Regional and International Engagement in the Sudanese Conflict: Limits and Potential for Activation

The Sudanese war has entered its third year. Leaving behind escalating humanitarian consequences, that have extended to many regions in the Sudanese state, and impacted countries in the region. While Western governments have increasingly condemned the massacres and violations resulting from military operations; especially those involving the Rapid Support Forces. Criticism of these governments is also growing, for failing to influence the warring parties and their regional backers. In light of this, this paper analyzes the limitations of the international role in the political and military conflict in Sudan. Arguing that the shortcomings of this role, stem not only from the rise of regional powers and their direct influence over the parties of the conflict, but also from the fragmented approaches adopted by international actors. These shortcomings include: the tendency sometimes to reduce the Sudanese war to an "ideological" conflict between the warring parties, or a rivalry between two generals, the inclination to delegate the management of the conflict to regional powers allied with Western governments, the tendency towards a single civilian bloc, the introduction of simplistic frameworks for complex issues such as military reform and civil-military relations reform, the delay of economic support for the transitional government, and the weak coordination between international and regional initiatives to resolve the conflict. In light of the opportunity presented by the Quartet initiative put forward by the Trump administration in partnership with regional actors. The paper proposes a number of ideas to address the shortcomings; including the threatening to review some agreements with the regional supporters of RSF, providing economic incentives to both sides of the war; while brandishing the threat of international trials for war violations, attempting to contain moderate Islamist forces to build a broad civilian consensus on the political settlement, postponing the discussion of civilian control over military institutions until a civilian government is elected, and supporting the post-war transitional government economically with clear mechanisms to monitor the implementation of this support.