Publications

Is an entry of Belarus into the war against Ukraine looming?

For weeks, Ukrainian President Zelensky has been warning that Russia is attempting to openly draw Belarus into the war.

Ukrainian intelligence services have reportedly registered the construction of roads leading toward the Ukrainian border as well as the preparation of artillery positions in Belarus. According to the Ukrainian side, Russia is considering offensive scenarios launched from Belarus toward Chernihiv and Kyiv. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that the Russian General Staff is examining offensive operations from the north in order to stretch the front line. However, according to the prevailing assessment of independent Belarusian analysts, no troop movements have so far been observed that would clearly substantiate these scenarios. A direct Belarusian entry into the war remains rather unlikely. Nevertheless, the situation remains tense given the country’s close military alignment with Russia and its high degree of militarization. Most recently, Russia and Belarus conducted joint exercises with a nuclear dimension, thereby creating a clear posture of intimidation. On 25 May, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leading representative of the democratic Belarusian opposition, arrived in Kyiv — an important political signal from Ukraine that Ukrainian Belarusian relations are to be oriented more strongly toward the democratic opposition and distanced from dictator Lukashenka.

BELARUS AFTER A POTENTIAL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN UKRAINE:

scenarios, risks and opportunities for the EU

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Belarus has become deeply embedded in the war's military, logistical and political infrastructure, despite not being a full-fledged participant. The war's future course, including the prospect of a peace settlement, will directly impact Belarus's military, political and economic reliance on Russia, its relations with the West and Ukraine, the sustainability of sanctions, the trajectory of the regime and its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. This paper assumes that for Belarus, it is not only important whether the war continues, but also the regional environment that will emerge from any given outcome. Three potential paths that the war could take are introduced here, each of which would create qualitatively different conditions for Minsk.

THE UNION STATE OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA: A LABORATORY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Policy Brief

How should we really understand the Union State — failed integration project or something far more consequential?

Update Belarus: “Release” of Political Prisoners — December 13, 2025

Newsletter of 16th December

Top news in the period under review: Following negotiations with Trump’s Special Envoy in Belarus Coale on December 12 and 13, the Belarusian ruler released 123 prisoners on December 13 to lift sanctions on Belarusian potash. 114 were deported to Ukraine, including 104 Belarusians and  five Ukrainian citizens. The rest including the Belarusian Nobel Prize laureate Ales Bialatski were deported to Lithuania. Among the released are prominent human rights defenders and Viasna members Ales Bialiatski and Uladzimir Labkovich, as well as key opposition figures, such as Maryia Kalesnikava, Viktar Babaryka and lawyer Maksim Znak, co-chairman of the BCD party Paval Seviarynets.

Roadmap of Reciprocal Steps for a Limited De-escalation between Belarus and the EU

An Expert View

During the year 2025 the Belarusian regime has pursued an active diplomatic outreach toward the United States. This process has included high-level contacts, group releases (and deportations) of political prisoners, and the first precedent easing of the U.S. sanctions since 2020.

EU Project: “Strengthening of Independent Belarusian Social, Political and Economic Research”

From November 2024 the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) started to lead the EU-funded initiative supporting the Belarusian research sector in the social, political, and economic fields. This project is realized by five Belarusian Think tanks and responds to the difficult circumstances the sector faces following the 2020 crackdown and the ongoing political crisis in Belarus.

Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor's Office of Belarus: Careers Before/After 2020

The study “Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor's Office of Belarus: Career Trajectories Before and After 2020” focuses on the professional career paths of Belarusian law enforcement officials before and after 2020, using case studies of the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), and the Prosecutor’s Office of Belarus. It analyses the biographies of senior officials, examines open sources, and incorporates insights from expert interviews to explore changes in the leadership of these institutions in the context of the 2020 political crisis and the subsequent repressions.

Update Belarus about Zapad 2025

Newsletter of 16th september about Zapad 2025

Top news in the period under review: • After the final play held within the framework of the Zapad 2025 exercise in the 227th combined-arms training area on September 16, Chief of the International Military Cooperation Department, Aide for International Military Cooperation to Lukashenka’s Defense Minister Valery Revenko reported on a complex of measures Belarus had taken to enable the transparency of Zapad 2025. He also stated that Belarus demanded that Poland clarify its military activity and a response was received. Revenko saw in the Polish response to the Belarusian request an opportunity for a constructive conversation. The Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy MoD Pavel Muraveyko noted that the active phase of Zapad-2025 is ending. At the same time, the maneuvers will end when all units return to their deployment locations.

Between nuclear threats and diplomatic initiatives: The Zapad 2025 military exercise in Belarus

Even after the military exercises, the country remains a Russian staging area

The active phase of the Russian-Belarusian military exercise Zapad 2025, held from September 12 to 16, 2025, ended—just as expected—without major incidents. However, in recent weeks, the threat to countries bordering Belarus has reached a new level. On September 10, at least 19 Russian drones, mostly flying over Belarus, penetrated deep into NATO member Poland. According to security experts, Russia likely intended to test NATO’s defensive response. In reaction, NATO announced Operation "Eastern Sentry" to strengthen defense along its eastern flank. Although only 8,000 troops (including just 2,000 Russian soldiers) were deployed in Belarus this time, with an estimated 30,000 more stationed in Russia, the exercise brought back grim memories of Zapad 2021, after which Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory. Back then, however, 200,000 troops participated in the drills. This year’s joint exercises were meant to demonstrate just how closely Belarus and Russia now cooperate militarily. It was also a show of force aimed at the West, with Russian leader Putin maintaining a firm grip on his junior partner, Lukashenko.

Formally still independent, but hardly sovereign

Belarus in Russia's wake

Russia is now driving the process towards a union state with Belarus, which has long been simmering on a low flame, at all levels and at high speed. Most recently, the pompous forum ‘Great Heritage - Common Future’ took place at the end of April in Volgograd, Russia, on the margins of the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in Stalingrad. What independent observers describe as Moscow's ‘victory hysteria’ surrounding the military parade on 9 May, is equally evident in official Belarusian rhetoric. The Russian narrative about the interpretation of the history of World War II is also actively employed in Belarus to justify aggression against Ukraine and to shape its stance toward Europe. Lukashenko has maintained his grip on power by making extensive concessions to the Kremlin, effectively trading Belarusian sovereignty for political survival. In terms of security policy, the ‘Agreement on Security Guarantees in the Union State’, ratified in Moscow at the beginning of the year, represents a further stage of escalation. Among other things, it enables military bases for Russian nuclear missiles, which can reach Vilnius in two minutes. Russia needs the regime in the neighboring country as a critical military ally, relying on its territory for missile deployment and as a strategic staging ground for troops near the borders of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. The upcoming Zapad 2025 military exercises, scheduled for September, evoke troubling memories of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which followed similar “training maneuvers.”