jongin from Korea University also drew a lot of attention as he discussed the North Korean cyber warfare tactics and strategies against the ROK military. He proposed that the ROK military develop an offensive cyber strategy in the form of an “armed attack.” The impression was clear-cut that the Prof. expected more from the military than just dismantling the enemy’s C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) or cutting their cash flows as was done by the recent UN Security Council Res. 2270. Reacting strongly to the repeated hacking attempts made via Chinese IP addresses to jeopardize the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), he emphasized that the talk of cyber security could not be divorced from a discussion about protection of critical infrastructure and “confidence building” to enable international cooperation.
Starting off his presentation with some amount of contextualization that we needed to draw a clear line between cyber “safety” and cyber “security,” Prof. HAN Hee from Seoul Media Institute of Technology shared his observation that North Korea was demonstrating a pattern of deliberate attacks against “peripheral targets” to instill confusion and to conceal their ulterior motives. He criticized the conventional defensive cyber strategy of relying too heavily on operational apparatuses like Lockheed Martin’s Kill Chain model. Instead of developing an “incidence response” to cyber threats, there had to be a new cyber intelligence-based defense system that could decipher the enemy’s intentions in advance. He brought up the classical McKinsey 7-S Model—which addresses the critical role of coordination rather than structure in organizational effectiveness—as a means to combat North Korean cyber threats.
A trio of experts with extensive military and theoretical experience set the goalposts for the panel discussion that followed. Vice-Admiral (ret.) Lutz FELDT of the German Navy, Prof. Soojin LEE from KNDU and Col. Byeongjun PARK from ROK Cyber Command served as reference points in one or more of the three panel discussions throughout the conference. In turn, their discussion built a common foundation on some big themes, such as the need to bring together IT experts and the operational leadership, let alone to interweave private and military sectors. Among what little remaining time they had, the six experts including the presenters crammed into a single time slot kept their focus on the key vulnerabilities of the status quo defensive cyber strategy and areas for improvement. Among them, Col. PARK, who introduced himself as a Defensive Cyber Operations Officer at the ROK National Cyber Command, had fascinating contribution to the conversation based on his extensive field experience. He pointed out the changing pattern of North Korean cyberattacks, the more strategic selection of targets that included not only critical infrastructure but also specific personnel and departments within the military. He also emphasized the vulnerability of the current post-mortem approach to cyber defense.
The overall consensus was that with sufficient funding, a workable control tower, a system of information sharing backed by a military leadership with the will to make tough decisions, changes were possible. The moderator intervened from time to time, repeatedly pressing the panelists to respond to their own probing questions. The Korean perspective provided clarity that the North’s primary intention was to test the ROK’s cyber warfare capacity and to test its own capacity in preparation for war. But the South Korean reactions thus far have been far too weak and must be more offensive in the future. An alternative German viewpoint held that people’s most common misperception was to measure capability in terms of quantity. Contrary to how the Korean experts referred to the logic that “offense is the best defense,” the counterargument from Dr. SCHERF was that “defense is still the best defense.”
The second session moderated by KAS Representative, Mr. Stefan SAMSE, centered on three major themes of hybrid warfare, European refugee crisis, and the North Korean defectors. There was an overriding consensus among experts about the magnitude of the threat migration crises posed for states. Dr. Peter ROELL, for example, recommended that a double-track policy of continued dialogue combined with strong political-military signals was needed to resolve the refugee crisis. Col. (GS) JOEDECKE from BMVg emphasized that states “stay flexible” in the face of daunting migration crisis, and that political leadership must learn to use preexisting systems, laws and assets to deal with the problems. Meanwhile, the Korean counterpart Mr. PARK from the Ministry of Unification focused more on the policies after migration to help with the inclusive settlement for defectors.
Fear of antagonistic sentiments and political entanglement was present in both German and South Korean sides. In this context, appeal to the Geneva Convention or to the moral responsibility of states to accept refugees who are victimized by various crises helped form a general consensus on the question of international cooperation. But no specific solutions were provided on how to achieve this. An insightful comment was put forward during the panel discussion that states must move beyond dealing with crises after they arrive upon their own shores. For example, one of the panelists predicted that the Yemeni civil war would also eventually end up in Europe, and that a close information sharing system among various organizations both governmental and non-governmental would be paramount to coping with the impending influx of additional refugees. Possibly an allusion to Donald Trump recent talk about withdrawal of US troops, a Korean viewpoint added that there was a noticeable change in the willingness of the United States to risk their forces for others’ regional security.
The search for strategic wisdom and common ground was culminated with the final session on epidemic risk assessment and responses, moderated by Prof. Young Ho KIM from KNDU. The first speaker, Prof. Haejoo CHUNG from Korea University argued that the role of the World Health Organization was slowly weakening over the last 40 years, raising a lot of question marks about its leadership role in preserving and promoting global health. Dr. KERN assessed the often underestimated risk of epidemics and pandemics by security experts. He demonstrated that there was an enormous amount of GDP at risk, with human pandemic and epidemic coming second only to financial crisis in terms of risk by threat type according to his comparative study. The third presentation by an expert from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention emphasized the importance of control measures in the earlier phase of an outbreak.
As in the previous sessions, there was a general consensus to be found among the opinions of participating experts and panels. One of them was that there had to be a stronger alliance system against communicable diseases and global pandemics. And instead of trying to manage a crisis post-mortem, it would be much more effective to develop a detection mechanism against disease outbreaks by searching for ways to close the information gap between local and global health centers. Dr. KERN, the Managing Director at agriExcellence GmbH, pointed out that NATO could do so much more precisely in this area by aiding with essential risk assessment capabilities in Europe, while WHO restructures its management systems.
There were a number of labels that could be heard at various times in the discussions: international cooperation, information sharing and changing norms. What is the implication of choosing one or another label for the security functions of regional architecture? The most pointed discussion occurred in the panel on cyber warfare where the military was most directly implicated in the issue. What this implies is that even in the face of an unprecedented threat or crisis, individual states may be more sensitive to the realistic price of cooperation and information sharing when the military is involved. Yet, when one considers the geopolitical positions of Germany and South Korea, both states have an urgent need to develop strategies and operations to defend themselves against the threat of potential cyberattacks from Russia and North Korea, respectively. In this respect, the 6th RINSA-KAS Joint International Conference clearly served as a forum for testing the feasibility of international alliance and security partnerships on various military and non-military dimensions.