This text was last updated in Mai 2018

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict revolves at its core around territorial questions that also affect the access to natural resources. The so called Green Line separates Israel form the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and constitutes the basis for Palestinians territorial demands. Palestinians have currently no complete access to the resources in these territories, including its natural water reservoirs. Broadly, the region comprises three water sources that stretch on both sides of the Green Line and that are therefore claimed by both Israelis and Palestinians:

• The coastal aquifer along the coast of the Gaza Strip and Israel;
• The mountain aquifer under the West Bank and Israel;
• As well as the Jordan with its riparian states Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian West Bank.

! The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) singed during the 1990s a number of treaties that aimed at the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The 1995 „Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Oslo II) kicked off a five-year interim period in the course of which the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually attained responsibilities and territories.

The interim period was supposed to be concluded with final status negotiations. These negotiations were meant to resolve contentious issues that were either insufficiently regulated in the Oslo Accords or that were deliberately excluded from them, including borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, security and water rights. Despite the five-year deadline having passed and the peace process having failed, the regulatory framework of the 1990s is being adhered to until today.

Utilization of the transboundary water resources

The interim agreement does not specify Palestinian rights for the utilization of the Jordan River or the coastal aquifer. In the case of the Jordan River, this means that Palestinians have no access to this water resource. Israel and the Arab riparian states further upstream divert up to 95 percent of the original flow before the Jordan River reaches the West Bank as a dirty stream.

In the case of the coastal aquifer, the lacking regulations lead to a situation in which both Palestinians and Israelis can extract water without mutual control or limitations. In combination with the high birth rates in the Gaza Strip and the lack of alternative sources such as water imports or seawater desalination, the lacking regulation has led to an overuse of the coastal aquifer that reaches back to the 1990s. While the groundwater under the Gaza Strip is recharged with 50 to 60 million cubic meters (MCM) annually, Palestinians estimate that 167.2 MCM were extracted in 2016. Because of the sinking water table seawater and untreated sewage are infiltrating the ground and are contaminating the most important water source for the Gaza Strip. As of 2017, 97 percent of Gaza’s groundwater is considered to be unfit for human consumption.

The only water resource that is dealt with directly in the text of the Interim Agreement is the mountain aquifer under the West Bank (Annex III, Article 40). Its recharge rate over the West Bank was agreed to be 679 MCM annually at the time of the treaty’s signature. Israel “recognizes Palestinian water rights in the West Bank” (Annex III, Article 40.1), but they are supposed to be settled only during permanent status negotiations. The treaty allows Palestinians to extract 118 MCM annually for the time of the interim period. This corresponds to the Palestinian extraction rates before 1995, which were based on the population development at that time. The treaty furthermore specifies that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated at 80 MCM, to be extracted primarily via new wells. In order to meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians, 28.6 MCM out of these 80 MCM were to be made available already during the interim period. This includes commitments by Israel to supply out of its own network 3.1 MCM to the West Bank and 5 MCM to the Gaza Strip. Israel, on the other hand, is allowed to maintain its existing extraction rates in the West Bank for the duration of the interim period.

Assessments about the current Palestinian extraction rates diverge: Israel argues that the Palestinian extraction rates rose significantly since the treaty’s signature. According to this assessment, the PA gained ownership of the Palestinian water infrastructure that until 1995 was managed by the Israeli Civil Administration. The Israeli Civil Administration is the unit within the Israeli military that is responsible for the administration of the occupied territories. Palestinians also received permits to construct new wells. Furthermore, Israel accuses Palestinians of constructing illegal wells that in 2009 were assumed to extract an additional 10 MCM. Contrary to this line of argumentation, Palestinian public authorities argue that technical and bureaucratic hurdles led to an actual decline in the extraction rates. In 2016, licensed pumping stations extracted 84.4 MCM and natural wells produced an additional 29.0 MCM, which adds up to a figure that is below the Palestinian extraction rates of 1995.

In the absence of a final status agreement, Israel continues to utilize water resources that lie entirely or partially under the Palestinian West Bank. Various restrictions limited Palestinian water extraction in 2016 to less than 20 percent of the average annual recharge rate of the mountain aquifer. The remaining water was extracted by Israel via pumping stations in the West Bank or over those parts of the aquifer that extend into Israeli territory. The current numerical status quo does thus not take into account climatic and demographic developments on the Palestinian side that took place since the 1990s.

Transboundary water resources in international law

Palestinians base their demand to increased extraction rates on international law. Since international law in this field evolved slowly, only vague guidelines exist that revolve around the concept of “equitable and reasonable utilization” of transboundary water resources. In 1966 this principle was stipulated in the non-binding “Helsinki Rules”. In 1997 the United Nations agreed on the legally binding “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses” that went into force in 2014. While the Palestinian Territory cannot be regarded as a fully sovereign state under international law and therefore cannot enforce its demand via legal procedures, the convention nevertheless constitutes a guideline that can be applied to the relations between Israel and the PA.

Palestinians refer in particular to article 6.1 of the convention that lists natural factors such as geography and hydrology to determinate equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources. Palestinians infer from the fact that the mountain aquifer is replenished primarily by precipitation over the West Bank a right to use this water comprehensively. Israelis argue, however, that due to hydraulic factors most natural springs are located on Israeli territory. Israelis can furthermore refer to those provisions of article 6 and7 that protect the existing utilization of water resource by the affected parties. Factors are, for instance, the “existing and potential uses of the watercourse” (6.1.e), the “social and economic needs” of the countries (6.1.b), the “population dependent” on the water (6.1.c) as well as the “economy of use” of the water (6.1.f). Palestinians, on the other hand, can refer to the “potential uses” for their social and economic needs, in addition to the argument that their current pattern of usage has developed under Israeli occupation. The convention does not introduce a ranking of the various factors and thus does not readily permit to infer absolute rights for either of the two parties.

The water sector in the West Bank

According to Palestinian estimates, the population of the West Bank had in 2016 around 182.4 MCM at their disposal. Out of these, 84.4 MCM were extracted from licenced wells in public and private ownership, another 29.0 MCM were extracted from natural wells. The remaining 69.0 MCM or around 38 percent were delivered by the Israeli water company Mekorot that is operating wells in Israeli territory as well as in Area C of the West Bank. Numbers from the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (PCBS) show that 116 MCM out of the overall 182.4 MCM were used for domestic purposes. However, due to inadequate infrastructure 34.7 MCM or around 30 percent of this amount was lost. The average consumer had therefore only 82.2 litres per capita per day (l/c/d) at his disposal. This is considerably less than the 100 l/c/d recommended by the WHO as minimum standard. The amount of available water furthermore fluctuates according to location and season. In 2016, the average consumer in Jericho could use 207.0 l/c/d, whereas the consumers in Jenin received only 44 l/c/d via the public water network. According to the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), this average can drop during the summer months in rural areas without proper connection to the public water network to 20 l/c/d. In contrast to these numbers, the 600,000 Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank receive on average 250 l/c/d to cover their domestic needs.

The sewage system is also suffering from a lack of investment and bureaucratic obstacles. The PCBS estimated for 2015 that the number of households with a connection to the sewage system stood at 34 percent in the north of the West Bank, 48 percent in the center and 36 percent in the south. During the same year approximately 66 MCM of sewage were incurred, out of which only 15 MCM were collected by the sewage system. Only 10 MCM were partially treated, the remaining amount seeped into the groundwater or ran off downstream. This poses a challenge for Palestinian communities that are located in downstream communities as well as for Israel, where voices warn regularly about the negative consequences for the ecosystem and the groundwater reservoirs.

The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee

The Interim Agreement established an Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee that is responsible to issue permits for water-related infrastructure projects in the West Bank. At a first glance, both sides seem to meet on an equal footing with three Palestinian and three Israeli representatives. However, the Water Committee’s mandate remains restricted to the West Bank. This introduces an imbalance in which Israel can influence infrastructure developments in the West bank, whereas the PA has no means to control the aquifer’s utilization on the Israeli side of the Green Line.

The Interim Agreement’s division of the West Bank into Area A, B and C introduced further limitations for the PA. Area A and B are under the PA’s full civilian control, for Area A it has furthermore the exclusive mandate to uphold public order and internal security. The majority of the Palestinian population lives in these (semi-) urban areas that comprise of around 40 percent of the West Bank. The remaining 60 percent are known as Area C and remain under full Israeli control. Around 390,000 Palestinians live there alongside 400,000 Jewish settlers that are spread across 250 settlements and outposts. Important components of a Palestinian water infrastructure such as waste water treatment plants, wells and pipelines have to be located in the Area C, among others because of limited space in Areas A and B. Next to a permission of the Water Committee that is required in the whole West Bank, the PA also needs a permission from the Israeli Civil Administration to conduct infrastructure projects in Area C. The Israeli Civil Administration is a unit within the Israeli army that administers the occupied territories. Israeli agencies can thus effectively block Palestinian projects in Area C that received the necessary permit from the Water Committee. The bureaucratic delays can be exemplified by eight wells that received the necessary approval from the Water Committee in 2001, but only in 2009 received a partial building approval from the Israeli Civil Administration.

This imbalance is further increased by the adaption of Israeli interpretations of vague guidelines outlined in the Oslo treaties. In the beginning it was widely assumed that article 40 would only concern the Palestinian water infrastructure in the West Bank. Israel, however, started to hand in proposals to connect settlements to the Israeli water infrastructure. This introduced a practice in which Israel would make the approval of Palestinian proposals depending on the approval of Israeli projects. Through this practice, the PA gave until 2010 its approval for more than 100 infrastructure projects that primarily served the Israeli settlements. Israel on the other hand would often disregard the permission process and implement projects in Area C without awaiting the necessary permits.

This mechanism put the Palestinian side under pressure since each approval of an Israeli project could be read as a retroactive approval of settlements activities. Between 2010 and 2017 the PA cancelled its participation in the Water Committee to protest this practice. The Water Committee was revived in January 2017 with a new agreement. The Palestinian Water Authority is now clearly defined as the sole body that can put forward projects to the Joint Water Committee. Projects with a direct impact on the water table continue to need a permit from the Water Committee. This includes all works on wells and activities that could lead to an increase of water production. Israel thus continues to exert control over the Palestinian utilization of the natural water resources. Notwithstanding some further limitations, many projects now seem to be exempt from the need to attain a permit before implementation. Especially the upgrading of the water network seems to be freed from this particular political hurdle. Practice will have to show if this new agreement can indeed be translated into a swifter upgrading of the water network.

The water sector in the Gaza Strip

According to Palestinian estimates, the population of the Gaza Strip had in 2016 around 181.2 MCM at their disposal. Out of these, an estimated 167.2 MCM were extracted out of the coastal aquifer, including through thousands of private wells. A further 3.9 MCM were produced in privately owned desalination plants. The remaining 10.1 MCM were delivered by the Israeli water company Mekorot. Based on estimates of the PCBS, Palestinians utilized 94.2 MCM out of the overall 181.2 MCM for domestic consumption. However, 35.5 MCM or around 38 percent of this amount was lost due to inadequate infrastructure. The average consumer could therefore only use 84.0 l/c/d.

While the numbers seem comparable to those of the West Bank, the situation in the Gaza Strip is a lot more challenging. The Israeli and Egyptian blockage that was imposed after the Hamas takeover in 2007 has exacerbated already existing negative trends in the Gaza Strip. Three rounds of violent conflict in 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014 left Gaza’s infrastructure heavily damaged. Israel is restricting the export to Gaza of building material to prevent its utilization by Hamas for military purposes. These measures hinder the repair, maintenance and upgrading of the water and sewage systems as well as of the energy sector. The lack of readily available energy in the Gaza Strip puts further stress on energy-dependent infrastructure such as desalination plants, water pumps and the distribution system. The energy supply of the Gaza Strip is heavily restricted due to insufficient fuel and energy imports. In 2017, for instance, the residents of the coastal enclave received on average only 4 to 6 hours of electricity per day, which in turn had a direct impact on the functionality of the water infrastructure.

Given these factors, the United Nations warned in 2015 that the Gaza Strip could become inhabitable by 2020 if current trends continue unabated. After decades of over pumping, 97 percent of the coastal aquifer was in 2017 considered to be unfit for human consumption. Because of insufficient infrastructure and the impact of electricity shortages on the operation of the few existing wastewater treatment plants, an estimated 110 million liters of raw or only partially treated sewage were flowing on a daily basis into the Mediterranean. The catastrophic situation in the sanitation system has prompted warnings about the possible outbreak of epidemic diseases such as Cholera.

Major infrastructure initiatives have been delayed despite this dramatic situation. High hopes are attached to the desalination of sea water. In 2018, an estimated 136 small private desalination plants are operating in close proximity to established wells. While these plants can deliver water with relatively low salinity, the price is around six times higher than the regular water delivered through the public network. The largest seawater desalination plant in the Gaza Strip was opened in 2017. The plant, co-funded by the European Union, can produce under full capacity 2.19 MCM per year and secure the water supply of up to 75.000 persons. However, the plant had to run at decreased capacity in 2017 because of inadequate energy supplies. The most important project – the Gaza Central Desalination Plant and Associated Works Program with a planned capacity of 110 MCM – has been in delay since 2011, partly due to unresolved issues surrounding the energy supply as well as political rivalries between the PA and Hamas. The inauguration of the plant cannot be expected before the year 2020.