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Unsurprisingly, there is no single answer to the question of whether the BRICS are perceived as an anti-Western alliance that applies equally to all Asian countries. Two of the five BRICS countries, China and India, are located in Asia. Together, these two geopolitical heavyweights account for almost a third of the world's population. A third BRICS country, Russia, is predominantly located in Asia, at least in terms of area. China's enormous political and economic weight and Russia's search for new forms of international networking and recognition do not yet make BRICS an Asian event. However, the countries in the immediate neighbourhood are already economically and politically dependent on both superpowers and are massively affected by their ambitions and interests.
While the BRICS summit in Johannesburg and the expansion of the alliance that took place at the summit generated little media coverage in Mexico, Central America, the Andean states and Uruguay, the event was followed with greater interest in the member country Brazil, as well as in Chile. In the left-wing authoritarian states of Bolivia and Venezuela, the BRICS expansion also received a great deal of official attention, as the heads of state of both countries travelled to Johannesburg as observers or joined in via video message, reaffirming their interest in becoming members themselves. Argentina's potential membership of BRICS+ has become a topic of discussion in the presidential election campaign, with the country on the Rio de la Plata now debating the pros and cons of joining at the turn of the year.
Four of the six potential new BRICS members - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) - belong to the Middle East and North Africa region. The motives of these four countries for joining BRICS are diverse: while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are primarily interested in expanding their economic partnerships, membership of the BRICS group means a way out of economic and political isolation for Iran. Several other countries in the region such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Algeria, Sudan and the Palestinian territories have applied for membership. While Egypt, the UAE and Iran officially joined on January 1, 2024, Saudi Arabia is still hesitant to officially accept the invitation to join the alliance.
For the first time in its history, the BRICS Summit took place on the African continent in Johannesburg. The theme of the summit, "BRICS and Africa: A Partnership for Growth, Sustainable Development and Multilateralism", also reflects the BRICS' growing interest in Africa. In addition to the fact that two African countries, Egypt and Ethiopia, will be accepted as full members of the alliance from 2024, the participation of 30 African heads of state and government at the summit also manifests the importance that African countries now attach to the BRICS. South Africa and Ethiopia, as current and designated member states, as well as Nigeria and Kenya, which are regarded as regional powers and influential geopolitical players, are paying particularly close attention to the topic. In many other sub-Saharan African countries, however, it plays a rather subordinate role in public and political discourse.
Overall, government representatives from Europe and North America were noticeably reticent to make public statements on the most recent BRICS summit and the BRICS expansion. The low media attention is also associated with the fact that the BRICS should not be overrated. Calls to join the BRICS alliance, such as in Serbia or parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are not echoed at all. Overall, the BRICS alliance tends to be seen as an anti-Western alliance of states in Europe and North America, although its influence is considered to be low primarily due to its great heterogeneity. Some observers even see the BRICS as weakened by the strong fragmentation, for example in Canada and Sweden: even defining common goals is becoming increasingly difficult, and Egypt and Argentina are considered to be rather economic brake pads than drivers.
When the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, draft-ed the Declaration in 1947, the goal was to bridge deep divisions between liberal states and authoritarian regimes, between secular and religious countries. The result was thirty concise articles. Their adoption by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948—although not legally binding—was an astonishing histor-ical development. Since then, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not remained free of criticism. And when it comes to human rights violations, we are often dealing with massive offenses. The implemen-tation of human rights in social and political reality therefore remains an ongoing challenge. This is currently evident in the developments in the Middle East.
In times of accelerating digitalisation, adapting to new social realities is one of the key challenges for established parties. Which paths established parties take in this regard and which instruments they can and should use are not just exciting scientific questions. They are questions that are of crucial importance for the future of our representative democracy.
In the shadows of the global drug trade, the Captagon business has evolved into an empire intricately linked with the Syrian Assad regime. This flourishing organisation not only funds the rulers in Syria but also significantly contributes to the support and financing of terrorism throughout the entire region. This paper analyses how hybrid actors and cartels have expanded the production of Captagon on an unprecedented scale. Additionally, it examines the consequences and assesses the implications for Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany.
