Publications

Roadmap of Reciprocal Steps for a Limited De-escalation between Belarus and the EU

An Expert View

During the year 2025 the Belarusian regime has pursued an active diplomatic outreach toward the United States. This process has included high-level contacts, group releases (and deportations) of political prisoners, and the first precedent easing of the U.S. sanctions since 2020.

EU Project: “Strengthening of Independent Belarusian Social, Political and Economic Research”

From November 2024 the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) started to lead the EU-funded initiative supporting the Belarusian research sector in the social, political, and economic fields. This project is realized by five Belarusian Think tanks and responds to the difficult circumstances the sector faces following the 2020 crackdown and the ongoing political crisis in Belarus.

Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor's Office of Belarus: Careers Before/After 2020

The study “Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor's Office of Belarus: Career Trajectories Before and After 2020” focuses on the professional career paths of Belarusian law enforcement officials before and after 2020, using case studies of the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), and the Prosecutor’s Office of Belarus. It analyses the biographies of senior officials, examines open sources, and incorporates insights from expert interviews to explore changes in the leadership of these institutions in the context of the 2020 political crisis and the subsequent repressions.

Update Belarus about Zapad 2025

Newsletter of 16th september about Zapad 2025

Top news in the period under review: • After the final play held within the framework of the Zapad 2025 exercise in the 227th combined-arms training area on September 16, Chief of the International Military Cooperation Department, Aide for International Military Cooperation to Lukashenka’s Defense Minister Valery Revenko reported on a complex of measures Belarus had taken to enable the transparency of Zapad 2025. He also stated that Belarus demanded that Poland clarify its military activity and a response was received. Revenko saw in the Polish response to the Belarusian request an opportunity for a constructive conversation. The Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy MoD Pavel Muraveyko noted that the active phase of Zapad-2025 is ending. At the same time, the maneuvers will end when all units return to their deployment locations.

Between nuclear threats and diplomatic initiatives: The Zapad 2025 military exercise in Belarus

Even after the military exercises, the country remains a Russian staging area

The active phase of the Russian-Belarusian military exercise Zapad 2025, held from September 12 to 16, 2025, ended—just as expected—without major incidents. However, in recent weeks, the threat to countries bordering Belarus has reached a new level. On September 10, at least 19 Russian drones, mostly flying over Belarus, penetrated deep into NATO member Poland. According to security experts, Russia likely intended to test NATO’s defensive response. In reaction, NATO announced Operation "Eastern Sentry" to strengthen defense along its eastern flank. Although only 8,000 troops (including just 2,000 Russian soldiers) were deployed in Belarus this time, with an estimated 30,000 more stationed in Russia, the exercise brought back grim memories of Zapad 2021, after which Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory. Back then, however, 200,000 troops participated in the drills. This year’s joint exercises were meant to demonstrate just how closely Belarus and Russia now cooperate militarily. It was also a show of force aimed at the West, with Russian leader Putin maintaining a firm grip on his junior partner, Lukashenko.

Formally still independent, but hardly sovereign

Belarus in Russia's wake

Russia is now driving the process towards a union state with Belarus, which has long been simmering on a low flame, at all levels and at high speed. Most recently, the pompous forum ‘Great Heritage - Common Future’ took place at the end of April in Volgograd, Russia, on the margins of the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in Stalingrad. What independent observers describe as Moscow's ‘victory hysteria’ surrounding the military parade on 9 May, is equally evident in official Belarusian rhetoric. The Russian narrative about the interpretation of the history of World War II is also actively employed in Belarus to justify aggression against Ukraine and to shape its stance toward Europe. Lukashenko has maintained his grip on power by making extensive concessions to the Kremlin, effectively trading Belarusian sovereignty for political survival. In terms of security policy, the ‘Agreement on Security Guarantees in the Union State’, ratified in Moscow at the beginning of the year, represents a further stage of escalation. Among other things, it enables military bases for Russian nuclear missiles, which can reach Vilnius in two minutes. Russia needs the regime in the neighboring country as a critical military ally, relying on its territory for missile deployment and as a strategic staging ground for troops near the borders of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. The upcoming Zapad 2025 military exercises, scheduled for September, evoke troubling memories of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which followed similar “training maneuvers.”

“Election” in Belarus

Ruler Lukashenko Grants Himself Another Five Years

The result of the “presidential election” in Belarus on January 26th, with 86.82 percent for the 70-year-old Lukashenko, who has been in power for 30 years, and 8.83 percent for the four “alternative” candidates, is completely fictitious. Experts assume that Lukashenko might realistically achieve 40-50 percent of the vote due to the country's hopeless situation in Russia's stranglehold and the lack of alternatives. However, this cannot be verified. OSCE observers were not allowed to attend the “election,” and candidates from opposition parties or independent civilian election observers were not even given a chance to stand. The “election” should actually have taken place in July but was brought forward to January 26th during a visit by Lukashenko to Russia in October last year. The active phase of the election campaign thus fell in the coldest month of the year, with many public holidays, which reduced the likelihood of street protests. The slowdown in economic growth by mid-2025 would also have had a more significant impact on the population's prosperity. In the event of peace negotiations in Ukraine after Donald Trump’s inauguration, Lukashenko wanted to legitimize himself early on with a renewed mandate as the real incumbent to participate in these negotiations. Since the protests against the election fraud in 2020 were brutally suppressed, Belarus has been on the path to becoming a totalitarian state, with close ties to Russia and isolated from the West by extensive sanctions.

New Iron Curtain rising on the EU border with Belarus

"New EU-sanctions package against Belarus might backfire"

After introducing the latest EU sanctions package against the Republic of Belarus, the Baltic States Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania imposed an entrance ban for almost all passenger cars with Belarusian license plates. Belarusian cars currently present in these countries were given limited time to either leave or reregister locally. Aimed at closing loopholes in the sanctions which were introduced to punish the regimes in Minsk and Moscow for their aggressive behaviour and to strengthen border security at NATO’s eastern flank, the passenger car ban sparked strong negative reactions, also from the democratic community of Belarus. They warn that shutting the EU’s door for regular citizens, most of whom voted for Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in 2020, will only further alienate the Belarusian population from the West. As trade with the Lukashenka regime continues, his propaganda machine will know how to use the “travel ban” to strengthen the pro-Russian narrative claiming that “nobody in the West wants you Belarusians”.

EU sanctions against the regime in Minsk

Analytical note compiled by Belarusian experts.

In recent years, the relevance of the topic of sanctions policy towards the regime in Belarus has grown continuously.  The Western community keeps adopting new packages in response to the regime’s political repressions, its participation in Russia’s war on Ukraine and threats to regional security, and there are no signs that sanctions might soon be eased or lifted. This policy brief, compiled by Belarusian experts from various professional fields, aims to provide readers with a wide range of information and analysis on the inner rationale and effects of Western sanctions on regime in Belarus. The paper presents not only the chronology of sanctions but seeks to point out the correlation of goals and results, as well as the effects in different spheres and on separate groups of actors. The goal is to provide decision makers and the interested public with a "big picture" view on the sanctions’ environment, hoping to inform adequate and effective decisions in this field.

Political system in Belarus

One nation – two new representative bodies?

In spring 2024, Belarusians had the “pleasure” of renewing two political bodies, both of which claim to represent the people, albeit in diametrically opposed ways: The All-Belarusian People's Assembly, appointed by Lukashenka, is intended to be the new super-authority to ensure his personal rule and the continuation of the authoritarian system, while at the same time fulfilling a demand by Vladimir Putin for internal reforms in Belarus. Staffed by 1,200 loyalists, it is also an artificial image of an “ideal society” in the eyes of the ruler, which excludes political opponents, i.e. most of the electorate, from participation. The democratic forces in exile, on the other hand, held what was probably the first Belarusian democratic election since 1994 with the elections to the Coordination Council. Technically successful, they hardly managed to arouse greater interest among the population, as the mandate, function, and potential for action of the “proto parliament” remains unclear. This report analyses how both work, how they came about and how they fit into the current political situation in and around Belarus.